WENPHIL CORPORATION, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ROBERTO MALLARE(G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989)

FACTS: Respondent was hired by Petitioner first, as a crew member, then as Assistant Head of the Backroom in its Cubao branch. On May 29, 1985, the Respondent got into an altercation with his coworker, Job Barrameda which resulted in Barrameda’s suspension while respondent was dismissed from work.

His dismissal prompted the Respondent to file a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter, however, dismissed the complaint. But upon appeal to the NLRC, the said tribunal reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner cried foul imputing to the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion, contending that the decision of Petitioner to dismiss Respondent was justified. In support of his contention, Petitioner cited a provision in the “Personnel Manual” which states that if an employee commits an offense punishable with suspension of more than 15 days, an investigation may be conducted at the request of the concerned employee. In this case, said Petitioner, Respondent did not request for an investigation, therefore, Respondent’s right to invoke said provision should be deemed waived.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent’s right to due process was violated.

HELD: “The incident happened on May 20, 1985 and right then and there

as afore repeated on the following day private respondent was suspended in the morning and was dismissed from the service in the afternoon. He received an official notice of his termination four (4) days later.

“Although in the Personnel Manual of the petitioner, it states that an erring employee must request for an investigation it does not thereby mean that petitioner is thereby relieved of the duty to conduct an investigation before dismissing private respondent. Indeed said provision of the Personnel Manual of petitioner which may effectively deprive its employees of the right to due process is clearly against the law and hence null and void. The security of tenure of a laborer or employee is enshrined in the Constitution, the Labor Code and other related laws.

“Under Section 1, Rule XIV of the Implementing Regulations of the Labor Code, it is provided that "No worker shall be dismissed except for just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process." Sections 2, 5, 6, and 7 of the same rules require that before an employer may dismiss an employee the latter must be given a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the grounds thereof; that the employee may answer the allegations within a reasonable period; that the employer shall afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires; and that it is only then that the employer may dismiss the employee by notifying him of the decision in writing stating clearly the reasons therefor.

“The failure of petitioner to give private respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed

constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws.

“The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer.

G.R. No. 117040 January 27, 2000

RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents

Facts:Sometime in1991, Isetann

Department Store (Isetann) instituted a retrenchment program which abolished its Security Checkers Section. Isetann engaged the services of an independent security agency. On October 11, 1991, Ruben Serrano, the head of Isetann’s Security Checkers Section received a letter from the Human Resources Department of Isetann terminating his services effective the same day.

Because of loss of employment, Ruben Serrano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims.

Labor Arbiter rendered judgement finding the dismissal of Ruben Serrano illegal and that Isetann failed to accord due process to the petitioner. Isetann was ordered to pay Ruben Serrano full backwages from the time of his dismissal until reinstatement.

Isetann appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which, reversed the decisionof the Labor Arbiter and ordered Ruben Serrano to be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service. NLRC held that the abolition of the Security Checkers and hiring of an independent security agency constituted an exercise by Isetann of its legitimate business decision.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not the hiring of

independent security agency by Isetann to replace the Security Checkers Section a valid ground for the termination of Ruben Serrano

Whether or not the non-compliance of Isetann of the 30-day written notice requirement in Art 283 (old) of the Labor Code constituted a denial of due process

Ruling:Article 283 of the Labor Code

provides that the employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month before the intended date

thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be considered as one whole year.

Supreme Court held that Management cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its preparation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides. Consequently, absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgement by an employer. The termination of petitioner’s services was for an authorized cause.

Supreme Court also held that not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can be exercised. With respect to Art 283 of the Labor Code, the employer’s failure to comply with the notice of requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment

which makes the termination merely ineffectual.

In sum, if in proceedings for reinstatement under Art. 283, it is shown that the termination of employment was due to an authorized cause, then the employee should not be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to comply with the 30-day notice requirement. Instead, he must be granted separation pay in accordance with Art. 283.

If employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or only granted separation pay, he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance.

Petition granted and the resolution the NLRC is modifies by ordering Isetann to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service and full backwages from the time his employment was terminated up to the time decision becomes final.

TONGKO vs. MANULIFE

FACTS:Tongko started working at Manulife by virtue of a Career Agent’s Agreement. He was first named as Unit Manager in Manulife’s Sales Agency Organization and later on as Branch Manager. When Manulife instituted manpower development programs in the regional sales management level, he received a letter informing him that his region is the lowest performer in terms of recruiting. As a result, meetings were held to tackle on issues and Tongko was provided with directives as part of the changes needed to meet the goal.

Subsequently, Tongko received a notice of termination with 15-day effectivity from receipt of such letter.

ISSUES:1. Was there an employer-employee relationship between Manulife and Tongko?2. If yes, was Manulife guilty of illegal dismissal?

RULING:1. “Thus, with the company regulations and requirements alone, the fact that Tongko was an employee of Manulife may already be established. Certainly, these requirements controlled the means and methods by which Tongko was to achieve the company's goals.”

“Additionally, it must be pointed out that the fact that Tongko was tasked with recruiting a certain number of agents, in addition to his other administrative functions, leads to no other conclusion that he was an employee of Manulife.”

2. “Manulife did not even point out which order or rule that Tongko disobeyed. More importantly, Manulife did not point out the specific acts that Tongko was guilty of that would constitute gross and habitual neglect of duty or disobedience. Manulife merely cited Tongko's alleged ‘laggard performance,’ without substantiating such claim, and equated the same to disobedience and neglect of duty.”

“Here, Manulife failed to overcome such burden of proof. It must be reiterated that Manulife even failed to

identify the specific acts by which Tongko's employment was terminated much less support the same with substantial evidence. To repeat, mere conjectures cannot work to deprive employees of their means of livelihood. Thus, it must be concluded that Tongko was illegally dismissed.”

“Moreover, as to Manulife's failure to comply with the twin notice rule, it reasons that Tongko not being its employee is not entitled to such notices. Since we have ruled that Tongko is its employee, however, Manulife clearly failed to afford Tongko said notices. Thus, on this ground too, Manulife is guilty of illegal dismissal.”

ARMANDO ALILING, petitioner, vs. JOSE B. FELICIANO, MANUEL F. SAN MATEO III, JOSEPH R. LARIOSA AND WIDE WIDE WORLD EXPRESS CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts: Aliling was an employee of Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) who was tasked to handle the company’s Ground Express (GX) involving domestic cargo forwarding services. Barely a month after, the company sent an email to the petitioner to express dissatisfaction with the latter’s performance. On September 20, 2004 respondent through its memo asked Aliling to explain why he should not be terminated for failure to meet expected job performance (This letter was later denied to have been

received by the petitioner, thus he was not able to explain). Thereafter, on a letter dated October 1, 2004, respondent informed petitioner that his case was still in the process of being evaluated. On October 6, 2004, respondent again wrote, this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his services effective as of that date owing to his “non-satisfactory performance”.

Issue/s: Whether or not Aliling was illegally terminated by reason of violation of due process requirement.

Held: YES, Aliling was illegally terminated. As a rule to effect a legal dismissal the employer must show not only a valid ground therefor but also procedural due process should properly be observed. When the Labor Code speaks of procedural due process, the reference is usually to the two (2) notice rule, envisaged in Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules of Implementing the Labor Code which provides: “Section 2. Standard of due process: requirements of noticeI. For termination of Employment base on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Coode:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of termination, and giving the said employee reasonable opportunity to explain his side;

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given the

opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and

(c) A written notice [of] termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstance, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

As to the first written notice, WWWEC did not adduce proof to show that a copy of the letter was duly served upon Aliling. Clearly enough, WWWEC did not comply with the first notice requirement. Lastly, the termination letter did not specifically state Aliling’s “non-satisfactory performance,” or that Aliling’s termination was by reason of his failure to achieve his set quota. In other words, the written notice of termination itself did not indicate all the circumstances involving the charge to justify severance of employment.

Here, the first and second notice requirements have not been properly observed, thus tainting petitioner’s dismissal with illegality.

EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. vs. OJ-MARK TRADING, INC. and SPOUSES OSCAR AND EVANGELINE MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 165950 (August 11, 2010)

FACTS:

Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of P 4,048,800.00. As security for the said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, Pasig City, Metro Manila where the spouses are residing.

Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation, they offered to settle their indebtedness with the assignment to the Bank of a commercial lot of corresponding value and also requested for recomputation at a lower interest rate and condonation of penalties. The respondents failed to submit the required documents such as certificates of title and tax declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt via dacion en pago. The petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.

Respondents then filed Civil Case No. 69294 for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale. They imputed bad faith on the part of petitioner who did not officially inform them of the denial or disapproval of their proposal to settle the loan obligation by dacion via assignment of a commercial property. The trial court granted a TRO effective for twenty (20) days.

Petitioner questioned the issuance of preliminary injunction before the CA arguing that the respondents are not

entitled to injunctive relief after having admitted that they were unable to settle their loan obligations. By Decision dated October 29, 2004, the appellate court sustained the assailed orders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of the third-party mortgagors property while the case for annulment of REM on said property is being tried.

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court held that the respondent spouses have not shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure. According to the SC:

1. It is not sufficient for the respondents to simply harp on the serious damage they stand to suffer if the foreclosure sale is not stayed. They must establish such clear and unmistakable right to the injunction. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an action which did not give rise to a cause of action. There must be an existence of an actual right.

2. Respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. On the face of their clear admission that they were unable to settle their obligations which were secured by the

mortgage, petitioner has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77703 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction is DENIED.

EMER MILAN, RANDY MASANGKAY, WILFREDO JAVIER, RONALDO DAVID, BONIFACIO MATUNDAN, NORA MENDOZA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SOLID MILLS, INC., AND/OR PHILIP ANG, Respondents.FACTS:

Petitioners are employees of Solid Mills, Inc. Petitioners were allowed by Solid Mills, Inc. to occupy a property owned by the latter known as the SMI Village. This was granted by the respondents to the petitioners out of liberality and for convenience of the latter. Solid Mills experience a serious financial losses to which had force its operation to ceased. The petitioners then were required to sign a memorandum of agreement with release and quitclaim before their vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay, and separation pay would be released. Employees who signed the memorandum of agreement were considered to have agreed to vacate SMI Village, and to the demolition of the constructed houses inside as condition for the release of their termination benefits and separation pay.  Petitioners refused to sign the documents and demanded to be paid

their benefits and separation pay. Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of Petitioner. NLRC affirmed. CA ruled in favour of Solid Mills.ISSUE:

WON Solid Mills Inc, can withhold the payment of vacation and sick leave benefits, 13 month pay and separation pay.HELD:

Our law supports the employers’ institution of clearance procedures before the release of wages.  As an exception to the general rule that wages may not be withheld and benefits may not be diminished, the Labor Code provides:

Art. 113. Wage deduction. No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except.1. In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance2. For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and3. In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. (Emphasis supplied)

The Civil Code provides that the employer is authorized to withhold wages for debts due:

Article 1706. Withholding of the wages, except for a debt due, shall not be made by the employer.d

“Debt” in this case refers to any obligation due from the employee to the employer.  It includes any accountability that the employee may have to the employer.  There is no reason to limit its scope to uniforms and equipment, as petitioners would argue. Petitioners do not categorically deny respondent Solid Mills’ ownership of the property, and they do not claim superior right to it.  What can be gathered from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals is that respondent Solid Mills allowed the use of its property for the benefit of petitioners as its employees.  Petitioners were merely allowed to possess and use it out of respondent Solid Mills’ liberality.  The employer may, therefore, demand the property at will.

G.R. No. 205300, March 18, 2015

FONTERRA BRANDS PHILS., INC., Petitioner, v. LEONARDO1 LARGADO AND TEOTIMO ESTRELLADO, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Fonterra Brands Phils., Inc. (Fonterra) contracted the services of Zytron Marketing and Promotions Corp. (Zytron) for the marketing and promotion of its milk and dairy products. Pursuant to the contract, Zytron provided Fonterra with trade merchandising representatives (TMRs), including respondents Leonardo Largado (Largado) and TeotimoEstrellado (Estrellado).

Fonterra sent Zytron a letter terminating its promotions contract. Fonterra then entered into an agreement for manpower supply with A.C. Sicat Marketing and Promotional Services (A.C. Sicat). Desirous of

continuing their work as TMRs, respondents submitted their job applications with A.C. Sicat, which hired them for a term of five (5) months.

When respondents’ 5-month contracts with A.C. Sicat were about to expire, they allegedly sought renewal thereof, but were allegedly refused. This prompted respondents to file complaints for illegal dismissal against petitioner, Zytron, and A.C. Sicat.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled that respondents were not illegally dismissed.

The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter, finding that respondents’ separation from Zytron was brought about by the execution of the contract between Fonterra and A.C. Sicat where the parties agreed to absorb Zytron’s personnel, including respondents.

The NLRC decision was assailed in a petition under Rule 65 before the CA.

CA held that respondents were illegally dismissed since Fonterra itself failed to prove that their dismissal is lawful. However, the illegal dismissal should be reckoned from the termination of their supposed employment with Zytron on June 6, 2006. Furthermore, respondents’ transfer to A.C. Sicat is tantamount to a completely new engagement by another employer. Lastly, the termination of their contract with A.C. Sicat arose from the expiration of their respective contracts with the latter. The CA, thus, ruled that Fonterra is liable to respondents and ordered the reinstatement of respondents without loss of seniority rights, with full backwages, and other benefits from the time of their illegal dismissal up to

the time of their actual reinstatement.

Zytron and Fonterra moved for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition.

Issue:whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed. (By zytron and A.C. Sicat)

Held: No.

We do not agree with the CA that respondents’ employment with Zytron was illegally terminated.

As correctly held by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the termination of respondents’ employment with Zytron was brought about by the cessation of their contracts with the latter. We give credence to the Labor Arbiter’s conclusion that respondents were the ones who refused to renew their contracts with Zytron, and the NLRC’s finding that they themselves acquiesced to their transfer to A.C. Sicat.

By refusing to renew their contracts with Zytron, respondents effectively resigned from the latter. Resignation is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to dissociate themselves from their employment, done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.

Here, it is obvious that respondents were no longer interested in continuing their employment with Zytron. Their voluntary refusal to renew their contracts was brought

about by their desire to continue their assignment in Fonterra which could not happen in view of the conclusion of Zytron’s contract with Fonterra. Hence, to be able to continue with their assignment, they applied for work with A.C. Sicat with the hope that they will be able to continue rendering services as TMRs at Fonterra since A.C. Sicat is Fonterra’s new manpower supplier. This fact is even acknowledged by the CA in the assailed Decision where it recognized the reason why respondents applied for work at A.C. Sicat. The CA stated that “[t]o continuously work as merchandisers of Fonterra products, [respondents] submitted their job applications to A.C. Sicat xxx.” This is further bolstered by the fact that respondents voluntarily complied with the requirements for them to claim their corresponding monetary benefits in relation to the cessation of their employment contract with Zytron.

In short, respondents voluntarily terminated their employment with Zytron by refusing to renew their employment contracts with the latter, applying with A.C. Sicat, and working as the latter’s employees, thereby abandoning their previous employment with Zytron. Too, it is well to mention that for obvious reasons, resignation is inconsistent with illegal dismissal. This being the case, Zytron cannot be said to have illegally dismissed respondents, contrary to the findings of the CA.

whether the termination of respondents’ employment with A.C. Sicat is valid?

We agree with the findings of the CA that the termination of respondents’ employment with the latter was simply brought about by the expiration of their employment contracts.

Foremost, respondents were fixed-term employees. As previously held by this Court, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with predetermined dates of completion; they also include those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of termination.11 The determining factor of such contracts is not the duty of the employee but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of the employment relationship.

In the case at bar, it is clear that respondents were employed by A.C. Sicat as project employees. In their employment contract with the latter, it is clearly stated that “[A.C. Sicat is] temporarily employing [respondents] as TMR[s] effective June 6[, 2006] under the following terms and conditions: The need for your service being only for a specific project, your temporary employment will be for the duration only of said project of our client, namely to promote FONTERRA BRANDS products xxx which is expected to be finished on or before Nov. 06, 2006.”

Respondents, by accepting the conditions of the contract with A.C. Sicat, were well aware of and even acceded to the condition that their

employment thereat will end on said pre-determined date of termination. They cannot now argue that they were illegally dismissed by the latter when it refused to renew their contracts after its expiration. This is so since the non-renewal of their contracts by A.C. Sicat is a management prerogative, and failure of respondents to prove that such was done in bad faith militates against their contention that they were illegally dismissed. The expiration of their contract with A.C. Sicat simply caused the natural cessation of their fixed-term employment there at.

PHIL. JAPAN ACTIVE CARBON CORP. and SATOFUKA v. NLRC and QUIÑANOLAG.R. No. 83239, 08 March 1989, FIRST DIVISION (Griño-Aquino, J.)

FACTSOlga S. Quiñanola employed as

Assistant Secretary/Export Coordinator, was promoted to the position of Executive Secretary to the Executive Vice President and General Manager. For no apparent reason at all and without prior notice to her, she was transferred to the Production Department as Production Secretary. Although the transfer did not amount to a demotion because her salary and workload remained the same, she believed otherwise so she rejected the assignment and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter found that the transfer would amount to constructive dismissal ("she was dismissed for unjustified causes") hence, her refusal to obey the transfer order was

justified. The LA finds Quiñanola was illegally dismissed and orders Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation and/or Tokuichi Satofuka to reinstate her with backwages and damages.

Upon appeal to the NLRC, the Commission approved the Labor Arbiter's decision.

ISSUEWas there a constructive dismissal?

HELDThe Supreme Court rules that

there was NO constructive dismissal.A constructive discharge is

defined as: "A quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as, an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay." (Alia vs. Salani Una Transportation Co., January 29, 1971)

In this case, Quiñanola's assignment as Production Secretary of the Production Department was not unreasonable as it did not involve a demotion in rank (her rank was still that of a department secretary) nor a change in her place of work (the office is in the same building), nor a diminution in pay, benefits, and privileges. It did not constitute a constructive dismissal.

It is the employer's prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees' qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its business operations in order to "ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company." When an employee's transfer is not

unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.

NLRC's decision is affirmed insofar as it orders herein petitioners to reinstate Quiñanola, but she shall be reinstated to her position as Production Secretary of the Production Department without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.

MINTERBRO, INC. and/or DE CASTRO v. NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA MINTERBRO–SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR and/or ABELLANA, et al.G.R. No. 174300, 05 December 2012, FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)FACTS

Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. (Minterbro) is a domestic corporation managed by De Castro and engaged in the business of providing arrastre and stevedoring services to its clientele at Port Area, Sasa, Davao City. Del Monte is their exclusive client.

Davao Pilots' Association, Inc. (DPAI) informed Minterbro of its intention to refrain from docking vessels at Minterbro’s pier for security and safety reasons until its docks are repaired or rehabilitated. Minterbro decided to rehabilitate the pier and on the same day, sent a letter to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to inform DOLE of Minterbro’s intention to temporarily suspend arrastre and stevedoring operations.

The Union composed of respondents Manuel Abellana, et al., employees of Minterbro, filed a complaint for payment of separation pay against Minterbro and De Castro.ISSUEWhether or not the union members/employees were deprived of gainful employment making Minterbro liable for separation pay HELD

The Supreme Court finds Minterbro liable to its employees.

Minterbro's inaction on what they allege to be the unexplained abandonment by Del Monte of its obligations under the Contract for the Use of Pier coupled with petitioners’ belated action on the damaged condition of the pier caused the absence of available work for the union members. As Minterbro was responsible for the lack of work at the pier and, consequently, the layoff of the union members, it is liable for the separation from employment of the union members on a ground similar to retrenchment. This Court has ruled:

"A lay-off, used interchangeably with "retrenchment," is a recognized prerogative of management. It is an act of the employer of dismissing employees because of losses in operation of a business, lack of work, and considerable reduction on the volume of his business, a right consistently recognized and affirmed by this Court. The requisites of a valid retrenchment are covered by Article 283 of the Labor Code."When a lay-off is temporary, the

employment status of the employee is not deemed terminated, but merely suspended. Article 286 of the Labor

Code provides, in part, that the bona fide suspension of the operation of the business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six months does not terminate employment.

When Minterbro failed to make work available to the union members for a period of more than six months by failing to call the attention of Del Monte on the latter’s obligations under the Contract of Use of Pier and to undertake a timely rehabilitation of the pier, they are deemed to have constructively dismissed the union members.

Begino et. al. Vs ABS-CBN Corporation and Amala Villafuerte

FACTS:

Respondent ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) employed respondent Villafuerte as Manager. Thru Villafuerte, ABS-CBN engaged the services of petitioners Begino and Del Valle as Cameramen/Editors for TV Broadcasting, Petitioners Sumayao and Llorin were likewise similarly engaged as reporters. Petitioners were tasked with coverage of news items for subsequent daily airings in respondents’ TV Patrol Bicol Program.

Claiming that they were regular employees of ABS-CBN, petitioners filed a complaint against before the NLRC. In support of their claims for regularization, underpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, damages and attorney's fees, petitioners alleged that they performed functions necessary and desirable in ABS-CBN's business. They

averred that they were repeatedly hired by respondents for ostensible fixed periods and this situation had hone on for years since TV Patrol Bicol has continuously aired from 1996 onwards.

Respondents argued that, although it occasionally engages in production and generates programs thru various means, the company had allegedly resorted to engaging independent contractors who offered their services in relation to a particular program, such independent contractors were required to accomplish Talent Information Forms to facilitate their engagement for and appearance on designated project days. Respondents argued that the company cannot afford to provide regular work for talents given the unpredictability of viewer.

Respondents insisted that, petitioners were hired as talents, to act as reporters and/or cameramen for designated periods and rates. Although petitioners were inevitably subjected to some degree of control, the same was allegedly limited to the imposition of general guidelines on conduct and performance, simply for the purpose of upholding the standards of the company and the strictures of the industry.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship.

RULING:

Yes, there exist an employer-employee relationship.

“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment.— The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.”

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.

The Court finds that, notwithstanding the nomenclature of their Talent Contracts, petitioners are regular employees of ABS-CBN. Time and again, it has been ruled that the test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. As cameramen/editors and

reporters, petitioners were undoubtedly performing functions necessary and essential to ABS-CBN’s business of broadcasting television and radio content. Aside from the fact that said program is a regular weekday fare of the ABS-CBN the record shows that, petitioners were continuously re-hired by respondents over the years.

It is evident from the foregoing disquisition that petitioners are regular employees of ABS-CBN. This conclusion is borne out by the ineluctable showing that petitioners perform functions necessary and essential to the business of ABS-CBN which repeatedly employed them for a long-running news program.

NOTES:

• 4 kinds of employees contemplated in Art. 280 of the Labor Code:

1. Regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer;

2. Project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee;

3. Seasonal employees or those who work or perform services which are seasonal in nature, and the employment is for the duration of the season; and

4. Casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal employees.

• To determine the existence of said relation, case law has consistently applied the four-fold test, to wit:

(a) the selection and engagement of the employee;

(b) the payment of wages;

(c) the power of dismissal; and

(d) the employer's power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished.

Of these criteria, the so-called "control test" is generally regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.

Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco & Sebastian Chua, Petitioners vs. Ronaldo D. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia & Lorna A. Estrella, Respondents

Facts: Petitioner Corporation has a company policy promulgated in 1995, viz.1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get

married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.Respondents herein were all regular employees of the company. Simbol was employed by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married. On the other hand, Comia also married a co-employee, while Estrella had an affair with her co- employee. Respondents were all dismissed.Issue: Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative.Ruling: The policy violates the rights of the employee. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our jurisdiction. We employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity.We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.

Petitioners’ sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law. It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect.Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.

G.R. No. 124208 January 28, 2008GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ABRAHAM CATE, represented by DOROTHY CATE, respondents.X----------------------------------------------- XG.R. No. 124275 January 28, 2008EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ABRAHAM CATE, represented by DOROTHY CATE, respondents.

Facts:

Abraham Cate(Abraham) was a Rifleman of Philippine Navy before joining the Philippine National Police(PNP). During his service with the PNP, he noticed a mass on his left cheek which after a series of tests turned out to be an Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma, which is one of the most aggressive primary bone cancer. He underwent a series of surgeries and radiotherapy, however, he died and was survived by his wife and children.

His wife filed a claim for income benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under PD No. 626, as amended. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that osteosarcoma is not considered an occupational disease under PD No. 626 therefore there must be sufficient proof that Abraham had an increased risk of contracting said ailment.

The decision of GSIS was affirmed by the Employees Compensation Commission(ECC), however, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and declared that Abraham’s disease is compensable on the ground that the Employees Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to our working men, and should, therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the applicant. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling

that the ailment of the late Abraham is compensable under the present law on employees’ compensation?

Held:

In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational disease in the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. Hence, it is supposed to be upon the claimant or private respondents to prove by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting Osteosarcoma was increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The rule is that awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the claimant must prove a positive thing. The application of the rules would mean that absent any proof that the risk of contracting the ailment was increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham, private respondents would not be entitled to compensation.

It is practically undisputed that under the present state of science, the proof referred by the law to be presented by the deceased private respondent claimant was unavailable and impossible to comply with, the condition must be deemed as not imposed.

In the specific case of respondent, the requirement is impossible to comply

with, given the present state of scientific knowledge. The obligation to present such as an impossible evidence must, therefore, be deemed void. Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent with the social legislation’s intended beneficial purpose.

“WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.”

ONE SHIPPING CORP., AND OR ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN, Petitioner, vs. IMELDA C. PAÑAFIEL Respondent, GR No. 192406, January 21, 20015

FACTS:

Ildefonso Pañafiel, the husband of the respondent Imelda Pañafiel, was hired by One Shipping Corp. for and in behalf of the principal One Shipping Kabushiki Kaisha/Japan as second engineer on board vessel MV/ACX Magnolia. Respondent alleged that while on board the vessel, her husband experienced chest pain and difficulty in breathing which he reported to his superior, but was ignored. He returned to the Philippines on May 21, 2005 and sought for post medical examination from the petitioners but was not heeded. Ildefonso suddenly collapsed and died on July 2, 2005. Due to this incident, respondent filed for monetary claims against the petitioners.

Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the monetary claims arguing that Ildefonso was no longer their employee when the incident occurred.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit which the NLRC affirmed on appeal. The issue was raised to CA through petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of Revised Rules of Court. CA granted the petition and reversed the resolution of NLRC.

ISSUES:

1. W/N CA has jurisdiction over present case after the Resolutions of Labor Arbiter and NLRC became final and executory

2. W/N Respondent is entitled to avail death benefits

HELD:

1. CA has no jurisdiction on the case after the resolutions of NLRC became final and executory. It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done

is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.

The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. Nunc pro tunc judgment does not pertain to rendering new judgment; rather, it is one that places the previous judgment in proper form on the record to make it speak of the truth as to make it show what the judicial action really was.

2. Respondent is not entitled to avail death benefits. In order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the affectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. In the present case, Ildefonso died after he pre-terminated the contract of employment. That alone would have sufficed for his heirs not to be entitled for death compensation benefits. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that Ildefonso's illness was acquired during the term of his employment with petitioners. Petition is GRANTED.

Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Avestruz GR 207010 Feb. 18, 2015

Facts: Toribio Avestruz was hired by Maersk-Filipinas as Chief Cook on board the vessel M/V Nedlloyd Drake for a period of six months. In the course of Avestruz’s work, he had an argument with the ship’s captain, Charles C. Woodward. This argument resulted in Captain Woodward summoning and requiring Avestruz to write a statement regarding the incident. Captain Woodward likewise asked Messman Jomilyn P. Kong to submit his own written statement regarding the incident. On the very same day of the incident, Captain Woodward informed Avestruz that he would be dismissed from service. After Avestruz’ return to the Philippines, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired portion of his contract, damages, and attorney’s fees against Maersk. Maersk alleged that Avestruz has been lawfully dismissed due to insubordination.

Issue: Whether or not Avestruz is illegally dismissed by his employee Maersk due to insubordination.

Ruling: Yes.

Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee,

and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

In this case, the contents of Captain Woodward’s e-mails do not establish that Avestruz’s conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. The Court concurs with the CA’s observation that Avestruz’s statement regarding the incident in the galley deserves more credence, being corroborated by Kong, a messman who witnessed the same. Apart from Captain Woodward’s e-mails, no other evidence was presented by the petitioners to support their claims. While rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies, petitioners should have offered additional proof to corroborate the statements described therein.

It was incumbent upon the petitioners to present other substantial evidence to bolster their claim that Avestruz committed acts that constitute insubordination as would warrant his dismissal. At the least, they could have offered in evidence entries in the ship’s official logbook showing the infractions or acts of insubordination purportedly committed by Avestruz, the ship’s logbook being the official repository of the day-to-day transactions and occurrences on board the vessel. Having failed to do so, their position that Avestruz was lawfully dismissed cannot be sustained.

The Supreme Court also affirmed the finding of the CA that

Avestruz was not accorded procedural due process, there being no compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the POEA-SEC which requires the “two-notice rule.”

G.R. No. 196357 April 20, 2015The Heirs of the late Delfin Dela Cruz vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers

FACTS:

The late Delfin Dela Cruz was contracted by Philippine Transmarine carriers for the position of Oiler. He left the Philippines and embarked on August 17, 2000. While performing regular duties,, he was hit by a metal on his back. He requested medical attention and was advised to be given light duties. Upon the vessel’s arrival at a convenient port on August 16, 2001, his contract expired and was signed off from the vessel. He also sought medical assistance but was not extended such. Afterwards, he was not employed because he was already incapacitated to engage in his customary work. On November 13, 2003, he went to De Los Santos Medical Center and underwent X-Ray and MRI of the Spine. He filed his claim for sickness allowance but was not granted. His condition deteriorated and thereafter, he was admitted at St. Luke’s Medical Center where he was diagnosed of MPNST, a malignant peripheral nerve sheath tumor.

On December 4, 2003, he filed a complaint before the NLRC, claiming a payment for sickness allowance and disability compensation in which it was moved to dismiss by the Philippine Transmarine carriers on the ground of prescription, the claim having filed

beyond one year from the date of the termination of the contract. On May 6, 2005 Delfin passed away.

ISSUES:

Whether the heirs of the late Delfin Dela Cruz are entitled to permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance.

HELD:

The 1996 POEA SEC concerning disability claims and sickness allowance applies to the case where it states on Section 20 (3) that upon sign off for the purpose for medical treatment, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Furthermore, failure to do such mandatory reporting requirements shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the benefits. Unfortunately, the petitioners failed to show the steps supposedly undertaken by Delfin to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement. To the Court’s mind, this lapse on petitioners’ part only demonstrates that Delfin did not comply with what was incumbent upon him. The reasonable conclusion is that at the time of his repatriation, Delfin was not suffering from any physical disability requiring immediate medical attendance.

Wherefore, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

Marcopper Mining Corporation vs National Labor Relations

commission and National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union G.R. No. 103525 March 29, 1996

Facts: Marcopper mining corporation entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the National Mines and Allied Workers Union effective from May 1, 1984 until April 1987. Before the expiration of the CBA, they executed a memorandum of agreement modifying the CBA by adding wage increase 5% of the basic rate, to be effective May 1, 1987. On June 1, 1987 Executive Order no. 178 was promulgated and it mandated the integration of the cost of living allowance into the basic wage of the workers, its effectivity retroacts to May 1, 1987. Petitioner implemented it by increasing first by 5% the basic rate base on the CBA and then integrating the cost of living allowance to the basic wage, the respondents assailed such manner of increase and argued that cost of living allowance should first be integrated before the 5% increase of the CBA is computed.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 178 should take effect before computing the CBA increase?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled, “We rule for the respondents..

The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands strong and true. However, the present controversy involves not merely an interpretation of CBA provisions. More importantly, it requires a determination of the effect of an executive order on the terms and the conditions of the CBA. This is, and should be, the focus of the instant case. It is unnecessary to delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they allegedly meant by the term "basic wage" at the time the CBA

and MOA were executed because there is no question that as of 1 May 1987, as mandated by E.O. No. 178, the basic wage of workers, or the statutory minimum wage, was increased with the integration of the COLA. As of said date, then, the term "basic wage" includes the COLA. This is what the law ordains and to which the collective bargaining agreement of the parties must conform.

Petitioner's arguments eventually lose steam in the light of the fact that compliance with the law is mandatory and beyond contractual stipulation by and between the parties; consequently, whether or not petitioner intended the basic wage to include the COLA becomes immaterial. There is evidently nothing to construe and interpret because the law is clear and unambiguous. Unfortunately for petitioner, said law, by some uncanny coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date the CBA increase became effective. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that the computation of the CBA increase on the basis of the "integrated" wage does not constitute a violation of the CBA.

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a

policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.”

Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) vs. National Labor Relations Commision, Labor Arbiter Isabel P. Ortiguerra, and Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA), G.R. No. 85985 (August 13, 1993)

Facts: In 1985, Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline which was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented. In effect, some employees were subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein. On August, the same year, the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for unfair labor practice, alleging that PAL violated paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and Article 253 of the Labor Code, because the implementation of the Code of Discipline was unilaterally implemented without notice and prior discussion with the Union. Also, some provisions of the Code run counter to the construction of penal laws and making punishable any offense within PAL’s contemplation. Lastly, PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers.

PAL, on the other had asserts its prerogative as an employer to prescribe rules and regulations regarding employees’ conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that by implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective bargaining agreement or any provision of the Labor Code. PAL maintained

that Article 253 cited by PALEA referred to the requirement for negotiating a CBA which was inapplicable in this case.

The Labor Arbiter Isabel Ortiguerra found that there was no bad faith on the part of PAL in adopting the Code and ruled that there was no unfair labor practice. However, PAL was not totally fault free. Management prerogative must meet reasonableness, propriety and fairness. Also, PAL failed to prove that the new Code was amply circulated. Thus, PAL was ordered to furnish all employees with the new Code, to reconsider the cases of employees meted with penalties under the new Code and discuss with PALEA the objected provisions. NLRC affirms.

Issue/s: Whether the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the employees.

Ruling:The petition is DISMISSED and the questioned decision AFFIRMED.

The exercise by management of its prerogative shall be done in a just, reasonable, humane and/or lawful manner.

Petitioner's assertion that it needed the implementation of a new Code of Discipline considering the nature of its business cannot be overemphasized. Nonetheless, whatever disciplinary measures are adopted cannot be properly implemented in the absence of full cooperation of the employees. Such cooperation cannot be attained if the employees are restive on account

of their being left out in the determination of cardinal and fundamental matters affecting their employment.