raim prediction service short finals and no fuel the … · *note that it will be possible to fly...

Pointing to Safer Aviation

R A I M P R E D I C T I O N S E R V I C E

S H O R T F I N A L S A N D N O F U E L

T H E A I P – W H AT i s I T ?

C H E A P E R O P E R AT I O N S

September/October 1999, Issue 6

September/October 1999, Issue 6 VECTOR2

C O N T E N T S

ISSN 1173-9614

Also Featuring:

Page 7 The AIP – What is It?The AIP is made up of nine differentproducts, which are essential to flightsafety. Do you know what they are?

Page 4 RAIM Prediction ServiceSometimes there are insufficient satellitesin view to provide an integrity check forpilots relying on GPS for navigation. Thisarticle explains what Receiver AutonomousIntegrity Monitoring (RAIM) is and how thenew RAIM prediction service works.

Cover Photo:

An early morning winter scene at North Shore aerodrome as local balloon operators make an intermediate landing

during a morning champagne flight. North Shore Aero Club President, Carole Dennis, captured the moment on a club

camera kept handy for opportunities like this.

Page 9 Military Low Flying ZonesThe CAA has just designated three newmilitary low flying zones that you shouldknow about. Details and diagrams arecontained within.

Page 10 Cheaper OperationsWe all know that you have to spend moneyto make money! So why not make aninvestment now in a safety programmethat is going increase your long-termprofits? It makes good business sense –read on to find out more.

Page12 Cellphones – a Help or a Hindrance?Using your cellphone to obtain a pre-flightbriefing and then file a flight plan/SARWATCH may not always be the bestoption. This FAA News article explains why.

Managing Editor: Cliff Jenks

Vector Editors: Pam Collings & Barnaby Hill

CAA News Editors: Emma Peel & FrancineBeachman

Design: Gusto Design & Print Limited

Published by: Civil Aviation Authority ofNew Zealand, PO Box 31-441, Lower Hutt,NEW ZEALAND. Telephone +64–4–560 9400,Fax +64–4–569 2024, Managing Editoremail: [email protected], CAA News Editoremail: [email protected]. Published sixtimes a year, in the last week of every oddmonth.

Publication ContentThe views expressed in Vector (with theexception of “Occurrence Briefs”) are thoseof the Editor or the named contributor. Theyare intended to stimulate discussion and donot necessarily reflect the policy of the CivilAviation Authority. Nothing in Vector is tobe taken as overriding any New Zealand CivilAviation legislation, or any instructionsissued or endorsed by the Civil AviationAuthority of New Zealand.

Reader comments and contributions arewelcome and will normally be published, butthe Editor reserves the right to edit orabridge them, and not to publish those thatare judged not to contribute constructivelytowards safer aviation. Reader contributionsand correspondence regarding the contentof Vector should be addressed to: VectorEditor, PO Box 31-441, Lower Hutt.

Free DistributionVector is distributed automatically toNew Zealand Flight Crew and AircraftMaintenance Engineer licence holders, tomost organisations holding an AviationDocument, and to certain other persons andorganisations interested in promoting saferaviation. Vector articles also appear on CAA’sweb site at http://www.caa.govt.nz/

Change of AddressReaders receiving Vector free of chargeshould notify the Civil Aviation Authority(Approvals Clerk) of any change of address;quoting your CAA Client Number (or licencenumber) will assist in administration. Payingsubscribers should notify PublishingSolutions Ltd.

Paid SubscriptionsVector is available on subscription only fromPublishing Solutions Ltd, PO Box 983,Wellington, freephone 0800 800 359, phone+64–4–471 0582, fax +64–4–471 0717.

CopyrightReproduction in whole or in part of any itemin Vector, other than material shown to befrom other sources or named authors, isfreely permitted, providing that it isintended solely for the purpose ofpromoting safer aviation, and providing thatacknowledgment is given to Vector.


Page 12 ASC Course ReminderPage 13 Survival Uses for Aircraft PartsPage 14 New Video – Rotary TalesPage 15 Occurrence Briefs

Page 11 Short Finals And No FuelSometimes small oversights in the flight-planning phase can compound to result ina serious incident or accident. Find outwhat happened to this particular pilot.

September/October 1999, Issue 6VECTOR 3

Safety SeminarsSafety SeminarsCross-Country SeminarsThis year’s series of safety seminars is wellunder way and have proven very popular sofar, with large numbers attending.

The seminars revolve around the planningand decision-making involved in making aVFR cross-country flight. At North Islandseminars pilots will be tasked with flying southto Warbirds Over Wanaka, and at South Islandvenues pilots will plan a flight north to theAmerica’s Cup. Most aspects of planning andexecuting such a flight will be covered, withparticular emphasis on airspace considerations,understanding local weather patterns,avoiding inhospitable terrain, mountain flyingconsiderations where applicable, andinterpreting AIP Supplements and NOTAMs.

Experienced instructors will provide you withuseful tips about operating in their part ofthe country, and CAA staff will cover variousaspects of the planning and decision-makinginvolved in a cross-country flight.

Whether you have five hours or fivethousand hours, these seminars will beof value to you – particularly if you don’tfly ‘across the ditch’ very often.

There are six Av-Kiwi Seminars scheduledto run from mid through to late October.Check the accompanying list for venue anddate details, and watch out for advertisingposters displayed at your local trainingorganisation or aviation business. Theseseminars are enjoyable, informative, andpopular – so see you at one soon!

Seminar Schedule

Thu 14 October, 7:00 pm – 10:00 pm

New Plymouth Aerodrome, atNew Plymouth Aero Club.

Sat 16 October, 9:30 am – 12:30 pm

Ohakea, Educational Unit Theatrette.(*See note below).

Sun 17 October, 9:30 am – 12:30 pm

Paraparaumu Aerodrome, atAssociated Aviation.

Tue 19 October, 7:00 pm – 10:00 pm

Omaka Aerodrome, at MarlboroughAero Club.

Wed 20 October, 7:00 pm – 10:00 pm

Nelson, Tahuna Function Centre,Beach Road, Tahuna.

Thu 21 October, 7:00 pm – 10:00 pm

Greymouth Aerodrome, at GreymouthAero Club.

*Note that it will be possible to fly in tothe Ohakea seminar provided that youadvise your aircraft type, registration, andETA to Base Operations (Phone 0–6–351 5442 or Fax 0–6–351 5448) bymidday Friday 15 October 1999. Thisoffer is open only to those wishing toattend the Av-Kiwi seminar. If drivingin, visitor passes and directions will beavailable at the main gate. A visit to ATC

may be possible immediately followingthe seminar. Kites Café will be open forlunch.

Maintenance SeminarsTwo safety seminars on maintenance areplanned for Pine Park and Dargaville inOctober of this year. These will focuson last year’s topic, Maintenance Matters,and are particularly pertinent to aircraftowners/operators and pilots.

Achieving a high standard of main-tenance is a function of good plant, goodplanning and good decisions. Theseseminars look at the ingredients to assistthis and highlight the relationships thatexist between engineer, owner, operatorand pilot to achieve serviceability andsafety. The roles and responsibilities of allparties under the relevant CAA rules arealso explored in some detail.

The seminars will be presented by OwenWalker, CAA Field Safety Adviser(Maintenance). Venue details and datesare outlined below:


Dargaville Aerodrome, at NorthernWairoa Aero Club.


Pine Park Aerodrome, at Pine ParkAero Club.


RAIM Prediction ServiceReceiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is an important function forchecking GPS navigation integrity. On occasions there are insufficient GPS satellitesin view to provide an integrity check using the RAIM function. Such gaps in coverage,or ‘RAIM holes’, need to be known in advance when pilots are relying on GPSnavigation. This article, compiled by Rudi Van der Velden (Navigation EngineeringDevelopment) of Airways Corporation of New Zealand, explains what RAIM is andhow the new RAIM prediction service works.

This article is technical by its verynature and is therefore awash withacronyms, which are necessary toensure its readability. We have listedthe majority of these below as ahandy reference:

AFTN – Aeronautical FixedTelecommunication Network

DoD – US Department of Defense

GBAS – Ground Based AugmentationSystem

GLONASS – Global NavigationSatellite System

GNSS – Global Navigation SatelliteSystem

NPA – Non-Precision Approach

RAIM – Receiver AutonomousIntegrity Monitoring

RPS – RAIM Prediction System

SBAS – Space Based AugmentationSystem

TSO – Technical Safety Order

RAIM PredictionServiceAirways Corporation has recently signeda contract with AirServices Australia(ASA) to provide RAIM predictioninformation from their RAIM PredictionSystem (RPS). This was a more cost-effective approach than developing ourown system here in New Zealand, sincewe only needed to supply ASA with adatabase of selected New Zealandairfields.

The purpose of the RPS is to provideaerodrome specific GPS RAIM outagesto pilots during the pre-flight planningprocess. It can also be used to notify Air Traffic Control, via the AFTN(Aeronautical Fixed TelecommunicationsNetwork), of these outages. RPS canprovide up to 72 hours of GPS outagepredictions. The service is provided byAirways Corporation free-of-charge to

users and can be accessed via either theAFTN or the Internet.

RPS has been on trial for the past yearin New Zealand and has providedsignificant information on theoccurrence of RAIM outages around thecountry.

How RAIM WorksRAIM provides navigational integrity bydetecting if a GPS satellite has failed oris sending an invalid message. It is asoftware function available in IFR-certified GPS receivers that comparesposition and time information fromcombinations of any four out of five ormore satellites. Occasionally there areinsufficient satellites in view to providea GPS integrity assurance using theRAIM function. This may mean thatGPS accuracy is outside the requirementsconsidered safe for navigation.

RAIM prediction systems offer advancewarning of GPS position informationintegrity at specific locations. Duringpre-flight planning such warnings can beuseful if the user is intending to use GPSas a primary navigation tool (providedall CAA rule requirements are met underPart 19 Transition Rules) and in particularwhen used for non-precision approaches.

RAIM holes can exist for periods of 30or more minutes at certain locations.Being aware of these in advance can offerfuel savings by delaying departure timesso as to arrive at the desired destinationwhen sufficient satellites are in view.

Accessing RPSInformationInternetThe Internet is the easiest method ofobtaining RPS information providingyou have a PC and Internet access.This information can be found athttp://www.airservices.gov.au andcan be accessed as follows:

1. Select Pilot Briefing

2. Select GPS RAIMAvailability –New Zealand

3. Select the aerodromes you wishto receive a RAIM availabilityprediction for

4. Submit your request

AFTNFor those that who do not have accessto the Internet, RAIM availabilityinformation is also distributed using theAFTN. RAIM messages are available onrequest, and they are also sent to theNational Briefing Office once a day at1400 UTC, or when there is a change tothe constellation status. Up to 20locations may be included in one requestmessage.

For example, a pilot requesting RAIMinformation for Milford and Kaitaia, asabove, could receive the following reply:

NZMF NO GPS RAIM OUTAGES

NZKT 9906092303 TIL 9906092323

GPS RAIM UNAVBL FOR NPA.

This means there are no RAIM outagesfor Milford, but there is a predictedRAIM outage for Kaitaia on 9 June 1999from 2303 to 2323 UTC, ie, for 20minutes, during which GPS is notavailable for non-precision approaches.

Similar messages are also received whenrequests are made via the Internet.

GPS ReceiversRAIM prediction is also available fromIFR-certified GPS receivers; it providesa determination of the number ofsatellites available over a particular



location at a specific time. Using this data,and the RAIM algorithm, the GPSreceiver will provide an indication ofwhether using GPS as a primary meansof navigation throughout the flight ispossible.

A limitation of GPS receivers thathave RAIM prediction capability is thatthey do not take into account forcedsatellite outages. Occasionallythe US

Department ofDefense (DoD)needs todo maintenance onGPS satellites.This includes possible

re-align-ment of thesatellites, uploadingdata, and adjustments toclock data. DoD

provides GPS NOTAMs when-everthere is a scheduled maintenance outagefor a GPS satellite.

Aircraft GPS receivers capable of carryingout RAIM predictions may not alwaysremove satellites that are unavailable, sincethey only consider almanac data (whichprovides information on approximatepositions for active satellites). They mayconsider that a satellite is available whenin fact it may have been taken out formaintenance.

Ground-Based SystemsThe RPS that Airways Corporationprovides in conjunction with AirservicesAustralia is located at Brisbane Airport.

The RPS RAIM algorithm used is basedon the same requirements as the RAIMalgorithm that is contained in an aircraftGPS receiver.

In order for the GPS RPS to computeRAIM availability, it must first downloadthe satellite almanac data. It does thiseither from a GPS receiver or from a website maintained by the United StatesCoast Guard. The almanac data providesthe precise position of all orbitingsatellites. This data is downloaded at leastonce a day. GPS NOTAMs of scheduledand unscheduled outages are received viathe AFTN as notified by DoD.

Both the almanac and GPS NOTAMdata are required by the RPS to generateGPS outage data. RAIM outageinformation for the aerodromes listed onthe database are computed once a day,or whenever a satellite outage NOTAMhas been received.

RAIM Coverage inNew ZealandThe RPS predicts, up to 72 hours inadvance, any RAIM holes at anaerodrome listed on the database. Analysisof the information provided by the RPShas revealed that a number of RAIMholes exist from time to time aroundNew Zealand. There are regular RAIMoutages towards the north of the NorthIsland, although these are generally ofshort duration lasting less than 10minutes. There have also been instances

where RAIM outages have exceeded 30minutes at some aerodromes.

Examples of the extent to which RAIMoutages have occurred are given in Tables1 to 3.

The predicted RAIM outages from 16to 29 November 1998 shown in Table 1,and 1 to 14 December 1998 in Table 2,revealed a large number of outagesaround the country. Table 2 showed largeoutages (more than 25 mins) on 1, 2 and3 December for nearly all of the countrystarting at about the same time. The timesgiven in each cell indicate when theoutage occurred. An asterisk indicatesthere was more than one outage duringthe day but only where the longestoutage was noted. For example, NZKT– 1625* means that more than oneoutage occurred on 1 December but thelongest outage started at 1625 and lastedmore than 25 minutes at Kaitaia.

Currently, only the aerodromes listed inthe above tables have been provided foron the AirServices Australia RPSdatabase. Further aerodromes will beadded in future if required.

RPS Use and LimitationsAnyone who uses GPS extensivelyshould consider using the RAIMprediction facility – especially those whouse GPS for non-precision approaches.A number of non-precision approachprocedures are now in place, althoughmainly for emergency service helicopteroperations.

Table 1. RAIM availability 16 to 30 November 1998

Continued over...


RAIM prediction should be carried outas part of the pre-flight planning whenGPS is to be used as a primary means ofnavigation. There is, however, a drawbackwith the RPS, which lies with the 72-hour prediction default setting. That is,if a prediction is made more than 24hours in advance, the accuracy of theprediction may be less reliable. This is dueto some GPS NOTAMs being cancelledwithin the 72-hour period, which meansprevious predictions that have taken theseinto account are no longer valid. For thisreason, a RAIM prediction should bemade as close as possible to the intendedtime of departure using the Airways RPS.Additionally, if you have a TSO-C129receiver capable of RAIM prediction,

then a further prediction should becarried out during flight before arrivingat the destination. Since it can take morethan 45 minutes for the US Air Forcecommand centre to receive informationon an errant GPS satellite, it is prudentthat pilots maintain RAIM vigilance.

GPS Receivers andBaro-aidingThe availability of RAIM improves if aGPS receiver incorporates barometricaltimeter information. Commonly calledbaro-aiding, this effectively simulates asatellite located directly overhead the user.Hence, baro-aiding means that theRAIM requirement for five or six

satellites is reduced to four or fiverespectively.

RPS assumes baro-aiding is availablewhen making its calculations. In Australiathe calculation is not so much of aproblem, as barometric aiding has beenmandated for all non-precision GPSapproaches. New Zealand, on the otherhand, has not mandated barometricaiding. There is some chance, therefore,that the RAIM prediction result is betterthan what is actually determined by aGPS receiver that does not have baro-aiding.

Consideration is being given to a softwareswitch that would allow baro-aiding tobe selected or de-selected when RPSinformation is requested via the Internet.

Table 3. RAIM availability 1 to 14 May 1999

Table 2. RAIM availability 1 to14 December 1998

...continued from previous page


It is recommended that pilots whoare considering purchasing GPSreceivers, or replacing the onesthey have, consider models thataccept barometr ic altimeterinformation, thus significantlyimproving the RAIM availability.

The Future of RPSCurrently only 29 airfields existon the New Zealand RPSdatabase. This database will beexpanded as airfields orlocations with GPS approach proceduresare further developed. Requests fromother users for additional airfields will beincluded if they are considered suitable.

The availability and accuracy of GPSsatellite information is critical to theintegrity of GPS as a navigation aid.RAIM is necessary to ensure thisintegrity. Future systems, such as Groundand Space Based Augmentation Systems

(GBAS and SBAS), will offeran additional means ofnavigation utilising theGlobal Navigation SatelliteSystem (GNSS). With GBASproviding precision approachcapability, and SBASproviding en-route and non-precision approach capability,these systems will offerimproved accuracy, integrity,availability, and continuity fornavigation by satellite in the

future. They should also reduce theoccurrence of RAIM outages.

GNSS incorporates the American DoDGPS as well as the Russian equivalentGlobal Navigation Satellite System(GLONASS).

Selective Availability (SA), the intentionaldegradation of the GPS accuracy byDoD, is being considered for removalwithin the next 10 years. This, together

with the introduction of GBAS andSBAS in future, should substantiallyincrease the integr ity of satellitenavigation and possibly remove theexistence of RAIM holes altogether.

Further InformationFurther background information on theGPS RAIM Prediction Service may beobtained from the AirServices Australiawebsite at:

http://www.airservices.gov.au/Apps/Briefing/raimdoc.htm

Alternatively contact:

Rudi Van der VeldenAirways Corp. of New Zealand LtdAirways HousePO Box 294 WellingtonTel: 0–4–471 5681Fax: 0–4–471 5698Email: [email protected]

Most of us are familiar with the VisualFlight Guide (VFG), TopographicalCharts, and the Visual Terminal Charts(VTCs), but what about the other productsthat make up the AeronauticalInformation Publication (AIP)?Supplements and VFG Change Noticesare products that we should also befamiliar with. This article provides a briefdescription about each product and howit is used.

The AIP forms a major part of theAeronautical Information Service(AIS). The remainder of this

service is comprised of the Pre-flightInformation Service, which is providedby the National Briefing Office (NBO)and the NOTAM office. It is theresponsibility of each pilot licence holderunder the Civil Aviation Rules to ensurethat they have up-to-date documents andcharts that are appropriate for the typeof flying they do.

The AIP contains a vast amount ofinformation that is designed to assistpilots with pre-flight planning and whenin the air. Every effort is made by theCAA and the Airways Corporation tokeep this information as up-to-date aspossible – especially while the transitionbetween the old Civil AviationRegulations and the new Civil AviationRules is taking place. These changes,combined with other changes such as

The AIP – What is It?

those to airspace and aerodromes, oftenmean that there is a large volume ofamendments to the AIP. For safetyreasons, therefore, it is important thatthese documents are kept up to date.

So what are the various products whichmake up the AIP?

Visual Flight Guide (VFG)

The VFG provides information andprocedures for VFR operations that areland based. It contains information onnormal VFR operations, specialprocedures, emergency procedures, andpictorial information on many of theaerodromes around New Zealand.

It is issued annually in June and becomeseffective in mid July. A subscriptionentitles you to one VFG and the annualamendment service of Supplements, VFGChange Notices, and AeronauticalInformation Circulars (AICs). If you area VFR pilot, it is extremely important tohave an up-to-date VFG and to alwayscarry it with you in the aircraft, even ona local flight.

Helicopter/WaterAerodrome VFG (HWVFG)

The HWVFG provides information anddetails on procedures for VFR operations

Continued over...



into heliports and water aerodromes andis structured in a similar way to the fixed-wing VFG. Issued annually, a subscriptionentitles you to the same amendmentservice as the fixed-wing VFG.

VFG Change NoticesVFG Change Notices containamendments to VFG text and aerodromecharts that are important to flight safety.Change Notices are issued approximatelyevery two months and tend to grow insize as more material is added. Thecontents of the Change Notice is thenincorporated into the next annual editionof the VFG.

Each time you receive a Change Noticeit is a good idea to highlight the affectedpages in your VFG. The current ChangeNotice should always be kept with yourVFG. The highlighted page of the VFGwill remind you to refer to the ChangeNotice for the updated aerodromeinformation if you are planning to flythere.

Instrument Flight Guide (IFG)The IFG provides information and detailsof procedures (along with Area andEnroute Charts) required for IFRoperations. It contains operational data,instrument approach/departureprocedures, special operating procedures,and pictorial information on all theaerodromes around the country that haveinstrument approach/departureprocedures.

Amendments to the IFG are issued two-monthly, whereas Area and EnrouteCharts are issued annually in June(effective in July). Annual subscriptionsto the amendment service include a fullSupplement and AIC service. There areoften a large number of IFG amendmentsbecause of changing instrumentprocedures, and it is therefore vital thatthe IFG it is kept up to date.

AIP SupplementsAIP Supplements contain information ofa temporary nature that is not deemedurgent enough to issue as a NOTAM, orinformation that comprises extensive textor graphics. Military exercises, forexample, must be published as an AIPSupplement simply because they are toodetailed to be published as a NOTAM.Supplements often contain informationabout temporary airspace such asTemporary Restricted Areas associatedwith airshows, or Danger Areas wherearmy firing is taking place, for example.Other information might include

aerodrome hazards, or the establishmentof a Mandatory Broadcast Zone.

AIP Supplements are issued every monthand, like all other AIP products, willusually be in your mailbox one monthbefore they become effective. It isimportant that you always have a currentAIP Supplement and that you read it aspart of your pre-flight planning beforeventuring out of your local area – it oftencontains information that will affect yourflight – especially in relation to militaryexercises.

Planning ManualThe AIP Planning Manual providesinformation for the purposes of pre-flightplanning. It provides pilots withinformation on the various aeronauticalservices that are available within the AirNavigation system (eg, Air TrafficServices, aeronautical telecommunicationservices, meteorological information, andaviation security services) and details howbest to comply with the general flightoperating rules, particularly Part 91General Operating and Flight Rules. ThePlanning Manual also provides assistancewith things such as how to interpret ameteorological forecast, or differenttypes of airspace, and it also contains agreat deal of useful flight-planninginformation. Its easy-to-use tabulationand contents system enables this type ofinformation to be accessed quickly. ThePlanning Manual is not, however,intended for use in the air.

Amendments to the Planning Manual areissued every two months.

Topographical Charts(1:500,000)Topographical Charts are specificallydesigned to assist with VFR navigationand therefore depict a large amount ofdetailed geographical information suchas spot heights, relief shading, andnumerous place names. In order to avoidchart clutter, however, they do not depictairspace completely. There are four1:500,000 topographical sheets, and theyare issued annually in June (effective inmid July).

Visual Terminal Charts (VTCs)VTCs are 1:250,000 scale charts thatdepict airspace in and around controlledaerodromes. They are critical in helpingto separate VFR and IFR traffic. Thereare two large VTCs that cover the maincentres (Auckland/Ohakea andWellington/Chr istchurch) and sixsmaller VTCs that cover the regional

centres. They are all issued annually(effective in mid July).

The applicable and up-to-date VTC(s)should always be carried in your aircraft– especially if you are planning to operatein airspace that you are not familiar with.We suggest that you always carry theappropriate VTCs and TopographicalCharts when operating under IFR, as youmay need to make the transition to VFRat any stage during the flight. While thetwo large VTCs generally cater for themajority of flights, the smaller VTCs area must if you plan to fly to regionalcentres such as Gisborne or Queenstown.

Enroute Instrument ChartsFour Enroute Instrument Charts depictIFR routes on both a national and a localscale. They are issued annually (effectivein mid July) as part of the IFGamendment service.

The AIRAC CycleAll amendments to the AIP are issued inaccordance with the ICAO (Inter-national Civil Aviation Organisation)AIRAC (aeronautical informationregulation and control) cycle of effectivedates. This process ensures the timelydistribution of what is often safety criticalinformation at least 28 days before itbecomes effective.

Subscribing to the AIPAll of the AIP products listed above canbe obtained from Aviation Publishing(Tel: 0800 500 045) either on a one-offbasis or through an annual subscription.A typical annual subscription to the AIPfor a private pilot costs around $180 andwould include a VFG (with AIPSupplements, Change Notices, andAICs), two Topographical Charts, twolarge VTCs, and two small VTCs. Notethat both Topographical and VisualTerminal Charts can usually be obtainedfrom your local flight trainingorganisation for a competitive price.

SummaryWe would like to stress that it is part ofthe responsibility of being an active pilotto have the relevant up-to-datedocuments and charts for the type offlying that you do, in order to comply withPart 91 General Operating and Flight Rules.While cost is often cited by some pilotsas the main barrier to achieving this, itmust be put in perspective in relation tothe considerable sums that many of usoften spend on flying each year. The AIPis critical to flight safety – make sure youdo your bit by keeping it up-to-date.

...continued from previous page



As a result of the recent CAA reviewof low flying zones (LFZs), three

designated for the purpose of militarylow flying down to a height of 50 feetagl have been disestablished. This isbecause Part 91 General Operating andFlight Rules of the Civil Aviation Rulesdoes not apply to military aircraft withrespect to low flying.

Instead, three military low flying zones(MLFZs) will take their place: RiverheadForest (North Auckland), Santoft Forest(West Wanganui), and Kaweka-Urewera(Central North Island). These will beillustrated on the applicable aeronauticalcharts, but civilian pilots should note thatthey are not available for civil low-flyingtraining, as they are not designated underCAR Part 73 Special Use Airspace.

The structure of Riverhead Forest MLFZis of particular importance to GA pilots.This MLFZ uses the old NZL167dimensions, but it has a new smaller civillow flying zone (NZL168, RiverheadForest) contained within it (seeaccompanying diagram, or the latestAuckland VTC, for details). If you wishto conduct low-flying training withinNZL168, you must first contact theUsing Agency (Aviation Classics Ltd) toobtain a briefing.

It must be stressed that civil low-flyingtraining can be conducted only withinNZL168 and not in the Riverhead ForestMLFZ. Be aware that military aircraftmay be operating coincidently withinNZL168 down to 50 feet agl, somaintaining a good lookout and listeningwatch is essential. Refer to the RACsection of the NZAIP Planning Manualfor Using Agency contact details.

Vector would like to remind pilots thatthey must contact the Using Agencyresponsible for a particular LFZ to obtaina briefing from a flight instructor beforeventuring into it. The Using Agency willnot be impressed if the land-ownersbelow, or adjacent to, an LFZ withdrawtheir consent for its use because aircraftare not observing local operatingprocedures. Bear this in mind when youare next planning a training flight in aLFZ (particularly if it is away from yourhome base) and, please, ‘fly neighbourly’when within a LFZ.

Military Low Flying Zones

Santoft Forest (West Wanganui)& Kaweka-Urewera(Central N Island) MLFZs

Riverhead Forest(North Auckland)

MLFZ

Photograph courtesy of RNZA

F


Safety – Costs vsBenefitsA strong safety programme is one thataims to prevent accidents and incidentsthat can cause injury, property damage,and possibly loss of life. The human lossesin an accident are traumatic for survivingfamilies and friends. But in addition toits moral duty to prevent accidents, themanagement of an aviation operation ischarged with protecting the company’sfinancial bottom line. It is thereforereasonable to question the cost-benefitratio associated with implementing anew, or improved, safety programme.

There is, however, a paradox when tryingto measure the benefits of a safetyprogramme. If a programme is effective,there will be few incidents and accidents.So how does a company assign costsavings to incidents and accidents thatdid not occur?

Poor Safety = PoorFinancial PerformanceA highly profitable, low-fare airline wasinvolved in a fatal accident. Followingthe accident, questions surfaced about avariety of safety issues. Within weeks ofthe accident, the civil aviation authorityinvolved grounded the airline’s fleet amidpublic examination of the airline’s safetypractices. After an intensive review, whichresulted in changes and improvementswithin the airline – and the industry –regulators found the airline fit to fly.

When the airline resumed service some

Cheaper OperationsA Sound Safety Culture – the Benefits

We all know that you have to spend money to make money! So why notmake an investment now in a safety programme that is going increase yourlong-term profits? It makes good business sense – read on to find out more.

three months later, its stockplummeted and its fleet was

operating well belowcapacity. The state-ment “Poor safety

performance = poorfinancial performance”leaves little room forargument. Moreover,the industry at large –

airframe and enginemanufacturers, maint-

enance organisations,insurers, regulators, and the

airlines and operators – can often pay aprice too. The public can demand thatgovernment impose sweeping newregulations that would offer a perceived(but not necessar ily an actual)improvement in safety, while resulting inreal increases in costs and complexitiesfor everyone. Thus valuable resourcescould be diverted from where they couldhave a positive influence on real safety.

Safety – a CompetitiveAdvantageA highly successful airline conducted asurvey of its customers. The surveyshowed that about 25 percent of therespondents chose the airline over itscompetition because of convenient flightschedules; another 25 percent preferredits generous frequent-flier programme.But the most significant finding was thatabout 50 percent selected the airlinebecause of its excellent safety record!

Safety is FreeImplementing a safety programme costsmoney, but tremendous financial benefitsoften result from an airline functioningat peak safety levels. An effective safetyprogramme, for example, can lowerworkers’ compensation and aircraftinsurance premiums.

The CEO of a large, successful and safety-minded helicopter service openly statesthat safety increases the company’sfinancial bottom line. For every dollarinvested in its safety programme, thecompany calculated that it receives eight

to nine dollars in savings. Because thesafety programme is credited with savingthe company millions of dollars, the CEOsays, “Safety is free, because the benefitsare greater than the costs.”

A Safety Programme –an Internal ProcessThis is what the International CivilAviation Organisation (ICAO) had to sayabout safety programme implementationin a 1993 ICAO Circular:

“When internal responsibilities regardingsafety are not clearly defined,organisations tend to rely excessively onexternal sources to discharge them, ie,regulatory authorities. Regulationsusually represent minimum levels ofsafety compliance; furthermore, ifregulations are formally applied but thesense of them is lost, the original reasonfor introducing them is quickly forgotten.It follows that regulation is, at best, alimited way of affecting humanbehaviour. Regulations cannot cover allrisks involved in aviation, since eachaccident is unique.”

What ICAO is really saying in thiscircular is that an operation has to haveits own safety programme to achievecompliance with regulations, and that itmust go beyond that to actively seek andfind the latent conditions that existwithin their organisation – and preventthem causing incidents.

SummaryIt is up to every organisation to take upthe challenge of improving their safetystandards beyond the minimumregulatory requirements and to seek outand eliminate the hazards, which are lyingin wait to cause an accident or incident.This can be achieved through an effectivesafety programme. Make sure that yourorganisation is actively working towardssuch a goal. Don’t delay, start now!

References: “Managing for Safety – ICARUS Committee

Briefing, No 5,” July-September 1998 issue of Flight Safety

Digest. “Human Factors, Management and Organisation”,

ICAO Circular (1993), Human Factors Digest No 10.


Short Finals and No Fuel

The aircraft was on final approach to aerodrome YYwhen its engine stopped through fuel exhaustion. Thestudent pilot made a successful forced landing justshort of the aerodrome.

The Cessna 172 aircraft had been “topped up” ataerodrome XX by the student during the dualportion of a cross-country training flight (YY-

XX-YY) earlier in the day. The fuel tanks, however,were not dipped, and the instructor did not sight thefuel level in the tanks at the time. The instructorassumed that the student had filled them to capacity,but in fact they had been filled only to approximatelyone inch (2.5 cm) below the tank filler neck.

The tanks were subsequently dipped by the student at90 litres useable prior to the student departing YY onthe solo section of the cross-country exercise. Thisallowed little margin above VFR minimum fuelreserves. The student advised the fuel quantity to theinstructor and they discussed it, but the flight was stillauthorised.

The engine fitted to this aircraft was modified forincreased power and it was known to thus have a higherfuel consumption rate than a standard Cessna 172engine. The student pilot was aware of this, havingbeen alerted by the aircraft’s operator (which was notthe instructor’s club). The operator had also made apoint of telling the student pilot that the engine mustbe leaned in the cruise. The instructor was not awareof the higher-than-normal fuel consumption. Becauseof traditional thinking, the student was discouragedfrom leaning unless above 3000 feet.

The student became aware of the aircraft’s low fuelstate approximately 30 nautical miles south of YY butwas reluctant to land at a nearby suitable aerodromebecause re-calculation of the total fuel remaining (basedon the original 90 litres useable fuel and the nominatedfuel consumption rate) showed that there was sufficientto make YY. It was not until approximately 10 milesfrom YY that the student became extremely concernedabout the fuel state.

Unexpected headwinds, some slight alterations to theplanned track, and the failure to lean, eventuallycombined to result in fuel exhaustion. The enginestopped while on final approach to YY. A successfulforced landing was made just short of the runway.

Vector CommentFailure to ensure that sufficient fuel reserves (more than the legal 30-minute minimum) were on board, inadequate supervision by the instructor,incorrect leaning of the mixture, and a reluctance to divert to the nearestaerodrome, all combined to cause this incident.

Incorrect leaning of the mixture, unexpected headwinds, alterations totrack, and poor fuel log management have led to many a surprised piloturgently looking for somewhere to land – especially when the flight wasplanned with minimum fuel reserves.

The insistence by some flight training organisations that, in particular, theengine should not be leaned until above 3000 feet has been implicated inother fuel exhaustion incidents. Student pilots must be adequately briefedon why it is important to lean the mixture at any cruising altitude andhow it should be accomplished (refer to the aircraft Flight Manual foradvice on specifically recommended engine leaning practices). In addition,they should be encouraged to carry at least one hour’s fuel in reserve, bereminded to dip fuel tanks accurately before every flight, and be taught tokeep an accurate in-flight fuel log. It is up to the supervising instructor toensure that the student does all of these things religiously.

It is also good practice to dip the aircraft fuel tanks accurately after a flight(or at an aerodrome en route) in order to calculate the fuel burnt and thusthe fuel consumption rate. There could be quite a difference betweenthis figure and the consumption rate used for flight planning. (Individualaircraft of the same type can have different fuel consumption rates; powersettings and altitude will also have a bearing on the amount of fuel burnt.)Whenever you make an intermediate landing on a cross-country flight,always double-check your fuel consumption, especially in an aircraft youhave not flown before.

A simple consumption check at either YY or XX could well have preventedthis particular occurrence.

Instructors must thoroughly check that all pilot-in-command responsibilitiesand requirements are met by their students before authorising solo flights.There is a significant risk that assumptions made about a student’sexperience, competency, or thoroughness can lead to an incident or accident– for which the instructor can be held accountable. You are largelyresponsible for your student’s safe flight.

Students need to remember that they are the pilot in command when ona solo training flight, and that common sense must prevail when it comesto in-flight decision-making. If something doesn’t seem right – assess thesituation and take action. Once the words “maybe” or “I think it will beokay” creep into your thoughts – beware. It is time to act positively.

The lessons from this incident do not apply just to instructors and students.We should all take note of the need to be meticulous when it comes toflight planning and in-flight fuel management.


The following article has been adapted from the Av News sectionof the July/August edition of the FAA News.

Well, like in the movie “Jaws,” just when you thought itwas safe to go back into the water something comes along

to cause you grief. In the past, this magazine has reported howcellular telephones have saved lives, and how one was even usedto contact air traffic control when a commercial aircraft’s radiosfailed. Now, we have heard of a problem caused by cellulartelephones. Fortunately, it is a problem that can be avoided or atleast minimised. An Air Traffic Manager at one of the FAA’sAutomated Flight Service Stations (AFSS) has a problem withcellular phones. The problem is pilots are calling the AFSS forweather briefs and for filing flight plans using cellular telephones.As the manager stated in the letter to the magazine, in most casesthe reception is bad and the background noise level results in mis-communication and numerous repeats of information. In theinterest of safety for our flying customers, we would like to submitthe following scenario:

‘You forget to call for a weather briefing at the office orhome, so the cellphone comes in handy as you drive to theaerodrome. You get a briefer on the line, but someone is yellingin the background as they are giving you the weather. So, youend up getting part of it only. Just as the briefer begins to giveNOTAMs for your destination aerodrome, you stop at a redlight and construction workers are busting up the footpathwith a jackhammer. But, you were just at the aerodromeyesterday, so nothing should have changed. As you begin givingyour flight plan, your reception starts to fade because youcalled long distance to reach your favourite briefer. The brieferunderstood you to say an altitude of 5000 feet, but you said9000 feet.’

Pilots without cellular phones are almost as rare nowadays as aircraftwithout radios. Just as radio reception varies from one place toanother, cellphone reception and signal quality also vary. Takingthe time to verify that your cellphone reception is clear and freefrom interference, while calling for pilot briefing services, ensures

Cellphones – a Help or a Hindrance?

that the specialist understands your request. And you receive theinformation needed to have a safe and ‘uneventful’ flight. Safety isthe main rule of the game, even before you start your engine.

Vector CommentIf you are one of the pilots just described, you may wantto consider the background noise environment and thesignal strength of your cellphone when calling the NationalBriefing Office (NBO). We suggest that whenever possible,you should use a standard telephone to call the NBO toobtain pre-flight information or file a flight plan orSarwatch. That way both you and the briefer will be ableto hear each other clearly. Using a regular telephone maybe the safer option in many situations. Effectivecommunications are always important when planning aflight, so make sure that you don’t compromise them byusing a cellphone in an unsuitable environment.

ASC Course ReminderDon’t forget the Aviation Safety Coordinator trainingcourses to be held in Palmerston North on 30 Septemberto 1 October and Hamilton on 7 to 8 October.

An Aviation Safety Coordinator runs the safety programme inan organisation. Does your organisation have a properlyadministered and active safety programme? (See the previousissue of Vector for further detail on the ‘what and why’ of anaviation safety programme.)

If you are involved in commuter services, general aviation scenicoperations, flight training or sport aviation this course is relevantfor your organisation.

For further information and enrolment forms contact: RoseWood, SEPU Administrator, Civil Aviation Authority, PO Box31-441, Lower Hutt, email [email protected]


AIR FILTER – Fire starter since it is usuallymade of paper and is impregnated with highlyflammable oil.

ALUMINIUM SKIN – Reflector for warmth froma fire; signalling device; splint; snow shovel; sawblade.

BATTERY – Signalling with aircraft lights orradio; fire starter.

BATTERY BOX – Stove or cooking container.

CHARTS/MAPS – Stuff inside clothing forinsulation. (Don’t burn them, since you may needthem for navigation if it becomes inevitable thatyou need to walk out.)

COMPASS – Direction indicator.

CONTROL CABLES – Binding for shelter; splints.

DOORS – Shelter; windbreak.

ENGINE COWLING – Shelter; water collection;windbreak; fire platform.

ENGINE MAGNETOS – Fire starter.

ENGINE OIL AND FUEL – Fire starter and fuel forfire; makes black smoke for signalling.

FABRIC SKIN – Fire starting material and fuel;water collection.

HOSES – Siphoning fuel from tank.

Survival UsesFor Aircraft Parts

We thought that publishing this list would be a usefuladdition to “Surviving After a Crash”; which featuredin the previous issue of Vector. You might considercutting it out and adding it to your survival kit.

Here is a consolidated list of safety videosmade available by CAA. Note the instructions

on how to borrow or purchase (ie, don’t ring the editors.)

Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand

No Title Length Yearreleased

1 Weight and Balance 15 min 19872 ELBA 15 min 19873 Wirestrike 15 min 19876 Single-pilot IFR 15 min 19897 Radar and the Pilot 20 min 19908 Fuel in Focus 35 min 19919 Fuel Management 35 min 199110 Passenger Briefing 20 min 199211 Apron Safety 15 min 199212 Airspace and the VFR Pilot 45 min 199213 Mark 1 Eyeball 24 min 199314 Collision Avoidance 21 min 199315 On the Ground 21 min 199416 Mind that Prop/Rotor! 11 min 199417 Fit to Fly? 23 min 199518 Drugs and Flying 14 min 199519 Fatal Impressions 5 min 199520 Decisions, Decisions 30 min 199621 To the Rescue 24 min 199622 It’s Alright if You Know What You Are Doing –

Mountain Flying 32 min 199723 Momentum and Drag 21 min 199824 The Final Filter 16 min 199825 We’re Only Human 21 min 199826 You’re On Your Own 15 min 199927 Rotary Tales 10 min 1999

Miscellaneous individual titles

Working With Helicopters 8 min 1996**re-release date

Civil Aviation Authority, Australia

The Gentle Touch (Making a safeapproach and landing) 27 min

Keep it Going (Airworthiness and maintenance) 24 min

Going Too Far (VFR weather decisions) 26 min

Going Ag – Grow (Agricultural operations) 19 min

Going Down (Handling emergencies) 30 min

Safety Videos

titles 1 to 8, Vol B titles 9 to 14, Vol D titles 15 onwards. TheAustralian programmes are on a multi-title volume (Vol C).Contact CAA Librarian by fax (0–4–569 2024), phone (0–4–560 9400) or letter (Civil Aviation Authority, PO Box 31–441,Lower Hutt, Attention Librarian). There is a high demandfor the videos, so please return a borrowed video nolater than one week after receiving it.

To Purchase: Obtain direct from Dove Video, PO Box 7413,Sydenham, Christchurch. Enclose: $10 for each title ordered;plus $10 for each tape and box (maximum of 3 hours pertape); plus a $5 handling fee for each order. All prices includeGST, packaging and domestic postage. Make cheques payableto “Dove Video”.

The videos are VHS format and may be freely copied, but for bestquality obtain professional copies from the master tapes — see“To Purchase” below.

The New Zealand tapes are produced on a limited budget, thefirst 11 titles using Low-band equipment. Quality improves inlater titles. While the technical quality of the videos may not beup to the standard of commercial programmes, the value lies inthe safety messages.

To Borrow: The New Zealand tapes may be borrowed, free ofcharge, as single copies or in multi-title volumes (Vol A contains

CUT OUT AND KEEP

PTO


Accident Notification24-hour 7-day toll-free telephone

0508 ACCIDENT(0508 222 433)

CAA Act requires notification“as soon as practicable”.

Publications0800 800 359 — Publishing Solutions, for CA Rules and ACs, Part 39 AirworthinessDirectives, CAA (saleable) Forms, and CAA Logbooks. Limited stocks of still-currentAIC-AIRs, and AIC-GENs are also available. Also, paid subscriptions to Vector and CivilAircraft Register.CAA Web Site, http://www.caa.govt.nz for CA Rules, ACs and Airworthiness Directives.0800 500 045 — Aviation Publishing, for AIP documents, including Planning Manual,IFG, VFG, SPFG, VTCs, and other maps and charts.

INNER TUBES – Elastic binding material whencut into strips; black smoke when burned.

INTERIOR FABRIC – Water straining or filter;clothing or coverings; bandages; fuel for fire.

LANDING LIGHTS/STROBES – Signals whenused with battery; lights at night; reflectivesurfaces for signalling when the battery dies.

NOSE CONE/SPINNER – Bucket for water, oiland fuel; scooping tool; pot for cooking; funnel.

OIL FILTER – Burn for black smoke.

ROTATING BEACON LENS – Drinking cup.

RUGS – Ground pad; insulation; clothing orwarm covering.

SEATS – Sleeping cushions; back brace for spinalinjury; insulation; ground pad; sponge rubberfor neck support.

SEATBELTS – Binding material; slings; bandages.

TYRES – Black smoke when burned.

VERTICAL STABILISER – Shelter support; fireplatform.

WINDOWS – Cutting tool.

WINGS – Wind break; shelter supports;overhead shade; platform for fire; watercollector; signalling device. (If the aircraft isintact, blankets or plastic tarps draped over thewings and secured to the ground make anexcellent tent.)

WINGTIPS – Drip collection; water carrier.

WIRING – Binding and rope; starting fire withbattery.

WOODEN WING STRUTS, BRACES ORPROPELLERS – Fire starter; fuel.

Source: FAA News; US Department of Transport

Between 1 April 1994 and 15 April1999 there were 133 accidents in NewZealand involving helicopters.

Thirteen pilots died along with 19 passengers. There were,during this same period, many more incidents involvinghelicopters that came very close to being up-graded toaccident status.

Rotary Tales is a new safety video that has just been releasedby the CAA. This 10-minute video consists of two shortsketches that carry safety messages for all helicopter pilots.

Interestingly, the video does not contain any film footageof helicopters at all. How did we make a helicopter safetyvideo without showing a helicopter? If you want to findout the answer to this question, borrow a copy from theCAA Library or purchase one from Dove Video. Don’tforget that the CAA has a whole range of other safetyvideos, which can also be borrowed free of charge fromthe CAA Library. See this issue of Vector for details.

New Video

Safety and Professionalism —Don’t start without them!

Safety and Professionalism —Don’t start without them!

John Fogden(North Island, north of line, and including,New Plymouth-Taupo-East Cape)Ph: 0–9–425 0072 Fax: 0–9–425 7945Mobile: 025–852 096 email: [email protected]

Ross St George(North Island, south of line, and including,New Plymouth-Taupo-East Cape)Ph: 0–6–353 7443 Fax: 0–6–353 3374Mobile: 025–852 097 email: [email protected]

Murray Fowler(South Island)Ph: 0–3–349 8687 Fax: 0–3–349 5851Mobile: 025–852 098 email: [email protected]

Owen Walker(Maintenance, New Zealand-wide)Ph: 0–7–866 0236 Fax: 0–7–866 0235Mobile: 025–244 1425 email: [email protected]

Field Safety Advisers


OccurrenceThe content of “Occurrence Briefs” comprises all notified aircraft accidents, GA defect incidents (submitted by the aviationindustry to the CAA), and selected foreign occurrences that we believe will most benefit engineers and operators. Statisticalanalyses of occurrences will normally be published in CAA News.

Individual Accident Reports (but not GA Defect Incidents) – as reported in “Occurrence Briefs” – are now accessible on theInternet at CAA’s web site (http://www.caa.govt.nz/). These include all those that have been published in “Occurrence Briefs”,and some that have been released but not yet published. (Note that “Occurrence Briefs” and the web site are limited only to thoseaccidents which have occurred since 1 January 1996.)

BRIEFS

Accidents

ZK-FQN, Rutan Variviggen, 28 Aug 98 at 1700,Rotorua. 2 POB, injuries 2 fatal, aircraft destroyed.Nature of flight, private other. Pilot CAA licencePPL (Aeroplane), age 42 yrs, flying hours 277 total,0 on type, 10 in last 90 days.

This was the first flight in the aircraft by the pilot who was nottype rated. He was accompanied by the owner/builder whodid not hold any pilot qualifications. About 20 minutes intothe flight, the aircraft was seen to complete a number of turnsand then head back towards the aerodrome. Another turn (tothe right) was commenced and the aircraft’s nose was seen tofall followed by a spiral dive into the ground.

The on-site investigation did not reveal any evidence of amechanical failure or malfunction. According to witnesses andthe investigation, the engine appeared to be operating normallyup to the time of impact

Main sources of information: CAA field investigationCAA Occurrence Ref 98/2360

The pilot in command of an aircraft involved in an accident is required by the Civil Aviation Act to notify the Civil AviationAuthority “as soon as practicable”, unless prevented by injury, in which case responsibility falls on the aircraft operator. The CAAhas a dedicated telephone number 0508 ACCIDENT (0508 222 433) for this purpose. Follow-up details of accidents shouldnormally be submitted on Form CAA 005 to the CAA Safety Investigation and Analysis Group.

Some accidents are investigated by the Transport Accident Investigation Commission, and it is the CAA’s responsibility to notifyTAIC of all accidents. The reports which follow are the results of either CAA or TAIC investigations.

ZK-TOY, Corby CJ-1 Starlet, 7 Sep 98 at 1810, PikesPoint. 1 POB, injuries nil, damage minor. Nature offlight, private other. Pilot CAA licence PPL(Aeroplane), age 22 yrs, flying hours 200 total, 130on type, 30 in last 90 days.

The aircraft encountered a soft wet patch after landing on thegrass runway at Pikes Point, and nosed over onto its back. Theaircraft sustained only minor damage to the top of the rudderand the canopy.

Main sources of information: Accident details submitted bypilot

CAA Occurrence Ref 98/2462

ZK-DKL, Cessna 177B, 14 Sep 98 at 1152, nr MtCook. 3 POB, injuries 3 fatal, aircraft destroyed.Nature of flight, transport passenger A to B. PilotCAA licence CPL (Aeroplane), age 29 yrs, flyinghours 1306 total, 80 on type, 68 in last 90 days.

At about 1152 hours on 14 September 1998, ZK-DKL, a Cessna177 on an air transport scenic flight across the Mount Cookregion, struck a snow-covered mountain face 11 kilometresnortheast of Mount Cook. The pilot and the two passengerswere killed on impact .

The aircraft probably encountered a strong laminardowndraught, before entering a thin layer of cloud prior toimpact. Although ample escape options were available to thepilot to turn away from the rising terrain ahead, the pilot didnot make a timely decision to do so. The pilot may not haverecognised that he was descending quickly towards the cloudlayer and mountainous terrain until shortly before enteringcloud. The pilot may have believed he had crossed the MainDivide to the west, and once ZK-DKL had entered cloud hemost likely elected to continue straight ahead in order to breakout of the cloud, as he knew the conditions were clear on theWest Coast.

Why the pilot did not make a timely turn away from the risingterrain ahead is unexplained. The pilot might have perseveredfor too long expecting to encounter an updraught, or somedistraction could have diverted his attention away from thesafe operation of the aircraft. Alternatively, the pilot might havebeen unaware of, or have misjudged, the intensity of anydowndraught encountered.

The cause of the accident was not established.

Main sources of information: Abstract from TAIC AccidentReport 98-009




ZK-HSC, Sikorsky S-55B, 22 Sep 98 at 1600, Winton.1 POB, injuries nil, damage substantial. Nature offlight, agr icultural. Pilot CAA licence CPL(Helicopter), age 43 yrs, flying hours 1500 total, 620on type, 80 in last 90 days.

The helicopter was conducting agricultural spraying when itsuffered a power loss while downwind. A heavy landing at 30knots resulted, which caused the undercarriage to collapse anda main rotor blade to cut through the tail boom. Furtherinvestigation found white deposits at the exhaust outlet,indicating that the engine had been running on a weak mixture.This could have caused the power loss.

Main sources of information: Accident details submitted bypilot plus further enquiries by CAA.


ZK-HWO, Bell 206B, 9 Oct 98 at 1700, Okahu Valley.1 POB, injuries nil, damage substantial. Nature offlight, other aerial work. Pilot CAA licence CPL(Helicopter), age 30 yrs, flying hours 4500 total, 2500on type, 119 in last 90 days.

The helicopter was lifting an underslung load when it suddenlylost power at about 30 feet agl. The subsequent forced landingwas heavy and the helicopter impacted the ground ahead ofthe sling load with the engine still running. The pilot shut itdown after the impact.

The pilot reported a TOT reading of about 900 degrees Celsiusat some stage during the accident sequence of events. Significantinvestigation of all systems components did not reveal the causeof the power loss.

Main sources of information: Accident details submitted bypilot plus CAA engineering investigation.


ZK-GDV, Slingsby T51 Dart, 18 Oct 98 at 1320, nrBlenheim. 1 POB, injuries 1 fatal, aircraft destroyed.Nature of flight, private other. Pilot CAA licencenil, age 86 yrs, flying hours 146 total, 53 on type, 1in last 90 days.

The pilot was on a soaring flight to the south of Blenheim,and had climbed from 700 feet in the circuit area of the Omakaaerodrome to over 4000 feet in the vicinity of Orchard Spur.The last communication from the pilot was an ‘ops normal’call made at about 1315 hours. The wreckage of the glider wassighted at about 1400 hours near the crest of the spur at anelevation of 2300 feet. The aircraft had struck the ground in asteep nose-down attitude after apparently stalling. No fault couldbe found with the airframe.

No definite cause was established for the accident, althoughthe prevailing turbulent conditions and lack of recent pilotingexperience were probably contributing factors.

Main sources of information: CAA field investigation.CAA Occurrence Ref 98/2908

ZK-FPE, Micro Aviation B22 Bantam, 1 Nov 98 at0830, Whakatane. 1 POB, injuries 1 minor, damagesubstantial. Nature of flight, private other. Pilot CAAlicence nil, age not known, flying hours 668 total,480 on type, 6 in last 90 days.

The aircraft engine failed at 800 feet. The pilot attempted aforced landing into a farm paddock but undershot the approachand struck the downwind fence.

The cause of the engine stoppage was found to be a failedsmall-end bearing. The aircraft manufacturer advised that, whilebig-end bearing failures in the Rotax 532 engine occur fromtime-to-time, small-end failures are virtually unheard of. Thereis a set procedure for monitoring big-end bearing play, and ifperformed regularly, it can give warning of an impending failure.Small-end play would also be detectable by the same procedure,but if excessive play were detected, it would be only on enginedismantling that it could be attributed to one end or the otherof the relevant connecting rod

Main sources of information: Accident details submitted bypilot plus further enquiries by CAA.


ZK-HOA, Hughes 269C, 4 Nov 98 at 1900, LindisPass. 1 POB, injuries nil, aircraft destroyed. Natureof flight, mustering. Pilot CAA licence PPL(Helicopter), age 39 yrs, flying hours 3309 total, 2900on type, 50 in last 90 days.

The pilot reported that while mustering sheep on a ridge-tophe decided to use the aircraft skid to assist getting a sheep outfrom a bush. However, the sheep jumped out of the bush andlanded on the skid causing the pilot to lose control of theaircraft. The low impact forces did not activate the ELT.

Main sources of information: Accident details submitted bypilot.


ZK-SPW, Rans S-14 Airaile, 7 Nov 98 at 1630,Auckland. 1 POB, injuries nil, damage minor. Natureof flight, private other. Pilot CAA licence nil, age56 yrs, flying hours 1600 total, 200 on type, 15 in last90 days.

The aircraft suffered an engine failure while over water. Thepilot made a successful forced landing on to mud flats.

Investigations revealed that the crankshaft’s centre main bearinghad failed.

Main sources of information: Accident details submitted bypilot.


ZK-MXP, Eipper Quicksilver MX II, 8 Nov 98 at1400, Lichfield. 1 POB, injuries 1 serious, damagesubstantial. Nature of flight, private other. Pilot CAAlicence PPL (Aeroplane), age 21 yrs, flying hours 85total, 5 on type, 5 in last 90 days.

The aircraft was heard to approach the strip and then suddenlyapply power. This was followed by an audible ‘thump’ a shorttime later.

The pilot estimated that there was a crosswind of 10 knots atthe time of the accident. The pilot later indicated that he hadencountered a very strong wind gust at about 15 feet agl, whichupset the microlight longitudinally, while approaching the strip.The nose dropped, but application of power and back pressureon the stick failed to improve the situation. The aircraft impactedthe ground in a nose-down attitude.

Main sources of information: Accident details submitted bypilot and operator plus further enquiries by CAA




GA Defect Incidents

The reports and recommendations which follow are based on details submitted mainly by Licensed Aircraft MaintenanceEngineers on behalf of operators, in accordance with Civil Aviation Rule, Part 12 Accidents, Incidents, and Statistics. They relateonly to aircraft of maximum certificated takeoff weight of 5700 kg or less. Details of defects should normally be submitted onForm CAA 005 to the CAA Safety Investigation and Analysis Group.

The CAA Occurrence Number at the end of each report should be quoted in any enquiries.

Partenavia P 68BLycoming IO 360-A1B6 top through-bolt fails,P/N 75155

After levelling off in the cruise, the lefthand engine started tovibrate and lose power. The aircraft was immediately returnedto the departure airfield. Trouble checks were completed andpower was reduced to ease the vibration. The engine was notshut down due to power still being available.

Inspection revealed that the top through-bolt adjacent to No.3cylinder had failed, resulting in the transmission of higher loadsto the remaining cylinder base studs. The cylinder eventuallyloosened, causing the vibration to worsen and the crankcase tocrack. TSO 1513 hrs; TSI 40 hrs.ATA 8500 CAA Occurrence Ref 98/1265

Partenavia P 68BPrestolite ALU-8421R alternator wiring shorts,P/N ALU-8421R

On approach the righthand alternator circuit breaker popped.Five seconds later the lefthand alternator circuit breaker alsopopped. The pilot decided to continue, as conditions were notcompletely IMC, when the battery circuit breaker popped.He then had to use his torch and managed to land safely about10 minutes later.

Subsequent inspection revealed a wire from the diode backplate was shorting, causing the circuit breakers to pop.ATA 2410 CAA Occurrence Ref 98/2063

Partenavia P 68CEngine mounts crack

During scheduled maintenance the lower engine mounts onboth of the engines were found to be cracked.

A fleet check also revealed engine mount cracks on anotheraircraft. The Partenavia P68 engine mounts are known to crackbut not in the area identified in this case. An AirworthinessDirective is under preparation to increase the applicableinspection interval. TTIS 3250.ATA 7120 CAA Occurrence Ref 98/155

Piper PA-23-250Hydraulic pump gasket fails

The pilot had to make an ‘urgency call’ because the lefthandengine was smoking. A full emergency was declared and theaircraft returned for a successful landing.

Further investigation revealed that the gasket between hydraulicpump and crankcase had failed allowing oil to leak out. Theengineer stated that an incorrect gasket had been fitted twoyears earlier.ATA 2900 CAA Occurrence Ref 98/46

Piper PA-23-250Righthand alternator fails, P/N ALX 842R

The crew experienced a total electrical failure and advisedATS of the situation by cellphone. ATS were then able toobserve the aircraft as a primary radar target. Communicationvia cellphone was subsequently lost resulting in a Local Standbybeing declared. Cellphone communication was, however,regained with ATS and then with the Tower while on finalapproach to the runway. The aircraft landed safely.

Further investigation revealed that the lefthand alternator hada loose field wire, and that the righthand alternator had a collapsedrotor. The ammeter was also determined to have been inoperative.The ammeter and righthand alternator were subsequentlyreplaced and the loose field wire was repaired. TSO 715hrs.ATA 2410 CAA Occurrence Ref 98/652

Piper PA-28-181Faulty fuel tank selector

After the downwind checks had been completed the engine failed.Subsequent checks during the glide revealed zero fuel pressure.

The student had inadvertently selected the fuel to ‘OFF’ whilechanging tanks during the downwind checks. The studentdiscovered his error and quickly switched to the left tank.Engine power was restored allowing the instructor to performa normal landing.

Further investigation revealed that the fuel selector lever wassitting too high and did not even touch the indent stop, whichis designed to prevent fuel ‘OFF’ being inadvertently selected.ATA 2820 CAA Occurrence Ref 98/2147

Piper PA-46-310PFuel line ‘T’ union breaks

When the aircraft was in a late lefthand downwind positionthe aircraft suffered a partial engine failure. The pilot was ableto carry out a successful forced landing.

Engineers discovered that the ‘T’ union to the throttle meteringassembly had cracked and broken off, isolating the fuel supplyto the engine. TTIS 1450 hrs.ATA 7310 CAA Occurrence Ref 98/3196

Pitts S-2EAviat forward-retention strap breaks

On pulling up for an aerobatic manoeuvre the pilot heard anunusual thump. A quantity of fuel splashed over pilot’s rightleg. The pilot observed that the fuel cap was no longer visibleand that rudder movement was restricted. ‘Off Checks’ werecarr ied out and a successful dead-stick landing wasaccomplished, despite limited rudder travel.

Further investigation revealed that the forward fuel-tankretention strap had failed adjacent to its bolt attachment hole.This allowed the front of the fuel tank to drop into the fuselagewhere it partially obstructed rudder pedal movement.ATA 2810 CAA Occurrence Ref 98/583



International OccurrencesLessons from aviation experience cross international boundaries. In this section, we bring to your attention items from abroadwhich we believe could be relevant to New Zealand operations.

AustraliaOccurences

The following occurrences come from the August 1996 editionof Air Safety, which is published by the Bureau of Air SafetyInvestigation (BASI), Australia.

Robinson R22 Beta – Pilot loses control ofhelicopter after takeoff

Witnesses reported seeing the helicopter land in the corner ofa fenced paddock. A short time later the helicopter took offagain, but, after climbing to about three metres above theground, it began rotating and gyrating erratically, contactingthe ground a number of times. It came to rest in an uprightposition but with the tail boom severed and damage to themain rotor assembly and gearbox.

The pilot reported that he had recently recovered from a viralcomplaint, which was characterised by severe coughing bouts,but had been free of these symptoms for a few weeks. As heflew over the area of the accident, however, he had experiencedthe incipient stages of a coughing fit so he landed the helicopter,shut the engine down, and walked around for a short timeuntil the symptoms disappeared. He then reboarded thehelicopter to continue the flight, but shortly after liftoff wasovercome by a severe coughing fit. This caused him to partiallylose control of the helicopter and it contacted either the fenceor the ground.

Cessna 152 – Engine fails after takeoff

The instructor and student were conducting crosswind-trainingcircuits on runway 07 at Redcliffe. At approximately 200 feetagl, after takeoff on the third circuit, the engine began to runvery roughly. The instructor immediately assumed control andtransmitted a Mayday call. A decision was then taken to carryout a landing onto the clear swampy terrain straight ahead.The aircraft nosed over soon after touching down on the softsurface. Both occupants were able to exit the aircraft withoutassistance.

The investigation found that the No 4 engine cylinder had alarge fatigue crack in the non-finned base area, that extendedapproximately two-thirds the circumference of the cylinderwall. No other defect was found with the engine, accessoriesor engine control systems that would have contributed to therough running.

It is probable that the rough running was caused by excessivevalve clearances and/or piston-to-cylinder binding, as the crackopened under load.

Twin Astir (VH-IKA) – Glider wing clips treewhile landing out

The gliding club was conducting a ridge-soaring camp remotefrom its main base of operation, but gliders launched thatmorning by aero-tow were reporting poor lift conditions.

A glider, released near the ridge just prior to VH-IKA takingoff, was finding it difficult to find any significant lift, and the

pilot believed that they had released too early for the prevailingconditions. He saw VH-IKA release about 400 to 500 feet lowerthan he had, and commented to his passenger that VH-IKAwould have to land out.

A short time later he saw VH-IKA tracking towards somesuitable paddocks, but they were overflown, then, after severalleft and right turns, VH-IKA commenced a low approach toland in another paddock.

The paddock selected was lined by trees and powerlines, and,as the approach was continued, the left wing clipped a tree andthe glider impacted the ground inverted. Both occupants wereinjured and the glider substantially damaged.

The occupant of the rear seat held a gliding instructor ratingbut was riding as a passenger on this flight. Although he realisedthat the approach was becoming low, he did not doubt that theexperienced pilot could handle the situation and failed to takeaction to prevent the accident.

United KingdomOccurrencesThe following occurrences come from the March 1999 editionof Flight Safety, Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing Occurrence Lists,published by the Safety Data Department, United KingdomCAA.

BAe146 – Aircraft overruns runway on landing

The aircraft allegedly touched down slightly beyond the normaltouchdown zone on runway 22, and due to lack of effectivebraking overran the end of the runway onto the grassundershoot area. The aircraft became bogged down in mud,but no damage occurred.

Investigations revealed that the landing was made with a 10-knot tailwind component. ATC had advised that the runwaywas “wet with water patches” but the crew did not make anyoperational adjustments to the landing technique to addressthe problem that braking action might be poor. All aircraftsystems were found to be serviceable and braking performancewas within design expectations.

The operator has taken appropriate flight crew action and issueda Flight Crew Notice to address the points raised by theinvestigation.

SDD Occurrence No 9805489J

Cessna 177 – Manifold pressure and fuel flowdecrease en route

During the cruise the pilot noted that the engine’s manifoldpressure and fuel flow had decreased, which was accompaniedby an increase in exhaust gas temperature. A safe landing wassubsequently made.

The pilot reported that similar problems had occurredintermittently over the previous two months, and investigationfound that the alternate air door had come adrift and jammedthe fuel injector unit. Rivets in the air door hinge assemblyhad parted from the main body of the air box, probably as aresult of vibration. A new air door was fitted.

SDD Occurrence No 9805193H



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