USE OF FORCE IN FIGHTING PIRACY IN THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA

Background

The East African Coast, which includes the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, has seen the largest

share of global piracy attacks in recent years and the problem seems to be growing. In 2009,

more than half the global piracy attacks were ascribed to Somali pirates with the International

Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reporting the most significant

escalation. In May 2009, IMB report indicated that pirate activity off the coast of Somalia

jumped from a total of 111 incidents, including 42 hijackings during the twelve months of 2008,

to 114 incidents with 29 hijackings during the first four months of 2009.1 Other areas of piracy

risk include the Gulf of Guinea, the Malacca Straits and off Nigeria.

The recent wave of piracy began with seizures of vessels off the Somali coasts in 2002 and since

then the pirates have been emboldened, targeting larger vessels including tankers on the high

seas.2 Until recently, piracy was a phenomenon in decline, but attacks peaked at roughly 350 to

450 reported attacks per year during the period 2000-2004, and then dropped by almost half in

2005. This reduction was attributed to effective and coordinated international action against the

pirates. However, in 2008-2009, piracy figures again sky-rocketed due, almost entirely, to the

dramatic increase of such activities off the Coast of Somalia.3 Piracy is once again on the

1 “Pirate attacks off Somalia already surpass 2008 figures.” International Chamber of Commerce; Commercial Crime Services, (2009). http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirate-attacks-off-somalia-already-surpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51, Accessed 7 February 2011.

2 Deccan Chronicle, ‘Somali Piracy costs world economy up to $12 bn a year’ New York, Friday, January 14, 2011 (http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2011/Jan/piracy_costs_world_economy_up_to_12_bn_a_year.aspx), Accessed on 7 February 2011.3 See Middleton, Roger. Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars. Chatham House Africa Programme Briefing Paper No. 2. 2008.p.3

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forefront of the international community’s attention, as maritime trade is threatened and ransom

payments to Somali pirates have risen to the millions of dollars.

The term “piracy” encompasses two distinct sorts of offences; the first is robbery or hijacking,

where the motive of the attack is to steal a maritime vessel or its cargo; and the second is

kidnapping, where the vessel and crew are threatened until a ransom is paid. The East African

situation is unique in that almost all of the piracy involves kidnapping for ransom. Maritime

piracy is a rather violent, acquisitive crime, which is transnational because a ship is considered

the sovereign territory of the nation whose flag she flies. Maritime piracy is an organized

operation because hijacking and ultimate commandeering a ship at sea without being detected

requires considerable planning and some specialized expertise. Armed with AK-47s and rocket-

propelled grenades, pirates in rickety skiffs have often carried out brazen hijackings, seizing

massive oil tankers, cargo vessels and luxury boats. East African coast piracy, compared to other

areas like the Caribbean, Niger Delta and East Asia, has been relatively less violent with captors

seeking only ransom and sparing the crew, but of late it is progressively getting violent on either

side; the patrol navies as well as the pirates themselves. For instance on April 2011, three pirates

were killed by snipers in the U.S rescue operation of MV Maersk Alabama, a US flagged ship.

The rescue operation triggered retaliatory use of violence by pirates as was the case when

Somalia pirates attacked another US flagged ship MV Liberty Sun, and a pirate leader was later

quoted saying that they were not after the ransom, but had sent a team with special equipment to

destroy any ship flying the US flag in retaliation for the killing of their friends.4

4 Agence France Presse (AFP), ‘Pirates stage rocket attack on US freighter,’ April 14, 2009

2

This trend has subsequently necessitated the use of force to counter piracy. However, this is not

the first time military intervention has been used to fight piracy. Historically on its own

initiative, China engaged in signing bilateral treaties with foreign nations to control piracy;

between 1861 and 1869, China negotiated agreements with six other Western nations, Prussia,

1861, Denmark, 1863, the Netherlands, 1863, Spain, 1864, Belgium, 1865, Italy, 1866, and

Austria-Hungary, 1869, each of which dealt in some measure with the problem of Chinese

pirates. By exposing merchants who bought pirate spoils, the 1866 decree, amended in 1867 and

re-stated in 1868, was the greatest blow ever struck at piracy as it brought within legal restriction

the haunts and stores of the robbers and the native dealers in marine supplies. Meanwhile, the

registration of Chinese ships, which began in 1869, meant that vessels caught assisting pirates

could be impounded and that piracy losses were spread to the other “members of the same

shipping division in proportion to the degree of their responsibility.”5 This mutual responsibility

system exerted real social pressure within China to halt piracy, and it proved an extremely

effective deterrent.6

5 Fox, Grace. British Admirals and Chinese Pirates, 1832–1869. Westport, Conn.:Hyperion, 1973, pp.145–82.

6 Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg (eds), Piracy and Maritime Crime Historical and Modern Case Studies, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Newport, Rhode Island Newport Paper Thirty-five, January 2010

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International Intervention; Use of Military Force against East African Piracy

A diverse and growing number of nations are now are now involved in joint efforts, mainly

military, to reduce East African piracy. NATO has established the NATO Shipping Centre to act

as an information clearing house for news and information concerning pirates and best practices

for merchants. And warships from the navies of the United States, China, Turkey, France,

Germany, Spain, and others now participate as Combined Maritime Forces in patrols to disrupt

and intercept pirates.7On a similar note, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution

1851 in December 2008, authorizing states to take actions aimed at combating Somali based

pirates. For example, the resolution provided for the deployment of naval forces and the

investigation, trial and punishment as part of repression efforts “unprecedented in scope and

authority for the international community to counter a threat in the maritime domain.”8 The

International Maritime Organization has established the a global network of Maritime Rescue

and Coordination Centers to enhance the protection of merchant ships, by monitoring and

tracking their progress throughout their respective areas and coordinating military responses

when necessary.

The East African coast is very expansive; in the region in question, the coastlines alone of the

greater Horn of Africa and Yemen totals 5,510 miles. Worse still, only Yemen and Kenya have

at least rudimentary maritime patrol capabilities. This has necessitated the need for a

multinational force to be deployed in a joint effort to fight piracy. Hence three large coalitions of

naval forces conduct counter-piracy patrols in the vast area; Combined Maritime Forces of

7 Schaeffer N., (2009) “Combined Maritime Forces Works with International Navies to Counter Piracy.” Press Release, US 5th Fleet. Found at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2009/089.html. Accessed on 7 February 2011.

8 Brian W., “Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 4, July, 2009, p. 491.

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NATO (Operation Ocean Shield); the EU’s NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atlanta); and

Commander, Naval Forces U.S. Central Command in Bahrain, serving as Commander Maritime

Force for Combined Task Forces (CTF) 151. Whereas Task Force 150 has responsibility for sea-

borne counter-terrorism efforts in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Oman, Task

Force 151 is responsible for the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin and is the primary counter-

piracy operation of the allied effort. Since it has extensive geographical authority, Task Force

151 ranges beyond the Gulf of Aden and well into the Indian Ocean in response to increased

piratical attacks more than 1,000 miles east of Somalia. Task Force 152, whose mission is the

interdiction of terrorists and related materials, operates in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf from a base

in Abu Dhabi. Forty-five nations contributed service men and women, helicopters, drones, fixed

wing aircraft, and naval vessels to these three task forces and to the NATO and EU efforts in

2009 and early 2010.9 In August 2008, the Dutch-led task force CTF 150 and partner forces

agreed to the establishment of a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden to

serve as a dedicated, more secure transit zone for merchant vessels. The MSPA has been credited

in part with lowering the success rate of Somalia pirates in the Gulf of Aden transit zone.10 Until

2008, the international community did not respond to the threat of piracy in the waters off of

Somalia in a coordinated, dedicated manner. In December 2008, the European Union launched

EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, representing the first naval operation under the

framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).11 In support of Operation

ATALANTA, EU NAVFOR deployed up to twelve ships through December 2010 to: “Employ

9 Robert I. Rotberg, ‘Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action’, World Peace Foundation, Policy Brief #11, January 26, 2010:pp.1-11:3

10 Ploch, Lauren, et al, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service( CRS) Report R40528, 2009. p.16

11 Ibid, p.3

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the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to

bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where

they are present”.12 In addition to the United States and European Union; in March 2009, NATO

launched its second anti-piracy mission, Operation Allied Protector, which is being carried out

by Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1). According to NATO, the forces participating

in Operation Allied Protector will ‘deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities’ as they

transit the region.13

These combined, though not well coordinated, naval patrols in the East African waters is credited

for the relative reduction in the number of vessel capture. In 2009, the combined maritime

operations of NATO and allied forces disrupted 411 pirate operations of the 706 encountered;

delivered 269 pirates for prosecution under prevailing legal interpretations to Kenya and other

jurisdictions (of whom 46 were jailed); and killed 11 pirates. The combined operations also

destroyed 42 pirate vessels; confiscated 14 boats, hundreds of small arms, nearly fifty rocket-

propelled grenade launchers, and numerous ladders, grappling hooks, GPS receivers, mobile

phones, and other assorted equipment.14

Generally, the responses to piracy off the Horn of Africa include multinational naval patrols and

the establishment of a Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden. The Internationally

Recommended Transit Corridor protected by warships, the option of escorted convoys, has

improved arrangements for surveillance and information sharing among participating navies. 12 EU NAVFOR. “European union naval operation against piracy”, Mission Statement. http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/ (accessed 20 November 2009).13 Ploch, Lauren, et al, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service( CRS) Report R40528, 2009. p.1714 Robert I. Rotberg, ‘Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action’, World Peace Foundation, Policy Brief #11, January 26, 2010: pp1-11:2

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Also series of IMO meetings with littoral states have promoted cooperation and developed a

Code of Conduct among the countries covering matters such as the prosecution of offences.15

Limitations to Use of Force

However, the challenge is that still, with only two dozen patrol ships on station, all manner of

small ship or casual dhow can and do evade land-based and now sea- and air-based surveillance

efforts. Anna Bowden, director of the London foreign-policy think tank Chatham House research

project is quoted by press to have said that though piracy costs were increasing tremendously,

what was more concerning is that all counter-piracy efforts are simply treating the symptoms and

almost nothing is being done to treat the root cause.16

It has been observed that despite all these measures, attacks in the waters off the East African

coast especially the Horn of Africa continue. What is clear is that the current defences used by

merchant shipping are not effective enough. The number of vessels captured increased month on

month throughout 2008.17 To illustrate this, during 2008, a gradual upsurge in pirate attacks

occurred off the east African coast, principally in the Gulf of Aden, and to a large extent in the

Indian Ocean off the Kenyan and Somali coasts. More than 60 ships were seized by pirates off

the Somali coast, and these attacks have continued into 2009.18 This indicates that the naval

15 IMO, “Piracy in Waters off the Coast of Somalia”, at www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=1178. Accessed on 7 Feb 2011.

16 Deccan Chronicle, ‘Somali Piracy costs world economy up to $12 bn a year’ New York, Friday, January 14, 2011 (http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2011/Jan/piracy_costs_world_economy_up_to_12_bn_a_year.aspx), Accessed on 7 Feb 2011.

17 Liam Bellamy, ‘What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy?’ Research Institute for European and American Studies (Rieas) Research Paper, No. 129, March 2009 (http://www.rieas.gr). Accessed 7 Feb 2011.18Donald R. Rothwell, Maritime Piracy and International Law, Crimes of War Project’s website, February 24th 2009 (www.crimesofwar.org)

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operations have several limitations. Most warships have restrictive rules of engagement and they

lack the national legal authority to arrest pirates and bring them to trial. The most serious

limitation, however, is the lack of resources in terms of the number of ships and surveillance

aircraft covering the piracy-prone waters. Comprehensive air surveillance is a basic requirement,

but there are insufficient military patrol aircraft. The United States has deployed surveillance

drones to the Seychelles, but these do not provide a visible deterrent to pirates. However, modern

warships and military aircraft, with their sophisticated military equipment, are in many ways too

much resource for anti-piracy operations. Cheaper and less well-armed coast guard vessels and

aircraft would be quite sufficient for the task. An even cheaper option would be to use civilian

aircraft under charter perhaps to the United Nations.19 Finally, many merchant ships fail to take

all appropriate precautions against attack; for example, there are still slow and vulnerable vessels

sailing in the area independently of the escorted convoys.20

In a nutshell, an assessment by this study reveals a number of different angles or levels from

which the counter-piracy measures can be looked at. First, there are the individual merchant

ships. Then there are naval escorts with their associated weapons and aircraft. Then there are

limitations imposed by the environment and by the nature of international law. Finally, there are

the pirates themselves, who as a group, constantly adapt and react. By their very nature, the seas

off the coast of Eastern Africa represent an attractive environment for pirates.

19 The Auditor-General, 2000, Coastwatch: Australian Customs Service, Audit Report no. 38, Canberra, Australian National Audit Office, p. 66.

20 See Sam Bateman, Sea piracy: some inconvenient truths, Disarmament Forum, Maritime Security, 2010

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The Gulf of Aden represents a vital conduit through which vast quantities of finished goods,

natural resources, and military supplies transit. For example, 4% of the world’s daily oil

production passes through the area as does 18% of the US and Europe’s combined yearly oil

imports.21 Given this area’s importance to the global economy, governments around the world

are contributing to attempts to secure it. Yet despite the fact that naval vessels from a host of

countries now patrol some two million square miles of the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, pirate

attacks continue. Seaborne counter-piracy efforts are mired by the very size of the ocean and

pirate tactics that adjust for defensive measures. For example, as merchant ships move further

out to sea, pirates increase their range via the use of larger more sea worthy mother-ships from

which smaller raiding boats are launched. Most defense analysts acknowledge that while the

unprecedented level of naval patrols in the area, conducted by more than fifteen nations, has

deterred some attacks, the area is simply too vast to prevent all incidents. When the MV Maersk

Alabama was attacked on April 8, 2009, the closest naval vessel, the U.S.S. Bainbridge, was

approximately 300 nautical miles away. Similarly, the U.S.S. Bainbridge was only able to arrive

on the scene of an aborted 14 April 2009 attack on the MV Liberty Sun a reported 6 hours after

the attack ended.22 As Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, the new commander of the European Union’s

anti-piracy operations, told the BBC in June 2009 “Illegal activity off the coast of Somalia is not

necessarily something which will get solved at sea. The solution lies ashore.”23

Comparison of Case Studies on the Efficiency on the Use of Force

21 “FACTBOX-Somali pirates risk choking key world trade route.” Reuters,(2008). http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LD681364.htm. Accessed 7 Feb 2011.

22 Ploch, Lauren, et al, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R40528, 2009. p.20

23 “Piracy ‘cannot be solved at sea.’” BBC (2009). Found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8115662.stm. Accessed 7 Feb 2011.

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A comparison of strategies of anti-piracy measures in the East African coast and those of the

relatively successful Malacca Strait show similarity in concept on use of force, but a difference

in tactics. The similarity is that both are involved increasing the amount of maritime patrol and

enforcement. The difference is that in the Malacca Strait the patrols were performed by the three

littoral states concerned and in the East African region the patrols have been performed by a

coalition of warships from the international community. In spite of the efforts of the international

community the number of pirate attacks in East Africa has increased, whereas those of the

Malacca Strait have tremendously reduced. This may be primarily due to the fact that East

African coastal states are logistically and financially challenged with maritime enforcement only

affecting the seaward side of the littoral. Further, some states in the East African coastal region

have weak internal structures aggravating piracy and lawlessness. On the other hand, in the Strait

of Malacca the affected littoral states are also able to exert control over the landward side of the

littorals. In short the counter-piracy policy for the Malacca Strait is stronger enforcement, has

more regional cooperation, and a better use of technology aimed at the detaining pirates at source

rather than in the high seas.24

Any landward efforts in Somalia for instance have provided no significant result. The East

African counter-piracy efforts apparently need local multilateral cooperation. In whatever

capacity initiatives to support or promote anti-piracy and related terrorism measures,

coordinating initiatives with other concerned littoral states and international organizations needs

to be emphasized as much as possible. An example of local multilateral cooperation is the “Eye

in the Sky” initiative inaugurated in 2005 among Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand.

24 Ong-Webb and Graham G., (eds), Piracy, maritime terrorism and securing the Malacca Strait, Pasir Panjang, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006. pp. 29-30.

10

The idea ostensibly aims at providing limited airborne surveillance over the Malacca Straits and

builds off the earlier Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (MASLINDO) accord. Under the initiative,

each participating country will make two planes available, and commit to flying two sorties a

week over the Straits. Therefore, for every seven days there will be at least 16 hours of continual

coverage over the waterway.25

Legal Considerations

Despite significant, unprecedented moves by the international community to address the growing

threat posed by maritime piracy, considerable legal challenges remain. It is clear that the current

legal regime is not comprehensive with respect to the enforcement of either international law or

domestic criminal law against those responsible for pirate attacks. The jurisdiction of a State

over acts of piracy is based upon nationality or territoriality. That is, there must be a genuine link

between the State and the ship, or between the State and the waters on which the offences take

place. Thus unless Somali courts are willing and able to conduct prosecutions, the responsibility

for enforcement will predominantly fall upon those members of the international community

whose ships are currently patrolling off the coast of Somalia. The ability of a State with a ship in

Somali waters to apply and enforce its own laws with respect to piracy and sea robbery will

depend on whether the pirate ship or the pirates have the nationality of that State. It will also

depend on the extent to which the national law of the enforcing state makes piracy a universal

crime which can be subject to arrest and prosecution anywhere throughout the world.26

25 Chalk P., The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States (Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2008).

26 Mario S., ‘Somalia: State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to International Law, Virginia’ Journal of International Law, Vol. 50:3

11

Although there is sufficient legal scope for robust anti-piracy measures, the question of whether

this is ultimately a police mission, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), or a

more tangible Chapter VII mandate of UN continues to vex political leaders.27 This indecision is

not only hampering deterrence, but also the prosecution of hijackers. For instance French

commandoes have used force to free hostages, but can only hold pirates until a judicial authority

can formally arrest them.28 Other countries like Portugal, Canada and many others have boarded

vessels with ample evidence of piratical attacks, but then merely returned pirates to home shores

rather than sealing prosecutions, due to domestic legal constraints.

The EU has however, entered an agreement with Kenya, the Seychelles and other prospective

countries that have facilitated the handing over of captured pirates for prosecution.29 France and

Netherlands have by-passed Kenya’s Mombasa piracy court by trying pirates directly, while UK

and U.S prefer to work through the Kenyan courts.30

Nevertheless, all States need to have the capacity under international law to prosecute persons

who perpetrate acts of violence against foreign ships in all settings, except within the internal

waters of other States. Counter-balanced against this however is that while states may be

prepared to offer their military support to ensure the safety and security of shipping lanes, the

reality is that, as has occurred in Somalia, some states will be reluctant to seek to prosecute the

offenders either because their legal regimes are inadequate or for political considerations.

27 Hulbert M., ‘Making Waves: Piracy Floods the Horn of Africa’, Centre for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich No. 55, June 2009, p.3 28 Ib Id., p.3

29 Ibid

30 Ibid

12

Some new initiatives are being explored to address these issues. On January 16 the United States

and United Kingdom signed agreements with Kenya allowing for the transfer of suspected

pirates to Kenya for trial. These arrangements are designed to facilitate prompt detention and

transfer of suspected pirates to the Kenyan criminal justice system. Through this arrangement,

the US naval forces in the Gulf of Aden have on different occasions detained more than a dozen

suspected pirates who have subsequently been arraigned in Kenyan courts for trial. There are

also proposals to consider the creation of a specialist international criminal tribunal to deal with

pirates.

There are significant obstacles to using international law to address the problem of Somali

piracy. The Somali government lacks any means to investigate, detain, or prosecute pirates

operating within its jurisdiction. Although UN maritime law makes piracy on the high seas

illegal throughout the world, this law has proven to be ineffective, as evidenced by the dramatic

recent increase in piracy in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, although the Security Council

resolutions authorize the pursuit of pirates into Somali waters, most nations have been reluctant

to take pirates into custody for prosecution in their own domestic courts.31

Conclusion

In conclusion, despite the large international response in the fight against maritime piracy in the

East African coast, piracy attacks have still continued to plague the East African waters with the

Horn of Africa being the epicenter. As Ross et al says, “It seems involvement in piracy is

31 Mario S., ‘Somalia: State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to International Law, Virginia’ Journal of International Law, Vol. 50:3

13

seemingly worth any perceived risks”32 Besides use of force, much emphasis should be placed on

the inland causes of piracy. The improvement of security in the territorial and high seas of the

coast of East Africa coast particularly Somalia is not enough. The anti-piracy plan should

addresses the economic aspect, because it seems pirates weigh the risks of engaging in piracy

and benefiting from massive rewards and non-engagement in countries “where legitimate

business is difficult, where drought means agriculture is nothing more than subsistence farming,

and instability and violence make death a very real prospect.”33

It is generally understood that in order to combat piracy in the East African Coast, a strategy that

addresses the problems other than security is required: It is argued that a durable solution for

ending piracy in the Horn of Africa will require improving security, stability, rule of law, and

economic opportunity in Somalia, as well as solidifying political progress by forming a unity

government and advancing the peace process.34 Vice Admiral William Gortney, Commander,

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, is quoted from his testimony before the House Armed

Services Committee, on 5 March 2009: “Ultimately, piracy is a problem that starts ashore and

requires an international solution ashore. We made this clear at the offset of our efforts. We

cannot guarantee safety in this vast region.”35 The quote emphasizes the fact that the economic,

social, and political factors should be directly addressed in a strategy to combat piracy at the East

African coast.

32 Ross, Shani, and Joshua Ben-David, “Somalia piracy: an escalating security dilemma.” Harvard Africa Policy Journal 5 (2008-2009): 55-70:58

33 Middleton R., “Piracy in Somalia--threatening global trade, feeding local wars.” Briefing paper, Chatham House, October, 2008 (http://www.chathamhouse. org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/665/ (accessed 18 November 2009).34Ploch, Lauren, et al, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R40528, 2009. p.27

35 Ibid.

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Furthermore, legal provisions are another limitation to the extent to which use of force and

international naval interventions can be applied. Basically, these are decisions that can only be

taken by governments and Inter-governmental Organizations. Whether Special Forces will be

allowed to operate openly on dry land and use 'hot pursuit' and how International Law and Rules

of Engagement should be applied are more of political than military decisions. In conclusion,

ship owners can only address the immediate problems thrown up by piracy. Navies can only do

as much as their political masters will let them - and that in itself may not be enough to do more

than contain piracy to within tolerable levels. It is governments and IGO's that must make the

final choice about the extent to which they wish to deal with piracy. But what should be borne in

mind, is Somalia might be the worse area for piracy, but the practice is spreading elsewhere too

and hence it may as well prove to be a test case.36

A broad guiding principle of the Strategy for Maritime Security in the East African coast is that

success in securing the maritime domain will not come from a state acting alone, but through a

powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united front. Military intervention and foreign

assistance require political consensus, political will, local partnership and significant

coordination in order to be successful. Maritime security efforts in the Persian Gulf, the

Caribbean, the waters of West Africa and the Strait of Malacca have had the same requirements.

While short term results in containing other transnational threats have proven to be achievable,

the long- term ability of international intervention to eliminate these threats is less certain in the

absence of committed and capable regional and local actors.

36 Liam B., ‘What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy?’ Research Institute for European and American Studies (Rieas) Research Paper, No. 129, March 2009 (http://www.rieas.gr). Accessed 7 February 2011.

15

The view held is that the current strategic plan to combat piracy by use of force only is

incomplete in that it does not acknowledge fully the factors contributing to piracy. The problem

of piracy in this region must be addressed both at sea and land. The fact that the total number of

attacks has increased, in spite of significant international effort, demonstrates that the strategy is

not effective. Central to this drawback is the Somalia country whose political fragility and

extreme poverty for instance, makes the strategy of vast international flotillas at sea combating

piracy not conclusive and productive. In the Horn of Africa, in particular Somalia will not be

easy.

This is why the next chapter will comprise of the case study which will be the impact of the

Somalia situation on the fight against Piracy in the East Coast of Africa. Somalia is at the heart

of the East African coast piracy. Issues of failed state, anarchy, conflicts and terrorism will

emerge in this proceeding chapter.

16