G.R. No. 152809 August 3, 2006MERCEDES MORALIDAD, Petitioner,vs.SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES and ARLENE PERNES, Respondents.

GARCIA, J.:Facts:In her younger days, petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City and Manila. While teaching in Manila, she had the good fortune of furthering her studies at the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. While schooling, she was offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, which she did for seven (7) years. Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health Department of said University for the next seventeen (17) years.During those years, she would come home to the Philippines to spend her two-month summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being single, she would usually stay in Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario.Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene that Mandug at the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. Shocked and saddened about this development, she immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlene’s older sister, with instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down. This was why she bought the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-123125.Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986.

Issue:I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR BEING PREMATURE WHICH DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 448 AND 546 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE ON USUFRUCT INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

Ruling:

The Court rules for the petitioner.Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property. 9 It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, 10 with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. 11It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right "to build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks "proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties" for the petitioner’s "nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of (sic) in standing." The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also granted them, among the petitioner’s other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof. We have no quarrel, therefore, with the CA’s ruling that usufruct was constituted between petitioner and respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease contract between the parties.

Dichoso v Marcos DigestG.R. No. 180282, April 11, 2011Nachura, J.:

Facts:1. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the CA decision and resolution which reversed and set aside the RTC decision on the civil case. The resolution denied the MR filed by the petitioners .

2. In 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against the respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos and alleged therein that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553; while respondent is the owner another lot.

3. Since the petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners have been granted another passageway by Spouses Arce, the owners of another adjacent lot.

4. Hence the complaint before the RTC. Instead of filing an Answer, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and noncompliance with the requisite certificate of non-forum shopping.

5. The RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.

6. Respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway and that petitioners’ claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not necessity. He also maintained that there is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce. The RTC declared that respondent’s answer failed to tender an issue, and opted to render judgment on the pleadings and thus deemed the case submitted for decision.

7. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, granting a right of way over Lot 01 after finding that petitioners adequately established the requisites to justify an easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.

8. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners’ complaint. It concluded that there is no need to establish an easement over respondent’s property since the Arce spouses had already provided an access road which is adequate. It emphasized that the convenience of the dominant estate is never the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that respondent's lot is the shortest route in going to and fro their property to a public street and where they used to pass.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to a legal easement

NO. The petition is without merit. Petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the enumerated requirements under Art. 650 (NCC).

1. By its very nature, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted.

2. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." In order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. As such, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.

3. Petitioners had already been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot. There is an existing outlet to and from the public road. Other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway.