RAF career of Cecil de Courcy and his fellow crew members

Until recently the family of R.C.W de Courcy knew little of his career in the RAF. He had beena navigator in a Hampden bomber which was shot down in the Heligoland Bight in February1942. The officer returning his effects gave them a Squadron picture and commented on thenumber of people from that Squadron who had also been lost; he had plenty of company. Hisname was on the Runnymede stone, a copy of his service record could be requested by thefamily, but that was all.

Quite by accident a series entitled "RAF Bomber Command Losses in World War II" wasdiscovered in the Ian Allen bookshop at Picadilly Station in Manchester. The volume for 1942gave the following details for 7 February 1942

Hampden AE392 PL- ( F/L W.J.W Kingston, Sgt R.C.W de Courcy, Sgt Gibson, Sgt J.A Tobinand Sgt A. Fulton) took off from North Luffenham (on Gardening Operation). Shot down in thetarget area.

The mention of an earlier accident was curious

"F/L Kingston and Sgt de Courcy both came from the Republic of Ireland (sic) and both, alongwith Sgts Gibson and Tobin, had been involved in a crash near Langham on 14 - 15 January."

The family had no knowledge of this. He never spoke of it, but his sister had long talked of hisbeing home on leave during the previous weeks, and asking his mother to play the piano on theevening before his return to duty. We can probably assume that he was home on rehabilitationleave.

These events prompted a line of research which has included the posting of questions on theRAF and Luftwaffe web-sites together with follow-up correspondence with those who areinvolved in similar searches. The sections below will attempt to set the scene by describing theaircraft and the war-time circumstances in which Hampden AE392 was shot down.

The aircraft

The Handley Page Hampden bomber is not one of the legendary aircraft of the second world war,and yet it was the day-to-day work-horse of bomber command until it was replaced by theWellington and Lancaster. It was a two engine aircraft that has been described as "heaven to fly,hell to fly in". Owing to its shape it was called "The Frying Pan" or "The Flying Tadpole". Ithad a complement of four, pilot, navigator/bombadier, top-rear gunner and lower rear gunner.

The top-rear gunner was also the radio telegraph officer. An inspection of any pictures of theHampden indicates how cramped it was. The navigator had to crawl through a tunnel betweenthe pilot's legs in order to get to his station.

Guy Gibson, who is best known for his activities in Lancasters and Mosquitoes started his careerin Hampdens and his book "Enemy Coast Ahead" contains much details of the aircraft and itsoperations and he had been involved in laying the first sea mines dropped from a Hampden. Hedescribed this as a special weapon weighing about 1700lbs which was virtually sweep-proof.Known as a 'vegetable' it was intended to be dropped in deep water. It contained a lot ofexplosive, so that even if a ship were some way off the force of an explosion would lift it out ofthe water.

Gibson mentioned that the Hampden had a weak-spot. Even if they flew in very close formationso as to bring as much defensive armament as possible to bear on incoming fighters, he says thatthe Germans were no fools and found that there was a blind area on either side which was notcovered by the gunners. Messerschmitt 110 fighters had one gun that could fire sideways. Theirmode of attack was to fly in formation with the Hampdens, perhaps 50 yards out and slightly tothe front and pick off the outside men with their one gun aiming with a non-deflection shot at thepilot. The bomber boys could do nothing about it; they just had to sit there and wait to be shotdown. If they broke away they were immediately pounced on by three Messerschmitt 109swaiting in the background. If they stayed the pilot received a machine-gun serenade in his face.One by one they were hacked down from the wing man inwards. Because of the very narrowfuselage (to reduce drag) it was virtually impossible to remove a wounded pilot from his seat sothat another crew member could take over the controls. Even when the Hampden was used formine laying and a relief pilot was carried, changing seats called for a display of extreme dexterity.

The crew

The crew was an important nucleus of operations and where possible they started together andstayed together. When one member was killed or injured and had to be replaced there was alwaysa suspicion "will the new man fit in or will he bring us bad luck?" This was certainly the casehere. The major players were W.J.W. Kingston and R.C.W. de Courcy from Ireland. On 20September 1941, 144 Squadron took off for operations over Frankfurt. Hampden AD 923 waspiloted by F/O Kingston with Sgt de Courcy as navigator. They had wireless operators/gunnersSgts Tod and Tobin. Weather conditions that night were not good. Cloud obscured the target butmeant that there were no night fighters and little anti-aircraft fire. Whilst over Europe fog hadblanketed itself over much of England and this created great problems. Two Hampdens came togrief due to poor visibility. At 0420 a third (AD922), piloted by Sgt E.C.W. Turner ran out offuel and crashed at Foulsham. The pilot was killed by the three crew had baled out. It was now0430. AD923 having lost their way after being diverted to RAF Dishforth and almost out of fuelmade a perfect crash-landing at Hutton Moor, North Yorkshire, all the crew survived with only afew bumps and bruises. After a tiring walk to the nearest village they were soon picked up and

taken back to base. Shortly afterwards Kingston was promoted to Flight Lieutenant and givencommand of Hampden AE441.

Following this event Sgt Tod left the crew and joined AE238. Nothing is known of hissubsequent career. He was replaced by Sgt A. Gibson. On Hampden AE441, while returningfrom a bombing raid on Hamburg, they were out of fuel and trying to land at RAF Langham inNorth Norfolk when they hit a chimney stack at Field Dalling, just short of the runway. Theplane was a write-off but they all escaped serious injury.

The last flight

On the night of 7 February 1942 F/Lt Kingston took his third Hampden (AE392) on a minelaying operation. There was an additional crew member, Sgt A. Foulton (given as W/Toperator/gunner, but more likely to have been the relief pilot). The book "Hell on High Ground"(page 28, 29) is perhaps a little misleading as it places the operation to the west of the island ofTerschelling. It also quotes it as a night operation while "Royal Air Force Bomber CommandLosses (1942)" give the take-off time as 1130. In any event, the weather at that time of year wasvery foggy and in fact no fighter interception was expected.

A more detailed, and perhaps more accurate account of events can be derived from Rob vanNiewendijk, the author of several books on the air war over the Netherlands. He says that:

The British suspected that the German battleships, moored at Brest, would try to escape anytime by now (See Churchill's memoires). Because of this Hampdens were ordered to lay mines onthe main and expected sea routes the German battleships (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and PrinzEugen) were likely to take. The seawaters off the German Bright (Deutsche Bucht) was veryinteresting, because these gave the ships the open way to German waters.

Hampdens did not take part in many daylight operations. Almost a year after the debacle of 12April 1940 the bombers again took part in daylight operations once again against the Germanwarships. On 24 July 41 they attacked Brest. Two Hampdens did not return. Later theHampdens laid mines off Brest during daylight hours and in Feb 42 off the German Bight.

On 7 Feb 42 32 Hampdens were detailed to lay mines in the (German) Frisians. These operationswere named Gardening. The German reaction to these raids was few. Me 109's of the 1./JG 1were stationed in the German Bight area. Lieutenant Grosser claimed one Hampden andOberfeldwebel Gerhardt a probable. The 4./JG 1, stationed at Leeuwarden, received that verymorning orders to transfer to Haamstede because of the planned escape of the Germanbattleships.

The Staffelkapitän (commander) of 4./JG 1 was Oberleutnant R. Olejnik and he and his unit hadcarried out numerous tests with a nearby radar station ("Riesengerät", which was used actuallyby German nightfighters only!) in order to intercept allied aircraft in bad weather. Normally theGerman dayfighters did not try to intercept when weather was unfavourable.

Just before the transfer from Leeuwarden to Haamstede was put into effect Oberfeldwebel Lüthof the 4./JG 1 (was) in a position to claim three allied aircraft within almost one hour. The first at15.02, the second at 15.09 and the last at 16.04 hour. These were claims number 419 - 421 of theII./JG 1 and the first victories of this unit since the return from the eastern front. The next daythe German broadcast mentioned the success of Lüth, without mentioning his name. Theseclaims were Lüths 27-29.

Many Hampdens were intercepted during this operation. The Hampden P5331 of 144 squadrontook off at 11.15 hours and reached the drop position at estimated time of arrival when theysighted a convoy with fighter escort. Two Me 109's closed in to attack from astern in turn. PilotOfficer Frow climbed steeply doing a slow turn to right. First e/a shot the tail plane partly away,and the upper rear gunner saw his bursts enter the e/a's fuselage. Second e/a closed in to attackwhen the P5331 entered low cloud - bursts mainly went into the starboard wing and engine. Frowrequested SOS fixes immediately as they were losing large quantities of petrol and oil, and the a/cwas difficuly to control owing to port aileron being u/s. This Hampden returned safely at thehomebase at 17.20 hours (local time).

The P1151 sighted a Me 109 at 6 miles north of Baltrum island at 1,000 feet, but saw no moreafter this Hampden climbed into the clouds. Hampden AD832 saw another Hampden shot up byfighter. (source: Public Record Office, AIR 27/982 Operational Record Book 144 squadron).

Six Hampdens of 50 squadron were briefed for operations, detailed to plant vegetables in thenectarine area. They took off from Skellingthorpe at about midday. The majority reportedinsufficient cloud cover over target area. Two a/c planted vegetables in alternative positions andone a/c failed to return. One a/c reported enemy fighters (AIR 27/487 Operational Record Book50 squadron).

50 Squadron lost AE306, which was shot down by Lüth off Terschelling. The entire crew of fouris still missing in action. 144 squadron lost two Hampdens. Hampden AD824 was shot down byLüth off the (German ?) Frisians. This Hampden had a crew of five aboard. Sgt R.F. Thompson(KIA), F/Sgt R.N. Thompson (KIA), Sgt Duce (MIA), Sgt Bow (MIA) and Sgt Rowell (MIA)

(KIA = killed in action, body was found, MIA = missing in action, body not found). R.F.Thompson is buried in the Nes General Cemetery on Ameland, while R.N. Thompson is in WestTerschelling General Cemetery. (These figures don't quite tally. If the first kill was west ofTerchelling at 15.02 it is unlikely that the next could have in the German Friesian islands, adistance of at least 90 miles some seven minutes later).

Hampden AE392 of 144 Squadron was shot down by Lüth off the North German coast. F/LtKingston (MIA), Sgt R. de Courcy (MIA), Sgt J. Tobin (MIA), Sgt A. Gibson (KIA) and Sgt A.Fulton (MIA).

The body of Sgt Gibson was recovered and he was buried at Wangerooge. He was exhumed on10 June 1942 and is now buried in the Sage War Cemetery (on the other hand, RAF BomberCommand Losses 1942 says that Gibson was buried on 10 June 1942 at Wangerooge and latertransferred to the Sage War Cemetery)

All of this suggests that there still remains some confusion. The tidal flows may have somethingto do with where someone is found, but the two Thompsons of Hampden AE824 are buried inneighbouring islands in the Dutch Frisians. Maybe this was the aircraft that was lost west ofTerschelling. The distance between these locations is approximately 30 miles. The distancebetween Baltrum and Wangerooge where Gibson of AE392 was found is also 30 miles in thesame direction of tidal flow. If AE824 and AE392 were shot down in the same area(Terschelling), then this would account for the time difference of 7 minutes between the twointerceptions. This would suggest that the fighter seen off 6 miles off Baltrum (100 miles east ofTerschelling) was Lüth attacking or about to attack AE392 at 1604. My guess is that the targetwhere they were to lay their mine was in the waterway 10 miles east of Wangerooge which givesaccess to Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven, but they were shot down somewhere in the region ofBaltrum. All of this now tallies with the official report that had the plane lost in the GermanBight region.

War situation in Feb 1942

From the very outbreak of war Allied shipping had been in constant danger from the Germannavy. Chief amongst these were the ships:

Bismarck 50,153 tons (8 15" guns, 12 6" guns and 6 aircraft).

Admiral Graf Spee 10,000 tons (6 11" guns and 8 6" guns) One of the first 'pocket' battleshipswas intended as a commerce raider.

Scharnhorst, 38,900 tons (9 11" guns and 12 5.8" guns). Was intended as a fast commerce raiderand involved in the sinking of the carrier HMS Glorious.

Gniesenau, 38,900 tons (9 11" guns, 12 5.8" guns and 14 4.1" guns). Like the Scharnhorst wasintended as a fast commerce raider and was involved in the sinking of the carrier HMS Gloriousas it sailed from Norway.

Prinz Eugen

By 1942 some of the threat had been removed:

Admiral Graf Spee together with her sister ships Deutchland and Admiral Scheer she wasscuttled off the coast of Uruguay during the Battle of the River Plate in December 1939.

Bismarck was sent on a raiding mission into the Atlantic in May 1941, but was intercepted bythe Royal Navy and in the ensuing action she sank HMS Hood. Owing to the damage shesustained she was scuttled by her crew.

However, Scharnhorst, Gniesenau and Prinz Eugen remained a serious threat. It is my belief thatLisbon and Foynes were two key factors in the balance of war. They were essential for thetrans-Atlantic flying routes, but they were also a vital line of contact for any flight coming backfrom North Africa, the Middle and Far East. The direct line flight from Lisbon to UK passedsufficiently close to occupied France so as to make fighter attack almost certain. Instead,Sunderlands took off from Lisbon at night and landed at Foynes for refuellling at dawn (howaviation fuel was delivered to Foynes would be an interesting little topic for investigation) Now,imagine if one of the German ships had positioned itself off Lisbon or inside the mouth of theShannon. In the first case it would have been possible for the Navy to do a re-run of the Battleof Trafalgar. However, once inside the mouth of the Shannon, it might have been more difficultto dislodge a German marauder. The need to remove the threat was probably foremost in theminds of Churchill and his senior staff.

Scharnhorst, Gniesenau and Prince Eugen were holed up in Brest. However, they were in seriousdanger, being subject to constant aerial bombardment. From the German side, it was essential towithdraw them to safer waters. The long-way round to Germany via Ireland and the north ofScotland seemed to be very dangerous, as it would have drawn the entire Atlantic fleet. A dashup the Channel was the other option, but the narrow Dover Strait would leave the shipsvulnerable to attack from the RAF and from the Dover batteries. An element of surprise was

needed and this depended mainly on the weather. The required conditions were: rotten visibilityin the Channel, rotten conditions for the RAF to take off, operate and land and perfect conditionsfor the Luftwaffe to provide a defensive shield. The air ace, Genl Adolf Galland was brought into coordinate the fighter action and various units were withdrawn from other spheres in order toparticipate.

U-boats in the Atlantic were detailed to act as meteorological observation posts and an analysisof reports confirmed that everything would be just right for 11 February. The ships were aboutto start when there was an air-raid warning. They lost two hours as that sat tight to avoid givingany indication of the impending action. The ruse caught everyone on the British side of theChannel by surprise and they were passing Dover before they started to experience any realopposition and this was easily dealt with.

However, not all was lost on the British side. There had been an expectation that something likethis might happen and that is why so many Hampden bombers had been sent out on mine-layingoperations. At 1530 (German Summer Time) Scharnhorst hit a mine as it passed along theBelgian coast. At 2055 Gniesenau hit a mine in the vicinity of the island of Vlieland, which isjust west of Terschelling. At 2250 Scharnhorst hit another mine in the vicinity of Borkum. Theships limped into their home ports during the next two days.

Subsequent events

What happened to the ships

Scharnhorst was finally sunk in December 1943 by HMS Duke of York and three cruisers whenshe was on her way to attack an Arctic convoy.

Gniesenau, Following the 'Channel Dash' it reached Kiel, but was damaged during RAF bombingraids two weeks later. She was then moved out of range to Gdynia in Poland and wasdecommissioned in July 1942, her turrets being removed for coastal defence. A planned refit wasabandoned in 1943 and her hulk was sunk as a blockship at Gdynia in March 1945. Salved bythe Russians, she was broken up in 1947 - 51.

What happened to 144 Squadron afterwards

By 14/15 September 1942 Hampdens flew with Bomber Command for the last time. Theyacquired a new lease of life, being adapted to operate as torpedo bombers with RAF CoastalCommand. 144 Squadron flew to Russian bases to attack German supply ships off theNorwegian coast north of Bergen and in the Barents sea. The outward journey proved extremelyhazardous and one of the Hampdens was shot down by a Russian fighter while coming in over aprohibited area. As one of the Hampden pilots subsequently put it. They reached Russia"without wireless, in very bad weather, with very poor maps and having as our only means of

identification the undercarriage which we put down as a friendly gesture when the quick-fingeredRussians started to shoot". The Hampdens forced the Germans to provide both escort vesselsand air cover for their convoys and after completing their operations the two Squadrons (144 and455) handed over the fourteen remaining serviceable Hampdens to the Russians. What use theRussians made of these is unknown. 144 Squadron was re-equipped with Beaufighters at the endof 1942. 455 Squadron retained its torpedo bomber Hampdens until December 1943, when itwas re-equipped with Halifax bombers and returned to Bomber Command, at which point theoperation of Handley Page's first bomber monoplane finally drew to a close.

What happened to Luth

Oberfeldwebel Detlev Lüth made a belly landing with his Focke Wulf Fw 190 at airfieldValkenburg (near Leiden) on 21 August 42 after a combat with B-17's. He was unhurt. On 11 Sep42 his Fw 190 collided whilst taxiing at Venlo airfield with another Fw 190. Lüth was wounded.On 3 Nov 43 he bailed out his Fw 190 after combat with USA aircraft off Schiffdorf (Germany).He was unhurt. On 26 Nov 43 he had to make a belly landing at Oldenburg after combats withUSA aircraft and was unhurt. At the end of 43 his score had risen to 37 victories.

Further details that have been obtained since this original document was first drafted are listedbelow and are based on extracts form the three volume history of JG-1 by Eric Mombeek. Eachextract is headed by the page from where it is taken in Mombeek's work.

p.41This fourth Gruppe was formed at Vannes and subsequently transferred to Jever. Sent furthernorth, to Norway, it would serve as the backbone of Jadgeschwader 5 upon that unit's formation andwould be redesignated III./JG 5.

At the start of February, the majority of Il./JG 1's pilots of were sent to Amstede. On 7 February,during a transfer flight, contact was made with the enemy for the first time. Of w. Detlev Lüth wasdirected by night fighter operators onto the track of three RAF Hampdens. He shot down all ofthem (his 27th, 28th and 29th victories). The laconic entry in the unit's war diary noted At last thefirst successes since Russia". Up to that date. the Gruppe had recorded 421 victories. (Cecil deCourcy's aircraft was the 29th kill)

The same day, some pilots of l./JG 1 intercepted a formation of Spitfires. Two were claimed by Lt.Heinz Grosser and Ofw. Werner Gerhardt (his seventh Abschuss)

p.53Rotte comprising Omr. Schmidt and Fw. Nelleskamp from 6. Staffel disappeared over the sea asvictims, so it would appear, of Spitfires. On 30 March, Obit. Waiter Diesselhorst of 5./JG 1 crashedinto the sea and was reported missing. On 8 and 9 May, two more pilots of 11. Gruppe were killed

in accidents in the North Sea. But on 9 May, two Spitfires fell to the guns of Ofw. Lüth and Fw.Hutter.

p.55. . . an alarming change in the direction of the air war. JG 1 clashed with the 'heavies' for the firsttime on 21 August; 9 Fw 190s led by Obit. Robert Olejnik intercepted a formation of 12 B-17sfrom the 95th BG en route for the ship yards in Rotterdam once their fighter escort had turned forhome. Well grouped however, the Americans repulsed the German attacks before being recalled.Ofw. Detlev Lüth of 4./JG 1 was forced to make a belly landing when his engine was hit by returnfire from the Fortresses.

p.90

p.104 . . . five Fw 190s of 5. Staffel led by Ofw. Detlev Lüth, took off from Schiphol. Twenty minuteslater their battle began. Lüth and two other pilots each recorded a victory. Fifteen minutes behind 5.Staffel, 6./JG 1 was in the air. Their seven Fw 190s made contact with the enemy formation 40minutes later. By now it was too late to use the element of surprise against the Americans anddespite several attacks, only one Boeing was damaged. It continued to fly in spite of the fact thattwo of its engines no longer functioned. The drama continued. Obit. Walter Leonhardt, successor toRoLwer as Staffelkapitan of 6./JG 1, broke away from his fellow pilots. Latching on to a Viermot,he was determined not to let it return to England. The enemy aircraft fought back furiously.

p.123In II. Gruppe, Hptm. Dietrich Wickop developed a reputation as a skilled fighter pilot. At 19.20hrs on 4 April, the Fw 190s of the Stab and 4. and 5. Staffeln intercepted a formation of 24 RAFVenturas, escorted by some 50 Spitfires Their target was Rotterdam. Eight victories were claimedlay Il./JG 1: five Spitfires to Hptm. Wickop, Ofw. Lüth, (his 31st victory), Uffz. Stellfeld, FwHaninger, and Uffz. Fuchs, as well as three Venturas to Uffz. Schonrock, Ofw. Winkler and Fw.Roden, who had also shot down a lone Lightning fiteen minutes earlier. Once again however,figures from the opposing sides do not tally: the British reported the loss of two Venturas and twoSpitfires (118 and 167 Squadrons)

p.158'Green' pilots were generally accepted very well by the old hands. Obviously it was all a question ofpersonalities. Most of the 'old~timers' took the new boys under their wings to protect them. Bycontrast, others, on rare occasions, thought - 'These young boys, how long will they survive? It'sbetter not to get too attached to them.

"Occasionally, they were rather unfriendly. Nevertheless, the great majority adhered to the familyspirit of fighter pilots. It was a great strength. I remember for example the sensitivity ofOberfeldwebel Detlev Lüth. He was like a mother to us. His move to another Staffel was terrible forus, but when we found out he had been killed in combat we felt like orphans.

p.160The next major engagement took place on 12 August at 09.10 hrs, when the three Gruppenestablished contact with a formation of around 330 B-17s over the Ruhr area. Over Solingen theAmericans ran into an intense flak barrage which disrupted their formation. It was at this mornentthat the pilots of 11. Gruppe launched their attack. The result was seven B-17s claimed, with Hptm.Walter Hoeckner, Obit. Harry Koch, Ofw. Detlef Lüth and Ofw. Otto Bach among the claimants.One pilot was killed, Uffz. Kurt Brumund of 6 Staffel, and 12 aircraft were damaged by returndefensive fire.

p.193. . . Midday- 14 October. The German listening services were picking up messages '' indicating abomber formation heading in the direction of Brussels.

The Eighth Air Force were preparing for their second raid against the ball-bearing factories atSchweinfurt. The 17 August attack and the terrible losses inflicted that day were still fresh in theminds of the American bomber crews. Morale was low. As was the case on the 17 August mission,a diversionary raid was planned. This time too, bad weather would interfere with the operation.

At about 13.30 hrs, l. and Il./JG 1 engaged the American formation as it entered the Eindhoven areaunder strong escort. With their auxiliary fuel tanks released, the Fw 190s turned into the attack at analtitude of 8,000 m (26,246 ft). At this moment the escorting P-47s dropped towards the Germanaircraft. The confusion was indescribable. Ofw. Detlef Lüth in his Fw 190 A-6 'White 9', escapedthe Thunderbolts and found himself on the track of a B-17.

"On 14 October 1943, at 12.14 hours, l took off as No.3 in 4. Staffel, JG 1, following orders fromJaLu 3. At about 13.32 hours, we saw between 250300 Boeings, split into two large formations. AsI had not released my auxiliary fuel tank, I lost contact with the rest of the Gruppe. I approachedthree aircraft flying about 1,500 metres from the right of the formation. When I was sufficientlyclose to the three aircraft, I identified them as Thunderbolts. I got into position directly behind them,but at the same moment I was attacked by a fourth fighter, which pursued me down to 5,000 metres.Following that, still with plenty of fuel, I looked to make contact with my colleagues. After three orfour minutes I realised that would not be possible. I had to attack alone. I placed myself above agroup of 15-20 Boeings and dived on them from the right. In a wide curve, l passed under them toput myself in a position to fire on the last Boeing on the left side. I approached, firing all the timefrom 150 metres closing to 50. A part of its fuselage came away, the rudder tore off, as well as partof the wings. I followed the Boeing for a moment. Its guns continued to fire up to the point when itleft the formation, making a turn to the left. Two men bailed out, and I noticed that during this turn,a Bf 109 made a fresh attack on the aircraft. I made a second pass, this time on the flank. Twofurther crew members took to their parachutes. The aircraft itself then began to fall. It lost its fin,appeared to steady itself for a second, before crashing from 3,000 metres. I would place the impactwith the ground at about a kilometre south-east of Duren. I was then chased by two escort fighters.I no longer had sufficient ammunition to fight them. It was 13:40 hours: Thirty five minutes later, Ilanded at Koln-Ostheim airfield."

It is interesting to note that Lüth's aircraft, a Fw 190 A-6 fitted with two MG 151/20 cannon andtwo MG 17 machine guns, fired 280 rounds with the former weapon, and 550 with the latter. Eightcrew members of Lüth's B-17 were captured unhurt. Another was wounded and one killed.

Fw. Kurt Niedereichholz shot down a B-17, while Ofw. Leo Schuhmacher, Fw. Wolfgang Brunner(Fw 190 A-6 'Yellow 1') and Obit. Eugen Kotiza each claimed a Herausschuss. The American forcereached the Rhine, at which point their fighter escort had to turn back. II. Gruppe also had to turnback.

Within I. Gruppe, Obit. Engleder distinguished himself once again by shooting down two B-17s.In fifteen days, he had destroyed or seriously damaged seven Flying Fortresses! Hptm. Schnoorclaimed one which made his 13th victory. Ofiv. Piffer and Demuth, Fw. Rathenow and Uffz. Kunzeeach claimed a Boeing. In total, I./JG 1 claimed ten B-17s (including 5 Herausschusse).

III./JG 1, especially 7. Staffel were less fortunate; three of their pilots were killed and the two B-17sshot down by Ofw. Frohlich of 8. Staffel and Obit. Klopper of 7. Staffel (his 88th claim) were littlecompensation.

The second air battle for Schweinfurt was reaching its zenith. Like a cursed city, it seemed to havethrown a curse on the crews from the New World. On their airfields in England, USAAFcommanders and ground personnel scanned the skies nervously. How many Fortresses wouldreturn? And in what condition? How many dead or wounded on board?

Like those of 17 August, the results of the raid were catastrophic. Sixty B-17s went down in enemyterritory, five more in England. Twelve others were damaged but miraculously got down and werethen written off. More than 120 other Flying Fortresses regained their bases with serious damage.Nearly six hundred men were missing. Five dead and forty wounded were taken from returnedaircraft.

But, once again, German claims were greater than American stated losses; 145 four-engined aircraftshot down (or seriously damaged), plus three P-47s. The Luftwaffe suffered 20 fighter pilots killedand 15 wounded.

p.194. . . daylight mission to date, were escorted by a combined force of 378 P-47 Thunderbolts and P38Lightnings. l./JG 1 took off at 12.26 hrs and returned with two victories, but on the debit side theylost Fw. Johannes Rathenow, the pilot who had scored the Gruppe's first victory. His Fw 190 A-6'White 7' was hit and exploded.

Bf 109 G-6s of III./JG 1 took off from Leeuwarden at 12.43 hrs. Visibility was poor, and the rainwhich soaked the airfields made take-off hazardous. When the cloud base had been negotiated, thedrops of rain smacked against the fighters like shot. Then the escort fighters pounced on theGermans. What followed was a massacre. The Staffelkapitane were the first victims: Obit. RainerFramm of 9. Staffel crashed in his Bf 109 G-6 'Yellow 1' near Bad Zwischenahn. Not long after,Hptm. Alfred Faber of 8. Staffel and his Bf 109 G-6 'Black 1' disappeared into the North Sea nearAmeland. Another veteran, Fw. Josef Kehrle of 8. Staffel was wounded. In contrast 7. Staffelmanaged to evade the American defensive screen, Obit. Heinz Klopper claiming two B-17s andUffz. Weber, one.

Twenty-two Fw 190s of 11. Gruppe took off at 12.55 hrs. The Gruppe suffered one pilot killed andtwo pilots had to bail out (Fw. Sauer and 0~. Lüth shortly after shooting down a B-17 in Fw 190A-6 'White 9', W.Nr. 550741). A P-38 Lightning from the 55th Fighter Group was shot down byOfw. Haninger.

p.196Two days later, P-38s of the 55th Fighter Group prevented 11. and lII./JG 1 reaching the bombersduring a mission to Bremen. Seven pilots from JG 1 each claimed a P-38, including Hptm. Kochand Eberle. This time, Jagdgeschwader 1 escaped without loss.

The American raid of 26 November - once more to Bremen - turned again to JG 1's advantage withjust one pilot killed, Uffz. Walter Ruttau of 4. Staffel, for eight B-17s and one B-24 shot down orseriously damaged. Among the Abschiesser were such well known names as Hptm. Hoeckner andKoch, Obit. Klopper, Ofw. Piffer and Lüth.

Nevertheless, November 1943 ended tragically for III./JG 1. On the 29th, a little before 15.00 hrs, I.and Il./JG 1 avoided confrontation with the fighter escort guarding yet another strike . . .

p.199 . . . and instantly the Boeing dived out of control. It crashed on Norderney Island, taking four crewmembers to their deaths. Swoboda managed to bail out and reached the ground unscathed. In thecombat which followed, Hptm. Koch and Ofw. Lüth each claimed a B-17. Swoboda was rewardedby the Iron Cross 1st Class and promotion to officer rank during the summer of 1944.

p.227The bomber stream approached Berlin. The German fighters were now running short ofammunition and fuel. They had to get down quickly. Of the 21 Fw 190s of Il./JG 1 which took off,only two managed to regain their home base. Seventeen others landed at various aerodromes acrossnorth-west Germany. Apart from the loss of Obit. Kretschmer, II. Gruppe also lost the experiencedand highly respected Ofw. Detlev Lüth, who remained trapped in his aircraft when it crashed atEydelstadt.

Ofw. Detlev Lüth, a II. JG I 'veteran', was killed in action on 6 March 1944.

Post ScriptOne of my ex students works for a company which produces digitised maps. He was able to getme a copy of a marine chart for the area off Baltrum, where the Hampden bomber is believed tohave come down. A careful inspection shows that there is an unexploded mine in the sea in theprecise region (6 miles off Baltrum) and slightly to the east of this there is a record of wreckage.This has been highlighted in the picture which is shown below.