digest - (3rd batch) ramirez vs. ca
TRANSCRIPT
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1. Ramirez V. CA
G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan
a!t":
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, ster !arcia, in a confrontation in the latter"s office, allegedly ve#ed,
insulted and humiliated her in a $hostile and furious mood% and in a manner offensive to
petitioner"s dignity and personality,% contrary to morals, good customs and public policy&%
'n support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages& The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner&
As a result of petitioner"s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the (asay RTC for
violation of Republic Act )*++, entitled $An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes&%
(etitioner filed a otion to Quash the 'nformation, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R&A& )*++&
The CA declared the RTC"s decision null and void and denied the petitioner"s R, hence the
instant petition&
#""ue:
-./ the Anti0-iretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
$e%&:
'e". Section 1 of R&A& )*++ entitled, % An Act to (rohibit and (enalized -ire Tapping and 2ther
Related 3iolations of (rivate Communication and 2ther (urposes,% provides:
Sec& 1& 't shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spo4en word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spo4en word by
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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/sep1995/gr_93833_1995.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/sep1995/gr_93833_1995.html
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using a device commonly 4nown as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or wal4ie0tal4ie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described&
The aforestated provision clearly and une5uivocally ma4es it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder& The law ma4es no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the privatecommunication& The statute"s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to ma4e such recording
is underscored by the use of the 5ualifier $any%& Conse5uently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, $even a 6person7 privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the 4nowledge of the latter 6will7 5ualify as a violator% under
this provision of R&A& )*++&
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court"s
conclusion that in enacting R&A& )*++ our lawma4ers indeed contemplated to ma4e illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications ta4en either by the
parties themselves or by third persons&
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute& The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information& -hat R&A& )*++ penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein& The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R&A& )*++& As the Solicitor !eneral pointed out in his C2/T before the respondent court:
$/owhere 6in the said law7 is it re5uired that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed&%
(etitioner"s contention that the phrase $private communication% in Section 1 of R&A& )*++ does not
include $private conversations% narrows the ordinary meaning of the word $communication% to a
point of absurdity& The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning $to
share or to impart&% 'n its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, or signifies the $process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols 6as language signs or gestures7%
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non0verbal, written or e#pressive
communications of $meanings or thoughts% which are li4ely to include the emotionally0chargede#change, on 8ebruary **, 19, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter"s office& Any doubts about the legislative body"s meaning of the phrase $private
communication% are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms $conversation% and
$communication% were interchangeably used by Senator Ta;ada in his #planatory /ote to the
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2. (eop%e V. Car%o"
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3. )on!a&o V. (eop%e*" Court
=ilario oncado v& (eople"s Court case brief summary
$i%ario )on!a&o +. (eop%e*" Court!&R& /o& >0*), ?anuary 1), 19)
ACS: 'n an e@ectment case filed before the @ustice of the peace court of !ui@ulngan, /egros
2riental, after trial in the absence of the defendants, rendered @udgment in favor of plaintiff& The
Court of 8irst 'nstance then sent notice by registered mail posted on September , 199 the notice
of receipt of appealed case and the period for pleading& Befendants were informed of such mail by
the postmaster but the same was not claimed, C8' of /egros 2riental, upon motion of plaintiff,
ordered defendants to vacate the land and to pay, @ointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of
(=( 1 as damages, plus costs& Befendant"s appealed the decision claiming that their failure to get
notice from post office was due to ignorance and that they were not served with copy of plaintiff"s
motion for default&
C8' denied defendant"s motion on ?une 19, 19)+&
#SS-: -as defendant"s failure to get notice valid and e#cusable
R-/#NG: /o, the Court ruled that in the first place, defendant"s are not entitled to a service of copy of the motion that they are in default e#cept when they file a motion to set aside the order of
default, in which event they are entitled to notice of all further proceedings 6Rule *D, Section 9,
Rules of Court7& Second, failure to get notice was not e#cusable neglect as claimed by defendants&
'ndeed, a notice, is deemed served if delivered by registered mail and claimed within E days from
first notice of postmaster 6Rule *D, Section , Rules of Court7&
Appealed order affirmed&
0. a!e !o., V. Ruiz
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ACS4
Respondent isael (& 3era, Commissioner of 'nternal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
respondent ?udge 3ivencio & Ruiz re5uesting the issuance of Search -arrant for violation of
Section )J of /ational 'nternal Revenue Code and authorizing Revenue e#aminer Rodolfo de
>eon, to ma4e and file the application for Search -arrant which was attached to the letter& At that
time ?udge was hearing a certain caseK so, by means of a note he instructed the Beputy Cler4 of
Court to ta4e the depositions of respondents de >eon and >ogronio& The stenographer, upon
re5uest of respondent ?udge, read to him her stenographic notesK and thereafter, respondent
?udge as4ed responded >ogronio to ta4e the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found
to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for per@ury&
#SS-4
-hether or not ?udge 3ivencio & Ruiz conducted a personal e#amination
$/4
/o& The petition for Certiorari, prohibition and andamus are granted& Search -arrant /o& *00
D+ issued by respondent ?udge is declared null and void&
RA#6NA/4
(ersonal e#amination by the ?udge of the complainant and the witnesses is necessary to enable
him to determine the e#istence or non0e#istence of a probable cause, the determination of whether
or not a probable cause e#ists calls for the e#ercise of @udgment after a @udicial appraisal of facts
and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary&
'n this case at bar, no personal e#amination at all was conducted by respondent ?udge of the
complainant and his witnesses&
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes to a
few words of warning against the commission of per!ury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness" This cannot #e considered a personal e$amination" %f there was ane$amination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was one conducted #y the &eputy 'ler(
of 'ourt
Se!tion 0 7amination o te App%i!ant:4
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The ?udge or ?ustice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally e#amine on oath or
affirmation the complaint and any witnesses he may produce and ta4e their depositions in writing,
and attached them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him&
5. ur;o" V. Cie o Sta 7A(:
?ose 0J)*J1
Becember *J, 19)
8acts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of $etropolitan
ail% and $-e 8orum% newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in
subversive activities& (etitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
in@unction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be en@oined fromusing the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner&
(etitioners 5uestioned the warrants for the lac4 of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address& 'n addition, the items seized sub@ect to the
warrant were real properties&
'ssue:
-hether or not the two warrants were valid to @ustify seizure of the items&
=eld:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application& The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant&
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the
case of &avao Sawmill 'o" v" 'astillo, ruling $that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed
by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner&% 'n the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of
the land and.or building on which the machineries were placed& This being the case, the
machineries in 5uestion, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant&
=owever, the Court declared the two warrants null and void&
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(robable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
ob@ects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched&
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
re5uirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations&
8urthermore, @urisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants& 6Stanford
vs& State of Te#as7& The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched
and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items&
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interest& 6iller v& California7& Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the
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(etitioner contends that the term $television program% Oin Sec& of (B /o& 19J that the
respondent
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the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology& The bedroc4 of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the mar4etplace of duelling ideas& -hen the lu#ury of time permits, the mar4etplace
of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spar4 of opposite speech,
the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth&
'n #0rating the T3 program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule& 'n *merican i#le Society v& 'ity of Manila, this Court held: $The
constitutional guaranty of free e#ercise and en@oyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information& Any restraint of such right can be @ustified
li4e other restraints on freedom of e#pression on the ground that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent&% 'n 1ictoriano vs& li;alde
/ope Wor(ers #""ue"4 (rivacy
e"t4 importance of 82
(ena%t4
e!i"ion4 in@unction for breach of privacy set aside
Juri"&i!tion4 (hilippines 6Supreme Court7
8acts:
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Australian film ma4er =al clroy and his movie production company, Ayer (roductions,
envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the peaceful struggle of the 8ilipinos at BSA
6pifanio de los Santos Avenue7 to oust then (resident 8erdinand arcos& They consulted with
!eneral 8idel 3& Ramos and Senator ?uan (once nrile, who played ma@or roles in the events&
-hile !eneral Ramos signified his approval, Senator nrile wrote a letter stating that he would
not approve of the use of his name or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television
production for commercial e#ploitation, and advised petitioners that in the production ore#hibition of said or similar film, no reference 6whether written, verbal or visual7 should be made
to him or any member of his family& The film producer deleted the name of Senator nrile in the
script and proceeded to film the motion picture& Senator nrile then filed a Complaint with
application for a -rit of (reliminary 'n@unction with the Regional Trial Court of a4ati, see4ing to
en@oin clroy and Ayer (roductions from producing the movie& Senator nrile alleged that the
production of the film without his consent and over his ob@ection constitutes a violation of his
right of privacy& The trial court issued a writ of preliminary in@unction, ordering clroy and Ayer
(roductions to desist from filming the movie, and from ma4ing any reference to Senator nrile or
his family or any fictitious character identifiable with them& clroy and Ayer productions
5uestioned the trial court decision in a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, claimingtheir right of freedom of speech and e#pression&
=eld:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the -rit of (reliminary 'n@unction issued by
the respondent trial court&
8reedom of speech and e#pression includes the freedom to film, produce and e#hibit motion
pictures& The freedom of speech and e#pression includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and to e#hibit such motion pictures in theaters or through television& 'n our day and age,
motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of e#pression& Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass
communication for information, education and entertainment&
Available to foreign0owned companies& This freedom is available in the (hilippines both to locally0
owned and to foreign0owned motion picture companies&
Commercial purpose does not affect the availability of the right& The circumstance that the
production of a motion picture is a commercial activity is not a dis5ualification for availing the
freedom of speech and of e#pression& (rivate sector0owned media facilities commonly re5uire to
be sustained by being devoted to revenue producing activities& To e#clude commercially owned
and operated media from the e#ercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of
e#pression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in the country&
(rior restraint presumed invalid& 't may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the
instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent ?udge upon the e#ercise of
speech and of e#pression by petitioners& The ?udge restrained petitioners from filming the entire
proposed motion picture&
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freedom of speech and of e#pression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of
prior restraint upon the e#ercise of such freedoms& The invalidity of prior restraint does not, of
course, mean that no subse5uent liability may be imposed upon a person claiming to e#ercise such
constitutional freedoms&
Counter0balancing with right of privacy on case0to0case basis& 2ur law, constitutional and
statutory, does include a right of privacy& 't is left to case law, however, to mar4 out the precise
scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations& The right of privacy or
Lthe right to be let alone,L li4e the right of free e#pression, is not an absolute right&
(rivacy of a Lpublic figureL necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizens& A limited
intrusion into a persons privacy is permissible where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a
public character& The sub@ect matter of the movie relates to the non0bloody change of government
that too4 place in 8ebruary 19J& Such sub@ect matter is one of public interest and concern as it
relates to a highly critical stage in our history& 't has passed into the public domain and as an
appropriate sub@ect for speech and e#pression and coverage by any form of mass media&
At all relevant times that petitioners propose to film were ta4ing place, private respondent was
what (rofs& (rosser and Geeton have referred to as a Lpublic figure&L A public figure has been
defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a public personage& =e is, in other words, a celebrity& To be included in
this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the
public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer&
The list is, however, broader than this& 't includes public officers, famous inventors and e#plorers,
war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the !rand
#alted Ruler of a lodge& 't includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person& Such public figures were held to have lost, to some
e#tent at least, their right of privacy because: they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so
could not complain when they receive itK or that their personalities and their affairs had already
become public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private businessK and that the press
had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become
legitimate matters of public interest&
(rivate respondent is a Lpublic figureL because of his participation as a principal actor in the
events of the change of government in 8ebruary 19J&
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private respondent& There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling
private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts& To the
e#tent that the movie limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent to those
events which are reasonably related to the public facts of the BSA Revolution, the intrusion into
his privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable& Such portrayal may be carried out
even without a license from private respondent&
9. Gonza%e" V. Come%e!
B2@ SCRA 835 G.R. />2@833 18 A(R 19
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before the utterance can be punished& The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil
sought to be prevented& 't has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a
definite rule in constitutional law& 't provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
established& The Ldangerous tendency ruleL is such that $'f the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable&% 't is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated& 't
is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms& /or is it necessary that the languageused be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness& 't is
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body see4s to prevent&
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional re5uirements as to a valid limitation under the
clear and present danger doctrine& As the author Ta;ada clearly e#plained, such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not
merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual e#istence of a grave and substantive evil of
e#cessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country&
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances& As in the case of freedom of e#pression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, e#cept on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent&
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for
or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of thepublication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether directly or indirectly, or the underta4ing of any campaign literature or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command&
1E. (eop%e V. "pue%a"
8acts:
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them the situation in Central >uzon, the =u4balahaps& Tell them about ?ulio !uillen and the
banditry of >eyte& Bear wife, write to (resident Truman and Churchill& Tell them that here in the
(hilippines our government is infested with many =itlers and ussolinis& Teach our children to
burn pictures of Ro#as if and when they come across one& ' committed suicide because ' am
ashamed of our government under Ro#as& ' cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty
government& ' committed suicide because ' have no power to put under ?uez de Cuchillo all the
Ro#as people now in power& So, ' sacrificed my own self&L spuelas was charged for violating Article 1)* of the Revised (enal Code, which punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate
scurrilous libels against the !overnment of the (hilippines or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir
up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community& spuelas
admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter and caused its publication in the 8ree (ress, the
vening /ews, the amdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one
Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as
Alberto Reveniera in a picture ta4en wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a
limb of a tree& spuelas was, after trial, convicted in the Court of 8irst 'nstance of
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the (resident, his Cabinet and the ma@ority of legislators to whom the ad@ectives Constitutional
>aw '', *++E 6 1 7 /arratives 6aw of the Gnife, a Lsummary and arbitrary e#ecution by the 4nifeL, the
idea intended by spuelas to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeacefulmethods to free the government from the administration of Ro#as and his men& The meaning,
intent and effect of the article involves maybe a 5uestion of fact, ma4ing the findings of the court
of appeals conclusive upon the Supreme Court&
11. Fa%&i+ar V. Gonza%ez
== S'/* .= > ?egal thics > 'ontemptuous ?anguage > &uty of a ?awyer
Ialdivar was the governor of Anti5ue& =e was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations ofthe Anti0!raft and Corrupt (ractices Act& !onzales was the then Tanodbayan who was
investigating the case& Ialdivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
(rohibition and andamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 19D Constitution& The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Besist
2rder against !onzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Ialdivar&
!onzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Ialdivar& !onzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one onthe Supreme CourtK that the Supreme Court"s issuance of the TR2 is a manifestation theta the
$rich and influential persons get favora#le actions from the Supreme 'ourt, while: it is difficult
for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to #e given due course+"
Ialdivar then filed a otion for Contempt against !onzalez& The Supreme Court then ordered
!onzalez to e#plain his side& !onzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were trueK that
he was only e#ercising his freedom of speechK that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the
Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error& =e also said, even
attaching notes, that not less than si# @ustices of the Supreme Court have approached him to as4
him to $go slow% on Ialdivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court&
#SS-4 -hether or not !onzalez is guilty of contempt&
$/4 es& The statements made by respondent !onzalez clearly constitute contempt and call
for the e#ercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court& =is statements necessarily
imply that the @ustices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office& Such statements
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constitute the grossest 4ind of disrespect for the Supreme Court& Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of @ustice in the country&
!onzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech& -hat !onzalez seems unaware
of is that freedom of speech and of e#pression, li4e all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of e#pression needs on occasion to be ad@usted to and accommodated with there5uirements of e5ually important public interests& 2ne of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of @ustice& There is
no antinomy between free e#pression and the integrity of the system of administering @ustice&
!onzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special (rosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the @udicial power in the government of the Republic& The responsibility of
!onzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of @ustice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer&
!onzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide& 'n
the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme
Court approached him, are of no relation to the Ialdivar case&
The Supreme Court suspended !onzalez indefinitely from the practice of law&
12.a&o V. Come%e!
A6' +". C6)/C
35 SCRA 285
a!t": Anacleto B&
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also mentioned with e5ual prominence&% Comelec Resolution RR0D*), as amended, merely
restates the ban in Section 1* 687&
#""ue4 -hether the ban in Section 1* 687 is valid or constitutional&
$e%&4 Hnder Section 1* 687, the moneyed candidate or individual who can afford to pay for
advertisements, comments or articles in favor of his candidacy or against the candidacy of anotheror which mention his name and the fact of his candidacy, is re5uired to mention all the other
candidates in the same district with e5ual prominence, to e#empt him from the penal sanction of
the law& The evident purpose of the limitation is to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in
the election& The restriction is only one of the measures devised by the law to preserve suffrage
pure and undefiled and to achieve the desired e5uality of chances among all the candidates&
Considering the foregoing limitation in Section 1*687 in the light of the other provisions of RA
J1* designed to ma#imize, if not appro#imate, e5uality of chances among the various candidates
in the same district, the said restriction on the freedom of e#pression appears too insignificant to
create any appreciable dent on the individual"s liberty of e#pression& 't should be noted that
Section 6a7 of the same law, prohibiting political parties from aiding candidates and thus wasmore restrictive than Section 1*687, was previously upheld to be valid& The limitation in Section
1*687 is a reasoned and reasonable @udgment on the part of Congress& 't is not unconstitutional&
13.Sani&a& V. Come%e!
Constitutional >aw& (olitical >aw& (lebiscite Cases&
SA/'BAB 3S C2>C
D SCRA K 2ctober 1*, 19DJ
(onente: artin, ?
8ACTS:
2n September *D, 19DJ, (ablo Sanidad and (ablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with
preliminary in@unction to en@oin C2>C from holding and conducting the Referendum
(lebiscite on 2ctober 1JK to declare without force and effect (B /os& 991 and 1+, as well as (B&
1+1& (etitioners contend that the president has no power to propose amendments to the new
constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis&
'SSH:
1& 's the case at bar @usticiable
*& Boes the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution
& 's the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
sufficient and proper submission
=>B:
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The issue of whether the (resident can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a @usticiable
5uestion since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform
such act is in 5uestion& The president has the authority to propose amendments as the
governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis& The time for
deliberation of the referendum0plebiscite 5uestions, wee4s, is not too short especially since the
5uestions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation
of martial law&
10./e&e"ma V. CA
8ACTS:
Citiwide sold * cars to a certain ?o@o Consun@i evidenced by * invoices& Hpon delivery of the cars,
?o@o paid with a anager"s Chec4 6(h(1+1,+++&++7& -hen Citiwide deposited the chec4, it was
dishonored for being tampered& Amount was changed from 1+1&++ to 1+1,+++&++&
Citiwide reported the crime to the (hil& Constabulary where he found that Consun@i was actually
Armando Suarez, a professional criminal&
2ne car was found abandoned, while the other was discovered to be in the possession of ?aime
>edesma, who claims to have purchased the car in good faith from the registered owner, evidenced
by the >T2 Registration&
RTC ordered the car to remain in the possession of >edesma&
CA overruled RTC, stating that Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of property through false
pretenses amounting to fraud&
'SSH:
-hether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property
=>B:
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/o& There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale& 8ailure to pay by Suarez through the
subse5uent dishonor of the chec4 did not render the contract of sale void& 2wnership was already
transferred by the delivery of the cars to Suarez&
15.-S V. u"to"
a!t"4 'n the latter part of 191E, numerous citizens of the (rovince of (ampanga
assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the #ecutive Secretary6privileged
communication7 through the law office of Crossfield and 2
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The right to assemble and petition is the necessary conse5uence of republican institutions
and the complement of the part of free speech& Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs& (etition means that
any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch
or office of the government for a redress of grievances& The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made& All persons have an
interest in the pure and efficient administration of @ustice and of public affairs&
(ublic policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion& The inevitable and incontestable result has been
the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege& All persons have an interest in
the pure and efficient administration of @ustice and of public affairs& The duty under which a
party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mista4en& Although the
charges are probably not true as to the @ustice of the peace, they were believed to be true by
the petitioners& !ood faith surrounded their action& (robable cause for them to thin4 that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office e#isted is apparent& The ends and the motives of thesecitizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were
@ustifiable& 'n no way did they abuse the privilege&
'n the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words& (rivilege destroys that
presumption& A privileged communication should not be sub@ected to microscopic
e#amination to discover grounds of malice or falsity&
8acts: 'n 191E, numerous citizens of (ampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
#ecutive Secretary 6privileged communication7 through the law office of Crossfield and 2eoncio Quiambao: (unsalan ;a+e im (3E an& i" complaint was shelved&
/ow, (unsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against him&
'ssue: -2/ accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and
free press&
=eld: es& The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the ri;t to !riti!ize Hu&i!ia%
!on&u!t& The administration of the law is a matter o +ita% pub%i! !on!ern& -hether the law
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is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit sub@ect for proper comment& 'f the people!annot
!riti!ize a Hu"ti!e o te pea!e or a @udge the same as any other public officer, public opinion
will be effectively suppressed& 't is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist
in the investigation of any alleged misconduct& 't is further the duty of all who 4now of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to
the notice of those whose duty it is to in5uire into and punish them&
Constitutional Biscussion:
8reedom of speech was un4nown in the (hilippine 'slands before 19++&
?ose Rizal in L8ilipinas Bespues de Cien AnosL describing Lthe reforms sine 5uibus non,L which
the 8ilipinos insist upon, said: Lreforms, must begin by declaring the press in the (hilippines free
and by instituting 8ilipino delegates&L
The alolos Constitution zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and
petition&
(resident cGinley in the 'nstruction to the Second (hilippine Commission 619++7 laying down
the inviolable rule LThat no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press orof the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the !overnment for a redress of
grievances&Lcralaw virtua1aw library
The (hilippine aw, the Act of Congress
of August *9, 191J, in the nature of organic acts for the (hilippines, continued this guaranty&
The adoption of the HS Constitution carries with it all the applicable @urisprudence of great
nglish and American Constitutional cases&
I)en in pub%i! %ie ma "uer un&er a o"ti%e an& an unHu"t a!!u"ation te
=oun& !an be a""ua;e& =it te ba%m o a !%ear !on"!ien!e. A pub%i! oi!er mu"t not
be too tin>"?inne& =it reeren!e to !omment upon i" oi!ia% a!t".
e ;uarantie" o a ree "pee! an& a ree pre"" in!%u&e te ri;t to !riti!ize
Hu&i!ia% !on&u!t& 'f the people cannot criticize a @ustice of the peace or a @udge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled&
?ustice !ayner: LThe people are not obliged to spea4 of the conduct of their officials in whispers
or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism&L
The particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se&
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