available digest labor

8/10/2019 Available Digest labor

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1. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Listana, Sr.

G.R. No. 152611, August 5, 2003

Facts:

Respondent Listana is an owner of a parcel of land. He voluntarily offered to sell hisland to the government through the DAR pursuant to RA 6657 or the CARL. Whenthe value of the land was determined, the PARAD issued a Writ of Execution orderingthe manager of Land Bank to pay respondent the value of the land as justcompensation. Subsequently, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with thePARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ ofExecution, which the PARAD granted.

Issue: Do Labor Arbiters have contempt powers?

Ruling:

Yes. However, it is important to note that quasi-judicial agencies that have the powerto cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court canonly do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within theirjurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters arestill within the province of the Regional Trial Courts.

2. Atlas Farms, Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 142244, November 18, 2002

Facts: Private respondents dela Pena (urinating and defecating in company premises)and Abion (clogging the fishpond) were both terminated for violating company rulesand regulations and refusing to receive their formal notices and give explanations.Subsequently, both filed complaints for illegal dismissal. On the other hand, petitioneralleges that the labor arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination case,claiming that the cases should have been resolved through the grievance machinery,and eventually referred to voluntary arbitration, as prescribed in the CBA.

Issue: Is termination dispute a grievable issue over which Labor Arbiters have nojurisdiction?

Ruling:


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No. In Maneja vs. NLRC, the Supreme Court held that a dismissal or termination casedoes not fall within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation orimplementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from theinterpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies." Hence, Labor Arbitershave jurisdiction over dismissal or termination disputes.

11.Tanjay Water District vs. Gabaton, G. R. No. 63742, April 17, 1989

Facts: Petitioner Tanjay Water District filed in the RTC of Negros Oriental an actionfor injunction with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, against respondentMunicipality of Pamplona and its officials to prevent them from interfering in the

management of the Tanjay Waterworks System. On March 25, 1983, respondentJudge issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter (water) and over the parties (both being government instrumentalities)by virtue of Art. 88 of PD No. 1067 and PD No. 242. He declared that the petitioner'srecourse to the court was premature because the controversy should have beenventilated first before the National Water Resources Council pursuant to Arts. 88 and89 of PD No. 1067. He further ruled that as the parties are governmentinstrumentalities, the dispute should be administratively settled in accordance with PDNo. 242.

Issues:

a) Whether or not local water districts are government owned or controlledcorporations whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law.

b) Whether or not respondent Judge acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the case for alleged lack of jurisdictionover the subject matter.

Rulings:

a) Yes. Petitioner being a local water district is considered as a quasi-publiccorporation and, therefore, the dismissal of their employees are governed by the civilservice laws, rules and regulations. Significantly, Article XIB Section 2(l) of the 1987Constitution provides that "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters." Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended,


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is the original charter of the petitioner, Tanjay Water District, and respondent TarlacWater District and all water districts in the country, they come under the coverage ofthe civil service law, rules and regulations. (Sec. 35, Art VIII and Sec. 37, Art. IX ofPD No. 807.)

b) Art. 88 of PD No. 1067 provides that the water Resources Council shall haveoriginal jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization,exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within themeaning and context of the provisions of this Code. Inasmuch as the case involves theappropriation, utilization and control of water, We hold that the jurisdiction to hearand decide the dispute in the first instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council asprovided in PD No. 1067 which is the special law on the subject. The Court of FirstInstance (now Regional Trial Court) has only appellate jurisdiction over the case.Additionally, P.D. No. 242 prescribes administrative procedures for the settlement ofall disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the departments,bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations but excluding constitutional offices oragencies, arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts oragreements. P.D. No. 242 is inapplicable to this case because the controversy hereindid not arise from the "interpretation and application of statutes, contracts, oragreements" of the parties herein. As previously stated, it involves the appropriation,utilization, and control of water.

12. Zamboanga City Water District vs. Buat, [G. R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994

Facts: Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in thebusiness of supplying water in the City of Zamboanga. Private respondents are allemployees of petitioner. In March 1987, a strike occurred in the company. It wasconducted and participated in by private respondents, for which reason they wereseparated from their employment. Petitioner filed a complaint before the LaborArbiter to declare the said strike illegal. The following day the Union (ZULU) towhich private respondents belonged filed before the Labor Arbiter, a complaintagainst petitioner for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages. The Executive Labor Arbiterthen declared both the strike and the dismissal of private respondents illegal andordering the reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions, withoutloss of seniority rights and privileges, but without back wages.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: There is no dispute that petitioner, a water district with an original charter, is agovernment-owned and controlled corporation. The established rule is that the hiringand firing of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are


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governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules andRegulations. Jurisdiction over the strike and the dismissal of private respondents istherefore lodged not with the NLRC but with the Civil Service Commission.However, the court did not allow petitioner to belatedly raise the issue of jurisdictionbefore it, considering that it never raised said issue before the Executive LaborArbiter, the NLRC or even before the Supreme Court in another related case. In fact,it was petitioner itself which filed the complaint before the Executive Labor Arbiterand sought affirmative relief therefrom and participated actively in the proceedingstherein. Although jurisdiction over strikes and dismissals of employees in local waterdistricts is lodged not with the NLRC but with the Civil Service Commission, here,the petitioner is already estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC and is,therefore, bound to respect all the proceedings therein.

16. PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTOR PHILS.vs. GALANG

September 24, 1991

Facts: The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were suspectedof complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola bottles. On July 16,1987, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft against them but this waslater withdrawn and substituted with a criminal complaint for falsification of private

documents. After a preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Courtof Tanauan, Leyte, the complaint was dismissed.

Allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents weredismissed by the petitioner company on November 23, 1987. As a result, they lodgeda complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC inTacloban City and decisions mandateed reinstatement with damages. In addition, theyinstituted in the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, a separate civil complaint against thepetitioners for damages arising from what they claimed to be their maliciousprosecution.

The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the trial courthad no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-employer relations thatwere exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. The motion was granted .On July 6,1989, however, the respondent judge, acting on the motion for reconsideration,reinstated the complaint, saying it was distinct from the labor case for damages now

pending before the labor courts. The petitioners then came to this Court for relief.


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Issue: Whether or not it is the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the claim fordamages arising from the malicious prosecution of the petitioner company.

Held: No. It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and theiremployers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is areasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and employee-employerrelations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, thecomplaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of theircivil and criminal jurisdiction. The case now before the Court involves a complaint fordamages for malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court ofLeyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is areasonable causal connection between the complaint and the relations of the parties

as employer and

employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could have

arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties. No suchrelationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are allegingis that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaintwhich the Municipal Trial Court said was intended to harass the poor employees

and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor for lack of

evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the respondents

16. Insular Life v. NLRC

(Nov. 15, 1989)

FACTS:

Insular Life (company) and Basiao entered into a contract by which Basiao wasauthorized to solicit for insurance in accordance with the rules of the company. Hewould also receive compensation, in the form of commissions. The contract also

contained the relations of the parties, duties of the agent and the acts prohibited to himincluding the modes of termination.

After 4 years, the parties entered into another contractan Agency ManagersContactand to implement his end of it, Basiao organized an agency whileconcurrently fulfilling his commitment under the first contract.


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The company terminated the Agency Managers Contract. Basiao sued the company

in a civil action. Thus, the company terminated Basiaos engagement under the first

contract and stopped payment of his commissions.

ISSUE: W/N an independent contractors claim for unpaid commission should be

litigated by the Labor Arbiter.

HELD: No. Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, anindependent contract whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigatedin an ordinary civil action in a regular court. The Labor Arbiter erred in takingcognizance of, and adjudicating, said claim, being without no jurisdiction to do so.

7. PAFLU vs. SALAS

G.R. No. L-39084

February 23, 1988

FACTS:

Gan Huns personal properties in his residential apartment unit were levied, pursuantto a Writ of Execution, issued by the CIR, as a result of a decision rendered in favor ofPAFLU, to a complaint for unfair labor practice against Gan Hun and NorthwestManufacturing Corp..

However, private respondent Wong King Yuen filed a complaint with the CFI fordamages against the sheriff, claiming that Gan Hun is his boarder and that theproperties inside the apartment unit levied belonged to him. Judge Salas, of the CFI,issued an Injunctive Writ, restraining the sheriff from proceeding with the sale of theproperties in question.

PAFLU sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that CFI had no jurisdictionover the case, and argued that the case relates to an existing labor dispute cognizableby the industrial court.

Wong contends that the case is not a labor dispute recognizable by the industrialcourt, but an ordinary civil action for damages against the sheriff, directed against the


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latters bond; and, that it is an entirely separate proceeding distinct from the labor casefiled with the CIR.

CFI denied the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration, thus thispetition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI has the jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief questioned bythe petitioner

RULING:

Yes. The case filed by Wong is an ordinary civil action for damages, not a labordispute.

Even if the act complained of by Wong arose from a labor dispute between PAFLUand another party, there is no labor dispute between PAFLU and Wong. The civil caseremains distinct from the labor dispute pending with the CIR.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 103, the jurisdiction of the Court of IndustrialRelations is limited to labor disputes, i.e., problems and controversies pertaining toemployer-employee relationship.

8. SMC vs NLRC

G.R. No. 80774 May 31, 1988

FACTS:

Private respondent Rustico Vega submitted to SMC an innovation proposal, in linewith the Innovation Program sponsored by SMC. SMC, however, did not acceptVegas proposal.

Vega filed a complaint with Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII (Cebu City),

alleging that his proposal had been accepted by the methods analyst and implementedby SMC, and that the same ultimately and finally solved the problem of SMC in theproduction of Beer Grande.

SMC answered that Vega had no cause of action. It denied the latters allegations, and

stated that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction, Vega having improperly bypassedthe grievance machinery procedure under an existing CBA and the administrative


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remedies provided under the rules of the Innovation Program. It also invoked Art. 217of the Labor Code.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but the NLRCordered otherwise, thus this present Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether money claims arising out of or in connection with employment are within theoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters

RULING:

The money claims of workers referred to in paragraph 3 of Art. 217 embrace thosewhich arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some

aspect or incident of such relationship.

However, in Molave Motor Sales, Inc. v. Laron, Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome andSingapore Airlines Limited v. Pao, where the claim to the principal relief sought is tobe resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or aCBA but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to theregular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In suchsituations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise in the application of the generalcivil law.

SMCs Innovation Program, an employee incentive undertaking, though unilateral inorigin, could nonetheless ripen into an enforceable contractual (facio ut des)obligation on the part of SMC under certain circumstances. Thus, whether or not anenforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen between SMC andVega in the circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached,are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to laborlegislation and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions ofemployment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.

7. DFA vs. NLRC, et al., G. R. No. 113191, September 18, 1996

FACTS:


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Private respondent Magnayi intiated a case before the NLRC for his alleged illegaldismissal by the Asian Devt Bank (ADB) and the latters violation of the labor-only contracting law. Summonses were served both to ADB and DFA. ADB andDFA notified the Labor Arbiter that ADB, as well as its President and Office, werecovered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or saleof securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the ADB Charter, in relationto Sec. 5 and Sec. 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and the Govt of the Phils.

Regarding The Banks Headquarters.

The LA took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waivedits diplomatic immunity from suit and rendered decision declaring complainant

private respondent as ADBs regular employee and the latters termination is illegal.

DFA referred the matter to the NLRC which ruled that the controversy was within theCommissions jurisdiction, referring to a labor dispute within Art. 217. The NLRC

also ruled that ADB failed to raise the defense of immunity before the LA and that itdoes not have competence to investigate/review any decision of a LA.

ISSUE:

W/N ADB falls under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters?

RULING:

No, ADB was correct in invoking its immunity from suit under the Charter and the

Headquarters Agreement. Except in the specified cases of borrowing and guaranteeoperations, purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunityfrom legal process of every form. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity

in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and theHeadquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treatycovenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Governmentwhich must be respected.

Diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse tolook beyond a determination by the executive branch. In such cases where the plea of

diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, the judicialdepartment of govt follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass

the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. The executive branchsdetermination is conclusive upon the courts. The filing of the petition by the DFA, in

behalf of ADB, is itself an affirmance of the governments own recognition of ADBs

immunity.


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ADB, being an international organization that has been extended diplomatic

status, is independent of the municipal law and is immune from local jurisdiction.

Note the provisions in the Charter and Headquarters Agreement:

* Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:

The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in casesarising out of or in

connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations,or to buy and

sell or underwrite the sale of securities. 3

* Under Article 55 thereof

All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, includingexperts

performing missions for the Bank:

(1) shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by them intheir official

capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity.

* Headquarters Agreement. Thus, its Section 5 reads:

The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in casesarising out of, or in

connection with, the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations,or to buy and

sell or underwrite the sale of securities.

* Section 44 of the agreement states:

Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the president, Vice-Presidentand executive


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officers as may be agreed upon between the Government and the Bank shall enjoy,during their stay

in the Republic of the Philippines in connection with their official duties with theBank:

(b) Immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or writtenand all acts done

by them in their official

capacity.

13.) Tolosa vs. NLRC; GR No. 149578

Facts:

Captain Virgilio Tolosa was hired by Qwana-Kaiun, through its agent, ASIA BULK,to be the captain of the vessel named M/V Lady Dona. At the time of embarkation,Capt. Tolosa was to be in good health. During channeling activities upon thevessels departure from Yokohama, Capt. Tolosa was drenched with rainwater. The

following day, he had a slight fever and in the succeeding 12 days, his healthdeteriorated resulting in his death. Because of such incident, his wife, Evelyn Tolosafiled a Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA against Qwana-Kaiun, thru itsresident agent. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. However, the NLRCand CA, vacated such decision and ruled that the labor commission had nojurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction?

Ruling:

No. While it is true that labor arbiters and NLRC have jurisdiction to award not onlyreliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, thesereliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection withthe Labor Code, other labor statutes, or CBA. In the present case, petitioners claim

for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes or


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CBA. The loss she claims does not refer to the actual earnings of the deceased but tohis earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years. This amount isrecoverable if the action is based on quasi-delict. Therefore, it is not the NLRC but theregular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which employer-employee relation is merely incidental and which the cause of action proceeds from adifferent source of obligation such as tort.

Part II

2.) Basaya, Jr. vs. Militante; GR No. 75837

Facts:

Petitioners constitute the crew of the fishing vessel chartered by Philippine TunaVentures, Inc. (TUNA), with petitioner Dominador Basaya, Jr. as its captain. TUNA,

Inc. sought the remedy of Replevin against petitioners before the RTC praying thatpetitioners be ordered to deliver to it the possession of its Vessel, which petitionerspossessed in violation of its rights. Petitioners argued that their possession was anextension of the private respondent over the vessel and to deprive them of itspossession is tantamount to an illegal termination.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the Replevin Case?

Ruling:

Yes. Replevin is a possessory action. The relief sought therein is the return of theproperty in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is a proceedingadjudicating rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question ofwhether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved, whetheror not the adverse party has wrongfully taken said property as to require its return toplaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of labor tribunal, it is beyond the field ofspecialization of Labor Arbiters. The labor dispute involved is not intertwined withthe issue of replevin case. The respective issue raised in each forum can be resolved

independently of the other. The Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but definingavenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.

8. Lasco, et al. vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration[UNRFNRE], et al., G. R. Nos. 109095-109107, February 23, 1995

FACTS:


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Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondentUNRFNRE, a special fund and subsidiary organ of the UN. The UNRFNRE isinvolved in a joint project with the Philippine Govt and the UN for exploration work

in Dinagat Island. Petitioners filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. UNRFNREalleged that NLRC had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomaticimmunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of theUN and it also attached a letter from the DFA which acknowledge its immunity fromsuit. NLRC dismissed the complaint on the ground that UNRFNRE is protected bydiplomatic immunity.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari arguing that the acts of miningexploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an internationalagency protected by diplomatic immunity and even if UNRFNRE was entitled todiplomatic immunity, it waived it when it engaged in exploration work and enteredinto a contract of employment with petitioners.

ISSUE:

W/N UNRFNRE is entitled to diplomatic immunity from suit. RULING:

Yes. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established bythe letter of the DFA, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE inaccordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN, towhich the Philippine Govt is a party. UNRFNRE is not engaged in a commercialventure in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into

by the Philippine Govt and the UN for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Itsmission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to helpimprove the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners.

As a matter of State policy, the Philippine Govt adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law. Being a member of UN, and a party to the Conventionon the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the UN, thePhilippine Govt adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the UN and its

specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.

We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific universalendeavors, such as health, agriculture, science and technology and environment. It isnot surprising that their existence has evolved into the concept of

international immunities. The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities tointernational organizations, its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal andpractical independence in fulfilling their duties. Immunity is necessary to assure


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unimpeded performance of their functions. There is no conflict between theconstitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers and promote theirwelfare and the grant of immunity to international organizations.

5.) Nacpil vs. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation, [G. R. No. 144767, March21, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner claimed to be the Assistant General Manager for Finance/Administrationand Comptroller of Respondent IBC. Petitioner claims that he was harassed, insulted,humiliated and pressured into resigning until he was forced to retire. The newpresident refused to pay him his retirement benefits, allegedly because he had not yetsecured the clearances from the PCGG and the COA and because the new presidentrefused to recognize his employment and position as Comptroller. This promptedpetitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits beforethe Labor Arbiter.

IBC filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction overthe controversy. IBC contended that petitioner was a corporate officer who was dulyelected by the BOD of IBC; hence, the case qualifies as an intra-corporate disputefalling within the jurisdiction of the SEC.

Petitioner argued that he is not a corporate officer of the IBC but an employee thereofsince he had not been elected nor appointed as Comptroller and Assistant Manager bythe IBC's Board. He claims that he was appointed by IBCs General Manager. He

strengthens his claim by stating that IBC By-Laws do not provide for the position ofComptroller as part of the corporations corporate officers. Hence, his dismissal is a

controversy within the jurisdiction of the labor courts.

The LA ruled in favour of petitioner. The NLRC ruled against IBC for the lattersfailure to file the appeal bond. The CA, on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 ruledin favour of IBC. Hence, the instant petition.


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ISSUE: WON the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissaland non-payment of benefits filed by petitioner?

RULING:

The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the controversy.

Under PD No. 902-A (the Revised Securities Act), which was the law in force whenthe complaint for illegal dismissal was instituted by petitioner in 1997, the SEC hasexclusive jurisdiction over controversies in the election or appointment of directors,trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. TheCourt has consistently held that there are two elements to be considered indetermining whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the controversy, to wit: (1) thestatus or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is thesubject of their controversy.

The fact that petitioner was merely appointed by the General Manager does notremove him from being a corporate officer. Such appointment was subsequentlyapproved by the General Manager. Further, the fact that the position of Comptroller isnot found in the by-laws is no excuse as well. Section 25 of the Corporation Codeauthorizes the BOD to appoint such other corporate officers as necessary. Hence,

petitioners appointment as General Manager requiring BOD approval falls within

controversies involving the appointment of corporate officers, which are under theSECs jurisdiction.

6.) Prudential Bank and Trust Company vs. Reyes, [G. R. No. 141093, February 20,2001

FACTS:

Respondent Reyes filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal againstpetitioner before the Labor Arbiter. Before her dismissal she occupied the position ofAssistant Vice President in the foreign department of the Bank.

Petitioner claims that there was sufficient basis to terminate respondents employment

based on its loss of trust and confidence in the latter. Petitioner claims that respondentReyes is a corporate officer, an elective position under the corporate by-laws and hernon-election is an intra-corporate controversy cognizable by the SEC.

The LA ruled in favour of respondent. The NLRC reversed. The CA reversed theNLRC and affirmed the LA. Hence, the instant petition.


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ISSUE: WON the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal?

RULING:

While generally, the dispute is one intra-corporate in nature and hence, beyond the

jurisdiction of the NLRC, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the issue ofjurisdiction under the principle of estoppel. The Bank actively participated in theproceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. While it istrue that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of theproceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened.

Further, the banks claim that respondent is merely holding an elective position and is

not a regular employee is belied by respondents work history with the bank, whichshowed that she rose from the ranks of the employees. It has been said that "anemployee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not

because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them. As Assistant VP, sheperforms tasks integral to the operations of the bank and her length of service with thebank totaling 28 years speaks volumes of her status as a regular employee of the bank.As a regular employee, she is entitled to security of tenure; hence, dismissible only forjust cause.

Metropolitan waterworks and sewage system vs. Hernandez

143 scra 602

August 19, 1986

Facts:

Petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) was haled beforethe Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region of the National Labor RelationsCommission on charges of willfull failure to pay wage differentials, allowances andother monetary benefits to its contractual employees numbering 2,500 or so. On June5, 1985, judgment was rendered by the labor Arbiter to whom the case was assigned,adverse to MWSS. MWSS claims lack of jurisdiction of the NLRC over the casebecause it is a GOCC.

Issue:


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WON the contractual employees of the MWSS are governed by the labor code or theCivil service law

Ruling:

the character of the MWSS as a government-owned or controlled corporation is notcontested; it is, in any case, a proposition that cannot be gainsaid. Republic Act No.6234 created it as a "government corporation to be known as the MetropolitanWaterworks and Sewerage System." As in the case of the National HousingAuthority, therefore, employment in the MWSS is governed not by the Labor Codebut by the civil service law, rules and regulations; and controversies arising from orconnected with that employment are not cognizable by the NationalLabor RelationsCommission.

9. G.R. No. 73199 October 26, 1988

DR. RENATO SARA and/or ROMEO ARANA petitioners, vs. CERILAAGARRADO and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,respondents.

Facts: Private respondent Cerila Agarrado was an attendant in the clinic of petitioner

Dr. Renato Sara. Four years later, petitioners Dr. Sara and Romeo Arabia, beingowners of a rice mill, entered into a verbal agreement with private respondentAgarrado whereby it was agreed that the latter would be paid P2.00 commission persack of milled rice sold as well as a commission of 10% per kilo of palay purchased. Itwas further agreed that private respondent would spend her own money for theundertaking, but she was authorized to borrow money from other persons, as in factshe did, subject to reimbursement by petitioners.

Later, private respondent file a complaint before the NLRC Regional ArbitrationBranch for unpaid commissions and reimbursements. Petitioners contend that the

labor arbiter has no jurisdiction since there was no employer-employee relationshipbetween the private parties so claims were cognizable by the regular courts. The laborarbiter ordered petitioner to pay all claims. On appeal, labor arbiters decision wasaffirmed. Thus this petition.

Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners andprivate respondent as to warrant cognizance by the Labor Arbiter.


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Ruling: No. To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, theCourt has applied the following four-fold test: [1] the selection and engagement of theemployee; [2] the payment of wages; [3] the power of dismissal; and [4] the power tocontrol the employee's conduct. Noticeably absent from the agreement between theparties is the element of control. The means and methods of purchasing and sellingrice or palay by private respondent were totally independent of petitioners' control.Note that private respondent was never given capital by his supposed employer butrelied on her own resources and if insufficient, she borrowed money from others. Theabsence of control is made more evident by the fact that private respondent was noteven obliged to sell the palay she purchased to petitioners. Moreover, privaterespondent worked for petitioners at her own pleasure and was not subject to definitehours or conditions of work. Under the conditions set forth in their agreement, privaterespondent was an independent contractor. The absence of employer-employeerelationship deprives the labor arbiter of jurisdiction.

10. G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985

NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN JUCO ANDTHE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts: Private respondent Benjamin C. Juco was a project engineer of the NationalHousing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. For havingbeen implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds involving 214pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation, Juco's services were terminatedby NHC. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner NHC with theMinistry of Labor and Employment. The NHC alleged that the NLRC,

is without authority to entertain the case for lack of jurisdiction, considering that theNHC is a government owned and controlled corporation.

Issue: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) covered by theLabor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?

Ruling: Employees of the NHC are covered by the CSC.

Applying the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code as amended,and the Civil Service Decree as amended and the precedent in the Alliance ofGovernment Workers decision, it is clear that the petitioner National HousingCorporation comes under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, not theMinistry of Labor and Employment.


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This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performsgovernmental functions and not proprietary ones. The petitioner points out that it wasestablished as an instrumentality of the government to accomplish governmentalpolicies and objectives and extend essential services to the people. It would beincongruous if employees discharging essentially governmental functions are notcovered by the same law and rules which govern those performing other governmentalfunctions.

The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government may becreated by special charter does not mean that such corporations not created by speciallaw are not covered by the civil service. Nor does the decree repealing all charters andspecial laws granting exemption from the civil service law imply that governmentcorporations not created by special law are exempt from civil service coverage. Thesecharters and statutes are the only laws granting such exemption and, therefore, theyare the only ones which could be repealed.

Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides:

The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality ofthe Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. ...

The Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, provides:

ART. 277 Labor Code as amended. Government employees.The terms andconditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of

government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil ServiceLaw, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be standardized by the NationalAssembly as provided for in the New Constitution. However, there shall be reductionof existing wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment beingenjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of the Code.

PNOC- exploration corporation vs NLRC

164 scra 501

August 18, 1988

Facts:


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on April 14, 1976, the PNOC-EC was organized. On May 28, 1976, petitioneremployed Oscar Salvador as a driver mechanic for its project in the Cagayan Valley.Upon completion of the project, private respondent's services were terminated. OnOct. 1, 1978, private respondent was again hired as , this time in petitioner' s GravityProject in Samar. Hence, when the second project was completed, petitioner' semployment was likewise terminated and was never renewed in the subsequentprojects of the company. Believing that he had become a regular employee and thathis termination was illegal, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner forillegal dismissal, backwages and allowances before the Labor Arbiter

issue:

WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide the case

Ruling:

The Court has squarely ruled that PNOC subsidiaries, whether or not originallycreated as government owned or controlled corporations are governed by the CivilService Law. Petitioner PNOC-EC being admittedly a subsidiary affiliate of PNOC istherefore unmistakably within the scope of the Civil Service Law and beyond thejurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor or any of its agencies. Having been renderedwithout jurisdiction, the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter which was affirmed byrespondent NLRC is null and void.

SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED v. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO

G.R. No. L-47739 June 22, 1983

Facts:

Private Respondent Carlos Cruz entered into a training agreement with PetitionerSingapore Airlines Ltd. (SAL) where the company will provide him free training andin return he will render his services to the company for 5 years, and in case of failureto do so, a clause for liquidated damages was included. Carlos signed the agreementtogether with Villanueva as surety. SAL claimed that Carlos had gone on leavewithout approval, and for such, the Company filed a suit for damages for violation ofcontract against private respondent and his surety. Cruz denied any breach of contract


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as it was not stated that the 5 year service clause was required to be rendered straight.Villanueva also averred that he was a guarantor and not a surety. During pre-trial,Judge Pao dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction stating that since this is an issuearising from an employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is within the LaborArbiters of the NLRC.

Issues:

1. WON a violation of a training agreement is cognizable by the regular courts.

2. WON the jurisdiction of the present case belongs to the Labor Arbiters.

3. WON the Labor Arbiters are competent to resolve the issue of liability ofsuretyship.

Ruling:

1. No. Violation of a training agreement is an issue involving or arising from anemployer-employee relationship, which under 216 of the then Labor Code,jurisdiction is vested with the Labor Arbiters.

2. No. In this case, the jurisdiction rightly belongs to the regular courts because therelief sought of is for liquidated damages for breach of contract. This, and other reliefsare not reliefs under the Labor Code but under the Civil Law. Breach of an obligation,as is in this case, is intrinsically a civil dispute.

3. No. The Supreme Court held that the determination of is issue is beyond thecompetence

Maneja v NLRCG.R. No. 124013. June 5, 1998

Facts:


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Maneja worked for Manila Midtown Hotel as a telephone operator. She was also amember of the Union (NUWHRAIN) with a CBA. A fellow telephone operatornamed Lelong received a Request for Long Distance Call (RLDC) and a deposit froma guest named Hiota Ieda. The call was unanswered and the P500 deposit wasforwarded to the cashier. Ieda made a second call and second P500 deposit but the callwas also unanswered. Loleng passed on the RLDC to Maneja for follow up. Manejamonitored the call. A hotel cashier after inquired about the P1000 deposit made byIeda. After a search, Loleng found the first deposit in the guest folio and the second inthe folder for cancelled calls.

Finding that the second call was stamped with the wrong date, Maneja changed itfrom Feb. 15 to Feb 13, 1990. Loleng then delivered the RLDC and money to thecashier. The chief telephone operator issued a memorandum directing Maneja andLoleng to explain the incident and recommended they be subject to disciplinary actionfor forging falsifying official documents and culpable carelessness for failure tofollow specific instruction or established procedure. Maneja was served with a noticeof dismissal, and wrote instead under protest.

Petitioner filed for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter, who held that petitionerwas illegally dismissed, however he held that the complaint was on its face within thejuridical ambit of the grievance procedure under the CBA and if unresolved one forproper voluntary arbitration.

The Hotel appealed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the case should have beenfiled with the proper grievance procedure or voluntary arbitration. The NLRCaffirmed the decision.

Petitioners MR was denied, hence this petition for certiorari arise.

Issues: 1. WON the LA had jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.

2. Was there illegal dismissal?

Held: 1. Termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of theLabor Arbiter as contemplated in LC 217, but it should be read in conjunction with

LC 261 which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction tohear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation of CBA or ofenforcement of personnel policies. In the Sanyo case, the Sol. Gen. argued that adistinction should be made between interpreting the CBA and enforcing personnelpolicies and a termination case. Dismissal does not involve CBA or personnel policy.Where the dispute is just in interpretation, they could resort to the grievancemechanism, but when there was actual termination, it was already cognizable by the


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Labor Arbiter. In this case, there has been an actual termination. The LA does havejurisdiction under LC 217, otherwise an employee who was on AWOL or committedoffenses would no longer be able to file illegal dismissal cases because the dischargewould be premised on the interpretation enforcement of company policies. The Hotelalso voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

2. Yes. Given the factual circumstances there was no dishonesty. The money was alleventually found and the date was a correction, not falsification. There was also nohearing, merely a request for written explanation.

Maneja v NLRCG.R. No. 124013. June 5, 1998

Facts:

Maneja worked for Manila Midtown Hotel as a telephone operator. She was also amember of the Union (NUWHRAIN) with a CBA. A fellow telephone operatornamed Lelong received a Request for Long Distance Call (RLDC) and a deposit froma guest named Hiota Ieda. The call was unanswered and the P500 deposit wasforwarded to the cashier. Ieda made a second call and second P500 deposit but the callwas also unanswered. Loleng passed on the RLDC to Maneja for follow up. Manejamonitored the call. A hotel cashier after inquired about the P1000 deposit made by

Ieda. After a search, Loleng found the first deposit in the guest folio and the second inthe folder for cancelled calls.

Finding that the second call was stamped with the wrong date, Maneja changed itfrom Feb. 15 to Feb 13, 1990. Loleng then delivered the RLDC and money to thecashier. The chief telephone operator issued a memorandum directing Maneja andLoleng to explain the incident and recommended they be subject to disciplinary action


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for forging falsifying official documents and culpable carelessness for failure tofollow specific instruction or established procedure. Maneja was served with a noticeof dismissal, and wrote instead under protest.

Petitioner filed for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter, who held that petitioner

was illegally dismissed, however he held that the complaint was on its face within thejuridical ambit of the grievance procedure under the CBA and if unresolved one forproper voluntary arbitration.

The Hotel appealed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the case should have beenfiled with the proper grievance procedure or voluntary arbitration. The NLRCaffirmed the decision.

Petitioners MR was denied, hence this petition for certiorari arise.

Issues: 1. WON the LA had jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.

2. Was there illegal dismissal?

Held: 1. Termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of theLabor Arbiter as contemplated in LC 217, but it should be read in conjunction withLC 261 which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction tohear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation of CBA or ofenforcement of personnel policies. In the Sanyo case, the Sol. Gen. argued that adistinction should be made between interpreting the CBA and enforcing personnel

policies and a termination case. Dismissal does not involve CBA or personnel policy.Where the dispute is just in interpretation, they could resort to the grievancemechanism, but when there was actual termination, it was already cognizable by theLabor Arbiter. In this case, there has been an actual termination. The LA does havejurisdiction under LC 217, otherwise an employee who was on AWOL or committedoffenses would no longer be able to file illegal dismissal cases because the dischargewould be premised on the interpretation enforcement of company policies. The Hotelalso voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

2. Yes. Given the factual circumstances there was no dishonesty. The money was all

eventually found and the date was a correction, not falsification. There was also nohearing, merely a request for written explanation.


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CELESTINO VIVERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HAMMONIA MARINESERVICES, ET AL., (G. R. NO. 138938, OCTOBER 24, 2000)

Facts: Petitioner Vivero, a licensed seaman, is a member of the Associated MarineOfficers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP).

On grounds of very poor performance and conduct, refusal to perform his job, refusalto report to the Captain or the vessels Engineers or cooperate with other ship officersabout the problem in cleaning the cargo holds or of the shipping pump and his dismalrelations with the Captain of the vessel, complainant was repatriated on 15 July 1994.

On 01 August 1994, complainant filed a complaint for illegal dismissal at AMOSUPof which complainant was a member. Pursuant to Article XII of the Collective

Bargaining Agreement, grievance proceedings were conducted; however, partiesfailed to reach and settle the dispute amicably, thus, on 28 November 1994,complainant filed the complaint with the POEA. While the case was pending beforethe POEA, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that thePOEA had no jurisdiction over the case considering petitioner Vivero's failure to referit to a Voluntary Arbitration Committee in accordance with the CBA between theparties. Upon the enactment of RA 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas FilipinosAct of 1995, the case was transferred to the Adjudication Branch of the NationalLabor Relations Commission.

Labor Arbiter, on the basis of the pleadings and documents available on record,rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. NLRC set asidethe decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the record was clear thatpetitioner had exhausted his remedy by submitting his case to the GrievanceCommittee of AMOSUP. NLRC then remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter forfurther proceedings. On 3 July 1998 the MR of the private respondent was denied,thus it raised the case to the CA. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of privaterespondents holding that the CBA is the law between the parties and compliancetherewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.

Hence petition for review was filed by the herein petitioner.

Issue: Whether the NLRC is deprived of jurisdiction over illegal dismissal caseswhenever a CBA provides for grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrationproceedings.

Held: No.


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The instant case is a termination dispute falling under the original and exclusivejurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, and does not specifically involve the application,implementation or enforcement of company personnel policies contemplated in PolicyInstruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy Instruction No. 56 does not apply in the caseat bar.

It is clear from the claim/assistance request form submitted by petitioner to AMOSUPthat he was challenging the legality of his dismissal for lack of cause and lack of dueprocess. The issue of whether there was proper interpretation and implementation ofthe CBA provisions comes into play only because the grievance procedure providedfor in the CBA was not observed after he sought his Unions assistance in contesting

his termination. Thus, the question to be resolved necessarily springs from the primaryissue of whether there was a valid termination; without this, then there would be noreason to invoke the need to interpret and implement the CBA provisions properly.

Under their CBA, both Union and respondent companies are responsible for selectingan impartial arbitrator or for convening an arbitration committee; yet, it is apparentthat neither made a move towards this end. Consequently, petitioner should not bedeprived of his legitimate recourse because of the refusal of both Union andrespondent companies to follow the grievance procedure.

Under Article 262, the Voluntary Arbitrator may assume jurisdiction only whenagreed upon by the parties. Policy Instructions No. 56 issued by DOLE SecretaryConfesor clarifying the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and Voluntary Arbitrations doesnot apply. It reiterated the ruling that dismissal is not a grievable issue.

GREPA Life Assurance Corporation vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 73887

December 21, 1989

Facts:

On June 9, 1976, private respondent Judico entered into an agreement of agency withpetitioner Grepalife to become a debit agent attached to the industrial life agency inCebu City. Being a debit agent, private respondent Judico had definite work


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assignments including but not limited to collection of premiums from policy holdersand selling insurance to prospective clients. Complainant initially received anallowance of P 200.00 for 13 weeks. Sometime in September 1981, complainant waspromoted to the position of Zone Supervisor and was given additional allowance fixedat P110.00 per week. During the third week of November 1981, he was reverted to hisformer position as debit agent but, for unknown reasons, not paid so-called weeklysales reserve of at least P 200.00. Finally on June 28, 1982, complainant wasdismissed by way of termination of his agency contract. Consequently, Judico filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal against Grepalife. Both parties appealed to the NLRCwhen a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint on theground that the employer-employee relations did not exist between the parties. TheNLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter ruling that complainant is a regularemployee of petitioner. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not employer-employee relationship exists between insurance agents andtheir principal, and hence they are to be governed by the Labor Code

Ruling:

As the Court held in Investment Planning Corp. vs. SSS, 21 SCRA 294, an insurancecompany may have two classes of agents who sell its insurance policies: (1) salariedemployees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of thecompany; and (2) registered representatives who work on commission basis. The

agents who belong to the second category are not required to report for work atanytime, they do not have to devote their time exclusively to or work solely for thecompany since the time and the effort they spend in their work depend entirely upontheir own will and initiative; they are not required to account for their time nor submita report of their activities; they shoulder their own selling expenses as well astransportation; and they are paid their commission based on a certain percentage oftheir sales.

In the determination of employer-employee relationship is the fact that thecompensation that these agents on commission received is not paid by the insurance

company but by the investor (or the person insured). The test therefore is whether the"employer" controls or has reserved the right to control the "employee" not only as tothe result of the work to be done but also as to the means and methods by which thesame is to be accomplished.

In the case at bar, the element of control by the petitioner on Judico was very muchpresent. He was controlled by petitioner insurance company not only as to the kind of


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work; the amount of results, the kind of performance but also the power of dismissal.Undoubtedly, private respondent, by nature of his position and work, had been aregular employee of petitioner and is therefore entitled to the protection of the law andcould not just be terminated without valid and justifiable cause.

COSMOPOLITAN FUNERAL HOMES vs. MAALAT

G.R. No. 86693

July 2, 1990

Facts:

Petitioner Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Inc. engaged the services of privaterespondent Noli Maalat as a "supervisor" to handle the solicitation of mortuaryarrangements, sales and collections. The funeral services which he sold refer to the

taking of the corpse, embalming, casketing, viewing and delivery. The privaterespondent was paid on a commission basis of 3.5% of the amounts actually collectedand remitted. On January 15, 1987, respondent Maalat was dismissed by the petitionerfor commission of several violations despite previous warnings. Maalat filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of commissions. The Labor Arbiterrendered a decision declaring Maalat's dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRCreversed the Labor Arbiter's decision.

Issue:

Whether or not a "funeraria" supervisor is an employee or a commission agentRuling:

Under the "right of control" test, an employer-employee relationship exists where theperson for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only theend to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. Inthe case at bar, the fact that the petitioner imposed and applied its rule prohibiting


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superiors from engaging in other funeral business which it considered inimical tocompany interests proves that it had the right of control and actually exercised itscontrol over the private respondent. In other words, Maalat worked exclusively for thepetitioner. He was also prohibited from engaging in part-time embalming businessoutside of the company and a violation thereof was cause for dismissal. Incurringabsences without leave was likewise subject to disciplinary action. Moreover, thepayment of compensation by way of commission does not militate against theconclusion that private respondent was an employee.

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