The Political Economy of Somali Piracy

Fowzia Abdi, Leonie Le Borgne, Ryan Coatalen-Hodgson, Allison Enns &

Krystina Kohler.

Central Question

• “What are the factors that make the Gulf Of Aden vulnerable to piracy?”

Thesis

• A historical lack of governance, indifferent/impotent international response and a proximity to huge wealth has made piracy a ‘weapon of the weak.’ (James Scott)

Scope

• International Relevance and Consequences• Somali Conflict History• Relevant Actors and Perceptions of Piracy• The Economy of Piracy• Theories Applicable to Piracy• Conclusions

What is the relevance to us?

Critical

In Danger

Foreign Policy2010 Failed States Report

Maritime Geography

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Regional Maritime Trade

• 8% of World Trade.• 33 Million TEU per

Annum.

• 50% of Europe’s Oil.• 3.2 Million Barrels Per

Day.

Routes

• Gulf of Aden is a crossroads for East-West trade.

• Economic Consequences of disruption:

• Closure of these sea lanes estimated to add 30% to prices of all freight.

From To NM Via Suez NM Via Cape Horn/Panama

% miles saved

Jeddah Piraeus 1320 11207 88

Tokyo Rotterdam 11192 14507 23

Ras Tanura New York 8281 11794 30

Colombo New York 8600 14073 39

Singapore New York 10133 12506 19

Economic Consequences

• Suez Canal was closed after 6 Day War in 1967; reopened 1975.

Feyer (2009)

Ungoverned Space?

Legality

• Very limited provision for enforcement within international law. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea states that :

• “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”Article 100, UNCLOS.

• “We lack a practical and reliable legal finish.”Admiral M Fox USNCommander 5th Fleet.

Historical Pattern of the conflict in Somalia

• Siyad Barre 1969-1991• 1977-1978• Somali military vs Somali National

Movement (SNM) 1988• Government forces vs growing number of

clan based liberation movements (1989-1991)

Historical Pattern of the conflict in Somalia

• United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), 1993-1994

• Post 9/11 the Arta Peace Conference in 2000• Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 2004

–current

Causes Of Somali Piracy

• Lack of government, security, and accountability (Political Piracy)

• Illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste (Defensive Pirates/Resource Piracy)

• Poverty and unemployment (Rational Choice)• Lack of legal and maritime counterstrategies

(Ransom Pirates)• Globalisation and technology

Regional Actors

Somali Pirates on a fishing vessel, January 6, 2012. (Tyler Hicks/The New York Times)

International Actors

Flying on board a Panther helicopter dispatched from the French frigate, Le Floreal, a crew member watches a commercial ship during a supervision mission on January 11, 2009, in the Gulf of Aden. (Stephane de Sakutin/AFP/Getty Images)

The Piracy Value Chain

Different Perceptions

• Sympathetic to pirates

• Pirates as criminals

• Linked to terrorists?

(REUTERS/Bundeswehr)

The Economy of Piracy

- Average ransom: $5 million - Total ransoms collected in 2011: $159 million

(HO/AFP/Getty Images)

Parachute dropping $3 million in ransom to pirates who hijacked the Sirius Star supertanker from Saudi Arabia

(REUTERS/David B. Hudson/U.S. Navy photo/Handout)

Pirate Network

Seized document from 2010 outlining the distribution of shares amongst pirate network (United Nations Security Council, 2011)

Cost of Piracy

The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011, www.oceansbeyondpiracy.org

Economic Impact on Somali Communities

People gather to collect their share of a ransom (REUTERS/Mohamed Ahmed)

Beneficial?

Or harmful?

Sign in Garowe that reads “No Pirates Allowed” (newyorktimes.com)

Theories

• Duffield:– Insured and non-insured/surplus population– Containment

• Rational choice theory/ Greed vs. Grievance – First grievance due to over-fishing and waste dumping,

slowly turned to greed, but not solely founded in greed.

– Islam’s role in order, not economy – Moral flexibility: “one man’s coast guard is another

man’s pirate”

“Robin Hood's conversion to royal archer may be a myth, but the myth records a practice.” Tilly: 1985: 173

Charles Tilly and Somali Pirates

Mancur Olson

Roving Bandits vs. Stationary Bandits

Samatar

• Moral economy • Conditions for piracy to exist • Types of pirates: resource, defensive, political,

and ransom.– A simplistic, unbalanced perception of piracy in the

West enrages Somalis • “Thus Somalis see the discourse on piracy as a

clear manifestation of the double standards used in the international system.” (1389)

Thesis

• A historical lack of governance, indifferent/impotent international response and a proximity to huge wealth has made piracy a ‘weapon of the weak.’ (James Scott)

What makes the gulf of Aden vulnerable to piracy?

• Geographical location• Historical conflict lawlessness• Proximity to wealth• External plundering of local resources

• What keeps this area vulnerable– A sticking-plaster approach rather than addressing

root causes.