rauch no pretension to be linguist

8/13/2019 Rauch No Pretension to Be Linguist

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Peirce: Wi th no pretension to be inga l inguis t

I R M E N G R D R U C H

ToThomasA.Sebeok,Distinguished Profes-sor ofLinguisticsand Semiotics, in theyearofhis sixty-fifth birthday.

In his prolific writings spanning half a century and literally millionso fsentences, Thomas A. Sebeok injects the somewhat hidden butthoroughly provocative phraselinguistics aliassemiotics'(1977: 184).These cryp tic wordsareused inconnection withJakobsonand necessarilyreflect only one area of Sebeokian thought, since, as we are well aware,Sebeok is inclined to emphasize the equation semioticsalias biologyand/or semioticsaliasp hilosophy.Thatthestateofsemioticsis a matterof simple equations is, of course, only a tnirage, provoking furtherresearch.For Sebeok,as hewrote (1984:2),'thevast semiotic adventure'is'a feast ... all encompassing inrange'; and 'Any discipline concernedwith the nonverbal or verbal commerce is wholly embraced by thedoctrine of messages'. Yet, in celebration of Thomas Sebeok it isparticularly fitting that the following paper address several of the modesinwh ich linguists perceive semiotics; in turn , that itaddressseveral of themodes inw hich Peirce deals w ith linguistics;and finally, that itpresent aparticular case of the unified efforts of linguisticsand semiotics.Lyons(1977)reiterates for us a leitmotif that wehave heard echoing inlinguistic research throughout this entire century, namely that 'by com-mon consent, languages are the most important and most highlydevel-oped semiotic systems employed by human beings'. Thus, Leach(1976:88)states:'Fromsomepointsofviewspoken languageis not onlyapart of culture, but prototypical of all culture'. Flattering though thisstatement mayseem to thelinguist,it iscritical for thesemiotisttoknow,in this case, precisely what Lyons' concept of semiotics is. Lyons (1981)defers somewhat a definition of semiotics, writing 'Semiotics has beenvariously described: as the science of signs, of symbolic behaviour or ofcommunication-systems; and we will construe comm unication , fairlybroadl y, as not necessarilyimplying theintentionto inform' (p . 17). This emiolica65-1/2 (1987),29-43. 0037-1998/87/0065-0029 2.00

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30 rmengard Rauchconstrual is a radical departure f rom his 1977 approach, in which herestricts the term communication to the intentional transmission ofinformation by means of some established signalling-system and stillfurther to the intentional transmission of factual, or prepositional,information (1977: 32).H is broader 1981 view self-admittedly allows oneto talkabout animal communication without begging some controversialphilosophical questions (1981: 17). In 1977 Lyons speaks, instead, ofanimal or non-human signalling.Interestingly, withtheextension of the concept communication to non-human signalling systems, Lyons appears not to have achieved therefinement he seeks of the sixteen so-called design features of languagepostulated byHockett (1963: 6-14)todistinguish human language fromother sign systems. These design features are: (1 ) vocal-auditory channelfor communicating, (2) broadcast transmission and directional receptionof the sign, (3)rapid fading of the sign, (4)user s ability to be eithertransmitter or receiver, (5) complete feedback of the sign, (6 ) specializa-tion of the sign for communication, (7 ) semanticity, (8 ) arbitrariness,(9 )discreteness, (10) displacement in that th e sign m ay refer to thingsremote in time or space, (11) openness in that a sign may be created,(12) tradition of passing on signs by teaching and learning, (13)dualityconsisting in a phonology and morphology forsigns, (14) possibility ofprevarications accomplished through signs, (15)reflexiveness in that asign can be a sign ofitself, and (16) user s ability to learn more than onesign system.Lyons (1977:5) singles out feature 15 (reflexiveness) as One of the mostcharacteristic features of natural languages (and one which may welldistinguish them, not only f rom signalling-systems used by other species,butalso f rom what is commonly referred to as nonverbal communicationin human beings . He later (1981: 18-19) speaks of the flexibility andversatilityof language as perhaps (its) most striking characteristic . Bythis he is referring in .particular to feature 10 (displacement). In bothpresentations Lyons emphasizes feature 8 (arbitrariness), feature 9 (dis-creteness), feature 11 (openness or productivity), and feature 13 (duality)asvery characteristic of human language and very questionable fo r othercommunication systems (1977:70, 84-85; 1981: 23).Charles Osgood (1980: 14)does, infact, considera type ofopenness orproductivity (feature 11); namely, the ability to combine signs indefinitelyand innovatively, as in the bee-dance, at least when viewed evolutionarily.In addition, Osgood extends th e defining characteristics o f humancommunicationorlanguage to arequirement that states: 'Thedistributiono f message forms over time o n a linear left-to-right basis requirestemporary storage and integration o f information' (1980:21). He offers

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Alias semiotics 31several non-defining characteristics in addition to Hockett s originalsixteen 'some of them absolute, but many of them only statistical'(1980: 26) universals of human communication: propositionalizing,translatability, selection and combination rules,aprogressive differentia-tion principle, a least effort principle, affective polarity, and a Polyannaprinciplewherein affectively positive structures are 'moreeasily processedcognitively (1980:31)than affectively negative structures.To return to Lyons (1977: 79-80), design feature 7 (semanticity),commonto allsemiotic systems, encapsulates hisbasic distinction inwhathe later (1981:140-144)calls'semiotic orcommunicative' functions. Asstated earlier, in order to becommunicative or semiotic, a sign systemneed no longer be designated by intentionality; but the function whichdistinguishes human from nonhuman semiotic is descriptive meaningpresent exclusivelyin the former, with social-expressivemeaningoccurringin both. From this bifurcation follows immediately the association ofdescriptivemeaningwith verbalsigns and of social-expressivemeaningwithnonverbal signs The bottom line for Lyons then feads: 'itis the verbalcomponent of human signals that separate(s) them most clearly f romother kindsofhuman and non-human signals (1981: 144). This speaksdirectly to our task: it demystifies, so to speak, any essential differencebetween linguistic signs and verbal signs. Verbal refers to all languagesigns, written as well as spoken; the rubric linguistic signs properlyengendersitsopposite title ' nonverbal interactional analy(sis) signs ,ashas been pointed out already in Sebeok (1977).Butwhat about Lyons exclusive association of intentionwith humanlanguage, whichh e extracted with great effort f rom his former definitionofcommunication,sothat communication might referto allsemioticandthus include animal signalling? Perhaps his effort was in vain. JonathanBennett(1976), fol lowing Grice, holds that meaning is a type of intention;accordingly he reserves a meaning for intending beings only, a categorywhich excludes non-humans. Bennett, however, achieves a synthesisbetween 'intention-dependent evidence 1 (human communication) andd i splay-depend ent evidence (nonhuman communication). For Bennettth e basic function of both human and nonhuman signifying is tocommunica te ;thus th e control which intention effects in human commu-nication is effected in nonhuman communication by natural selection. Hewrites: individual intention is significantly like biological function (1976:205, 206). Bennett s simile coincides with Peirce s ow n comparison ofabduction to the instructs o f animals fo r feeding and breeding:'allhumanknowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is but the development ofour inborn animal instincts (CP:2.754).So it is that Peirce determinedthe celebrated syllogistic effect in the pinching of the hind legs of a

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32 rmengardRauchdecapitated frog; that is , the way a decapitated frog reasons when youpinch his hin d legs (Fann 1970: 28). The internerve habits are analogousto the majo r premise, the pinching is analogo us to the m ino r premise, andthe act of jum pin g is analogo us to the conclusion . Perhaps w e can bo ldlyassert then that communication, now understood as both human andnonhuman, is signifying through an illative-type process (Rauch1979b:74).Thisnagg ing question o f definition or identity behind us, we will moveon to two other recent areas o f linguistic research with a focus on semioticmethod namely, research centered on the iconic principle and lan-guage, and research centered on abduction and language. Both focirepresent Firstness.

The type of iconicity involved in this area o f linguistic research is notimaginal; rather, it is the extrem ely intricate diag ram matic iconism,namely, that similarities are postulated between form and meaning basedon the relations oftheir parts. The cornerstone of diagrammatic iconismis the time-honored principle of isomorphism, bi-uniqueness, stated in theformula One fo rm: one meaning . This isomorphism, in variance, bi-uniqueness of verbal signs is called the law of semiotic relevance byShaumyan (1984: 235).Shapiro (1980) gives several excellent examples of linguistic diagram-matic iconism.One of these is his explication , not mere description or

rule formulation (1980: 67), of the verb desinences of the Russian non-preterite indicative. The first person singular u ending incorporates thehighest degree o f deflection for the marked person category with un-marked number, while the third person plural ending incorporates themaximally m arked num ber category with unm arked person. The greatestsemantic differentiation between person an d number value is in the firstperson singular, followed by the third person plural. This distinction incontent is then mirrored (iconically reflected) conversely in the forms,where, for example, the u o f the first person singular desinence is highlyunderdifferentiated; it is marked for neither the flat nor the d i f f u edistinctive feature (Shapiro 1980: 80). It would be folly to hold that theiconic principle is an explanation for all ling uistic relation s, or (as Shapiroclaims) fo r why the data cohere as signs (1980: 91). The pr inciple is aworking hypothesis, not a proof.It is precisely the purpose of John Haiman to underscore on the onehand the power of isomo rphism, w hile on the other hand to show that it isbut nearly universal (1980: 515). Haiman aims to account fo r homon-ymy, which is as impossible as synonymy under the principle of bi-uniqueness.He is unable to explain the anticipator y subject mo rpheme onthe medial verb in Hua, a Papuan language of Eastern New Guinea,

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Alias semiotics 33through isomorphism, because th e morpheme in question has oneinvariant form with three d ifferent meanings. Accordingly, Haiman seeksan answer outside of isomorphism, and he finds it in the universalprinciples of coreference, subject-verb agreement, and the nominal char-acter of medial verbs. Haiman writes that such 'principles ... areuniversal,and override bi-unique correspondence orisomorphism where-everthey conflict withit'(1980: 519). In fact, he claims that 'thevalue oftheiconic assumption lies in the impetus it provides toward the discoveryof such (otherwise unnoted) principles . This view differs considerablyfrom that of Shapiro, for whom the value of iconicity in coherencebetween sign and meaning lies in itshermeneutic force.

Robertson hypothesizesa correlation between the iconicor symboliccharacterof agrammar and Huntington s Law, which holds that ' thenumber of elements in every logical field must be 2 m wherem=1, 2, 3... ', 2 represents plus or minus a semantic value, and thevariablemequalsthenumberofsemantic values (1983: 529). Robertsonmaintains that strongly iconic language structures favor many logicalpossibilities,andconversely, thatasymbolic system tendsto besyncretic.Examples from English are the 'hierarchically defined grammaticalsystem (HDGS)of theverb which admitsof logical possibilities suchasthe future, past, progressive, present perfect and others (1983: 530). Ontheother hand, in theHDGSof the thirdpersonplural pronoun they fewlogicalpossibilitiesarerealized thelogical meanings he she andit thatis, singular of all three genders, are syncretized in the symbol they.Robertson displays the Mayan evidence showing Common Mayan tohavebeen syncretic and symbolic in itsHDGS for pronouns,but to havedeveloped into an iconic, less syncretic HDGS. Needless to say, it isdifficult to agree that Robertson s appeal to the Peircean categoriesexplains how linguistic data realize Huntington s theorem; they simplycorroborate what has already been observed linguistically. Moreover,Robertson has totally overlooked Secondness which should be his pointofdeparture in utilizing the categories dynamically making them workin th e system, rather than appending them as superficial similes (see th ediscussion of Andersen below).Haiman(1983)has in themeantime addressed linguistic iconicity again,where he establishes an economic/iconiccorrelation between a linguisticformand itsconceptual category.Forexample, appealing to Greenberg suniversalw hich reads'In no language willthe linguistic distance between and y be greater in signalling inalienable possession, in expressions like x'sy , thanit is insignalling alienablepossession,'Haiman (1983: 793)demonstratesthat in many Austronesian languages distance between th econceptually alienable my and house is iconically mirrored morphologi-

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34 Irmengard Rauchcally by the fact that my is a separate word. Thus in Nakanai one saysluma taka house m y , while the conceptually lesser distance or theintimac y betweenmy and handis narrowed by the fact that my is an f f i xto its possession, thu s one says l ima-gu hand m y . A fam iliar case in pointin demonstrating the economic/iconic correlation between linguisticexpression and conceptual distance is seen in the set of what Haiman(1983: 803) calls introverted verbs (for example, the English wash ascontrasted to his set of so-called extroverted verbs (such as kick . In thephrase M ax washed, th e reflexive object is incorporated into the verb,m irroring closeness, while in the phra se Max kicked himself, the reflexiveobjectis less close, tha t is, not incorporated into the verb, and accordinglyrequires overt expression (see Rauch 1987).The second semiotig principle that do m inates the recent applications ofsemiotic theory to linguistics is abdu ction, which represents Firstness andhence icon icity as well. Andersen (1973) speaks to the replacement of thesharped labials /pbm/ by the dentals /tdn/ in the L itom ysl dialect of Czechduring th e fourteenth century, with their subsequent reversion to plainlabials in the nineteenth century. For convenience he refers to theinnovators as Tetak speakers with initial / for the Czech pjet five , ascontrasted then with the Petak speakers. Andersen, rejecting all previousexplanations for the actuation of these changes, claims that the Peirceanmodel of abduction can account for both transformations. In thefourteenthc entury , Tetak speech evolved through indeterminacy (am bigu-ities) in the production and perception of the sharped labials. T he languagelearners (younger generation) with un derlying dentals accommodated th egradua lly receding surface labials by means of an adaptive rule of t> p informal style or older generational style. Gradually this adaptive rule waslost. For Andersen th e loss of the sharp labials to dentals occurred byabduc tive inference. Similarly, An dersen appeals to ab duction in explain-ing th e nineteenth-century return of the dentals to plain labials. Thetriggering m echanism w as not phonological ambiguity, but rather borrow-ing or influence from th e neighboring prestigious Petak dialects. In thisinstance an adaptive rule of the sortp t would compensate to retaindoublets at least until such time as the socially preferred labials l imit th eTetak peculiarities to the older and finally passing generation.W e observe that th e nineteenth-century change has had absolutely nostructural effect on the Tetak phonological component. It amounts to afew m ore labial occurrences in the labial inven tory. Ma ny l inguists wouldnot consider it a linguistic change per se. Concerning th e fourteenth-century abduction, Andersen writes on the one hand that It is thereinterpretation of the phonological structure that motivates a phoneticinnovation (1973: 780), and on the other hand that It is m otivated by

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Alias semiotics 35ambigui t ies in the corpus of u t terances from which ( the innovat ion) isin ferred (1973: 774). Although the firs t s tatement emphasizes the percep-t ion and the second the product ion of ambigui t ies , both s ta tementsunderscore the infe ren tial process as accountable for the change. In fact ,Andersen wr i tes : the conception of langu age acquis it ion assum ed for ourmode l of phonological change involves processes tha t a re basic to allactivities o f t he human mind (1973: 778).This is exactly the point for part ing company with Andersen inconsidering abduct ion as any sort of cause for l inguist ic change. Obvi-ously processes which a re f un d a m e n ta l to all activities of the h u m a n m i ndare a necessary ingredient in language change. A factor in the phonologi-cal am big ui ty m ust be sought as the com pelling reason, the Secondness,inwhich the Tetak dentals have their existence. We f ind this factor in themi n o r premise of the abduct ive inference. It is a purely linguistic one,perfectly obvious , namely that the Tetak sharped lab ial was a t least 51 percent de nta l acoustically and physiologically t ha t is, the sharped labialswere, so to speak, more acute than grave. Spectrographically, the secondf o rman t was raised from the f i rs t , the m ou th cavi ty was narrowed by theadvancemen t of the tongue toward the alveolar ridge and the teeth, withthe accompanying d i la t ion of the pharyngeal cavi ty. In l ight of th isphon ological rea li ty and related facts such as vowel palatalization, w hichis more common to Czech than any other Slavonic language, i t is all them ore su rpr is ing tha t And ersen d i sm isses out r igh t Jakobson s (1962: 275)considerat ion of the Tetak change a s a case of regressive assimilat ion.And ersen s abd uct ive change concept is mere redundancy; h is abduct ivemodel i s only of value as causation in the Tetak change if we require thed y na m i cof Secondness within the ab du ction and seek to identify it. RecallRob ertson s lack of appeal to Secondness (above).I ha ve ju st discussed several l ing uist ic viewp oints which explorePeircean thought. Let me now turn to several viewpoints of Peirce qual inguis t . Robin (1967) l is ts some ten pages w i th 126 entries of lingu ist ictopics ad dressed in Peirce s w rit ings . Ro bin s su bti t les read Classificationand Synonyms (1967: 133-134), Dictionaries (1967: 134-137), andSpell ing) (1967: 137-140), w i th four pages (140-143) entitled Miscel lane-ous . T his las t subt i t l e s ubsumes the 126 i tem s lis ted in cue words forexample , i tem 121 0 (1967 : 140), Notes on Chemica l Suffixes andPrefixes , or i tem 1248 (1967: 142), The Ca rdinal Digi ts in SeveralLangua ges . A lthou g h Robin s l i s ting provides an index of sor ts , i t goeswi thou t s ay ing tha t i t is no subs t i tute at all for combing Peirce directlyfor his ins igh ts in to linguis t ics .In his classification of the sciences, Peirce CP: 1 .183,186,189, 191, 200)suborders l inguist ics u nd er the order classificatory psychics or ethnology,



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36 IrmengardRauchwhich derives from the subclass psychical sciences, which falls under theclass idioscopy, which belongs to the subbranch science of discovery,which is part of the branch theoretical science.

He classifies language as the seventh genus o f the classificatory sciencesof intellectual performance CP: 7.385), deriving from classificatorypsychology (as does linguistics). Peirce wroteThis seventh Genus is stupendous, embracing not only Speech, but all modes o fcommunicat ion such a s sign language; and under speech studying all dialects, no tmerely in their gram m ar and vo cabulary, but also in their styles o f com position. Itwill also embrace studies o f Diplomatics, of Alphabets, etc. (1902: 242)Without dw elling at this po int on Peirce s ow n stupendous definition o flanguage, namely the f amed C P : 5.314) equatio n which reads m ylanguage is the sum total of myself, we should observe Peirce s dialogiccommentaryon language. Heexplains dialogic thus (CP: 5.497):writein th e form o f a dialogue, because it is in that form that m y thoughts com eto me... . Pragmatist (5.533) states: The brutes arecertainly capable ofmore than one grade o f control; but it seems to m e that o ur superiority tothem is m ore due to our greater num ber of grades of self-control than it isto o ur versatility . Doctor (5.534) asks: Is i t not due to our faculty o flanguage? Pragmatist replies:To my thinkin g that faculty is itself a phenom enon o f self-co ntrol.. . . Allthinkingisby signs; and the brutes are signs. But they perhaps rarely thi nk o f them as signs.To do so is m anifestly a second step in the use of language. Brutes use language,and seem to exercise som e little co ntrol over it. B ut they c ertainly do not c arry thiscontrol to anything like the same grade that we do. They do not criticize theirthought logically.In o ne breath Peirce, though with no pretension to being a linguist(2.328), foreshadows both of Lyons premier characteristics of humanlanguage: reflexiveness (1977) and versatility (1981), indeed using theidentical term for the latter. Note, too , th at Peirce does no t circum ventoutright the question o f language in animals. He speaks to theInstinctso f Com m unication; fo r some kind o f language there is am o n g nearly allanimals. Not only do animals of the same species convey their assertions, butdifferent classes o f an imals do so, as when a snake hypnotizes a bird. Twoparticularly important varieties of this Species of study will relate to Cries andSongs ( among mammals and birds chiefly) and to facial expressions amongm a m m a l s . . . . (CP: 7.379)He adds that cantell by the expression of face the state of m ind of myhorse just as unmistakably as I can that o f m y dog or m y wife .



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Alias semiotics 37Peirceaddresses the linguistic principle of bi-un iquen ess, also k no w n asinvariance (see Haiman 1980, 1983;Robertson 1983), isomorphism, orShaumyan s law of semiotic relevance . He writes (2.222): As an ideal to

be aimed at ... each word should have a single exact m eaning. . . . Peircealso speaks to l inguistic change, specifically semantic change, saying: Forevery symbol is a living thing, in a v ery strict sense that is no mere figureof speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaninginevitably grows, incorporates new elem ents and throw s off old ones .The experience of reading that In most languages that have nouns andadjectives, th e participal adjective follows th e noun C P : 4.56) is thatfamiliar l inguistic one of reading about a universal of l inear syntax.Equal ly,if not more, sought after by linguists is a definition of a sentence,such as can be found in Peirce (3.461): The proposition, or sentence,signifies that an eternal truth, a permanent conditional force, or law,attaches certain hecceities to certain parts of an idea .Peirce s d efinition,however, strikes the linguistic ear as less familiar, since it typifies th eclassic Peircean definition of a sign.Peirce s interest in linguistic pragmatics goes without saying. Obviouslythis statem en t is som ew hat m isguided, since it is on ly in the last decade orso that th e l inguist began to understand th e position of pragmaticconsiderations in l inguistic structure and description. Peirce demonstratesth e pragmatics of verbal interaction or discourse grammar:Two men meet on a country road. One says to the other, that house is on fire.Wha t house? W hy th e house about a m ile to m y right. Letthis speech be takendown and shown to anybody in the neighboring village, and it will appear that th elanguage by itself does not fix the house. But the person addressed sees w here thespeaker is standing, recognizes h is right hand side ... estimates a mile ... andlooking there sees a house. It is not the language alone, with its mere associationsof s imilar i ty, but the language taken in connection with th e author s ow nexperiential associations of contiguity which determines for him what house ism eant. It is requisite then, in order to show w hat w e are talking or writing abo ut,to put the heare r s or reader s m ind into real, active connection with theconcatenation of experience or of fiction w i th which we are dealing, and, further,to draw his attention to, and identify, a certain number of particular points insuch concatenation. (CP: 3.419)The more conservative l inguist m ay relate to Peirce s discussion ofsentence function for including pragmatics in his (the linguist s) ow nwork. Thus Peirce maintains,The distinction between an assertion and an interr oga ting sentence is of secondaryimportance. An assertion has its modality, or measure of assurance, and aquestion generally involvesas part of it an assertion of emphatically low mod ality.



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38 rmengard RauchIn add ition to that, it is intended to s timulate the hearer to make a n an swer. Thisis a rhetorical function which needs no special gramm atical f orm . If in wan deringabout th e country, I wish to inquire the way to town, I can perfectly do so byassertion, w ithou t drawin g upo n the interrogative form of syntax. Thu s I may say,this road leads, perhaps, to the city. I wish to know what you think about it . Themost suitable way of expressing a question would, from a logical point of view,seem to be by an interjection: this road leads, perhaps, to the city, eh? CP: 4.57)As a logician Peirce naturally deals with various parts of speech; he isintenton explaining , for example, subjecthood, verbness^the nature of thepreposition and the noun . Thus, concerning subjecthood, Peirce writes:I term those occasions or objects which a re denoted by the indices th e subjects ofthe assertion. But these will not coincide with th e objects denoted by thegrammaticalsub jects.... That w hich is called the subject is the no un w hich is in thenominative, although, even in our relatively small family of Indo-Europeanlanguages, there are several in which that noun which in Latin, Greek, and themodern European languages is put in the nominative, is put in an oblique case.Witness the Irish and Gaelic. (CP: 2.338)He writes further:Each part of a proposition which might be replaced by a proper name, and stillleave the proposition a proposition is a subject of the proposition. This, it will beremarked, makes what modern grammars call the direct and indirect objects, aswell as much else, to be subjects; and some persons will consider this to be a badabuse of the word subject. C P :4.438)Feistily, Peirce co ntinu es, Come, let us have this out , and he proceeds toexplain the origin o f the logical d efin ition of subjecthood according toBoethiusand Cicero, predating by more than a millenn ium that gramma-tical notion of subjecthood which insists on a surface nominative.Subjecthood in linguistic deep structure grammars, for example casegrammars, coincides nicely w ith Peirce s logical concept of subject.Peirce considers th e preposition an essential part of speech ... in thatno language can exist without prepositions, either as separate wordsplaced before or after their objects, as case-declensions, as syntacticalarrangements of words, or some e qu ivale n t form s (3.458). He has littleuse for the common noun (as I will point out furthe r below). Com paringth e preposition to the noun, he writes (2.341), It is absurd, indeed, toerect this unnecessary part of speech (the noun) into a logical form andleave th e indispensable prepositions unrepresented, merely because inIndo-European languages they often appear in the form of terminations .From the m ore recent linguistic view poin t, Peirce expresses the sentence-



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Alias semiotics 39likeor prepositionalcharacterof the exocentric prepositional phrase(seeRauch 1979a).Peirce's lengthy and frequent discussions of the dispensability of thenounge nerallygohand inhand w ithhisund erstandingof theprimacyofthe verb. He observes (2.328), 'It happens to be true that in theoverwhelmingm ajority oflanguages thereare nog eneral class nam esandadjectives that are not conceived asparts ofsome verbs...almost everyfamily of m an thi nk s of general w ords as parts of verbs'. F urthe r (2.341):'common nouns...areme re accidental gramm atical forms which happento be very prominent in the languages most familiar to us, but winchhardly exist, or at least are far from prominent, in the vast majority oftongues,and arereallynotneeded,atall,andoughtto beunknownto theGrammatica Speculativa\ And further still Peirce (3.440) writes: 'Thecommon noun happens to havea very distinctive character in the Indo-European languages. In m ost other tongues it is not sharply discriminatedfrom a verb or participle. Man , if it can be said to me an any thin g byitself, means what I am thinkingof is aman' .Thisnotion is repeatednineteen sections laterOur European languagesare peculiar in their marked differentiation ofcommonnounsfrom verbs...it is probably true that in the great m ajori ty of the tongues ofm n distinctive comm on nou ns either do not exist or are exceptional form ations.In their meaning as they stand in sentences, and in my comparatively widely-studied languages, common nouns are akin to participles, as being mere inflec-tions of verbs. C P : 3.459)Twoadditional statements ofPeirceon the positionof thecomm on nounwill serve as a prelude to the final topic we will consider in theinterdigitation of linguistics and semiotics. Peirce writes:There are more than a dozen d i f f e r e n t families of languages, d i f f e r i n g radically intheir manner of thinking-, and Ibelieveit isfair to say that among thesethe Indo-European is the onlyone inwhich words whichare distinctively common nounsarenumerous.Andsinceanouno rcomb inationofnounsbyitself says noth ing ,Ido not knowwhy thelogician shouldberequiredtotake accountof it atall. EveninI ndo -Eu rope an speech the linguists tell us tha t the roots are all verbs. It seemsthat, Speaking broadly, ordinary words in the bulk of languages are assertory.They assert as soon as they are in any wayattached to any object. If youwriteGLAS S upon a case, youwillbe und erstood to m ean that the case co ntains glass. C P : 4.56,italics m ine)Finally Peirce saysThe Indo-European languages aresingularinhavingthecommon noundistinctlyand fully developed as a separate part of speech, and by more or less development



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40 Irmengard aucheven of abstract nouns. I do not mean to say that the common noun is not fullydeveloped in anyother language, but only thatsuch a phenomenon is e xceptionalin every other great family of speech. This requires and evidences considerablepowero f thoughtonth epartof thosewho usethese languages.W ith the exercise of alittle ingen uity it is possible to express anything in these languages, provided nohigher relations than dyadic ones enter. Only very simple propositions can beexpressed involving higher relations; and those whosementaleducation is limitedby th epow ers o f these languages are unable to grasp the meaning of a complextriplerelation.... C P: 7.385, italics mine)It isimportant in cogitating these tw o statements to shift attention fromthe common no un toPeirce'simplication that the structure of a languagean d the thin kin g of its speakers are intimatel y related, perhaps in a causean d effect relationship.In the final section of this paper viewing Peirce with no pretension tobeing alinguist', we will consider something known to linguists as theSapir-Whorf hypothesis. Alternately we may wish to consider our con-cluding discussion underthe rubric'Peirce: those whose mental educa-tion is limited by the power of these languages' .First to the linguists. Although the premises contained in the Sapir-Whorf hyp othesis are man ifold , the basic or central proposition holds, inthe words of Whorfs editor, John B. Carroll (1956:23), that 'thestructure of a hum an being s language influences the manner in w hich heunderstands reality and behaves with respect to it'. The hypothesis soentitled byCarroll after two linguist-anthropologists of the first half ofthe twentieth century, Edward Sapir (1884-1939) and Benjamin Whorf(1897-1941),isotherwise known as the theory of'linguisticrelativity'orlinguistic relativism . Relativism itself actually holds that human lan-guages.are relative in their structure, since it claims there is no absoluteuniversal structure; reality, it claims further, attests to endless diversityamon g languages. Sapir-Whorfian relativity incorporates also the conceptof linguistic determinism , which holds that language determinesthought. This combination theory commonly admits of two degrees, astronger version and a weaker version the former maintaining thatlanguage determines cognition and action, the latter maintaining thatlanguage merely influences cognition and action. Statements of Sapirasserting, for example, that 'Such categories as number, gender, case,tense ...are not so much discovered in experience as imposed upon itbecauseof the tyrannical hold that linguistic form has upon our orienta-tion in the world (1931:578), and of Who rf proclaiming tha t 'linguisticsis fundamen tal to the theory ofthinking' (1964: 136), are most frequentlyconstrued as represen tative of the stronge r version of linguistic relativity.The juxtaposition of thinking an d language is, of course, a venerable

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Alias semiotics 41topic.Tw entieth-c entury linguistic relativity derives from theories of theinterrelatedness of thought and language which enjoy an uninterruptedsuccession from Ferdinand de Saussure through Wilhelm von Hum boldt,Johann Gottfried Herder, and Johann Georg Hamann all of whomconsidered our world view to be directly influenced by language. Penn(1972) traces the hypo thesis of the influence of language on thought as farback as Plato, and Brown (1967: 13) im plies a broad netw ork ofHumboldt-influenced linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and anthro-pologists since Sapir and Whorf, many of whom are still active today(Cassirer,Weisgerber, Trier, Bally, Levi-Strauss, Piaget, Sommerfelt, andWittgenstein).

In fact, evidence of the linguistic relativity concept is ubiquitous. Ourlinguist-semiotist colleague Ru lon W ells, speak ing of evolution, writes: Itis customary to speak of the Darwinian hypothesis, as though it were asingular, individual, and determinate object. This is a way in which ourlanguage misleads us into steps and p aths which it is all-imp ortant toavoid (1964: 306, second emphasis mine). Another case in point is foundin the appendix to Orwell s 1984. Orwell describes the official language,Newspeak, of his imagined Oceania: It was intended that when News-peak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, aheretical thought that is, a thought diverging from the principles ofIngsoc should literally be unthinkable, at least so far as thought isdependent on words (emphasis mine).Let us turn now to Peirce on linguistic relativity. Peirce (CP: 2.67-70)speaks directly to linguistic relativity as one Of a swarm of differentmethods of establishing the truths of logic . He writes,I m ust acknowledge... there are a num ber of em inent linguists who m aintain thismethod in its extremest possible fo rm. . . . When Sayce (a linguist) says that hadAristotle been a Mexican, his system of logic would have assumed a whollydifferent form , I am willing to adm it that there is a good deal of truth in that. It islucky tha t Aristotle s on ly language was one that led him into as few errors as didthe Greek. But so far am I from finding in this remark any encouragem ent to trustto the indications of language as evidence of logical necessity, tha t it seem s to m eto go quite the other way. (CP: 2.69, emphasis mine)

Let us consider a few more citations from Peirce where he addresseslinguistic relativ ity indirectly. Peirce (CP: 3.430) observes that speculativegrammar must analyse an assertion into its essential elements, indepen-dently of the structure of the language in which it may happen to beexpressed .He notes (CP: 3.481, emphasis mine): Itis acurious exampleof the degree to which the thoughts of logicians have been tied down tothe accidents of the particular language they happened to write (mostly



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liassemiotics 43Leach, Sir Edmund 1976). Social geography an d linguistic performance. Semiotica 16,

87-97.Lyons,John 1977).Semantics vol. 1.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981).LanguageandLinguistics.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Orwell,George 1949).1984.NewYork: Harcourt, Brace.Osgood, Charles E. 1980). What is alanguage?In TheSignifying Animal:TheGrammarof

LanguageandE xperience IrmengardRauch andGerald F.Carr (eds.),9-50. Blooming-ton: Indiana University Press.Peirce, CharlesS. 1902). Chapter II,Philological Notions. Section I, Classificationof theSciences Logic II). Manuscript on microfilm at the University of Illinois Rare BookRoom.Urbana,Illinois.(1913-1934). Collected Papers of CharlesSandersP eirce vols.1-5, C.Hartshorne and P.Weiss (eds.);vol.7, A.Burks ed.). Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.Penn,Julia 1972).Linguistic Relativity versusInnate Ideas. The Hague: Mouton.Rauch, Irmengard 1979a). First-language syntax in the New High German of Swissauthors.AmsterdamerBeitrge zu r neuerenGermanistik9,23-32. 1979b).Thelanguage-inlayinsemiotic modalities. Semiotica25,67-76. 1987). Old-Saxon hell drawl an d silence. In Althochdeutsch:Festschrift f r RudolfSchtzeichel R.Bergmann,H.Tiefenbach, and L.Voetz(eds.).Robertson, John S. 1983). From symbolto icon:Theevolutionof thepronominal system

from common Mayan to modern Yucatecan. Language59 ,781-819.Robin, RichardS. ed.) 1967).AnnotatedC atalogueo f thePapers of CharlesSandersPeirce.Worcester, MA: Universityof Massachusetts Press.Sapir, Edward 1931).Conceptual categories inprimitive languages. Science74,578.Sebeok, ThomasA. 1977).EcumenicalisminSemiotics.InA Perfusion of Signs Thomas A.Sebeok ed.), 180-206.Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1984).Signsof life. International Semiotic Spectrum 2 1-2.Shapiro, Michael 1980). Russian conjugation: Theory and hermeneutic. Language 56,

67-93.Shaumyan, Sebastian 1984). Semiotic laws in linguistics and natural science. In NewDirectionsinLinguisticsandSemiotics JamesE.Copeland ed.),231-257.Houston: RiceUniversity Press.

Uexkll, Jakob von 1940). Bedeutungslehre (=BIOS 10). Leipzig: Johann AmbrosiusBarth.Uexkll,Thure vo n 1981).DieZeichenlehreJakobvonUexklls.In D ie Welt als Zeichen.Klassiker dermodernenSemiotik M.Krampen et al. (eds.), 233-279.Berlin: Severin an dSiedler.

Wells,Rulon 1964).The truenatureofPeirce sevolutionism.InStudiesin thePhilosophy ofCharlesSanders Peirce E. C. Moore and R. S. Robin (eds.), 304-322.Amherst, MA:University ofMassachusetts Press.Whorf , Benjamin Lee 1964). Alinguistic consideration ofthinkinginprimitive communi-ties. InLanguagein Culture and Society Dell Hymes ed.), 129-14L NewYork: Harperand Row.

Irmengard Rauch b.1933)isProfessorofGermanat theUniversityo fCalifornia, Berkeley.Herprincipal research interests include GermanicandIndo-European linguistics, synchronyand diachrony, semiotics and semiotic change, and linguistic and semiotic methodology.Among herpublicationsa reApproaches in LinguisticMethodology 1967)and The SignifyingAnimal: The Grammar of Language and Experience 1980).



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rauch no pretension to be linguist

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