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PHRONESIS,FAITH,ANDTHETASKOFENVISIONINGASOCIALGLOBALIMAGINARY2017SRSConferenceAbstracts

Boston,MA

1. PRESENTERSANDTITLES2. INDIVIDUALABSTRACTS3. PANELSATAGLANCE(pleaseseeseparatedocumentforpanelabstracts)

• DigitizationPanel• GraduatePanel1:Ricoeur’sMetaphorandAncientGreekPhilosophy• GraduatePanel2:Narrative(and)Identity• GraduatePanel3:RicoeurianEthicsandImagination• InterfaithDialogueinaPost-TruthDiscourse:MessianicJews• PaulRicoeurandCorneliusCastoriadisinDiscussion• Ricoeur’sPhilosophyofImagination

1.PRESENTERSANDTITLESSuziAdams CastoriadisandRicoeurontheHermeneuticSpiral:Creation,Interpretation,

Critique(SeePanelPaulRicoeurandCorneliusCastoriadisinDiscussion)RecepAlpyagil “…thestubbornnessoftheMarranosandthatoftheMoriscos.”:SomeRemarks

ontheAffinitiesbetweentheThoughtofRicoeurandDerridaStephanieArel CritiquingtheCircleofIdeology:APsychoanalyticandAffectiveExaminationHsueh-IChen Metaphor,Mimesis,NarrativeandIdentityintheContextofPaulRicoeur’s

ConceptionofCreativityBeatrizContrerasTasso Delasospechaalaafirmacióndelaconfianza-desí:ungestohermenéuticoenla

éticadelahospitalidaddeRicœurFrancescad'Alessandris NarrativeIdentityandReductionism.AComparisonbetweenPaulRicoeurand

DanielDennett(SeeGraduatePanel2:Narrative(and)Identity)BradDeFord Ricoeur’sVow:FaithandCreativeFidelityinRicoeur’sLaterLifeHessamDehghani TheCourseofMetaphor:RicoeuronFollowingthe‘Self’(SeeGraduatePanel1:

Ricoeur’sMetaphorandAncientGreekPhilosophy)MarcDeLeeuw FromCriticalHermeneuticstoCriticalPhronesis:Ricoeur’sSearchfortheJustMarie-HélèneDesmeules PaulRicœur,theStoryModelandtheJusticeProcess(SeeGraduatePanel2:

Narrative(and)Identity)DriesDeweer Ricoeur’sPoliticalPhilosophyandItsImplicationsforCivicEducationGeoffreyDierckxsens ImaginationandEmbodiedCognition:ApplyingRicœurtoEnactivism(SeePanel

Ricoeur’sPhilosophyofImagination)SeanDriscoll MetaphorasLexis:RicoeuronDerridaonAristotle(SeeGraduatePanel1:

Ricoeur’sMetaphorandAncientGreekPhilosophy)JosephEdelheit InterfaithDialogueinaPost-TruthDiscourse:MessianicJews(SeePanel

Description)VitaEmery NarrativeUnity,NationalUnityAdelaideFins L’idéologieetl’utopie:quelleidentitéetresponsabilitépourl’avenirde

l’humanité?DavidFisher PhronēsisandTragicWisdomGustavoGarcia SubtlerLanguages:PaulRicoeurandCharlesTayloronthePoeticsofReligion(with

BrianGregor)ChrisGenovesi ‘Seeing-as'andCognitiveContent.AnEpistemologicalViewoftheTheoryofthe

MetaphorofPaulRicoeurDavidGibson IdentityasFluidandRelational:ARicoeurianChallengetotheBioethicsof

PersonalIdentity(SeeGraduatePanel2:Narrative(and)Identity)GuidoGorgoni TheSubjectofRightsasaVulnerableSelf:ReconstructingtheIdentityoftheLegal

SubjectthroughtheIdeaofRecognition

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AdamGraves CuriousFreedom:WeaknessofWillfromAugustinetoRicoeurBrianGregor HumanCapabilityandUnionwithGod:Ricoeur’sHermeneuticsofReligionBrianGregor SubtlerLanguages:PaulRicoeurandCharlesTayloronthePoeticsofReligion(with

GustavoGarcia)ChristinaM.Gschwandtner Phronesis,Faith,andViolence:NarrativeIdentityandRhetoricalPraxisinReligious

CommunitiesTimoHelenius AtLeastaWager,PerhapsaLeap:Ricoeur’sKierkegaardCristalHuang PhronesisinNarrativeImaginationMornyJoy ActingandSuffering,FragilityontheWaytoEthicsSebastianKaufmann WhatDoesRicoeur´sIdeaofForgivenessTeachUsaboutHisConceptofAction?MichaelLeChevallier PracticalWisdomamongDisjointedInstitutionalWorlds:RicoeurandCatholic

SocialTeachinginDialogue(SeeGraduatePanel3:RicoeurianEthicsandImagination)

MarinaMarren Ricoeur’sMetaphoricProcessasPlato’sChora(SeeGraduatePanel1:Ricoeur’sMetaphorandAncientGreekPhilosophy)

GregMcKinzie "Soyothenwhat’syourstory?”:DavidFosterWallace,PaulRicoeur,andNarrativeIdentity(withBryanTarpley)

ToddMei ThePoeticsofMeaningfulWork:AnAnalogytoSpeechActsJamesMoore InterfaithDialogueinaPost-TruthDiscourse:MessianicJews(SeePanel

Description)FernandoNascimento PhroneticalDeliberationandToleranceRobertPiercey InstitutionalizingPhilosophyFrancescoPoggiani Appropriationvs.Attestation:Ricoeur’sContributiontoaNon-rationalistic

ConceptionofRationalAgency(SeeGraduatePanel3:RicoeurianEthicsandImagination)

ElysePurcell BeyondtheGenderedBody:PaulRicoeurandNarratingGenderedSpaceSebastianPurcell WorldandImaginary:PaulRicoeurandCharlesTayloronSocialRealityJeffreySacks Ricoeur’s“miracleofexchangeofroles”:AHopefulPlatformforRepairofthe

TraumatizedGlobalSocialImaginaryRogerSavage AGlobalImaginary?Phronesis,theRuleofJustice,andtheIdeaofaCommon

HumanityJimSisson PaulRicoeurandtheNecessaryFictionoftheGreatWarJohnStarkey TheRamayana,IntotheWoods,andTheRoadDanStiver CopingwithIdeology:RicoeurandDreyfusonanEmbodiedHermeneuticof

SuspicionNejmaTamoudi TheRicoeurian‘SocialImaginary’andtheQuestionofIntergenerationality(See

GraduatePanel3:RicoeurianEthicsandImagination)BryanTarpley "Soyothenwhat’syourstory?”:DavidFosterWallace,PaulRicoeur,andNarrative

Identity(withGregMcKinzie)GeorgeTaylor OntheCusp:RicoeurandCastoriadisattheBoundary(SeePanelonPaulRicoeur

andCorneliusCastoriadisinDiscussion)David-Le-DucTiaha Lesujetdutraumatismepsychiqueetlaculturedelapsychologieclinique,dela

psychiatrietransculturelleàlaphénoménologieherméneutiqueJohn-HarmenValk Phronesis,FaithandaDystopicLiberalGlobalEthicEvelienVanBeeck ImaginationinRicoeur:APossibilityofRe-enchantment?(SeePanelonRicoeur’s

PhilosophyofImagination)CristinaVendra FromTextandtotheSocialImaginary:PaulRicœuracrossTraditionand

InnovationLeenVerheyen Ricoeur’sConceptionofProductiveImaginationReconsidered(SeePanelon

Ricoeur’sPhilosophyofImagination)Wen-ShengWang RelationbetweenRicoeurandArendtRegardingNarrative

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2.INDIVIDUALABSTRACTSRecepAlpyagil(IstanbulUniversity,Turkey)“…thestubbornnessoftheMarranosandthatoftheMoriscos.”:SomeRemarksontheAffinitiesbetweentheThoughtofRicoeurandDerrida

ThereadersofRicoeurarefamiliarwiththedebatewithDerridaoverthestatusofmetaphorandamorerecentdiscussionaboutmemoryandforgiveness.TheconfrontationsbetweenthetwoFrenchphilosophershas continued toattract interest. In thispresentation, Iwill showanewaspectoftheseindirectencounters.TheMarranosandMoriscoswereJewsandMuslimslivingontheIberianPeninsulawhowereforcedtoconverttoChristianitybutmaintainedtheirownreligiouspracticesinsecret.Iwillputforwardthatthesetwonamesmayofferanewandmorepositive connection between our two thinkers. Derrida openly presents himself as a sort ofMarrano,particularlyinAporias,Circonfessions,ArchiveFeverandMonolingualismoftheOther.Forhim,inthemetonymicandgeneralizedfigureoftheMarranoistherighttosecrecyasrighttoresistanceagainstandbeyondtheorderofthepolitical,orevenofthetheologico-politicalingeneral.Similarly, theMoriscosaddtothisconnectionanadditionaldimension.Ontheotherhand,itseemsthatRicoeurindicatestheparallelpointthroughthe“kingdomoftheasif”.Thedoublecharacteroftheasifopensthewayforspeakingofquasi-plot,quasi-character,andquasi-event.

StephanieArel(TheNationalSeptember11Memorial&Museum/NewYorkUniversity,USA)CritiquingtheCircleofIdeology:APsychoanalyticandAffectiveExamination

InhisseminalvolumeIdeologyandUtopia,PaulRicoeurassertsthatpowerisnotonlycentraltotheinterplaybetween“ideology”and“utopia,”butitisalsorepetitious.Regardlessoftheformsideologies and utopias assume, Ricoeurmaintains, “one power imitates another” (298). Thisassertion raises questions concerning (affective)motivation and surplus value. The challengeRicoeurpositsattheendofhistextrelatestohow–ifever–weescapethecircleofideology,initsattemptstolegitimatepower,andutopia,initsattemptstoreplacepowerwithsomethingelse.Hesuggests that“the judgementofappropriateness,”andperhapsthesocial imaginary,“mayhelpustounderstandhowthatcirclebecomesaspiral”(314).Inthetext,Ricoeurconsidersself-reflectioninpsychoanalysisasamodelorprototypeforthecritiqueofideology,offeringtosocietywhatpsychoanalysisofferstheindividual–amethodormeansofovercomingresistance.Thisresistance,Iargue,isonebolsteredbyaffectivechargesmanipulatedbypowercontainedwithintheideologyitself.Inthisessay,usingapsychoanalyticandaffectivelens,Iexaminethedynamicsofideologiesandhowtheseoperatedrawingcorrelationswithtwofeaturesofpsychoanalysis.IprobethewaysinwhichthecirclebetweenideologyandutopiareplicatetheaffectivecomponentsofFreud’srepetitioncompulsion.Forinstance,thisindividualrepetitiouscyclecanbealteredbysublimation–thetransformationoflibidinaldrivesintomoresophisticatedformsofsocialachievements–whichIcontendconnectstoaspectsofRicoeur’sconceptofimagination.IalsoaddressRicoeur’srecognitionofthedualityinideologiesaspossessingbothintegrativeanddestructivefunctions,aligningthesewiththeirpsychanalyticcounterparts.Thesetermsechoonasocialscale1)thegoalofanalysis(integrationinCarlJung)and2)Freud’snotionofthedualdrivesErosandThanatos.Theprimaryfocusoftheessayhighlightshowindividual,affectivephenomena–operatingatthelevelofthepsyche–fosteramorerobustunderstandingofhowideologiesoperatesimilarlyonasocialandglobalscale.

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Hsueh-IChen(NationalTaiwanNormalUniversity,Taiwan)Metaphor,Mimesis,NarrativeandIdentityintheContextofPaulRicoeur’sConceptionofCreativity

Paul Ricoeur is a pre-eminent contemporary French philosopher. If postmodern thoughts areconsideredrevolutionaryagainstcontinentalphilosophy,thenhisphilosophycanberegardedasarathermoderate,butneverthelesscriticalreform.IncomparingRicoeurwithotherpostmodernphilosophers, the biggest difference is he vouches for the idea of reconstruction and not fordeconstruction.TheobjectiveofthispaperistoexploretheconceptionofcreativityincontextsofRicoeur’scoreideas.Liketheterm‘reconstruction,’‘creativity’isnotatypicalRicoeurianterm.Ifwelookattheissues of his concern, however, like symbol,metaphor,mimesis, narrative and identity, thesetopicsarerelatedtotheideaofcreativity.Ricoeurappearstoapplyhisideasofdistanciationanddetourtogainaccesstocreativity.Ricoeur’s different ideas of creativity are developed with the help of different conceptualstructures and refer to various disciplines.Metaphor, for example, refers to classical rhetoric,poeticsandimpactssemantics,semioticsandhermeneutics.Mimesis,narrativeandidentitydealwith problems of narratology, phenomenology, hermeneutics and analytical philosophy. TheproposedpaperwillattempttoapprehendRicoeur’sconceptionandmethodofcreativitywithregardtolinguistics,semantics,hermeneuticsandotherhuman-relateddisciplines.

BeartizContrerasTasso(PontificiaUniversidadCatólicadeChile,Chile)Delasospechaalaafirmacióndelaconfianza-desí:ungestohermenéuticoenlaéticadelahospitalidaddeRicœur

LaconfianzaesuntalantequeotorgasusellodistintivoalpensamientodeRicœur.Setrata,sinembargo, de una confianza diacrítica1, que no tiene un carácter ingenuo, pues brota de unatensiónirreductibleconlasospecha.Esenelejerciciohermenéuticoquedichaconfianzaseafirmaen la confrontación con una negatividad no suprimible, en los diversos registros de supensamiento(ontología,antropología,ética,lenguajeoreligión).Laoperatividadhermenéuticadedichaconfianzasepuederastrearenelcampoantropológicodelascapacidadesdelsímismo,esdecir,eneldesarrollodelaconfianzadesíengermenenlafenomenologíadelaFilosofíadelavoluntad (1950-1960), y desplegada en su obra madura. Dicho trayecto inicial arroja clavesimportantesacercadelacomposiciónhumanamixtaysufragilidadquerestituyenalaafectividadunestatutoepistémicoen lahermenéuticadelsímismo.Clavesqueorientanelanálisisde lascapacidadeséticas segúnunaarquitectura tambiénmixta: la sabiduríaprácticaes frutodeundelicadoentrecruzamientodeteleologíaydeontología.Laindagaciónonto-antropológicaancladaenlatensiónoriginariaentreafirmaciónynegatividades,anuestrojuicio,unabasefundamentaldelahermenéuticadelsímismo,desarrolladaenclaveéticaenSímismocomootrocomoyenCaminos del Reconocimiento. Nuestra hipótesis es, por tanto, que existe una conexiónhermenéuticafecundaentreontologíayéticadesplegadaenelrecorridolargodesdeelyopuedodelafenomenologíadelhombrefaliblehastaelyohagoenlahermenéuticadelhombrecapaz.Allíquedamanifiestaunaodiseadeordenético-ontológico-afectivoentresospechayconfianza.La vida buena compartida con otros en instituciones justas supone el afrontamiento de dicha

1Cf.R.Kearney, “Entre soi-mêmeetunautre: l’herméneutiquediacritiquedeRicœur”, enL’HerneRicœur,ÉditionsdeL’Herne,Paris,2004.

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tensión fundadora.Asimismo, sepuede rastreardemanera incoactiva laconfianzade sí eneltejidoafectivodelapasiónantropológicadelvaler,lacualmuestrasupotencialéticoenlarelacióndinámicadeestimadesíysolicitud.Concluyendo, explicitar dicha confianza incoactiva, arraigada en el fondo onto- antropológicodescrito, permite: a) ganar lucidez acerca de conceptos éticos ejemplares que la registran –promesa, convicción, perdón–, b) reafirmar la trama ética de las capacidades de atestación yreconocimiento, afrontando críticamente su amenaza de debilitamiento,mediante un trabajohermenéuticosobre la sospechayeldesconocimiento,arraigadosen lapasióndelvalerensuexpresiónegocéntrica.Estatareacobramayorfuerzahoy,sipermite,porúltimo,c)descifrarlosfactoresqueexacerbanuntempledesospechaqueafectaalasinstitucionesyalosvínculosentrelaspersonas,gestandosentimientosdedesconfianza,indiferenciaoexclusión,porsobrelosdehospitalidad.Lassituacionesdevulnerabilidadquerecorrenelpanoramamundialnosimpulsanadesarrollarunaimaginacióndenuevasformasdeemergenciadelaconfianza,potenciadasapartirdesupropiafragilidad.

BradDeFord(MarianUniversity,USA)Ricoeur’sVow:FaithandCreativeFidelityinRicoeur’sLaterLife

Inconsideringtherelationshipbetweenphronesisandfaith,IwanttobeginwhereRicoeurendshis“Interlude”on“TragicAction”inOneselfasAnother—thesectionhehasdedicatedtohisson,Olivier,afterhissuicide.Theconcludingsentenceofthatsectionreads:“Fromtragicphroneintopracticalphronesis: thiswillbethemaximthatcansheltermoralconvictionfromtheruinousalternativesofunivocityorarbitrariness.”(1994,249)What interestsme iscomparingwhatRicoeurwriteshereof tragicwisdomwiththepracticalwisdom thatmotivated his vow: “to remain alive until… and not for death,” as he puts it inMemory,History,Forgetting (2006,357). BothtextsarewrittenbyRicoeurduringperiodsofmourning:theInterlude,whilemourningOlivier;thebook,whilemourningSimone.Olivier’ssuicide,as“theinstructionoftragedy”(241),taughtRicoeursomethingaboutthelimitsof practical wisdom. In the Interlude, Ricoeur addresses the “agonistic ground of humanexperience” (243)usingSophocles’Antigone, andaffirming thenon-conceptualqualityof thepoetic. Heconcludes:“oneofthefunctionsoftragedy inrelationtoethics is tocreateagapbetweentragicwisdomandpracticalwisdom”(247). This“gap”representsthe“fault”-line inRicoeur’sethics,whichcanbeseenwhenhepointsoutthatAntigone’s“conviction”has“positedthelimitthatpointsupthehuman,alltoohuman,characterofeveryinstitution”(245).Ifthis“fault”or“gap”betweentragicwisdomandpracticalwisdomcutsthroughRicoeur’sethicalintentionof“aimingatthe‘goodlife’withandforothers,injustinstitutions,”italsoisreflectedinhisvow.HemadeitinitiallyduringatimeofSimone’sextendeddeclinein1996.Ms.GoldsteinputitthiswayinLivingUptoDeath:“Still,atthesametimetheanguishPaulfeltwassuchthat,contrarytoall [thatwashappeningtoSimone], inordertokeephimselfaliveheaddedtohismeetings,trips,andworkcommitments”(2009,92;emphasisadded).Here,inthecontextofthetragic,ofthe“agonisticgroundofhumanexperience,”Ricoeurmakesavowhedeemstohavepracticalvalue.Yet,thevowitselfwasdestinedtobetragic:forRicoeurdefined“life”asactivity:reading,writing,thinking.Inotherwords,Ricoeurmadeavowtowhichhecouldnotultimatelyremainfaithful,fordeathitselfwouldlimitthefidelityofhisintention.It is for this reason, to counterpoise Ricoeur’s vow, that I would consider Gabriel Marcel’s“creativefidelity.” Iamseekingto find inMarcelabridgeacrossthis“gap” inbothRicoeur’s

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ethicsandinhispersonallife.ItislessthatRicoeurwouldhavedonewelltohavereframedhisethics intermsof“aimingforthegooddeath,”thanthat,perhaps, ifhehadutilizedMarcel’ssenseof“creativefidelity,”hewouldhavebeenlessanxiousabout“nothingness”(2009,95)andmayhavebeenabletobemoreaffirming“thatthedeadpersonwhomwehaveknownandlovedremainsabeingforus…”(1974,149).JustasRicoeur“remainsabeingforus.”Inthisway,thepracticalwisdomofMarcelmightredeemthetragicwisdominRicoeur.References:Marcel,Gabriel(1974)CreativeFidelity.Farrar,StrausandGiroux,Inc.,NewYork,NY.Ricoeur,Paul(2009)LivingUptoDeath.TheUniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,IL.----------,(2006)Memory,History,Forgetting.TheUniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,IL.----------,(1994)OneselfasAnother.TheUniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,IL

MarcDeLeuuw(UniversityofNewSouthWales,Australia)FromCriticalHermeneuticstoCriticalPhronesis:Ricoeur’sSearchfortheJust

The final stage of the ethical-hermeneutical arch belongs to what Ricoeur calls a criticalphronesis.AsAristotleexplainsinBookVIoftheNicomacheanEthics,phronesisis“thatcapacityofdeliberatingwellaboutwhatisgoodandadvantageousforoneself”regarding“whatsortofthingcontributestothegoodlifeingeneral”(BookVI,1140a).Thecapabilityofthephronimos(wiseperson)isthatheorsheisgoodatknowingthenatureofthegood.Ricoeur’sfine-tuningoftheclassicalconceptcombinesaKantianreframing,albeitacriticalphronesis,withthepoeticforceofareflexivenarrativeself,andtheethicaldeficitevokedbytheunresolvableabsolutenessofthesingularityoralterityofothers.Whenconfrontedwithbothade-centeredsubjectandtheinfiniteunknownsourceofjustifications,allethicalandmoralpropositionsappearaspartofafundamental incompleteproject(thegeneralityofthegoodandourmoralruleshidethefactthat,ultimately,alldecisionsaremadeas"exceptions").Ricoeur's purpose is to understand howexceptions to normative rules aremade and can bejustified while avoiding to fall into absolute moral arbitrariness. The core of the validatedexceptionliesinaconditionbeyondthefundamentalmoralconflictorotherness.This“beyond”pointstoourdeepsenseofa"shared life",ofa"life incommon".Only if there isrecognition(wherebythisrecognitionalsopointstoashared imagining)ofourabsolutesingularitywithintheabsoluteofoursharedlife“theexceptiononbehalfofothers”(OA269)willguideourmoraldecision.Finally,Ricoeurreturnstothequestionofhowtoactwhenconfrontedwiththetragicconsequences of our moral positions as exemplified by the "mythical" ground of theincommensurable(e.q.Antigone’sblood-tiesvs.Creon’sstate-hegemony).Onlybykeepingthemoral exception in close proximity to the universal rule, so Ricoeur, and perceive even theuniversalasalways“inchoate”andincontext,theexceptionwillnotundotheethicalandmoralscheme.Inshort:theneedforexceptionsnaturallyemergesfromthereductiveviolenceofmoralprincipleswhichdonotrecognizeOthers,andthesingularpositionsandactstheyconfrontuswith,justliketheoverallcomplexitiesofliferesistgeneralization;itisinphronesisaspoetics–imagining a different ‘beyond’ - that Ricoeur discovers the ultimate grounding of ourmoralconvictions.This paper examines in more detail how Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics informs his criticalphronesis,andhowsingularityistheultimatetestfortheimaginingandrecognitionofasharedlife“withandforothersinjustinstitutions”.

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DriesDeweer(TilburgUniversity,theNetherlands)Ricoeur’sPoliticalPhilosophyandItsImplicationsforCivicEducation

In reaction to the social, economic, political and spiritual challenges in the aftermath of theSecondWorldWar,Ricoeurinquiredintothetaskofthepersoninhistory.ThisresultedinwhatRicoeur himself called a “political education”,which emphasized thedistinctness of differentaspectsofthecrisisinsociety(e.g.Lectures1,1991,241-57).Ricoeurespeciallydisentangledthesocio-economicandthepoliticaldimensionandstressedthefactthatasolutiontotheproblemsof society requires attention to theparticularity of bothdimensions.WhatRicoeur’s politicaleducationespeciallytaughtisthateveryenlargementofgovernmentpowershouldbemetwithanequalincreaseofciviccommitment,whichdoesnotonlyincludethepowerofcontestation,butalso thepowerofparticipation.Mypaperwill consistof twosteps. In the first step Iwilldeepen Ricoeur’s conception of political education by introducing elements from his laterpolitical philosophy. I will highlight two aspects in particular. First, Ricoeur does not divorcejustice from solicitude and self-esteem. This is grounded in his anthropology that relatesautonomytofragility(Soi-mêmecommeunautre,1990).Second,Ricoeurarguesthatatheoryofjustice struggles with a lack of meaning if rules of justice are not properly integrated in adialecticalrelationshipbetweenloveandjustice(AmouretJustice,1990).Basedonthesetwoclues,IwillreconstructaRicoeurianperspectiveoncitizenshipthatintegratescareandempathywithoutneglecting thedemandsof justiceand thenatureof thepolitical. This conceptionofcitizenship promises to strengthen the possibility of reintroducing solidarity as an essentialcomponentofwhatitmeanstosharemembershipinapoliticalcommunity.IwillarguethatthisRicoeurianperspectivechallengesustorethinkcommonconceptionsofciviceducationinliberaldemocraciesinthatitshiftsthefocusfromrightsawarenessandinstitutionalknow-howtothedevelopmentofpracticalwisdomandpoliticalemotions.

VitaEmery(FordhamUniversity,USA)NarrativeUnity,NationalUnity

Onequestionthatisoftenraisedabouttheselfiswhetherit isonedistinctentitythatcanbedescribedinthesamewayovertimeandthroughvaryingcircumstances.PaulRicoeur,inOneselfasAnother,positsthatthere issomethinggoodaboutthewaythatanarrativecancaptureasingleindividual’sexperiencesandchangesthroughtime.Yet,therearepotentialproblemswithunityasitrelatestobothanindividual’snarrativeandamorenationalnarrative.FirstIplantoexplorethebenefitsofunityastheyappearintheworkofRicoeur,AlasdairMacIntyre,andVictorFrankl. Though all three believe that unity is an important value in constructing a narrative,Ricoeur’sperspectiveismostreadilyappliedtothesocialandpoliticalspheres.ForRicoeurunityis a temporal concern, as a character draws his or her “singularity from the unity of a lifeconsideredatemporaltotalitywhichisitselfsingularanddistinguishedfromallothers.”(OneselfasAnother,147)Usingthisdefinitionofsingularity,unity,andtheirrelationshiptotime,Iwishtoexplorehowunityfunctionsatthenationallevel.Apoliticalregimetapsintoapeople’sbeliefthat theirnationhasonetruehistory thatcanbeunifiedby itsexpressionthroughtime.Thepeoples who find themselves under these regimes are also more likely to unify their ownindividualidentitytofitthemodeofthenation.Thisisatleastinpartbecausesuchregimesasktheirfollowerstounifytheirlivesarounddefendingagainstwhateveristheperceivedthreattotheirwayof life. Andthis“wayof life” isdefined inreferencetothesameperceivedunifiedhistory.Anadditionalproblematicaspectofthinkingthatanarrativeshouldbeaunifiedentityisthejustifyingrolethatunitycanplayforasubject.Whenpeoplefeelthattheyneedtohaveaunifiedpersonalidentitytheyseektojustifybehaviorstofeellikethesebehaviorsareconsistentwith the rest. A nation can problematically do the same thing. Therefore, if the category of

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narrativeisgoingtobeappliedtoidentity(bothpersonalandnational)weneedtore-thinkthecallforunity.

AdelaideFins(UniversitéSorbonne,France/UniversitédeCoimbra,Portugal)L’idéologieetl’utopie:quelleidentitéetresponsabilitépourl’avenirdel’humanité?

Dans l’Idéologieet l’utopie,PaulRicœur interrogelaconflictualitéde l’idéologieetde l’utopiedansunmêmecadreconceptuelafindemontrerlesfonctionscomplémentairesdecequ’onpeutdésignersouslestermesd’«l’imaginationsocialeetculturelle».Ricoeurfaiticiréférenceàdeuxinstancesquirendentpossiblel’activitéimaginairedansl’action.D’abordl’idéologie,quiestunensemblederécits,demythesetdediscourssociaux.Puisunedeuxièmefigure:celledel’utopie.Ilmontrealorsquechacunedecesnotionscomporteunsensnégatifetunsenspositif,un«rôleconstructif»etun«rôledestructeur»,unedimensionconstitutive,essentielle,etunedimensionpathologique.Or,sil’idéologiecomporteuneimaginationquiproduitduconsensus,l’utopieviseàremettreencausel’ententepourpenserunealtéritéradicale,cequi«n’apaslieu»,etquicomporteuneautredimensionsymbolique.Ainsi, l’utopieconstitued’aprèsRicœur«unrécitalternatif»oùl’activitéimaginaireinsistesurleretraitparrapportàcequiest,uneconsciencedenullepartquiconvoque la dimension éthique vis-à-vis du présent et du futur de la communauté humaine.Cette critique de l’idéologie et de l’utopie a d’importantes conséquences concernant l’agirhumain:sinousavonsbesoind’utopiepourcritiquerl’idéologie,ilnousfautaussidurêveetdes«variationsimaginatives»pourcomprendrelaconstitutiondel’identiténarrativeauseindelafonctionintégrativeouconstituantedel’idéologie,identitéquifaitsigneversunailleurséthique.Au delà de l’approche de l’imaginaire social, notre objectif dans cette analyse sera decomprendre la signification de l’action humaine développée par Idéologie et l’utopie sousl’horizon éthique, entre recherche de la vie bonne (Aristote) et éthique de la responsabilité(Ricœur,Jonas).QuellienentreL’idéologieetdel’utopieetledébatéthiqueprésentdansTempsetrécitetSoi-mêmecommeunautre?LestroistomesdeTempsetRécit(1983-85),ainsiquelacinquièmeetsixièmeétudedeSoi-mêmecomme un autre (1990), révèlent les enjeux de l’identité historique, fictive et véridique et –l’identiténarrativeestseulecapablederépondreà laquestion du«Qui?», faisantdès lorspencherlaquestionducotédelaresponsabilité.Ricœurfaitdumomentdel’ipséitélemomentdelaresponsabilité,etnouschercheronsàmontrerquesil’agirhumainestunmomentdelibertédansL’idéologieetdel’utopie,l’agiretl’identiténarrativesontdesinstancesquidonnentàlavieunitéetsagessepratique.SelonRicœur,nousentronsdansl’éthiqueparlaconfrontationàdesvaleurstransmisesparlesrécitsdevie,etnotrejugementchercheraparcebiaisàancrernosdécisionsdansunsystèmedevaleurs ;ainsid’aprèsRicœur, lebien-êtrehumainàcotédubonheur,du justeetde l’égalitéconstitue une valeur axiologique, qui ne s’impose pas de l’extérieur ni en référence à unedimension universelle, mais qui vient du dedans, du vouloir et du désir, un chemin fait deresponsabilitéquinousconduitdelasimplecommunicabilitéauxactionsdesollicitudeenversautrui,ycomprisceluiquiestfragileetvulnérable.Or, c’est justement, cettecapacitéd’initiativede l’hommeau regarddeson identitéetde saresponsabilitéquiseformeàpartird’untravailde lasubjectivitéquenoustenteronsdefaireressortiràlafindenotreanalyse.Nousconfronteronsainsil’heuristiqueoptimistedeRicœurà

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l’heuristiquedelapeurdeJonas(1990)afind’élaboreruncadreconceptuelpourunephilosophieéthiquedusujet.RicœurP.,L’idéologieetl’utopie,(trad.del’ouvragepubliéenanglaisen1986),Paris,Seuil,1997.---Dutexteàl’action,Essaisd’herméneutiqueII,Paris,Seuil,1986.---Tempsetrécit,3tomes,Paris,Seuil,1983-85.---Soi-mêmecommeunautre,Paris,Seuil,1990.---Lectures1,Autourdupolitique,Paris,Seuil,1991.Jonas,H.,LePrinciperesponsabilité,trad.J.Greisch,Paris,LeCerf,1990.

DavidFisher(NorthCentralCollege,IL,USA)PhronēsisandTragicWisdom

Phronēsis, as classically defined byAriosttotle and those influenced by him, is an experiencebasedhumancapacityofaphronemostoperceive,deliberate,andjudgeincomplexsituationsinvolving choice. A background requirement for phronēsis is a society with relatively stableboundaries, i.e. polity and institutions reflectiveof a shared tradition.Deinonphronēsis is anexperiencebasedhumancapacitytoperceive,deliberateandjudgewithinabackgroundofde-stabilized polity and institutions in which specific norms (or normativity as such) have beenquestioned,underminedorrejected;“darktimes”asunderstoodbyHannahArendt.1The difference between phronesis and deinon phronesis is the difference seeing in light andsensinginthedark.Aphronemosisattunedtothemeaningsofasharedcultureandseesthroughhisorherethos;hisorhercharacter. Inabsenceof theguiderailsprovidedbystablenorms,practitioners of deinon phronesis are attuned to the uncanny and nomi in flux, guided bycombinationsofnousandthumos.Theargumentofthefollowingremarksisthat“darktimes”producebackgroundconditionsthatdemanddeinonphronēsisandthatPaulRicoeur’saccountofphronēsis, informedby tragic thinking (inOnselfasAnotherandhisdialogueswithGabrielMarcel)providesresourcesfordevelopingaspectsofdeinonphronēsis.

GustavoGarcia(CaliforniaStateUniversity,DominguezHills,USA)SubtlerLanguages:PaulRicoeurandCharlesTayloronthePoeticsofReligion(withBrianGregor)

ThephilosophiesofPaulRicoeurandCharlesTaylorhavemuchincommon,insofarasbothareengagedinprojectsofphilosophicalanthropology,conductedinahermeneuticalkey.Bothhavewritteninfluentialworkonthephilosophyofaction,language,andtheroleofrecognitionintheconstitutionofidentity.Inthispresentation,wewillfocusonanotherareaofsharedconcern:thephilosophyofreligion.WhilereligionisastrongthemethroughoutRicoeur’swork,itonlyreallycomestotheforeinTayloroverthelasttwodecades,culminatinginhismonumentalworkASecularAge.AndwhileRicoeur’snameneverappearsinthebook’s800pages,ourpresentationwilldemonstratethattherearenumerousRicoeurianaffinities inTaylor’saccountof theconditionsofbelief inourtime.Indeed,inconversation,TaylorhascitedRicoeur(alongsideHeidegger)asakeyinfluenceonhisphilosophyofreligion.

1HannahArendt,MeninDarkTimes(NewYork:Harcourt,Brace&World,1968).

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LikeRicoeur,Taylor isparticularlyattunedtowhathecallsthe“crosspressures”ofbeliefandunbeliefinoursecularage,andisseekinganewhermeneuticsoffaith.Thisconcernisparticularlyevidentinthebook’sfinalchapter,whereTaylordiscussestheneedforanexpandingpaletteofreligiousexpressiontoarticulateoldtruthsanew.Hecitesseveralauthorsandpoetsasexamplesofthislinguisticcreativity:FlanneryO’Connor,WalkerPercy,CharlesPeguy,andGerardManleyHopkins. Taylor is particularly interested in the way Hopkins continues the tradition of theGermanRomanticsofthelate18thCentury,whohelpedtoshowthewaylanguageisconstitutiveratherthandesignativeandtherebyallowsnewmeaningtoemerge.TaylorcitesA.W.Schlegelto this effect: “How can the infinite be brought to the surface, to‘appearance’[Erscheinung]…? “Only symbolically, in pictures and signs’” (A Secular Age,p.756; The Language Animal, p.167). This insight regarding symbols is central to Ricoeur’shermeneutics of religion, but in a 2013 lecture Taylor notes that Ricoeur never explicitlyarticulatestheroleofthesymbol in1790sGermanRomanticism.Nonetheless,Taylor locatesRicoeurwithinthelineageofthisRomantictradition,anddoesdiscusshimonseveraloccasionsinhismostrecentbook,TheLanguageAnimal.Inthefinalsectionofourpresentationweexaminetheprospectsofthisconstitutive-expressiveview of poetic language for the philosophy of religion. We offer a case study of Herder’sphilosophyofreligion,sinceHerderiscentraltoTaylor’saccountoftheconstitutive-expressiveviewoflanguage.Thechallengeforanypoeticsofreligionistoshowhowtheworkofthehumanimagination can be genuinely poetic (i.e., creative, constitutive, or productive) while alsomaintainingthetranscendenceofdivinerevelationasawordthatisgenuinelyextranos.Herder,Ricoeur,andTaylorallseektomaintaintheintegrityofbothhumananddivine,buteachofthemhelpsustoseethatthecollapseofthedivineintothehuman(àlaFeuerbach)isanever-presentpossibilityforthepoeticsofreligiontobeware.

ChrisGenovesi(InstituteofCognitiveScience,CarletonUniversity,Canada)‘Seeing-as'andCognitiveContent.AnEpistemologicalViewoftheTheoryoftheMetaphorofPaulRicoeur

PaulRicoeurisoneofthetwentiethcenturiesforemostthinkers.Hismaneuverabilitybetweentheanalyticandcontinentaltraditionsallowedhimtodistillmajorcontributionstosemantics,semiotics,andmostimportantly,metaphorology.ButRicoeurismorethanagreatre-teller.Infact,Ricoeur’sextensivewritingsonmetaphorhavebeenat thecentreofanongoingdebatewithin the interactionist tradition, specifically, and philosophical research onmetaphormorebroadly.Thisdebateconcernswhatwemaycall,followingDonaldDavidson(1978),‘seeing-as’.Itreferstotheimpactthatthecreativefunctionofmetaphorhasinchangingourperceptionofthe world. The argument about perception-changing echoes that of Wittgenstein’s gestaltduck/rabbit:theimagechangesasweshiftourattentiontoentertaincertainaspects,wecanseetheimageasonethingoranother.Thegestalthasbeenusedasananaloguetounderstandingthesortofperceptionshiftinducedbymetaphor.Whatisgenerallyagreeduponbymetaphortheoristsisthat(‘living’)metaphorsdoinfactproduceanoverallnovelwaytoperceivetheworld,rather than simply making explicit some implicit similarity. The main disagreement centresaround the process of ‘seeing-as’. Certain theorists interpret Ricoeur’s metaphorology as acommitmenttoanontologicalprincipleresponsiblefordeterminingthestructureofexperience“wherethestructureofexperienceispriortoandconstitutiveofthehumansubject,theworld,andthe interactionbetweenthetwo”(Cazeaux,2007).This interpretationseemsto follow insomerespectsbynotingthatforRicoeur“thestrategyoflanguageatworkinmetaphorconsistsinobliteratingthe logicalandestablishedfrontiersof language, inordertobringto lightnewresemblances,thepreviousclassificationkeptusfromseeing”(1978,pp.201).Iarguethatthe

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language here is misleading, and that an ontological reading of the power of metaphoroveremphasizestherevelationthatitmakespossiblewithinRicoeur’stheory.AlthoughRicoeurrejectsanyexactknowledgeoforadequatelanguagefor‘thingsinthemselves,’hedoesnotthinkthatmetaphorisaworld-creatingprocess.Rather,Ibelieveamoremoderateviewofmetaphoremergesfromhiswriting.InclaimingthatRicoeurfocusesonhowmetaphorre-describesrealityIstressthatthisfunctionishermeneutic,notontological(i.e.,metaphorinterprets,notmakes,reality).AmoderatereadingofRicoeuriscommittedto(only)thefollowingthreepropositions(i) that metaphor exploits the semantics of language to novel ends, (ii) that metaphor hascognitivecontent,and(ii)thatmetaphorinvolvestheprocessofseeingonethingassomethingelse.Ibelievethismoderatereadingismoreaccurateinattestingtohisinsistencethatmetaphorisoneofthebestvehiclesforenrichingourexpressionandperception.ImakeexplicitmyreadingofRicoeurbycashing-outpropositions(i)-(iii)andprovideanimportantdistinctionbetweentwousesof‘seeing-as’(Hills,1997)thatcanassistusinnavigatingbetweenaviewofmetaphorasperception-changingandaviewofitasreality-changing

GuidoGorgoni(UniversityofPadova,Italy)TheSubjectofRightsasaVulnerableSelf:ReconstructingtheIdentityoftheLegalSubjectthroughtheIdeaofRecognition

By advocating the non-distinction between the Subject of Rights and themoral Self, Ricoeurclaimsfortheunityofthesubjectandthecoincidencebetweenthelegalandthephilosophicalfundamentalanthropology,whichisthatoftheattestationcarriedoutinOneselfasAnother,andthencompletedandrefinedinTheCourseofRecognition,asfundamentallydifferentfromtheCartesianCogito,whichshapestheidentityofthemodernlegalsubject.ThereconstructionidentityofthemoralSelfthroughtheideaofrecognitionandtheroleoftheOtherhavebeenwidelyexploredwithinthephilosophicalfield,lessattentionhasbeengiventotheimplicationsofthoseideasontheidentityofthesubjectofrights.RicoeurclaimsthattheSubjectofRightsandtheSelfworthyofesteemandrespectarenottobeseparateasbothfiguresultimately designate an incarnated agent, nevertheless things are not straightforward ifconsideredfromtheperspectiveofjurisprudenceandofthe(western)legalsystems,whichdoshapetheidentityoftheSubjectofRightsinaformalway.Overcomingthegapbetweenthetwofigurespresentssomedifficulties,buttheexerciseappearstobeworth,ifnotevennecessaryforfacingsomeofthedifficultiesoursocietiesareconfrontedto (ranging from the management of the ecological crisis to the issues of migrations, forexample), answers to which are too often given under the form of a contingent reaction.Reconstructing the fundamental legal anthropology in the prism of the idea of recognitionintroducesvulnerabilityasadefinitionalfeatureoftheSubjectofRights,whichthenisirreducibletoapurelyformalabstraction;furthermoreimputationbecomesapositiveformofbothethicalandlegalcapacityoftheSelf(thehighest,inRicoeur’swords)ratherthantheformalconditionofbeingaskedtogiveanaccountorbeingliabletosanction.Ifrecognitioncanbeunderstoodthroughtheformsofitsdenial,asHonnethstresses,thennotonlyvulnerabilitybecomesadefinitionaltraitofthefundamentalethicalandlegalanthropology,butinturnthelawbecomesacrucialelementthroughwhichrecognitionhastobemediated.Interestinglyenough,vulnerabilityseemstoemergenowadaysasanewinterpretativecategoryin the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, invoked in order to grantfundamentalrightsamoreadequatesubstantialprotectionbypermittingtobetterassessingandadjustingtheeffectivenessofthelegalguaranteesintheindividualcase.

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Thisrecognitionofindividualvulnerabilitynotonlyre-establishestheequilibriumbetweentheparties(whichistheshorttermendoftheactofjudging),butonthelongerendhastheeffecttoempowerthesubjectbyrecognizinghisidentityofabothlegalandmoralself,thatisasubjectofrightsandaresponsibleagentatthesametime.ThiscontributionaimsatexploringtheimplicationsofthesesuggestionsmadebyRicoeurwithinthefieldoflegaltheory.

AdamGraves(MetropolitanStateUniversityofDenver,USA)CuriousFreedom:WeaknessofWillfromAugustinetoRicoeur

Throughout his early philosophy of thewill, Ricoeur traced the contours of human freedomagainstthebackdropofacertainconceptionofdivineorabsolutefreedom,whichservesasalimitingidea(intheKantiansense).Humanfreedom,forRicoeur,isaspassiveasitisactive,asdeterminedasit isdetermining,andasreceptiveasit iscreative.Eventually,Ricoeurcametodescribethisfreedomintermsofaservilewill,aboundorcaptivefreedom.Inthispaper,Itrytomakebettersenseofthisseeminglycontradictorynotionoffreedombysituatingitwithinthecontext of the classic problem(s) of the weakness of will, and specifically, by showing howAugustine¹scharacterizationofthisproblem(whichclearlyhadaprofoundimpactonRicoeur)differed from earlier treatments, such as those found in Plato's and Aristotle¹s discussion ofakrasia.

BrianGregor(CaliforniaStateUniversity,DominguezHills,USA)HumanCapabilityandUnionwithGod:Ricoeur’sHermeneuticsofReligion

Thisyear Iwould liketopresentsomethingofareconsiderationofRicoeur’shermeneuticsofreligion,inparticularitsfocusonthethemeofhumancapability.AccordingtoRicoeur,l’hommecapable is theaddresseeof religion. That is to say, religionaims to (re)constitute theselfascapable—inparticular, capableof the good. Where thewill is bound, captive to radical evil,religionaimstoliberatethewillandrestoreitsfreedomforGod,others,anditself.ThefirstsectionofmypresentationwillshowhowthethemeofhumancapabilitydevelopsinRicoeur’shermeneuticsofreligion.Hisessaysonreligionandbiblicalhermeneuticsinthe1960sand1970sextendstheworkhewasdoinginthePhilosophyoftheWill,andallowsustoenvisionsomethingofwhatthethirdvolumeofthetrilogy—ThePoeticsoftheWill—mighthaveincluded.Iwillarguethatthethemeofcapabilityisimplicitintheseessays,bothinthewaytheyfocusontheregenerationofthewillaswellasthewayreligiousdiscoursemakesuscapableofnamingGod.Thereisanimportantadvancetowardthethemeofcapabilityinthe1980swithRicoeur’sGiffordLectures andOneself as Another. There the theme of capability emergeswith the self whospeaks,whoacts,whonarrates,andassumesresponsibility.Thefinaltwolectures,“TheSelfintheMirrorofScriptures”and“TheSummonedSubject,”examinethewayinwhichthefiguresofreligiousdiscourseconstitutetheselfascapableofunderstandingitselfandofrespondingtothedivinecallinitsvariousmodes.ThesecondsectionofmypresentationconsiderstheinfluenceofKantonRicoeur’shermeneuticsofreligion.RicoeurfollowsKantinhisphilosophicalinterpretationofreligion,andalthoughhe

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cites certain limitations of Kant’s position (such as the lack of an account of the religiousimagination),hisprojectisfundamentallyKantian.WhilethisKantianprojectgivesusexcellentinsightintotheroleofreligionintheregenerationofthewill,itneglectsanothercrucialfeatureofthereligiouslifeinmanyofitsdiverseforms:thedesiretoknowGodandbeunitedwithGod.Kantofcoursediscardsthisconcernwhenhedeniesknowledgeinordertomakeroomforfaith,therebyshiftingreligiousquestionsfromthetheoreticaltothepractical.Kantgiveshisreasonsforthisinhiscriticalphilosophy,andRicoeurfollowsKantininsistingonthelimitsoftheoreticalreasonandthedangersofdialectical illusion. WhilethismaybeappropriatetoKant’scriticalphilosophy, it leaves anoversight inRicoeur’s hermeneutics of religion. If the aimof such aprojectistounderstandreligiousphenomenaastheyaremediatedbyreligiousdiscourse,thensuchaprojectneedstotakeintoconsiderationthedesireforknowledgeofandunionwithGod—albeitarelationalknowingthatconsistsinfaithratherthanobjectivecognition.

BrianGregor(CaliforniaStateUniversity,DominguezHills,USA)SubtlerLanguages:PaulRicoeurandCharlesTayloronthePoeticsofReligion(withGustavoGarcia)

ThephilosophiesofPaulRicoeurandCharlesTaylorhavemuchincommon,insofarasbothareengagedinprojectsofphilosophicalanthropology,conductedinahermeneuticalkey.Bothhavewritteninfluentialworkonthephilosophyofaction,language,andtheroleofrecognitionintheconstitutionofidentity.Inthispresentation,wewillfocusonanotherareaofsharedconcern:thephilosophyofreligion.WhilereligionisastrongthemethroughoutRicoeur’swork,itonlyreallycomestotheforeinTayloroverthelasttwodecades,culminatinginhismonumentalworkASecularAge.AndwhileRicoeur’snameneverappearsinthebook’s800pages,ourpresentationwilldemonstratethattherearenumerousRicoeurianaffinities inTaylor’saccountof theconditionsofbelief inourtime.Indeed,inconversation,TaylorhascitedRicoeur(alongsideHeidegger)asakeyinfluenceonhisphilosophyofreligion.LikeRicoeur,Taylor isparticularlyattunedtowhathecallsthe“crosspressures”ofbeliefandunbeliefinoursecularage,andisseekinganewhermeneuticsoffaith.Thisconcernisparticularlyevidentinthebook’sfinalchapter,whereTaylordiscussestheneedforanexpandingpaletteofreligiousexpressiontoarticulateoldtruthsanew.Hecitesseveralauthorsandpoetsasexamplesofthislinguisticcreativity:FlanneryO’Connor,WalkerPercy,CharlesPeguy,andGerardManleyHopkins. Taylor is particularly interested in the way Hopkins continues the tradition of theGermanRomanticsofthelate18thCentury,whohelpedtoshowthewaylanguageisconstitutiveratherthandesignativeandtherebyallowsnewmeaningtoemerge.TaylorcitesA.W.Schlegelto this effect: “How can the infinite be brought to the surface, to ‘appearance’[Erscheinung]…?“Onlysymbolically,inpicturesandsigns’”(ASecularAge,p.756;TheLanguageAnimal,p.167).ThisinsightregardingsymbolsiscentraltoRicoeur’shermeneuticsofreligion,butina2013lectureTaylornotesthatRicoeurneverexplicitlyarticulatestheroleofthesymbolin1790sGermanRomanticism. Nonetheless,Taylor locatesRicoeurwithinthe lineageofthisRomantic tradition, and does discuss him on several occasions in hismost recent book, TheLanguageAnimal.Inthefinalsectionofourpresentationweexaminetheprospectsofthisconstitutive-expressiveview of poetic language for the philosophy of religion. We offer a case study of Herder’sphilosophyofreligion,sinceHerderiscentraltoTaylor’saccountoftheconstitutive-expressiveviewoflanguage.Thechallengeforanypoeticsofreligionistoshowhowtheworkofthehumanimagination can be genuinely poetic (i.e., creative, constitutive, or productive) while also

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maintainingthetranscendenceofdivinerevelationasawordthatisgenuinelyextranos.Herder,Ricoeur,andTaylorallseektomaintaintheintegrityofbothhumananddivine,buteachofthemhelpsustoseethatthecollapseofthedivineintothehuman(àlaFeuerbach)isanever-presentpossibilityforthepoeticsofreligiontobeware.

ChristinaM.Gschwandtner(FordhamUniversity,USA)Phronesis,Faith,andViolence:NarrativeIdentityandRhetoricalPraxisinReligiousCommunities

ThispaperdrawsonthreepolesofPaulRicoeur’sworkinordertoexaminehowparticularsocialimaginaries can be shaped within religious communities and to what extent narrative andrhetoricfunctionwithinsuchcontextseithertoencourageexclusionandviolenceortofostercompassionandpeace.ThefirstprongreliesonhisworkonthemimeticfunctionofnarrativeinTimeandNarrativeandothertextstoshowthewaysinwhichnarrativecanservetoshapeactionwithin theworldand thecreationofa specific social imaginary inwhich suchaction finds itsmeaning.Thesecondpolederivesfromhisdiscussionofphronesisinthe“littleethics”ofOneselfasAnother (chapters7-9),which is curiouslydisconnected fromhisdevelopmentofnarrativeidentityintheimmediatelyprecedingchapters(chapters5-6).ThethirdsourcewillbeRicoeur’sanalysisofbiblicalhermeneuticsandreligiousnotionsoftheselfinvariousshortertexts(manyofwhicharecollectedinFiguringtheSacred),whichrarelyexploreanyexplicitsocialorpoliticaldimensions of religion (be they violent or peaceful). The presentation will bring these threeaspectstogether—inawayRicoeurhimselfdoesnotdo—inordertotracetherolenarrativeanditsoftenhighlyrhetoricalinterpretationcanplayintheformationofreligiousidentityandthepotentialofsuchnarrativeinterpretationtoshapethesocialimaginaryofitsadherentsineitherdestructivelyviolentorcompassionatelypeacefulways—andtoshowthecrucialroleanarrativeformofphronesisplays in the latter.Thepresentationwill“test” theseconnections inabriefcomparison of the inflammatory rhetoric of Cyril of Alexandria with the far more generousrhetoricofhiscontemporaryEphremtheSyrian.Bothwriteinsimilarcontextsandoftendrawonthesametexts,yettheirhermeneuticpracticesandthesortsofsocialimaginarytheirverydifferentinterpretationsfosteraretelling,ontheonehandhelpingusseehowreligiousviolencemay emerge or be justified, on the other hand giving us hope that the supposed “wisdomtraditions”doindeedhavethenarrativephroneticpotentialtoteachcompassionandpeace.

TimoHelenius(BrownUniversity,USA)AtLeastaWager,PerhapsaLeap:Ricoeur’sKierkegaard

GiventhealmostabsolutelackofreferencestoKierkegaard(onlytwice,bothinpassing)inthelargecollectionofessaysintheLibraryofLivingPhilosophersvolumeonRicoeur—includinghispersonalresponsestoeachofthem—itissafetostatethatintheeyesofRicoeurscholarshipKierkegaard has not been considered formative for Ricoeur’s thought.Neither is Kierkegaardpresent in Charles E. Reagan’s Paul Ricoeur: His Life and His Work, nor in Reflection andImagination:ARicoeurReader (editedbyMarioJ.Valdés). Intheseworksandintheincludedinterviews, Ricoeur himself remains silent about Kierkegaard’s potential contributions to hiswork.There are, however, some scholarly texts that probe into this question of a potentialphilosophicalinfluence.1ThesefewexistingtextsonRicoeur’sindebtednesstoKierkegaardtake

1VanessaRumble,"NarrativeandFinitudeinKierkegaardandRicoeur,"inSørenKierkegaardandtheWord(s):EssaysonHermeneuticsandCommunication,ed.PoulHoueandGordonD.Marino(Copenhagen:C.A.Reitzel,2003).;PierreBühler,"RicoeuretKierkegaard,"Revuedethéologieetdephilosophie138,no.4(2006).;JoelD.S.

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two of Ricoeur’s 1963 essays as their focal point. Both “Kierkegaard and Evil” and “DoingPhilosophyafterKierkegaard”areunderstandablyintheinterestsofthescholarsmappingthecontinuity of Kierkegaard’s thought in the work of subsequent thinkers, but such limitedapproachstillleavesmuchroomforaskingwhetherandhowKierkegaardinfluencedRicoeur’sworkasawholeinanymeaningfulmanner.Thatthereissomedefiniteinfluenceandinterestbeyondthemoregeneralaspectsandthemes(thatarepresentinmanytextsthatcarryaChristianexistentialundertone)is,Iclaim,apparentinRicoeur’sadmission—madedistinctlyfromthetwoessays—thatintermsofhisearly,albeitalso lasting, interest inphilosophical anthropology (thatheunderstands tohavebecome “anurgenttaskforcontemporaryphilosophy”2),Kierkegaardshouldbeacknowledgedasasourceofphilosophicalsupportforhim:“itisperhapsKierkegaardwhogetsclosesttotheinitialintuitionofourinquiry.”3Inthelightof“theproblemoftheinnerdisproportionwithinhumanbeingsoroftheirantinomicalstructure,whereintheyfindthemselvesdistendedbetweenaninfiniteanda finite pole”4 in particular, Ricoeur’s stance is strikingly Kierkegaardian—this is clear fromRicoeur’sbriefcommentaryofKierkegaard’sSicknessuntoDeath.5KeepinganeyeonRicoeur’sphilosophicalanthropology inparticular, thispaperwillmapoutRicoeur’sexplicitinterestinKierkegaardinthecorpusofhismajorworks.Eventhoughmanyofthese references are made passim, it is possible to construe a humbly withdrawingKierkegaardiananthropologyinRicoeur’sworkthat,Iclaim,isneverthelessfirmlypresentandwhichwillshedsubstantiallighttoRicoeur’santhropologicalthoughtasawhole.Whilethepaperwill pay special attention to the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary—or that offinitude and the infinite—the last section of the paperwill present an overview of Ricoeur’sphilosophyofwagersasareflectionofKierkegaard’sphilosophyoftheleap.

CristalHuang(SoochowUniversity,Taiwan)PhronesisinNarrativeImagination

Thispaperaimstore-thinknarrativetheologyinviewofRicoeur’snotionsofphronesisandthenarrative imagination. By first situating phronesis in relation to the concepts of “poiesis”(production) and “prosthesis” (addition), this paperwill show how practicalwisdom involveswhatHans-GeorgGadamerdescribesasaprocessofdifferentiationwithrespecttocertainkinds

Rasmussen, "Paul Ricoeur: On Kierkegaard, the Limits of Philosophy, and the Consolation of Hope," inKierkegaard'sInfluenceonPhilosophy,ed.JonStewart,KierkegaardResearch:Sources,ReceptionandResources(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2012).; Alison Scott-Baumann, Ricoeur and the Negation of Happiness(London-NewDelhi-NewYork-Sydney:BloomsburyAcademic,2013).70-75.2PaulRicoeur,PhilosophicalAnthropology,trans.DavidPellauer,vol.3(WritingsandLectures)(Cambridge,UKandMalden,MA:PolityPress,2015).1.3Ibid.,5.4Ibid.,2.5“InTheSicknessuntoDeath,consciousness(theself)isdefinedinaslightlyskewedfashionas‘arelationthatrelatestoitself[freedom]andinrelatingitselftoitselfrelatesitselftoanother[God].’Whatrendersthisrelationtoanabsoluteotherunstableisthattherelationtooneselfis,Kierkegaardsays,a‘synthesisoftheinfiniteandthefinite.’ForKierkegaard, the infinite is the imaginationthatpurveysunlimitedpossibilities; finitude is thefiniterealizationof life intermsofa family,a job, thestate.Despair, fromwhicharisessinandwhich issin,betrays the finite through some fantasized existence, onewithout any duty or connections, or betrays theinfinitethroughatrivial,obedient,philistineexistence.Inthisway,theintuitionofanunstablemixture,whichmakesupthedualityofhumanexistencethatwereferredtoatthestart,standsoutinKierkegaard.”Ricoeur’sonlyobjectionorslightcriticismisthat“Kierkegaard’sdiscourseisstillrhetorical,stillaconfession,anappealfromonehumanbeingtoanother.”Ibid.,5-6.

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ofoperationsandpractices.ThispreliminaryanalysiswillthenallowustoseethesignificanceofRicoeur’sapproachtopoeticnarrative,specificallyhowthenarrativeimaginationisessentialtothe operations and practices derived from that narrative. In other words, the narrativeimaginationenablesarelation—imaginative,conceptual,personal.IfAristotle’snotionsofphronesisandpoiesisplayapivotalroleinRicoeur’stheoryofnarrativeimagination then Gadamer’s account of poiesis/production is germane: “The old Aristoteliandistinctionbetweenpracticalandtheoreticalknowledgeisoperativehere—adistinctionwhichcannotbereducedtothatbetweenthetrueandtheprobable.Practicalknowledge,phronesisisanotherkindofknowledge.”1Accordingly,thispaperwillshowthattheactofproducinghelpstoformpracticalwisdom.Authors,designers,etc.maygainmorewithrespecttopracticalwisdomwhen engaged in the act of producing. For Gadamer, as John Arthos argues, the concept ofpoiesisisafundamentalmodeofexistingandunderstanding.Gadamerthusplacespoiesisinamore central role than Ricoeur.2 Bearing this difference in mind, one can say where poeticexperience is key toGadamer in termsof nurturing practicalwisdom, forRicoeur that key isnarrative temporality. The phronesis in narrative imagination provides our world multipledimensionsthroughimaginaryproductionandhermeneuticaddition.Practicalwisdomfromthisperspectiveenrichesourworldinnarrativeimagination.

MornyJoy(UniversityofCalgary,Canada)ActingandSuffering,FragilityontheWaytoEthics

TheworkofHannahArendthadaprofoundinfluenceoncertainaspectsinthedevelopmentofPaulRicoeur’sphilosophy,e.g.theconceptof“who”and“what”(2005:253)and“promising”and“pardon”(2005:131-2).Inapreviouspaper,ItracedanotherofRicoeur’sjourneyswithArendtashe refinedandexpandedhisownphilosophical understanding,movingdelicatelybutwithdeliberation fromthenotionof“fallibility”as fault inhisearlywork, to thatof“fragility”andvulnerability.ThispaperexploresanotherofRicoeur’sjourneys–promptedbyArendt’swork–engagingwithherwritingsonactingandsuffering.ItprovidesRicoeurwithanimpetustoincludehumansufferinginhistreatmentofaction.InTheHumanConditionArendtacknowledges:“Becausetheactoralwaysmovesamongandinrelationtootheractingbeings,heisnevermerelythe“doer”butalwaysandatthesametimeasufferer.Todoandtosufferarelikeoppositesidesofthesamecoin,andthestorythatanactstartsiscomposedofitsconsequentdeedsandsufferings”(1958:169).ThisquotebelongstoasectioninArendt’schapteronactionentitled:“TheFrailtyofHumanAffairs.”HereArendtalsoemploystheterm“frailty/fragility”toindicatethedireinjuriesandseverepunishmentshumanbeingscaninflictontheirfellowhumans.In1983,theFrencheditionofArendt’sTheHumanCondition(LeConditiondel’hommemoderne)waspublished,forwhichRicoeurwroteapreface.AnEnglishversionofthiswaspublishedinthejournalSalmagundi,No.60,Spring-Summer1983:60-72. In thisarticleRicoeurobserves:“Thelife-storyproceedsasacompromisefromtheencounterbetweentheeventsinitiatedbymanastheagentofactionandtheinterplayofcircumstancesinducedbythewebofhumanrelationship”

1Hans-GeorgGadamer,TruthandMethod(NewYork:Bloomsbury,2013),p.20.2JohnArthos,"WhereisMuthosHidinginGadamer'sHermeneutics?Or,theOntologicalPrivilegeofEmplotment",GadamerandRicoeur,Ed.ByFrancisJ.MootzIIIandGeorgeTaylor(NewYork:Bloomsbury,2012)pp.119-141,on120.

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(1983:67).Aroundthisperiodin1984,RicoeurreportshiscompletionsofhisactualwritingofthethreevolumesofTimeandNarrative(Ricoeur,“IntellectualAutobiography”inHahn1995:48).Inthissameretrospectivearticle,Ricoeurruminatesabouthissubsequentdirections.Hestates:“The third direction that my inquiry took had to do with the component of passivity or ofothernessthatself-identitywastoassumeasacounterparttotheproudinitiativethatwasthedistinctivemarkofaspeaking,acting,andself-narratingsubject….[thisinvolved]thetakingintoaccount[of]theprimordialsufferingwhichappearstobeinseparablefromhumanaction”(49).It is obvious, however, that Ricoeur’s awareness of human suffering will not just treat thepassivityorbeing-acted-uponthatArendtinitiallyproposed.Instead,itwillencompassthefullrangeofmeaningsthatArendtemploys,includingfragility.Ricoeurwillcontributedeeplymovingreflectionsthatbothwitnesstohisanguishandinitiatehisvitalmovetowardethics.InalaterinterviewRicoeuradmitstoCharlesReaganthathewasnotcompletelysatisfiedwithhisGiffordlectures,admitting:“Ikeepsayingthatinstories,inhistory,innarrativeofallkindswehavetodowithactingandsufferingpeople.Infact,allmyworkisaboutacting,butnotaboutsuffering.I try to cast a glanceat least in thatdirection throughethicsbecause it is anaccess…to theproblemofvictimizationwhichkeepsgoingonthroughhistory”(RicoeurinReagan1996:113).Mypaperwillendeavourtotrace inmoredetailRicoeur’sexplorationsashe incorporateshisownvisionofhumansufferingandfragilityintohisontologicalframeworkthatembracesethicsandcapability,andthatultimatelydifferentiateshisworkfromthatofArendt.

SebastianKaufmann(UniversidadAlbertoHurtado,Chile)WhatDoesRicoeur´sIdeaofForgivenessTeachUsaboutHisConceptofAction?

InMemory,History and Forgiveness, Ricoeur affirms that forgiveness can be explained as thepossibilityofseparatingthepersonfromtheevilthatshehasdone:

“Underthesignof forgiveness, theguiltyperson is tobeconsideredcapableofsomethingotherthanhisoffensesandhisfaults.Heisheldtoberestoredtohiscapacityforacting,andaction restored to its capacity for continuing. This capacity is signaled in the small acts ofconsiderationinwhichwerecognizedthe incognitoofforgivenessplayedoutonthepublicstage.And,finally,thisrestoredcapacityisenlistedbypromisingasitprojectsactiontowardthe future. The formula for this liberatingword, reduced to thebarenessof itsutterance,wouldbe:youarebetterthanyouractions”

Thisideahasbeenanalyzedasakeypartofhistheoryofforgiveness.However,ithasnotreceivedthesameattentionfromtheperspectiveofthetheoryofaction.WhatRicoeuristellingusaboutactionhere?Forexample,heisaffirmingthatouroffensesandfaultscanimpedefutureactionsand that thepersonwho is granting forgivenessmustmake the restorationof the capacityofactingoftheevildoer.IsitdifferentthisideaofactionfromwhatRicoeurtellsusaboutactioninotherworkswhereheexplicitlyreferstothenatureofaction,forexampletowhatissaidinTimeandNarrativeorinTheModeloftheText:MeaningfulActionConsideredasaText?InthispaperIwillaffirmthattheideaofactionthatispresentedinRicoeur´stheoryofforgivenessiscoherentwiththeideaofactionthatispresentinothertexts,butatthesametimecanserveasabridgetocomplementhisnotionofactionwithotherimportantconceptssuchasrecognition.InthefirstpartofmypresentationIwillintroduceRicoeur´sideaofactioninMemory,HistoryandForgetting.InthesecondpartandIwillcompareitwithothertextswhereactionisexplicated.Inthe conclusion, I will show how the idea of action presented in his reflection on forgivenessenricheshisgeneraltheoryofaction.

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GregMcKinzie(FullerTheologicalSeminary,USA)"Soyothenwhat’syourstory?”:DavidFosterWallace,PaulRicoeur,andNarrativeIdentity(withBryanTarpley)

IntheopeningsceneofDavidFosterWallace’smostacclaimedworkofliteraryfiction,InfiniteJest,amysteriousailmenthasbefallenHalIncandenza,theprotagonistofthenovel.Thisailmentrendershisutterancesunintelligible,precludinghimfromchallengingtheidentityimposeduponhimbythosewhofalselyaccusehim.Hal isassumedbyhisaccuserstobementally ill,and ispromptly whisked away via ambulance to a hospital where, upon arrival, he is asked by anorderly,“Soyothenwhat’syourstory?”(17).ItisourcontentionthatthissceneservesasamodelforWallace’sbroaderanalysisoftheAmericanculturalmilieuofthelate1990’s,ananalysisfoundnotonlywithinInfiniteJest,butthroughoutWallace’soeuvre;ananalysiswhichdiagnosesthemiddle-classAmericansubjectassufferingfromanemaciatedsense-of-self,andprescribesasremedytheactofself-narration.Wallacetracestheetiologyofthisailment,assertingasitscausethepredominanceofirony-as-worldview,aconditionwhichprecludessincereexpressionabouttheself.It is our further contention that a fruitful dialogue exists betweenWallace andPaul Ricoeur,whosemodeloftheselfasconstitutedviathenarrativelymediateddialecticofidem(identityassameness)and ipse(identityasselfhood)bothcomplimentsandnuancesWallace’saccountofthe self. Indeed, Ricoeur’s elucidation of the narrative self serves as the best philosophicalframework for evaluatingWallace’s claims about the role television binge-watching plays inbringing about the emaciation of sense-of-self and the effectiveness of language games thatprivilegesincerespeech(inRicoeur’sterms,attestation)asawaytoremedysuchemaciation.Finally,Wallace’semphasisonthefelicitousspeech-actofsincerityasatherapeuticstrategyforthecultivationofasense-of-self(Ricoeur’sipseity)promptsustoconsider,mightarelatedbutdistinct speech-act we refer to as authenticity correlate with the constitution of the idemdimension of the identity? In other words, we feel that this dialogue betweenWallace andRicoeurleadstowardacompellingtheorizationoftherolesofsincerityandauthenticityintheconstitutionofnarrativeidentity.

ToddMei(UniversityofKent,UK)ThePoeticsofMeaningfulWork:AnAnalogytoSpeechActs

Oneofthefociofanalysisconcernedwithdistributivejusticeishowtoensureapolity’scitizenshave access to meaningful work.Meaningful work refers to the idea that human work isinherentlymeaningfulbeyonditssimpleaimoffulfillingnecessaryends.Work,inotherwords,isanintegralpartofthewayhumansthinkoftheirlivesasgoingwell.TheconcepthasitsrootsinAristotle’saccountofcapabilityandAbrahamMaslow’spsychologicalresearchonhumannatureandself-actualization.Forexample,studiesinpsychologyandsociologybuildingonthisresearchtend to focus on practical application. This approach has been gaining more coverage asemployersandbusinessesbegintoseehowsatisfactionaboutmeaninginworkcorrelateswithincreased.Inphilosophy,thediscussiontendstorevolvearoundpoliticalquestions,especiallyonmattersofjusticeandwhethertheStateshouldinsomesensetakestepstoeradicateorlessenthepresenceofmeaninglesswork.

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However,despitethebreadthofinvestigationintherecent,generalliterature,thereislittletonodiscussionabouthowitisinfactthecasethatworkismeaningful,orinotherwords,howthepredicationofmeaninginworkfunctions.Thereisabasicassumptionthatcertainfactsaboutwork make it meaningful, which I will briefly discuss in terms of prima facie and historicalassumptions.Againstthisbackdrop,onemightconstruethetaskofthephilosophyofworkasoneofshowingpreciselyhowmeaningfulnessarisesfromwork.Irefertothistaskasthepoeticsofwork.Inthispaper,Iwilldiscussoneaspectofthepoeticsofworkintermsofananalogytodiscourse,ormore specifically to speechacts.UsingRicoeur’sattempt tobasea theoryofactiononananalogytospeechacts(i.e.AustinandSearle),Iwilltreatworkasaspecialcaseofaction.Aswewill see, unlike action generally construed, work involves a unique relation to meaningpredication because of its creation of an end product. I will attempt to show how work ismeaningfulwithrespecttohowthisendproductisinvolvedinconstitutiveandextra-constitutiverules,thelatterofwhichcanbetrulydesignatedasmeaningpredicating.

FernandoNascimento(BowdoinCollege,USA)PhroneticalDeliberationandTolerance

Inthispaper,Iproposeananalysisoftolerancefromtheindividualpointofviewinsteadofthetypicalpoliticalandsocialdrivenapproach.AsRicoeursuggestsinTheErosionofToleranceandtheResistanceoftheIntolerable,toleranceisbothanindividualaswellasacollectivevirtue.So,Iwanttoconsidersomeofthetraitsofthetolerantman.Specifically,Iarguethatwecanfindanimportant aspect of the tolerantmanwhenwe look at practicalwisdomand its deliberativeprocess.Since its tragicorigin,practicalwisdom(tophronein) is relatedtoacertainaspectofdeliberation that takes into account as many valid practical aspects as possible of a givensituationtodecideforthebestpossiblepracticalalternative.Inordertoanalyzethisdeliberativeprocess, Iwould like to explore it from a narrative framework. The idea of narrative densitycapturesthemultiplicityofnarrativethreadswithinanarrateddiscourse.Thehigherthenumberofnarrativethreadscomposinganarrateddiscourse,thehigheritsnarrativedensity.Iarguethatonekeyaspectofthegooddeliberationistohaveahighnarrativedensity,whichis,asweshalldiscussinthistext,alsoafundamentaltraitofthetolerantdiscourse.Anintolerantdiscourseisaweakonein itsdeliberativeaspectas it lacksnarrativedensity.By ignoringothersandtheirnarrative threads, the intolerant deliberates from his one perspective and ignores otherspriorities,beliefs,argumentsandexpresseddesires.Adensernarrativedeliberationisarelevantlinguisticaspectofthetolerantmanasitallowshimtoovercomehisfearoftheunknownandcounterbalance his egocentric tendencies. Phronetical deliberation is, therefore, an essentialsteptowardsthepossibilitytorespectothers.Itisareflexofthemutualrecognitionandalsothestartingpointoftolerantdecisionsandactions.

RobertPiercey(UniversityofRegina,Canada)InstitutionalizingPhilosophy

Anoddlyneglectedmetaphilosophicalquestionconcernstherelationshipbetweenphilosophyanditsinstitutionalsettings.It’sobviousthattheinstitutionsinwhichphilosophyisdoneshapewhatphilosophersdoandhowtheydoit.Onewouldexpectphilosopherstohaveinvestigatedthismatterexplicitly,askingwhich institutionalarrangements tendtomakeourphilosophicalworkbetter,orworse,ornotreallyphilosophyatall.Butdiscussionsofthistopicareremarkablyrare,andthefewthatexistrangefromunhelpfultolaughable.Yetfewquestionsaremoreurgent

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in the contemporary neoliberal university. Faculty positions in philosophy are disappearing;departmentsofphilosophyareclosing;and“curiosity-driven”researchisbeingsidelinedbytheneedtosecureexternalfundingandtoappearproductiveinresearchassessments.Philosophy’schiefinstitutionalsettingisbeingdismantled,andit’snotclearwhat,ifanything,willreplaceit.Soit’snosurprisethatRobertFrodeman’sandAdamBriggle’srecentbook,SocratesTenured,hasattractedagreatdealofattention.It’soneofthefewworkstoaskwhatmightbecomeofphilosophyastheuniversitydepartmentsthatarenowitschiefhomeweakenanddisappear.FrodemanandBriggleseethisshiftasanopportunity,claimingthatphilosophy’ssequestrationintouniversitydepartmentshasbeenbadforthefield.Ithas,theyargue,ledphilosopherstodoneedlesslytechnicalworkaddressedonlytootherspecialistsinsteadofthe“practicallyengaged,stakeholder-centered”work thewider public needs.1 But if Frodeman and Briggle should beapplaudedfortheirwillingnesstoreflectonphilosophy’sinstitutionalcontexts,theirproposalsforremakingthedisciplineareterrifyinglynaïve.Theycomplainabout“thefetishizingofrigor”2andurgephilosopherstoembrace“lesscarefulanalysis, lessthoroughargumentation.”3Theyadvisephilosophers towork in shoppingmalls,4where“metrics forassessingsuccess”willbe“definedby[the]audience”thatpaysforit.Aboveall,FrodemanandBriggleareoblivioustotheideological dimension of philosophy’s institutional settings. They recognize the need forphilosophytoaddressawiderworld,butnotthedangersofmakingitsingforitssupper.WhatdoesanyofthishavetodowithRicoeur?Inhislifeandhiswork,Ricoeuractuallywrestledwiththequestionofhowphilosophy’sinstitutionalsettingsmighthelpitserveawiderpublic,withoutbeingwarpedordestroyedbyideologicalforces.HismovetoNanterre—which,farfrombeingofmerelybiographical interest, is intimatelyconnectedwithhisthought—offersaclearvisionofhowthe institutionsofphilosophymightbereformed,whilepreservingphilosophy’sneedtoengageinacritiqueofideology.ThekeytorecognizingthisisRicoeur’sclaimthatthemovetoNanterrewasmotivatedbyhis“Hegeliansenseoftheinstitution.”5Mygoalinthisessayistounpackthisclaim,showingthatitcontainsapromisingalternativetothemetaphilosophyofinstitutions defended in Socrates Tenured. Though it is not without difficulties, Ricoeur’sapproachtothistopicisbothvastlypreferabletoitscompetitorsandmorerelevantthanevertoday.

ElysePurcell(SUNYOneonta,USA)BeyondtheGenderedBody:PaulRicoeurandNarratingGenderedSpace

For approximately thirty years now, feminists have paid serious attention to genderedembodimentandhowthisposeschallengesforwomenatbothabanallevel,suchasthrowingstones,andatamoremomentouslevel,suchasthepossiblelifeplansonehasavailable.Forthemostpartfeministshavefoundtwophilosophicsourcesforthisconcern:MauriceMerleau-PontyandMichel Foucault. From the sideofMerleau-Ponty, one finds such representatives as IrisYoungandCarolBigwood. Thelatter inherarticle“Renaturalizingthebody(withthehelpofMerleau-Ponty),”undertakestoanalyzetheexperienceofpregnancyby“whatMerleau-Pontycallsa‘certainlivingpulsation’”todescribehowthe“bodyissodramaticallygripped,”thatitbythispulsationthatisnotofthebodybutwhatthebody“livesthroughandthatalsolivesthrough

1RobertFrodemanandAdamBriggle,SocratesTenured:The Institutionsof21st-CenturyPhilosophy (London:RowmanandLittlefield,2016),4.2SocratesTenured,87.3SocratesTenured,80.4SocratesTenured,117.5QuotedinCharlesReagan,PaulRicoeur:HisLifeandWork(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1996),128.

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it.”1Likewise,IrisYoungadaptsideasfromMerleau-Pontyforherownworkin“ThrowingLikeaGirl.” For Young, the “enclosed space” described as “a modality of feminine spatiality” is adefenseor“existentialbarrier”againstinvasionfromtheotherand“livesherspaceasconfinedandclosedaroundher.”2OnefindssimilarcriticalengagementswithMichelFoucault’sworkonembodimentintheworkofJudithButlerandSusanBordo.Ontheonehand,ButlerinGenderTrouble examines thenotionof gender as a “personal/cultural historyof receivedmeanings”whichis“subjecttoasetofimitativepractices”andwhich“constructtheillusionofaprimaryand interior gendered self.”3 On the other hand, Bordo inUnbearableWeight analyzes howunsituated,disembodiedfreedom“glorifies itselfonlythroughtheeffacementofthematerialpraxis of people’s lives, the normalizing power of cultural images, and the continuing socialrealitiesofdominance.”4Whileasignificantamountofprogresshasbeenmadewithbothapproachestoembodiment,these considerations rather strikingly fail to address how space comes to be gendered eventhoughit isnotembodied. Here,oneneedonlythinkofhowmanymenavoidthe“feminineproducts”aisleinthesupermarkettorecognizehowthisisthecase.Anexampleofthisblind-spot in feminist literature comes out in Diana I. Agrest’s work Architecture From Without:Theoretical Framings for aCritical Practice. Agrest argues that thebody andarchitecture areideas incapable of being severed. For to ask “what body?” is “synonymous to asking ‘whichgender?’foragenderlessbodyisanimpossiblebody.”5Theaimofthispaper,then,istoaddressthisequallyimportantbutneglectedtopicofgenderedspaces.Buttodoso,wemustfirstask:whyhasthistopiclargelybeenneglected,especiallysinceitseemstopervademostsocialspace?Theanswer,Ibelieve, liesinthephilosophicaltoolsusedfortheanalysis. Forthosefeministswho use Merleau-Ponty’s work, we find that the point of his analysis of the body in thePhenomenology of Perception is that “[o]ur own body is in the world as the heart is in theorganism: it keeps thevisible spectacleconstantlyalive, itbreathes life into itandsustains itinwardly, andwith it formsa system.”6 This statement comes from the sectionentitled “Thetheoryofthebodyisalreadyatheoryofperception.”Thebody,then,formstheschematismforspace,time,andperceptioningeneral.Thus,fromthismethodologicalperspectiveitmakeslittlesensetospeakofgenderedspaceswithoutfirstspeakingofthegenderedbody.Similarly,withFoucault’s work inDiscipline and Punish, the whole of his aim is to examine how power, inparticular penal power, operates through the body. While the movement away from thepunishment of Damiens the regicide to contemporary carcerial practices follows a doubleprocess,namely“thedisappearanceofthespectacleandtheeliminationofpain,”thisprocessdoesnotdowithoutthebody.7Rather,asFoucaulthimselfwrites,“itisalwaysthebodythatisatissue.”8Thisiswhy,whenhelaterexaminesBentham’spanopticon,theempoweredcharacterofspacestillremainsunderwrittenbytheaimtoformdocilebodies.Inbothcasesthen,thetoolsusedboth allowed for revolutionary breakthroughs in feminist analysis, and similarly blindedfeministsfromnon-embodiedspaces.Thus,theaimofmypaperistogobeyondthegenderedbodyinregardtospaceandexamineanon-embodiedgenderspacethroughtheuseofnarrative.

1Bigwood,Carol.“Renaturalizingthebody(withthehelpofMerleau-Ponty),”p.69.2Young,Iris,ThrowingLikeaGirl,p.156.3Butler,Judith,GenderTroubleandtheSubversionofIdentity,p.2034Bordo,Susan,UnbearableWeight,p.273.5Agrest,Diane,ArchitectureFromWithout:TheoreticalFramingsforaCriticalPractice,p.174.6Merleau-Ponty,ThePhenomenologyofPerception,p.203.InwhatfollowsIconsideronlytheearlierworkbyMerleau-PontynotbecauseIbelievethatthe laterwork isessentiallythesameonthispoint,butbecause itseemsthatfeministshavelargelyneglectedMerleau-Ponty’slaterworkinreflectionsonspatiality.7Foucault,Michel,DisciplineandPunish:TheBirthofthePrison,p.11.8Ibid.,p.25.

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Toproduceevenapreliminary analysis of non-embodied, butnevertheless gendered spaces,then,itwillbenecessarytolookfordifferentconceptualtools.TodosoIbelievethatwecanlooktotheworkofPaulRicoeur,particularlybyextendinghisaccountofnarrativeasdevelopedprincipallyinhisworkonmetaphor,TimeandNarrativeaswellasOneselfasAnotherintotherealmofthesocialimaginary.

SebastianPurcell(SUNYCortland,USA)WorldandImaginary:PaulRicoeurandCharlesTayloronSocialReality

AttheendofvolumethreeofTimeandNarrative,PaulRicoeurtakesMartinHeidegger’ssenseof“world,”andthefourdifferentlevelsoftimethathearticulatesinBeingandTime,andinvertsthem,sothatclocktimeandbeing-within-timearetakenasthemostrelevant,andTemporalityistakenastheleastrelevant.Hedoesthistomakesenseofthewaythatindividualsconnectthenarrativesoftheirexistencetothebroaderontologyofhumansociety.AtthebeginningofModernSocialImaginaries,CharlesTaylortakesupatopicthatwaslatentinhisearlierwork:justwhatarethedimensionsofsocialrealitythatmustbepresentinordertoexplainhowpeoplecoordinatetheiractionsincooperativeways?Hehasinmindpracticessuchasdrivingcars,electingofficials,orevenparticipatinginpracticessuchasbasketball.Hisproposalisthatasharedsocialimaginary,asharedmentalmapofsocietyanditsrelations,mustexistforsuchactionstobepossible.BothRicoeurandTaylor,then,areinterestedinfeaturesofsocialrealityinordertoexplainthepossibilityofleadinghumanlives.Bothareexplicitintheirethicalintentions,asTaylornotesthatpart of our shared expectations include shared norms for how the practices should go, andRicoeurconnectsthebroadernarrativefeaturesofhumanexistencetothenarrativesthatmakeour individual lives possible. Yet almost no scholarship on either figure has focused on thisconnection.The matter also proves ethically important. Taylor’s approach to the social imaginary hasdifficulty navigating the ethical problems that might emerge when peoples embodyfundamentally different imaginaries. If one society’s gender practices include a rigidsubordination of women to men, and if the shared practices, goods, and norms in a socialimaginaryarewhatprovidethegroundsformoralevaluation,thenitwouldbedifficulttocriticizethatpatriarchy.YetRicoeur’sethics,whichrathersignificantlymodifiesKantianprocedures,canprovideguidanceinthosecases.Ricoeur’ssenseofthe“world,”inturn,lackstheabilitytodealwiththespecificactionsandpracticesthatTaylor’ssocialimaginaryhas.What the present essay proposes, in response to these two problems, is an integration. Itproposes an ontology development of Ricoeur’s sense of “world” by way of Taylor’s socialimaginary, and a normative development of Taylor’s social imaginary by way of Ricoeur’snarrativeethics.

JeffreySacks(TheMountSinaiSchoolofMedicine,USA)Ricoeur’s “miracle of exchangeof roles”:AHopeful Platform forRepair of the TraumatizedGlobalSocialImaginary

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InhisprefacetoTheJust(2000),Ricoeurremarks“thephonetic,liesinexploringthemiddlezonewherethejudgmentisformed,halfwaybetweenproof,definedbytheconstraintsoflogicand...poeticorproductiveimagination...whereinnovativepoweroftheimaginationactsontheveryproductionofarguments,meetandbecomeentangledwitheachother”(respectively,pp.xxii, xxxiii). Another dimension of this entanglement, he continues, is the interpersonal“relationship that accomplishes themiracleof anexchangeof the rolesbetweenbeings thatcannotbesubstitutedforeachother”(p.xxxiii).Thispaperexamines theRicoeurian“miracle”ofexchangeof roleswithin theclinicallybasedvulnerableintersubjectivespace.Insidethisinterpersonaltransitionalspaceroles,logicandthepoeticallcreativelyintertwine.Thisblendedinteractionbetweenalienothersoffersaplatformofimagination,analternativetothepostmodernassaultontheimaginationandworshippingtheother.Ricoeur later locates this“miracle,” inhisTheCourseofRecognition (2004),withinautopian,dyadic, therapeutic process of he called healing mutual recognition. This phenomenologicalhermeneuticaldialecticalprocessbothremovesandengagesactuality.Thisspaceisembeddedin“asif”playfulnessorexchangeofroles.TheRicoeurianmodelofexchangeofrolesormutualrecognitionarticulatesanewspaceofintersubjectivevulnerabilityforpsychoanalysis.Thisplatformofmutualrecognitioncontainsacultural-evolutionaryviewfromtheone-personisolatedconstructof imaginationtoatwo-personconstructandultimatelytothemythopoeicglobalsocialimaginary.Thisshiftfromtheprivateknowingtotheinterpersonalpoeticandontothepublicmiracleofvulnerableentanglementofroles,capturesandchallengesmans’linguisticandinterpretativecapacity.Inshort,itfacilitatessemanticinnovationandthecreationofnewrealities.Ricoeur,inhis1965coreconceptof“thesemanticsofdesire”presentedinFreudandPhilosophybeginsthe(our)journeyfromtheselfasbodyanddesiretothesemanticormetaphoriclinguisticself, to the intersubjective interpersonal self as another towards the global social linguisticactuality.Thetransitionfromtheprivate,utopian,psychoanalyticspacetothetraumatizedglobalsocial(public) imaginary and our other worshiping “Culture Collapse” is our current challenge toRicoeur’s dialectical philosophical anthropology. Who or what sustains hopefulness whileawaitingasymbolicor linguisticsynthesisthatbothshattersandcreatesreality?Thishopefulofferingtotheworldofanewplatformbothshattersandcreatesreality.This “Miracle” of the intersubjective power of the poetic, offers a new world of Ricoeurianpsychoanalyticinterdisciplinaryinterpersonalspace.Thisnarrativelaunchesautopianplatformoffaithandhopeintothetraumatizedglobalsocialimaginary.

RogerSavage(UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles,USA)AGlobalImaginary?Phronesis,theRuleofJustice,andtheIdeaofaCommonHumanity

Inhisreflectionsonthehermeneuticsofhistoricalconsciousness,PaulRicoeursetsouttheaporiathat ties the global imaginary to an eschatology of nonviolence. On the one hand, if “everyexpectationmustbeahopeforhumanityasawhole,”theaimsofthiseschatologycanonlyberealizedifthereisonehistorythathashumanityasitscollectivelysingularsubject.Ontheotherhand,theHegelianphilosophy’slossofcredibilityblocksanyreturntotheideathatthereisone

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plotthatisequaltothisideaofonehumanityandonehistory.Bycreditingtheimpossibilityoftotalizinghumanity’shistoricalrealitytothefreedomthatRicoeurandHannahArendt identifywithourpowertoact,Iproposetoexplorehowthefederatingforceoftheideaofjusticefiguresin the social global imaginary. In view of competing and conflicting geopolitical agendas andaspirations, theclaimto theright tobedifferent thusnotonlycounterbalances the threatsofoppression and violence stemming from the hegemony of the idea of a universal historydominatedbyonesocietyoronegroupofnations;themultiplicityoftheclaimsrootedindifferenttraditionsandsystemsofbeliefalso fuel thestruggles inwhichthenormative ideaof justice’sfederatingforcetakesroot.ThepresumptionoftruththatRicoeuridentifieswiththecontentsofatraditioncounterpointsthenormativeideaoftheruleofjustice.Bydrawingouttheconnectionbetweenthispresumptionof truthandthe feelingofdependence (whichacquires itsmost radicalexpression in religiousexperience), I will attribute the anthological presupposition of autonomy to our capacity torespondtothedemandsofthesituationsinwhichwefindourselves.Thepowerofimaginationoperative in these judgments bears out the dynamic relationship between phronesis and theexemplaryvalueofsingularmoralandpoliticalacts.Bysuggestingthattheseactsgiveafigureanda body to the global imaginary, I will consequently highlight how, in the absence of ameta-historicalnarrative,thefederatingforceoftheideaofjusticeseekstoequaltheideaofacommonhumanity.

JimSisson(MiddleGeorgiaStateUniversity,USA)PaulRicoeurandtheNecessaryFictionoftheGreatWar

The poet Ted Hughes (1930-1998) remarked of the impact of the FirstWorldWar upon hisexperienceoftheSecondWorldWar,“Itwasrighttherefromthebeginning....TheFirstWorldWarwasoursortoffairy-storyworld”(Sagar).HowdoesRicoeurandhisunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenfictionandhistory,andfiction’streatmentofwar,specificallydeathandhorror,respondtothe“myths”oftheGreatWar,e.g.,itsepithetsasthe“wartoendallwars”andits“wipingoutofanentiregenerationofEurope”(includinghisfather)?IlimitmystudytoRicoeur’s Time and Narrative, Vol. 3, and his 6th study inOneself As Another, “The Self andNarrativeIdentity.”MyspecifictouchstonefromthelatterworkisRicoeur’sassessment,“It ispreciselybecauseoftheelusivecharacterofreallifethatweneedthehelpoffictiontoorganizeliferetrospectively”(162).Inthissamework,Ricoeurnotesthatitisliteraturethancan“softenthestingofanguish”anddeath(162).IattempttobegintoengagethequestionofhowthemythsoftheFirstWorldWarshapetheexperienceoftheSecond,at least in literature,throughtheprism of Ricoeur’s understanding of the relationship between fiction and history. Time andNarrativeprovesusefultoconsiderasRicoeurarguesthere,“Fictiongiveseyestothehorrifiednarrator” (188), but does the SecondWorldWar’s horrors (including theHolocaust towhichRicoeurreferences[187-188])actuallyeclipsethememoryoftheFirstWorldWar?EmbeddedinthemythsoftheFirstWorldWarisitsgeneration’smonikeras“TheForgottenGeneration,”asopposedtotheSecondWorldWar’s“GreatestGeneration.”Atwhatthresholddoesfictionriskamnesia,perhapsevena“chosenamnesia”(cf.Harding468andMemory,History,Forgetting)inthenameof“organiz[-ing]liferetrospectively?”WorksCitedHarding,VincentG.“BeyondAmnesia,MartinLutherKingandtheFutureofAmerica.”Journalof

AmericanHistory.74.2(1987):468-76.Ricoeur,Paul.“TheInterweavingofHistoryandFiction.”TimeandNarrative,Vol.3.UCPress,

1988,pp.180-192.

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----------.“TheSelfandNarrativeIdentity.”OneselfasAnother.UCPress,1992,pp.140-168.Sagar,Keith.“TedHughesandHisLandscape.”TheAchievementofTedHughes.UGAPress,1983.

JohnStarkey(OklahomaCityUniversity,USA)TheRamayana,IntotheWoods,andTheRoad

Our conferencecallsus to think, if youwill,of thecontinuityamong theemotional-volitional(phronesis), the emotional-pious (faith), and the emotional-imaginative (social imaginary). Irepeat“emotional”evenwithfaithtoemphasizethecontinuityIndetail:thevolitionalaspectofphronesisisunthinkablewithoutasocialimaginaryandafaithinitsembeddedvalues;thepietyoffaithisnotlivingunlessitissuesinworksshapedbyanimaginary,andasocialimaginaryistheprecipitateofmanypersons’actionsandfeelingsinteractingwithcultureoversignificanttime.Allinteractasone:anycontrastofcolonialist-patriarchalculturewitheco-feministcultureshowsthat.The paper focuses on particulars. I examine first the classic Hindu epic, the Ramanayana, apremodernworkdevelopinginthedirectionofaffirminganeverdeeperpersonalisttheism,onethatgaveanewdepthofmotivationtoitsphroneticimplications.Thatis,asRamaisseenevermore clearly and fully as the avatar of the greatGod Vishnu, his actions become evermoreexemplaryforours,notintheiridealitybutintheirshapeandmotivation.ButinthemannerofRicoeurinIdeologyandUtopia,andinhisreligiousworks,Ishallsubjecttheimaginary,thefaith,andtheworkstoademystifying(andtoalesserdegree,demythologizing)critique.ThesecondworktobeexaminedwillbethemodernAmericanmusical,StephenSondheim’sandJamesLapine’sIntotheWoods.Aswithsomanymodernworks,itseemstorejectfaithinthereligioussocialimaginary,thesubjects’falsehopesandfalsevaluesbeingthoroughlyshattered.Butlikeamid-centuryexistentialistRicoeur,Ishallargueitistheformoffaiththathaschanged,andthatsaving faith isattainedbysome.More thanthat, though Ihavenodisputewith thewriters,theirconvictionthattheyaresimplydeconstructingthereligiousimaginary,isnotthecase. True, their work is not a work of remythologization.We turn to others for that. Theiremphasisissimplyonphronesis:painfullyacquiredknowledgeabouthowtoactmorallyinthewoods.ButIshallarguethatthatsuchfeltknowledgecanfuelareligioussocialimaginary.TomakegoodthatfinalpointImovetothelimit:CormacMcCarthy’snovelTheRoad.HisisalandscapeutterlydenudedofanythinglikeapersonalGodofatranscendentsort.Transcendencemaystillsponsorbeauty,perhaps—butthereisnotranscendentcomforttobehad.Andyet,asanycriticwouldagree,theworkhasadeepreligiousfeel.ItissimplythatdivinityinitswarmandcaringaspectshascomeentirelydowntoearthintheformofthisManandhisBoyandtheirdailystrugglestosurviveon‘theroad.’Actionasanactingandasuffering,phronesisasdifficultdecisionswitheachnewcasegovernedbycircumstances—andfaithasa livedrelationtotheotherinthisworld,theonlyonewehave—allthisisaffirmedinprofoundlyCatholiclanguageandimagery.

DanStiver(Hardin-SimmonsUniversity,USA)CopingwithIdeology:RicoeurandDreyfusonanEmbodiedHermeneuticofSuspicion

HubertDreyfusisanotedHeideggerandMerleau-Pontyscholarwhoemphasizeswhathecalls“skillful coping” that involves mastery that is non-representational, embodied, and largelyunconscious. Dreyfusargues thatoneofHeidegger’smain contributions is to reviseHusserl’s

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intentional phenomenology from one involving conceptual representations to embodied skillwithoutconsciousintentionality,whichMerleau-Pontyhowevercallsan“intentionalarc.”Suchskillcanbeseenasanimportantaspectofpracticalwisdom(phronesis).Thechallengeofideology,however, isthatsuchembodied learning isverymuchwhat is involved in ideology. Ideology isoftenunconsciousandlivedwithoutbeingconsciouslyintentional.Itbecomessecondnature,andpeoplegetgood,orskillful,atit.ItiswhatPierreBourdieucalls“culturalcapital”onthepartoftheprivilegedthatcanbothminimizeandoppressthosewhodonothaveitandhardlyhavethechanceforthelongchallengeoflearningsuch“skill.”Onewouldprobablynotwanttocallthisexpression of ideology “practical wisdom.” The tacit, embodied nature of ideology thuscomplicates it far beyond what it would be it were a conscious, conceptual, intentionalrepresentation.WheredoesRicoeurcomein?Ricoeur’searlymajorworkFreedomandNaturepoints toawayto integratetheconsciousandunconscious,whichheterms in thatwork“thevoluntaryand involuntary.”Moreover,Ricoeur’s laterworkonahermeneuticofsuspicionandideologypotentiallybringsacriticaledgetoDreyfus’kindofembodiedcopingandpointstoawaytodifferentiatewisdomfromideology.ThequestioniswhetherRicoeurmakesthemistakethatDreyfus charges many with making about Heidegger, namely, failing to grasp the non-representationalandnon-intentionalnatureof“skillfulcoping.”InFreedomandNature,Ricoeurbeginswith“Idecide.”Ricoeur’s later ideologycritique isverbal ifnotconceptual,drawingon“explanation”and“utopia”tocritiqueideology.RichardKearneyhasrecentlycalledfora“carnalhermeneutics”thatintegratesRicoeur’searlyworkonembodimentwithhislaterhermeneutics.Is itpossibletodothis inawaythatthatallowsfor“skillfulcoping”with ideologyasatypeofpracticalwisdomintermsofembodiment?Oneapproachistoseeideologycritiqueasjustthe“break”fromskillfulcopingthatisinvolvedwhensomethinggoesawry.InHeidegger'sexampleofthehammer,itoccurswhensomethingiswrongwiththehammer,andonebecomesconsciousof the hammer as a hammer, as a tool composed of certain elements that may need to bereplaced. Another more interesting approach, which may be complementary, is to considerwhether ideology critique itself is a kind of skillful coping, involving training, learned habits,practicalwisdom,andunconsciousmasteryofwaysofuncoveringandreactingtoideology.Inthisway, ideology critique can be seen as an integration of the voluntary and involuntary alongRicoeurianlines.

BryanTarpley(TexasA&MUniversity,USA)"Soyothenwhat’syourstory?”:DavidFosterWallace,PaulRicoeur,andNarrativeIdentity(withGregMcKinzie)

In theopeningsceneofDavidFosterWallace’smostacclaimedworkof literary fiction, InfiniteJest,amysteriousailmenthasbefallenHalIncandenza,theprotagonistofthenovel.Thisailmentrendershisutterancesunintelligible,precludinghimfromchallengingtheidentityimposeduponhimby thosewho falselyaccusehim.Hal is assumedbyhisaccusers tobementally ill, and ispromptlywhiskedawayviaambulancetoahospitalwhere,uponarrival,heisaskedbyanorderly,“Soyothenwhat’syourstory?”(17). It isourcontentionthatthissceneservesasamodelforWallace’sbroaderanalysisoftheAmericanculturalmilieuofthelate1990’s,ananalysisfoundnotonlywithin InfiniteJest,butthroughoutWallace’soeuvre;ananalysiswhichdiagnosesthemiddle-classAmerican subject as suffering froman emaciated sense-of-self, andprescribes asremedytheactofself-narration.Wallacetracestheetiologyofthisailment,assertingasitscausethepredominanceofirony-as-worldview,aconditionwhichprecludessincereexpressionabouttheself.ItisourfurthercontentionthatafruitfuldialogueexistsbetweenWallaceandPaulRicoeur,whosemodel of the self as constituted via the narratively mediated dialectic of idem (identity as

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sameness)andipse(identityasselfhood)bothcomplimentsandnuancesWallace’saccountoftheself.Indeed,Ricoeur’selucidationofthenarrativeselfservesasthebestphilosophicalframeworkforevaluatingWallace’sclaimsabouttheroletelevisionbinge-watchingplaysinbringingabouttheemaciationof sense-of-self and theeffectivenessof languagegames thatprivilege sincerespeech(inRicoeur’sterms,attestation)asawaytoremedysuchemaciation.Finally,Wallace’semphasisonthefelicitousspeech-actofsincerityasatherapeuticstrategyforthecultivationofasense-of-self(Ricoeur’sipseity)promptsustoconsider,mightarelatedbutdistinctspeech-actwerefertoasauthenticitycorrelatewiththeconstitutionoftheidemdimensionoftheidentity?Inotherwords,wefeelthatthisdialoguebetweenWallaceandRicoeurleadstowardacompellingtheorizationoftherolesofsincerityandauthenticityintheconstitutionofnarrativeidentity.

David-Le-DucTiaha(IndependentScholar,Canada)Lesujetdutraumatismepsychiqueetlaculturedelapsychologieclinique,delapsychiatrietransculturelleàlaphénoménologieherméneutique

Encontexteclinique,letraumatismepsychiqueestunepathologiementaleétroitementliéeàlaquestion du sujet au sens anthropologique : Qu’est-ce qui constitue le traumatisme ? Est-cel’évènementtelqu’ilestadvenuouest-cel’impactqu’ilexercesurlesujetquiyaétéconfronté? Lesmanifestations du traumatisme psychique se donnent-elles à voir indépendamment del'appartenanceculturelledusujetconfrontéàunévénementtraumatique?Quellesquesoientlesdivergencesd'interprétationscliniquesdutraumatismepsychique,l'événementtraumatiquedéconstruitl'organisationdel'appareilpsychiqueet,decefait,exerceunimpactdésubjectivantpour le sujet confronté à lui. Autrement dit, l'événement traumatique vide d'une certainemanièrelesujet,quiyestconfrontébrutalement,desapropresubjectivité.Sil'expressiondelavie psychique est culturellement conditionnée, il convient alors de noter que l'impactdésubjectivantde l'événementtraumatiquemetaussienéchec leprocessusdesymbolisationaveclequeltoutsujetparvientàsapropresubjectivitécommehabitantd'uneculturedonnée.Afinderépondreprovisoirementàcesquestionsnéesd'uneexpériencederencontredespost-traumatisés du génocide rwandais quatre ans après l'événement, il s'agit pour nous nonseulementd'interrogerlespré-supposésanthropologiques,c'est-à-direlesconceptionsdusujet,sous-jacents aux dispositifs théoriques et pratiques de deux écoles de psychiatrie, depsychopathologie et de psychothérapie françaises, spécialisées dans la prise en charge destraumatismespsychiques,maisaussidemettreenreliefleurcomplémentaritéparledétourdesméthodes philosophiques de la phénoménologie et de l'herméneutique. La première écoled'orientationpsycho-dynamiqueetphénoménologiqueestportéeparlestravauxdupsychiatremilitaireF.Lebigot.Laseconded'orientationtransculturelleetherméneutiqueestaniméeparlestravauxdespsychiatresT.BaubetetM.R.Moro.Lapsychanalysedemeureledispositiftechniquecommunàcesdeuxécoles,mêmesiellesenfontunusagedifférentenfonctionduFreuddeLacanetduFreuddeRicœur.

John-HarmenValk(StAndrews,UK)Phronesis,FaithandaDystopicLiberalGlobalEthic

Inhisarticle“ReimaginingaGlobalEthic”whichintroducedthethree-yearcentennialprojectofthe Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, Michael Ignatieff (2012) lays out aroadmapforaglobalethicthatheseesasthemostaptresponsetotherealityofpluralismin

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today’s globalizedworld.His sketchof a global ethic adoptswhatPaulRicoeur (1992) calls astrategyofpurificationdirectedtowardsethicalparticularity.YetwhatisstrikingaboutIgnatieff’ssketchisthatitexhibitsanevidenttensionthatarisesfromtheattempttobringtogethertwostrandsofliberalthoughtthatadvancewhatareinfactdistinctstrategiesofpurification.Ontheonehand,IgnatieffdrawsfromThomasNagelandJohnRawlstooutlineaglobalethicthatlaysclaimtoaviewfromnowhere,toapositionbehindaveilofignorance.Purificationhereentailsdelineatingapurportedlyuniversalbarofreasontowhichallparticularitymustjustifyitself.Onthe other hand, Ignatieff draws from Isaiah Berlin and Judith Shklar—who might be called“dystopicliberals”(Benhabib1996;Rengger2013)—tooutlineaglobalethicthatisnomorethana bracketing operation which determines purportedly basic intuitions regarding theminimalrights necessary for human agency. This latter strategy of purification, as Ignatieff (2001)suggestedinhisTannerLectures,isnomorethanaprudentialandhistorical,minimaliststrategythatrepresents“themostthatwecanhopefor”.This paper appeals to the thought of Ricoeur to challenge the dystopic liberal strategy ofpurification in Ignatieff’s sketch of a global ethic. While a response to the first strategy ofpurification coulddraw fromRicoeur’s (1992, 2000) explicit andextensive engagementswithJohnRawlsandJurgenHabermas,aresponsetothedystopicliberalstrategyofpurificationcallsforadifferentresponsethatrequiresareconstructiveweavingtogetherofseveraldimensionsofRicoeur’sthought.Theseincludehis(2007)caveattotheWeberiandistinctionbetweenethicsand politics that leaves open a place for poetics; his (1988, 1992, 2007) understanding ofphronesis which he draws from those such as Aristotle, Hegel, Gadamer and Koselleck; hisunderstanding of an eschatological faith lived in hope influenced by those such as JurgenMoltmann(1976,2007);andtheconnectionhe(1986)makesbetweenphronesis,eschatologicalfaithandthedialecticofideologyandutopiaindicativeofthesocialimaginary.Anemphasisonphronesisandonaneschatologicalnotionoffaithopensthepossibilityofcultivatingtheethicalparticularitiesofthepoeticregister intheefforttofosteraglobalethical imaginary—whichisnot the same as a global ethic—while guarding against themoral andpolitical absolutismofsedimentedtradition.

CristinaVendra(UniversitàdeglistudidiChieti,Italy/ÉcoledesHautesÉtudesenSciencesSociales,France)FromTextandtotheSocialImaginary:PaulRicœuracrossTraditionandInnovation

In today’seraof globalization,wherehumansare forcedasneverbefore to face rapid socialchanges,thecomplexquestionofrethinkingthesocialimaginarywithinourmultifacetedrealityarises with a strong sense of urgency. By focusing attention on intercultural dialogue andembracingapluralisticapproach,althoughviolentconflictsandhostilitypersistintheworld,thegrowingawarenessthatweliveinthemidstofculturalplurality,andtheensuingpassagefrommonologuetoadialogicalperspective,demonstratethathumanitybelievesinthenecessityofbuilding respectful relationships among adherents of different traditions. Neither irenic norsimplyconflictual,theinterculturaldialogueisapracticeenclosingunderlyingcomplexitiesthatneedtobephilosophicallyexplained.

PaulRicœur’sworkcanbeconsideredaguideforbetterunderstandingthecomplexchallengeofenvisioningasocialglobalandsharedimaginary.Hisphilosophycanprovideconcreteassistanceinthesearchforthemeaningofthe“in-between”spaceofinterculturalhospitality,leadingustoreflectonour senseofbelonging. Through reference toRicœur’shermeneutical thought,mypaperseekstoprovidefoundationsforanethicsofhospitalitywhichwouldbeabletoorientthereconfigurationofthesocialimaginary,i.e.anethicsofdwellingtheinterdependence.Themain

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references are From Text to Action and Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. The questions ofhospitalityandsocialspacewillbethenanalyzedfromareflectiononlanguageinconnectionwith the analysis of ideology and utopia as two imaginative directions that constitute socialreality.

Thecomprehensionofatext is relatedtothemeetingof theotherandtherecognitionof itsotherness.Theanalysisofatextinvolvesacomprehensionofboththetextandthereaderitself,whotriestoestablishadialoguebetweenitsownpre-understandingandthatoftheother.Inthisway,understandingisachievedviathecircularhermeneuticalprocessofacommunicationacross distanciation, appropriation, and disappropriation. In this dialectical movement, thereadercanrecognizethelimitsofitsowninterpretationandofitsculturalheritage,openingitselftowardsanauthenticmeeting–whichcanhavebothpositiveandnegativeimplications–withtheother.

The hermeneutics of the text finds its practical application in the social sphere through thedialectic between ideology and utopia as two complementary components of the socialimagination. Renewing the social imaginary is possible only after a first movement ofdistanciation fromourselves,accepting the fact thatwearepartofauniquehumanitywhichexistsonlyinthepluralityofcultures.Thechallengeistofindtherightbalancebetweenloyaltiesto one’s tradition and the fictions engendered by utopia,moving across the boundaries of asettled social context,between traditionand innovationas twopolesofanongoingdialoguesupportedbyphronesis.Thisreflectionopensustoarenewaloftheconceptofsocialrealityandtruth,movingtowardanewontology:theontologyofmanifestationwithinhistory.

Wen-ShengWang(NationalChengchiUniversity,Taiwan)RelationbetweenRicoeurandArendtRegardingNarrative

The issueofnarrativeplaysan importantrole forRicoeurandArendtboth. In thispaper, therelationbetweenthemregardingnarrativewillbe investigatedfromtheproblematic,butnothistoricalpointofview.IwillbeginwithArendt’sdiscussionofstoryandstorytelling(narrative),andthenfollowhowRicoeurproceedstoherdiscussion.Myconcerningismorepracticalthantheoretical,insofarasahealingeffectofnarrativewillberesearchedundertheconcepts:sorrow,release,forgiveness,mourning,mimesis,catharsis,complaints,accusations,charity,friendship,compassion, generosity. The other related concepts: time and history, and philosophers:Aristotle,Augustin,Husserl,andHeideggerwillbetreatedfromthatpracticalaspect.Precisely speaking, regarding a possible reducing or mitigating my sorrow that is caused bysomebody,myforgivingofhim/heriscertainlyareleaseofmymind,whichhowever,accordingtoArendt,presupposesachangeofhis/hermind,namelyhis/hershowingmesorryorregretpreviously.Incomparisonwiththis,narrativeseemstobeabletoreleasemymindandreducemysorrowbymyself,whichcanbebasicallyexplainedwithAristotle’sdiscussionofmimesisandcatharsisinhisPoetics.ForRicoeur,becausecharityisexpectedtoassistmyforgivenessofothers,soitseemsthatIcanreleasemymindandreducemysorrowbymyself.However,charityisratherabletocontributetomycompassionandgenerositythatareclaimedtoreleasemyrigidsociallifethatonlyabidesbythelaw.Socharityisoriginallyofbenefittoustoopenourmind.Ifitisstillidealformetoforgiveothersonlybymyopenminditself,narrativethat isdevelopedbyRicoeur intermsofcharityandopenmindintomultiplelayersofmeaningbecomesmoreeffectiveforreducingmy

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sorrow.Narrativeisnotonlyshownin“workofmourning,”“transformationfromcomplaintstoaccusations,”“exchangeofmemories,”butalsoin“narrativehospitality.”However,Ricoeur’sdevelopmentofthemeaningofnarrativeisimpliedinwhatArendtalreadystatedinTheHumanCondition:“Onlythroughthisconstantmutualreleasefromwhattheydocanmenremainfreeagents,onlybyconstantwillingnesstochangetheirmindsandstartagaincantheybetrustedwithsogreatapowerasthattobeginsomethingnew.”

—ENDOFABSTRACTS—