batch 1 cases property

8/10/2019 Batch 1 Cases Property

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UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.G.R. No. 190071

FACTS:Union Bank is the owner of a commercial complex located in Malolos, Bulacan, known

as the Maunlad Shopping Mall.Sometime in August 2002, Union Bank, as seller, and respondentMaunlad Homes, Inc. (Maunlad Homes) , as buyer, entered into a contract to sell involving theMaunlad Shopping Mall. Under the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes to take

possession of the property and to build or introduce improvements thereon. The parties alsoagreed that if Maunlad Homes violates any of the provisions of the contract, all payments madewill be applied as rentals for the use and possession of the property, and all improvementsintroduced on the land will accrue in favor of Union Bank.

In the event of rescission due to failure to pay or to comply with the terms of the contract,Maunlad Homes will be required to immediately vacate the property and must voluntarily turn

possession over to Union Bank.When Maunlad Homes failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank sent the

former a Notice of Rescission of Contract dated February 5, 2003, demanding payment of theinstallments due within 30 days from receipt; otherwise, it shall consider the contractautomatically rescinded. Maunlad Homes failed to comply. Hence, on November 19, 2003,Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a letter demanding payment of the rentals due and requiringthat the subject property be vacated and its possession turned over to the bank.

On February 19, 2004, when Maunlad Homes continued to refuse, Union Bank institutedan ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 64.Maunlad Homes resisted the suit by claiming, among others, that it is the owner of the propertyas Union Bank did not reserve ownership of the property under the terms of the contract. Byvirtue of its ownership, Maunlad Homes claimed that it has the right to possess the property.On May 18, 2005, the MeTC dismissed Union Banks ejectment complaint. It found that Union

Banks cause of action was based on a breach of contract and that both parties are claiming a better right to possess the property based on their respective claims of ownership of the property.

The MeTC ruled that the appropriate action to resolve these conflicting claims was anaccion reivindicatoria, over which it had no jurisdiction. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 139, affirmed the MeTC in its decision dated July 17, 2008; itagreed with the MeTC that the issues raised in the complaint extend beyond those commonlyinvolved in an unlawful detainer suit.

The RTC declared that Union Bank cannot rely on the waiver of venue provision in thecontract because ejectment is not an action arising out of or connected with the contract.Union Bank disagreed with the CAs finding that it is claiming ownership over the propertythrough the ejectment action. The Court initially denied Union Banks petition in its Resolution

dated March 17, 2010. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Union Bank, the Court set asideits Resolution of March 17, 2010 (in a Resolution dated May 30, 2011) and required MaunladHomes to comment on the petition.

Maunlad Homes contested Union Banks arguments, invoking the rulings of the lowercourts. It considered Union Banks action as based on the propriety of the rescission of thecontract, which, in turn, is based on a determination of whether Maunlad Homes indeed failed tocomply with the terms of the contract; the propriety of the rescission, however, is a question thatis within the RTCs jurisdiction. Hence, Maunlad Homes contended that the dismissal of theejectment action was proper.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO POSSESS THE PROPERTY WASEXTINGUISHED WHEN THE CONTRACT TO SELL FAILED TO MATERIALIZE

HELD:Maunlad Homes acquired possession of the property based on its contract with Union

Bank. While admitting that it suspended payment of the installments, Maunlad Homes contendedthat the suspension of payment did not affect its right to possess the property because its contractwith Union Bank was one of sale and not to sell; hence, ownership of the property has been


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transferred to it, allowing it to retain possession notwithstanding nonpayment of installments.The terms of the contract, however, do not support this conclusion. Section 11 of the

contract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes provides;"upon payment in full of the Purchase Price of the Property x x x, the SELLER shall execute and deliver

a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the Property to the BUYER. Jurisprudence has established that wherethe seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment ofthe price, the contract is only a contract to sell. The presence of this provision generally identifies thecontract as being a mere contract to sell. After reviewing the terms of the contract between Union Bankand Maunlad Homes, we find no reasonable ground to exempt the present case from the general rule; thecontract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes is a contract to sell.In a contract to sell, the full

payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition whose non-fulfillment is not a breach ofcontract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. "

The non-payment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective andwithout force and effect." Maunlad Homes act of withholding the installment paymentsrendered the contract ineffective and without force and effect, and ultimately deprived itself ofthe right to continue possessing Maunlad Shopping Mall.


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JOSEPHINE MARMO, NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL PILARand MARISA DEL PILAR, vs. MOISES O. ANACAY

G.R. No. 182585

FACTS: Respondent filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages against

the petitioners and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. The complaint states, amongothers, that: the respondent is the bona-fide co-owner, together with his wife, Gloria P. Anacay(now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of land and the house built thereon.

They authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject property; petitioner Josephinesold the subject property to petitioner Danilo for P520,000.00, payable in monthly installmentsof P8,667.00 from May 2001 to June 2006; petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment

payments from December 2002 onwards; the respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No.815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T- 972424 was issued in petitioner Josephine s name by

virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001; petitioner Josephinesubsequently transferred her title to petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled andTCT No. T- 991035 was issued in petitioner Danilos name. The re spondent sought theannulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 and the cancellation of TCT

No. T- 991035; in the alternative, he demanded petitioner Danilos payment of the balance ofP347,000.00 with interest from December 2002, and th e payment of moral damages, attorneysfees, and cost of suit.

In her Answer, petitioner Josephine averred, among others, that the respondentschildren, as co-owners of the subject property, should have been included as plaintiffs becausethey are indispensable parties. Petitioner Danilo echoed petitioner Josephines submission in hisAnswer.

The respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his children are not indispensable parties because the issue in the case can be resolved without their participation in the proceedings. They charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not dismissing the case after the respondent failed to include indispensable parties. It found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss, noting that the respondents children are not indispensable parties.The petitioners moved but failed to secure a reconsideration of the CA Decision.

ISSUE :WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE RTC DID NOT COMMIT

ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTSCHILDREN ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.

RULING: The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners Motion to

Dismiss; the resp ondents co -owners are not indispensable parties. The RTC grounded its Orderdated March 14, 2006 denying the petitioners motion to dismiss on the finding that therespondents children, as co -owners of the subject property, are not indispensable parties to theresolution of the case. When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 ofthe Civil Code explicitly provides that any one of the co -owners may bring an action inejectment.

In the term action in ejectment includes a sui t for forcible entry ( detentacion ) orunlawful detainer ( desahucio ). Also, the term action in ejectment includes also, an accion

publiciana (recovery of possession) or accion reinvidicatoria (recovery of ownership). Mostrecently in Estreller v. Ysmael , we applied Article 487 to an accion publiciana case; in Plasabasv. Court of Appeals we categorically stated that Article 487 applies to reivindicatory actions.


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In sum, respondents children, as co -owners of the subject property, are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the case. We held in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman that in caseslike this, the co-owners are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded inthe suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit ofall.

Thus, the respondents children need not be impleaded as party-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2919-03. In light of these conclusions, no need arises to act on petitioners prayer for a TROto suspend the proceedings in the RTC and we find no reason to grant the present petition.

WHEREFORE , premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for its failure toshow any reversible error in the assailed Decision dated December 28, 2007 and Resolutiondated April 11, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94673, both of which wehereby AFFIRM . Costs against the petitioners.


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HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON, ET AL vs. FIL-ESTATEMANAGEMENT INC, ET AL.

G.R. No. 170750

FACTS:Petitioners before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of

Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages againstrespondents. The eight Complaints were similarly worded and contained substantially identicalallegations. Petitioners claimed in their Complaints that they had been in continuous, open, andexclusive possession of the afore-described parcels of land (subject properties) for more than 90years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991. They hadcultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real estate taxes for the same.Respondents cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 9176, No. 9177, No. 9178,

No. 9179, No. 9180, No. 9181 and No. 9182, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias intheir names, to support their claim over the subject properties since, petitioners averred, thesubject properties were not covered by said certificates.

Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application fora Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal ofthe eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action;and (4) res judicata . Respondents also contended that petitioners were guilty of laches. Despitetheir alleged possession of the subject properties for 90 years, petitioners failed to take any stepsto oppose the land registration cases involving the same properties or to seek the nullification ofthe decrees of registration and certificates of title which were entered and issued as early as 1966and 1967.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE RTC PROPERLY GRANTED RESPONDENTS MOTION TODISMISS.

RULING:Respondents seek the dismissal of petitioners Complaints for failure to state a cause of

action. Even assuming as true that the subject properties have been in the possession of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest for 90 years; that petitioners have been paying therealty taxes thereon; and that petitioners are able to submit a sketch plan of the subject

properties, respondents maintain that their ownership of the subject properties, evidenced bycertificates of title registered in their names, cannot be defeated.

This contention is untenable. This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by

petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are theowners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have theright to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they mayrecover the same. The Court notes that petitioners prayer for the cancellation of respondentscertificates of title are inconsistent with their allegations.

Admittedly, while petitioners can seek the recovery of the subject properties, theycannot ask for the cancellation of respondents TCTs since petitioners failed to allege anyinterest in the land covered thereby. Still, the other reliefs sought by petitioners, i.e. , recovery ofthe possession of the subject properties and compensation for the damages resulting fromrespondents forcible taking of their property, are still proper. In all, this Court pronounces thatrespondents failed to raise a proper ground for the dismissal of petitioners Complaints.

Petitioners claims and respondents opposition and defenses thereto are best ventilated in a trialon the merits of the cases.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , the instant Petition is GRANTED . The Decisiondated 16 September 2005 and Resolution dated 9 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80927 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE SO ORDERED.


6/27

COLITO T. PAJUYO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 146364

FACTS:Petitioner paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in

Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot.Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.On 8 December 1985,Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, asowner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra wouldmaintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he wouldvoluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand.

In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demandedthat Guevarra vacate the house however, Guevarra refused. Pajuyo filed an ejectment caseagainst Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31.

On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. Aggrieved,Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81. The RTC affirmedthe MTC decision. Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November 1996. Guevarra hadonly until 14 December 1996 to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing hisappeal with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a Motion forExtension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42 (motion for extension ).Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure questions of law.

The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion for extension on 13December 1996 or one day before the right to appeal expired.On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filedhis petition for review with the Supreme Court.On 8 January 1997, the First Division of theSupreme Court issued a Resolution referring the motion for extension to the Court of Appealswhich has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The case presented no special and important

matter for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of at the first instance. The Thirteenth Divisionof the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting the motion for extension conditioned on thetimeliness of the filing of the motion.

On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the RTC decision.Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. The Court of Appeals declared thatPajuyo and Guevarra are squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested lotwhich the government owned.

ISSUE :WHETHER OR NOT IN RULING THAT THE KASUNDUAN VOLUNTARILY

ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES WAS IN FACT A COMMODATUM, INSTEAD OF ACONTRACT OF LEASE AS FOUND BY THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND INHOLDING THAT THE EJECTMENT CASE FILED AGAINST DEFENDANT -APPELLANTIS WITHOUT LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS

RULING: Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for

recovery of possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to

withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.The case for review before the Court of Appeals was a simple case of ejectment. The

Court of Appeals refused to rule on the issue of physical possession. Nevertheless, the appellatecourt held that the pivotal issue in this case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has thepriority right as beneficiary of the contested land under Proclamation No. 137. According to theCourt of Appeals, Guevarra enjoys preferential right under Proclamation No. 137 because Article


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VI of the Code declares that the actual occupant or caretaker is the one qualified to apply forsocialized housing.The ruling of the Court of Appeals has no factual and legal basis.

First. Guevarra did not present evidence to show that the contested lot is part of arelocation site under Proclamation No. 137. Proclamation No. 137 laid down the metes and

bounds of the land that it declared open for disposition to bona fide residents.The records do not show that the contested lot is within the land specified by Proclamation No.137. Guevarra had the burden to prove that the disputed lot is within the coverage ofProclamation No. 137. He failed to do so.

Second . The Court of Appeals should not have given credence to Guevarrasunsubstantiated claim that he is the beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra merelyalleged that in the survey the project administrator conducted, he and not Pajuyo appeared as theactual occupant of the lot. There is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of the benefits ofProclamation No. 137. Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to occupy the disputed property in 1985.President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 137 into law on 11 March 1986. Pajuyo made hisearliest demand for Guevarra to vacate the property in September 1994.

During the time that Guevarra temporarily held the property up to the time that Proclamation No.137 allegedly segregated the disputed lot, Guevarra never applied as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Even when Guevarra already knew that Pajuyo was reclaiming possession of the property, Guevarra did not take any step to comply with the requirements of Proclamation No.137.

Third. Even assuming that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No.137 and Guevarra has a pending application over the lot, courts should still assume jurisdictionand resolve the issue of possession. However, the jurisdiction of the courts would be limited tothe issue of physical possession only.In Pitargue , we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public landto determine the issue of physical possession. The determination of the respective rights of rivalclaimants to public land is, however, distinct from the determination of who has the actual

physical possession or who has a better right of physical possession. The administrativedisposition and alienation of public lands should be threshed out in the proper governmentagency. The Court of Appeals determination of Pajuyo and Guevarras rights underProclamation No. 137 was premature. Pajuyo and Guevarra were at most merely potential

beneficiaries of the law. Courts should not preempt the decision of the administrative agencymandated by law to determine the qualifications of applicants for the acquisition of public lands.Instead, courts should expeditiously resolve the issue of physical possession in ejectment cases to

prevent disorder and breaches of peace.


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NELSON LAGASO vs. GERALD B. SORIANO and GALILEO B.SORIANO

G.R. No. 170864

FACTS :Respondents filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, a complaint for

Forcible Entry with Application for Termporary Restraining Order and a Writ of PreliminaryInjunction and Damages against petitioner. Respondents claimed they were the owners of a

parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-665, Lot No. 816, Pls-93 with anarea of 58,171 square meters. They allegedly acquired the same by purchase from theirgrandfather, Arsenio Baac, on September 10, 1998, but even prior thereto, they were alreadyallowed by Arsenio Baac to cultivate said land. They paid real property taxes for said propertyfrom 1990 to 1998 and had been in actual possession from that time.

However, on January 6, 2001, herein petitioner allegedly unlawfully entered the property by means of force, stealth, and strategy and began cultivating the land for himself. Petitionerinsisted in his Answer that he, together with his mother, brothers, and sisters, were the lawfulowners of the land in question, being the legal heirs of Alfredo Lagazo, the registered ownerthereof. They denied that the subject land was sold to Arsenio Baac, alleging instead that theagreement between Alfredo Lagazo and Arsenio Baac was merely one of mortgage. Petitioner,likewise maintained that he and his co-heirs had always been in possession of the disputed land.They allegedly tried several times to redeem the property, but Baac increased the redemption

price from P10,000.00 to P100,000.00. This prompted them to bring the matter before theBarangay Lupon of Balong, Tabuk, Kalinga, but no agreement was reached.

On November 23, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision and which was appealed to theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabuk, Kalinga. Said appellate court ruled that hereinrespondents failed to prove prior physical possession, thus, it reversed the MTC Decision anddismissed the complaint against herein petitioner. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but thesame was denied per CA Resolution dated December 20, 2005.

ISSUE:WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE

TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PETITIONER SUBSTANTIATING HIS PRIORITY INPOSSESSION OVER THE LOT IN CONTROVERSY.

RULING: The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. Prior physical possession is an indispensable

element in forcible entry cases. Thus, the ultimate question here is who had prior physical possession of the disputed land. Ordinarily, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari , this Courtonly considers questions of law, as it is not a trier of facts. However, there are exceptions to thisgeneral rule, such as, when the findings of fact of the appellate court are contrary to those of thetrial court. The most important evidence for respondents was the testimony of Brgy. Capt.Artemio Fontanilla, who stated that he was born and had continuously resided in Balong, Tabuk,Kalinga; that the disputed land was only about three kilometers from his house; that for thelongest time, he had always known that it was Arsenio Baac who was cultivating and occupyingsaid property; and that it was only sometime in January 2001, when the police asked him toaccompany them to the subject land, that he saw petitioner with some other men working saidland.

On the other hand, what petitioner's evidence sought to establish was that he and his co-

heirs continued to be the owners of the land, as his predecessor never intended to sell the property to Arsenio Baac, the true agreement being only one of a mortgage. Petitioner neverestablished the fact of his physical possession over the disputed land. Ironically, the most telling

pieces of evidence that doomed petitioner's case were the testimonies of petitioner himself andhis sister, Marina Nialga. Their own admissions on the witness stand proved that respondentswere indeed the ones in physical possession of the subject property. Meanwhile, Marina Nialgaalso recounted that in 1979, they left the subject property out of fear because Arsenio Baac


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allegedly wanted to grab the land for himself. She testified that after they left in 1979, it wasalready Arsenio Baac who cultivated said land. Despite such claim that Arsenio Baac took theirland with force and intimidation, Marina said they never reported the matter to the police, andnever filed any criminal action in court against Arsenio Baac.

Verily, the foregoing leaves no doubt in our mind that it was only on January 6, 2001 that

petitioner, believing himself to be the lawful owner of the disputed land, entered the same,thereby disturbing respondents' peaceful possession thereof.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , the instant petition is dismissed . The Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 2005 and December 20, 2005,respectively, in CA G.R. SP No. 80709 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.


10/27

SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD ET AL vs. FIL-HOMESREALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG

REALTY CORPORATIONG.R. No. 189239

FACTS: Respondents were co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City, filed a

complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners before theParaaque Metropolitan Trial Court.

Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lotssince 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them. Petitioners countered that there isno possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted

possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents predecessor -in-interest,Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that thequestion of ownership must first be settled before the issue of possession may beresolved.During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filedexpropriation proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque withthe intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupantsincluding petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the City.

Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in theunlawful detainer case against petitioners. The MeTC held that as no payment had been made torespondents for the lots, they still maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannotclaim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiarieshave yet to be named. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4,2008, reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint. The court a quo ruledthat the case filed by plaintiffs is unlawful detainer as shown by the allegations of the Complaint.

The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate. It is not the allegations of the Complaint that finallydetermine whether a case is unlawful detainer, rather it is the evidence in the case.The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars thecontinuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already beenrendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, theMeTC has no jurisdiction to disregard the . . . final judgment and writ of possession due tonon-payment of just compensation

ISSUE:WHETHER RESPONDENTS ACT OF ALLOWING SEVERAL YEARS TO PASS

WITHOUT REQUIRING [THEM] TO VACATE NOR FILING AN EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST

THEM AMOUNTS TO ACQUIESCENCE OR TOLERANCE OF THEIR POSSESSION.

RULING:

Petitioners did not present evidence to rebut respondents allegation of possession by tolerance, and considering petitioners admission that they commenced occupation ofthe property without the permission of the previous owner Pilipinas De velopmentCorporation as indicium of tolerance by respondents predecessor -in-interest, ruled infavor of respondents. Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas DevelopmentCorporation in 1983. They stepped into the shoes of the seller with respect to itsrelationship with petitioners.

Even if early on respondents made no demand or filed no action against petitionersto eject them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained the status quo allowed

petitioners possession by tolerance.WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED .


11/27

MILAGROS SALTING vs. JOHN VELEZ and CLARISSA R. VELEZG.R. No. 181930

FACTS:Respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner. They obtained a favorable

decision when the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig City, ordered petitioner to vacate thesubject parcel of land and to pay attorneys fees and costs of suit. The decision became final andexecutory, after which respondents filed a motion for execution which was opposed by

petitioner.Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

153, for Annulment of Sale of the Property covered by TCT No. 38079, with prayer for theissuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction againstrespondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70859-TG. Petitioner claimed that she

purchased the subject parcel of land from Villamena as evidenced by a notarized documentknown as Sale of Real Estate. She further explained that respondents were able to obtain title tothe subject property through the fraudulent acts of the heirs of Villamena. Finally, she averred

that the decision in Civil Case No. 2524 had not attained finality as she was not properlyinformed of the MeTC decision. Petitioner thus prayed that a TRO be issued, restrainingrespondents and all persons acting for and in their behalf from executing the MeTC decisiondated March 28, 2006.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WRIT OFPRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT FOREJECTMENT.

RULING:We find no merit in the petition. We first determine the validity of the service of the

March 28, 2006 MeTC decision on petitione rs counsel who, as of that date, was alreadydeceased. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall

be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by thecourt.

Thus, w hen the MeTC decision was sent to petitioners counsel, such service of judgmentwas valid and binding upon petitioner, notwithstanding the death of her counsel. It is not theduty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnershipcontinues to exist lawfully, the partners are still alive, or its associates are still connected with thefirm. Litigants, represented by counsel, cannot simply sit back, relax, and await the outcome of

their case. It is the duty of the party-litigant to be in contact with her counsel from time to time inorder to be informed of the progress of her case. It is likewise the duty of the party to inform thecourt of the fact of her counsels death. Her failure to do so means that she is negl igent in the

protection of her cause, and she cannot pass the blame to the court which is not tasked to monitorthe changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsels.

Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of theMeTC decision. The enforcement of the writ of execution which would evict petitioner from herresidence is manifestly prejudicial to her interest. However, she possesses no legal right thatmerits the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction. Her right to possessthe property in question has been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to respondents in theejectment case in the MeTC decision which has become final and executory.

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. TheCourt of Appeals Decision dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution dated February 27, 2008 inCA-G.R. SP No. 97618 are AFFIRMED .

SO ORDERED .


12/27

ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO vs. HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ,G.R. No. 137794

SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES and LOURDES EMBORES vs. HON. RAYMUNDO G.VALLEGA

G.R. No. 149664

FACTS:The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these cases are part of the Tala Estate,

situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City and encompassing an area of7,007.9515 hectares more or less. In G.R. No. 137794, respondents Segundo Bautista andspouses Bernard and Florencia Perl sought the ouster from the contested lots of Erlinda Reyes,spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo and Sergio Abejero, who are occupants of separate homelots in Camarin, Caloocan City.

The first case was commenced on December 11, 1996, by respondent Segundo Bautista, aregistered owner of the parcel of land occupied by spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. Thecase was a complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property ( Recoverycase ) against the latter spouses with the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 124. This was docketed asCivil Case No. C-17725. Shortly thereafter, a separate but related action, was initiated by theRepublic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands on December 27, 1996, beforethe Quezon City RTC, Branch 85 (re-raffled to Branch 93). This was a complaint for Annulmentof Title/Reversion ( Annulment/Reversion case ) against Biyaya Corporation and the Register ofDeeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator ofthe Land Registration Authority involving the Tala Estate. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.Q-96-29810, sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the name ofBiyaya Corporation, and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to declare the land in suitto be reverted to it as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and the same be awarded tothe actual occupants. One of the intervenors therein is Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay(SAMAKABA) of which petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are members.

On May 28, 1997, the Quezon City RTC in the Annulment/Reversion case issued aPreliminary Injunction freezing all ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate pending in theMeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City. Believing that the Injunction issued by the QuezonCity RTC can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case pending before the Caloocan City RTC,on June 27, 1997, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the

proceedings of the Recovery case. On December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124denied said motion. Spouses Matienzo moved for the reconsideration of the motion, but the samewas denied on May 14, 1998. The spouses received the order denying their motion forreconsideration on June 9, 1998. Trial on the merits started on December 2, 1998.

The second case, an ejectment complaint, was commenced by spouses Bernard andFlorencia Perl on June 25, 1997, against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC, Branch49. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 23477. Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 1997, spouses Perlfiled the third case, an ejectment action against Sergio Abejero. The case, which was raffled offto Branch 49 of the Caloocan City MeTC, was docketed as Civil Case No. 23519. Subsequently,these two ejectment cases were consolidated Ejectment cases .

In its Order dated January 22, 1999, the MeTC did not entertain Reyess motion, instead,it required her to submit a position paper. Erlinda Reyes received the order on March 11, 1999.On April 16, 1999, the trial court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested

property. The Recovery case and the Ejectment cases converged when petitioners RosemarieMatienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with this Court theinstant petition denominated as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari , and Prohibition, mainlyassailing the denial of their respective motions for suspension. Petitioners Matienzo and Reyesasked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null andvoid for violating the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. This case is docketed as G.R.

No. 137794. During the pendency of G.R. No. 137794, certain events supervened when theEjectment cases ran their course and petitioner Reyes appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC.


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G.R. No. 149664, on the other hand, emanated from four distinct ejectment complaintsfiled against petitioners. The parcels of land from which petitioners were sought to be evictedwere located in Camarin, Caloocan City and within the Tala Estate. Petitioners were members ofAlyansa Ng Mga Naninirahan Sa Tala Friar Lands (ALNATFRAL), an intervenor in theReversion case. On March 4, 2003, the petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 filed a motion for

consolidation asking that the said case be consolidated with G.R. No. 137794. On July 28, 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Dismiss Instant Petition,stating that since a decision in the Annulment/Reversion case (Civil Case No. Q-96-29810) wasalready issued (although they did not attach a copy thereof), the petition is therefore renderedmoot and academic as the injunction order was effective only pending determination of themerits.On August 30, 2006, the Court granted the motion to withdraw petition in G.R. No.149664 and considered the same closed and terminated. On October 11, 2006, G.R. No. 149664

became final and executory.Petitioners specifically alleged that the MeTCs refusal to suspend the Ejectment cas es

despite the Injunction order is tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. Asto the Caloocan City RTC, its desistance to heed the Injunction is unjustified and contrary to

well-settled jurisprudence. It must be recalled that on December 8, 1997, the Caloocan CityRTC, Branch 124 denied Matienzos motion to suspend proceedings. It was only on March 25,1999 that petitioner Matienzo assailed the order denying her motion for reconsideration, albeitwrongly before this Court. From this , it can be inferred that petitioner Matienzos recourse is a

belated attempt designed to salvage her lost opportunity to assail the order denying her motion tosuspend proceedings.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT CALOOCAN CITY RTC AND METC COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED PETITIONERS MOTIONS TOSUSPEND PROCEEDINGS.

RULING:Let a writ of preliminary Injunction be issued ordering defendant representing Biyaya

Corporation, its agents, assigns, and transferees, as well as all other persons representingthemselves as owners of certain portions of the land in question, otherwise known as the TalaEstate, to immediately cease and desist from doing or causing to do, further acts of disposition ofthe lots subject of the present complaint, such as the filing of ejectment cases in the MunicipalTrial Courts of Quezon City and Caloocan City and, the demolition and ejectment therefrom ofthe members of the herein Intervenors. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Courts of QuezonCity and Caloocan City are specifically ordered to cease and desist from further conducting trialsand proceedings in the ejectment cases filed and to be filed involving the lots of the presentcomplaint, until further orders from this Court. Hence, petitioners posture that the Ejectmentcases should be suspended due to the pendency of the Annulment/Reversion case is notmeritorious.

WHEREFOR E, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED . TheTemporary Restraining Order dated October 25, 2000 issued by this Court is LIFTED .

SO ORDERED.


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VIEGELY SAMELO vs. MANOTOK SERVICES, INCG.R. No. 170509

FACTS: Respondent alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of land known as Lot 9-A,

Block 2913, situated at 2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila. On January 31, 1997, therespondent entered into a contract with the petitioner for the lease of a portion of Lot 9-A, Block2913, described as Lot 4, Block 15 ( subject premises ). The lease contract was for a period of one(1) year, with a monthly rental of P3,960.00. After the expiration of the lease contract onDecember 31, 1997, the petitioner continued occupying the subject premises without paying therent. On August 5, 1998, the respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok, sent a letter to the

petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises and pay compensation for its use andoccupancy. The petitioner, however, refused to heed these demands.

Respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before theMetropolitan Trial Court ( MeTC ), Branch 3, Manila.

The petitioner alleged that the respondent had no right to collect rentals because the

subject premises are located inside the property of the Philippine National Railways ( PNR ). Shealso added that the respondent had no certificate of title over the subject premises. The petitionerfurther claimed that her signature in the contract of lease was obtained through the respondentsmisrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she is now the owner of the subject premises asshe had been in possession since 1944.

The MeTC, decided in favor of the respondent. The MeTC held that the only issue to beresolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical possession or possession de facto , and that therespondent had established its right of possession over the subject premises. It added that the

petitioners right under the lease contract alread y ceased upon the expiration of the said contract.It further ruled that the petitioner is already estopped from questioning the right of therespondent over the subject premises when she entered into a contract of lease with the

respondent.The petition er filed an appeal on the RTC. The RTC set aside the MeTCs

decision, and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. The RTC held, among others, thatthe respondent had no right to collect rentals as it failed to show that it had authority toadminister the subject premises and to enter into a contract of lease with the petitioner. It alsoruled that the subject premises, which were formerly owned by the PNR, are now owned by the

petitioner by virtue of her possession and stay in the premises since 1944.The CA, in its decision of June 21, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and

reinstated the MeTC judgment. The CA held that the petitioner is now estopped fromquestioning the right of the respondent over the subject property. It explained that in an actioninvolving the possession of the subject premises, a tenant cannot controvert the title of his

landlord or assert any rights adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves. The appellate court added thatthe petitioner cannot claim that she repudiated the lease contract, in the absence of anyunequivocal acts of repudiation.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO LEASE THE

SUBJECT PREMISES BECAUSE THE LATTER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT IS ITSOWNER OR ADMINISTRATOR.

RULING: We find the petition unmeritorious. It is undisputed that the petitioner and therespondent entered into a contract of lease. We note in this regard that in her answer withaffirmative defenses and counterclaim before the MeTC, the petitioner did not deny that shesigned the lease contract (although she maintained that her signature was obtained through therespondents misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the petitioner obligated herself to paya monthly rental to the respondent in the amount of P3,960.00. The lease period was for one


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year, commencing on January 1, 1997 and expiring on December 31, 1997. It bears emphasisthat the respondent did not give the petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the leasecontract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on August 5, 1998), and the lattercontinued enjoying the subject premises for more than 15 days, without objection from therespondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor, there can be no inference that it intended

to discontinue the lease contract.We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the respondent had no authority tolease the subject premises because the latter failed to prove that it is its owner or administrator.Additionally, the petitioner is liable to pay interest by way of damages for her failure to pay therentals due for the use of the subject premises. We reiterate that the respondents extrajudicialdemand on the petitioner was made on August 5, 1998. Thus, from this date, the rentals due fromthe petitioner shall earn interest at 6% per annum, until the judgment in this case becomes finaland executory. After the finality of judgment, and until full payment of the rentals and interestsdue, the legal rate of interest to be imposed shall be 12%.

WHEREFORE , in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition. The decision and

the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 and November 10, 2005, respectively,in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the unpaid rentalsshall earn a corresponding interest of six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from August5, 1998 until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, therate of legal interest shall be computed at twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finalityuntil its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED .


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HEIRS OF ROGELIO ISIP ET AL vs. RODOLFO QUINTOS ET ALG.R. No. 172008

FACTS :Rogelio Isip, Sr occupied and took possession of a parcel of land where Rogelio Sr.

constructed a small house to serve as his place of residence. A year later, Toyo Keiki Philippines,Inc. (Toyo Keiki) requested Rogelio Sr. that it be allowed to dig a deep well on the subject

property and to put up thereon a water distribution system. Since Rogelio Sr. was a stockholderof Toyo Keiki, he allowed the corporation to build the water distribution system. Thus, ToyoKeiki tore down Rogelio Sr.s house and replaced it with a bigger structure with a room for thelatter and an office in front. The water distribution project, however, did not become fullyoperational. In January 1991, the deep well was rehabilitated with funding from SunriseManagement Corporation and Jiro Yamashita. Upon the completion of the rehabilitation work,Sunrise Management Corporation operated the water distribution system with Rogelio Sr. asGeneral Manager, assisted by his two sons Rolando Isip and Rogelio Isip, Jr. and brother-in-lawAlfredo Lobo.In 1997, Rodolfo Quintos proposed to Rogelio Sr. to operate a car repair shop in

the compound. Since Quintos is a former claims manager in an insurance company and isfamiliar with running a business, Rogelio Sr. agreed and, hence, a car repair shop wasconstructed in the compound.

However, despite the completion of the repair shop, they were not able to start the business due to Rogelio Sr.s illness. Upon Rogelio Sr. s death his son Rolando was appointedGeneral Manager of the water distribution system of Sunrise Management Corporation. Quintosthen revived to Rolando the proposal to establish the car repair shop. When Rolando returned tothe compound, however, he was refused entry by three armed security guards allegedly upon theinstructions of Quintos, Rodolfo De Guzman and Isagani Isip.

Thus, on January 4, 1999, petitioners Celedonia Isip, Rolando, Rogelio Jr. and Irene Isip-Silvestre, claiming to be the legitimate children and legal heirs of Rogelio Sr., filed before the

MeTC of Taguig City a complaint for forcible entry against respondents Quintos, De Guzman,and Isip, all doing business under the name Roniro Enterprises. Petitioners claimed thatrespondents, through deceit, strategy, and stealth, succeeded in entering the deep well compoundand once inside the premises, prevented the petitioners from re-entering the same through the useof force, intimidation, and threat. Respondents claimed that Rogelio Sr., the petitioners

predecessor-in-interest, was an employee of Sunrise Management Corporation. After the death ofRogelio Sr., De Guzman wrote a letter dated August 14, 1998 addressed to the president andchairman of the board of Sunrise Management Corporation stating that he is terminating theservices of the said corporation because of the unfortunate death of Rogelio Sr.

The MeTC rendered a Decision on May 22, 2001 dismissing the complaint for lack ofcause of action. It held that no forcible entry was committed since Roniro Enterprises was merely

exercising its right over the premises. Upon appeal, the RTC initially reversed and set aside theMeTCs Decision. Aggrieved, petitio ners filed a petition for review before the CA. On June 18,2003, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing the petition and affirming theOrder of the RTC. Undeterred, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was likewisedenied.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED FORCIBLE ENTRY.

RULING:

The petition lacks merit. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a case offorcible entry may be filed by, " a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth x x x." In cases of forcible entry, "the possession is illegalfrom the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto ."


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In the case at bench, It is clear that respondents have prior possession de facto. The possession of respondents was lawful from the beginning since it was acquired through lawfulmeans and thus no forcible entry was committed.

It is clear from the facts that when the rights over the subject lot was relinquished in favorof De Guzman, Rogelio Sr. was employed in order to help the respondents run the water

distribution system. Hence, it was actually through the respondents that the petitioners predecessor-in-interest was able to enter the disputed lot. And although Rogelio Sr. was able tooccupy the lot, he was in fact possessing the same in the name of the respondents. Verily,whatever right to possess petitioners have in this case cannot be superior to that of therespondents since it was from the latter that their predecessor-in-interest derived his claim of

possession.Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such

a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not necessary thatthe owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may

perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as

owner is in such occupancy. This declaration is in conformity with Art. 524 of the Civil Code providing that possession may be exercised in ones own name or in the name of another.

To conclude and to finally put this case to rest, forcible entry being an ejectment case issummary in nature. When the findings of facts of the trial court have been affirmed by the CA,such are binding and deemed conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED . The Decisiondated June 18, 2003 and Resolution dated March 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.SP No. 74178 are hereby AFFIRMED .SO ORDERED.


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SPOUSES EULOGIO N. ANTAZO vs.LEONIDES DOBLADA, ET AL

G.R. No. 178908

FACTS:Respondents, Leonides Doblada, Diosdado Celestra, Leopoldo Celestra, Ferdinand Celestra,

and Roberto Doblada, filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners, spouses Eulogio N.Antazo and Nelia C. Antazo. The complaint alleged that respondents have been in open and peaceful

possession of a parcel of land, identified as Assessors Lot Nos. 112 and 113, located in BarangayPila-Pila, Binangonan, Rizal, with an area of, approximately, 551.87 square meters. In May 2003,they received a letter from petitioners, through the Panganiban Law Office, informing them that thelatter had bought the property. It was made to appear in the said letter that respondents forcibly took

possession of the property from petitioners. Petitioners admitted that they sent a letter to respondentsthrough the Panganiban Law Office, but they denied that respondents had been in possession of the

property since time immemorial. They averred that respondents failed to show their right to recover possession of the property. On the contrary, petitioners claimed that they are the ones entitled to

possess the property considering that they purchased it from a certain Carmencita S. Anciano,registered it for taxation purposes in their names, and paid the real property tax thereon.

The records reveal that the subject property is part of the parcel of land owned by EduardoParalejas, respondents great grandfather, who died in 1939. Paralejas had three daughters: Matea,Eufemia and Leoncia. On April 12, 1983, Eufemia and Atanacio Buesa, Mateas son, purportedlyexecuted an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale, adjudicating to themselves the entire parcel of landand, at the same time, selling it to Guadalupe Morales Sevillano. The document bears thethumbprints of Eufemia and Atanacio, which, respondents claim, are not genuine. After Sevillanodied on November 24, 1995, her sole heir, Carmencita S. Anciano, petitioners predecessor -in-interest, executed a document, denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Paglilipat sa Sarili ng MgaLupang Naiwan ng Namatay, adjudicating to herself the properties that Sevillano left, which includedthe subject property. On April 21, 2003, Anciano sold the subject property to petitioners.

On July 2, 2004, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissed the complaint becauserespondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that they had prior possession of thesubject property. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially affirmed the MTC Decision.Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC on August 1, 2006.Unrelenting, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA. On February 28, 2007, the CAaffirmed the RTC.According to the CA, petitioners may not eject respondents from the subject

property since it appears that, as between them, the latter had prior possession thereof. Assuming that petitioners have the legal title to the property and that respondents are mere usurpers thereof, thelatter are nonetheless entitled to stay until they are lawfully ejected therefrom.

ISSUES:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION DATED AUGUST 18, 2005 AND IN ORDERINGTHE EJECTMENT OF PETITIONERS FROM LOTS 112 AND 113;II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE PRIORITYIN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

RULING: The petition is without merit. Petitioners argument is misplaced, considering that this is

a forcible entry case. They are apparently referring to "possession" flowing from ownership ofthe property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing morethan actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.

Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A partywho can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time,he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better rightlawfully ejects him. The party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a stronghand, violence or terror. We are convinced that respondents were in prior possession of the

property and that petitioners deprived them of such possession by means of force.


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The RTC correctly concluded that it would have been unnecessary to write the letter if petitioners were already in possession of the property. The contents of the letter are clear petitioners are demanding that respondents restore possession of the property to them.

We also note that petitioners did not deny in their Answer respondents allegation thatthey constructed a concrete fence on the subject property. Failure to specifically deny the

allegation amounts to a judicial admission. While the Letter intimates that petitioners were in possession of the property prior to respondents and that the latter were the ones who forciblyevicted them therefrom, such statement is clearly self-serving and unsupported by otherevidence. Granting that petitioners had earlier possession and respondents were the ones whofirst forcibly dispossessed them of the property, this circumstance would not have given

petitioners license to recover possession in the same way. Such course of action is precisely whatis sought to be avoided by the rule on ejectment. The underlying philosophy behind ejectmentsuits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of

possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The partydeprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Petitioners would have had aright of action against respondents to file an ejectment suit, but they evidently let the chance pass

and chose the easier and faster way. Unfortunately for them, this time, their opponents chose toresort to appropriate judicial measures.

WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE . The CA Decision datedFebruary 28, 2007 and Resolution dated July 18, 2007 are AFFIRMED .SO ORDERED .


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ANTONIO ARBIZO vs. PACITA MARCELOG.R. No. 171315

FACTS:The respondents filed with the MCTC three separate Complaints for Ejectment against the

petitioner. In their Complaints, the respondents averred that right after they purchased the subject properties in 1998, they immediately enclosed the same with a wooden perimeter fence with barbedwire. Sometime in September 2000, the petitioner, without their knowledge, much less consent,unlawfully occupied the subject properties by removing and destroying the fence they had installed,and later replacing it with his own concrete fence. Despite repeated demands to vacate the subject

properties, petitioner vehemently refused to do so. Thus, respondents prayed that the petitioner beordered to vacate the subject properties, and to pay each of them. In response, the petitionercountered that the subject lots formed part of the 29,345-square meter property previously owned byhis father, Celestino Arbizo, who occupied the same during his lifetime as early as 1921. Since then,

petitioner claimed to have been in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the 11,230-square meter parcel of land which included the subject properties.

On 18 August 2003, on the basis of the position papers and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the three Complaints for Ejectment filed bythe respondents after finding that the petitioner had preferred possession over the subject properties.Dissatisfied, the respondents then elevated the matter to the RTC.

On 20 February 2004, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the MCTC of the respondentsComplaints for Ejectment, holding that the petitioner had a better right of possession over the subject

properties for having been in possession of the same long before they were acquired by therespondents in 1998. The respondents then sought the reconsideration of the Decision, but the RTCdenied the same for lack of merit in the Order dated 17 March 2004.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID GROUND TO

EVICT PETITIONER FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.

RULING: The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, found that (1) respondents had prior

physical possession of the subject properties, and (2) they were deprived thereof by petitioner bymeans of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.We agree in the conclusion of the Courtof Appeals.

On the issue of who has prior possession, respondents prior physical possession of thesubject properties and deprivation thereof are clear from the allegation that they are the ownersof the subject properties which petitioner forcibly entered, of which they were unlawfully turnedout of possession and for which they pray to be restored in possession.

In ejectment cases, the plaintiff merely needs to prove prior de facto possession andundue deprivation thereof. Respondents in their complaint averred that after they purchased thelots in 1998 they immediately enclosed the same with a fence. We emphasize that ourdisquisition in this case is provisional and only to the extent necessary to determine who betweenthe parties has the better right of possession. In an appropriate proceeding before the courthaving jurisdiction, petitioner may still have the sale of the subject property to respondentsannulled, and the latters title cancelled if petitioners case is truly meritorious. Additionally, itmust also be remembered that the subject property is registered under the Torrens System in thenames of the respondents whose title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterallyattacked, less so in an action for forcible entry.

Admittedly, there are recognized exceptions to this rule when the evidence presented

during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court. Among theseexceptional circumstances is when the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those ofthe trial court.

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86456 isAFFIRMED . Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED .


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PAZ DE JESUS MESINA and PETER DE JESUS vs. CA and CETUSDEVELOPMENT, INC.

G.R. No. 100228

FACTS:The property is designated as No. 502 Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila. It was originally

owned by Gregorio Araneta from whom Clemente de Jesus, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, leased itway back in the late 1800's. In 1921, Clemente bought the two (2) houses erected on the lot. He died in1972 survived by petitioners who are his daughter Paz Mesina and his grandchild by his deceased son,Peter de Jesus, both of whom have lived in the property since birth. Paz has transferred residence to PasayCity since then. Peter on the other hand has been staying in one of the two (2) houses while the otherhouse is being leased to different tenants who are paying monthly rentals to petitioners.

Meanwhile, Gregorio Araneta sold the land to Susana Realty, Inc., which in turn sold the same toCetus Development Corporation (CETUS, for brevity) sometime in 1984. On 14 February 1986, CETUSfiled a complaint for ejectment against Paz Mesina on the ground that the property was assigned by theoriginal lessor to her who in turn sublet the premises to other persons without the written consent of thelessor.

Sometime in 1989, CETUS again initiated ejectment proceedings, this time impleading both PazMesina and Peter de Jesus as defendants. On 18 June 1990, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Br.10, rendered judgment ordering Paz Mesina and Peter de Jesus to vacate the leased premises. On appeal,the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 41, reversed the judgment of the inferior court and ordered thedismissal of the complaint filed by CETUS. 5 On 31 May 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed theDecision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court; hence,this petition filed by Paz Mesina and Peter de Jesus.

ISSUE:WHETHER RES JUDICATA APPLIES TO THE PRESENT ACTIONAND WHETHER OR

NOT THE INCLUSION OF AN ADDITIONAL PARTY DEFENDANT WOULD NOTSUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THEPRESENT CASE.

RULING: There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three requisites. Hence, the bone of

contention is reduced to whether there is identity of parties and of causes of action between thefirst case and the instant proceedings. For sure, there is identity of parties with respect to

petitioner Paz Mesina who was impleaded in the first action and again in the present case. Withregard however to petitioner Peter de Jesus, although he is a proper party in the first case,there is no identity of parties between the two actions as he was never impleaded in the first court

proceedings. Consequently, he cannot be bound by pronouncements of the court therein. But thequestion regarding the identity of parties is not the sole issue.

In ascertaining whether res judicata applies, it also has to be determined whether there isidentity of causes of action in both. There is none. The first case was based on the demand letterto vacate dated 18 November 1985 for subleasing the leased premises, in express violation ofB.P. 877, whereas the present case is based on the demand letter dated 12 July 1989 forsubleasing the premises after 18 November 1985 and before 12 July 1989. While the first actionhas already attained finality, it merely refers to the principal lease contract and the act ofsubleasing the property prior to 18 November 1985. Considering that the existing contract

between petitioners and private respondent CETUS is admittedly a verbal month-to-month leasecontract which expires at the end of every thirty-day period but which is automatically renewedfor the next thirty-day period, repeating the same cycle for the succeeding thirty-day periodsuntil the implied lease is expressly terminated, each thirty-day lease contract is separate and

distinct from the other thirty-day leases. Hence, a cause of action based on one thirty-day periodis separate and distinct from a cause of action based on another thirty-day period. Accordingly,there can be no identity in the causes of action between the two cases.

The contract of lease was impliedly renewed after the effectivity of B.P. 877, thatrenewed lease became subject to the provisions of the statute and any act of subleasing the

premises without the consent of the lessor would be invalid under its provisions. Thus, the lessoris prohibited from arbitrarily increasing the rentals and leaving the lessee no choice except to pay


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up or vacate the leased premises for the shelterless streets. On the other hand, the lessee is not permitted to insist on paying inordinately low rentals grown absurd and unrealistic in view ofrising costs, including the expenses of administering and maintaining the leased premises.

The Court is not unaware of the many gambits employed by landlords to eject theirincumbent tenants whose rentals may not be increased beyond the statutory maximum and who

may even enjoy the right to purchase the rented premises under certain conditions. Thus, lessormay pretend to need the premises themselves or to have to undertake urgent repairs thereon ornot to have received rentals on time when their real purpose is to lease the properly to newtenants at higher rentals not covered by the rental laws.

On the other hand, there are lessees who have taken undue advantage of the rental laws by holding on to the leased premises although they no longer need them for their own residenceor administering them to the prejudice of the landlord by partitioning the apartment or lot andsubleasing them to separate families or individuals, or accepting bedspacers and boarders, each

paying rentals that in the aggregate are much more than the regulated rentals the original lessee is paying the landlord.

The petitioner's contention that BP 877 is an ex post facto law must also be rejected. It isnot penal in nature and the mere fact that it contains penal provisions does not make it so. At anyrate, she is not being prosecuted under the said penal provisions. She was sued in the municipalcourt in a civil complaint to eject her from the lot on the ground that she had unlawfullysubleased it.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED for lack ofmerit. The questioned Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 May 1991 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

SHOEMART, INC . vs. CA and ANSON EMPORIUM CORPORATIONG.R. No. 86956

FACTS:


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On August 1, 1971, Anson Emporium Corporation leased from Shoemart, Inc. a portionof the building known as the Makati Arcade for a period of two (2) years. It was stipulated in thelease that after termination of the lease for any reason whatsoever, if the Owner shall permitthe tenant to remain in possession of the leased premises, it is expressly understood and agreedthat the lease shall be on a month to month basis in the absence of a written agreement to the

contrary.Anson remained in possession after the two year period but on an increased rental. Fouryears later, Shoemart terminated the month to month lease and gave notice to Anson to vacatenot later than August 31, 1977. Notwithstanding the notice and demand, Anson continued to stayon, thus the complaint for ejectment filed with the then Municipal Court of Makati, Civil Case

No. 16896.Anson raised the defenses that (1) the lease did not express the true intention and real

agreement of the parties, the true one being that its stay was guaranteed by Shoemart for amaximum period of twenty-four (24) years and (2) assuming that the lease had expired, it stillcannot be ejected until a longer term is fixed in accordance with Article 1673 in relation toArticle 1687 of the Civil Code.

After proceedings were on their way, Shoemart asked for and was granted leave to filesupplemental complaint which alleged that the rental of all the tenants of the premises had beenincreased which Anson refused to pay. In its answer to the supplemental complaint, Anson raisedthe defenses that Shoemart's claim for increased rentals has been barred by estoppel, novation,statute of frauds/limitations condonation, release and/or laches and in any event, the increase wasinequitable, unconscionable and arbitrary.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN

LIMITING ANSON TO PAY ONLY THE SUM OF P45,142.00 MONTHLY STARTING JANUARY 1,1979 UNTIL IT VACATES THE PREMISES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WERE FOUR (4)RENTAL INCREASES EFFECTED ON THE SUBJECT PREMISES DURING THE UNLAWFULDETAINER PERIOD AND DURING PENDENCY OF THE INSTANT CASE WHICH INCREASESWERE PROVEN DURING THE TRIAL.

RULING: In support of its first assignment of error, petitioner contends that there were four rental

increases effected during the period of unlawful detainer and during the pendency of the case,which increases were duly proven during the trial. However, according to respondent court,

petitioner failed to present evidence on other approved and accepted rental increases and sincethe supplemental complaint limited itself only to P45,142.00, the award of damages cannot go

beyond the said amount.Contrary to the conclusion of respondent court, petitioner's recovery is not limited by the

amount of P45,142.00 prayed for in the supplemental complaint as increased rental effectiveJanuary 1, 1979. Petitioner, therefore, did not foreclose its right to demand increased rentals thatmay be recovered expressed in terms of the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation forthe use and occupation of the real property.

In view of the failure of private respondent to object to the presentation of evidenceshowing that there were four rental increases on the subject premises although three of saidincreases are not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as regards the saidincreases or issues which shall be considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings .

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 2, 1988 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE . The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated November 10,1987 is Reinstated with the modification that the award of 1% interest starting October 1, 1977

and the reimbursement of cost of electrical consumption is excluded without prejudice to theinstitution of the proper collection case to enforce recovery and/or reimbursement of such costfor electrical consumption. SO ORDERED .


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GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) vs. LAUREANO BACALAN and thePROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU

G.R. No. L-46000

FACTS:Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by the late

Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an action to eject himwas filed. the plaintiff-appellant prayed that the defendant-appellee be ordered to immediatelyvacate the place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P2,300.00 representingarrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals until he actually vacates the place, attorney'sfees, expenses, and costs. the defendant-appellee included a counter-claim alleging that the

present action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice and badfaith on the part of the plaintiff for the obvious reason that plaintiff pretty well knows thatdefendant does not have any rentals in arrears due to the estate of Susana Agustin, butnotwithstanding this knowledge, plaintiff filed the present action merely to annoy, vex,embarrass and inconvenience the defendant. The City Court of Cebu subsequently rendered

judgment dismissing the counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises inquestion and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum ofP150.00 as attorney's fees' From this decision, the defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill ofthe Court of First Instance of Cebu.

A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff has nocause of action and that the court lacks jurisdiction to declare the nullity of a decision of another

branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.Plaintiff-appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an

appeal before the Court of Appeals, which, in a resolution, certified the same to us on the groundthat it involves pure questions of law.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAY, IN AN APPEAL,

AWARD THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S COUNTERCLAIM IN AN AMOUNTEXCEEDING OR BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF ORIGIN.

RULING:Thus, the defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the jurisdictional

amount of the city Court of Cebu, should be treated as having been deemed waived. It is asthough it has never been brought before trial court. It may not be entertained on appeal.

The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannotexceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not

acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, theappellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise.Appellate jurisdiction being not only a continuation of the exercise of the same judicial powerwhich has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the originaland appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise of the same judicial power (See 2Am. Jur. 850; Stacey Cheese Company v. R.E. Pipkin, Appt. 155 NC 394, 71 S.E. 442, 37 LRA606) It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the

proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause.The nullity of such portion of the decision in question, however, is not such as to affect

the conclusions reached by the court in the main case for ejectment. Consequently, the decisionover the main action, in the case at bar, must stand, best remembering that a counter-claim, by its

very nature, is a cause of action separate and independent from the plaintiff's claim against thedefendant.

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III in CivilCase No. R-12430 for ejectment is hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID insofar as itawards damages on the defendant-appellee's counterclaim in excess of P6,000.00 beyond itsappellate jurisdiction. The decision in all other respects is AFFIRMED .


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LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. ARTUROLEDESMA, ET AL

G.R. No. 154152

FACTS:Petitioner filed an ejectment case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) against private

respondent Ledesma, alleging that despite expiration of the contract of lease executed between them anddemands to vacate subject premises and pay rentals therefor, the latter failed to comply with suchdemands. Private respondent countered in his Answer that he had paid the rentals over subject premisesand petitioner no longer had the right to possess the property as it had been foreclosed by theDevelopment Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Private respondent further pointed out that subject premiseshad in fact been in the possession of the DBP since March or April of 1997, so since that time, it was withthe DBP that he made arrangements for his continued occupation of the subject premises.The MeTC then rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondent to surrender

possession of subject premises to petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court(RTC), and to stay execution of said judgment, private respondent filed a supersedeas bond with theMeTC.

The RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment. Petitioner then moved for the immediate execution of theRTC Decision, which motion was granted by the RTC. Meanwhile, private respondent elevated the caseto the CA via a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restrainingorder or writ of preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order was issued by the CA, effectivelystaying implementation of the writ of execution issued by the RTC. Eventually, the CA also issued a writof preliminary injunction per Resolution dated February 13, 2002.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OFPRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO STAY THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF THE RTCJUDGMENT AND WHETHER MANDAMUS LIES TO COMPEL RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE TOISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION.

RULING: The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious

and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse ofdiscretion is not enough; it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary ordespotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross asto amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined orto act at all in contemplation or law.

The CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in this case; rather, it acted prudently when itstayed execution of the RTC Decision until such time that a final resolution of the main case isreached. Since the only damages that petitioner may be entitled to in an action for unlawfuldetainer are those arising from its loss of the use or occupation of subject premises, the onlydamages petitioner can claim by reason of the stay of execution of the RTC judgment is alsoonly for the "rent" or "fair rental value" for the property in question.

Therefore, the CA did not err in considering the supersedeas bond filed with the MTC,which answers for unpaid rentals, as sufficient bond for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction.

In light of the foregoing, it is quite clear that there is no reason to compel the RTC toimmediately implement the writ of execution in this case.

WHEREFORE , the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolutions of theCourt of Appeals, dated February 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.66668, are AFFIRMED .SO ORDERED.


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ERNESTO VILLEZA vs. GERMAN MANAGEMENT ANDSERVICES, INC., ET AL

G.R. No. 182937

FACTS: Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the MeTC. On February

28, 1992, the MeTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of his motion to issuewrit of execution until his return. Three years later, as there was no further movement, the saidcourt issued an order dated January 9, 1995 denying petitioners pending Motion for Issuance ofWrit of Execution for lack of interest.

More than three (3) years had passed before petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsiderationdated May 29, 1998 alleging that he had retired from his job in Iloilo City and was still interestedin the issuance of the writ. On October 8, 1998, the MeTC issued a writ of execution.Respondent German Management moved to dismiss the complaint. It alleged that it had beenmore than 10 years from the time the right of action accrued, that is, from October 5, 1989, thedate of the finality of the Court's decision to October 3, 2000, the date of the filing of thecomplaint for its revival. It further argued that, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules ofCourt in relation to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the complaint is now barred by the statute oflimitations.

On March 29, 2001, the MeTC granted the motion to dismiss reasoning that Article 1144of the Civil Code was categorical that an action to enforce a judgment must be brought withinten years from the time such right accrues. Since it had been almost 11 years from the time the1989 Courts decision became final and executory, the action to revive it was barred.

ISSUE:WHETHER THE INTERRUPTION OR SUSPENSION GRANTED BY THE METC MUST BE

CONSIDERED IN COMPUTING THE PERIOD BECAUSE IT HAS THE EFFECT OF TOLLINGOR STOPPING THE COUNTING OF THE PERIOD FOR EXECUTION.

RULING: The Court finds no merit in this petition. The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes

final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by meremotion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to havethe decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to aright of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court withinten years from the time the judgment becomes final.

When petitioner Villeza filed the complaint for revival of judgment on October 3, 2000, it

had already been eleven (11) years from the finality of the judgment he sought to revive.Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in.

The Court has pronounced in a plethora of cases that it is revolting to the conscience toallow someone to further avert the satisfaction of an obligation because of sheer literal adherenceto technicality; that although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberalinterpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve theends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not beguided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so,manifest wrong or injustice would result. These cases, though, remain exceptions to the generalrule. The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment by action is

precisely to prevent the winning parties from sleeping on their rights.

WHEREFORE , the May 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. SP No.84035 is AFFIRMED . SO ORDERED .


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CITY OF NAGA vs.HON. ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION, ET AL

G.R. No. 174042

FACTS: Macario A. Mariano and Jose A. Gimenez were the registered owners of a 229,301-

square meter land in Naga City. The land was subdivided into several lots and sold as part ofCity Heights Subdivision (CHS). In a Letter dated July 3, 1954, the officers of CHS offered toconstruct the Naga City Hall on a two (2)-hectare lot within the premises of the subdivision. Saidlot was to be designated as an open space for public purpose and donated to petitioner inaccordance with the rules and regulations of the National Urban Planning Commission. OnSeptember 17, 1959, Mariano wrote a letter to Mayor Imperial inquiring on the status of thelatters proposal for the city government to buy the lots instead. Then, through a note dated May14, 1968, Mariano directed Atty. Eusebio Lopez, Jr., CHS General Manager, to disregard the

proposed donation of lots and insist on Mayor Imperials offer for the city government to purchase them.On December 2, 1971, Macario A. Mariano died.

Meanwhile, the city government continued in possession of the lots, and constructed the Naga City Hall on Block 25 and the public market on Block 26. It also conveyed to othergovernment offices portions of the land which at present, house the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI), Land Transportation Office, and Hall of Justice, among others.Thus, onFebruary 12, 2004, respondent filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner beforethe Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City, Branch 1.

In a Decision dated February 14, 2005 of the MTC in Civil Case No. 12334, the MTCdismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the citys claim of ownership over the lots

posed an issue not cognizable in an unlawful detainer case.

ISSUE:WHETHER RTC JUDGE MONTENEGRO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN GRANTING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.

RULING: Petitioner City of Naga ascribes grave abuse of discretion on Judge Montenegro for

allowing execution pending appeal and for refusing to inhibit himself from the proceedings. Itcontends that its claim of ownership over the lots behooved the RTC of jurisdiction to try theillegal detainer case. Granting arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction and its judgment wasimmediatel

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