PROPERTY:

II. PROPERTY BASED ON OWNER

CASES:1. Binalay vs. Manalo

FACTS:The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land in Isabela. On part or the said parcel of land was sold to Manalo. The western portion of the said sold land would periodically go under water as the Cagayan River would swell with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August and would remain submerged during the rest of the year. Manalo also bought another piece of land from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Taccad.

According to the survey plan of the lots, the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two branches – the western and eastern branches. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season.

Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the eastern and western branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. The land bought from Judge Taccad and the land bought from Taguba is then separated only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad (heir of Judge Taccad). Manalo claims that this said portion also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.

On the other hand, petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821 (the elongated strip of land formed by the western and eastern branches of the river), insisted that they own the same as they occupied its outer edges.

In a quieting of title case, the RTC rendered Manalo as the lawful owner of the land which was affirmed by the CA.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manalo is the owner of the land by virtue of accretion

HELD:The CA concurred with the findings of the trial court that lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from lot 307 since the eastern

branches of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically connected with the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo.

The trial court reached a conclusion that:“the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion (accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Taccad becomes a marshy land and is only six inches deep and 12 meters in width as its widest. It has been held by our Supreme Court that ‘the owner of the riparian land which received the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest.’”

The CA in supporting the decision of the trial court held that:“The disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up during supper. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season…which increases the water level of the Cagayan Valley.”

The CA also applied the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose which held that:

“According to the foregoing definition of the words “ordinary” and “extra-ordinary”, the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during the extra-ordinary one; in as much as the former is the one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure, and goes beyond that which Is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of waters, the natural bed r basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of the Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season…’

However, the court cannot agree with the CA in applying the abovementioned case with regards with the instant case, Laguna de Bay is a lake and therefore, Article 74 of the Law of Waters cannot be applied.

What is more applicable is Article 70 of the Law of Waters which states that:

“The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods.”

According to Article 420 of the CC which states:The following are public dominion:

(1)Those intended for public use… rivers, torrents…, banks, shores…

When Article 420 speaks of banks and rivers, “rivers” is a which includes: (1) running waters, (2)the bed and (3) banks.

The claim of ownership of Manalo over the submerged portions is bereft of basis even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase. If ever, Article 462 of the CC would apply divesting Manalo of the ownership of the land with just compensation.

On the issue of accretion, there is no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the CC has the following requisites:

a. that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible.

b. that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea)

c. that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or sea coast).

Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river. Also, a sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner. Lastly, the mere size of the questioned lot alone (20 hectares), it would be impossible that in only a span of 10 years a land that big would be formed by way of accretion.

2. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene co., inc. vs. BercillesFACTS:

In 1968, the City Council of Cebu approved the declaration of a portion of M. Borces Street, Cebu City as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plant. Subsequently, the City Council also authorized the acting Mayor of the city to sell the land through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the land was awarded to the petitioner.

The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual

ISSUE:Whether or not an abandoned road may be sold to a private person?

HELD:Yes, the said portion of abandoned land may be sold.

According to Article 422, the Civil Code expressly provides that:“Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.”

Aside from this, the Revised Charter of Cebu that:“Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.”

3. Chavez vs. Public Estates AuthorityFACTS:

In 1973, the Government through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Rod. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of 50% of the total reclaimed land.

In 1977, President Marcos issued P.D no. 1084 creating Public Estates Authority (PEA) which was tasked to “reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire… lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, the President issued P.D. no. 1085 transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of Manila Bay.

Also, the president issued a Memorandum directing the PEA to amend its contract with the CDCP, so that “all future works in the MCCRRP… shall be funded and owned by the PEA. In the Memorandum, it further stated that “CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of

CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in MCCRP… which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed by the CDCP as of December 30, 1981.”

In 1988, President Aquino issued special patent no. 3517 granting and transferring to PEA “the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRP. Also, the Register of Deeds of Paranaque issued TCTs covering three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands.”

In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint-Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation to develop the Freedom islands. The agreement also included the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands without public bidding.

In 1996, a senate committee investigated the joint venture agreement between the parties concluding that:

1. the reclaimed lands of PEA seeks to transfer to AMARAI under the JVA are lands of public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands.

2. Certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are void.

3. the JVA is illegalHowever, in a Presidential Administrative Order of President Ramos, the investigating counsel held the legality of the JVA and upon the order of the president, re-negotiations are being conducted.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus assailing that the sale to AMARI of the lands of public domain is a blatant violation of Section 3, Article 8 of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of public domain to private corporations.

ISSUES:(1) Whether the stipulations in the amended JVA for the

transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:The Regalian Doctrine (Article 420 of the CC)

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of public dominion.

“all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.”

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) CA 141 authorized the LEASE but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals.*continues as of today as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.

4. Municipality of Antipolo vs. ZapantaFACTS:

A single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants (Conrado Eniceo and Heirs of Joaquin Avendano) before the CFI of Rizal, Makati for the registration of land in the Municipality of Antipolo which the court approved.

Antipoli filed a complaint against the heirs of Joaquin Avendano praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court.

The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the appellant failed to file its bried withing the reglementary period.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not the appeal should be given due course on the important and substantial allegation that the registration court did not have jurisdiction over the land, it being property of the Municipality of Antipolo, used long before the war as a public market and other public purposes, and hence actually devoted to public use and service.

HELD:The Registration Court does not have jurisdiction over the land.

According to the record, for more than 50 years no, Antipolo the disputed property to be public land subject to Antipolo’s use and permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. The said site has been a public market as far back as 1908 or at least, since 1920 up to today. Gradually, additional public structures were built thereon.

At the time that the registration was filed in 1977, the disputed property was already devoted to public use and public service.

Therefore, it was outside the commerce of man and could no longer be subject to private registration.

The claim of the Avendano heirs that they merely tolerated the occupancy by Antipolo which had borrowed the disputed property from them, since they had been in possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time. THEY FORGET THAT ALL LANDS ARE PRESUMED TO BE PUBLIC LANDS UNTIL THE CONTRARY IS ESTABLISHED.

The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP.

Therefore, the Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of Antipolo, the decision adjudicating the disputed property as private is null and void.

“…if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included.”

5. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of ZamboangaFACTS:

Commonwealth Act 39 converted the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Under sec. 50 of CA 39,

“buildings and properties which the province (Province of Zamboanga) shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga…”

In 1952, The Province of Zamboanga was divided into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. The Executive Secretary held that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as co-owner of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City.

Subsequently, RA 3039 was approved amending sec. 50 of CA 39 which provided that

“all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former Province of Zamboanga and located within the

City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, FREE OF CHARGE, in favor of Zamboanga City.”

Zamboanga del Norte then filed a complaint of Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction on the grounds that (1) RA 3039 be declared as unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation.

The lower court declared that RA 3039 as unconstitutional as it deprives the plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.

ISSUE:Whether or not disputed 50 properties are public domain or patrimonial property.

HELD:RULE:

If the property is owned by the municipality in its PUBLIC and GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY, the property is PUBLIC and CONGRESS has ABSOLUTE CONTROL over it.

But if the property is owned in its PRIVATE or PROPRIETY CAPACITY, then it is PATRIMONIAL and Congress HAS NO ABSOLUTE CONTROL. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation.

This capacity in which the property is held is, however, DEPENDENT on the USE as to which it is INTENDED and DEVOTED.

The Civil Code under Article 424 classified which properties were of public use. Under this rule, the disputed (50) properties, except 2 lots used for high school playgrounds could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga Province, as the capital site, hospital and leprosarium sites and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not PUBLIC USE. They would fall under the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be free and indiscriminate use by anyone.

However, under the Law of Municipal Corporations, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for

GOVERNMENTAL or PUBLIC PURPOSES like local administration, public education, public health, etc to be deemed public.

On the question on which law would apply (General law[CC] vs. Special law [Law of Municipal Corporations]), it is stated under Article 424 of the CC that “…without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.”

The law on Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws.” Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

6. Rabuco vs. VillegasFACTS:

Petitioners’ filed a petition for injunction to enjoin the demolition of their houses and ejectment form the public lots in question and to direct respondent administrator of Land Authority (DAR) to implement the provisions of RA 3120 for the subdivision and sale on installment basis of the subdivided lots to them as the tenants and bona fide occupants thereof, instead of ordering their ejectment.

The City Mayor and City Engineer of Manila is not only the demolition of the petitioners’ houses but their ejectment proceedings against the petitioners as well. However, under Sec. 2 of RA 3120, there shall be no ejectment proceedings against any tenants or bona fide occupants. In addition, the defendants argued that they still may claim a right, by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of RA 3120, to continue possession and occupation of the premises and the lifting of the order of demolition issued against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3120 is unconstitutional

HELD: RA 3120 is constitutional.

The issue at the case at bar is the constitutionality of RA 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate “which are reserved as communal property” into “disposable or

alienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration” for subdivision into smaller lots and for sale on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof.

The City of Manila however contends that the Act must be stricken down as unconstitutional for depriving the City of Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is untenable and without basis, since the lots ARE MANIFESTLY OWNED BY THE CITY IN ITS PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY and therefore PUBLIC PROPERTY over which Congress had ABSOLUTE CONTROL as distinguished from PATRIMONIAL PROPETY owned by it in its PRIVATE or PROPRIETY CAPACITY of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.

Citing Salas vs. Jarencio:The general rule that “regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, EXCEPTING those acquired with its own funds in its PRIVATE or CORPORATE capacity, such property is HELD IN TRUST for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or propriety purposes. It holds such lands subject to the PARAMOUNT POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as and agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration.

The lots in question were not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. Therefore, the City was not deprived of anything it owns by acquisition with its private or corporate funds either under the due process clause or under eminent domain.

7. Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 103882)FACTS:

The Congress passed RA 1899 which authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities at their own expense.

By virtue of the said law, Pasay City Government passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City. In another Ordinance (Ordinance no. 158), the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) was authorized to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.

In 1961, Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with writ of preliminary preventive injunction as it questioned the subject matter of the agreement as it is outside the commerce of man as the lands in question are not foreshore areas but submerged lands.

The RREC and Pasay City averred that the subject matter of such agreement is within the commerce of man, that the phrase “foreshore lands” within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning than that cited in the dictionary.

The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the defendants which the CA affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not “foreshore lands” as mentioned in RA 1899 includes submerged areas.

HELD:No, as submerged areas are not the same as foreshore lands and therefore outside the commerce of men.

The respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of “foreshore lands”, beyond the intent of the law and against the legal connotations of “foreshore lands.” It is rather elementary that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction.

The term foreshore lands refer to:The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.

The court cannot broaden the meaning of the word. If the intention of the Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly.

8. Salas vs. JarencioFACTS:

In 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requesting the President to consider a property in the said city as patrimonial in character for the purpose of reselling the same to the actual occupants thereof. Thus, granting the same, RA 4118 was passed which pertinent provisions are as follows:

“…that this parcel of land which is located in Malate, Manila, which is reserved as communal property, is hereby converted into disposal or alienable land of the State, to be placed under the disposal of the Land Tenure administration…for the sale of the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants…”

However, due to some reasons, the City Mayor of Manila brought an action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the appellants from implementing RA 4118 and praying for the declaration of the said law as unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process of law and payment of just compensation.

ISSUE:Whether or not the property in question is private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

HELD:No, the property in question belongs to the State.

As a general rule: Regardless of the source or classification of land in possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or propriety purposes.

It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for the purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use.

If follows therefore that although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality.

*Communal lands – portion of the public domain owned by the State; it came into existence as such when the City of Manila, or any pueblo or town in the Philippines for that matter, was founded under the laws of Spain; that the administrative authority was required to allot ad set aside portions of the public domain for a public plaza, etc, that in assigning these lands were earmarked strictly for public purposes.

The municipalities merely act as a governmental agent of the State with authority to govern a limited portion of its territory or to administer purely local affairs in a given political subdivision, and the extent of its authority is strictly delimited by the grant of power conferred by the State.

9. Villarico vs. SarmientoFACTS:

III. OWNERSHIP

CASES:1. Javier vs. Veridiano 237 SCRA 565

FACTS: On January 25, 1963, petitioner (Javier) filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641, of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision in Olongapo City. In 1970, petitioner alleged that she was forcibly disposed of a portion of the land by Ben Babol, in which she instituted a complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo. The complaint states as follows:

“…that the defendant, without express consent of the plaintiff and without lawful authority, through scheme, strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the southwestern part of the lot…and started construction of a riprap along the Kalaklan River… the said entry was further likewise augmented by removing plaintiff’s chain link, fence…”

The City Court of Olongapo dismissed the case on the ground that the Bureau of lands has considered the area in question outside of lot no. 1641. In April 1973, the decision became final and executory when the CFI of Olongapo dismissed the complained and affirmed the findings of the City Court.

Meanwhile, in December 1973, the petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent covering lot no. 1641. However, Ben Babol (defendant) sold the property in question to Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand.

In 1977, four years after the finality of the dismissal of the civil case, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Babol and Roseto before the CFI of Zambaes. Roseto moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The CFI granted the motion to dismiss, and denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the principle of res judicata applies in the present case.

HELD: No. The principle of res judicata is not applicable in the case.

The court held that in order for res judicata to bar an institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:

1. There must be a final judgment or order2. The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter.3. The former judgment is a judgment on the merits4. There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and causes of action.

In the case at bench, the first three requisites of res judicata are present. The only question to be answered is the presence of the fourth requisite.

The petitioner’s contention that there is no identity of the parties on the ground that Rosete was never impleaded in the forcible entry case. However, the application of res judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional parties in a subsequent litigation. In fact we have said that there is still identity of parties although in the second action there is one party who was not joined in the first action, if it appears that such party is not a necessary party either in the first or second action, or is a mere nominal party.

Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of court states that: “…the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive BETWEEN PARTIES and their SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST BY TITLE…”

Defendant Rosete is a successor in interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. However, there IS MERIT on the petitioner’s argument that there is NO IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION between the two civil cases.

The first complaint was a complaint for FORCIBLE ENTRY (ACCION INTERDICTAL), where what is at issue is PRIOR POSSESSION, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. Thus the only issue in an action for forcible entry is the PHYSICAL or MATERIAL POSSESSION of real property, that is possession DE FACTO not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party IN PEACEABLE QUIET POSSESSION SHALL NOT BE TURNED OUT BY STRONG HAND, VIOLENCE OR TERROR. And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.

The second complaint: an action for QUIETING OF TITLE AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION WITH DAMAGES is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an ACCION REIVINDICATORIA under article 434 of the Civil Code.

Citing Emilia vs. Bado, cites the doctrine of remedies available under existing laws ad jurisprudence to recover possession of real property: accion inderdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the defendant’s possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper Municipal Trial Court or Metropolitan Trial Court.

Accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to posses without claim of title.

The first civil case, the petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from the second civil case where she clearly alleged ownership and clearly gives defendants therein notice of

plaintiff’s claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to posses which is an elemental attribute of such ownership. Therefore, being two subject matter and cause of action between the two civil cases, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied.

2. German Management & Services Inc. vs. CA (177 SCRA 405)

FACTS:Spouses Jose are residents of Philadelphia, USA and are owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. In 1982, the spouses executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner obtained a development permit. However, petitioner found out that part of the property was occupied by private respondent and 20 other persons. Petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused.

Private respondent filed an action for forcible entry against the petitioner alleging that they have occupied and tilled the land for some 12 years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. In a permit acquired by the petitioner, the Provincial Government of Rizal allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, Antipolo, Rizal, at his expense under the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot. Thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process by:

1. Forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their properties without notice.

2. Bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of the respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and

3. Trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective famholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815 and 1028.

The MTC dismissed the private respondent’s complaint and their appeal was also dismissed by the RTC. The CA, however, reversed the decision of the previous courts, which held that, since the private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of the possession.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the (1)CA denied due process to petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the

opportunity to file its answer and (2) whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.

HELD:(1) The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file and answer for due process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the CA. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading.

(2) Notwithstanding petitioner’s claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were already in possession thereof. There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents’ peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner’s act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

The petitioners rationalized the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help (Art. 429 of CC). The court finds the justification unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear in Art. 536 of the CC which states that “in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive

another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.”

3. Caisip vs. People (36 SCRA 17)

FACTS:Complainant Gloria Cabalang and her husband cultivated a parcel of land in Hacienda Palico in Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant.

The husband of Cabalang filed an action seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of the owner of the Hacienda (Cia Roxas). However, the court of Agrarian Relations declared that it has no jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as the husband is not a tenant on the said parcel.

The owner (Cia Roxas) then filed an action against Cabalang’s spouse for forcible entry, praying that the same be ejected from the premises, which the court granted.

In 1959, petitioner and complainant had a disagreement regarding the cutting of sugar cane. The following day, complainant allegedly entered the premised and refused to be driven out by petitioner. Thus, Gloria Calabag was charged with grave coercion. The case was dismissed on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Because of the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to remain in the premises, Caisip sought for the help of the Chief of Police of Nasugbu, who did not act on the said request because there was no proper court order. Caisip then sought the help of the administrator of the hacienda which rendered the chief of police to send police sergeant and police corporal (co-accused) to the premises. Caisip approached Cabalag and told her to leave the premises, but the latter refused to do so, because of this, Caisip asked his co-accused to go to Cabalag. In turn, the police officers dragged Cabalag westward and brought her to the municipal building.

ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not their actions were justified under Art. 429 of the CC2. Whether or not the 20-day holding period of grace given to Cabalag

and her husband was valid and lawful.

HELD:(1) The justification under article 429 of the petitioners is untenable. In the case at bar, the complainant has been given 20 days from June 6, 1959 within which to vacate the lot, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 – or within the same period – invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda

owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not “repel or prevent in actual or threatened … physical invasion or usurpation.” They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them.(2) The 20-day holding period was legal (see case if you want to know

the reason)

4. Custodio vs. CA (253 SCRA 483)

FACTS:Spouses Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected there on in P. Burgos. St, Metro Manila. Mabasa acquired said property through a contract of sale with spouses Rayos. The said property was described to be surrounded by other immovables of the appellants. There were two passageways going inside the plaintiff’s house. However, some time in 1982, plaintiff found out that there had been an adobe fence built on the first passage way. In a judgment promulgated by the trial court, spouses Custodio et. al were ordered to give the Mabasa permanent access to the property while the Mabasa was ordered to pay the spouses sum of money as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.

On an appeal to the CA, the judgment rendered by the trial court was sustained by the same, hence this petition.

ISSUE:(1) Whether or not the award of damages is proper in favor of the

plaintiffs (Custodio).

HELD:The court ruled that the award of damages has no substantial legal basis. Based on the decision of the Court of Appeals, the records show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff thereform. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

There is material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which

results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain or suffering.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, the act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damage et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage regarded as damnum absque injuria.

In the case given, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The defendants could not invoke article 21 of CC as the construction of the fences were valid exercise of their rights as owners. The law also recognizes under Article 430 of the CC that “every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. It was only from the decision of the trial court which gave private respondents the right to use said passageway after payment of just compensation.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise said right. Whatever damage or injury that may have been sustained by the petitioners is damnum absque injuria.

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and roper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, such as damage or loss is damnun

absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured because the inconveniences arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury or damaged occasioned thereby is damnum abseque injuria.

5. Andamo vs. IAC (191 SCRA 195)FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Andamo are owners of a parcel of land situated in Silang, Cavite. The said land is adjacent to that of the respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners’ land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners’ crops and plants, etc.

The petitioners’ filed a criminal case under Article 324 and a civil case for damages with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

The case was dismissed by the CFI and this decision was affirmed by the IAC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. (see sec. 3(a) rule 111 Rules of Court)

Petitioners raised the issue of the propriety of the dismissal of complaint since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners could claim damages.

HELD:A careful examination of the complaint of the petitioners, the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 under quasi-delicts as all the necessary requisites of quasi-delicts are present:

a. damages suffered by the plaintiffb. fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for

whose acts he must respond

c. the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Citing Samson vs. Dionisio, the court applied article 1902, now article 2176 of the CC and held that “any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow of communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.”

While the property involved in the case cited belonged to the public dominion and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners’ complaint sufficiently alleges that they have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation.

It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the CC provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person” sic utere tuo ut aliemnum non laedas. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of a landowner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structure causes injury or damage to adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

The negligence arising from criminal actions is different from civil negligence. And in the case of Castillo vs. CA, the court held that culpa aquilliana or quasi-delict is a separate legal institution under the CC and is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Therefore, the conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil case arose does not exist.

6. NPC vs. IbrahimFACTS:

Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they owned several parcels of land. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and with respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was discovered sometime in 1992 by the respondents which were later confirmed by NAPOCOR. The

tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus projects.

In 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their lives and properties.

NAPOCOR in their counterclaim denied the allegations and interposed defenses namely: (1) there is a failure to state a cause of action since respondents seek possession of the sub-terrain portion when they were never in possession of the same. (2)there is no cause of action because respondents failed to show proof that they are the owner of the property. (3) the tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all.

The RTC ordered that NAPOCOR pay Ibrahim et. al damages while denying the removal of the tunnels. On the appeal on CA, the court affirmed the decision with modification.

ISSUE:Whether or not the respondents are entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied by petitioner.

HELD:Upholding the trial court’s decision, the court said that the respondents owned and possessed the property and that its substrata were possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels. This court sustains the findings that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to the respondents, citing Article 437 of the CC.

“The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.”

Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. Citing Republic of the Philippines vs. CA:

“…there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather a strange doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application… The court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The

classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.”

Also, presumably, the landowner’s right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest protected by law.

Respondents therefore have a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for purposes of a deep well but was hindered by the tunnels constructed by the petitioner.

Lastly, the court stated that NAPOCOR has the power to exercise eminent domain in order to acquire easements, however, the same did not make use of such, thus violating the due process rights of the respondents.

7. Republic vs. CA (L-43938)FACTS:

Jose de la Rosa applied for registration of parcels of land in Benguet Province, which was sold to him by Balbalio and Alberto. The said registrations of the parcels of land were opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. and Atok Big Wedge Corporation and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development.

The sellers, Balbalio and Alberto stated that the lands that they sold to de la Rosa was previously possessed and owned by their ascendants. Buenget opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim was sold to it by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly. From the date of purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land. Atok on the other hand claimed that some of the parcels of land were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims and was in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of such lands. The Bureau of Forestry on the other hand asserted that the parcels of land in question were covered by Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217.

The RTC denied the application, holding that that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The CA on the other hand, reversed the decision and affirmed the surface rights of the land to De la Rosa while reserving the sub-surface rights to Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Hence, this appeal to this court.

ISSUE: Who has a superior right of ownership over the said parcels of land?

HELD:Benguet and Atok have superior rights to the property over de la Rosa.

The Bureau of Forestry cannot invoke that the parcels of land is of public dominion as there is a perfection of a mining claim by both Benguet and Atok which converted the property to mineral land and under the laws (Act. No. 4268) then in force removed it from public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

The contention invoked by the respondents is not applicable in the case for two reasons:

(1) The evidences by the respondents to support the open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession of the parcels of land were insufficient.

(2) Even if it is assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosa’s had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land.

The CA justified this by saying there is “no conflict of interest” between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, the land was originally classified as forest land ceased to

be so and became mineral – and completely mineral – once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural.

*Regalian Doctrine The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even in private land devoted to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or for any purpose other than mining.