property case reviewer (1)

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B2015 PROPERTY CASE COMPILATION

III. The General Law on Property Rights >> A. Constitutional Framework >>

Case (Year) This case is about Resolution Legal Basis + Interpretation

Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Org. vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (1973)

Union members rallying in protest against the Pasig police despite protestations from its company that it will hamper productivity. Employees were terminated because of the no strike clause in the CBA

The dismissal was not valid. The employees did not violate the CBA.

The Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.

III. The General Law on Property Rights >> C.Right-Holders:Who may have property rights >>

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

Constitutionality of IPRA IPRA is Valid7-7 vote tied. So petition was dismissed.

Puno for validity of IPRA: Ancestral Domain(AD) and Ancestral Land(AL) are the private property of the Indigenous Peoples(IP) and do not constitute part of the land of the public domains, as they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE (AD/AL) A Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts AL into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that AL is private. The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate such AD

III. The General Law on Property Rights >> D. Formal Classification of Property>>1. With reference to the holder of the rights; basic kinds of property>>a. Public

Province of Zamboanga vs. City of Zamboanga

CA 39 converted Zamboanga from a municipality to a city and provided that properties left by the province when it transfers to a new capital will be paid for by the new city. RA 711 divided the province into Zamboanga del Norte and del Sur, also dividing assets and liabilities, with the result that Zamboanga del Norte became entitled to 52.39% of the amount payable by Zamboanga city. RA 3039 was passed, which provided that assets belonging to the former Zamboanga province are transferred free of charge to Zamboanga city. Zamboanga del Norte assailed the constitutionality of RA3039.

Zamboanga City was ordered to pay Zamboanga del Norte 54.39% share in 26patrimonial properties

If the properties were owned by Z province in its public and governmental capacity, then it is Public and Congress has absolute control. If they were owned in its private or capacity, then it is Patrimonial and Z province cannot be deprived without due process and just compensation. There are 2 norms of classification in Art 423 and 424CC Under this, all but 2 of the properties would be patrimonial properties of the former Z province. Under the law on Municipal Corps, however, to be considered public property, it is enough that property beheld and devoted for governmental purposes. Using this, 26 of the lots are patrimonial. The SC used the latter classification, as to classify the properties as private could result in dire consequences (they can be

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levied and attached) and the CC says without prejudice to provisions of special laws

Salas vs. Jarencio

The Municipal Board of Manila issued a Resolution requesting the President to consider the possibility of declaring a lot as patrimonial property for resale. After being passed by the Senate and the House, the President approved the bill, which became RA 4118. To implement it, the Land Tenure Administration proposed a subdivision plan, to which it did not object. Upon LTAs request, the city surrendered the TCT, which was replaced with a one in the name of the LTA. Later, the Mayor brought an action to prohibit LTA from further implementing RA 4118. The TC declared the statute unconstitutional as a deprivation of the citys property without due process and just compensation.

RA 4118 is constitutional The lot is not patrimonial property of the City. It failed to present evidence showing in what manner it acquired the land as its private or patrimonial property. In the absence of a deed or title to any land claimed by the City as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality. The general rule is that regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private capacity, such property is held in trust for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purpose.

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority

The petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years. Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately 1,578,441 Square Meters for a total consideration of P1,894,129,200.00.

Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the States inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA" violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."

Cebu Oxygen vs. Bercilles

The land in question was originally part of M. Borces St., Cebu City. It was declared an abandoned road

Court held that the sale is valid and petitioner has a

The city Charter of Cebu gives the City the right to declare the said road as abandoned. It empowers the City to close a city road or

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through a resolution. Another resolution was passed authorizing the Mayor to sell the land through public bidding. Petitioner was the highest bidder. The Mayor executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioner filed an application to register the title. Asst. City Fiscal moved to dismiss saying the property is outside the commerce of man since it is part of the public domain. TC granted.

registerable title over the lot. street and withdraw it from public use after determining WON the property is still necessary for public use. Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioners application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Art422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use of for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. * Note that the revised charter of the city of Cebu states that: Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be sued or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.

III. The General Law on Property Rights >> D. Formal Classification of Property>>With reference to the object; things that may be subject of property rights>>a. Corporeal>>i. Immovables

Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng

Mabalacat Sugar Co. obtained from Cu Unjieng a loan secured by a mortgage constituted on two parcels of land with all its buildings and improvements now existing or that may be constituted in the future. Mabalacat later decided to buy additional machinery, for which Berkenkotter advanced payment. He was to be paid after Mabalacat receives the proceeds from the additional loan they plan to acquire from Cu Unjieng. Mabalacat failed to obtain the second loan. Berkenkotter claims the improvement (additional machinery)was not permanent, hence not included in the second mortgage.

Court held that the additional machinery constitute a permanent improvement.

Art 334(now Art 415) par 5 of the Civil Code gives the character of real property to machineryintended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry. The installation of the machinery and the equipment in Mabalacats Central converted them into real property by reason of their purpose. Their incorporation therewith was permanent in character because, as essential and principal elements of a sugar central, without them the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.

Philippine Refining Co. vs. Jarque

Philippine Refining Co. and Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zargazo. Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor. This was granted and Jarques

Court held they are covered by the Chattel mortgage law.

Personal property includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the first must be noted in the registry of the

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properties were then assigned to Curaminas. An issue arose on whether the vessels are covered by the Chattel mortgage law.

register of deeds.

Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor

Mindanao Bus Co. is engaged in a public utility business, solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in Mindanao. It owns a main office and branch offices. To be found in their offices are machineries and equipment, which were assessed by the City Assessor as real properties.

Court held that the tools and equipments are movables.

Movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of law must first be essential and principal elements of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. The tools and equipments are by their nature not essential and principal elements of petitioners business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals.

Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo

Davao S. operates a sawmill on land owned by another. It erected a building which housed its machinery, which were mounted on cement foundations. The sawmills contract with the landowner provides that upon expiration of the lease, all improvements shall pass to the landowner but machineries and accessories are excluded from those improvements which will pass to the landowner. In a previous action, a writ was issued against the sawmill and the properties in question were levied upon as personalty by Davao Light which took possession of such. Davao Sawmill has on previous occasion treated the machinery as personalty by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons.

Court held that the machinery is personal property

While not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. The SC said par 1 and 5 of Art. 334 (Art. 415 NCC) do NOT apply. The machinery was not intended by the owner for use in connection therewith but was intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the land by the owner to be returned to the lessee on the expiration of the lease. Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of a property or plant but not when placed by a tenant, usufructuary etc. unless acting as an agent of the owner.

Prudential Bank vs. Panos

Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential. They executed a real estate mortgage over a residential building with the right to occupy the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the building stood. The Sec of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later on mortgaged to the bank.The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses

Court held that the mortgage on the building was valid.

A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can only mean that the building itself is an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as a Real Estate Mortgage for the building would still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.

Caltex vs. Caltex loans machinery and equipment to gas Court held the properties as The equipment are taxable improvements and machinery subject to

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Central Board of Assessment Appeals

station operators under a lease agreement. Caltex retains ownership during the terms of the lease. The City Assessor of Pasay characterized the equipment as taxable realty. The Central Board of Assessment Appeals held that they are real property within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code and that the definitions of real and personal property in Arts 415 and 416 NCC do not apply. Caltex contends they are personal property.

immovables. realty tax under the Assessment Law and Real Property Tax Code. Such machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building owned by Caltex, are necessary to the operation of the station, for without them it would be useless. They have been attached permanently to the station. Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes they may be considered personalty. (The point being that classification of property into realty or personalty is different for the taxation purposes. The NCC only supplements the Tax Code)

Benguet Corp. vs. CBAA

Realty tax was imposed on Benguet Corps tailings dam and the land thereunder. Benguet does not dispute that the dam may be considered realty under Art 415 NCC but it insists that the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as a separate and independent property because it does not constitute an assessable improvement within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code.

Court held that the tailings dam is an assessable improvement.

SC said that the Real Property Tax Code does not define real property so we apply Art 415 par 1 and5 NCC. From these & definition of improvements in the Tax Code(valuable addition intended to enhance value, beauty or utility.;reasonably permanent), it would appear that whether a structure constitutes an improvement so as to partake of the status of realty would depend upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction and use. Permanence means only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has been accomplished. The dam is within this definition as it is permanent in character, enhances the value and utility of the mine and is not an integral part thereof.

Tumulad vs. Vivencio

Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Tumalads over their house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public auction and Tumalads were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against Vivencio, praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners.

Court held that the house is a movable.

Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise. In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have meant that Vivencio conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.

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Sergs Products vs. PCI Leasing

PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin for the seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by Serg in favor of PCI. Machineries of Serg were seized and Serg filed a motion for special protective order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be subject of a chattel mortgage.

Court considered the property as personal

The machineries in question have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature. Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.

III. The General Law on Property Rights >> D. Formal Classification of Property>>With reference to the object; things that may be subject of property rights>>a. Corporeal>>ii. Movables

U.S. vs. Tambunting

Accused and his wife were found guilty of stealing gas from the Manila Gas Corporation. It was found out that during their occupancy of the upper portion of a house wherein the corporation was supplying gas, the spouses made an illegal connection so that they could benefit from the supply.

Court held that gas is personal property

There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to place.

V. Ownership

Case This case is about Resolution Legal Basis + Interpretation

SANDEJAS v. ROBLES (1948)

(no facts in the case) Basically, there was a prior judgment on the case during the Japanese occupation. But Sandejas assailed the validity of the decision. The parties in the present and prior action are the same or represent the same interest, and that the cause of action in both are the same, that is, the performance or non-performance of the terms and conditions of a contract of sale for the enforcement or resolution thereof. ISSUE: WON the Court which has rendered the former judgment had

The decision of the court during the Japanese occupation was valid as per Co Kim Chan v. Valdez. The action for the resolution of contract of sale of real property is an action IN PERSONAM so the court has jurisdiction.

IN PERSONAM- if the object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, then it is an action in personam, even though it concerns the right to or possession of a tangible thing IN REM- if the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection against the right sought to be established and if anyone in the world has the right to be hard then the action is in rem WON IN REM/IN PERSONAM is determined by its nature and purpose In Personam- to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person even if it involves a property In Rem- object is a judgment against property, to determine its status Quasi In Rem- an individual is named as defendant and the purpose

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jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.

of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property

- Proceedings whose object is the sale or disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure or other form of remedy

- Judgment is conclusive only between the parties

CHING v. CA (1990)

Sps. Lumandan sold a piece of land to Ching Leng. Ching died in the US. His son was appointed administrator of his estate. Thirteen years after, Asedillo filed a suit against Ching for reconveyance of the property. Since Ching was in the US and it was not known won he was dead or alive, then the estate may be served by summons with publication. The RTC promulgated its decision by publication. Eventually, Chings son learned if the decision and assailed the jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: WON an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is IN PERSONAM. If so, would a dead man and/or his estate be bound by the service of summons and decision by publication.

Action for Reconveyance and Cancellation of title is an action IN PERSONAM. Judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over Chings person. He could not be validly served a summon since hes already dead and no longer had civil personality. His estate can only be sued through its administrator.

In Personam- judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded In Rem- directed against thing or property or status of a person and seek judgment with respect to the whole world Action to recover land- a real action but in personam since it binds a particular person only

HERNANDEZ v. DBP (1976)

DBP awarded a lot to Hernandez under its housing project. Later on, it cancelled the award. Hernandez filed a complaint seeking annulment of cancellation of award of house and lot and for restoration of all his rights thereto. ISSUE: WON petition was properly filed in Batangas where Hernandez resides (vs. in Quezon City where the house and lot is located).

The action is a personal action so it can be filed in Batangas. Venue depends largely on the nature of action, won real or personal. The complaint is a personal action. It does not involve title or ownership but seeks to compel DBP to recognize the award as valid.

Real Action- brought for specific recovery of land, tenements or hereditaments Personal action- brought for recovery of personal property, for enforcement of control/recovery of damages for its breach or for recovery of damages for injury to person/property

DOMAGAS v. Domagas filed a complaint against Forcible entry is a real action and in In Personam- proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations;

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JENSEN (2005) Jensen for forcible entry. Jensen allegedly gained entry into her property by excavating a portion of it and constructing a fence. Summons and complaint was not served since Jensen was in Norway. The sheriff gave it to her brother instead. MTC issued a decision. Now, Jensen is assailing that decision for lack of jurisdiction over her.

personam since Domagas seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability undr Art 539 of the CC for Jensen to vacate the property and restore physical possession. Since the action is in personam, substituted service is allowed. But in this case, the summons was given to her brother who was merely a visitor in her house. It was insufficient for the sheriff to leave the summons and complaint at her house.

based on jurisdiction of person - Purpose: to impose some responsibility or liability directly

upon person of defendant Quasi In rem- brought against persons seeking to subject their property to the discharge of claims

- Purpose: to subject his interests to the obligation or loan burdening the property

- Judgment applies only to parties; it doesnt cut off rights of all possible claimants

HEIRS OF OLVIGA v. CA (1993)

Cornelio was in actual possession of the subject property. Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for the lot in fraud of the rights of Cornelio. Heir of Cornelio filed a complaint for reconveyance of the parcel of land. ISSUE: WON the action has already prescribed.

Action for reconveyance of parcel of land is actually an action to quiet title. It does not prescribe if person claiming to be the owner is in actual possession of the property. Even if it were based on implied/constructive trust, it still does not prescribe since Cornelios are in actual possession of the property.

Action to quiet title to property in possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of court.

PINGOL v. CA (1993)

Pingol sold half of his undivided land to Donasco. Donasco took possession and constructed a house on the lot. However, he was not able to pay the full price for the lot. After death of Donasco, his heirs offered to pay the balance but the Pingols asked for a bigger amount. Pingols committed acts of forcible entry and encroachment. The heirs of Donasco filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.

The action denominated as one for Specific Performance and Damages is actually an action to quiet title. There was no enforcement of contract needed since delivery of possession of land has consummated the sale. This is an action to remove the cloud upon the ownership by refusal of Pingols to recognize the sale through their refusal to accept the tender of payment by heirs of Donasco.

In an action to quiet title, it is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title. An equitable title is sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title. An action to quiet title of property in ones possession does not prescribe.

TITONG v. CA (1998)

Plaintiff alleges that respondents, through hired labor, forcibly entered into a portion of his land and began plowing. Respondents claim that the area is part of their land. Plaintiff filed an action for quieting of title.

Complaint for quieting of title should have been dismissed outright. Under Art 476 of NCC, claimant must show an instrument , record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a cloud upon owners title or interest. In the case at bar, complainant merely alleged forcible entry then prayed

- In an action for quieting of title, the court cannot order the determination of the boundaries of the property, as this is tantamount to awarding to a party the undisputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding constitutes a cloud. The determination of boundary is appropriate in a proceeding where possession

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for a writ of preliminary injunction and that he be declared the true owner. Physical intrusion is a ground for action for forcible entry not for quieting of title. This case is simply a boundary dispute.

or ownership may properly be considered.

SPS. PORTIC v. CRISTOBAL (2005)

Sps. Alcantara sold the subject land to petitioners Sps. Portic with the condition that they assume the mortgage executed over the land with SSS. However, they defaulted so SSS foreclosed the lot. Before expiration of redemption period, Sps. Portic sold the land to respondent. Thereafter, the Sps. Alcantara also sold the same property to respondent. Respondent paid SSS so a TCT, originally in the name of Sps. Alcantara, was issued to respondent Cristobal. Later, the Sps. Portic demanded the balance of the price from Cristobal who refused to pay. So the Sps. Portic filed this case to remove the cloud created by the issuance of the TCT in favor of Cristobal. ISSUE: WON the cause of action is for quieting of title (or for enforcement of a written contract). Also, theres the secondary issue of prescription of the action filed. Respondent claims that the action is for enforcement of a written contract so it has already prescribed.

Court ruled in favor of Sps. Portics. The action is one for quieting of title. 2 questions need to be resolved. WON Cristobalss title to the property is valid. NO The contract between the parties was a contract to sell which is subject to the suspensive condition of payment of full purchase price. So the mere issuance of the certificate of title in her favor did not vest ownership in her. Registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of title. Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good faith must concur. Clearly, respondent has not yet fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting ownership against petitioners. WON the Portics are in possession of the premises which would mean that the action for quieting of title is imprescriptible. Yes, they are in continuous possession Action to quiet title has not prescribed since Portics are in continuous possession of the premises

Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, title does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. (Take note that in this case, the Portics have retained the title to their property since its only a contract to sell.)

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BISHOP OF CEBU v. MANGARON (1906)

Defendant and his family were in possession of a land. It was not shown under what capacity they held it. In 1887, they were ordered to vacate the property because it was part of a fire zone. After vacating the land, the parish priest of Ermita Church fenced the lot claiming that it belonged to the Church since time immemorial and that defendant only held it by mere tolerance of the Church. IN 1898, defendant occupied the land again and built a nipa house on it and continued to live there with the consent of the parish priest of Ermita Church. Plaintiff then filed an action to recover possession of the land. This was later amended by the plaintiff, praying that the land be declared the property of the Church and it be restored to it. ISSUE: Propriety of action to be filed

Court ordered that defendant vacate the land. The occupation of the land by the defendant in the year 1898 was illegal, for, if he thought he had a right to the land, he should have applied to the courts for the possession of what belonged to him, and not proceed to occupy property claimed by another against the will of the latter. This possession held by the defendant in 1898 cannot be added to the former possession, which was interrupted in 1877 by the order of the municipality, so as to consider such possession continous. This is because possession was not improperly lost since it was a result of a municipal order. If plaintiff had within a year instituted the accion interdictal, or summary action for possession, he would have been, necessarily and undoubtedly, restored to the possession of the land. But a year elapsed and the plaintiff brought this summary action for possession, and the Court said that such summary action for possession could not be maintained. This quiet and peaceful possession of twenty years, more or less, thus lost in a moment, could not be recovered in a summary action for possession after the expiration of one year, but possession could still be recovered through the accion publiciana, which involved the right to possess. In one way or the other the plaintiff would have recovered such possession, in the first case the physical possession and in the second case the right to possess, which is not lost by the mere occupation of a third person, whether such occupation was effected violently, secretly, or arbitrarily. The right acquired by the person who has been in possession for one year and one day is the right that the former possessor lost by allowing the year and one day to expire. The right is lost by the prescription of the action. And the action which prescribes upon the expiration of the year is "the action to recover or to retain possession; " that is to say, the interdictory action. (Art. 1968, par. 1.) then the only right that can be acquired now, as before, by the person who was in possession for one year and one day is that he cannot be made to answer in an interdictory action, but this is not so in a plenary action unless he had some title in good faith. The former possessor who had been in possession for twenty years, more or less, was

3 remedies under the Civil Code for parties unlawfully dispossessed of property: 1. Accion Interdictal- can be brought within 1 year in a summary proceeding; has for its object the recovery of the physical 2. Accion Publiciana-Plenary action for possession in an ordinary proceeding to which can only be brought after 1 year determine who has a better right to possession 3. Action for title in an ordinary proceeding brought in case the plenary action for possession failed

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considered as owner, and unless he was given an opportunity to be heard, and was defeated in law, he could not be deprived of such possession; and notwithstanding all this, and in spite of such prohibition, the maintenance of a possession wrongfully taken from the former possessor by a willful act of the actual possessor had to be sustained. Defendant in this case could never have lawfully and legally done what he did, to wit, to reenter upon the land which he had been ejected by the city of Manila. If the order of the municipality was illegal, and the possession was improperly lost, the defendant should have requested the assistance of the competent authorities to recover it. He should have applied to the executive or administrative officials, as the case might have been, or to the courts of justice in a plenary action for possession, for a year having elapsed since he was ejected from the premises, he could not maintain a summary action for possession.

CHACON v. CA (1983)

Ramon Chacon was granted a fishpond lease agreement. When he died, his heirs applied for a title over the said fishpond and for the adjoining eastern portion. A title was issued in their favor. Later, they filed an ejectment suit against respondents who were then in actual possession of an area in the eastern portion. But this case was dismissed. Chacon then filed a case for recovery of possession. Respondents filed another case for annulment of certificate of title and reconveyance of the portion of land.

Despite the name annulment of title and reconveyance, the action constitutes a quieting of title or a removal of cloud over such title. Proof that respondents were in actual possession of the land is the fact that Chacon filed an ejectment case against them. Chacons fraudulent misrepresentation thatthere was no indication of occupation on the lands it was applying to buy is a ground for the cancellation of said title.

The action to quiet title to property in possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptile. The owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his rights.

GERMAN MGT v. CA (1989)

Sps Jose, who live in the US, authorized German Mgt to develop the subject property into a residential subdivision. But there were occupants in the property. German Mgt bulldozed their crops, removed their fences and harassed them to eject them from the land. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry.

Regardless of authorization by owners to develop subject property, German Mgt did not have a right to bulldoze and destroy the crops of respondents. Ownership is not the issue at present. Respondents were in actual, peaceful possession of the land. The owner must resort to judicial processes for the recovery of said property.

Art 536 of NCC

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DE LA PAZ v. PANIS (1995)

This case is about the propriety of action to be filed and the jurisdiction accorded to municipal trial courts. Petitioners claim that respondents illegally entered portions of said property, established possession and introduced illegal improvements. Respondents admitted entering the property but alleged that they did so with the honest belief that it was part of public domain. They introduced improvements without objection from any party and have been in peaceful, open and uninterrupted possession of the property for more than 10 years. Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession in CFI in Zambales. The CFI judge dismissed the case because it was one for ejectment cognizable only by municipal courts.

The action is not one for forcible entry since there was no allegation that petitioners were denied possession through methods under Sec 1, Rule 70 of Rules of Court. It is also not an action for unlawful detainer since theres no lease contract. This is a plenary action for recovery of possession so CFI has jurisdiction.

Ejectment may be effected only through action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Both actions may be filed with municipal courts within 1 year after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. The main difference lies in the time the possession became unlawful. In forcible entry, it starts from the time of entry. In unlawful detainer, it starts when possession which was at first lawful then becomes illegal. Forcible entry- a summary action to recover material/physical possession of real property when the person who originally held it was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth Unlawful detainer- may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration/termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied

VDA. DE AVILES v. CA (1996)

Anastacia Vda. De Aviles was the actual possessor of a parcel of land. This is the share of Anastacias father in the estate of his deceased parents. Camilo Aviles encroached upon a portion of the property by constructing a fence and moving the dikes that served as the boundary of the properties. Anastacia filed a case for quieting of title. ISSUE: Won the action for quieting of title is the proper remedy.

The action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling boundary disputes. The only controversy in this case is the whether the lands were properly measured.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title of real property. To avail of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real property.

BARICUATRO v. CA (2000)

Baricuatro bought 2 lots which are part of a subdivision project from Galeos. Title for lots remained in the name of Galeos. Petitioner introduced improvements and has since been in

The action is one for quieting of title. This is the remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. It may be availed of under the circumstances in Art 476 of NCC.

Art 476 of NCC and Art. 1544 of NCC

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actual possession of the property. Subsequently, the entire subdivision was sold by Galeos to Amores. Amores registered the land and obtained individual titles to them. The subject lots were sold to Sps. Nemecio by Amores. The Sps. Nemecio caused the transfer of titles and demanded Baricuatro to vacate lots. Eventually, the Sps. Nemecio filed a complaint for quieting of title.

Amores and Sps Nemecio are purchasers in bad faith. For a second buyer to successfully invoke the protection provided in 1544, he must possess good faith from the time of acquisition of the property until the registration of deed of conveyance.

BA FINANCE v. CA (1996)

Sps. Manahan executed a promissory note in favor of Carmasters, Inc. which was secured by a deed of chattel mortgage. This was later assigned to BA Finance. The spouses failed to pay so BA Fin filed a complaint for replevin with damages against the spouses and Roberto Reyes. The vehicle was thereafter seized from Reyes. However, the Sps. Manahan were not served with summons. Hence, the court dismissed the case and ordered the return of the car to Reyes. ISSUE: WON a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any possessor of the object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the mortgage.

No, he may not. Reyes is only an ancillary debtor. The Sps. Manahan are the principal debtors. The plaintiff has no cause of action against Reyes. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to replevin the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for that action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.

Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendent lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein. Consequently, the person in possession of the property sought to be replevined is ordinarily the proper and only necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such interim possession. Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property is so conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the property.

PEZA v. FERNANDEZ (2001)

The subject lot was partitioned by some of the heirs of the registered owners in fraud of other heirs. The lot

Action has already prescribed. An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the discovery of the

Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose property has been wrongfully registered in the name of another. But such recourse cannot be availed of once the property has passed to an innocent

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was among the objects of an expropriation proceeding. PEZA acquired the land through a compromise agreement approved by the RTC. The defrauded heirs filed a complaint for nullity of documents, redemption and damages.

fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon issuance of the certificate of title. Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice. Even an action for reconveyance based on implied constructive trust would have already prescribed since the prescription period is 10 years from registration. The imprescriptibilty of an action for reconveyance applies only if the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In this case, the property already passed on to an innocent purchase for value. Remedy of respondents: they may sue their co-heirs for damages for defrauding them.

purchase of value.

V. Ownership -> A. Sole Ownership -> b. Rights of owners -> 3) Right to accession -> Immoveable property -> b) continua -> i) naturally incorporated


Zapata v. Director of Lands (1962)

This case is about the claim of the plaintiff to the increase in his property adjoining creek, which was contested due to the setting up of artificial means, designed to cause accretion. Julian Zapata owns two parcels of land adjoining a non-navigable and non-floatable river. Soil had been accumulated by the water current of the river on the banks of the lots owned by Zapata. Zapata filed a petition claiming that the three lots belong to her by accretion, using Art. 457 of the NCC. The Director of Lands opposed her petition.

Case was resolved in favor of Plaintiff. The accreted land belongs to Zapata.

Zapata may claim title to the increase in his property adjoining creek under 457, NCC. There is no evidence to show that the setting up of fish trap was expressly intended or designed to cause accretion. Also, the setting up of fish traps stopped or was discontinued even before 1926 so it shows that the alluvial accretion was not entirely due to the setting up of fish traps.

Cortez v. City of Manila

This case is about the application of plaintiff for registration of a parcel of land which was contested by the City of Manila, alleging that the portion sought to be registered was part of the

Case was resolved in favor of plaintiff Cortez. It has been satisfactorily shown that the portion of land included in the technical description situated between the lot to which said instrument refers and the bed of Meisic creek has been gradually formed by alluvion as the result of the current of the stream.

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creek which is part of the public domain. Maximo Cortez filed a written application for the registration of a parcel of land owned by him together with the buildings erected thereon. Examiner of title said that the lot was attached by reason of certain proceedings instituted against Cortes for treason and rebellion. Yet, since the land was acquired by him more than 10 years previously, he could be considered owner thereof by prescription. In order to obtain title, it was necessary for Cortes that said attachment be discharged or cancelled. The attorney of City of Manila contested, alleging that a certain area of the Meisic creek would become property of Cortes should the application be granted. Such creek was property of Manila.

By right of accretion, said portion belongs to the owner of the land referred in the instrument. If lands bordering on the stream are exposed to floods and other damages due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various easements, it is only just that such risks or damages should be compensated by right of accretion.

Hilario v. City of Manila

This case is about the claim for damages against City of Manila for its excavation activities in the alleged private land of Hilario. Dr. Hilario was the owner of a large tract of land, the western side of which was bound by a river. To protect the land, a ditch was built. However, an extraordinary flood occurred which caused the river to leave its original bed and meander into Hilarios land. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises and started excavating and extracting soil from areas along the river. The estate

The case was resolved in favor of the City of Manila.

Art. 339 of the old is very clear that riverbanks are property of public ownership. Moreover, Art. 73 defines the phrase banks of rivers understood to be those lateral strips at its bed, only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. This clearly shows the intent to consider the banks as part of the riverbeds for all legal purposes. Since all beds of rivers are undeniably of public ownership, it follows that the banks are also of public ownership. Art. 553 was not meant as a means of acquiring ownership of banks, but of recognizing vested rights of riparian owners, who, by prior law or custom, preserve ownership but subjected to easement for public use. Subsequent legislation made it clear that riverbanks are of public ownership.

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administrator of Dr. Hilario and the US Army paid filed a claim for damages. The defendants in the case took over the platn and continued operations.

Grande v. CA This case is about the owners failure to register his a part of his property formed by alluvion. Grande was an owner of a parcel of land by inheritance from their mother. It was bounded by the Cagayan River on its northeastern boundary. The bank of the Cagayan river receded and an alluvial deposit had been added to the registered area. Grande instituted an action to quiet title to the alluvial deposit because the defendants entered upon the said land under claim of ownership.

The case was resolved against Grande who failed to register the alluvial property.

There is no dispute that Grande was the lawful owner of the alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. But the accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by Torrens title. Ownership and registration under the Torrens system are different things.. Registration does not vest or give title to the land but merely confirms the title already possessed by the owner making it imprescriptible.

Ignacio v. Director of Lands

This case is about the application for the registration of land including that formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay. The Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that it was public domain and Ignacio had not title to it. Ignacio alleged that he was occupying the land since 1935, planting trees on it and possession was open, continuous for 20 years until the possession was disturbed.

The case was resolved against Ignacio. The lands do not belong to Ignacio by law of accretion (Art. 457 of NCC) because the said article refers to accretion/ deposits on banks of rivers. In this case, the accretion was caused by Manila Bay. Until a formal declaration on the part of Government to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for appropriation or ownership by private persons.

Republic v. Tancinco

This case is about the registration of lands by way of accretion. The plaintiffs sought to register three lots adjacent to their property which

The case was resolved in favor of the Republic. There is no accretion. Art. 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion is said to have taken place

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was opposed by the Republic. The Republic submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Art 457, NCC because what happened is that the respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the riverbed, and thus, if there is any accretion, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.

1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) That it be made through the effects of the current of

river 3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to

the banks of rivers The lands in question are almost 4 hectares, which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the effect of the current of rivers but as a result of the transfer of dikes towards the river and encroaching upon it. The lands sought to be registered are not even dry lands cast imperceptibly and gradually by the rivers current on the fishpond adjoining it.

Binalay v. Manalo

This case is about the claim of plaintiff of a portion of an elongated strip of land which forms part of his property. The western portion of Manalos property would periodically go under the waters of the river as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season. Manalo claims this part of an elongated strip of land formed by western and eastern branches of the river that looked like an island, claiming that it belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it was adjacent.

The case was resolved against Manalo. Manalo did not acquire ownership of the said elongated strip. The SC argued that Government V. Colegio de San Jose was not applicable in this case because that case particularly involved Laguna De Bay, a lake, and applied the definition of natural bed or basin of lakes found in art. 74 of the Law of Waters. What it involved here is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. Also, the depressed portion is a river bed, and was part of public dominion. Court also applied the requisites of accretion:

1) That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible

2) That it be the result of action of the waters of river (or sea)

3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of river (or the sea coast)

Baes v. CA This case is about the cancellation of title of Baes because the title allegedly contains a portion of a creek which is part of the public domain. The government dug a canal in a land to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek. Baes acquired the lot and

Case was resolved in favor of the government. If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage/ loss of property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him if the change is effected through artificial means. The loss was due to the deliberate act of the government. It is obligated to pay Baes for loss.

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subdivided it into three. TCTs were issued in favor of Baes. On one of the lots, the government discovered that the TCT includes the Pasay Cadastre which was filled up with a portion of the creek. Government sought to cancel the title.

However, Baes was already compensated for it when he was given a lot in exchange of the lot which was claimed by the government. To allow Baes to acquire ownership over dried up portion of creek would be a clear case of double compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the state.

Vda. de Nazareno v. CA

This case is about a claim for a parcel of land which was formed as a result of sawdust being dumped into a dried-up creek. Respondents leased the subject lots from petitioners predecessor-in-interest. Due to respondents non-payment of rentals, a case for ejectment was filed against them. The decision was against the lessees. Before his death, the petitioners predecessor-in-interest sought the approval of a survey plan to perfect his title. Respondents contested it. A decision was rendered in favor of respondents, adjudicating to them the areas they occupied.

The case was resolved in favor of lessees/ respondents.

The accretion was man-made/ artificial. According to Meneses v. CA, there are three requisites for accretion as a mode of acquiring property which must concur:

1) Deposition of the soil/ sediment is gradual and imperceptible

2) It is the result of the action of the waters (of the river or sea)

3) The land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or sea coast)

In this case, the petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by the duping of boulders, soil, and other filling materials on portions of the creek and river bounding their land. Also, Republic v. CA held that the requirement that the deposit should be made through the effect of the current is indispensable.

VIII. Ownership >> 1. Right to Accession >> b. continua>> ii.artificially incorporated


EQUATORIAL VS. MAYFAIR (2001) .

Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc leased its property to Mayfair who used it as movie houses (Maxim Theater and Miramar Theater). The lease is for a period of 20 years with a Right of First Refusal to purchased the leased properties. Within the 20-year lease period, Carmelo sold the property to Equatorial for 11.3 million without first offering it to Mayfair. As a result, Mayfair filed a complaint before RTC

SC ruled that there was no delivery despite execution of a deed of sale because there was no subsequent actual transfer. Assuming arguendo that there was a valid delivery, Equatorial is not entitled to any benefits from the rescinded deed of sale because it acted in bad faith when it purchased the property despite being aware of the lease contracts between Carmelo and Mayfair.

Rent is a civil fruit of ownership that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. While the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive/symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. The execution of a contact of sale as a form of constructive delivery is a legal fiction and holds true only when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of property from the vendor to the vendee

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for (1) annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, (2) specific performance, and (3) damages SC ruled in favor of Mayfair and declared the Deed of absolute sale rescinded. Carmelo ordered to return to Equatorial the purchase price; Equatorial directed to execute deeds and documents necessary to return ownership to Carmelo; Carmelo ordered to allow Mayfair buy the property for 11.3 million. Mayfair submitted its motion for execution, while Equatorial filed an action for the collection of a sum of money against Mayfair, claiming payment of rentals or reasonable compensation (P115,947,867)for Mayfairs use of the subject property after its lease contracts expired.

LIWANAG VS. YU-SONGUIAN (1905)

Yu-Chinco left Manila for China and died there. Then, Yu-Chiocco leased certain land in Tondo and erected buildings on such land using the materials owned by Yu-Chinco. Liwanag, as administratrix of Yu-Chinco filed an action in the CFI claiming that the building belonged to the estate of Yu-Chinco. CFI ruled that since the labor for the erection of the building was performed by Yu-Chiocco but the materials used belonged to Yu-Chinco, Liwanag as administratrix owned half of the building

SC ruled that the owner of the materials used to construct a building who did not contribute to the labor of the buildings construction does not automatically become part owner of such building. Article 360 of the Old Civil Code applies (NCC, Art 447). At most, Liwanag has a claim for the value of the materials allegedly owned by Yu-Chinco and used in the buildings.

The owner of the materials used to construct a building who did not contribute to the labor of the buildings construction does not automatically become part owner of such building. Article 447 applies. At most, owner of the material has a claim for the value of the materials allegedly used for the buildings construction. Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for damages. (360a)

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JM TUASON VS. VDA. DE LUMANLAN (1968)

JM Tuason, the registered owner of Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, filed an ejectment case against Estrella Vda. de Lumanlan who unlawfully entered into possession of 800 sq.m. of land and constructed a house on it. Lumanlan claimed to have bought her property from Deudor, and that she is one of the recognized buyers in a compromise agreement between JM Tuason and Deudor. CFI ordered Lumalan to vacate the lot. CA reversed and held the compromise agreement to be a valid defense against the possessory claim of JM Tuason

SC ruled that the compromise agreement in no way obligated Tuason & Co. to sell to those buyers the lots occupied by them at the price stipulated with the Deudors, but at "the current prices and terms specified by the OWNERS (Tuason). As to Lumanlan's allegation in her counterclaim that she should be deemed a builder in good faith, SC held she was not because there being a presumptive knowledge of the Torrens titles issued to Tuason & Co. and its predecessors-in-interest since 1914, the buyer from the Deudors cannot, in good conscience, say now that she believed her vendor had rights of ownership over the lot purchased. She should have

To be considered builder in good faith, buyer must first make reasonable inquiry or investigation regarding the title of the property. If a vendee failed to make the necessary inquiry, he is now bound conclusively by the Torrens title.

GABOYA VS. CUI (1971) .

Don Mariano Cui sold three lots to his children. In the deed of sale, he retained usufruct of the 3lots (no improvements during the sale). The children built a 12-door commercial building using money loaned from RFC after mortgaging the lots with Don Marianos consent. The rents were collected by the children and were used to pay RFC. Gaboya, the administrator of Don Mariano now claims for P126,344 as fruits due to Don Mariano as usufruct. Gaboya claims that the usufructuary rights extends to the rentals of building and that the violation of the usufructuary rights entitled Don Mariano to rescind the sale

SC ruled that the usufructuary rights does not extend to the building but is limited over the land occupied by the building. Article 571 is not applicable. Also, the usufruct was not a condition on the sale.

Under the articles of the Civil Code on industrial accession by modification on the principal land (Articles 445 to 456) such accession is limited either to buildings erected on the land of another, or buildings constructed by the owner of the land with materials owned by someone else. Nowhere in these articles on industrial accession is there any mention of the case of landowner building on his own land with materials owned by himself. The reason for the omission is readily apparent: recourse to the rules of accession are totally unnecessary and inappropriate where the ownership of land and of the, materials used to build thereon are concentrated on one and the same person. Even if the law did not provide for accession the land-owner would necessarily own the building, because he has paid for the materials and labor used in constructing it

FLOREZA VS. EVANGELISTA (1980) .

Evangelistas loaned a total of P870 from Floreza. With the consent of Evangelistas, Floreza then occupied Evangelistas residential lot with a barong-barong built thereon. Floreza demolished the barong-barong and in its place constructed one of strong

SC ruled that Floreza must vacate the premises and that he must remove his house at his own expense. SC held that Art 448 is not applicable because Floreza does not build his house thinking he was the owner. Since Art 448 is not applicable neither is Article 453. Floreza did not build his house as vendee a retro because

Article 448 is not applicable when a person builds his house over a land not thinking he was the owner. There is bad faith on the part of the land owner if it tolerates construction made on its land by third persons.

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materials. Subsequently the Evangelistas sold the lot to Floreza with a right to repurchase within 6 years. Seven months before the expiry period, the Evangelistas repurchased the lot and asked Floreza to vacate the premises. Floreza refused to vacate unless he was reimbursed the value of his house. Evangelistas filed a complaint.

he built his house even before the pacto de retro sale by Evangelistas tolerance. Both are in bad faith. Floreza must pay rental fees from payment of repurchase price

Manotok Realty Inc v. Tecson (1988)

Manotok Realty filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against Madlangawa who was in possession and introduced improvements on the said land. LC ruled in favor of Manotok approving exercise of its option to appropriate improvement introduced by Madlangawa but a fire razed the house during the pendency of the case. Manotok filed a petition for mandamus. Defendant said Manotoks option can no longer be exercised since subject matter was extinguished by fire.

Petition for mandamus granted. Judge cannot deny issuance of writ of execution because of the supervening circumstance since the option given by the law either to retain the premises and pay for improvements or to sell the said premises to the builder in good faith belongs to the OWNER of the property. Since improvements have been gutted by fire, the basis for private respondents right to retain the premises was extinguished without the fault of Manotok. They must therefore vacate the premises and deliver it to peititoner.

The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for improvements. The builder cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land. Requisites of builder in good faith

1. that he be a possessor in the concept of an owner 2. that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode

of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The builder in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenses

MWSS v. CA (1986)

City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former NAWASA for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan waterworks system. NAWASA filed a counterclaim for reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for the necessary and useful improvements it had introduced. LC ruled in favor of the City of Dagupan. NAWASA now wants to remove the useful improvements.

As builder in bad faith, MWSS can neither seek reimbursement nor remove the improvements. (case did not include stipulation of facts but it appears that NAWASA constructed improvements while a case for recovery of ownership and possession was pending)

Article 449: A builder in bad faith loses whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity Article 546: Only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed Article 547: Only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing useful expenses

Pleasantville v. CA (1996)

Agents of Pleasantville pointed the wrong lot to buyer Mr. Kee who proceeded to construct his residence, store and auto repair shop and other

Kee was a builder in good faith. At the time he built improvements, he believed that the said lot was what he bough from Pleasantville. Pleasantville is liable through acts of its agent.

Good faith: belief of a builder that the land he is on is actually without defect.

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improvements on the land. The holder of the title to the said land Jardincio filed an ejectment case against Kee and demanded that he remove all improvements on the land.

The rights of Kee and Jardincio are regulated by law as builder in good faith. It was was wrong for CA to make modificiation in the application of such law on the ground of equity

Alviola v. CA (1998)

Tinagans filed a case against spouses Alviola for recovery and possession of a land on which Alviola built a copra dryer and copra store. Court ruled in favor of the Tinagans.

Alviolas cannot claim indemnity fot the copra dryer and copra store because such are TRANSFERRABLE and cannot fall under article 448 of the CC.

A requisite for Article 448 to allow indemnity if that the improvements introduced must be of such permanent character if to be considered accession.

Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr. v. Uym (2000)

Before notices to vacate were served, employees of Durano proceeded to bulldoze parcels of lands occupied by 25 parties, destroying their plantings and improvements. Duranos even filed a case for damages stating that the respondents were spreading false rumours and damaging tales which put Duranos in public contempt and ridicule. Court ruled in favor of 25 petitioners.

The 25 parties were possessors in good faith and such possession ripened into ownership by acquisitive prescription. The lands were conveyed to them by purchase or inheritance, they were in actual, continuous and adverse possession, they exercised rights of ownership like paying taxes and introducation of plantings, and they each had completed 10 year prescriptive period. Duranos were in bad faith since their title to the land was doubtful.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription of immoveable property- possession of thing in good faith with just title for a period of 10 years Right of owner of the land to recover damages from a builder in bad faith is clearly provided for in Article 451 of CC. Court perceives basis of damages as corresponding with the value of the properties lost of destroyed as a result of occupation in bad faith, as well as fruits from those properties that the owner of the land reasonably expected to obtain

V. Ownership >> B. Co-Ownership >> 1. Definition


Pardell v. Bartolome

Vicenta and Matilde Ortiz were the only two surviving heirs of their parents. Vicenta alleges that Matilde took upon herself the administration and enjoyment of the properties, and collection of the fruits. And that despite extrajudicial demand, Matilde has refused to divide the properties. Matilde denied this, stating that she was willing to make the partition.

Matilde occupied a part of the property in the exercise of her right as co-owner. There was no proof to show that detriment was made to the interest of the community of property, nor that she prevented her sister from utilizing it according to her rights. Each co-owner of undivided property has rights over the whole property. Matilde is only liable for the part of the property that her husband made use of without payment of rent.

Article 394 - Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights.

Basa v. Aguilar The Basas were c-owners of an undivided parcel of land with Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina. Puyat sold his share to his daughter Macaria and

A co-owner exercising the right of redemption under Article 1620 may do so when the share of another co-owner is sold to the child of said co-owner. The Basas may exercise the right of

The term third person under Article 1620 is to be applied to all persons who are not co-owners of the thing.

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her husband Primo Tiongson. 7 days later, the Basas filed a civil case to be allowed to exercise the right of redemption.

redemption.

Del Ocampo v. Abesia

The Del Ocampos and Abesia were co-owners pro diviso of a parcel of land. An action was filed for partition of the property and this was granted. Upon partition, a part of Abesias house was found to be encroaching upon the share of the Del Ocampos. The action is to decide who is entitled to ownership of the land partially occupied by the house.

The construction was made in good faith since it was done prior to the partition of the property. The Del Ocampos have the right to appropriate the portion encroached upon payment of indemnity. Abesia may also demolish the portion of the house encroaching upon the property of the Del Ocampos.

Article 448

Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals

Roasali and Gaudencio Bailon each sold their 1/6 share in a parcel of land to Delgado. Rosalia then sold the remaining 2/3 of the land to Lanuza. Lanuza then acquired the remaining 1/3 from Delgado. Several decades later, the heirs of the other Bailons filed a case for the recovery of property.

The heirs of the other Bailons are entitled to the 2/3 share of the parcel of land. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will only affect his share. The shares of the other co-owners are not affected.

Article 493

Oliveras v. Lopez This is a case for partition of an undivided parcel of land filed by the Oliveras brothers. Tomasa and Candido Lopez had sold a specific portion of the undivided land they had inherited along with their co-heirs to the Oliveras brothers. The brothers took possession of the portion they had bought and had introduced improvements. They now demand that partition be made in order for them to acquire title over the portion they are occupying.

The deeds of sale are valid. The parcel of land should be partitioned.

Before the partition of a land held in common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion. However, the duration of co-ownership of an estate should not exceed 20 years. In this case, the heirs have held the estate for more than 20 years before the portion was sold to the Oliveras brothers. They validly disposed of the portion since the co-ownership had already ceased by operation of law.

Tagarao v. Garcia

This is an action praying for the award of the 3 plaintiffs (Ressureccion, Serafin and Buenaventura) supposed combined share of of a parcel of

Only Serafin and Buenaventura are entitled to their shares of the land. Ressureccions right of action had already prescribed. Ressureccion had allowed Marcos to perform acts of

Even though their rights of action arose from the same facts, their respective rights are joint and several. The disability of which protects one does not extend to the rest.

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land. The land was originally purchased by Marcos and his brother Ventura. Ventura died, leaving as his heirs Merced and Claro. While Merced was still living, Marcos delivered to her and her brother their share in the fruits. When Merced died, Marcos claimed the land as exclusively his. Marcos then executed a document in favor of Claro giving Claro his share of the property. Ressurecccion found out about this and started negotiating with Marcos. However, Marcos sold his share of the property to Rufino.

ownership on the land for more than 10 years, which bars her from now assailing Marcos claim of ownership.

Rivera v. Peoples Bank

This is an action for recovery of a bank deposit by Rivera. Rivera was a housekeeper employed by Stephenson. Stephenson then opened an account with Peoples Bank. A Survivorship Agreement was them executed over the contents of the account, stating that the money deposited by either Rivera or Stephenson to the account shall be the property of both of them during their joint lives and after the death of one of them, it shall belong to the survivor. When Stephenson died, Rivera attempted to claim the amount deposited but the bank refused to pay.

The Survivorship Agreement is valid. Rivera is entitled to the amount deposited in the bank. It is well-established that a bank account may be so created that 2 persons shall be joint owners thereof during their mutual lives, and that the survivor takes the whole on the death of the other. This right exists in common law.

Gatchalian v. CIR This is an action questioning the propriety of the tax imposed on the 15 joint owners of a winning lottery ticket. These 15 people pooled their money to buy a lottery ticket which won. The CIR then made an assessment against them for the payment of taxes on the winnings. Due to this, they paid the taxes in protest.

By pooling their money to buy the winning ticket, they had organized a partnership of civil nature for the sole purpose of dividing the prize if they won. They are thus bound to pay the tax collectively.

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V. Ownership >> B. Co-Ownership >> 1. Definition


Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay

This is a case for recovery of possession of a parcel of land that had been leased out by one of its co-owners without the consent of the others. The original owner Julian died, leaving the property to his heirs. Some of these heirs then leaser out the property for a period of 20 years, extendible for another 20, to Yap. Yap took possession and introduced ownership. When Yap died, the lease was transferred to Dy. When partition of the property was made, Liberata, the wife of Ramon who was one of the original heirs, demanded that an increase of the rent. Dy refused to comply. The wife insisted that they had no knowledge of the lease.

The contract is null and void. Liberata is entitled to the land.

The contract of lease is null and void for being for a term of over 6 years. It is against public policy for having such a long term. This is because only a small majority of the co-owners assented to the lease. The Court cited Articles 398, 1548, and 1713 but no explanation was made on how they apply to this case.

Tuason v. Tuason

Angela, Nieves and Antonio co-owned a parcel of land. The share of Nieves, after being offered to her siblings, was sold to Gregorio. The three co-owners then agreed to have the land subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds later to be divided among them. They then entered into a contract with Araneta Inc, wherein the company would finance the development of the subdivision. Angela, after some time, moved for the rescission of the contract with the company, alleging that it is contrary to Article 400 of the Civil Code.

The contract is valid. Article 400 is inapplicable because the contract, though it obliges the co-owners to remain the community, has for its purposed and object the dissolution of the co-ownership by selling the parcel of land held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-ownership.

Article 400 - No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common

Mariano v. Court of Appeals

This is a case regarding a co-heirs right of redemption over a parcel of land. Francisco was the original owner of a parcel of land. He mortgaged the land

Grace and her other siblings are entitled to their share of the redeemed property. Applying Article 1620, the property was never the subject of partition or distribution among

Article 1620

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to Rural Bank, and he defaulted on the loan. Upon his death, Amparo, one of his heirs, redeemed the property. Antonia, the wife of Francisco, along with several of the other co-heirs, executed a Deed of Assignment of Right of Redemption to Amparo. Grace, one of the co-heirs, and her other siblings, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Legal Redemption with Damages upon learning of the sale.

the heirs. This means that Grace and her siblings had not ceased to be co-heirs. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Arcelona v. Court of Appeals

This is a case for nullification of a final decision on the ground of non-inclusion of some co-owners in a suit involving tenancy over an undivided property. A final judgment was rendered in facor Farnacio, declaring him to be the tenant-caretaker of the property. However, not all the co-heirs were made defendants in the case. They now assail the decision on the ground that the decision is void due to it being void for not having acquired jurisdiction over the other co-owners.

A final judgment may be attacked through a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals. A challenge based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be brought up anytime. If a defendant is not summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person and a personal judgment against him is void. Co-owners of an undivided property are indispensable parties. A tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land.

Adlawan v. Adlawan

This is a case of unlawful detainer filed by Arnelito against Emeterio and Narcisa. Ramon and Oligia were the original owners of a parcel of land. To qualify for a loan, they transferred ownership to their son Dominador by executing a simulated deed of sale. Dominador never disturbed his parents ownership over the land. When Dominador died, his illegitimate son Arnelito claimed to be the sole heir of the property. He allowed his fathers siblings to stay there on the condition that they vacate when told to. When

Arnelito is not the sole owner of the property. When Dominador died, he became co-owner of the property with Graciana, Dominadors wife. Though Article 487 allows any co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, the rule does not apply when the suit is for the benefit of one of the co-owners alone who claims sole ownership against his co-owners.

Article 487

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he requested they vacate, the occupants filed a case for quieting of title. Amelito then filed an ejectment suit.

VI. USUFRUCT


Alunan v Veloso (1928)

The right of the widow to the usufruct of a money (as adjudicated to her in the settlement of his husbands estate)

Widow has a right to the usufruct in MONEY. Money, although a fungible thing, may be the subject of a usufruct.

Art. 482 of the Civil Code (I think this is the old Civil Code.

Belonio v Novella (1959)

The interpretation of the grant of usufructuary rights to a vendee A RETRO during the entire period of redemption

The vendee a retro has the right to enjoy the usufruct of the land during the period of redemption

Usufruct is an element of ownership, which is involved in a contract of sale

Mercado v Rizal (1939)

The responsibility of the usufructuary and the owner of the land with respect to the payment of realty taxes

The usufructuary does not have the responsibility of paying the realty taxes of the land.

The said responsibility, under Art. 505 of the Civil Code, is placed upon the owner. If the usufructuary shall voluntarily pay the realty tax, then he shall recover them upon the expiration of the usufruct. However, the provision does not apply in the case where the OWNER COMPELLED THE USUFRUCTUARY TO PAY OR USE THE USUFRUCTUARYS MONEY WITHOUT HIS CONSENT.

Vda. De Albar v Carandang (1962)

The right of the usufructuary to the compensation paid by the government for the improvements in the property that were destroyed during the war and the obligation of the usufructuary to return the amount paid by the owner of the lands for repurchasing the property after it was sold in a public auction due to the usufructuarys failure to pay the taxes.

The usufructuary is entitled to the sum paid by the government for the improvements that were destroyed but is also liable for the amount paid for repurchasing the lot after it was sold in a public auction due to the usufructuarys failure to pay the taxes.

The court did not cite any legal provision because it only discussed the procedural aspects.

Board of Assessment Appeals v Samar Mining (1971)

The responsibility of a lessee to pay taxes for a road it constructed on the public land it leased.

A real tax, being a burden upon the capital, should be paid by the owner of the land and not by a usufructuary. Since the land leased is a public land (belonging to the State), then the duty to pay taxes is

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