Reflective Personality: Identifying Cognitive Styleand Cognitive Complexity

Inge C. M. van Seggelen-Damen

Published online: 26 January 2013# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract Categorized among learning practices, reflection involves cognitive process-ing. Some people say they reflect often, whereas others claim they are less inclined toreflect on a regular basis. The present study examines reflection in an academic learningsetting. In contrast with previous studies testing reflective task accomplishment, we areinterested in personality traits that can predict reflection or a reflective outcome. Bymeans of a survey university students are questioned about their learning practices whenworking on their final thesis. To test whether certain traits influence reflection andwhether reflection produces cognitive outcomes at the individual level, we performedhierarchical regression analysis. In addition, structural equation modeling is used to testfor the mediation effects of reflection. The data stress a mediating role of reflection in therelationship between particular personality traits and cognitive complexity.

Keywords Reflection . Need for cognition . Openness to experience .

Private self-consciousness . Cognitive complexity

Introduction

Students are often said to improve performance in assignments or project workbecause of reflective learning (for example White and Frederiksen 1998; Rogers2001; Etkina et al. 2010). Reflection does not take place all the time and in everyplace, however. It is considered a tendency, which people show now and then. Certainstimuli cause people to think through their thoughts, feelings and actions (Kuhn et al.2004). People address uncertainties by reflecting on their experiences (Tversky andKahneman 1982; Aukes et al. 2008; Matthew and Sternberg 2009). Distancingthemselves from the experience, it is argued, provides room to reconsider and getan overview (Kuhn et al. 2000; Chak 2006).

Curr Psychol (2013) 32:82–99DOI 10.1007/s12144-013-9166-5

I. C. M. van Seggelen-Damen (*)Faculty of Psychology, Open University of the Netherlands, PO Box 2960,6401 DL Heerlen, The Netherlandse-mail: inge.vanseggelen@ou.nl

Over the years some indications have been found about a relationship betweenreflective judgment, culture and personal characteristics such as age, education,autonomy and altruism (Kitchener and King 1981; Friedman 2004; Rokach 2004;Rokach et al. 2004; Rice and Pasupathi 2010). Little is known, however, aboutreflection in terms of cognitive style. Following the tradition in reflection research,this study examines reflection in an academic learning setting. Whereas previousstudies test reflective task accomplishment (for example Masui and De Corte 2005;Bruno et al. 2011), we are particularly interested in personality traits that can predictreflection or a reflective outcome.

Background

A well-known definition of reflection is provided by Dewey: “the active, persistent,and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light ofthe grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey1933: 9). Boud et al. consider reflection to include those intellectual and affectiveactivities people use to explore their experiences in order to lead to new understandingsand appreciations (1988: 19). With a similar emphasis on cognitive processing, Seibertand Daudelin describe reflection as “the process of stepping back from and experiencecarefully and persistently ponder its meaning to the self through the development ofinferences” (1999: 20).

Reflection involves critical thinking (King and Kitchener 1994; Matthew andSternberg 2009; Van Woerkom 2010). When discussing reflection, many peoplecan tell whether they have been reflective. After listening to descriptions of reflectionand searching the literature, one quickly realizes that the term has many differentmeanings, varying from introspection and self-evaluation to expansive explorationand learning. Reflection has many synonyms as well, such as metacognition (Flavell1967; 1999; White and Frederiksen 1998), self-reference (Bartlett and Suber 1987;Sedikides and Skowronski 1995) and critical thinking (Brookfield 1988; King andKitchener 1994; Matthew and Sternberg 2009).

The definitions above make clear that reflection involves the cognitive activity ofquestioning (for example Boud et al. 1988; Mezirow 1998; Seibert and Daudelin1999; Vince 2002). In addition, the role of the self is stressed by making sense ofone’s own experiences (for example Boyd and Fales 1983; Bartlett and Suber 1987;Daudelin 1996). Reflection identifies personal pathways to cognition by means ofquestioning (Hmelo-Silver and Barrows 2008). Its experimental nature facilitatesobservation from different angles and helps to adopt multiple frames of reference(Millar and Tesser 1986; White and Frederiksen 1998). Previous studies found thatpeople vary in how and the degree to which they reflect (for example White andFrederiksen 1998; Rokach 2004; Rokach et al. 2004; Van Velzen 2004; Gurtner et al.2007; Rice and Pasupathi 2010; Bruno et al. 2011).

Discrepancies in Reflection

In considering reflection a questioning activity, we expect some persons to reflectmore than others. Livengood et al. (2010) for instance claim philosophers to be more

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reflective than the non-philosophically educated. This discrepancy in reflection couldbe traced back to differences in cognitive abilities (Livengood et al. 2010), differences ininterest (Bruno et al. 2011) and differences in self-knowledge (Trapnell and Campbell1999; Tahmasb et al. 2008; Silvia and Philips 2011). Cognitive abilities involved inreflection refer to efforts persons want or are able to display in becoming knowledge-able. Furthermore, studies indicate that human cognitive processing varies betweensuperficial and deep efforts (Marton and Säljö 1976; Evans et al. 2003; Coutinho etal. 2005). Since reflection involves critical questioning behavior, we expect this kind ofeffortful cognitive processing to extend (meta-)cognition and self-actualization (Schrawand Moshman 1995; Ertmer and Newby 1996; Harris 2004; Runco 2004).

Apart from cognitive abilities, discrepancies in reflection could also be directed bypersonal interests. People vary in subjects and experiences they find thought provoking,as well as in the amount of uncertainty they want to experience with regard to not-knowing or the amount of responsibility they want to bear in “getting to know”. Ingeneral, people are motivated either intrinsically or extrinsically to work on theircognition, often by particular provocations (Steinhart andWyer 2009). Here, motivationhas been defined as a drive producing cognitive engagement and achievement(DeBacker and Crowson 2006; Järvelä et al. 2010). This motivation could berepresented by personality traits that indicate a need to extend cognition, such as needfor cognition (Cacioppo et al. 1996; Steinhart and Wyer 2009).

In addition to cognitive abilities and personal interests, self-reference could ex-plain discrepancies in reflection (Sedikides and Skowronski 1995). Neurologicalstudies for instance demonstrate that reflection on self-related matters activates brainareas involved in feeling puzzled as well as self-awareness (Kjaer et al. 2002;Johnson et al. 2002; D’Argembeau et al. 2005; Saxe et al. 2006; Northoff et al.2006; D’Argembeau et al. 2008). The amount of self-reference indicates differencesbetween persons turning back on own experiences versus those reflecting on behaviorby others (Johnson et al. 2002; Saxe et al. 2006).

Cognitive Outcomes

We also expect cognitive outcomes to vary to the extent in which people reflect.Reflection involves frequent and extensive questioning. Because of these efforts inthinking, reflection produces cognitively elaborate and complex solutions (Linder andMarshall 2003). Cognitive solutions are considered complex if they demonstrate theintegration of multiple perspectives (Suedfeld et al. 1992). Study findings show uniquedesigns and applications as a result of integrating multiple perspectives (for exampleCsikszentmihalyi 1996; Müller et al. 2005; Etkina et al. 2010). These studies, however,do not address the way in which people develop and integrate multiple frames ofreference. Its thought provoking nature encourages us to further investigate whetherreflection contributes to the adoption of multiple frames of reference.

Conceptual Model

From the above it follows, that reflection is considered cognitive by nature but alsoinvolves a sense of self. In terms of personality, need for cognition and openness to

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experience are known representations of cognitive style, whereas private self-consciousness provides an indication of the sense of self. In this study, therefore,we intend to examine whether reflection is effectuated by need for cognition,openness to experience and private self-consciousness, and whether it producescognitively complex outcomes.

Need for Cognition

Cacioppo and Petty describe the need for cognition as “stable individual difference inpeople’s tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activity” (Cacioppoet al. 1996: 198). As implied by the composition of terms, need for cognitionindicates a variation in both motivation for and efforts in cognitive processingamong human beings (Tanaka et al. 1988; Sadowski and Cogburn 1997; Steinhart andWyer 2009; Curşeu 2011). Individuals display different levels of interest in effortfulcognitive processing. In this respect individuals with a high need for cognition tend toseek, think about, and reflect back on information for sense making purposes. Individ-uals with low needs for cognition are more likely to rely on others (for examplecelebrities and experts), cognitive heuristics, or social comparison processes for this(Cacioppo et al. 1996).

Differences in the need for cognition indicate variance in the nature of cognition,logic and problem solving strategies (Cacioppo et al. 1996; Coutinho et al. 2005).Because the need for cognition represents the enjoyment of cognitive activity, highneed for cognition is considered an antecedent for effortful cognitive processing(Leone and Dalton 1988; Sadowski and Gülgöz 1996; Steinhart and Wyer 2009).In other words, intrinsic cognitive needs are fulfilled with more intense cognitiveefforts. The argument here is that those who enjoy effortful thinking use deep andcomprehensive learning strategies to acquire better understanding (Coutinho 2006).Based on this we postulate that reflection represents a way of thinking used by peoplewho engage in effortful cognitive activity. In other words, questioning demonstratesactual effort in cognitive processing taken by those intrinsically motivated to think.Therefore, we hypothesize: Hypothesis One. Need for cognition is positively relatedto reflection.

Openness to Experience

Openness to experience is considered one of the five universal personality traits,together with neuroticism, conscientiousness, extraversion and agreeableness(McCrae and Costa 1997). This personality trait describes a person’s intellectualcuriosity, imagination and a wide range of interests (Mount et al. 1998; Harris2004). Certain curiosity and a wide range of interests is seen to provoke questioning(Kuhn and Lao 1998). Openness to experience indicates a tendency toward emotionaland intellectual exploration (De Raad and Schouwenburg 1996; McCrae and Costa1997; 2004). Open-minded people seek hiatus in their current cognition by means ofexploring their own frame of reference (Tindale et al. 1993; Harris 2004). Thisprocess of exploration is also referred to as discovering (Daft and Weick 1984),inquiry learning (Gijlers and De Jong 2009), or double-loop learning (Schön 1983;Argyris et al. 1985; Schön 1987; Argyris and Schön 1996; Argyris 1999).

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To increase current cognition, those open to experience are likely to cast doubt onand take distance from current frames of reference (Gavelek and Raphael 1985; Kuhnand Lao 1998; Duff et al. 2004; Chak 2006). This cognitive practice is also referred toas authentic scientific inquiry (Klahr and Simon 1999; Mantzicopoulos et al. 2009).Open-minded persons tend to use boundary pushing questioning to satisfy theircognitive needs (Moutafi et al. 2006). Based on the explorative nature of thispersonality trait, openness to experience is considered an antecedent for reflection.Thus, we hypothesize: Hypothesis Two. Openness to experience is positively relatedto reflection.

Private Self-Consciousness

Self-consciousness involves the tendency to direct attention inward or outward(Fenigstein et al. 1975; Fenigstein 1979). Public self-consciousness indicates aperson’s image (that is, in the eyes of others) based on his/her sense of identity(through their own eyes). Private self-consciousness has been defined as a sense ofidentity or introspective account: “consciousness of one’s inner feelings, thoughts,and physical sensations” (Trapnell and Campbell 1999: 284). Private self-consciousness specifically addresses the emotional part of self-focused attention(Kang and Shaver 2004; Harrington and Loffredo 2010). Emotions activate parts ofthe brain such as the precuneus, angular gyrus, and anterior cingulated (Niebauer2004; Travis et al. 2004; Eisenberger et al. 2005). Based on a distinction betweenvoluntary and determinist affectivity, private self-consciousness has been divided intothe factors self-reflectiveness and internal state awareness (Watson et al. 1996;Trapnell and Campbell 1999; Silvia and Philips 2011). Driven either positively ornegatively, private self-consciousness makes people (continuously) examine them-selves for the purpose of understanding thoughts and motives (Fenigstein et al. 1975;Gurňáková 2004). In other words, self-focus attention motivates questioning behavior.For this reason, we hypothesize: Hypothesis Three. Private self-consciousness ispositively related to reflection.

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive processing is defined in terms of the complexity of relations that underliethe problem or issue at hand (Andrews and Halford 2002). Some studies indicate thatsolving ill-structured problems requires more effortful cognitive processing thanwell-structured problems (for example Kitchener 1983; Woike and Aronoff 1992;Kapur 2008). Complex problems often do not allow drawing on problem solvingroutines (Smith 1988), such as conceptual chunking (simplification of relationshipsinvolved) or segmentation. These routines do not reduce complexity in case ofinteractions between relationships that characterize the problem or task at hand(Andrews and Halford 2002).

Problems are often considered complex or ill-structured because they touch uponthe boundaries of current frames of reference. When uncertainties and lack ofproblem solving routines surround complex problems, complex solutions are askedfor. Here, Smith (1988) sees a special role for reflection. To account for problemcomplexity, alternative frames of reference need to be explored by means of

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questioning the current one. This cognitively complex outcome is referred to ascognitive complexity. Cognitive complexity represents the differentiation andintegration of multiple frames of reference in cognitive processing (Barron 1953;Zimring 1971; Suedfeld et al. 1992; Curşeu and Rus 2005). To arrive at such acognitively complex outcome, cognitive processing should involve making “distinc-tions and comparisons among attributes and perceived dynamic relationships andcomplex connections between attributes” (Woike and Aronoff 1992: 98). Because ofits inquisitive and boundary pushing nature, reflection is expected to produce non-obvious, cognitively complex outcomes. Thus, we hypothesize: Hypothesis Four.Reflection is positively related to cognitive complexity.

Covariation and Mediation

From a substantive point of view, we noticed earlier that reflection includes ques-tioning of argumentation. Reflection is considered a trait in this study, and as suchdoes not operate in isolation. Previous studies have already indicated relationshipsbetween need for cognition and openness to experience (for example Berzonsky andSullivan 1992; Sadowski and Cogburn 1997), between need for cognition and privateself-consciousness (for example Mueller and Grove 1991; Petty and Jarvis 1996;Ghorbani et al. 2004) and between openness to experience and private self-consciousness (for example Realo and Allik 1998; Trapnell and Campbell 1999).For this reason, traits like need for cognition, openness to experience, and privateself-consciousness are allowed to covariate in the model.

Although relationships with other personality traits can be explained, reflection isnot displayed at all times. For this reason we expect a mediating influence byreflection, which depends on the outspokenness of these particular personality traits.More specifically, we expect reflection to mediate the relationship between need forcognition, openness to experience and private self-consciousness on the one hand andcognitive complexity on the other. Need for cognition, openness to experience andprivate self-consciousness are expected to increase the likelihood of reflection. This isbased on the argument that reflection serves as a tool for thinking to arrive at complexsolutions. Thus, reflection transforms cognitive intentions and routines into complexcognition.

Studies by Leone and Dalton (1988) and Coutinho et al. (2005) already indicatethat the relationship between the need for cognition and cognitive performance ismediated by efforts displayed in cognitive processing. More specifically, we argue (1)that need for cognition stimulates the act of questioning, (2) that openness toexperience helps to identify one’s own frame of reference and to relate it to otherframes of reference, and (3) that private self-consciousness demarcates emotionalexperiences. As a tool for thinking, reflection builds on these tendencies to question,identify and make sense. Following this line of thinking, we argue that cognitivecomplexity is positively influenced by personality traits such as need for cognition,openness to experience, and private self-consciousness. And since questioning helps topush the boundaries of cognition, furthermore, we expect reflection to relate positivelyto cognitive complexity. For this reason, we hypothesize: Hypothesis Five. Reflectionmediates the relationship between need for cognition, openness to experience, andprivate self-consciousness on the one hand, and cognitive complexity on the other.

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Method

Participants

Research participants were recruited from two Dutch universities and six socialscience departments. To find reflection initiated by students themselves, rather thanprovoked by lecturer instruction, we observed the final part of the academic program.This part involves working on the final thesis in thesis groups. Students work on theirown thesis and can provide informational, procedural and emotional support to otherstudents in thesis group meetings. Students feel working on the thesis requires themost concentrated efforts of their academic program, because they have to demon-strate their research and English writing skills. The students received a questionnaireabout the process of writing the final thesis.

From the population of 585 Dutch university students graduating in thesis groups 178students responded (30.4 %). The sample consists of 118 female and 60 male students,who participate in organization studies (44.4 %, n=79), management studies (24.7 %,n=44), human resource studies (7.3 %, n=13), leisure studies (7.3 %, n=13), pedagogy(14,1 %, n=25), theology (1.1 %, n=2) or did not mention their studies (1.1 %, n=2).The mean age is 23.6 years with a standard deviation of 3.87 year. Previous highesteducation of students involves grammar school (59.6 %, n=106), higher professionaleducation (30.9 %, n=55), university (6.2%, n=11) or another type of education (3.4%,n=6). This sample is considered representative for the Dutch student population de-scribed by the student monitor (Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science).

Measures

The questionnaire includes items on need for cognition, openness to experience, privateself-consciousness, reflection and cognitive complexity. An example of the eighteenitems on need for cognition (Cronbach’s α=.90) is “I really enjoy a task that involvescoming up with new solutions to problems” (Cacioppo et al. 1984; Cacioppo et al.1996). Openness to experience is measured with twelve items (α=.76). An exampleinvolves “I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature” (Costa and McCrae1995; McCrae and Costa 2004; McCrae et al. 2005). The subscale of private self-consciousness consists of ten items (α=.79), such as “I examine mymotives constantly”(Fenigstein et al. 1975; Fenigstein 1979; Ben-Artzi 2003). Reflection is observed usingan eight item subscale (α=.85). An example is “I explored my past experiences as a wayof understanding new ideas” (Peltier et al. 2005). Cognitive complexity is measuredwith five items (α=.79), including the item “If you have to appreciate the complexity ofyour thesis, what grade would you give on a scale of 1 to 10?” (Curşeu 2003). Except forthe latter item, all items have been measured on a five-point scale with scale categoriessuch as “completely disagree” to “completely agree” and “never” to “always”.

Results

Table 1 presents the correlations and alphas for scaled variables. The table demon-strates that most prevalent, significant correlations involve those between need for

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cognition and openness to experience, need for cognition and reflection, and privateself-consciousness and reflection. The Cronbach alpha values of private self-consciousness (.64) and reflection (.59) were somewhat low. Although both scaleshave been validated (Fenigstein et al. 1975; Fenigstein 1979; Trapnell and Campbell1999), these values may be due to the dimensional diversity of the psychologicalconstruct measured (Kline 1998).

Hypotheses One, Two and Three

To test the relationships between need for cognition and reflection, openness toexperience and reflection, and private self-consciousness and reflection, we performedhierarchical regression analysis. Instead of sex, being slightly overrepresented in thesample, the control variable thesis duration was addressed in step one of the regressionequation. Step two includes need for cognition. In subsequent steps openness toexperience and private self-consciousness were entered into the regression equation.The predictors have been entered separately to reveal whether any one of the cognitivetraits alone is more prominent than others.

Table 2 illustrates that standardized regression coefficients are significant for needfor cognition, openness to experience and private self-consciousness. The differencebetween R square values indicates whether an increase is significantly taking intoaccount both sample size and number of variables in the model. The R squaredifferences indicate that an additional 21.8 % of the variability in reflection isaccounted for by Model Two including need for cognition. An additional 4.1 % isexplained by Model Three including openness to experience, whereas Model Fourasserts an additional 5.8 % by including an influence of private self-consciousness atthe expense of openness to experience. The F ratio values that exceed the maximumvalues expected by chance alone illustrate that need for cognition, openness toexperience and private self-consciousness contribute to the prediction of reflection;F(3.09)=42.663, 8.393 and 12.970, p<.001.

These results provide support for Hypotheses One and Three, arguing that need forcognition and private self-consciousness stimulate reflection. Both relationships were

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6

1 Age –

2 Need for cognition (NC) .091 .813

3 Openness to experience (OE) −.117 .431* .688

4 Private self-consciousness (PS) .113 .265* .376* .637

5 Reflection (RE) .130 .490* .378* .408* .590

6 Cognitive Complexity (CC) .106 .299* .279* .130 .250* .712

M 23.57 3.62 3.50 3.51 3.68 3.25

SD 3.87 .47 .49 .44 .38 .68

*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. Main diagonals are coefficient alphas for scaledvariables

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significant after controlling for thesis duration. This means that the higher a person’sneed for cognition and the more self-conscious one is, the higher the degree ofreflection. Hypothesis Two, assuming a relationship between openness to experienceand reflection, has not been confirmed. This relationship disappears when private self-consciousness is introduced. When tested together with private self-consciousness,openness to experience did not significantly relate to reflection. This could be due tothe self-focused operationalization of reflection, which more or less contrasts theexternal focus of openness to experience.

Hypothesis Four

Hypothesis Four predicts the positive influence of reflection on cognitive complexity.To test this relationship another hierarchical regression analysis has been performed.The control variable thesis duration was entered again to double check whether thisvariable could solely explain a change in cognitive complexity. Step one in theregression equation includes the control variable thesis duration, whereas step twoincludes reflection.

Table 3 demonstrates that only reflection significantly contributes to model pre-diction. This means that the higher the degree of reflection, the more cognitivelycomplex its outcome. Based on the difference between R square values, indicating

Table 2 Hierarchical regression analysis predicting reflection

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Thesis duration .012 .008 .003 .003

Need for cognition .380*** .300*** .279**

Openness to experience .173* .104

Private self-consciousness .225***

F 1.526 22.304*** 18.394*** 18.139***

F change 1.526 42.663*** 8.393*** 12.970***

R2 .010 .228 .269 .327

Adj. R2 .003 .218 .254 .309

n=149. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Table 2 illustrates significant standardized regression coefficients for need for cognition, openness toexperience and private self-consciousness

Table 3 Hierarchical regressionanalysis predicting cognitivecomplexity

n=162. *** p<.001, ** p<.01,* p<.05Table 3 demonstrates thatreflection significantlycontributes to model prediction

Model 1 Model 2

Thesis duration .020 .013

Reflection .479**

F 1.373 6.758*

F change 1.373 12.050*

R2 .091 .278

Adj. R2 .008 .077

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that an additional 18.7 % of the variability in cognitive complexity is explained byreflection, Model Two provides the most accurate prediction. The F value exceeds themaximum values expected by chance alone. F(4.75)=12.050, p<.05, which impliesthat the model predictor contributes more to the prediction of cognitive complexitythan would be expected from the means.

These results demonstrate a significant relationship between reflection and cognitivecomplexity after controlling for thesis duration. This means Hypothesis Four has beenconfirmed. That is, the higher the degree of reflection, the more cognitively complexoutcomes are produced.

Hypothesis Five

Structural equation modeling has been performed to test Hypothesis Five, whichassumes a mediation effect of reflection in the relationships between personality traitsand cognitive complexity. Sample size is 178. Model One represents HypothesisFive. This model emphasizes a full mediation effect of reflection and excludes all thedirect effects of personality traits on cognitive complexity. In Models Two, Three andFour partial mediation is hypothesized. These models include the direct effects ofeach separate personality trait on cognitive complexity. Model Two assumes a directeffect from need for cognition on cognitive complexity. Model Three includes directeffects from need for cognition and private self-consciousness, whereas Model Fourinvolves direct effects from need for cognition and openness to experience. Figure 1depicts Model Four. Apart from the direct effects, this model assumes indirect effectson cognitive complexity from need for cognition and private self-consciousness.

Figure 1 demonstrates that reflection influences cognitive complexity with a smallbut significant standardized direct regression effect of .18. Other direct effects involveopenness to experience with .34 and need for cognition with .24. In addition, ModelFour illustrates that reflection is mostly influenced by need for cognition with asignificant standardized direct effect of .34. The direct standardized effect of privateself-consciousness is smaller with .26, whereas the effect of openness to experience isnon-significant.

Table 4 presents the parameters for model fit. Based on the sample size-parameterratio (178/27), which exceeds the value of 5 (Kline 1998), the statistical stability ofthe path analysis results is assumed. Rejection occurs when chi-square indices aresignificant, the X2/df ratio is not above .2 (Carmines and McIver 1981), the NFI, and

,18Reflection Cognitive complexity

Need for cognition

Openness to experience

Err CCErr RE

Private self-consciousness

,24

,34

,26

,34,10

,08

,05

, ,10 ,40

Fig. 1 Path model 4. Figure 1 depicts Model Four. In addition to the direct effects this model includesindirect effects on cognitive complexity from need for cognition and openness to experience

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CFI do not equal .90 (Bollen 1989), the Tucker-Lewis coefficient (TLI) is not at least.95, or the root mean square error of proximation (RMSEA) is not below .05.

In Table 4 Hypothesis Five again is represented by Model One. Model Oneincludes full mediation in which need for cognition, openness to experience andprivate self-consciousness influence cognitive complexity through reflection. Sincethe direct effects of personality traits on cognitive complexity and private self-consciousness are excluded, all effects are assumed to be delivered via reflection.The TLI index below .95, makes us conclude that Model One does not have sufficientfit. Models Two and Three assume partial mediation. Model Two includes directeffects from need for cognition on cognitive complexity. Model Three involves directeffects from need for cognition and private self-consciousness on cognitive complex-ity. Both models do not perform well. Finally, Model Four assumes partial mediationwith a direct effect of both need for cognition and openness to experience oncognitive complexity. Given the satisfactory goodness of fit indices, this modelsuggesting partial mediation provides the best fit. This means reflection mediatesthe relationship between private self-consciousness and cognitive complexity. Inaddition, reflection partially mediates the relationship between need for cognitionand cognitive complexity, since the former also has a direct influence on cognitivecomplexity.

Discussion

The results of this study demonstrate that reflection is found to be highest amongpeople with a high need for cognition and who are highly self-conscious. Reflectionis considered to transform cognitive, self-focused traits into a cognitively complexoutcome. In this respect, cognitively complex outcomes concern self-reported thesisinnovativeness and quality. Effectuated by the traits of need for cognition and privateself-consciousness, reflection extends cognitive complexity. Furthermore, need for

Table 4 SEM results

Model X2 df X2/df p NFI CFI TLI RMSEA

1 Mediation 10.252 3 3.417 .017 .931 .946 .730 .117

2 Part. mediation NC 4.288 2 2.144 .117 .971 .983 .872 .080

3 Part. mediation NC, PS 4.194 1 4.194 .041 .972 .976 .643 .134

4 Part. mediation NC, OE 2.689 2 1.344 .261 .982 .995 .961 .044

X2 cv=3.90, df=1, p=.05; X2 cv=6.81, df=1, p=.01

X2 cv=3.06, df=2, p=.05; X2 cv=4.75, df=2, p=.01

X2 cv=2.66, df=3, p=.05; X2 cv=3.91 , df=3, p=.01

X2 = Chi-square, df = degrees of freedom, X2 /df = relative Chi-square or minimum discrepancy, p =probability value, NFI = Normed Fit Index, CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis coefficient,RMSEA = root mean square error of proximation (residual). Bold type indicates fit

The parameters in Table 4 indicate that Model Four provides the best fit. According to this model, reflectionon the one hand mediates the relationship between private self-consciousness and cognitive complexity,and on the other partially mediates the relationship between need for cognition and cognitive complexity

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cognition and private self-consciousness are found to influence cognitive complexityin a direct way also, for instance by altering current routines in cognitive processing.

Further specification of relationships has been provided by Model Four. Here,need for cognition was allowed to correlate with openness to experience and privateself-consciousness. The relationship with openness to experience makes sense basedon this “hunger for information” which characterizes people with a high need forcognition. According to Costa and McCrae, openness to experience is illustrated by“proactive seeking and appreciation of experience for its own sake”, and “tolerationfor and exploration of the familiar” (1995: 2). Previous studies, similarly, found apositive correlation (for example Olson et al. 1984; Berzonsky and Sullivan 1992;Sadowski and Cogburn 1997; Realo and Allik 1998). Also, the effect of need forcognition on private self-consciousness has been found before (Ghorbani et al. 2004).This effect could be explained by the notion that private self-consciousness requiressome point of reference to develop. In other words, people high in need for cognitionfeed the self-image by providing a basis for comparison.

Additionally, need for cognition is found to have a substantive effect on reflection.This confirms Hypothesis One, which puts forward that need for cognition as atendency of displaying effortful thinking results in effortful thinking. In other words,those with a high need for cognition demonstrate thinking behavior that questionsargumentation. Studies by Hansell et al. (1986), Berzonsky and Sullivan (1992) andAllen et al. (1987) found similar effects on actual display of introspective thinking.

A somewhat smaller effect on reflection, in line with Hypothesis Three, comesfrom private self-consciousness. The aspiration to understand one’s own thoughts andmotives stimulates self-examination (Fenigstein et al. 1975; Gurňáková 2004). Anotherexplanation suggests the existence of overlapping domains between reflection and self-consciousness (Watson et al. 1996; Scandell 2001). Here, private self-consciousnessdoes not precede, but rather incorporates a negative, reflective factor characterized byrumination and mistrust. This explanation, however, excludes positively inducedreflectiveness.

The last significant relationship found involves the effect of reflection on cognitivecomplexity. This effect, central in Hypotheses Four and Five, makes sense from theviewpoint of cognition content. In the capacity of questioning argumentation, reflectionproduces cognitively complex or non-obvious outcomes. Here, questioning facilitatesuncovering paradoxes, “false” certainties or taken-for-granted assumptions. As such,truly questioning argumentation results in more complex understanding and nuance.

Limitations

To conclude this paper in a reflective way, we draw attention to some of this study’slimitations. One limitation of this study is its specific context. This paper focused onone particular learning context for reflection: working on the final thesis. The set-upof this study controlled for most differences in supervision, but did not take otherfactors – for example, student satisfaction with their supervisor – into account. Thislimitation implies that future research needs to include other learning contexts as well.

A second limitation involves the difficulty of measuring private thinking. Sinceour research design did not include experiments in which students perform certaintasks, instantaneous private thinking during reflection has not been measured.

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Instead, retrospective accounts have been used, involving students’ perceptions oftheir own thinking. Future work in this area, therefore, also needs to draw on real-timedata on instantaneous private thinking.

Another limitation refers to the self-report measures. The scales measuring per-sonality traits, reflection and cognitive complexity are based on self-perceptions.Since people’s memories in general are prone to distortions and biases, and sincesocial desirable and consistent respondent behavior cannot be excluded, over- andunder estimations could be present (Podsakoff et al. 2003). For this reason, wecontrolled for objective characteristics such as thesis duration.

A final limitation concerns this study’s exclusive focus on the cognitive nature ofreflection. Because of our initial interest in understanding reflection content, we optedfor using a cognitive behavior scale. This does not imply, however, affective behaviorand emotions could not be at stake. A recommendation for future research, therefore, isto examine the impact of affective personal states, for instance neuroticism, optimism,rumination and self-efficacy on reflection. Consequently, the latter should be measuredusing an extended scale, which also addresses affective behavior and emotions.

Conclusion

At the start of this paper we mentioned the objective to identify personality traits thatcan predict reflection or a reflective outcome. Our study demonstrates that highlyself-conscious persons and those with a high need for cognition display morereflection. Given this study’s focus on cognitive behavior in personality and reflectionmeasures, need for cognition and private self-consciousness are considered representa-tives of a reflective cognitive style.

In addition, we observed the more persons reflected, the more cognitively complextheir outcomes were. This holds promises for the production of other cognitivelycomplex outcomes, that require the integration of multiple frames of reference, forinstance mega-construction design or new energy technology.

In short, our study illustrates that reflective personalities are driven by the enjoy-ment of cognitive activity and self-examination. As such, they are more likely tocome up with complex problem solutions. This is not to say, that non-reflectivepersonalities cannot learn to reflect. Questioning argumentation, which is consideredinherent to reflection, can be cultivated. Nevertheless, we should take care of thecommon observation that reflection dawns. Rather than being instructed, persons arepreferably inspired to reflect, for instance by means of life-changing stories orstartling experiences.

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