recent events in lebanon
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IN LIGHT OF THE UN TRIBUNAL INDICTMENT. RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Recent Events. SUMMARY. Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 1/12: Ministers Resign and Collapse of Hariri’s Government Government Formation Process. After Hariri’s Murder The Judicial Process - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 1
RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON
IN L IGHT OF THE UN TRIBUNAL INDICTMENT
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Recent Events
Lebanon Background Lebanon Politics
Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Hizballah’s Threats
1/12: Ministers Resign and Collapse of Hariri’s GovernmentGovernment Formation Process
Map and StatisticsHistory of Main Events 1920-2010Internal Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the PresentSocial and Demographic Characteristics
Governmental RegimePolitical TrendsPolitical CampsExternal Actors
After Hariri’s MurderThe Judicial ProcessReactions to STL
Overview of HizbullahHizbullah’s Military AspectsA Threat to LebanonA Threat to IsraelA Threat to the Region
SUMMARY
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 3
SUMMARY• The fall of PM Saad Hariri’s government, and the growing tensions over the preliminary indictments of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, have provoked fears of regional destabilization and renewed sectarian violence in Lebanon.
• Hizbullah, strongly backed by a Syria and Iran striving to deepen their influence in Lebanon, acts aggressively against state institutions and political opponents to advance its interests, thus challenging Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence.
• The present crisis highlights the increasing “Hizbullazation” of Lebanon. Hizbullah continues to advance its goals, gain legitimacy and strengthen its political basis. For the first time since “The Cedar Revolution” (2005), Syria and Hizbullah have managed to attain political dominance.
• Hizbullah’s militaristic abilities and forces now largely surpass its 2006, pre-Second Lebanon War levels. The international acceptance of this trend has rendered Hizbullah confident of its power and its right to use it, despite its status as an illegal non-state terrorist entity.
• A radical government led by Hizbullah will have a major effect on national issues (government policy, “Defense Strategy”, internal security, UNIFIL’s mission, STL), constituting strategic challenges, not only for Lebanon and Israel, but for the entire region.
Foca
l Poi
nts
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 4
RECENT EVENTS
Ministers Resign and Collapse of Hariri’s Government
On 12 January 2011, 11 Lebanese ministers withdrew from the National Unity Government headed by Saad Hariri. The government immediately dissolved due to the lack of support from the Lebanese Parliament.
Of those 11 ministers (including the Foreign Affairs, Energy, Communications, Industry and Tourism ministers), 10 are members of the “March 8” political camp lead by Hizbullah. The other minister is a presidential appointee who publicly identifies with Hizbullah. This new crisis in the Lebanese political arena follows the failure between Saad Hariri’s and Hizbullah’s coalitions to come to a comprise regarding the outcome of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL, charged with investigating the assassination of Rafik Hariri), despite mediation attempts by Syria and Saudi Arabia to reach a deal concerning the reaction to the tribunal indictments.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 5
RECENT EVENTS
Government Formation ProcessAfter the Hariri government has collapsed, the current administration is considered temporary. The President (Michelle Suleiman) is required to build a new government within 30 days by electing a (Sunni) Prime Minister with the approval of Parliament.
In the past weeks, both the “March 8” and “March 14” alliances have tried to convince external parties to support them in their attempts to achieve a majority in the Parliament (they need at least 65 of the 128 members).
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s support for the “March 8” alliance could be decisive in promoting the formation of a new government more closely related to Hizbullah.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 6
RECENT EVENTS
Government Formation Process
Due to these developments, Lebanon is currently trapped in a delicate situation, giving rise to mutual accusations between the parties and fears of renewed sectarian violence.
The events of the past few days, and the announcement that Hizbollah has obtained a majority in the Parliament to elect the Sunni millionaire Najib Miqati as the next prime minister (as a consequence of Syrian moves), demonstrate the plausibility of a government established by Hizbollah.The “March 14” Alliance has expressed its refusal to participate in a Syrian-Iranian “puppet” government. Employing martial rhetoric, proponents of the Alliance called for a “Day of Anger” in protest. Christian leader Samir G’ag’a declared that a pro-Hizbullah government could lead to a civil war and “transform Lebanon into Gaza”.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 7
After Rafik Hariri’s Murder
Rafik Hariri, along with 22 other people, was killed on February 2005 by a truck bomb. The murder initially led to the appointment of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), headed by Detlev Mehlis. The Mehlis Report, presented on October 2005, implicated Lebanese, Syrian and Iran intelligence officers.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
The present crisis climaxes over tensions regarding the STL, which is expected to indict members of Hizbullah and to determine potential Syrian and Iranian culpability in the Hariri’s political assassination.
Following the 1757 UN Security Council Resolution on May 2007, the STL was finally created on March 2009 to procure a formal and binding international sentence in the case. The mission headquarters are located near the Hague and 49% of the project is financed by the Lebanese government.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 8
The Judicial ProcessThe draft indictments of the STL investigation were presented on Monday, 17 January 2011 but the details of the suspects and their charges remain confidential.
However, various sources report that the STL will charge high-ranking Hizbullah, Syrian and Iranian authorities with the crime of political assassination. This judicial process represents a huge danger to Hizbullah’s – and its supporters’ – status and legitimacy in Lebanon.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
Following the decision of the prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, to publish the indictments, Judge Daniel Fransen has 6-10 weeks to decide whether to confirm or dismiss them. The names of the suspects will be publicized if he decides that there is enough evidence to proceed with a trial.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 9
Reactions to STLThe potential impact of the STL depends much more on how the different
relevant actors react to the report than the conclusion of the report itself.
Many Hizbullah officials have expressed their potential willingness to tolerate a damning STL judgment should Hariri’s camp agree to make no concerted effort to fulfill its sentence.
However, if the “March 14” camp is determined to fulfill the indictments or possibly even declare support for the findings, Hizbullah might decide to re-ignite hostilities and provoke bloodshed.
Hassan Nasrallah tried to quell the tensions, but also stated that Hizbollah would not tolerate an arrest of any of its members. He also declared that Hizbollah would deny support to the STL should it gain control of the government.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 10
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 11
LEBANON BACKGROUND
Area: 10.452 km2
Width: 88 km (maximum)
32 km (minimum)Population: 4.224.000Population Density: 404/km2
Terrain: Plateau along the coast; mountainous in the center, east and north; valley in the far east. GDP (estimate to 2010): $58.576 billionGDP per capita: $14.988
Map and Statistics
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 12
LEBANON BACKGROUND
History of Main Events : 1920- 2010
1943
1975
1920
1978
1985
1989
1996
2000 200
5
1993197
6
Founding of the “Great Lebanon”
entity
Lebanon achieves
Independence – “National
Pact”
Start of the
Lebanese Civil War
Syria enters Lebanon
End of the Lebanese Civil War,
“Taif Agreement
”
“Grapes of Wrath” Israeli
Operation against
Hizbullah
Hariri’s Murder,“Cedar
Revolution”, Syrian
withdrawal after UN
Resolution 1559
Israeli withdrawal from South
Lebanon
2009
National Unity Government
2006
Second Lebanon War
– UNIFIL
Mandate by UNSCR 1701 Resolution
1982
“Peace in the
Galilee” War,
creation of
Hizbullah
“Litani Operation”, Creation of UNIFIL by
425 Resolution
Israeli withdrawal to the “Security Border”
“Justice and Accountabili
ty”: First Israeli
operation against
Hizbullah
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 13
LEBANON BACKGROUND
Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present September 2004: Lebanon Constitutional Amendment – Backed
by Syria, its approval extended the office term of President Emile Lahoud.
2010
200
9 2
008
200
7 2
006
20
05 2
004
14 February 2005 – Rafik Hariri’s Murder – Former Prime Minister Hariri killed by a car bomb in Beirut. Leaders of the March 14 Alliance accused Syria and Hizbullah. In response, the March 8 Alliance, which attributed responsibility for the murder to the USA and Israel, was formed.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 14
LEBANON BACKGROUND
Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present
2010
200
9 2
008
200
7 2
006
20
05 2
004
26 April 2005 - Syrian Retirement after UN 1559 Resolution – After the United Nations called for an investigation, Syria withdrew it troops from Lebanon. The Lebanese political arena consolidated into two political camps: the March 14 Alliance and March 8 Alliance.
14 March 2005 – “Cedar Revolution” – The murder of Hariri led to a series of demonstrations, popularly named the “Cedar Revolution”. Participants demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon as well as the establishment of an international commission to investigate the murder.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 15
LEBANON BACKGROUND
July 2006 – Second Lebanon War - In response to Hizbullah rocket fire and the wounding, killing and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, the IDF entered Hizbullah-controlled southern Lebanon. The war resulted in UN Resolution 1701, which prompted a ceasefire and established a renewed version of UNIFIL to act as a deterrent to Hizbullah aggression.
2010
200
9 2
008
200
7 2
006
20
05 2
004
May 2007 – Nahr al Bared conflict – Battles between the Lebanon Internal Security Forces (ISF) and militants of Fatah Al Islam (an Al-Qaeda inspired group).
Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 16
LEBANON BACKGROUND20
10 2
009
200
8 2
007
200
6
2005
200
4
May 2008 – Internal Strife – After Siniora’s government attempted to prohibit a Hizbullah communications network, the group responded with violence. The struggle concluded with the “Doha Agreement”, which ushered in Michel Suleiman as president and sealed a commitment between the coalitions to avoid a new civil war. June 2009 – Close victory of the “March 14 Alliance” in elections – A national unity government was formed, directed by Saad Hariri and including a Hizbullah veto (“National Silence Government”).
Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 17
LEBANON BACKGROUND
Social and Demographic Characteristics
Lebanon’s population is a mixture of 18 ethnic-religious minorities, including Muslim Shi’ites, Muslim Sunnis, Christian Maronites, Christian Greek Orthodox, Druze and Greek Catholics. This country’s diversity is a consequence of its history as a refuge for the region’s persecuted minorities.
Druze
Shiites
Christians
Sunnis
The last official census was held in 1932, when there was an established Christian majority.
A recent non-official study by the “Statistics Lebanon” firm shows that Shiites constitute 28% of the total population, Sunnis 28%, Maronites 21.5%, Greek Orthodox 8%, Druze 5% and Greek Catholics 4%.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 18
LEBANON POLITICS
Governmental Regime
President – Christian Maronite (Michel Suleiman)
Prime Minister – Muslim Sunni (Saad Hariri)
Parliament Chairman – Muslim Shiite (Nabih Berri)
Role Distribution in Government (before its fall):
Lebanon is technically governed as a parliamentary democracy. Due to its complex demographic composition, Lebanon has a special governing system known as “Confessionalism”, intended to ensure fair representation among its diverse population. This system functions in both the government and the parliament and was implemented by the “1943 National Pact” and the “1989 Taif Agreement”.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
The 128 seats of the unicameral Parliament are equally divided between Christians and Muslims, and proportionally between the minorities as well as between the regions.
Unclassified || Slide 19
LEBANON POLITICS
Governmental Regime
Distribution in Parliament:
After Taif Before Taif Confession
27 20 Sunni
27 19 Shi’a
8 6 Druze
2 0 Alawite
64 45 Total Muslims
64 54 Total Christians + Muslims
After Taif Before Taif Confession
34 30 Maronite
14 11 Greek Ortodox
8 6 Greek Catholic
5 4 Armenian Ortodox
1 1 Armenian Catholic
1 1 Protestant
1 1 Other Christians
64 54 Total Christians
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 20
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Trends
Ethnic-Religious rivalry - The main component of Lebanese politics affecting civil life, institutions roles distribution, laws and policies. Parties tend to be armed or connected to armed factions, so political issues tend to result in violent confrontations.
External involvement – Since the Civil War, Lebanon has been a battleground for regional actors to settle their disputes. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Arab Emirates, the USA and France are all historical stakeholders that have actively influenced Lebanese politics by supporting parties and indirectly dominating internal Lebanese affairs.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 21
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Trends
Hizbullah’s character as “a state within a state” – Hizbullah’s civilian-military system, provided by Iran and Syria, enables it to implement independent policies. Moreover, it gained the political “veto power” by integrating into the former government.
The Palestinian issue – A sensitive issue since the Civil War, the Palestinians maintain a substantial presence in Lebanon as refugees. Most of them have a limited legal status: they do not receive Lebanese citizenship or internal aid, and are often manipulated to achieve terrorist goals, both local and global.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 22
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
Religion and ethnic identification: Sunnis vs. Shiites vs.
Christians
Character of Lebanon: Secular vs. Islamist
Path of Politics: Moderation vs. “Resistance”
Regional affinity: Pro-Occidental / Pro-Saudi vs. Pro-
Syrian/Iran
Economic Methods
The elements that divide the camps include:
The characteristics of the Lebanese political regime, “Confessionalism”, requires the
conforming of inter-ethnic political camps. This means combining different ethnic groups
and forming political alliances.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 23
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
Headed by Saad Hariri’s principle Sunni party (Movement of the Future) with Maronite and Druze allies, it was consolidated after the mass demonstrations of the “Cedar Revolution”.
Obtained parliamentary majority (71 of the 128 seats) in the June 2009 elections and formed a government after four months of negotiations.
Hariri is seconded by the Christian leaders Amin J’amil (Falanges chairman) and Samir G’ag’a (Kajal chairman).
“March 14” Camp
Since 2005, the Lebanon political arena has been divided into two main political camps:
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 24
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
The main opposition coalition, it obtained 57 seats in the June 2009 elections and negotiated a national unity government with “veto power”.
It is conformed by the main Shiite parties Hizbullah (headed by Hassan Nasrallah) and Amal (headed by Nabih Berry), in cooperation with the Christian leader Michael Aoun and a number of Sunni, Christian and Druze leaders.
“March 8” Camp
The President: Michel Suleiman
The Druze leader: Walid Jumblatt
Non-aligned actors
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 25
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
PARLIAMENT ELECTION RESULTS 2009
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 26
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
March 14 Al-liance, 60Ma
rch 8
Al-liance, 57
Progressive Socialist Party *, 11
SEATSPARTIES IN THE
COALITION
29Movement of the
Future (Mustaqbal)
15March 14
Independents
5 Lebanese Forces
5 Kataeb Party
2 Hunchak Party
1 Islamic Group
1 Ramgavar Party
1Democratic Left
Movement
1 National Liberal Party
SEATSPARTIES IN THE
COALITION
19Free Patriotic
Movement
13 Hizbullah
13 Amal Movement
4 Marada Movement
2Lebanese
Democratic Party
2
Armenian Revolutionary
Federation
2Syrian Social
Nationalist Party
2 Ba'ath Party
PARLIAMENT COALITIONS AFTER ELECTION RESULTS 2009
(*Note: The Progressive Socialist Party (Druzes) was firstly part of the 14 March Coalition, one month after the elections withdraw, but remain part of the Parliament majority)
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 27
LEBANON POLITICS
External Actors
The division between the Lebanese camps follows a familiar pattern in the Middle East; they are divided into the “moderate camp” and the “radical camp”. The chief external actors in Lebanese politics reflect this schism: Syria – sees Lebanon as part of its area of influence,
primarily supports Shiites though also Sunni groups. Recently returned to influential prominence in Lebanon after international pressure forced its oust in 2005; is thus interested in maintaining stability.
Saudi Arabia – acts in support of the Sunnis to reinforce it position, especially following Syria’s recent withdrawal. While it strongly supports Hariri, it also wants stability.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 28
LEBANON POLITICS
External Actors
Iran – has a growing influence in the military arena
by providing financial support, intelligence, and
arms to Hizbullah, thus advancing Shiite interests
and fortifying the threat to Israel’s northern front.
Egypt, Arab Emirates – interested in protecting Sunni factions.
The Occident (mainly USA and France) – consider Lebanon a geo-strategic
asset in the region, and is interested in protecting the Christians minority
(Lebanon used to be a French colony). In addition, it works to support pro-
Occident Sunni parties.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 29
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Overview of Hizbullah
Following the rise of the Shiites in Lebanon in the 1960s-70s and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Hizbullah was established as a result of the 1982 Lebanon War, during which it was enforced by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Hizbullah’s main goal is to instigate an Islamic revolution in Lebanon by imposing a government based on Shiite laws and to export this revolution to different regions in the Middle East.
Hizbullah is a radical Shiite organization which represents a major political and military force in the region. The organization functions as a front-line Iranian proxy, relying on both Iranian and Syrian support.
With the death of Abbas Mussawi, in 1992, Hassan Nasrallah was nominated as the new Secretary-General. This marked a new era in Hizbullah operations, combined with expanding political activity as a party in the Lebanese Parliament.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Classified || Slide 30
HIZBULLAH THREATS
After the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hizbullah succeeded in strengthening its status in the Lebanese “street”, progressively legitimizing itself as a national resistance movement. This process was enforced by its entrance to the government in July 2005. Once in a position of power, the organization slowly consolidated its hold on the political situation, procuring a “veto” in 2008. Hezbollah’s power stems from a number of sources:
Military Political Socio-Economic
Professional and well-trained armyGuerilla warfare techniques and civilian shieldsStrategic force
(UAV’s, missiles, etc)
Terror component
Modus Vivendi with the government
Increased influence following
governmental recognition
“Blocking third” veto right
Operates primarily in Shiite regions
Ideological indoctrination
Largely backed by Iran
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 31
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Hezbullah’s modus operandi includes the use of advanced conventional weapons with guerilla terrorist techniques. To this effect, it has amassed a massive arsenal combined with advanced weapons, over 40,000 rockets, anti-tank and coastal missiles, IEDs, UAVs and more. This is backed by Scud and M600 rockets, which allow Hezbollah to target the Israeli population from deep within Lebanon strategic depth.
122mm Grad (25km / 15 mil)
240mm Fajr 3 (50km / 30 mil)
Fajr 5 (75km / 45 mil)
M-600 (300km / 185 mil)
Scud-D (600km / 375 mil)
THE IRANIAN-MADE ABABIL UAV
THE ZILZAL
220M ROCKET LAUNCHER
C802 COASTAL MISSILE
SAGGER ATGM MISSILES
Hizbullah’s Military Aspects
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Classified || Slide 32
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Following the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and despite UNSCR 1701, Hizbullah began the process of repairing and increasing its capabilities. This occurred through a number of venues:Training
DrillsSmugglingInfrastructure
PersonnelArsenal
Functioning as a front-line proxy of Iran in the region, Hizbullah continues to rely on massive weapon transfers as a lifeline for its operations. The smuggling takes place by air, land and sea, benefiting from pivotal Syrian support as well.
IRANIAN WEAPONS FOUND IN LEBANON
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Classified || Slide 33
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Despite the explicit prohibition of non-governmental weapons in southern Lebanon (UNSCR 1701), many weapons are sent on to the region.
Iranian meddling in the region well exceeds weapon transfers. Iran continue to play an active role in training members of Hezbullah, as well as providing assistance for its political activity, which has already seen dividends.
"Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer…any arms or related material…all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft“
(UNSCR 1747, Paragraph 5)
Iranian efforts are complemented by massive economic support to Hezbullah. The Iranian Quds organization alone contributes between 100-200 million dollars annually to Hezbullah.
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
34
Hizbullah’s military assets are deployed within populated areas throughout Lebanon, as part of its strategy, doctrine and preparation for war.
5,000 Activists≈40,000 Rockets
Hizbullah’s Deployment in Southern Lebanon
Command
Unit
Sector
Village
Each village military
compound contains dozens of activists and
hundreds of rockets
Concept of Operation
Massive long-range strikeTargeting mostly Israeli population centersTerritorial defense of the launching units
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
35
(Closed Military Zones)
2006 2010CMZ Inhabited
Environment
Khirbat Salim
14/17/09Depot in town center containing 122mm rockets, 155mm rockets, mortars and more detonates
Tayr Falsi
12/10/09Arms depot detonates. Weapons are removed and transferred to nearby village
Marwaheen
23/8/09Local civilians forcibly eject Hizbullah operatives attempting to establish operations in town
Since Lebanon War, Hezbollah routinely deploys in the rural environment of southern Lebanon. This serves as its backbone for war-
time operations.
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 36
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Hizbullah possesses the most powerful military force in Lebanon, thanks to Syrian and Iranian assistance. Its arsenal far outnumbers that of the Lebanon National Army, and in some parts of the country constitutes the de-facto martial authority.
Hizbullah continues to advance it goals, gain legitimacy and strengthen its basis in Lebanon (and may even attain political domination). It uses a dual strategy of accumulating power without seizing control of the government while progressively weakening political rivals and destabilizing the political system.
Hizbullah’s dual process of legitimization and destabilization in the Lebanese political arena is expected to continue for the foreseeable future (due to its demographic advantages), and could perpetuate ethnic tensions.
A Threat to Lebanon
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 37
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Since its creation, Hizbullah has posed a military threat to Israel’s northern border, challenging Israel’s security interests in Lebanon and the region.
During the past 30 years, Hizbullah has employed various means in its attempt to terrorize the Israeli population, including attacks on Israeli military bases, missiles fired at Israeli civilians, kidnapping soldiers, etc.
Hizbullah military potential is reserved as a future platform for Iran and Syria to
attack Israel. Iran established it and aided it with resources, logistics and arms. For Syria, Hizbullah is useful in the fight against Israel and as a means to advance its interests in the Lebanese internal political order.
A Threat to Israel
Military-Strategic Information SectionStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 38
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Hizbullah envisions itself as an active regional player with the purpose of creating an Islamic Shiite revolution in the Middle East.
Moreover, as an instrument of Iran Hizbullah believes that moderate/pro-occident countries stand in opposition to their plans in Lebanon. Hizbullah sees Lebanon as a potential military platform from which to threaten said countries and thus accumulate power for the radical camp.
A strong Hizbullah, in control of Lebanese politics and territory, constitutes a destabilizing force in the region that threatens the development of moderate trends in the Middle East.
A Threat to the Middle East