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PAL vs NLRC

Facts:

1. PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline and was immediately implemented.2. PALEA filed complaint before the NLRC for ULP with a remark that the code was

implemented without notice and discussion with Union by management.3. The union prayed that the implementation of the code be held in abeyance and that PAL

should discuss the substance of the code with PALEA, that employees dismissed under the code be reinstated and subjected to further hearing.

4. PAL filed a motion to dismiss asserting its prerogative as an employer to prescribe rules and regulations regarding employees’ conduct.

5. Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no bad faith and no ULP supporting the issuance of the rules and regulations is a legitimate management prerogative.

6. NLRC – affirmed with modification. The new code should be reviewed and discussed with complainant union. The constitution has recognized the principle of shared responsibility between employers and workers and has likewise recognized the right of workers to participate in policy and decision making process affecting their rights.

Issue: WON management may be compelled to share with the union or its employees its prerogative in formulating the code of discipline?

Ruling: A line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it that its employees are properly informed of its decisions or modes of action.

The exercise of managerial prerogatives is not limited. Petition dismissed.

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NAFTU vs Mainit Lumber Workers Union

Facts:

1. Private respondent unions: Mainit Lumber Workers Union and General Workers filed with the ministry of labor and employment a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative among the rank and file workers.

2. The case was scheduled for 2 times. During the first scheduled hearing, NAFTU requested for postponement on the ground that he was leaving for abroad.

3. Med Arbiter granted the petitioner for CE.4. NAFTU appealed the decision of Med-Arbiter on the ground that MALDECO was

composed of 2 bargaining units: Sawmill and Logging division but both the petition and decision treated these separate and distinct unit as one.

5. CE was held in sawmill and logging division and General Workers union garnered the highest vote.

6. NAFTU filed a protest alleging massive vote buying in which the Med-arbiter dismissed.

Issue: WON it was right to change the employer from separate bargaining units to only one?

Ruling:

Petitioner pointed out that the two divisions had then two separate CBAs. Although the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive.

There is mutuality of interest among employees of the Sawmill and Logging division. There may be difference as to the nature of their individual assignment but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of separate bargaining unit. Hence, the resolution is hereby affirmed.

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Barbizon vs Nagkakaisang Supervisor ng Barbizon

Facts:

1. Petitioner filed a petition for CE among its rank and file employees. Two unions sought recognition: UNION ALAB AND BUKLOD.

2. UNION ALAB moved for the exclusion of a number of employees allegedly holding supervisory positions.

3. Med-Arbiter issued an order denying the motion for lack of merit. 4. CE was conducted with votes of supervisors and confidential employees being

challenged. 5. UNION ALAB filed an election protest and BUKLOD moved for the opening of challenged

ballots.6. The challenged votes were opened with resulted in the garnering of highest votes in

favour of BUKLOD.7. CBA was signed by petitioner and BUKLOD which was effective for five years.8. While the CBA was still in force, several employees organized themselves into

Nagkakaisang Supervisor and Nagkakaisang excluded monthly paid employees allegedly because they were excluded from the existing CBA. Two separate petition for CE were filed.

9. Both petitions were dismissed by Med Arbiter but the Office of Secretary of Labor granted the appeal and directed the conduct of CE among subject employees excluded from the coverage of the bargaining unit of existing CBA among rank and file. Hence, this petition

Issue: WON the supervisors local union can form a union when the employees they want to represent for collective bargaining already belong in the appropriate bargaining unit of rank and file employees?

Ruling:

Petitioner’s reasoning is flawed. The status of the subject employees, however, is not the issue in the case at bar. The status as “supervisors” is not in dispute as the BLR has settled with finality that said employees are merely rank and file.

The exclusion of petitioner’s “supervisors” from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees indiscriminately curtailed the right of these employees to self-organization. BUKLOD cannot successfully act as the bargaining agent of and duly represent petitioner’s supervisor employees since the latter were expressly excluded from the bargaining unit.

The petitioner for certification election cannot likewise be deterred by the “contract-bar rule” which finds no application in the present case. The petitioning union NBSPI is not questioning the majority status of Buklod as incumbent bargaining agent of petitioner’s rank and file employees. The petitioner for certification election is addressed to a separate bargaining unit – the excluded employees of petitioner.

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Indophil Textile vs Voluntary Arbitrator

Facts:

1. Petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union is a legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees. Petitioner and Indophil Textile Mills executed a CBA.

2. Indophil Acrylic Corporation was formed and registered with SEC. The workers of Acrylic unionized and a duly certified CBA was executed.

3. The petitioner union claimed that the plant and facilities built and set up by Acrylic should be considered as an extension or expansion of the facilities of private respondent company.

4. Petitioner’s contention was opposed by the private respondent which submits that it is a distinct juridical entity from Acrylic.

Issue: WON Indophil acryclic is a separate and distinct entity from respondent company for purposes of union representation?

Ruling:

Petition is devoid of merit.

The fact that the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are related, that some of the employees of the private respondent are the same persons manning and providing for auxiliary services to the units of Acryclic and that the plans and facilities are situated in the same compound – not sufficient to justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic.

Acrylic, not being an extension of expansion of private respondent, the rank-and-file employees working at Acryclic should not be recognized as part of or within the scope of petitioner, as the bargaining representative of private respondent.

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SMP Permex vs Sec. of Labor

Facts:

1. A CE was conducted among employees of respondent Permex. The results of election yielded to a 465 “No Union” vote and 235 vote in favour of National Federation of Labor (NFL)

2. Some employees of Permex formed a labor organization known as the SMP, it later affiliated with the PIILU.

3. Permex recognized SMP as the exclusive bargaining agent and entered into a collective bargaining agreement with it ratified by majority of the rank and file employees of the company.

4. NFL filed a petition for CE but it was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter. The Secretary of Labor set aside the order and directed a CE to be conducted among the rank and file employees.

5. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

Ruling:

Permex should not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP when the latter asked for recognition as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees. The company did not have the power to declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for purpose of collective bargaining.

It is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given opportunity to express himself. In this case, the recognition given to the union came barely ten months after the employees had voted “no union” in the CE. There can be no determination of a bargaining representative within a year of the proclamation of the results of the CE. There is something dubious about the fact that just ten months after the employees had voted that they did not want any union to represent them, they would be expressing support for petitioner. The petitioner entered into a CBA with Permex when its status as exclusive bargaining agent had not been established yet.

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CAPITOL-ACE vs Laguesma

Facts:

1. The Med Arbiter granted respondent union’s petitioner for CE among the rank and file employees of the CMC. Respondent CMC appealed the order to the office of the secretary by questioning the legal status of respondent union’s affiliation with the AFW.

2. To correct any supposed infirmity on its legal status, respondent union registered itself independently, withdrew the petition earlier filed thereafter filed another petitioner for CE.

3. Elections were finally held with respondent union garnering 204 votes, 168 in favour of no union. Med Arbiter issued an order certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative.

4. Respondent CMC again filed an appeal based on its contention that supposed pendency of its petition for cancellation of respondent union’s certificate of registration. This petition was dismissed.

5. Responent Union, after being declared as certified bargaining agent presented economic proposals for negotiation of a CBA. CMC however, contended that the CBA negotiations should be suspended.

6. Due to respondent CMC’s refusal to bargain collectively, respondent union filed a notice of strike.

7. Petitioner union filed a petitioner for CE among the regular rank and file employees alleging in its petition that 331 out of the 400 rank and file employees signed a petition and that the said employees are withdrawing their authorization for the said union to represent them.

8. Petitioner also alleged that the CE can now be conducted as more than 12 mos have lapsed since the last CE was held and no CBA has as yet been concluded despite the lapse of 12 mos.

9. Respondent union opposed the petition and contended that it was not remiss in asserting its right as the bargaining agent for it continuously demanded the negotiation of a CBA despite the company’s avoidance.

10.Med-Arbiter granted the petitioner for CE among rank and file employees. The undersecretary of DOLE, herein respondent ruled against the holding of CE and directed the hospital to negotiate a CBA with respondent union.

Issue: WON public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner for CE?

Ruling:

While it is true that one year had lapsed since the time of declaration of a final certification result and there is no collective bargaining deadlock, there was no grave abuse of discretion since the delay in the forging of the CBA could not be attributed to the respondent union.

What happened in this case is worse than a bargaining deadlock for CMC employed all legal means to block the certification of respondent union as the bargaining agent of rank and file and use it as its leverage for its failure to bargain with respondent union. Thus, we can only conclude that CMC was unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement.

It is only just and equitable that the circumstances should be considered as similar in nature to a bargaining deadlock when no CE could be held. This is also to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by unscrupulous employers to prevent any CB agent from negotiating a CBA. |

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ALU vs Ferrer-Calleja

Facts:

1. ALU informed GAW trading that majority of the latter’s employees have authorized ALU to be their sole and exclusive bargaining representative and requested for a conference for the execution of an initial CBA.

2. GAW Trading heeded to this recognition and subsequently they signed a CBA.3. SPFL union together with NAWGAW undertook a strike after it failed to get the

management of GAW trading to sit for a conference and on the same day, in an effort to pressure GAW trading to make a turnabout of its standing recognition of ALU, it filed a petitioner for preliminary injunction.

4. Med Arbiter ruled for the holding of a CE in all branches of GAW trading as to which ALU filed an appeal. The BLR rendered a decision granting ALU’s appeal and set aside the order of Med-Arbiter on the ground that the CBA has been effective and valid and the contract bar rule applies.

5. However, the decision of BLR director was thereafter reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision and in ruling that the contract bar rule does not apply for the bargaining agreement was defective?

Ruling:

No grave abuse of discretion.

The standing of petitioner as an exclusive bargaining agent is dubious, it may be recalled that respondent company in a letter addressed to petitioner merely required petitioner to present proof that it was supported by the majority thereof. There was precipitate haste on the part of respondent company in recognizing petitioner union, which recognition appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of the latter that it had the support of the majority of employees in the bargaining unit. The employer was obviously aware that there were other unions existing in the unit.

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La Suerte Cigar vs Director of BLR

Facts:

1. La Suerte Cigar and Metro Manila Sales Force Association (UNION) applied and were granted chapter status by NATU.

2. Some 31 local union members signed a joint letter withdrawing their membership from NATU.

3. The union and NATU file a petition for direct certification which alleged that 48 of the 60 sales personnel of the company were members of the local union and that there is no existing recognized labor union in the company representing the said sales personnel.

4. Company filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it is not supported by at least 30% of the members of the proposed bargaining unit for the reason that: of the alleged 48 members of the local union, 31 had withdrawn prior to the filing of petition.

5. Med Arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The BLR reversed and set aside the order of dismissal, holding that the withdrawal of 31 signatories to the petition did not establish the fact that the same was executed freely and voluntarily.

6. The BLR promulgated a resolution directing that the CE be conducted immediately.

Issue: WON the withdrawal of 31 union members from NATU affected the petitioner for CE insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned?

Ruling:

The distinction must be made if the withdrawal or retraction is made before the filing of the petition, the names of the employees supporting the petition are supposed to be held secret to the opposite party. Logically, any such withdrawal shows voluntariness in the absence of proof to the contrary. Moreover, it becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of petition.

When the withdrawal is made after the petition is filed, the employees who are supporting the petition become known to the opposite party since their names are attached to the petition at the time of the filing. Therefore, it would NOT be unexpected that the opposite party would use foul means for the subject employees to withdraw their support.

The petition for CE is ordered dismissed.

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Toyota Workers Assoc vs CA

Facts:

TMPCWA filed a petition for CE in an unorganized establishment, particularly for the rank-and-file employees at the Sta. Rosa and Bicutan Plants of the respondent TMPC, before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). The respondent TMPC opposed the petition on the ground that a case was pending before the Supreme Court between it and another union, the Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union (TMPCLU), whose registration certificate has been cancelled. It asserted that the petitioner’s membership is the same as that of the TMPCLU, which sought to represent the same bargaining unit. The respondent TMPC further asserted that the petition was merely a rehash of its petition, which had been dismissed on June 18, 1998.

On March 29, 1999, Med-Arbiter Zosima C. Lameyra resolved to dismiss the petition.

On appeal, the DOLE, thru Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz(SOLE) reversed the Med-Arbiter’s decision, and ordering the conduct of a certification election. The DOLE denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

The respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under for the nullification of the Resolutions of the SOLE, with a plea for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or at least a temporary restraining order.

The respondent asserts that it has a clear legal right to deal with a bona fide bargaining agent. It sought injunctive relief from the CA precisely to protect said

right pending the resolution of its petition on the merits.

CA-- Granted preliminary writ of injunction.

Issue:

WON the respondent is the real party-in-interest to assail the resolution of the SOLE and the resolution of the Med-Arbiter.

Ruling:

No.

The CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondent’s plea for injunctive relief. In certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to assail the certification election.

In granting the injunction, the CA, in effect ruled that the respondent is the real party-in-interest, and not merely a bystander in the certification election; hence, has a material and substantial right sought to be protected. The CA may be perceived as having prejudged the principal issue before it.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on July 12, 2002 are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED.

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Reyes vs Trajano

Facts:

1. The CE was authorized to be conducted by the BLR among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation. The competing unions were OLALIA and TUPAS. Among the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 member of the INK.

2. The election yielded a result of 95 votes in favour of OLALIA and 141 challenged votes.3. The challenged votes were those cast by the INC members which were segregated and

excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between competing unions that the INK member should not be allowed to vote because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous CE.

4. INK employees filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it was not fair and the result did not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees.

5. OLALIA opposed the petition and contended that the petitioners do not have legal personality since they are prohibited, on religious grounds, from joining any labor org.

6. Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employees and certified OLALIA as sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees. BLR likewise ruled dismissing the appeal of INK. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON the members of INK, who are not allowed by their religion to join a union, have a right to vote in the CE?

Ruling:

The right not to join, affiliate or assist with any union and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization is subsumed in the right to join and maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse of refrain from exercising said right.

The purpose of a CE is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes much be respected and no union may properly be certified as exclusive representative of the workers.

Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a CE. On the contrary, the intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bonafide employees in the bargaining unit.

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Top form vs NLRC

Petitioner SMTFM-UWP was the certified collective bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of private respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. At the collective bargaining negotiation, the parties agreed to discuss unresolved economic issues. On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order No. 01 granting an increase of P17.00 per day in the salary of workers. This was followed by Wage Order No. 02 dated December 20, 1990 providing for a P12.00 daily increase in salary. The union requested the implementation of said wage orders. However, they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-board basis. Private respondent refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion. Thus, private respondent granted the P17.00 increase under Wage Order No. 01 to workers/employees receiving salary of P125.00 per day and below. The P12.00 increase mandated by Wage Order No. 02 was granted to those receiving the salary of P140.00 per day and below. For employees receiving salary higher than P125.00 or P140.00 per day, private respondent granted an escalated increase ranging from P6.99 to P14.30 and from P6.00 to P10.00, respectively.

Consequently, the union filed a complaint with the NCR NLRC alleging that private respondent's act of "reneging on its undertaking/promise clearly constitutes act of unfair labor practice through bargaining in bad faith."

Private respondent contended that in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, it had avoided "the existence of a wage distortion" that would arise from such implementation. It asserted that there was no agreement to the effect that future wage increases mandated by the government should be implemented on an across-the-board basis. Otherwise, that agreement would have been incorporated and expressly stipulated in the CBA. It quoted the provision of the CBA that reflects the parties' intention to "fully set forth" therein all their agreements that had been arrived at after negotiations that gave the parties "unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area of collective bargaining."

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal at the NLRC, same was dismisses for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

W/N TFM committed ULP in its refusal to grant across-the-board wage increases in implementing WO nos. 01 and 02.

HELD:

No. The CBA is the law between the contracting parties - the collective bargaining representative and the employer-company. Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to give protection to labor. In the same vein, CBA provisions should be "construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve." This is founded on the dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but one impressed with public interest. It goes without saying, however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation.

Obviously the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does

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not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement. . . .

With the execution of the CBA, bad faith bargaining can no longer be imputed upon any of the parties thereto. All provisions in the CBA are supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by the parties. This is not a case where private respondent exhibited an indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of petitioner union. The CBA is proof enough that private respondent exerted "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining."

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#12 Sundowner vs Franklin Drilon

December 6, 1989

Facts:

1. Private Respondent Mabuhay leased the premises belonging to Syjuco. Due to non-

payment, a case for ejectment was filed against Mabuhay.

2. Respondent Mabuhay offered to amicably settle by surrendering the premises and to sell its personal assets.

3. Syjuco offered to lease the said premises to Petitioner and thereafter a contract of lease culminated.

4. Respondent Mabuhay also offered to sell its personal assets to petitioner in which the latter agreed.

5. Respondent union picketed in the lease premises and denied the petitioner’s employees entry. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint against Syjuco.

6. A complaint for damages with injunction was filed by petitioner against respondent. A restraining order was issued against the union strikers.

7. Secretary of Labor issued an order directing respondent Mabuhay to accept returning workers pending the issue on absorption of employees.

8. Mabuhay submitted a position paper alleging that it had sold all its assets and personal properties to petitioner and that it completely ceased operation and surrendered the premises to petitioner so that there exists a legal and physical impossibility on its part to comply with the return to work order.

9. Respondent union filed its position paper alleging connivance between Mabuhay and petitioner in selling the assets and closing the hotel to escape its obligations to the employees of Mabuhay.

Issue:

WON purchaser of the assets of an employer corporation can be considered a successor employer of the latter's employees?

Ruling:

Rule is that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts being in personam, thus binding only between the parties. Exception to this rule is when a transaction is clothed with bad faith.

Petitioner agreed to purchase said assets of respondent Mabuhay to enable Mabuhay to pay its obligations to its striking employees and to Syjuco. The deed of assignment executed by petitioner in favour of Syjuco is "purely for and in consideration of the sale/transfer and assignment of the personal properties and assets of Hotel Mabuhay, Inc. listed . . . " and "in no way involves any assumption or undertaking on the part of Second Party (petitioner) of any debts or liabilities whatsoever of Hotel Mabuhay, Inc."

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Petitioner cannot be compelled to absorb the employees of Mabuhay and to pay them backwages.

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#13 BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. vs. BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-PAFLU, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA.

Facts:

The Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (BBWU) entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract with Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BENGUET). It became effective for a period of 4-½ years, and it embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. 3 years later, a certification election was conducted among all the rank and file employees of BENGUET. BCI Employees & Workers Union (UNION) defeated BBWU. CIR certified UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all BENGUET employees.

A Notice of Strike was filed, and the UNION members who were BENGUET employees went on strike. Picket lines were formed, and the picketers, resorted to threats and intimidation, and use of force and violence. Some of the properties of BENGUET were also damaged. Eventually, the parties agreed to end the dispute. BENGUET and UNION executed an agreement. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto and said agreement was attested to by the Director of the BLR. A collective bargaining contract was executed between UNION-PAFLU and BENGUET.

As a result of the strike staged by UNION and its members, BENGUET had to incur expenses for the repair of the damaged properties. BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their Presidents before the CFI on the sole premise that said defendants breached their undertaking in the existing contract not to strike. The unions and their presidents put up the following defenses: (1) they were not bound by the contract which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with BENGUET; (2) the strike was due to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was lawful and in the exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU.

CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the contract did not bind defendants.

Issue:

Did the contract executed between BENGUET and BBWU automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification as sole bargaining representative of all BENGUET employees? NO.

Ruling:

BENGUET invoked the "Doctrine of Substitution" referred to in General Maritime Stevedores' Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines where it stated that, “if a bargaining agent other than the union or organization that executed the contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect said contract.” The statement was obiter dictum. BENGUET's reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is totally misplaced.

The "substitutionary" doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in the light of this that the phrase "said new agent would have to respect said contract" must be understood. It only means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of course to negotiate with management for the shortening thereof. The doctrine cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings in the collective bargaining agreement made by the deposed union.

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When BBWU bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not have validly bound also all the other rival unions existing in the bargaining units in question. BBWU was the agent of the employees, not of the other unions which possess distinct

personalities. The UNION could always voluntarily assume all the personal undertakings made by the displaced agent. But as the lower court found, there was no showing at all that, prior to the strike, UNION formally adopted the existing contract as its own and assumed all the liability ties imposed by the same upon BBWU.

Everything binding on a duly authorized agent is binding on the principal; not vice-versa, unless there is a mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself to the party with whom he contracts. In the case at bar, it was BBWU who expressly bound itself to BENGUET. UNION, the new agent, did not assume this undertaking of BBWU. Since defendants were not contractually bound by the no-strike clause, for the simple reason that they were not parties thereto, they could not be liable for breach of contract to plaintiff.

The judgment of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.

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#14 Apalisok vs. Radio Philippines Network

G.R. No. 138094 May 29, 2003

Facts:

On May 15, 1995, Marilou Gaunzon Apalisok (petitioner), then Production Chief of Radio Philippines Network (RPN) Station DYKC, received a Memorandum from Branches Operations Manager Gilito Datoc asking her to submit a written explanation why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for performance of acts hostile to RPN, and arrogant, disrespectful and defiant behavior towards her superior Station Manager George Suazo. Complying, petitioner submitted on May 16, 1995 her Answer to the memorandum. On May 31, 1995, petitioner received another memorandum from the Administrative Manager of RPN, informing her of the termination of her services effective the close of regular office hours of June 15,1995. By letter of June 5, 1995, petitioner informed RPN, by letter of June 5, 1995, of her decision to waive her right to resolve her case through the grievance machinery of RPN as provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and to lodge her case before the proper government forum. She there after filed a complaint against RPN DYKC and Suazo (respondents) for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch of Region 7 which referred it to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. By Submission Agreement dated June 20, 1995 signed by their respective counsels, petitioner and respondents agreed to submit for voluntary arbitration the issue of whether petitioner's dismissal was valid and to abide by the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. In her position paper submitted before the voluntary arbitrator, petitioner prayed that her dismissal be declared invalid and that she be awarded separation pay, back wages and other benefits granted to her by the Labor Code since reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations. She also prayed that she be awarded P2,000,000.00 for moral damages and P500,000.00 for exemplary damages. Respondents on the other hand prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the case and, assuming that he had, the complaint is dismissible for lack of merit as petitioner was not illegally dismissed.

On October 18, 1995, the voluntary arbitrator rendered an Award in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Respondents' motion for reconsideration of the Award having been denied by the voluntary arbitrator by Order of November 21, 1995, they filed a petition for certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R.No. 122841. By Resolution of December 13, 1995, the Third Division of this Court referred G.R. No. 122841 to the Court of Appeals, following the case of Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, et al. holding that decisions or awards of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators in labor cases are reviewable by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, finding that the option of petitioner not to subject the dispute to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA was tantamount to relinquishing her right to avail of the aid of a voluntary arbitrator in settling the dispute which "likewise converted an unresolved grievance into are solved one," held that the voluntary arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint and accordingly nullified and set aside, by Decision of October 30, 1998, the voluntary arbitration award. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision having been denied by Resolution of February 26, 1999, the present petition was filed which raises the following

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator had jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint, and

2. Whether or not respondents are guilty of estoppel. |

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RULING:

Petitioner, citing Article 262 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended which reads:

ARTICLE 262. JURISDICTION OVER OTHER LABOR DISPUTES. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. (Emphasis and italics supplied),contends that her option not to subject the dispute to the grievance machinery of RPN did not amount to her relinquishing of her right to avail of voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling it for she and respondents in fact agreed to have the dispute settled by a voluntary arbitrator when they freely executed the above-said Submission Agreement. She thus concludes that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the controversy. Petitioner contends in any event that even assuming that the voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the case, it would not be in keeping with settled jurisprudence to allow a losing party to question the authority of the voluntary arbitrator after it had freely submitted itself to its authority. boss, chief, manager the petition is impressed with merit. The above quoted Article 262 of the Labor Code provides that upon agreement of the parties

, the voluntary arbitrator can hear and decide all other labor disputes. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling the dispute

was not forced upon respondents. Both parties indeed agreed to submit the issue of validity of the dismissal of petitioner to the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator by the Submission Agreement duly signed by their respective counsels. As the voluntary arbitrator had jurisdiction over the parties' controversy, discussion of the second issueis no longer necessary.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of October 30, 1998 is hereby SET ASIDE and the

voluntary arbitration Award of October 18, 1995 is hereby REINSTATED.

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LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs.

ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.

Facts:

An issue arose from the parties, whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the Memorandum of Agreement.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. ALDBE submitted a Position Paper but LDB failed to submit despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator.

Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is appealable to the Court of Appeals and not to the Supreme Court.

Held:

Yes.The court resolved to refer this case to the Court of Appeals.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(B)Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi- judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the afore quoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi- judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.

Notes:

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1. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.

Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed by the government.

Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution. Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done

by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator’s decision.

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