projects, politics and professionals: alternative approaches for project identification and project...

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Agricultural Systems 41(1995) 21 l-233 Copyright 0 1994 Elwier Science Limited

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Projects, Politics and Professionals: Alternative Approaches for Project Identification and

Project Planning

David Hulme

Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, Manchester Ml3 9QS, UK

(Received 5 November 1993; accepted 28 January 1994)

ABSTRACT

In the 1970s agricultural and rural development projects were believed to be on ‘the cutting edge’ of initiatives to improve rural livelihoods. However, subsequent evaluations have concluded that many projects have produced poor results. One response to these negative findings has been the generation of a large number of dis- parate ideas about how projects could be better identified, planned and managed. Despite the eflorts devoted to drawing up these alternative approaches they are little known to the majority of planners. This paper reviews these alternative approaches by presenting a

framework for their classtfication and comparison. It concludes that there is no optimal model for planning agricultural or rural projects but, rather, a set of alternatives that should be considered depending on the spectjic context and objectives of an intervention. Pro- jects seeking to improve the living conditions of the rural poor, however, are likely to perform better when the conventional approach to project planning is put aside.

This article is based on a paper originally presented at the International Conference on Project Identification in Developing Countries held at the University of Manchester in 1987. Subsequently, parts of it appeared in Manchester Papers on Development (1988), 4(2), 273-93. I am grateful to Keith Thompson for comments on the earlier paper and for permission to draw on his unpublished thesis (Thompson, 1990).

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INTRODUCTION

‘When the project set itself down... it quickly found itself in the position not of a craftsman approaching his raw materials, but more like that of a breadcrumb thrown into an ants’ nest’.

(Ferguson, 1990)

Dissatisfaction with the results achieved by official agricultural and rural development projects in poorer countries has generated an array of proposals about ways of improving project design and implementation. A vast literature has been produced, much of which emphasises the need for more refined and sophisticated appraisal techniques. However, efforts to improve the outcomes of development initiatives require that a fuller understanding of actual processes, as well as normative models of project planning, be achieved. This paper takes an exploratory step in that direction by examining conflicting images of the nature of project planning and relating these to proposals for changing project methodologies. The subject of project identification, by which I mean the generation of project concepts and initial screening to see which merit further analysis, is singled out for particular attention. In its initial section the paper reviews the dominant model of projects as the products of technical analysis concerned with the cost-effective achievement of well-defined goals. This is contrasted with an alternative image with roots in political analysis. It is then argued that, in practice, those involved in project design find themselves in a situation in which varying mixes of both models operate, depending on specific circumstances.

The courses of action open to those involved in project design, and particularly those seeking to improve the identification process, are examined in the light of these conflicting images. For analytical purposes three broad categories of response are recognised - leaving things as they are (Loyalty), modifying the existing models (Voice) or rejecting orthodox frameworks and proposing an alternative (Exit). This terminology is drawn from Albert Hirschmann’s (1970) famous essay ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’. These three terms provide a useful shorthand for different forms of response to orthodox planning methodologies. It must be noted that the use of the terms in this paper is not identical to that in Hirschmann’s work. As most of the responses arising out of dissatisfaction with the outcomes achieved by orthodox planning methodologies fall under the headings Voice and Exit more space is devoted to these than to the discussion of Loyalty. This is not intended to suggest that practitioners have abandoned the orthodox approach. In conclusion, the paper argues that:

Alternative approaches for project identification and planning 213

(i) there is no optimal project identification and planning approach, but rather a set of alternative approaches that are more or less appropriate to different contexts;

(ii) normative models of the project cycle should include a pre-project identification stage during which a decision is taken on the approach to project identification and planning that is to be utilised;

(iii) given the nature of rural physical and socio-economic environments in poorer countries, and the objectives of development projects, a hybrid model, incorporating elements of the political and orthodox models, offers the greatest opportunities for the production of more effective identification and planning methodologies.

ORTHODOX PROJECT CYCLE MODELS AND PROJECT IDENTIFICATION

‘The dominant image suggests that projects are instruments fashioned with impartial expertise for the hands of bureaucrats and politicians.’

(Johnson, 1985)

Orthodox models of the project cycle are presented in almost all of the textbooks on project planning (for examples see Gittinger, 1982; Ben- jamin, 1985; Overseas Development Administration, 1988). Most have been developed by economists and, although there are differences between these models, their major characteristics are the same. They are normative models derived from ideal models and view projects as a logically ordered sequence of activities (Baum, 1978) in pursuit of the achievement of a known and stated objective or set of objectives. They are rational (see Carley, 1980 for a discussion of this term), in that they gather information in relation to defined objectives, generate alternative courses of action, assess the likely consequences and risks of these options and indicate which of the options is preferable in terms of stated objectives. In addition, the orthodox models assume that the professionalism of the actors in the planning process minimises subjective considerations.

A complex set of methodologies has been developed to quantify and assist in decision-making at certain stages of the project cycle. It is sur- prising (perhaps) to find that the orthodox models treat project identification in a relatively cursory fashion and that most manuals allocate the topic only a few paragraphs. Two main methods of generating project concepts can be drawn out of the major texts on project planning:

(i) Ad hoc suggestions originating from a wide range of sources. For Benjamin (1985) these include borrower countries, consultants,

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engineering firms, officials of donor countries and bi-lateral agencies. For Gittinger (1982) they are well informed technical specialists, local firms, development banks and government agencies.

(ii) Systematic analysis of national development plans and sectoral surveys of market trends, import and export statistics, employment and other factors, by project analysts.

Overall, such writers suggest that project identification is seen as a non-competitive exercise in which those involved and interested in agricultural and rural development activities contribute their ideas, whilst a rapid review of recent sectoral trends is undertaken to see if there are any obvious gaps in the list that is evolving.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF THE PROJECT CYCLE AND PROJECT IDENTIFICATION+

The orthodox model of the project cycle has considerable common sense appeal but is has been challenged by social scientists who have developed alternative frameworks for the analysis of decision-making in the public sector. A substantial set of criticisms of the orthodox model has been presented and a variety of alternative propositions made. However, these constructs have often been ambiguous and have not been organised into a formal model and still less into a theory in regard to projects. Com- monly, these writings deal with policy, but this is defined in such a way that it includes activities characteristic of projects (e.g. agricultural extension, rural credit programmes). Lindblom’s (1959, 1968) work is at the root of much of this political approach, although the weaknesses of his early writing are widely recognised. In recent years Grindle (1980), Schaffer (1984), Ferguson (1990) and Porter et ai. (1991) have used political approaches for the analysis of rural and agricultural development initiatives.

Schaffer (1984) has provided a broad outline for a political model of project activities. What are its main features?

‘The reader may wish to consider whether or not the use of the term alternative model is legitimate. I have struggled with this, as the ‘alternative’ has not been formally and co- herently specified in the way that the orthodox model has. It must also be noted that the ‘alternative’ is based upon a descriptive construct, rather than a normative or prescriptive construct, so it is not directly comparable with the orthodox model in the way that, for example, two competing normative models would be. Perhaps, as I suggest in the later section, the orthodox and alternative approaches should be treated as conflicting images rather than comparative models.

Alternative approaches for project ident$cation and planning 215

(1) It is a descriptive model based on the study of empirical situations and is not derived from a prescriptive model of ‘what should be’.

(2) The parties (individuals and agencies) involved in determining public actions are viewed as being partisan or, at the very least, poten- tially partisan. Responses are determined not only in terms of stated objectives but also in terms of self-interest (viz. personal security, personal gain, professional identity, risk avoidance). Pro- jects are ‘ . ..a seething mass of contending perceptions, divergent personal and institutional strategies and polarized interests...’ (Porter et al., 1991, p. 198).

(3) There is often conflict between the interests of different parties but bargaining and mutual adjustment mean that this rarely becomes overt. Depending on the issue being debated complex sets of loose coalitions may operate. Trade-offs are commonly, but informally, agreed.

(4) Objectives are seldom spelt out in precise terms. Many projects are ascribed multiple objectives which may be conflicting. Some objectives are visible, whilst others are hidden.

(5) Parties compete to get different issues on the agenda for public discussion and to discourage issues that are seen as unfavourable to their interests. Once an item becomes a public issue then its likeli- hood of becoming the object of, and ultimately an output from, a bargaining process is greatly increased. A complex and changing network of factors determine whether an issue gains entry to an agenda. These include circumstances (e.g. the constituency interests of the new Minister of Agriculture), organisational features such as the compartmentalisation of public services (e.g. if there is a land settlement division then there must be land settlement), and the data categorisations adopted by statistical bureaucracies (e.g. the definition of poverty lines, household and small farm units). Differ- ent individuals and agencies have different levels of influence over events, depending on the power that they wield and the resources that they manipulate and control.

(6) The quest for stability means that a broad consensus from interested parties is required before an agenda item receives serious consideration. In the ‘chaos of purposes and accidents’ only relatively unobjectionable proposals (from the viewpoints of interested parties) proceed forward. Informal lobbying and negotiating result in a portion of unobjectionable items gradually being perceived as unavoidable public actions. The decision to proceed is usually identified with a formal meeting, but this is ‘more or less mythical’ (Schaffer, 1984, p. 148).

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(7) There is no starting point in the project process as there is never a clean slate. A number of proposals are always at different stages on the road to sanctioning and have well-mustered support from their proponents. The mere existence of data on an issue increases the chances of that issue gaining access to an agenda for discussion.

(8) Those involved in public sector decision-making frequently refer to the orthodox model so as to avoid responsibility for their own and their agency’s actions. Project failure can be explained by poor implementation (if one is a planner) or poor planning (if one is an implementor). Political representatives can point out that there was a shortfall because of errors in the technical analysis, whilst bureaucrats argue that political interference hampered the project. There are escape hatches for all, except the project’s intended beneficiaries!

In such a political model, project identification does not appear as the most neglected aspect of the project cycle, as it does in the orthodox model (Smith, 1987), but as the central issue around which the most heated debate, negotiation and exertion of influence occurs. This is largely done through an array of informal means and in consequence the processes are hidden, unreported and cloaked in ambiguity and uncertainty. Before a proposal is permitted to be taken seriously its implications will be considered by those individuals and agencies who are recognised as party to the debate. Power and skill at manipulating the agenda are the tools of such a process. Information is withheld, until it suits the holder’s needs, loose alliances are forged and support is traded. The ability to block or ‘torpedo’ a potential item (i.e. enforcing a non-decision) is of prime importance. Project identification becomes incremental and creativity is likely to be discouraged, although the system is open to any new fad that does not appear to threaten stability or which might offer additional resources to bargain over (e.g. external funding). This latter point explains the way in which aid-funded fashions, such as community development, integrated rural development projects, and training and visit extension systems, diffuse so rapidly.

COPING WITH CONFLICTING IMAGES

The conflicting images presented in the previous sections raise a host of issues about different aspects of the project cycle. (For project appraisal see Gasper, 1987 and Porter et al., 1991. For evaluation see Hulme,

Alternative approaches for project identiJcation and planning 217

1989.) Attention here is focused on project identification. Commonly the conflict inherent in these two images is seen as an ‘either...or’ situation: one must adopt the image that seems more valid (the criteria may be intellectual, moral, professional, self-interest or a mix of these) and reject the other image. In terms of coping strategies for individuals involved with projects this is probably the easiest route to take. It leads to external commentators on projects (political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists) sniggering at the naivety and/or duplicity of project practitioners who spend their time utilising and developing complex planning and management techniques while ignoring the intrinsically political nature of project decisions. On the other side, the practitioners of the orthodox approach scorn the commentators’ non-involvement in actual project decisions, and ridicule their aversion to quantitative methods and technical analyses. The authors of orthodox textbooks (either out of politeness, embarrassment or ignorance) choose not to mention the alternative image.

Once sides are drawn in this manner then many potential avenues for improving project processes, and particularly identification, are lost. The project practitioner pursues an orthodox approach and ignores, or treats in ad hoc fashion, what are seen as extra-rational influences. The external commentator becomes a cynic or makes ill-defined calls for self-awareness or disparages quantitative techniques and the notion of a project cycle.

But do these conflicting images have to be treated as inevitably pro- ducing an ‘either...or’ situation ? I believe not, as neither is able to demonstrate a monopoly in terms of explanatory power. In practice, when specific projects are examined, then differing combinations of elements of the two models can be recognised. The orthodox model does not deal with the partisan way in which many, if not most, actors operate. It avoids the evidence that being partisan is a routine aspect of institutional and professional socialisation which only the rare ‘deviant’ manages to avoid. The political model ignores the contribution that technical analysis makes to some project decisions. At times, poor project proposals are rejected on the basis of data generated by quantitative analysis, and project performance is improved by technical inputs on issues such as project siting, crop varieties, scheduling and management. Whilst there are numerous examples of projects that are best understood in terms of the political model (e.g. Moore, 1984; de Valk & Sibanda, 1986; Hulme, 1987, 1989), there are also examples in which an orthodox model offers a rough approximation to actual events (e.g. the approval of the Hoskins Oil Palm Scheme and the rejection of the Cape Rodney Rubber Scheme in Papua New Guinea in the late 1960s; see Hulme,

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1984). It is thus possible to propose a hybrid model in which elements of both the orthodox and political models are combined. The basis of the model is an acknowledgement of the political nature of public decision- making, alongside the recognition that some actors can suppress institutional and professional biases, at least partly, and can use tools evolved from the orthodox model to influence debate on an issue and the shape of eventual decisions.

The opportunities that arise from exploring a hybrid model have so far only been exploited to a limited degree. The training of professional staff responsible for project identification and planning is almost entirely in terms of the orthodox model and until very recently most efforts for improvement have been based on this dominant image. Poor project outcomes have been seen as a consequence of ‘weak links’ in the orthodox model, rather than a fundamental misconception in the overall approach. It is at the project identification stage that this overall weakness is most apparent. The vagueness surrounding project identification processes cannot be explained simply in terms of neglect. It arises because the identification stage is that at which actual practices are most likely to mirror the agenda setting and manipulative treatments of the political model. In consequence, the call for greater creativity in project identification requires the generation of alternatives from models other than the orthodox model. The subsequent testing of these alternatives is not to find the one true, correct and optimal procedure for identification but to expand the range of alternatives available to those involved in identification and provide indications of the circumstances in which these are more or less appropriate. What are the alternatives?

RESPONSES TO DISSATISFACTION WITH ORTHODOX MODELS OF PROJECT PROCESSES

This section reviews the responses open to individuals dissatisfied with the results of development projects. These are examined in terms of three broad categories: (i) leaving things as they are (Loyalty); (ii) modifying the orthodox model (Voice); (iii) rejecting the orthodox model and introducing an alternative (Exit). This terminology is drawn from Hirschmann’s (1970) famous essay, although the meanings used here are modified from the original. Each of these categories is subdivided in terms of whether the response has its origins in the orthodox model, or the political model or in a hybrid model (Table 1). This provides a framework for relating and contrasting different proposals and encouraging those involved in project planning to reflect on their personal position(s),

Alternative approaches for project ident$cation and planning

TABLE 1

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Responses to Dissatisfaction with Orthodox Project Planning Models”

Response Conceptual origin of the response

Orthodox model Hybrid model Political model

3 Use political model @chaffer, 1984)

SOSIP - sophisticated obfuscation of self- interest and prejudice (Stern, 1976)

6 Search for ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Clay & Schaffer, 1984) Real world tactics (Ferguson, 1990)

- 1

Use orthodox model (Gittinger, 1982)

2 Pragmatism (Johnson, 1985) Sensitised orthodox approach (Pratt & Boyden, 1985)

Anguish 5

Whistle blowing (Clad. 1986)

Leaving things as they are (Loyalty)

4 Social planning (Conyers, 198 1)

Modifying the way things are (Voice)

Consideration Commitment of ‘sociological analysis variables’ (Heaver & (Cernea, 1985, 1991) Israel, 1986)

Teleological systems approach (Smith, 1987, 1988a,b)

Separation of technical and political roles (Hinchliffe & Allan, 1982)

7 Adaptive management and ‘process’

approach and approach

Simple is optimal (Chambers, 1978, 1988, 1993)

8 Learning process approach (Korten, 1980, 1987)

(Rondinelli, 1983, 1993) Local organisations (Esman & Uphoff, 1984)

9 Class analysis (Barnett, 1975, 1977)

Conscientisation and community empowerment (Freire, 1972)

Rejecting the orthodox

proposing an alternative (Exit)

Participatory rural appraisal (Chambers, 1978, 1988, 1993)

Liberalisation and market mechanisms (Davies, 1987; Kikeri et al., 1992)

“Names in brackets indicate an author who has proposed or illustrated a particular response. Inevitably the positioning of proposals within any individual box is a matter of judge- ment and the reader should not be surprised if s/he would like to reposition some of the responses that are listed.

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TABLE2 The Main Characteristics of Different Responses to Dissatisfaction with Orthodox Models

of Project Identification and Planning

Response

Orthodox

Conceptual origin of the response

Hybrid Political

Loyalty Problem solving; objectivity; professional actors; defined objectives; economic models; optimal solutions.

Voice Analysis of additional variables; consideration of other decision- takers; planner as broker; beneficiary consultation; socio-cultural models of development.

Exit Process approach to planning with experimentation, learning and staged adaption; intended beneficiaries involved in setting objectives and design; professional planners and managers needed.

Political forces influence orthodox approaches; attempts to be pragmatic.

Recognition of orthodox and political models; attempts to separate technical and political analysis; new forms of training; consideration of moral issues.

Includes both populist and neo-liberal ideas; community management and local organisations; participation; public sector as facilitator; reduced role for foreign aid; creation of ‘enabling’ environment’.

Self-interest and prejudice influence decisions; subjectivity; bargaining and trade-offs; agenda- setting; avoidance of responsibility.

Need for self- awareness; search for ‘room for manoeuvre’; moral responsibility of individuals.

Class analysis reveals need for fundamental social change; political action required; conscientisation; empowerment; existing approaches to projects only strengthen the existing distribution of power.

Source: Adapted from Thompson (1990).

its (their) implications and the alternatives that merit consideration if projects are to produce improved outcomes for intended beneficiaries. The main characteristics of each category of response are summarised in Table 2.

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Leaving things as they are (Loyalty)

Loyalty with orthodox origins This is the textbook approach characterised by Gittinger (1982), Ben- jamin (1985) and the Overseas Development Administration (1988). Moris (198 1, p. 122) has issued the following warning to project managers about the role of those who take this narrow, technical stance:

‘Scientists generally and Western technicians particularly are trained to believe that their professional competence is based on universal and ‘real’ principles. They treat political constraints as external to their frames of reference and hence in some mysterious way irrelevant - ‘not my problem’.’

By adopting this position the technocrat avoids personal responsibility for the outcomes of projects he/she helps to identify because of reality’s failure to match the assumptions of the orthodox model! Dissatisfaction with project results are met with calls for the cessation of political interference and more training. The procedures are correct and so failure is attributable to individuals not fully understanding how the procedures should work.

Loyalty with hybrid origins This view is typical of the enlightened practising project planner described by Johnson (1985). Although trained within orthodox confines, his/her apprenticeship has taught him/her that other processes are operating and he/she attempts to deal with these pragmatically without bolting to the comfort of the textbook position or the cynicism of the SOSIP position (see next section). This is the position that Pratt & Boyden (1985) recommend for Oxfam field directors. It has been termed a sensitised orthodox approach (Thompson, 1990), using conventional techniques whenever possible but tempering them with an acceptance that political goals must also be satisfied.

Existing identification methods are seen as being far from perfect, but no better approaches are known. Such a position can prove stressful for an individual and may precede the adoption of a Voice position.

Loyalty with political origins This is the position that Schaffer (1984) recognises for most of those involved in project identification and it has been well-illustrated by de Valk & Sibanda’s (1986) case study of a pig project. Whilst knowing that the project process functions through agenda setting and manipulation, bargaining and trade-offs motivated by self-interest, its adherents purport to be operating in an orthodox framework. By this means they are able to

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achieve some of their objectives whilst avoiding responsibility for outcomes. In addition, major benefits may be derived by denying access to significant information to external commentators who might take a criti- cal position. Private ‘privileged admissions’ that the orthodox model does not operate are commonplace, but this is not stated in public.

A particularly insidious form of this position is what Stern (1976) has termed SOSIPing - sophisticated obfuscation of self-interest and prejudice. This is the use of purportedly neutral technical analyses, incompre- hensible to non-specialists, to strengthen the case for particular decisions which offer advantages to technical specialists, their companies or their professions.

Modifying the way things are (Voice)

For some, dissatisfaction with the orthodox approach to projects and its outcomes leads to calls for changes to be made. These calls can develop from a variety of perspectives and range from proposals for modest tin- kering to demands for radical overhauls. Thompson (1990) distinguishes between quiet voice and loud voice in a detailed review of this category of response.

Voice with orthodox origins The social planning school of the late 1970s and early 1980s adopts this stance. It diagnoses the poor results of many projects as attributable to an overemphasis on economic issues and proposes that this could be overcome by an additional sub-discipline - social planning. This means that orthodox approaches should be used but in addition there should be a social analysis and a greater emphasis on participatory planning. (The term participation has many meanings. For proponents of social planning, participation was conceptualised as non-conflictive and could more accurately be termed as consultation.) Conyers (1981, p. 103) illustrates this approach and sees participation as a neglected means of ‘obtaining information about local conditions, needs and attitudes without which development programmes and projects are likely to fail’, and of eliciting beneficiary commitment to projects. The subject of project identification is not clearly addressed but the approach suggests that orthodox analysis with more participation is the way forward. Several of the writers in Cernea’s (1985) excellent volume adopt a similar position.

Smith (1987; 1988a,b) has argued for the modification of orthodox approaches from a systems perspective, to overcome the ‘grotesque’ neglect of identification. He describes a number of weaknesses in the existing orthodox model and presents an ideal model from which a number of

Alternative approaches for project identiJication and planning 223

prescriptions of ‘what should be’ are generated. Central amongst these is the contribution that project beneficiaries might make to identification.

There are noticeable similarities in these approaches. Both strive to make orthodox planning more rational by enhancing information flows and recognising categories of decision-takers that are commonly forgot- ten, ignored, or neglected by conventional approaches. However, both can be criticised for a failure to consider the political feasibility of their prescriptions. Smith (1987) prescribes radical administrative reform without any discussion of the means of reform. As prescriptions for ideals both sets of proposals have merit, but as prescriptions for action both fail to tackle fundamental questions of feasibility.

Voice with hybrid origins This position is characterised by individuals who originally placed their trust in the orthodox model, but who have subsequently become concerned that the processes are being subverted. Whilst retaining the main features of the orthodox model these proposals attempt to find ways of coping more effectively with political factors.

The most simple of these options (and yet, perhaps the most difficult) is what may be termed whistle blowing; that is, the public denunciation of a specific project or projects by someone involved in its (their) design. It arises when an individual following an orthodox approach, but aware of some of the weaknesses (Box 2 in Table l), feels that political influences (pressure from politicians, bureaucratic politics, professional self- interest) are so distorting project design that active personal intervention is morally justified. The concerned individual attempts to force those involved in project design to steer their practices back towards the orthodox position and to pursue stated objectives by releasing (or threatening to release) information to the public, usually through the media. It is a daring course of action and can have dire personal consequences for those who choose to exercise it. (You will not find it taught in project planning courses!) A spectacular example has been reported by Clad (1986) and involved the release of information from the Asian Develop- ment Bank demonstrating that project identification was skipped and appraisal was manipulated (e.g. assumptions about projects were modified until the required cost-benefit ratios were achieved). This is seen as occurring because of pressures on Bank staff and divisions to meet annual loan disbursement targets and demands from recipient governments for the rapid transfer of funds. Such disclosures are likely to lead agencies to adopt a more rational approach to project identification in the short term, but whether they can influence agency behaviour in the long term is a matter for speculation.

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A pragmatic attempt to handle the knowledge that project planning is not solely a technocratic exercise has been made in Papua New Guinea. This was when a comprehensive budgeting system, the National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP), was introduced based on ‘a more realistic view of politics’ and attempting to maximise ‘systematically exercised political control by developing a framework within which public expenditure proposals (projects) can be consistently compared’ (Hinchliffe & Allan, 1983, p. 957). The system attempted to specify and separate administrative and formal political roles in the decision-making process. Every year departments and provinces were invited to submit outline proposals (i.e. project concepts) for projects aimed at achieving any of the eight strategic objectives that the national government had defined. These were screened by public servants and then, in the light of technical comments, a National Planning Committee (NPC), composed of senior ministers, would decide which proposals should proceed to a design list. Design list proposals were developed into detailed project blueprints, subjected to technical screening and finally the NPC decided which projects should be funded. In practice, a complex set of informal networks also operated around the system, but it can be judged a success from a project identification stand- point in terms of the massive increase in project ideas that it generated and the pressure it put on departments and provinces to compete for resources through the quality of proposals.

Finally, in this section reference must be made to the wide-ranging work of Robert Chambers, discussed in greater detail in a later section. Relevant at this point is Chambers’ (1978, 1993) call for a ‘simple is optimal’ approach to project design involving administrative decentralisa- tion, simplification of procedures, decision matrices, the ranking of projects in terms of ‘who benefits’ and changes in the value-orientation and behaviour of professional and technical staff. The last point was subsequently termed the new professionalism and argued for professionals to switch from core preferences (power, comfort, wealth, standardisation, control, certainty) to peripheral preferences (weakness, discomfort, poverty, diversity, lack of control, doubt) in their approaches to problem-solving (Chambers, 1993).

Voice with political origins This is the response of those who believe the political model to be valid but think that practice can be modified. It is a difficult position to take as the political model permits few opportunities for the room for manoeuvre that this response seeks. Proposals for procedural change or new sub- disciplines are viewed as a means of maintaining the existing process, rather than changing it. The notions of political feasibility arising from


the underlying model preclude the possibility of generating a prescriptive model of ‘what should be’, and arguing that ‘what is’ must become ‘what should be’. These constraints can be felt throughout Clay & Schaffer’s (1984) volume and result in a concluding chapter of barely two pages that proposes ‘an absolute need for self-awareness and self-criticism... all is to be questioned. Nothing is to be taken for granted. Nothing is in- nocuous’. Clay and Schaffer’s political model may be more heuristically effective than the orthodox model, but it gives those practically involved in project identification few leads on how to modify practice.

Ferguson (1990) provides a thoughtful analysis of this dilemma when he poses the question ‘what is to be done ?’ having explored the processes surrounding a project in Lesotho. He concludes that prescriptions for improvement are infeasible but points to the opportunity for those who understand the actual nature of development practice to take political action within their own societies and to add to the enlightenment process through the dissemination and discussion of their findings.

Rejecting orthodox approaches and proposing an alternative

The final group of responses originate from those who are so dissatisfied with orthodox approaches that they believe alternative models must be introduced. While several of these proposals have a populist orientation, this is not a common feature for all. Indeed, the ‘new orthodoxy’ of a market-oriented approach to development is included in this group.

Exit with orthodox origins A number of writers, several with experience of USAID projects, adopt this position (Sweet & Weisel, 1979; Honadle, 1981; Rondinelli, 1983; Lecomte, 1986; Rondinelli, 1993). The influence of Lele’s (1975) seminal volume should be noted. Here the focus is on Rondinelli’s work. Whilst accepting the orthodox model as appropriate for certain types of project, such as construction and infrastructure, he contends that in projects that must cope with high degrees of uncertainty and that may encounter constraints not recognised during identification and appraisal then a ‘process’ approach is required. Consequently, rural development projects must move away from notions of identification and design that empha- sise blueprints and external expertise and instead become instruments for facilitating innovation and learning during the implementation phase. By analysing the weaknesses of the orthodox model Rondinelli constructs an alternative prescriptive model and argues that ‘a more flexible, adaptive, experimental and responsive set of planning and implementation procedures must be used’ (Rondinelli, 1983, p. 325). Lecomte (1986) argues

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along similar lines. The control of project activities remains within the bureaucracy, however. In its most developed form (Rondinelli, 1993) the alternative is a call for administrative reform throughout the Third World. As a prescription for ‘what should be’ the proposals have much to recommend them but scant consideration is given to feasibility. The case for administrative reform has been well made in the past but most attempts have foundered. Rondinelli refines the case but does not exam- ine the means for reform.

While thorough-going administrative reform is unlikely in most situations, the concepts of adaptive management and process approaches are having some influence in Africa (Goldman et al., 1989) and Asia (Hulme & Limcaoco, 1991). Several enlightened donors, notably the Norwegians, have modified some of their planning and budgeting procedures in line with such principles.

Exit with hybrid origins Several responses fall under this heading. They have similarities with Rondinelli’s work in proposing a process approach and flexible management that can learn and adjust to local situations. However, they differ by also attempting to incorporate a political element. The need for alternatives is seen as arising out of the powerlessness of the rural populace and the professional and organisational behaviour (and values) of those involved in project activities. A consequence is that bureaucratic involvement in planning and management is to be by-passed wherever possible.

Korten (1980, 1987) has been a vociferous critic of orthodox donor- funded project approaches and has proposed that a ‘learning process’ model would produce better and sustained results. The behaviour of national and international agencies is seen as being guided by organisational goals to the detriment of proclaimed objectives. In addition, the technocratic belief that problems can be ‘thought through’ is inappro- priate for interventions in which knowledge is limited and uncertainty high. His alternative proposals, that interventions should be based on a prelimi- nary thinking through, largely by those who the activity is meant to assist, followed by the acting out of the initial formulations, followed by learning and reflection, and a revised acting out. The activity is iterative and a final plan is never constructed. In this way flexibility is achieved, uncertainty can be more effectively coped with and the agreement of decision-takers is acquired through negotiation and bargaining. A social learning process operates in which technical analysis is combined with advocacy, bargaining and agreement on a course of action. Plan and commitment coincide. Unsuccessful learning organisations will disband, but successful learning organisations will gain confidence and expertise,


become more effective, increase efficiency and expand. The successful agency can ultimately become a force for challenging policies that are against the interests of the rural poor. In his seminal article (Korten, 1980) there is little discussion of how such an approach might be fostered but later work (Korten, 1987) makes a move in this direction.

Esman & Uphoff (1984) adopt a related line of argument but their ex- plicitly political approach leads them to focus not so much on project methodologies as on the institutions involved in development activities. They find the bureaucratic institutions lacking in technical terms and hamstrung by political influences and argue for a much greater focus on local organisations (LOS) as intermediaries in rural development. By LOS they mean voluntary associations of individuals with a common interest which are not part of formal state structures (e.g. local government councils), nor part of a primarily political grouping (e.g. local branches of political parties). Examples of LOS include water users’ associations, co- operatives, credit unions and self-help societies. By means of a theoretical review and a detailed comparison of case studies, Esman & Uphoff (1984) demonstrate the contribution of LOS to rural development in terms of practical achievements and also the less tangible objective of empowerment. A process approach underlies their analysis and one in which LOS, rather than bureaucratic organisations, determine actions. Nevertheless, two roles are identified for national and international agencies. The first is to provide technical advice and support for LO initiatives. The second is to stimulate the creation of LOS through community organizers.

Both the desirability and feasibility of Korten’s (1980, 1987) and Esman & Uphoffs (1984) proposals can be contested. From a technical perspective they may be criticised as slow, unable to undertake major infrastructural jobs and devaluing technical expertise and knowledge of alternatives. From a pragmatic political perspective it could be expected that LOS will be dominated by local elites, captured by the bureaucracy and only tolerated by formal political groups when they are ineffective (Hulme & Turner, 1990). The authors acknowledge these problems and have sought ways around them. They can also point out that neither learning processes nor local organisations are seen as blueprints that will work, but as formats to be encouraged. Numerous examples of effective spontaneous local organisations have been documented, whilst the operations of the National Irrigation Administration in the Philippines (Korten & Siy, 1989) and the Gal Oya Project in Sri Lanka (Uphoff, 1992) demonstrate that bureaucratic agencies can facilitate the operations of local organisations, without taking control, in very different politico- administrative environments.

228 D. Hulme

Chambers (1988) argues that international donor agencies could use a process approach through the establishment of ‘anti-project’ divisions with ‘no capital budget to be spent... no targets or schedules for physical achievement.. . no preference for visibles against invisible change’. This would entail the provision of funding for good staff to spend periods in the field exploring opportunities and learning with local people. These ideas have been associated with the development of participatory rural appraisal (PRA). This is a planning approach developed by non-government organisations (NGOs) which Chambers (1993, pp. 97-105) has been keen to promote. PRA seeks to wrest control of the identification of the problems that villagers face, and of the generation of possible solutions, from outsiders and into the hands of villagers. Although there is a series of techniques and methods associated with PRA (Mascarenhas et al., 1991) the ‘ . ..key innovations of PRA have been behavioural’ (Cham- bers, 1993, p. 98) persuading outsiders (i.e. planners, managers, technical experts) to let villagers take the initiative. Non-government organisations have adopted PRA with enthusiasm, but it remains to be seen whether state agencies can adopt such a radical format. Much further work also needs to be done on the pre-PRA phase (what introduction process should occur to ensure that inappropriately high expectations are not created amongst villages?) and post-PRA (what happens in the future?).

The process approaches advocated by Korten, Esman and Uphoff and Chambers posit that effective rural development requires multiple, small, experimental projects planned and managed through local collective action. Learning accrues to the group members and their activities are facilitated by NGOs or a reformed bureaucracy that offers advice and assistance and, perhaps, material support. Initiatives that achieve fit between beneficiaries, organisation and programme subsequently extend through organic growth.

Finally, in this section, brief mention is made of another anti-project approach (or, more accurately, anti-public project approach) which has similarities to the process approaches but focuses on individual rather than social enterprises. It is the policy of economic liberalisation and pri- vatisation. On the basis of neo-classical economic concepts and a political analysis of the inefficiencies of the public sector, the proponents of these policies argue for a shift away from investment in public projects. The alternative is projects organised by private sector entrepreneurs based on their understanding of public demand for goods and services. Whilst the desirability of such a model is contested (particularly in relation to how it deals with the needs of those with minimal purchasing power and infrastructural development), it is being adopted in many countries (Kikeri et al., 1992). With this approach, identification becomes

Alternative approaches for project ident@cation and planning 229

the task of the entrepreneur and a down-sized bureaucracy focuses on creating an appropriate framework of incentives for enterprise. Public sector project planning capacities become largely redundant.

Exit with political origins Those who adopt this stance see projects as a sub-category of societal actions which can only be understood through the historical analysis of the distribution of social and political power. Much of the writing in this area has adopted a radical perspective on development and interprets events in Third World countries in terms of deterministic neo-Marxist models. In the last decade such approaches have been heavily criticised and they are commonly held to be discredited (Hulme & Turner, 1990).

Neo-Marxist analyses rarely focus specifically on the project level. Bar- nett’s (1975, 1977) work on the Gezira Scheme is an exception. A review of his argument is beyond the scope of the present paper, but the conclusion it reaches must be briefly stated. It is that projects (along with all other development activities in a capitalist system) operate to subordinate the interests of labouring classes and permit capitalist and bourgeois groups to extract a surplus. Societal restructuring, perhaps through revo- lution, is a prerequisite to any development activity which will be of last- ing benefit to the majority of those living in rural areas.

Freire’s (1972) work presents a different line of argument, but promotes a radical view. Improvements in the living standards of dis- advantaged groups can only be achieved when people learn to recognise their own ability to promote change. In consequence, interventions for conscientisation and community empowerment are required, rather than project identification which is likely to reinforce the subordinate and passive role adopted by the rural poor. In contrast to neo-Marxist writings, Freire’s ideas have been operationalised and many NGOs and social movements (particularly in Latin America) claim to be acting on Freirian principles.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to chart the wide range of responses open to those seeking to make project identification and planning more effective, in terms of achieving the stated objectives of rural and agricultural development. It has pointed to the inadequacies of the orthodox model upon which the training of project personnel is largely based and from which most project planning methodologies have been derived. The conflicting image of projects as political arenas in which powerful groups conflict

230 D. Hulme

and bargain in their attempts to set and manipulate the agenda for public action has been presented. This appears to have significant explanatory power in terms of actual project processes, but its. rejection of technical analyses as mere guises for self-interest is unsatisfactory. Those who con- tinue to pursue the narrow confines of the orthodox model are likely to define ‘what should be’ without relating this to ‘what is’. Those who re- main within the boundaries of the political model may be academically comfortable, but may condemn themselves to being permanently marginal critics who are not able to contribute to changes in project practice.

It is the ground between these two positions, termed the hybrid model in this paper, that offers opportunities for the development of project methodologies that are both desirable and feasible. This search for improved methodologies is not for one optimal project identification procedure, but for the production of a number of alternative methodologies that can be recognised as being more or less appropriate in certain circumstances. It is not simply a question of blueprint versus process (Sweet & Weisel, 1979), but a question of which form of blueprint or process, in which circumstances, and even of what means may be used to integrate blueprint and process approaches. For rural and agricultural initiatives in developing countries, where uncertainty is high, knowledge is limited and intended beneficiaries are commonly peripheral to centres of local and national decision-making power, then process approaches which make a serious attempt at beneficiary participation and informal institu- tion building are likely to be most relevant.

The dominant image of projects as a technocratic exercise must be replaced with a revised image that recognises projects as arenas for conflict, bargaining and trade-offs, and in which data and technical tools have the potential to clarify likely outcomes and shape arguments. This is an altogether less cosy image of what projects and project identification are about, but in reality the textbook notions of project planning have never transcended their covers.

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