Case 1 - STANDARD OIL vs

PROPERTY

BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ

LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

STANDARD OIL vs. JARANILLO(immovable Beron)

Petitioners seek for the registration of the chattel mortgage over a parcel of land together with the building on it. The parcel of land and building were leased by de la rosa who later on conveyed these properties by mortgage to petitioner.

Petitioners went to respondent to register the mortgage but such was denied on the ground that the properties are real and therefore in violation chattel mortgage law which requires personal property.

SC : Register of Deeds has a ministerial duty to register instrument upon payment of proper fees. There is no provision in law which confers judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document. Registration adds nothing to the instrument, it merely acts as notice.

Property may have character different from that imputed to it in said articles. Parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as personal real properties.

If the mortgaged property is real, chattel mortgage is deemed ineffective as to third parties.

RICARDO PRESBITERO vs, FERNANDEZ(Immovable Calinisan)

Facts:

1) ESPERIDION Presbitero failed to furnish Nava the value of the properties under litigation.

2) Presbitero was ordered by the lower court to pay Nava to settle his debts.

3) Nava's counsel still tried to settle this case with Presbitero, out of court. But to no avail.

4) Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted to the plantation and adhered to the Ma-ao Mill District and registered in the name of Presbitero as the original plantation owner.

5) The sheriff was not able to present for registration thererof to the Registry of Deeds.

6) The court then ordered Presbitero to segregate the portion of Lot 608 pertaining to Nava from the mass of properties belonging to the defendant within a period to expire on August 1960.

7) Bottomline, Presbitero did not meet his obligations, and the auction sale was scheduled.

8) Presbitero died after.

9) RICARDO Presbitero, the estate administrator, then petitioned that the sheriff desist in holding the auction sale on the ground that the levy on the sugar quotas was invalid because the notice thereof was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.

Issue: W/N the sugar quotas are real (immovable) or personal properties.

Held:

1) They are real properties.

2) Legal bases:

a) The Sugar Limitation Law

xxx attaching to the land xxx (p 631)

b) RA 1825

xxx to be an improvement attaching to the land xxx (p 631)

c) EO # 873

"plantation" xxx to which is attached an allotment of centrifugal sugar.

3) Under the express provisions of law, the sugar quota allocations are accessories to the land, and cannot have independent existence away from a plantation.

4) Since the levy is invalid for non-compliance with law, xxx the levy amount to no levy at all.

BISCERRA v TENEZA

(immovable - Fernandez)

Facts:

-A house allegedly owned by the Bicerras was forcibly demolished by the Tenezas who claim ownership of the same.

-The materials, after the house was dismantled, were brought to the custody of the Barrio Lieutenant.

-Bicerras filed an action before the CFI of Abra praying that they be declared owners of the house and that damages be awarded to them. CFI dismissed on the ground that jurisdiction belongs to the Justice of the Peace courts.

Issue:

Does the action involve title to real property which makes it cognizable by the CFI?

Or does jurisdiction belong to the Justice of the Peace courts as there is no real property involved?

Held:

Jurisdiction is within the Justice of the Peace Courts as there is no real property litigated. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built. But once a house is demolished, it ceases to exist as such and its character of being immovable likewise ceases.

BERKENKOTTER VS. CU UNJIENG E HIJOS(immovable - Delgado)

Facts: Appellant Berkenkotter appeals the judgement to CFI of Manila. Mabalacat Sugar Company obtained a loan from Cu Unjieng e Hijos. The loan was then secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels of land with all its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part the necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill. Shortly after obtaining a loan, Mabalacat decided to increase its capacity by buying additional machinery and equipment. To carry out this plan, the president of Mabalacat, Mr. Green, proposed to Mr. Berkenkotter to advance the necessary amount for the purchase of the effects with the promise that it would be reimbursed after Mabalacat obtains another loan to from Cu Unjieng. Mr. Green furnished the amount adding to its existing credit in Mabalacat amounting to 47 thousand (unpaid salary and loan). Machinery and equipment were bought. Mabalacat obtained another 75,000 Php loan from Cu Unjieng and offered the machinery and equipment as added security.

Appelllant contends that installation of machinery and equipment claimed by him was not permanent in character aas much as Mr. Green in proposing to him to advance money said that when their new loan to Cu Unjieng ends in futility, the machinery and equipment will be security. Thus Mr. Green binds himself not to mortgage it or encumber to anyone until he is reimbursed.

Issue: W/N lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment as improvement incorporated with the sugar central are subject to the deed of mortgage executed in favor of Cu Unjieng.

Held: Yes. It is a well established rule that the mortgage on real properties includes the improvements of the same. The Civil Code gives the character of real propertyto machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adaptedto meet the requirements of such trade and industry.

Installation or machinery and equipment converted them into real property by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not permanent in character because, as essential and principal elements of sugar central, without them sugar central would be unable to function or carry the industrial purpose for which it is established.

Leung Yee vs. F.L. String Machinery Co. and William

(del Socorro)Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo(immovable - Legaspi)

Facts Davao Sawmill operated a sawmill on a land belonging to another person.

On the land, the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it.

The machines were placed and mounted on foundations of cement.

The contract of lease between Davao Sawmill and the owner of the property provides that

"on the expiration of the period agreed upon...all the improvements and buildings erected by the (lessee) shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the (lessor)... Provided... that the machineries and accessories are not included in the improvements which will pass to the (lessor)

There was another action wherein Davao Light&Power Co. was the plaintiff and Davao Sawill the defendant. Davao Light & Power Co. won thus a writ of execution was issued and the machineries in the sawmill were levied upon.

contentions

Davao sawmill: real property consists of "constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil" (art. 334 par. 1)

Castillo and Davao Light&Power: real property consists of machinery ...intended by the owner of any building or land... for use in connection with any industry or trade bring carried on therein". (art. 334 par. 5) The machinery in this case was intended by the lessee for use in a building on the land by the owner to be returned to the lessee on the expiration of the leaseTC: properties are personal in nature, after winning the bid, Davao Light&Power may take possession of the machinery levied uponIssue

w/n the machinery mounted on foundations of cement was personal property

Ruling

the machinery is personal property The characterization of the property as chattels by Davao sawmill is indicative of their intention to classify it as personal property.

Davao Sawmill also has on a number of occassions treated the machinery as personal property and executed chattel mortgages thereon.

The lessee placed the machinery in a building erected on a land belonging to another with the understanding that it was not included in the improvements which would pass from lessee to lessor.

Machinery which is a movable in its nature becomes immobilized only when placed in a plant by the owner of the property but not so when placed by the tenant.

People's Bank and Trust Co. (Bank) vs. Dahican Lumber Company (DALCO) (immovable - Lopez)

Facts:

- DALCO buys Dahican Lumber concession from Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila (Atlantic). To develop the concession, they obtained various loans from the Bank. They also acquired certain loans from foreign banks throught the help of Dahican American Lumber Corp. (DAMCO), one of its stockholders.

- Both transactions above are secured by a mortgage over the same five pieces of land owned by DALCO. The mortgage had a stipulation that all equipment and machinery acquired after the institution of the mortgage will be included in the same.

- After the execution of the mortgage, DALCO buys several new equipment to relace the old ones they have. In connection with these purchases, Connell Bros. Company appeared in the books of DALCO as its general purchasing agent.

- Prior to the maturity of the mortgages, DALCO issues a resolution rescinding the purchase agreements with Connell and DAMCO but the latter refuse to do so.

- Atlantic and the Bank then files foreclosure proceedings in the lower court after DALCO did not push through with the rescission of the contract with Connell.

- Upon motion of the parties, the court orders that the equipment of DALCO be sold. This amounted to Php 175,000.

- After due trial, the court issues its resolution ordering that DALCO pay its liabilities with the Bank, Atlantic, DAMCO and Connell. Also, the court held that the 175k should be divided to the previously mentioned four companies.

Issue:

- W/n the properties acquired after the mortgage are covered by the said mortgages.

- W/n the mortgages are binding even if they are not registered in accordance with the Chattel Mortgage Law.

Held:

- The mortgages are clear that all equipment acquired after the execution of the mortgage would be covered by the said mortgage.

- The mortgages are binding, there was no need to register them according to chattel mortgage laws because the equipment are real property and not personal. The equipment were immobilized by the fact that they were placed by the owner in the plant with the intention of using them to meet the needs of the lumber company. (Art. 415 (5)).

- (side issue) The 175k should be given to the Bank and Atlantic. DAMCO and Connell did not have a superior lien on the equipment. There was no clear proof that they were the providers of the equipment to DALCO. DAMCO was actually a stockholder and Connell was a general agent of DALCO, thus, it is doubtful that they really are the suppliers of the equipment for DALCO.

- (side issue) The action was not filed prematurely. Included in the aforementioned resolution of DALCO was a statement that the company was insolvent and that the company did not anymore expect any funds to come their way in the future. This statement authorized the Bank and Atlantic to file the action to foreclose the mortgage.

Board of Assessment vs. Meralco (Art 415 paragraph 5 Mendiola)

Facts: A franchise was granted to Charles Swift in accordance with Act. 484 (which allowed the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchise to utilities). Meralco became the transferee and owner of the franchise.

Meralco has constructed 40 steel towers (the lines coming from a Laguna hydro-electric plant) within Quezon City, on land belonging to it. City Assessor (Board of Assessors) declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax Declaration.

Despite appeal by Meralco, the Board of Assessment Appeals required respondent to pay the as real property tax on the said steel towers. Meralco paid under protest, and filed a petition for review in the CTA. CTA ordered the cancellation of the said tax declarations. The CTA said that the poles are exempted according to part 11 paragraph 9 of Meralcos franchise, and that they were personal properties not subject to real property tax. Board of Assessment appealed to the SC.

Issue: Are the poles personal property?

Are they subject to real property tax?

Held: The word "poles should not be given a restrictive interpretation. In many American cases, poles are described not merely as cylindrical in form but may be in any from (e.g. towers) as long as they are used to carry the transmission or conveyance lines. Since the towers (not pole-like in appearance) of Meralco are used for the conveyance of electric current from the source to its consumers, it therefore falls within the jurisprudential definition of poles. Thus, the towers of Meralco, even if they are not pole-like in form, are within the exemption granted by its franchise.

Granting that the steel towers are not embraced within the term poles, they are still not taxable because they do not fall under any of the categories in Art. 415.

They are not included in Par. 1 because poles do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not included in Par. 3 because they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material of the object to which they are attached (they are fastened only with bolts that can be unscrewed). These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries or receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.

Prudential Bank vs. Panis(immovable Rivas)

On Nov. 19 71, spouses Magcale secured a loan for the sum of 70,00 from Prudential Bank.

A deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed in favor of the bank as a security for the loan.

Included in the Real Estate Mortgage are the building and the lot on which building is erected. A rider is also contained at the bottom of the reversed side of the document which states that the Magcales filed a Miscellaneous Sale Application over the lot.

Secretary of Agriculture issued Miscellaneous Sale Patent over the parcel of land on April 24 73.

On May 2 73, a second loan was asked by the Magcales from Prudential for the sum of 20,000 with another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties previously mortgaged.

Mortgage was foreclosed and sale of the property was made because of Magcales failure to pay its obligation

RTC declared that the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage was null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid Real Estate Mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another.

HELD: Yes

RATIO:

In the enumeration of properties under Art. 415, it is obvious that the inclusion of building is separate and distinct from land, in said provision of law it can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable object.

Thus, while it is true that a mortgaged land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would still be considered a Real Estate Mortgage for the building would still be considered real property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.

The first Real Estate Mortgage was executed before the issuance of the final patent and before the government was divested of its title to the land, an event which takes effect only on the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Mortgage executed by Magcale on his own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intent valid.

As to the second mortgage over the same property, it is evident that such mortgage was executed after the issuance of the sales patent and of the Original Certificate of Title. It is declared null and void for it falls squarely under the prohibition stated on Public Land Act and RA 730.

Machinery & Engineerin Supplies, Inc. v. CA, et al (immovableSarenas)

Facts:

Petitioners won a previous case for replevin.

To satisfy judgment, the machines that were sold to respondents on the first case were ordered seized.

The local sheriffs office went to their factory. They were stopped by the factory owner saying that the machines cannot be dismantled without destroying the factory itself.

Nagmatigas tong mga sheriff at sinabi nila na our duty is merely ministerial aba, mga loko to ah. Tinuloy pa rin nila ang pagbabaklas ng mga makina that resulted in damages to many parts of the factory.

So siyempre nagreklamo sila. Sabi ng judge sa sheriff loko kayo ah, ibalik niyo yung mga machinery the way that you found them. Repair all damages

Gago talaga tong mga sheriff eh, tinambak lang yung mga machinery sa labas ng factory without reinstalling them. The petitioner was then asked to provide for laborers, equipment and expenses para ibalik yung mga machinery.

Reklamo naman tong mga petitioners. Ito yung case at hand natin. Sabi ng petitioners na grave abuse of discretion ang lower court ordering them to provide everything needed to return the stuff that the sheriffs took.

Sabi naman ng trial court eh gago naman pala kayo eh. Sabi nga naming na pwede niyong kunin balik yung mga stuff pero that doesnt mean na sisirain niyo yung factory. Considered immovable na kasi yung stuff. Inaffirm naman to ng CA.

Issue:

Ano ba talaga ang mga kagamitan, movable or immovable?

Held:

The machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in such a way they could not be separated without breaking the material or deterioration of the object

Said stuff were intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said immovable and tended directly to meet the needs of industry.

They were already immovable property pursuant to 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code.

Real property are not subject to replevin.

Sibal vs. Valdez(Beron)US vs. TAMBUNTING(Calinisan)Facts:

A) Manuel Tambunting and his wife occupied the upper floor of a house in Manila.

B) Previously, the Manila Gas Company had previously installed an apparatus for the delivery of gas on both the upper and lower floors, consisting of piping and a gas meter.

C) The gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter when it vacated.

D) Tambunting inserted a tube where the meter once was, and connected a rubber pipe between the said tube and his gas appliances.

E) This continued for 2 months.

F) This was discovered by the agent of the gas company. Tambunting admits his act of connecting his gas appliance to the tube, but denies actually inserting the tube.

Issue:

W/N Tambunting is guilty of theft. (RC note: lacerny was used in this case)

Held:

A) Guilty of theft.

B) Similar to theft of electricity.

C) The clandestine substraction and appropriation of gas, without the consent of the owner, et animo lucrandi, constitutes theft.

Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Lacson Ledesma(Delgado)Hernandez vs. Albano

personal property

Lloyd

Facts: Respondent Delfin Albano filed a complaint against petitioner Jaime Hernandez, then the Secretary of Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank - for violation of Article 216 of the RPC (possession of prohibited interest by public officer) for petitioners shareholdings in the University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG, Inc., and University of Nueva Caceres; and the claim that said corporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof.

Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the crime charged. His claim is that except for his holdings in Manila's University of the East the Manila Fiscals are powerless to investigate him. His reason is that the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests in corporations domiciled in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres and Bicol Electric Co.) and in Mandaluyong, Rizal (DMG, Inc.); and that the place where the crime is to be prosecuted is "the situs of such shares."

Petitioner relies on Black Eagle Mining Co. vs. Conroy,

"Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property, and are unlike other classes of personal property in that the property right of shares of stock can only be exercised or enforced where the corporation is organized and has its place of business and can exist only as an incident to and connected with the corporation, and this class of property is inseparable from the domicile of the corporation itself."

Issue: Whether or not the fiscals have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained of.

Held: Yes. Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an essential ingredient thereof took place, the Manila Fiscals have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained of.

The case sited is not applicable here. It speaks of property right to shares of stock which can only be enforced in the corporation's domicile. In the case at bar, the charges are not directed against the corporations. Not mere ownership of or title to shares is involved. Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a department Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of department and

chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations aforesaid which secured the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.

So, if the suit is directed not against the corporation itself but involves the commission of a crime one element w/c may be the ownership of shares of stock the domicile of the corporation is not an important factor, as long as any other element of the crime is committed in the place where the criminal case is brought.

Heirs of Proceso Bautista v Barza(Art 419

FERNANDEZ)

Facts: (ginawa ko nang detailed yung facts kasi parang detailed sya sa recits)

1 Proceso Bautista applied for a fishpond permit over a 30 ha parcel of marshy public land in 1946. This application, however, was rejected in 1948 because the area applied for was needed for firewood production.

2 Ester Barza also filed a fishpond application (14.85 ha) in 1948. This was approved.

3 It was found that the areas being applied for by Bautista and Barza were overlapping.

4 However, the land which was applied for by Bautista have been greatly developed due to the introduction of certain improvements by Bautista.

5 Because of the approval of Barzas application, and the denial of Bautistas, and because of improvements made by Bautista in the area, an administrative case occurred between them. Director of Fisheries ruled in favor of Barza but requires reimbursement to Bautista for the improvements thereon.

6 But Bautista did not agree with the appraisal made by the Dir. of Fisheries, and consequently, with the amount to reimbursed to him by Barza. An appeal was made but Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied such appeal.

7 After a reappraisal Barza then agreed to the amount to be reimbursed. This was consigned with the Justice of the Peace. But Bautista refused to accept the same.

8 After seven years, the Barzas filed an action for recovery of possession of the fishpond area. During this time Proceso Bautista is already dead so his heirs represented him.

9 RTC Bautista on the ground that Barzas did not acquire a vested right over the area since they did not pay the reimbursement of the value of the improvements. It also ruled that the consignation was also invalid.

10 CA reversed. It gave great weight to the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture on Barzas right over the area.

Issue:

10 Do the Barzas have a rightful claim over the fishpond area notwithstanding the failure to reimburse the Bautistas? Can they rightfully seek the enforcement of the decision of the Director of Fisheries and Secretary of Agriculture?

Held:

11 First and foremost, the area in question is, at the outset, a public land. Being such, neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing purposes, fishpond leases, etc. This, however, was changed when the area was opened for fishpond purposes giving way to the grant of Barzas application.

12 Even if Bautista was ahead of Barza in the possession of the area, he did not have the right over the same land and until there is a release by the Bureau of Fisheries, any application is ineffective as there would be no disposable land to speak of.

13 The function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed by law is not entrusted to the court but to executive officialsin this case, it is under the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. His discretion must be respected absent a proof of abuse.

14 Nevertheless, Barza is ordered to reimburse Bautista for the improvements in the fishpond area.

Republic vs. Vda de Castillo

(Legaspi)Mendoza vs. Navarette (Lopez)Facts:

1 Petitioner, Domingo Mendoza, owns of a particular land. He acquired such part of the land via an extra-judicial settlement of the land belonging to the intestate estate of his deceased father, Teodoro. Two new tax declarations were issued as replacement for the old one of Teodoro.

2 The other was given to Eugenia Aquino, the second wife of Teodoro (hindi nanay ni Domingo). Subsequently, Eugenia sells her portion to the respondent, Maria Mendoza Navarette (sister of Domingo who waived her share in the lot during the extra-judicial settlement).

3 Leoncio Navarette, husband of Maria, files for an application for Free Patent and caused the said whole lot to be titled and declared in his name (done in 1974).

4 Petitioner filed a case for annulment of title in 1985. Respondent files a motion to dismiss on the grounds of prescription. RTC dismissed said motion because of Art. 494 of NCC (no prescription between co-owners).

5 CA reverses the said decision saying that there was prescription.

Issue:

5 W/n prescription has set in and barred this action by petitioners.

Held:

6 No prescription, jurisprudence dictates that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void. The government cannot distribute property which does not belong to them as public domain. Thus, the action to annul a free patent which is void ab initio does not prescribe.

7 The petitioners open, public, adverse and exclusive possession of the land which was fraudulently included in the free patent gives the petitioner a cause of action for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible in favor of a person in possession of the property.

Government vs. Cabangis(Rivas)

Facts:

land in question used to belong to the predecessors of Cabangis

from 1986 to 1901, the land began to wear away due to the actions of the waves of Manila Bay until it bacame completely submerged in the water until 1912.

government decided to deposit sand and silttaken from the bed of the estuaryon the low land which were completely covered with water, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of this case.

CFI held that the land in question belong to Cabangis and registered land in the latter's name

Issue:

who owns the land?

Held:

land became a part of the public domain

shores are part of public domain as stated in Article 1 of the Laws of Water.

SHORES - space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide.

as the sea advances, the private properties are permanently invaded by the waves abd they become part of the shore or beach. thye then pass to the public domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from their new nature, it is a de facto case of EMINENT DOMAIN.

Article 5 of the Law of Waters states "lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos, or private persons, with the proper permission, shall become property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.

the predecessord of Cabangis could have protected their land by building a retaining wall, with the consent of the ompetent authorities in 1986 when the land began to wear away.

because land was cinsidered public domain, no private person could acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established by law.

Vda. de Villongco v. Moreno(Sarenas)Facts:

1 RA 2056: provides for the prohibition and removal of dams, dikes or any other works in public waters. Section 2 provides for the exemptions.

2 Senator de la Rosa complained with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against several fishbond owners in Macabebe, Pampanga, among whom is the peitioner. The complaint charges that petitioner has appropriated some portions of the coastal waters and converted it into fishponds

3 An investigation was conducted under the authority of the Secretary. As a defense, plaintiff is saying that the contended area is covred by a TCT. The investigation found that it is not part of the TCT and is therefore still public property. Plaintiff was ordered to remove their fishpond works and other constructions. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

4 Petitioner filed case before CFI against the Secretary arguing that RA 2056 is null and void for giving the Secretary the power to decide as to what encroaches public waters and that he acted beyond his jurisdiction.

5 CFI: petitioner falls within the exception under Section 2. (1) that the fishpond was constructed in good faith before the area was proclaimed as communal fishing ground (2) said constructions do not impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream. Decision of Secretary reversed.

Issue:

1 W/N the petitioner falls within the exception provided for under Section 2

Held:

2 No, petitioner does not fall within the exception.

3 The area included in the dikes of the petitioner was not part of the land titled to her. The area is navigable waters and is part of the Manila Bay Area and commonly used by boats and fishermen. The area is therefore public property, not susceptible to appropriation by any private individual, not only because it belongs to the State but also because it is used as a waterway.

4 Only those works constructed on communal fishing grounds are exempted under Section 2; constructions on coastal waters or public waterways are not subject to the exception.

Natividad vs. Gonzalo

(Beron)Sanchez v. Municipality of Asingan, Pangasinan Art. 421 Sarenas

Facts:

The lot in contention is a strip of land between the municipal school and provincial road. This lot is owned by the municipality.

Petitioners, with the consent of the municipality, put up temporary stores and light buildings. They also paid rent to the municipality.

When the local administration changed after an election, an ordinance was passed saying that the lot will be converted to a parking lot and widening of the school. So the petitioners were asked to vacate the property.

Petitioners filed for prohibition and an alternative prayer, that if they be ejected, the rents paid by them be returned.

Trial court dismissed petition and ordered them to vacate premises.

Issue:

W/N petitioners should be reimbursed the amount representing rent paid.

Held:

No, they are not entitled to reimbursement

In the case of Rojas v. Municipality, the people that were ejected were entitled to reimbursement because the property in that case was devoted for public use and as such is outside the commerce of man. It could not have in any circumstance have been the object of a valid contract of lease.

But in this case, the land is patrimonial in character. The implied agreement of lease with them was not null and void but merely terminable.

Municipality of Oas vs. Roa

(Beron)

Facts:

Plaintiff brought this action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo of Oas, claiming that it was a part of the public square of the said town. Defendant alleged that is was his.

Certain Resolutions adopted by the Principalia of the pueblo reciting the same fact (that the land had always been part of the public square) were presented as evidence. Defendant Roa signed this resolution.

Defendant on his part claims that it has been sold by Jose Castillo

Issue:

Was the property in question a part of the public square of the town of Oas

Held:

The Resolutions signed by Roa are competent evidence against him.

There is no evidence of any adverse occupation of this land for 30 years; consequently the extraordinary period of prescription does not apply. Defendant cannot rely upon ordinary prescription of 10 years because he is not a holder on good faith, for he knew and acknowledged thru the resolution the ownership of pueblo.

As early as 1812, the land had been used by the municipality for other purposes as that of a public square. It therefore has ceased to be property used by public and had become part of bienes patrimoniales.

As to the ownership, the court has declared the land as owned by Oas. The building thereon was declared as co-owned by Roa subject to purchase of the Municipality of Oas.

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v Hon. Bercilles (Calinisan)

Facts:

A) The City council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces St., Mabolo, Cebu City as an abandoned road, it not being included in the City Development Plan.

B) Another resolution authorized the acting city mayor to sell the land through a public bidding.

C) A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Cebu Oxygen for P11T.

D) Cebu Oxygen sought to register the said parcel of land.

E) The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside of the commerce of man.

Issue:

A) W/N Cebu Oxygens land is part of the public domain and therefore should not be registered to said company.

Held:

A) It was patrimonial property, thus it can be conveyed.

B) The City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.

C) When no longer intended for public use or for public service, it (property) shall form part of the patrimonial property of the state.

D) Property thuse withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.

Mun. of Hinunang vs. Dir. Of Lands(Delgado)Dacanay vs. Asistio public streets as property for public use Lloyd

Facts:

- Caloocan City Mayor Martinez opened as a flea market the street where petitioner Dacanay lives, pursuant to a city ordinance

- licenses were granted to the vendors

- implementing a policy of cleaning up of streets, Mayor Martinez ordered the demolition of the stalls on the street

- private respondent stallholders sought prohibition of the demolition

- RTC ordered demolition

- shortly after decision, there was a change in administration

- new City Mayor public respondent Asistio did not pursue the former mayors policy of cleaning up the streets

- petitioner Dacanay, as a concerned citizen and taxpayer, sought to enforce the RTC by way of mandamus, although he already filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against Mayor Asistio

Issue: Whether or not the Executive Order by Mayor Asistio authorizing the use of the street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the City Govt are valid

Held: Void E.O. as it contravenes the general law w/c reserves city streets and roads for public use

- the disputed areas from w/c the market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets

- public streets are property for public use, w/c is outside the commerce of man may not be the subject of lease or any contract

- such lease by the stallholders to the City Govt are void

- the right of the public to use the City Streets may not be bargained away by a contract

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v CITY OF ZAMBOANGA

(Patrimonial property

Fernandez)

Facts:

The Municipality of Zamboanga was converted into a City by virtue of Commonwealth Act 39 (CA 39). Sec 50 of the same Act transfers abandoned properties and buildings to the City of Zamboanga (for a certain price) upon the transfer of the capital to another place.

Of these properties were the 50 lots with some buildings thereon (devoted to capitol, school, hospital, leprosarium, etc).

Capital of Zamboanga province was transferred to Dipolog, and then to Molave. Value of properties to be transferred were fixed.

Province of Zamboanga was divided into two: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Assets of the defunct Zamboanga province were divided into two: Norte-54.39%, Sur-45.61%

Exec Sec issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner of the properties mentioned in Sec 50 of CA 39 and is entitled to the payment to be given by Zamboanga city. This revoked the Cabinet resolution conveying lots to Zamobanga city for P1.00

CIR deducted on Citys Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for payment of properties. But RA 3039 was enacted and it amended Sec 50 of CA 39that the properties transferred are now free of charge. CIR ordered to stop deductions in the IRA and to return what was paid.

Petitioner assails constitutionality of RA 3039 for it allegedly deprives petitioner of property without just compensation. Petitioner was favored.

Appeal was made

Issue:

Does RA 3039 deprive Zamboanga del Norte of property without just compensation?

Held:

If property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. If property is owned in its private and or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control.

Applying principles on the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. It is enough, that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like public administration, public education, public health, etc. Using this classification, RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as a capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites. These 24 lots are public property.

For the buildings on the lots, it can be assumed that there were erected by the National Governmenthence Congress may dispose them. But even if provincial funds were used, buildings were mere accessories to the lands which are public in natureso they follow the nature of the lands which is public.

For the remaining 26 lots, they are patrimonial in nature as they are utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. In these lots, plaintiff may collect from defendant. Registration of the lots is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.

Salas vs. Jarencio(Legaspi)Viuda de Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo Art. 424 Lopez

Facts:

Municipality of Iloilo appropriated 2 strips of land owned by petitioner for widening of a street.

Petitioner files case in CFI to recover the purchase price for the said lots. CFI rule in her favor.

Because of lack of funds, the Municipality failed to pay and several property of theirs were attached. (2 auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, police stations and concrete structures used as markets)

The Municipality files a motion to dissolve the attachment and declare such as null and void for being illegal. This was granted by the CFI.

Issue:

W/n the properties mentioned can be attached by a judgment-debtor of a municipality.

Held:

SC recognized that the properties of municipalities can be divided to those for public use and those considered as patrimonial. Art. 424 provides an enumeration of what can be classified as for public use. SC said that the classification is important because property of municipalities for public use cannot be levied upon whereas patrimonial property is susceptible of being attached. (But property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely because it is temporarily used for private purposes, although if the public use is wholly abandoned it becomes subject to execution.)

In cases when a creditor is trying to collect from a municipality and the latter does not have any other property to be attached, the remedy of the creditor is by way of mandamus.

Mun. of Paoay vs. Manaois(Mendiola)

Facts: The municipality of Paoay has for many years leased fishery lots over municipal waters. Mr. Duque was on of the lessees. However, the municipal council approved a resolution confiscating the 6 fishery lots leased by Duque because of his failure to comply with the lease contract.

The fishery lots were subjected to a public bidding. Manaois won the bidding and paid for rentals for the whole year. However, Duque and his men prevented Manaois from entering the fishing lots. Manaois filed suit to recover what he paid. The CFI favored Manaois. CFI ordered the Sheriff to levy on the rentals of Tabije of a fishery lot and the fishery lots leased to 45 different persons.

The Provincial fiscal opposed the attachment by arguing that these properties are for public use.

Issue: Are the properties leviable?

Held: The fishery lots are not leviable, but the amount representing the rentals by Tabije may be attached.

The fishing lots may not be levied, because they do not belong to the municipality. They may well be regarded as property of the State. What the municipality of Paoay has is merely a usufruct or right to use the municipal waters.

Not even the usufruct may be levied upon. The municipality is not holding the usufruct in a permanent manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or allow it to be taken away from it as property through execution. It is merely a grant. Besides, if levy of the usufruct will be allowed, there will be an anomalous situation where a private person conducts a public bidding for the use of the lots owned by the State and appropriating the rentals for his own benefit.

However, the revenue coming from the renting may be levied. The grant was given by the Legislature to the municipality to bolster its income. But it must be stressed that this type of revenue source is not available to municipalities without coastal waters these municipalities fair out even without leasing fishery lots. It goes to prove that such is not indispensable for the functioning of the governmental functions. This letting out of municipal waters for fishing purposes is a sort of side-line; in the absence of which, the municipality can still continue to function,.

Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria

(Rivas)

Facts:

Harty, the representative of the Catholic Church, filed a case against the Municipality of Victoria alleging that the parish of the said town is the owner of a parcel of land within the said municipality known as the plaza.

He argued that the parish was in continuous possession of the land since 1901 and parish was unlawfully deprived of its use over the land.

The municipality on the other hand argued that they were the owners of the land since 1855, way before the parish was extablished.

RTC: decided in favor of Harty and asked the municipality to vacate the land.

Issue:

Who is the owner and proprietor of the parcel of land that surrounds the parish church of the said town, and which is called the public plaza of the same.

Held:

the municipality of Victoria is the rightful owner of the plaza

from the conversion of the barrio Canarum into the town of Victoria, the large tract of land that surrounds the church and the parish house was known as a public plaza, destined to the use of all the residents without any hindrance from the local authorities or the curate of the town.

As part of the conversion from a barrio to a town, it is a condition that the town should have streets and a public plaza with its church and parish house, and also a tribunal destined for the use of the local authorities.

It was a custom observed by all towns established administratively in these islands under the old law that on their creation, a certain amount of land was always reserved for plazas, commons and special and communal property.

The contention of Harty that the land was donated by Tanedo, it must be presumed that the he waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople, since from the creation of the town up to the present, all the residents have enjoyed the free used of said plaza.

Plazas are destined to the public use and are not subject to prescription as stated in Art 1936 of the Civil Code.

Planting of trees and plants of the curate and the gobernadorcillio of the said town does not mean private ownership but merely an intention to improve the plaza for the benefit if the people.

Municipality of Paoay v. Manaois(Sarenas)

Facts:

Paoay has been leasing fishery lots on municipal waters. Francisco Duque leased some fishery lots offered by Paoay. These lots were later confiscated because Duque has been in default of payment under the lease agreement.

Manaois became the subsequent lessee of the lots. But when Manaois tried to enter the lots in order to catch fish, Duque refused to let them in and was saying that he was still the lessee.

Manaois complained to Paoay. Paoay tried to request Duque to leave but Duque refused to budge. So, Manaois brought a case for recovery of sum paid plus damages against Paoay.

CFI ruled in his favor. In the execution of judgment, sheriff levied (1) rent paid by a certain Tabije to Paoay and (2) about 40 fishery lots

Paoay objected to the attachment of the properties

Issue:

W/N the fishery lots can be attached to satisfy judgment

Held:

No, the fishery lots are considered properties for public use. They are not subject to levy and execution.

They are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat or destroy said purpose.

They are regarded as property of the State. What the Municipality of Paoay merely holds is the right of usufruct. They do not hold it in a permanent manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or allow it to be executed.

The right or usufruct of Paoay likewise is not subject to execution.

But the rent that was levied may be the subject of execution

Nelayan vs. Nelayan(Beron)

Facts:

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Cecilia Nelayan and the Director of Lands ofr cancellation of title and reconveyance, alleging that they have been, since time immemorial, in actual possession as owners

Defendants claim that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case for the Director of Lands has already issued free patent. They further claim that the petitioners failed to allege sufficient facts of ownership to hold against the defendants

Held:

The court ruled in favor of the petitioners

As to the 1st defense, the court said applying section 38 of Act 496, the petitioner is given 1 year form date issuance of patent. It was barely 2 months from issuance when complaint was filed

As to the 2nd defense, plaintiffs allegation they have been in continuous possession since time immemorial is sufficient proof of private ownership. It carries the presumption that it has been a private property even before Spanish conquest. It has become private property by presumption. What is lacking is the judicial sanction of title.

Cuaycong v Benedicto (Calinisan)

(RC note: Long case but it really is just a simple story.)

Facts:

A) This case concerns the use of 2 (wagon) roads:

1) Nanca-Victorias Road (NV) (this case primarily concerns this road)

2) Dacuman-Toreno Road

B) The haciendas (one of them is Hacienda Toreno) are connected to the provincial road through the NV.

C) For 30+ years, it has been used by the plaintiffs (no need to memorize the names) to transport their goods (primarily agricultural) and supplies from the haciendas.

D) Use of the NV has been tolerated by the owners (Benedictos) for many years until 1911, when they closed it, and began charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart that passed the road.

E) The plaintiffs wants the road/s opened, alleging it is a public highway.

Issue:

W/N NV is a public highway, and if it is not, is it subject to a private easement of way in favor of plaintiffs.

Held:

A) There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs predecessors was based upon any express grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way, or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owner of the estates affected.

B) The plaintiffs only had PERMISSIVE USE.

C) Possession is the fundamental basis of (the) prescription.

D) Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title. It must be adverse.

E) Plaintiffs did not even assert that the road was of public domain, or used by the public, or was maintained or constructed by public funds.

F) The license to use was essentially revocable.

G) Judgment in favor of Benedicto.

Santos vs. Moreno(Delgado)Zobel vs. Mercado (need for judicial pronouncement - Lloyd)

Facts:

- plaintiff Zobel owned the land in question, w/c is a part of the Hacienda Bigaa, as evidenced by a titled

- Zobel leased a portion of the land to defendant Mercado for fishing purposes for a yearly rental of P50.00 per hectare.

- Mercado executed a promissory note in favor of Zobel

- Mercado failed to pay amount in despite demands from Zobel

- Zobel files for recovery of money

Issue: Mercado defenses that the contract of lease entered into between plaintiff and defendant is null and void because the portion of land involved therein is a fishpond which is part of the public domain

Held: Valid contract; not part of pub. domain

A. Evidence shows that said portion is covered by the certificate of title issued in favor of Zobel

- if there is any error in the Torrens title of the plaintiff in the sense it included lands belonging to the government, it is only the government who could properly question that fact

- the government is not a part of this action

B. The fact that defendant was granted an ordinary fishpond permit by the Bureau of Fisheries to fish in the portion of land in question six years after the execution of the contract of lease, is no proof that said portion belongs to the government.

- there is still need of a judicial pronouncement in order to have it excluded from the torrens title issued to Zobel

C. Estoppel: since defendant entered into a contract of lease with plaintiff over the portion of land in question and said contract was found by the trial court to be valid and binding, it is clear that defendant is now prevented from denying the title of Zobel over said portion

- tenants are estopped from disputing title of the landlord and his right to such possession upon the termination of the lease

VDA DE MEDINA V CRUZ(Fernandez)

Facts:

Phil Realty has title over lot 6 of Grace Part Subdivision.

Mangahas and Ramos occupied lot without Phil. Realtys consent.

Lot was later sold to Magbanua. Mangahas and Ramos moved to annul the sale.

Court ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot. They appealed but were denied.

Salamat vda de Medina purchased from the heirs of Don Mariano Esteban the same parcel of landlot 6. A deed of Absolute Sale executed in her favor. She later bought 6 houses standing on the land from de Guzman.

Magbanua sought the execution of the decision ordering Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the property. Pero makulit sila.

So Magbanua sought to have the houses of Ramos and Mangahas demolished. Vda. de Medina opposed claiming that she is the owner of the said houses.

Medina filed action for recovery of ownership. Judge ordered demolition in lieu of the decision ordering Mangahas and Ramos to vacate premises.

Medina claims since she is not a party to that case, decision cannot be enforced against her

Issue:

Can the final and executory decision, ordering Mangahas and Ramos to leave premises, be enforced against Vda de Medina (considering that she claims ownership over the houses to be demolished)?

Held:

Lot in question is formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos. The two sold it to the de Guzmans, and the de Guzmans sold it to petitioner. Though it is true that strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court, petitioner is privy to the judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos by virtue of the sale transactions. Hence, she can be reached by the order of execution and Writ of Demolition.

Petitioners claim of payment of land tax does not bear conclusive weight in proving ownership over the lot to which payment was made for. Magbanua is the registered owner, under the Torrens System, of the lotssuch is given greater credence.

Lunod vs. Meneses(Legaspi)Alano vs. Ignacio Art. 433 Lopez

Fact:

1 Manuel Ignacio had three children, namely, Victoriana, Pedro and Antonio. Plaintiffs in this case are the grandchildren of Victoriana while defendants are the grandchildren of Pedro.

2 Plaintiffs allege that upon the death of Manuel, Victoriana and Pedro acquired ownership of 5 parcels of land. Pedro possessed the property as administrator until his death when he was replaced by his son Estanislao.

3 Plaintiffs come to the CFI asking for a partition of the said parcels of land.

4 CFI dismissed the action because it says that there was no proof given that Manuel really did possess the land and that he intended to divide it among his three children. CFI found that plaintiffs failed to prove why Pedro was allowed to keep the property from the time of death of Manuel.

Issue:

4 W/n plaintiffs have a claim on the questioned parcels of land.

Held:

5 SC affirms CFI, the testimony of the witness adduced by the plaintiff (daughter of Victoriana) to the effect that her father worked on the said land is lacking. It did not clarify in what capacity was her father working the land (pwede kasing as tenant lang and not as owner).

6 Assuming that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is prima facie proof of their case, the same is completely overcome by conclusive evidence of possession as owner submitted by defendants. There were tax declarations presented. Also, a deed of mortgage, which proves exercise of ownership, was also presented. All of these evidence prove that defendants have been in possession of the lands as owner as early as 1912 so that the possession lasted for 45 years up to the filing of the action in 1957.

Supia vs. Quintero(Mendiola)

Facts: Ayala filed a complaint of unlawful entry and detainer against Supia and Batioco alleging that Supia and Batioco had sold to Ayala certain real property with the right to repurchase within one year. The complaint averred further that during the one-year period, Supia and Batioco will occupy the property as tenants of Ayala. However, Supia and Batioco failed to repurchase the property; consequently, the lease was terminated. Now, Ayala contends that Supia and Batioco are unlawfully withholding possession of the property from Ayala.

As a defense, Supia and Batioco claim that the alleged contract was not of a sale, but a mortgage. As such, they argue, the Justice of the Peace has not jurisdiction because his jurisdiction is limited to the determination whether or not there is a valid sale and that the authority of the Justice of the Peace cannot tread upon the settlement of ownership (which is the subject matter of the allegation that the contract is that of a mortgage.)

Issue: Is the Justice of the Peace precluded from acquiring jurisdiction over the case of unlawful entry and detainer because of the allegation by Supia and Batioco that the contract is a mortgage?

Held: It has been settled that the Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction over an action for forcible entry and detainer as established in Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They have been given this jurisdiction, because the court of Justice of the Peace are more accessible and in a position to afford the promptest remedy. However, it is beyond the authority of the Justice of the Peace to hear cases involving the question of title.

Despite the foregoing, the Justice of the Peace retains jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry and detainer, because the averment is a mere statement of the facts which is not evidence to prove that the action now involves the question of ownership. The Justice of the Peace may continue to hear the case until the evidence should disclose that the question involved is one of title.

Dissent by Villa-Real:

Ayala avers that the contract is not a mortgage but a sale and that by failure to repurchase, Ayala had become the absolute owner of the property. On the other hand, Supia claims that it is a mortgage and that he has paid the amount of indebtedness, and therefore he is the owner of he property. Clearly, the case has become a question of ownership. Therefore, the Justice of the Peace no longer has jurisdiction.

Del Valle vs. Mercado(Rivas)

Facts:

Quizon was the real owner of the land who motgaged the said land to Biquid

Del Valle, with the permission of the heirs, redeemed the land by paying Buquid

it is claimed by Del Valle that Mercado, without the approval of Del Valle, took possession of the land

Mercado: bought land form Julia Quizon

: heirs never consented to Del Valles possession

Julia Del Valle was asked to become a party to the case

RTC: Mercado is the rightful owner of the land

Issue:

W/N the land being claimed by Del Valle is the same land being held by Mercado

Held:

NO!

the property redeemed by del Valle is the same land purchased by Mercado from Julia Quizon

a person who claimsthe ownership of a real property is in duty bound to clearly identify the land claimed in accordance with the titles on which he claimshis right of ownership adn he shall not be permitted to rely on the defects of the defendant's title

evidenced adduced by Del Valle herself does not appear to be the same property contained in the complaint

Ramcar Inc. v. Garcia Art. 434 Sarenas

*case about evidence, ewan ko how to relate it to property

Facts:

1 Domingo Garcia had 2 of his cars repaired by Ramcar. Total cost for the repair amounted to P1610.82, which was payable within the first 10 days of the month.

2 Garcia failed to pay this amount and so Ramcar sued him for recovery

3 Garcia is contending that he is not indebted to the plaintiff because the obligation has not yet become due and demandable for the reason that plaintiff has not complied with defendants request to correct defects in the repair services.

4 Garcia is also contending that the burden of proving that the repairs were not defective lie on the petitioner

Issue:

1 Who has better evidence in this case?

Held:

2 The plaintiff in a civil case is called upon only to prove the material allegations in his complaint constituting his cause of action

3 The cause of action in this case relates to the agreement between the parties that Garcia will pay once the repairs are done

4 Although appellant made the defense that the repairs were not properly done, he presented no evidence in support of his contention

Dacer vs, Muoz(Beron)

Facts: In the complaint filed by petitioner, Faustino Llacer and Maria Prollamante were the owners of a certain parcel of land described in the complaint. They further allege that defendant Munoz claimed to be the owner of the said parcel of land and that the other defendant (Achaval) though with the consent of the sons of Llacer, occupied a portion of the land without paying the corresponding rent. Achaval claimed that said land belong to Munoz, defendant.

In the trial, Munoz presented Exhibit 7, 8 which were deeds executed by Faustino Llacer to all of the land in question to Antonio Munoz predecessor of defendant Francisco Munoz.

The plaintiff on the other hand claims that defendant could not have obtained the said lands by virtue of exhibit 7, 8, by the fact that his father had not obtained the subject land until 1881, or some years after the alleged deed to Antonio Munoz.

Lower court ruled in favor of Llacer.

Issue: W/n Munoz has a valid claim over the land...

Held: YES. The contention of plaintiff is without merit. Granting that father of Llacer did not obtain a portion of the land until some years after he had sold such land to Munoz, his subsequent acquisition of the land would have the effect of making his convenyance of the sane to Munoz valid.

A portion of the land in question which the defendant claims he acquired form Pio Balana in 1877 was transferred to father of Llacer in 1885 by virtue of a note to exhibit 8. Exhibit 8 is a deed executed and delivered in regular form on the 20th day of April 1877, by Pio Balana to a portion of the land in question to Antonio Munoz. This transferred all the rights of Pio over the tract of land to Munoz. The subsequent sale of this portion to father of Llacer in 1885 is therefore without effect.

Santiago vs. Santos(Calinisan)Sembrano vs. Arzaga and Longboy(delgado)

Facts: The action in the lower court is for the recovery of possession of two parcels of land. The defendants denied allegations and alleged that they were the owners of the lands. On the trial, the defendants failed to present witnesses and evidence, their counsels motion for extension to look for witnesses denied. The plaintiffs counsel likewise moved for new trial for the new evidence gathered but was denied. Plaintiff declared not the owner thereof. It seems that the lands in this case were not properly identified.

Issue: W/N ocular inspection is necessary.

Held: In practically every case relating to lands which comes to this court by appeal from the Ilocos provinces, there seems to be difficulty about the identification of the lands in question. It would be a wise course to adopt by the lower court in case of deficiency of evidence relating to the identity of land, to make an ocular inspection himself or to appoint a commission for that purpose in order that the court may know just what lands are in litigation. In actions for the recovery of the possession of land, the description should be so definite that an officer of the court, might go into the locality where the land is situated and definitely locate it.

Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon effect of issuance of decree of registration lloyd

Facts:

- subject lot already registered in the name of Hermenegildo Nadres

- lot divided into lots 1 and 2 to Clemente Reyes and Anselmo Nadres respectively; lots registered under Torrens System in their names

- Reyes and Nadres possessed the land for many years already

- thereafter, court ordered a decree declaring lands as public lands through a previous cadastral survey w/c included the subject lots

- petitioners filed a case to annul the decree declaring lands as public lands

Issue: What is the effect of the decree of registration?

Held: it is incontrovertible after the lapse of 1 year from its issuance.

- When once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree may be questioned, the title is perfect and cannot later be questioned it is incontrovertible.

- When the Court of Land Registration knows the same land has been registered in the name of two different persons, the court must investigate that fact even without requiring the parties to show that a fraud had been committed in securing the double registration. When it is established that the same has been registered in the name of two different persons the title should remain in the name of the person securing the first registration.

- SC annulled the judgment of the lower court declaring that the lands are public land

NOLAN v JALANDONI(Art 434 - Fernandez)

Facts:

1 Nolan (as administrator of Jabonetas estate) and La Sociedad Lizarraga Hermanos seek to establish title and recover possession of a parcel of land from Martin Jalandoni (as administrator of Nicolas Jalandonis estate).

2 Nolan and Hermanos base their claim from a common predecessor-in-interest that rented said land to Manzano, who later passed it to Nicolas.

3 Jalandoni, on the other hand, claims that Nicolas was in quiet possession of the land until the latters death. Jalandoni also denies any payment of rent by Nicolas for the land.

4 Nolan and Hermanos relied on oral testimonies to establish payment of rents by Manzano and Nicolas.

5 Jalandoni presented a deed evidencing sale of land by Manzano to Nicolas.

Issue:

To whom should the land be given?

Held:

Jalandoni. The oral testimonies presented by the Nolan and Hermanos were vague, indefinite and uncertain. Payments of rental were not conclusively established. Exact dates of payment were not shown, except on the date where the deed of sale between Manzano and Nicolas was executed. An excerpt from the deed admitted that Manzano did pay some amounts as rentals prior to the happening of the sale. However, the same excerpt also established that at the time the claim of absolute ownership was made, payments were not for rentals but just for the sake of peace and to avoid litigation. When the land was sold to Nicolas, the land was free from any encumbrance.

(More importantly) This being an action of ejectment, the burden of proof is upon those seeking to dispossess the actual occupant. Failure to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, the contention that Jalandonis 30-year plus occupation of the land was by virtue of a rent, judgment should be in favor of Jalandoni. Actual possession of real estate for more than thirty years, under a bona fide claim of ownership, establishes a perfect title, and such a title should not be permitted to be put in doubt by an allegation that the possession was not held under a claim of ownership, supported merely by vague, indefinite, and uncertain oral testimony as to payments of rent.

(Note that in the trial court, judgment was based on a previous suitJalandoni v Hermanoswhereas it was the burden of Jalandoni to establish title as his claim was based on the deed from Manzano. In the present suit, Jalandoni is in possession of the land and it is his opponents burden to show a better right to the land)

Visayan Refining vs. Camus(Legaspi)De Knecht vs. Bautista Art. 435 Lopez

Facts:

7 The government, through the Department of Public Works and Communications was planning to extend EDSA to Roxas Blvd. The initial plan was that said extension was going to pass through Cuneta Ave. This was subsequently changed to the Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.

8 Upon learning of the change in plan, petitioner, resident in the said streets, filed a formal petition to Pres. Marcos, who referred it to the Human Settlements Commission (HSC). The latter submitted a report that the Department of Public Works should revert back to the original plan.

9 Despite of the report by the HSC, government still filed a complaint for expropriation in the CFI. Said court ruled in favor of the government finding that they had the discretion as to what lands to expropriate.

Issue:

10 W/n the government can choose any private property for expropriation.

Held:

11 SC says that government has the power to choose but such discretion must not be exercised capriciously. There must always be a valid reason.

12 In this case, SC finds that the change from Cuneta Ave. to the Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets were not called for. SC finds it odd that such a sudden change is effected knowing that surely, several studies have already been conducted as to the original plan.

13 The SC also took note of the report of the HSC which says that the original plan is the best option taking into consideration the functionality, social impact and cost of both options.

Republic vs Juan(Mendiola)

Facts: Juan et al. are the registered owners of 2 adjoining parcels of lands in La Union. The President authorized the Executive Secretary to expropriate the land to be used as a site for the La Union Agricultural School. (It appears that before the expropriation proceeding, the principal of a school offered to purchase the land to no avail Juan wishes to sell at 170k.) The trial court authorized the Republic to occupy and take possession of the land upon deposit of 100k as the provisional value of the property.

Juan argues that the appropriation was invalid because there was no prior negotiation to purchase lots or to have them donated to the government as provided by EO 132. Juan also says that the value of the lots (based on the reports of the commissioners) is more than that what was determined by the courts.

Issue: Are the contentions of Juan correct?

Held: The procedures in EO 132 say nothing that these procedures are to be conditions precedent to the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The EO was merely intended to govern transactions involving purchase or donation of private property vis--vis the State. The withdrawal by Juan of the 100k deposit shows the recognition on their part of the right of the government to expropriate the lots.

The evaluation in the amount of 300k judicially given by Juan is a declaration and admission binding on them. In fact, they had already realized a gain of 10k when they withdrew the 100k deposit [ 100k (50k- original value of the land + 40k- expenses for leveling and surveying)]. The appraisal of the Provincial Agriculturist, Chief Agriculturist Appraiser, and DBP Commissioner is extravagant (because they are in the 1M range) considering that the property was only bought at 50k originally.

(As a matter of fact, Juan should have been bound by his 190k admission, because that amount is already just and reasonable. )

It could hardly be said that the amount of 300k is unjust. There had already been an interest of 6% p.a. on the 200k (amounting to 192k) that was not yet withdrawn by Jose. Adding the amount withdrawn, the balance, and the interest due, Juan us already entitled to 492k and anything beyond this price is already excessive and unjust to the State and the taxpayer.

Republic vs. La Orden(Rivas)

Facts:

Government, to ease traffic, offered to buy land of La Orden

RTC: government must pay La Orden 270,000

La Orden agrued that there is no necessity to the proposed expropriation of her land. it was also suggested by the La Orden that there are less expensive means that can ease the traffic situation

RTC: agreed with La Orden and held that no expropriation will happen

Issue:

W/N expropriation is necessary

Held:

Private property can only be expropriated after payment of just compensation and when public good and genuine necessity exists

courts have the power to inquire into the legality of eminent domain and determine the existence of genuine necessity for expropriation

SC remanded the case back to the RTC for further proceedings

Santos v. Director of Lands Art. 435 Sarenas

Facts:

1 Gabriela Santos is applying for registration of 5 parcels of land in the Province of Rizal

2 Director of Lands is opposing the registration. According to him, parcels A, B and C should be reduced accordingly because it forms part of the Pasig-Montalban Highway.

3 Added info:

oPetitioner and her ancestors have been in peaceful, continuous possession of the lands subject of registration

Issue:

1 W/N the petitioners possession of more than 30 years cannot serve as a title for the acquisition of ownership because the same are public roads or highways

Held:

2 The strips of land never were part of such roads

3 That the strips of land are necessary to give to the highways the required width according to law, is not a reason which can lawfully prevent the registration of the land because it has been shown that they were in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession for more than 30 years

4 What the Director of lands may do is bring the proper action for expropriation

Ayala vs. City of Manila(Beron)

Facts: Ayala applied to the city engineer Dieck, the defendant in this case, for a license to construct a terreace over the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall if her house and the edge of a canal (Sibacon creek). The said strip of land belongs to her.

Dieck refused. A similar petition was addressed to the Municipality Board but the same was denied. The reason for the denial was in order to use it as a wharf or public way so that the palintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in general.

Issue: W/n the action of the city engineer is in accord with due process of law...

Held: NO. What the defendants have done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use, and freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when they applied for a license to construct a terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it with the intention of establishing a public easement.

Art 349, no one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts must protect, and eventually restore possession to the injured party.

The court ordered the defendants to immediately issued a license in favor of the plaontiff herein to construct the terrace.

Arce vs. Genato

(Calinisan)City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila (Delgado, J.)

We already discuss this case in Stat.Con. on strict construction on delegated municipal corporation power and in Consti II under eminent domain)

Facts: City of Manila wants to expropriate land for the extension of Rizal Avenue (parallel toh ng Quezon Ave. crossing Recto Ave. dulo nito sa Caloocan na). The expropriation was opposed by the Chinese Community of Manila because it will hit a part of their cemetery. The lower court nullified the expropriation resolution of the City of Manila hence this appeal.

Issues: W/N the court can examine and take place the findings of the local legislative body on expropriation. W/N the cemetery is for public use (because if so, cannot be subject for expropriation).

Held: 1) The exercise of the right of the state of eminent domain, whether directly by the state, or by its authorized agents, is necessary in derogation of private rights, and the rule is that it must strictly be construed. The Spaniard fully recognized the principle and adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the encroachment upon the private property of the individual. Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by competent authority, for some purpose of proven public utility, and after payment of the proper compensation Unless this requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its 7/20/2005possession to him , as the case may be."

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but the general authority of municipalities and entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise such, it must comply with the limitations set by the authorizing statute. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

2) It is public as evidenced by the promulgation by the Spanish Governor-General to allocate this area for the burial of the dead of a certain race.

Judgement of the lower court affirmed.

Dissent (Moir, J.) Necessity for taking ordinarily not judicial question. The legislature, in providing for the exercise the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement or public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for these of the representatives of the people. Similarly, when the legislature has delegated the power of eminent domain to municipal or public service corporation or other tribunals or bodies, and has given them discretion as to when the power is to be called into exercise and to what extent, the court will not inquire into the necessity or propriety of the taking.

Jose de Luna vs. CA

Mendiola

Facts: De Luna alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of landing Zambales. De Luna claims that the defendants (Dimaano et. al.) entered the land and began to plow and plant sugar cane. The defendants allegedly fenced the property with barbed wire. Petitioner prays that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay him the amount of P45 monthly per hectare.

The defendants claim that De Luna is not the owner of the land. The defendants clam that the owner of the land is Dequina. They claim that Dequina leased to them the land.

The municipal trial court favored De Luna and ordered the defendants to return the land to De Luna. However, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The CA upheld the RTC.

Issue: W/N

Held:De Luna wins.

In ejectment cases, it is well established that the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical possession of the property or possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership. If the petitioner can prove prior possession by him, he may recover the property even from the true owner. However, when the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the inferior court has the power to resolve the issue of ownership.

In the case at bar, the court below acted correctly in receiving evidence regarding the ownership clam by the defendants. However, the lower court erred in saying that the property is owned by Dequina. First of all, De Luna had already shown that he had prior possession as established by the witnesses. The witnesses attested that they had seen the delivery of the land to De Lunas mother and that they saw De Luna and his mother cultivate the land.

Republic vs. Rama

Rivas

Facts:

The issue raised in this case refers to the propriety of awarding necessary expenses to the alleged possessor in good faith with right of retention until the expenses are paid.

Logronio, in his official capacity as officer-in-charge of the Bohol Reforestation Project of the Bureau of Forest Development, bulldozed portions of the 2 parcel s of land which he believed to be forest lands, occupied the same, and planted mulberry and other trees.

Rama commenced a complaint for recovery of possession, ownership and damages against Logronio alleging that he is the absolute owner and possessor of the 2 parcels of land occupied by Logronio. Petitioner Republic filed a motion for leave to intervene. The republic alleged that Logronio's acts were authorized by the government thru Director of Bureau of Forest Development in connection with the reforestation program of the government.

The trial of this case in the lower court, resulted to the conclusion that free patent covering the said parcels of land were issued in favor of Rama and the corresponding certificate of titles were issued as well. But the Office of the District Forester of Tagbiliran sent a letter to Rama informing him that the certification issued to Rama by the District Forester is revoked on the ground that after investigation the parcels of land is found to be within the Bohol Reforestation Project.

In view of its findings that the 2 parcels of land are forest lands, the lower court declared as null and void the Certificate of Title covering the parcels of land and ordered Rama upon being reimbursed by the Republic in P6,000 for the 1st land and 3,000 for the 2nd, as necessary expenses.

Republic appealed the lower court's decision insofar as it ordered the Republic to pay Rama for the necessary expenses with right of retention.

Rama alleged that the Republic has no cause of action and is guilty of estoppel for having caused the issuance of the certificate of title covering the forest land.

Issue:

W/n the grant of right to reimbursement to Rama was proper..

Held:

NO.

True, government officials caused the issuance of the patent title and the original Torrens title covering the land in Rama's name. However, the well-entrenched principle is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. Considering that the parcel of land is forest land, the patent and original certificate of title covering the subject parcel issued to Rama did not confer any validity to his possession or claim of ownership. The titles are void ab initio.

In effect Rama's possession of the parcel of land from the beginning was fraudulent and illegal. He was merely a squatter on the parcel. Rama is not a possessor in good faith as defined in art 526 of the civil code. Therefore he is not entitled to necessary expenses with right of retention until reimbursement.

Republic vs. CASarenas

Facts:

Sometime in 1928 or 29, Ricardo Ramos filed a homestead application for a 3-hectare land in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. This was approved, however while the papers were still being processed war broke out and so he needed to file a new application.

Pending his application, he migrated to Isabela. Here he filed for another homestead application for a 14-hectare land. It was accepted and approved.

After the 2nd homestead was finalized, the 1st homestead was also finalized.

Ramos later on discovered that there were people living on the 14-hectare land.

Ramos filed for ejectment but he lost. His 2nd homestead patent was found by the CFI to be void due to the prohibition on having 2 patents.

On appeal, Ramos won.

Issue:

W/N Ramos can claim ownership over the 14-hectare land that was subject to the 2nd homestead patent

Held:

Yes, the 2nd homestead patent is valid

The law does not prohibit a 2nd homestead patent. One who has not yet been issued a patent for his homestead, may be issued a patent for his previous homestead and allowed another homestead which, together with the previous homestead does not exceed 24-hectares.

As regard to the alleged fraud of Ramos (by not disclosing the pending 1st homestead and ownership of 88-hectares of friar lands), these were not entered by Ramos himself. He is illiterate and was only assisted by land officers. So it was the land officers fault.

Rivera vs. Tirona

Beron

Facts:

Rivera was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Pasay

Rivera sold the land to Tirona at the same time leasing the said land from Tirona for 6 months with right to repurchase the same within that period

Rivera continued to be in possession of the said land

Within the period agreed upon, Rivera tried to repurchase the land but Tirona refused

Rivera consigned the amount in court and filed a notice of lis pendens in the office of the register of deeds

Notice of lis pendens was entered in the day book of the register of deeds

Tirona thereafter sold the land to Lapuz who bought the land upon seeing that the TCT of the land was free form any encumbrance.

A new TCT was issued in the name of Lapuz who later sold the same land to his mother Kerr who was also able to transfer the TCT in her name

RTC: ordered Kerr to return the land to Rivera and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the TCT issued in her name

Issue:

W/N the sale made by Tirona to Lapuz was valid making the sale of Lapuz to Kerr valid as well

Held:

Sale was void!

One who buys a land from a person who is not the registered owner is not considered a "subsequent purchaser in faith and is not protected against any encumbrance except those annotated in the title

Lapuz is a purchaser in bad faith! He relied on the title still in the name of Rivera and upon the deed of sale executed by Rivera in favor of Tirona which was not annotated in the TCT. also, Lapuz is aware that Rivera was in