People of the Phils Vs Que Po Lay March 29, 1945, Montemayor

(effectivity of laws: is publication needed: Yes : Penal In Character)

Facts: Que Po Lay failed was found in possession of 7000 dollars worth

of US checks and Money orders but failed to sell it to the Central Bank

as required by Circular 20, the circular was issued on 1949 but was

published in the OG on November 1851, que po lay was sentenced by

the lower court to 6 years in prison but it took almost 6 months for the

circular to be published after conviction.

Issue: whether or not publication of Circular 20 in needed for it to

become EFFECTIVE.

Held: It is necessary for a law, rule or circular especially with a penal

character to be published in order to bound the public to its contents,

Que po lay was acquitted.

Askay VS Cosalan September 15,1924, Malcolm

(effectivity of laws: when is publication: exclusion if stated for approval)

Facts: Sakay questioned the jurisdiction of Judge Harvey in the case,

following the line that a certain Act.3107 that basically gives the

secretary of justice to assign judges to a court not of his own,should be

effective only 15 days after the publication. However on the last

section of the Act there states that the acts shall take effect on its

approval.

Issue: whether or not Act.3107 is in effect when Judge Harvey started

to hear the case

Held: Judge Harvey has jurisdiction over the case as Act 3107, provided

a clear section that the act should be in effect upon its approval which

covers the exclusion to the general rule of 15 days after publication.

Balbuena vs Secretary of Education November 29, 1960

(effectivity of laws: Publication: Only in General Application)

Facts: In a case pertaining to Department Order.8, members of the

Jehovah witness find it in violation of the their rights of freedom of

worship and speech especially when they are dismissed for not saluting

the flag. The case was dismissed in the reason that the Flag is not a

religious image together with the entire ceremony. The Jehovas

witnesses members however raised a new issue on the validity of the

the order on the subject of publication as it was not published in the

OG as required in C.A 638, Art.2 New Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not, Department Order.8 required publication in the

Official Gazette to take effect.

Held: It is the view of the court that this particular order does not

require general publication for it is not a law of general application

because it is addressed only to Director of Public and Private schools

where they have a job to maintain discipline.

Tanada vs Tuvera December 29, 1986 ,Escolin LANDMARK, NEW

BASIS(Effectivity of Laws: Publication: Indespinsable; Ignoratia Legis

Nominem Exusar.. due to the secret files of Marcos.

Facts: A motion for reconsideration pertaining to a previous case that

dealt with the necessity of publication in order for a law to be effective.

While it was found necessary to publish law as a rule, the argument

still continued about the specific clause that states other wise

provided in relation to law that have specific mention of validity on its

approval.

Issue: Whether or not, a law can have full effect right after its approval

without publication on the basis of the clause other wise provided

Held: The clause unless otherwise provided refers to the date of

effectively and not of the requirement of publication itself. As the SC

stated Publication in full or its no publication at all and that the

publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible for

ignoratia legis nominem excusat.

Lara Vs Del Rosario, April 20, 1954, Montemayor

Effectivity of Civil code (Replaced Code of Commerce Art.302 the

governing agency)

Facts: Lara et al were former taxi drivers of the defendant. When the latter sold some of his vehicles, the plaintiffs who were no longer needed were dismissed. Because their employer did not give them their one months salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, this action was instituted. ISSUE: Whether or not the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1949. HELD: In this case, the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum held that the new Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This

date is exactly one year after the Official Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said release having been made on August 30, 1949. The plaintiffs then are not entitled to any compensation, the New Civil Code having repealed the Code of Commerce. The case was on latter period on September 24,1950.

Wong Woo You vs Vivo, March 31, 1965, Angelo

Village Chief cannot celebrate marriage under Philippine Law:

Doctrine Procedurial Presumption

Facts: Wong Woo You a chinese woman was married to Perfecto Blas in

China which was solemnized by a certain Village Chief, Chua Tio. As a

requirement for entry in the Philippines as a non-qouta immigrant, a

binding marriage is required.

Issue: Is the marriage of Wong Woo you and Perfecto Blas legal?

Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient fact for her

marriage?

Held: The court did not find sufficient and substantial proof of marriage

between the two, other than oral and documentary evidence that has

basically little to no weight at all in proving a husband and wife

relationship, they cannot prove it. More importantly, the validity of the

marriage in China through the village elder may only be proven if again,

they can give enough proof of the case, such as laws. However since

they cannot provide one, the law of the Philippines applies about who

can celebrate marriage, which in this case, thus not include a village

elder. Doctrine of Procedurial Presumption.

Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee, Malcolm, Ignorantia Legis nominem

exusat: A question of fact, must be proven. Ignorance of the fact may

limit liability

Facts: A certain Cheong Boo, deceased, left a certain estate property

with an estimated worth of 100k, now Cheong Seng Gee claimed that

he is the legitimate son of Cheong Boo and Tandit who were married in

China and therefore have the right to the property and not Mora

Adong, who claimed to be lawfully wedded to Cheong Boo in Basilan.

Issue: Whether or not a marriage contracted in China and proven

mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines? Are

the marriages performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the

Mohammedan religion valid?

Held: Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that all marriages contracted outside

the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same

were contracted, are valid in these islands. In order for the marriage between

Cheong Seng Gee and Boo to be valid they must prove a question of fact, which a

matrimonial letter cannot do.

A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should

not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband through an

alleged prior Chinese marriage, save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal

as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. A

marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-

called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.

Marcos vs Comelec Marcos filed for certificate of candidacy as Rep of 1st distrct of Leyte Montejo filed petition for disqualification under the residency requirement Marcos amended COC, honest misrepresentation, claiming tacloban city as her domicile Marcos COC is stil void COMELEC issued another resolution allowing Marcos to office should the canvas show she obtained the highest number of votes Resolution was reversed again, proclamation would be suspended even if she did win. Marcos declared that she was the winner of the election.

Marcos was a resident of Tacloban and his marriage to Ferdinand only made her transfer actual residence, but after death she chose tacloban as expressed in the letter to PCGG chairman in rehabilitating their ancestral house. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because th term residence in civil law does not mean the same thin in political law, Proclaim Marcos as duly elected representative of the first district of leyte

Coron vs Carino FACTS: Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. The action sought to demolish the structures built by the private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the petitioners' wharf. After a series of postponements, the trial court, on January 16, 1979 reset the hearing for the latter time for three consecutive dates, March 20, 21 and 22, 1979 with further warning to the private respondents that no more postponements shall be allowed. On March 20, 1979 despite proper notice, the private respondents and their counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. The petitioner then moved that private respondents' non-appearance be considered as a waiver on their parts and rights to be heard. The private respondents went to the appellate court for certiorari but the petition was dismissed due to lack of merit. On appeal, the private respondents were required "to submit the forty (40) printed copies of their record on appeal together with the proof of service of fifteen (15) copies thereof with appellee." However, the respondents still failed to comply with the requirements even after the sixty (60) days extension. A resolution, dated September 27, 1982, dismissing the private respondents appeal had became final and executory. The respondents, in their supplemental motion argued that since under the present law, printed records on appeal are no longer required, their right to be heard on appeal must be upheld instead of the rule on technicalities. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the procedural rules invoked by the private respondents be given retroactive effect? HELD:NO, because the Supreme Court have resolved the issue as to the extent of the retroactive application of Section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court. It reiterated that "Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution of the respondent appellate court dated July 29, 1983 is SET ASIDE.

PAFLU VS Secretary of Labor

FACTS: PAFLU File for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain

Secretary to enforce an order of cancellaion of SSSEmploymentAssoc

which is Afilliated with PAFLU

And annul all proceedings in connection with the cancellation

AND prohibit enforcing sec.23 of R.A 875

and prey for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final

determination of the case, no W.P.I pendent lite has been issued

It appears that on September 25, 1963, the Registration of Labor Org,

issued a hearing on October 17, 1963, on the matter of cancelation of

SSSEA because

1: Failure to furinish BOLandRel, with verified copies of financial report

2.Failure to submit to this office, the names and addresses of the non

subversive affidavits of the officers of the union.

They violated, sec.23, of R.A.875, registration of labor organizations.

Councel of SSSEA moved the hearing to submit such documents but

nobody appeared, the next day October 22 SSEA ass.sec filed the

documents and the constitution and by laws.

October 23, BOLandR cancelled,SSSEA registration certificate.

Alfredo Fajardo, President of SSSEA, filed a reconsideration of the

decision and asked for time to November 15,..

December 4, the registrar declared that SSSEA failed to submit, non-

subversive affidavits and names and addresses.

SSEA then filed the case at hand, claiming that Sec.23 RA875 violates

their FREEDOM of ASSEMBLY and ASSOCIATIOn, and is inconsistent of

the UDHR, that it unduly delegates judicial power to an Admin agency.

*FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION is DEVOID OF FACTUAL

BASIS because registration is not a limitation but for a condition an org

or assoc. to acquire legal personality. Those financial statements are

also reasonable since they collect huge amount of money on behalf of

the org, making the demand reasonable.

*Section 23 does not impinge upon the right of organization by UDHR

or to ILO on the matter of employee to create an organization.

*SSSEA would still exist because it is their right but its judicial

personality and statutory rights and priviledges would be suspended

thereby.

*the period within which decision should be rendered is directory and

not mandatory, the judgement therefore is not null and void, those

who is incharge of the judgment may only be dealt with

administratively but the judgment still stands.

Also there is now law requiring the approval of Sec for cancellation,

because once the condition is meet, judgment on cancellation can be

rendered.

It also shows that the petitioners failed to exhaust all remedies for they

directly went to court against the secretary when the secretarty is not

needed yet on a decision since there was a pending petition for

extension to the registar.

PETITION FOR WRITS PRAYED FOR DENIED WITH COST AGAINST

PETITIONERS.

TANADA VS CUENCO

After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question. HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135 FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR. On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void. The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim.

Compulsory Recognition Bernabe v. Alejo [G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002]PONENTE: Panganiban, J. FACTS: The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo, his secretary for 23 years. The son, Adrian Bernabe, was born on September 18, 1981. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993 while his wifeRosalina died on December 3, 1981, leaving Ernestina as their sole surviving heir. Carolina, on behalf of Adrian, frilled a complaint praying that Adrian be declared as an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such, be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which was being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code, the complaint was alreadybarred. On appeal to the CA, it ruled that the subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away the right of Adrianto file a petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Hence this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for (1) nullification of the July 7,1999 CA decision and (2) reinstatement of two (2) orders issued by RTC. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Adrian Bernabe can petition for compulsory recognition now that his alleged father is dead. HELD: 1) Yes, Adrian Bernabe can petition for compulsory recognition even when his alleged father is already dead. RATIONALE: The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, Adrian was only 7 years old then and he was only 12 years old when his father died.The Supreme Court

ruled that Adrians right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Article 255 of the Civil Code states: This code shall have retroactiveeffect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Article285 of the Civil Code states: The action for recognition of the natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of thepresumed parents except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case thelatter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the fatheror of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize thechild. In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.The petition for compulsory recognition was filed by Carolina on behalf of Adrian on May 16, 1994, when Adrian was still a minor or13 years old. This is well before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority

U.S vs Palacio

Palacio was charge, omit from the tax list certain real properties belonging to said

Francisco Madlonito.

Palacio was found guilty and then appealed

SC STAGE

The basis of palacio report were facts given by Madlonito and the measurement

of the 2 laborers

Palacio did not also measure a certain property with an improvement because the

owner was not there, the brother of Francisco, Emiliano

Palacio should have verified the measurement, since it is his duty. Palacio wilfully

omitted from his report an extensive portion of Francisco madlonito, real

property.

when there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different

dates, and it appears evidently by the form and essence of the later law

that it was the intention of the legislator to cover therein the whole of

the subject, and that it is a complete and perfect system, or is in itself a

provision, the latest law should be considered as a legal declaration

that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force and that all that

is not shall rejected and repealed

However it was not the intention of the legislature to cover all matters

relative to the assessment.

Repeals by implications are not favoured, and will not be decreed,

unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended.

Palacio is liable, because it constitutes false representation in that

document and a fraud committed by the public official.

lower court judgement holds.

Lichauco vs Apostol (not favored-repeal by implication; specific over

general)

Lachauco wants to import draft cattle and bovine to produce serum for

diseases, D.A wants the cattle immunize from rinderpest before

embarkation at Pnom-Pehn as stated in A.O 21.(prohibiting bringing of

infected animals)

Company wants an order requiring DA to allow said importation.

1770 authorizes closing of port by DA on the matter of prevention of

infection

Section 1762 is general, amended by 3052 (no repealing clause)

1770 is special, deals with special contingency, power of DA

Repealing 1770 would render DA powerless to protect Agricultural

Agencies

General must always yield to the particular

No implied repeal of a special provision of the character of the one now

under consideration will result from the enactment of broader

provision.

A general statute without negative words does not repeal a previous

statute which is particular.

1770 remains in full force.

People vs Jabinal (Stare Decisis; People Vs Mapa: Retroactivity)

Jabinal found guilty of the crime, illegal possession of firearms and

ammunition.

Jabinal is an appointed secret agent by Gov.Leviste and confidential

agent from the PC provincial commander.

Decision is 1968 mitigating circumstance as Secret agent, not an

excuse to an offense but can reduce severity of the charge.

Macarandang -> Exempted from license requirements

Lucero-> granting temporary use of firearms is okay due to situation

MAPA -> no provision is made for a secret agent, he is not exempt.

Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet interpretation placed upon a the

written law by a competent court has the force of the law.

STARE DECISIS, Jabinal is absolved, lower court decision reversed,

appealant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done

was held not to be punishable. -> non-retroactivity

New decisions cannot reverse the previous decisions of the court in

terms of it being an evidence of what the law means, also the decision

was in 1967 of Mapa, while the appointment was 1962

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to

doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based

on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and

decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument

Apiag vs Judge Cantero (

Judge Cantero was charged with gross misconduct for allegedly

committing bigamy and falsification of public documents

Cantero allegedly left his family for no reason, nowhere to be found.

stare decisis et non quieta movere stand by the thing

and do not disturb the calm

Plaintiffs beg for support, ignored by defendant Cantero

A valid marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of

death and that Judge Canteros marriage to Ms.Ygay, is an act of bigamy

for it was contracted during the existence of the previous marriage.

A void marriage does not necessarily need a judicial decree in ODayat

vs Amante., there was no Family Code yet.

It is also important to show that Judge Cantero, has no malice and

believed that the first marriage is void as evidence in his confidence in

filing up these public documents, a valid defense.

Judge cantero should be liable for misconduct because the infraction he

committed continued from the time he became a lawyer to the time he

was appointed as judge, CONTINUING OFFENSE. BUT SC decided that

it is not applicable because it was his personal life and it was not in

conflict with his official responsibilities. Separation of Character of a

man and a character of the officer, OBITER DICTUM

Judge canter commited falsification, as in hius SALN, ITR, he declared

Ygay as the wife, while Apiag is the legal wife.

Personal Conduct of A judge - Disciplinary measures, Administratively

liable. The conduct of Judge Cantero in his personal life falls short of the

standards, free from appearance of impropriety.

Violated canon 2 and 3 of Judicial ethics

Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all activities.

The court was inclined to treat him with leniency, for it was this lone

case, that question his integrity, other than that he had untarnished 32

years in government service.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by

this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been

examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument

ENDENCIA VS DAVID (Abrogation of the decisions of the court)

David ordered the taxing of Justice Endencia salary. R.A 590, no salary

received by any public officer of the RP shall be considered exempt.

A court decision promulgated in Perfecto vs Meer, was not favourably

received by congress that is why they enacted R.A 590

Wether R.A 590 is constitutional

Congress argued that taxing Judicial officer is not a decrease in

compensation which violates Article 8, section 9 in the constitution

Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office

Congress, interpreted the constitution which is invasion of the well-

defined and established province and jurisdiction of the judiciary.

The reason of Article 8, section 9 is basically to preserve the

independence of the judiciary, the independence of the judiciary is of

far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing

their salary.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS MAY BE ABROGATED BY A CONTRARY RULING OF

THE SUPREME COURT;

CORRECTIVE LEGISLATIVE ACTS BY CONGRESS BUT IN TERMS OF

INTERPRETATION, JUDICIAL HAS THE SOLE POWER: in this case the

word DIMINISHED

Floresca vs Philex ( SC cannot legislate but with exception) IF THE LAW IS SILENT

Families of the deceased philex workers complains that alledgely, philex violated

government rules and regulations,

Negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the

protection of the workers.

Floresca and Families moved to claim their benefits and sued for additional

damages.

Philex argued that they can no longer be sued because petitioners already have

claimed benefits under the Wcompensation Act.

ISSUE: Wether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

DECISION: Under the law, floresca et al could only do either one BUT

SC however ruled that floresca et al are excuse from this one due to ignorance of

FACT. On the ground that if they have been aware of such, they wouldnt have

availed such remedy.

Going strictly by the book would defeat the purpose of the law, which gives value

to human life. In this case the spirit of the law insures mans survival and that

reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being, on this case.

Article 9 of the new civil code

No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,

obscurity or insufficiency of law

Legislators themselves recognizes, that there are instances where

judiciary must legislate to fill in gaps in the law.

Phil Rabbit Bus vs Arciaga ( how to interpret in case of doubt)

Passenger Singson on board a PRBL bus sustained injuries when the bus

crashed.

Singson brought a complaint for contractual tort.

PRBL argued that it was not intended but rather a fortuitous event.

Case dismissed for Singson did not appear. He then filed an appeal on

the grounds of equity.

ISSUE: if dismissal was proper

DECISION: upheald dismissal of the case basing its decision on the

doctrine of finality of judgment grounded on fundament considerations

concerning public policy and sound practice.

The court further states that the principle of equity cannot be applied

to him. equity aids the vigialnt, not those who slumber on their rights

Singson, was given a last chance but failed to avail of such last chance

within the grace period fixed by statute or rules of court is fatal

(Turqueza vs Hernando)

There are instances, indeed, in which a court of equity gives a remedy,

where the law gives none; but where a particular remedy is given by

the law, and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular

rules, it would be very improper for the court to take it up where the

law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows.