Santiago vs. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.2

PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 162419July 10, 2007

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of employment with the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10 days after. This contract was approved by POEA. A week before the date of departure, the respondent received a phone call from petitioner’s wife and some unknown callers asking not to send the latter off because if allowed, he will jump ship in Canada.

Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, hence, the claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRC’s finding that since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.

ISSUE: When does the employer-employee relationship involving seafarers commence?

RULING:

A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.

MANEJA VS NLRC 290 SCRA 603 (1998)FACTS: 3Petitioner Rosario Maneja worked with private respondent Manila Midtown Hotelbeginning January 1985, as a telephone operator. She was a member of the National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) with an existing CBA with theprivaterespondent.In February 13, 1990, a fellow telephone operator, Rowena Loleng, received a request for longdistance call (RLDC) form and a deposit for P500.00 from a Japanese guest but the call wasunanswered. The deposit was then forwarded to the cashier. The same evening, the Japaneseguest again made an RLDC and deposited another P500.00 but the call was also unanswered.Loleng passed the RLDC to Maneja for follow up.ON February 15, the cashier inquired about the P1000 deposit made. After a search, the firstone was found in the guest folio while the other in the folder for cancelled calls. PetitionerManeja saw that the 2

nd

RLDC form was not time stamped so she placed it in the machine tostamp it with the date February 15. But after realizing that the call was made 2 days before,she changed the date to February 13.On March 7, the chief telephone operator asked the petitioner and Loleng to explain the Feb 15incident. Both submitted their written explanation. On March 20, a written report wassubmitted, stating that their actions were covered violations of the Offenses Subject toDisciplinary Action (OSDA) as1.

Forging, falsifying official documents and;2.

Culpable carelessness

—

negligence or failure to follow specific instruction/s orestablished procedure/sOn March 23, petitioner was then served notice of dismissal effective on April 1. She refused to

sign and wrote “under protest.”

On October 2, 1990, Maneja filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondentbefore the labor arbiter (LA). LA found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, stating thateven though the case revolves on the matter of implementation and interpretation of companypolicies and is thus within the jurisdiction of the grievance procedure under the CBA, Art. 217Labor Code confers original and exclusive jurisdiction of all termination cases to LA. NLRCdismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction of LA because the case was subject to voluntaryarbitration.Petitioner insists that her termination is not an unresolved grievance as there had been nogrievance meeting between the union and the management. Petitioner alleged that it has beena company policy that termination cases are not referred to the grievance machinery butdirectly to LA.

ISSUE:

W/N THE LABOR ARBITER HAD JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE CASE

HELD:

NLRC’s interpretation of Art 216c Labor Code is erroneous. Even though such provision

provides that LA have no jurisdiction over cases arising from interpretation and implementationof CBAs (must be submitted to the grievance machine or voluntary arbitration), it must be readin conjunction with Art 261 which grants voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdictionto hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementationof the CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnelpolicies which is not the case here.According to the Sanyo case, there is dismissal which does not involve an interpretation orimplementation of a CBA or interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies butinvolves termination.

Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation orenforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA or byvoluntary arbitration. Where the was already actual termination, i.e. violation of rights, it isalready cognizable by LA.

Moreover, Art 260 also stipulates that only disputes involving the union and the company shallbe referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. In the case at bar, the uniondoes not event come into the picture as the practice in said Hotel in cases of termination is thatthey are not referred anymore to the grievance comitte and that the terminated employee whowishes to question the legality of his termination usually goes to LA for arbitration, whetherthe termination arose from the interpretation or enforcement of the company personnelpolicies or otherwise.Petitioner was illegally dismissed as there are two requisites in a valid dismissal: 1. That thedismissal must be for any causes expressed in Art 282 Labor Code and; 2. The employee mustbe given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.1.

There is no cause for dismissal as the petitioner’s actions were not contrary to company

practice and there is also no basis for personal appropriation based on the facts2.

An examination of the record reveals that no hearing whatsoever was ever conductedby the Hotel before Maneja was dismissed. While it may be true that the petitionersubmitted a written explanation, no hearing was actually conducted before she wasterminated. She was not accorded the opportunity to fully defend herself which isclearly a violation of her right to due process.

Urbanes Jr. vs Sec. of Labor[GR No. 122791, February 19, 2003]Facts:4Petitioner Placido O. Urbanes, Jr., doing business under the name and style of Catalina Security Agency, entered into an agreement toprovide security services to respondent Social Security System (SSS). During the effectivity of the agreement, petitioner, by letter of May 16,1994, requested the SSS for the upward adjustment of their contract rate in view of Wage Order No. NCR-03 which was issued by the

RegionalTripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act 6727 otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act.On June 24, 1994, petitioner pulled out his agency's services from the premises of the SSS and another security agency, Jaguar, took over. OnJune 29, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE-NCR against the SSS seeking the implementation of Wage Order No. NCR-03.The Regional Director of the DOLE-NCR rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. SSS appealed to the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor set aside the order of the Regional Director and the Secretary held petitioner's security agency "JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY liable forwage differentials, the amount of which should be paid DIRECTLY to the security guards concerned.

Issue:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction to review appeals from decisions of the Regional Directors in complaints filed underArticle 129 of the Labor Code

Ruling

:

In the case at bar, even if petitioner filed the complaint on his and also on behalf of the security guards, the relief sought has to do with theenforcement of the contract between him and the SSS which was deemed amended by virtue of Wage Order No. NCR-03. The controversysubject of the case at bar is thus a civil dispute, the proper forum for the resolution of which is the civil courts.But even assuming

arguendo

that petitioner's complaint were filed with the proper forum, for lack of cause of action it must be dismissed. Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code provide: ART. 106.CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR.

—

Whenever an employer enters into contract with anotherperson for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any,shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

 In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wage of his employees in accordance with thisCode,   the employer  shall  be   jointly  and severally   liable  with  his  contractor  or subcontractor to such employees to the

extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directlyemployed by him.

xxxxxxxxx (Emphasis and underscoring) ART. 107.INDIRECT EMPLOYER.

—

The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to anyperson, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractorfor the performance of any work, task, job or project. ART. 109.SOLIDARY LIABILITY.

—

The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employershall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining theextent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.In fine, the liability of the SSS to reimburse petitioner arises only if and when petitioner pays his employee-security guards "the increases"mandated by Wage Order No. NCR-03. The records do not show that petitioner has paid the mandated increases to the security guards. The security guards in fact have filed acomplaint with the NLRC against petitioner relative to, among other things, underpayment of wages.

NICASIO P. RODRIGUEZ JR., ANTONIO P. EREÑETA, JUANITO A. MAGNO, VICTOR C. PINEDA,BITUIN V.

SALCEDO, CESAR R. SAN DIEGO, VICTOR V. TANTOCO and AMADOR C. DE LA MERCED, 5petitioners

,

vs

.ANTONIO

L

.

AGUILAR

SR

., respondent.

37

FACTS:

Petitioners are members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank,and respondent Antonio Aguilar was employed as vice president of its Finance and AdministrativeGroup, when his service were terminated. Antonio Aguilar filed against petitioners with theRegional Trial Court for his illegal dismissal and prayed for award of damages and the issuance of temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners and to be reinstated.The judge dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction that the case lies within the LaborArbiter of National Labor Relation Commission. Private respondent

filed a Motion forReconsideration, an exparte to withdraw motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.Reinstatement be deleted.

ISSUES:

1.

Was the motion for reconsideration valid2.

Was the court has jurisdiction to decide the case

HELD:

1.

The filing of the motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the 15 dayreglementary period, its withdrawal left respondent in exactly the same position as the nomotion had been filed at all, it erases the tolling of reglementary period.2.

National Labor Relation Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide regarding anylabor disputes, while the RTC has the jurisdiction and the effective means and also theadequate tool for arriving at a just accurate assessment of damages.

DILY DANY NACPIL vs. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION G.R. No. 144767. March 21, 

20026Prepared by: Arnel D. Mateo

Facts:

Petitioner was the Assistant General Manager for Finance/Administration and Comptroller of private respondent Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) from 1996 until April 1997. Upon assumption of Emiliano Templo as the IBC President, petitioner was forced to retire. Templo refused to pay him his retirement benefits. Hence, in 1997, petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits.

IBC alleged that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, that the petitioner was a corporate officer who was duly elected by the Board of Directors of IBC; hence, the case qualifies as an intra-corporate dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Petitioner argues that he is not a corporate officer of the IBC but an employee thereof since he had not been elected nor appointed as Comptroller and Assistant Manager by the IBC's Board of Directors. He pointed out that he had actually been appointed on January 11, 1995 by the IBC's General Manager, CeferinoBasilio.

Issue:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits filed by petitioner.

Ruling:

Dismissal or non-appointment of a corporate officer is clearly an intra-corporate matter and jurisdiction over the case properly belongs to the SEC, not to the NLRC. Under Presidential Decree No. 902-A (the Revised Securities Act), Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations fall under the exclusive of the SEC. Two elements are to be considered in determining whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the controversy, to wit: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

Since complainant's appointment was approved unanimously by the Board of Directors of the corporation, he is therefore considered a corporate officer and his claim of illegal dismissal is a controversy that falls under the jurisdiction of the SEC as contemplated by Section 5 of P.D. 902-A. That the position of Comptroller is not expressly mentioned among the officers of the IBC in the By-Laws is of no moment, because the IBC's Board of Directors is empowered under Section 25 of the Corporation Code and under the corporation's By-Laws to appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary.

Lasco vs UNRFNRE7Case Digest_EldepioLasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE)

G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnitedNations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in DinagatIsland.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which thespecializedagencyisa party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland

Manila Hotel Corporation vs National Labor Relations Commission8FACTS: In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988, he

was recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos

agreed to the hotel’s job offer and so he started working there in November 1988. The

employment contract between him and Palace Hotel was however without the intervention

of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace

Hotel notified Santos that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In September 1989,

he was officially terminated.

In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel

Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was

impleaded but no summons were served upon it. MHC is a government owned and

controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL

manages the affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in

favor of Santos. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor

arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:

1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that Santos is a Filipino;

2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations – MHC cannot be held liable

because it merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs of the Palace

Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction can’t be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is

directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are separate entities.

3. Santos’ contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the Philippines;

4. Santos’ contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA (had POEA

intervened, NLRC still does not have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will hear

the case);

5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers

are not residents of the Philippines;

Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining

to the case. It is not competent to determine the facts because the acts complained of

happened outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case

a judgment is rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it

was not served any summons).

The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine

court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:

(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;

(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and

the facts; and

(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.

None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INCORPORATED vs. BERNARDIN J. ZAMORA 9

[G. R. No. 166996 February 6, 2007]

Facts:

Respondent Zamora had been in the employ of petitioner PAL since 9 February 1981 when the former was hired as a Cargo

Representative at petitioner PAL‘s Import Operations Division. On 13 November 1995, respondent Zamora was dismissed from serv

iceforhavin

g been found by petitioner PAL‘s management to be liable for insubordination, neglect of customer, disrespect for authority a

ndabsencewithout official leave. On 12 March 1996, respondent Zamora filed a complaint against petitioners PAL and Francisco X. Yngente IV before theNLRC for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, non-

payment of wages, damages and attorney‘s fees.

SC Ruling:

At this point, notwithstanding the fact that the present petition alleges three issues, the resolution of the third one relating to the

propriety of the execution of the NLRC‘s order of reinstatement despite the verity of the 17 May 1999 SEC Order approving the

Amended and

Restated Rehabilitation Plan of petitioner PAL and appointing a ―permanent rehabilitation receiver for

the latter,‖ is of paramount importance.

The overriding legal significance to the instant case of the SEC mandated rehabilitation of petitioner PAL will affect the progress, development oradvancement of the present petition.The relevant law dealing with the suspension of actions for claims against corporations is Presidential Decree No. 902-A,as amended.Particularly, Section 5(d) which reads:SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall haveoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:x x xxd) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases where thecorporation, partnership or association possesses property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them whenthey respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities,but is under the [management of a rehabilitation receiver or] management committee created pursuant to this Decree.and Section 6(c), to wit:SECTION 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following:x x x xc) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of the action pending before theCommission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order topreserve the rights of the parties-litigants and /or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: x xx Provided, finally, Thatupon appointment of a management committee, the rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions forclaims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, boardor body shall be suspended accordingly.

The term ―claim,‖ as contemplated in Sec. 6 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902

-

A, refers ―to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature.It means ‗the assertion of a right to have money paid.‘‖

37

The raison d'être behind the suspension of claims pending rehabilitation proceedings was explained in this wise:In light of these powers, the reason for suspending actions for claims against the corporation should not be difficult to discover. It isnot really to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to substitute the defendant in any pending action againstit before any court, tribunal, board or body. Obviously, the real justification is to enable the management committee or rehabilitationreceiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent

the ―rescue‖ of the debtor company. To allow such other action to continue would only

add to the burden of the managementcommittee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporationinstead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.No other action may be taken in, including the rendition of judgment during the state of suspension

–

what are automatically stayed orsuspended are the proceedings of an action or suit and not just the payment of claims during the execution stage after the case had become finalandexecutory.The suspension of action for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation receiver or management committee embraces all phasesof the suit, be it before the trial court or any tribunal or before this Court. Furthermore, the actions that are suspended cover all claims against adistressed corporation whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage, labor cases, collection suits or any other claims of apecuniary nature.

In the case at bar, the appellate court‘s pronouncement that in ―disallowing the enforcement to the claim x xx it would unnecessarily

add to the burden of management, does not justify the aggravation caused in the delay in execution of the judgment in favor o

f Zamora,‖ is quite

myopic. In actual fact, allowing such actions to proceed would only increase the work-load of the management committee or the rehabilitationreceiver, whose precious time and effort would be dissipated and wasted in defending suits against the corporation, instead of being channeledtoward restructuring and rehabilitation.The instant petition is partially granted in that herein proceedings are hereby suspended until further notice from this Court. Accordingly,petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. is hereby directed to quarterly update the Court as to the status of its ongoing rehabilitation

Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Oberio, et. al10.,

G.R. No. 168424, June 8, 2007

FACTS:

The respondents are allegedly employed as drama talents by DYWB-BomboRadyo, a radio station owned and operated by petitioner Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.

However, there was an issue raised which opposed by therespondents that sought respondents to file a case before DOLE.

DOLE after its inspection of DYWB station found out that the petitioner is guilty of violation of labor standard laws, such as underpayment of wages, 13

th

month pay, non-payment of service incentive leave pay,and non-coverage of respondents under the Social Security System.

The petitioners on the other hand argued that the respondents are notthey employees and refused to submit the payroll and daily timerecords to DOLE despite the subpoena decustecum issued by theRegional Director.

Thereafter, the respondents were pressured by the petitioner’s by

barring them to report to their work. Hence, the illegal dismissal wasfiled.

DOLE issued their order and certified the records of the case to NLRCif employer-employee relationship does exist. But respondentsappealed the order to the secretary of labor.

The respondents filed an illegal dismissal, underpayment/non-paymentof wages and benefits plus damages against petitioner. But it wasdismissed by the Labor Arbiter.

On respondents appealed to NLRC for determination of the existenceof employer-employee relationship, they submitted documents such astime cards, identification cards, payroll, a show cause order of thestation manager to respondent Danny Oberio and memoranda either noted or issued by said manager.

ISSUES:

Did respondents violate the rule on forum shopping?

Whether the NLRC correctly ruled on the merits of the case instead of remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter.

Whether respondent

’

s were employees of petitioner.

Whether

respondent’s

dismissal was illegal.

RULING:

No because it is the law itself which provides for two separate remediesfor their distinct causes of action. According to Article under Article 217 of the Labor Code, termination cases fall under the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. Whereas, Article 128 of the same Code vests the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives with the power to inspect the

employer’s records to determine and compel compliance with labor

standard laws. The exercise of the said power by the Secretary or hisduly authorized representatives is exclusive to cases where employer-employee relationship still exists. Thus, in cases where the complaint for violation of labor standard laws preceded the termination of the employeeand the filing of the illegal dismissal case, it would not be in consonancewith justice to charge the complainants with engaging in forum shoppingwhen the remedy available to them at the time their causes of action arosewas to file separate cases before different

fora

.

Yes, it must be stressed that labor tribunals are not bound by technicalrules and the Court would sustain the expedient disposition of cases solong as the parties are not denied due process. Indeed, no such denialexists because it had all the opportunities to present evidence before thelabor tribunals below, the Court of Appeals, and even before this Court,but chose not to do so for reasons which will not warrant the sacrifice of substantial justice over technicalities.

Yes, the respondents passed the “four

-

fold test” on em

ployer-employeerelations, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee, or the power to hire; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power to dismiss; and(4) the power to control the employee.

Yes. In labor cases, the employer has the burden of proving that thedismissal was for a just cause; failure to show this would necessarilymean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In this case,the petitioner therefore failed to discharge its burden, hence, respondentswere correctly declared to have been illegally dismissed.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 11

[525 SCRA 29 June 19, 2007]

Facts:

The present petition arose from a labor complaint filed by respondent PALEA against petitioners PAL and one Mary Anne delRosario, Director of Personnel of petitioner PAL, on 1 March 1989. The labor complaint charged both petitioners with unfair labor practice forthe alleged non-

payment of the 13th month pay of petitioner PAL‘s e

mployees who had not been regularized as of the 30 of April 1988, allegedlyin contravention of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) entered into by petitioner PAL and respondent PALEA.On 6 February 1987, petitioner PAL and respondent PALEA entered into a CBA covering the period of 1986-1989.Respondent PALEA assailed the implementation of the guideline on the ground that all employees of PAL, regular or non-regular,must be paid their 13th month pay. In fact, in a letter dated 16 December 1988, respondent PALEA, through Herbert C. Baldovinoinformedpetitioner PAL that there were several employees who failed to receive their 13th Month Pay as of the date of the correspondence.In response thereto, petitioner PAL informed respondent PALEA that rank and file employees who were regularized after 30 April1988 were not entitled to the 13th month pay as they were already given their Christmas bonuses on 9 December 1988 per the ImplementingRules of Presidential Decree No. 851.Disagreeing with petitioner PAL, respondent PALEA filed a labor complaint for unfair labor practice against petitioner PAL before

the NLRC on 1 March 1989. The complaint interposed that ―the cut

-off period for regularization should not be used as the parameter for granting13th m

onth pay considering that the law does not distinguish the status of employment instead the law covers all employees.‖

In its Position Paper submitted before the Labor Arbiter, petitioner PAL countered that those rank and file employees who were notregularized by 30 April of a particular year are, in principle, not denied their 13th month pay considering they receive said mandatory bonus inthe form of the Christmas Bonus; that the Christmas Bonus given to all its employees is deemed a compliance with Presidential Decree No. 851

and the latter‘s implementing rules; and that the foregoing has been the practice formally adopted in previous CBAs‘ as early

as 1970.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the order of the NLRC for the payment of the 13th monthpay or mid-year bonus to its employees regularized after 30 April 1988.

SC Ruling:

In a Resolution dated 19 June 2007, We resolved to suspend the proceedings of the case at bar in view of the on-going rehabilitationof petitioner PAL as mandated by the

Securities and Exchange Commission. On 28 September 2007, however, the SEC issued an Order granting petitioner PAL‘s request

toexit from rehabilitation after successfully stabilizing its financial operations. Hence, the suspension earlier issued by this Court is hereby lifted,making the present Petition ripe for resolution.A cursory reading of the 1986-1989 CBA of the parties herein will instantly reveal that Art. I, Sec. 3 of said agreement made itsprovision applicable to all employees in the bargaining unit. The particular section specifically defined the scope of application of the CBA, thus:Section 3

–

Application. All the terms and conditions of employment of employees within the bargaining unit are embodied in thisAgreement, and the same shall govern the relationship between the Company and such employees. On the other hand, all such benefitsand/or privileges as are not expressly provided for in this Agreement but which are now being accorded in accordance with the PALPersonnel Policies and Procedures Manual, shall be deemed also part and parcel of the terms and conditions of employment, or of thisAgreement.

38

Without distinguishing between regular and non-regular employees. As succinctly put by respondent PALEA in its Memorandum: Allemployees in PAL are entitled to the same benefit as they are within the same collective bargaining unit and the entitlement to such benefit spillsover to even non-union members.It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit, includingthose who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization. Otherwise, it would be a clear case of discrimination.Hence, to be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be members of the bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the

labor organization designated as the bargaining agent. A ―bargaining unit‖ has been defined as a group of employees of a give

nemployer,comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to theemployer, indicates to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of thelaw. There is no showing that the non-regular status of the concerned employees by said cut-off date sufficiently distinguishes their interests fromthose of the regular employees so as to exclude them from the collective bargaining unit and the benefits of the CBA.Having ruled that the benefits provided by the subject CBA are applicable even to non-regular employees who belong to thebargaining unit concerned, the next and crucial query to be addressed is whether the 13th month pay or mid- year bonus can be equated to theChristmasbonus.As far as non-regular employees are concerned, petitioner PAL alleges that their 13th month pay shall be the same as their Christmasbonus and will be paid according to the terms governing the latter.We do not agree. From the facts of the present Petition, it is crystal clear that petitioner PAL is claiming an exemption from paymentof the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus provided in the CBA under the guise of paying the Christmas bonus which it claims to be the equivalentof the 13th month pay under Presidential Decree No. 851.Presidential Decree No. 851 mandates that all employers must pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more thanP1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th month pay not later than 24 December of every year.While employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or more in a calendar year or its equivalent at the time of theissuance of Presidential Decree No. 851 are already exempted from the mandatory coverage of said law, petitioner PAL cannot escape liability inthis case by virtue thereof.It must be stressed that in the 1986-1989 CBA, petitioner PAL agreed to pay its employees

1) the 13th month pay or the mid-yearbonus, and 2) the Christmas bonus. The 13th month pay, guaranteed by Presidential Decree No. 851, is explicitly covered or provided for as themid-year bonus in the CBA, while the Christmas bonus is evidently and distinctly a separate benefit. Petitioner PAL may not be allowed to brushoff said distinction, and unilaterally and arbitrarily declare that for non-regular employees, their Christmas bonus is the same as or equivalent tothe 13th month pay.Presidential Decree No. 851 mandates the payment of the 13th month pay to uniformly provide the low-paid employees withadditional income. It but sets a minimum requirement that employers must comply with. It does not intend, however, to preclude the employersfrom voluntarily granting additional bonuses that will benefit their employees. A bonus is an amount granted and paid to an employee for hisindustry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employer's business and made possible the realization of profits. It is an act of generosity of the employer for which the employee ought to be thankful and grateful. It is also granted by an enlightened employer to spur theemployee to greater efforts for the success of the business and realization of bigger profits. We deem that the Christmas bonus in this case is of this nature, although, by virtue of its incorporation into the CBA, it has become more than just an act of generosity on the part of petitioner PAL,but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.The inclusion of a provision for the continued payment of the Christmas bonus in the 1986-1989 CBA between respondent PALEA

and petitioner PAL contradicts the company‘s claim that the grant of such benefit was intended to be credited as compliance w

ith the statutorymandate to give the 13th month pay. Memorandum Order No. 28, extending Presidential Decree No. 851 to all employees regardless of theamount of their monthly salaries, was issued on 13 August 1986. As early as said date, therefore, petitioner PAL was already fully aware that itwas lawfully compelled to accord all its employees a 13th month pay. Accordingly, if petitioner PAL truly intended that the Christmas bonus be

treated as the ―equivalent‖ of the 13th month pay required by law, then said intention should have been expressly declared in

their 1986-1989CBA, or the separate provision therein on the Christmas bonus should have been removed because it would only be superfluous.In the case under consideration, the provision for the payment of the Christmas bonus, apart from the 13th month pay, wasincorporated into the 1986-1989 CBA between respondent PALEA and petitioner PAL without any condition. The Christmas bonus, payable inDecember of every year, is distinguished from the 13th month pay, due yearly inMay, for which reason it was denominated as the mid-year bonus. Such being the case, the only logical inference that could be derivedtherefrom is that petitioner PAL intended to give the members of the bargaining unit, represented by respondent PALEA, a Christmas bonus overand above its legally mandated obligation to grant the 13th month pay.The non-regular rank and file employees of petitioner PAL as of 30 April 1988, are not actually seeking more benefits than what theother member-employees of the same bargaining unit are already enjoying. They are only requesting that all members of the bargaining unit betreated equally and afforded the same privileges and benefits as agreed upon between respondent PALEA and petitioner PAL in the CBA.A collective bargaining agreement refers to a negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerningwages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all other contracts, the parties to a CBA mayestablish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem

convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, goodcustoms, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties, and compliancetherewith is mandated by the express policy of the law

PERPETUAL HELP CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. (PHCCI) V.FABURADA12

FACTS:Private respondents Faburada et. al. filed a complaint against PHCCI for illegal dismissal, premium pay, separation pay,wage differential, moral damages and

attorney’s fees. PHCCI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that noemployer

-employee relationship exists since privaterespondents are all members and co-owners of thecooperative. Also, privaterespondents have not exhausted the remedies provided in the coop by laws. PHCCI also filed a supplemental motion todismissalledging that RA 6939, the Cooperative Development Authority Law, requires conciliation or mediation within thecooperative before a resort to judicial proceeding. 3.The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondents, holdingthat the case is impressed with employer-employee relationship and that the laws on cooperatives is subservient to theLabor Code. The NLRC affirmed.

ISSUE: WON private respondent, Faburada was a regular employee.

HELD: YES. Art. 280, Labor Code comprehends 3 kinds of employees: 1)REGULAR EMPLOYEES or those whose work isnecessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer 2)PROJECT EMPLOYEES or those whoseemployment has beenfixed for a specificproject or undertaking the completion ortermination of which has been determined at the time of theengagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment isfor the duration of the season 3)CASUAL EMPLOYEES or those who are neither regular nor project employees There are 2separate instances whereby it can be determined that an employment is regular: 1)If the particular activity performed bythe employee is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer 2)If the employee has beenperforming the job for at least a year Private respondents were rendering services necessary to the day-to-day operationsof PHCCI. This alone qualified them as regular employees. Moreover, all of them

except one worked with PHCCI for morethan 1 year. That Faburada worked only on a part-time basis does not mean that he is not a regular employee .Regularity ofemployment is not determined by the number of hours one works but by the nature and length of time one has been inthat particular job.

DOMONDON VS. NLRC 471 SCRA 559FACTS:13

Petitioner Roberto Domondon filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against privaterespondent Van MellePhils., Inc. (VMPI) and its President and General Manager, private respondent Niels H.B. Have. He claimed illegaldismissal and prayed for reinstatement, payment of full backwages inclusive of allowances, 14th month pay, sick and vacation leaves, share inthe profits, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Endaya was transferred to China and was replaced by private respondent Have. According to petitioner, respondent Have immediately set aone-on-one meeting with him and requested his courtesy resignation. Petitioner refused to resign and life got difficult for him. His decisionswere always questioned by private respondent Have. He was subjected to verbal abuse. His competence was undermined by baseless andderogatory memos, which lay the bases for his removal from the company. He also did not receive his 14th month pay.

Private respondent Have informed petitioner that things would get more difficult for him if he does not resign. Private respondent Have offeredfinancial assistance if petitioner would leave peacefully but the offer must be accepted immediately or it would be withdrawn. Thus, petitionersigned a “ready-made” resignation letter without deliberation and evaluation of the consequences.

Private respondents claimed that he voluntarily resigned.The initial agreement of the parties was that petitioner would be extended a“softlanding” financial assistance in the amount of P300,000.00 on top of his accrued benefits at the time of the effectivity of his resignation.However, petitioner later changed his mind. He requested that he be allowed to keep the car assigned to him in lieu of the financial assistance.However, company policy prohibits transfer of ownership of property without valuable consideration. Thus, the parties agreed that petitionershall still be extended the P300,000.00 financial support, which he shall use to pay for the subject car.Private respondents made a counterclaim involving

the transfer of ownership of a company car to petitioner. They maintain that he failedto pay for the car in accordance with their agreement.

ISSUE:

WON Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the question on the transfer of ownership of the car assigned to petitioner.

HELD: YES.

, the transfer of the ownership of the company car to petitioner is connected with his resignation and arose out of the parties’ employer -employee relations.

Accordingly, private respondents’ claim for damages falls within the jurisdictionof the Labor Arbiter

Building Care Corporation VS Myrna Macaraeg14

RESPONDENT Myrna Macaraeg was employed as a security guard of petitioner Leopard Security and Investigation

Agency. Her complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner was dismissed by the labor arbiter for lack of merit.

Her appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of

time.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC. It held that rules of procedure should be

liberally applied and that the respondent’s appeal should be allowed and resolved on the merits despite having been

filed out of time.

Issue: iDid the CA err?

     

Ruling: Yes.

We must stress that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” line is not some magic wand that will

automatically compel the Supreme Court (SC) to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled,

let alone dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial

rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.

In this case, the justifications given by the CA for its liberality by choosing to overlook the belated filing of the appeal

are, the importance of the issue raised, i.e., whether respondent was illegally dismissed; and the belief that

respondent should be “afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from

the constraints of technicalities,” considering that the belated filing of respondent’s appeal before the NLRC was the

fault of respondent’s former counsel.

Note, however, that neither respondent nor her former counsel gave any explanation or reason citing extraordinary

circumstances for her lawyer’s failure to abide by the rules for filing an appeal. Respondent merely insisted that she

had not been remiss in following up her case with said lawyer.

It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. A departure from

this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to

support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. The only exception

would be, where the lawyer’s gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due

process of law. In this case, there was no such deprivation of due process. Respondent was able to fully present and

argue her case before the Labor Arbiter. She was accorded the opportunity to be heard. Her failure to appeal the

Labor Arbiter’s Decision cannot, therefore, be deemed as a deprivation of her right to due process.

x xx

Clearly, allowing an appeal, even if belatedly filed, should never be taken lightly. The judgment attains finality by the

lapse of the period for taking an appeal without such appeal or motion for reconsideration being filed. In Ocampo v.

Court of Appeals (Former Second Division), G.R. No. 174247, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 416, the Court

reiterated the basic rule that “when a party to an original action fails to question an adverse judgment or decision by

not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law, he loses the right to do so, and the judgment or

decision, as to him, becomes final and binding.” 

The decision of the Labor Arbiter, therefore, became final and executory as to respondent when she failed to file a

timely appeal therefrom. The importance of the concept of finality of judgment cannot be gainsaid. (Building Care

Corp., et. al. vs. Myrna Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, Dec. 10, 2012).

BORJA ESTATE AND/OR THE HEIRS OF MANUEL AND PAULA BORJA and ATTY.

MILA LAUIGAN IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ESTATE ADMINISTRATOR, petitioners,

vs.

SPOUSES ROTILLO BALLAD and ROSITA BALLAD, respondents. 15

FACTS: The case arose out of the complaint filed by private respondents Spouses Rotillo

and Rosita Ballad (Ballad spouses) against the Borjas for illegal dismissal, non payment of

13th month pay, separation pay, incentive pay, holiday and premiums pay plus differential

pay, and moral and exemplary damages with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. II of the

NLRC in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, on 8 June 1999.

The Ballad spouses had been employed as overseers of the Borja Estate by its owners, the

spouses Manuel Borja and Paula Borja, since 1972. Their appointment as such was later

made in writing per the certification of appointment.

As overseers, the Ballad spouses’ duties included the collection of owner’s share of the

harvest from the tenants and the delivery of such share to the estate administrator, as well

as to account for it. They also collected monthly rentals from the lessees of the apartment

and tendered the same to the administrator. They were tasked to oversee the lands and

buildings entrusted to them and were instructed to report any untoward incident or incidents

affecting said properties to the administrator. They were allegedly required to work all day

and night each week including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.

For their compensation, the Ballad spouses received a monthly salary of P1,000.00 for both

of them, or P500.00 each. They were provided residential quarters plus food and traveling

allowances equivalent to twelve (12) cavans of shelled corn every crop harvest. In the year

1980, said salary was increased to P2,500.00 for each of them by Paula Borja when she

came from abroad. Until the time before their dismissal, the Ballad spouses received the

same amount.

The Ballad spouses further alleged that they were appointed as the attorney-in-fact of the

owners to represent the latter in courts and/or government offices in cases affecting the

titling of the Borjas’ unregistered lands, and to institute and prosecute recovery of

possession thereof, as well as in ejectment cases.

when the spouses Manuel and Paula Borja went to the United States of America, their

children Lumen, Leonora and Amelia succeeded to the ownership and management of the

Borja Estate. On 16 October 1986, the Ballad spouses claimed that Amelia or Mely, then

residing in Rochester, New York, wrote then administrator Mrs. Lim informing her that the

heirs had extended the services of the Ballad spouses and ordered Mrs. Lim to pay the

hospitalization expenses of Rotillo Ballad which accrued to Ten Thousand Pesos

(P10,000.00). It is also alleged that Mely had instructed Mrs. Lim to cause the registration of

the Ballad spouses as Social Security System (SSS) members so that in case any of the

latter gets sick, SSS will shoulder their medical expenses and not the Borjas.

Francisco Borja, brother of the late Manuel Borja, was appointed the new administrator, he

issued immediately a memorandum to all the tenants and lessees of the Borja Estate to

transact directly with him and to pay their monthly rentals to him or to his overseers, the

Ballad spouses. Francisco Borja allegedly promised to give the Ballad spouses their food

and traveling allowances aforestated but not the twelve (12) cavans per harvest which he

reduced to two (2) cavans per harvest. Francisco Borja also stopped giving the Ballad

spouses their allowances. For twenty-seven (27) years that the Ballad spouses were in the

employ of the Borjas they were purportedly not paid holiday pay, overtime pay, incentive

leave pay, premiums and restday pay, 13th month pay, aside from the underpayment of

their basic salary.

Ballad spouses alleged that Francisco Borja unceremoniously dismissed them and caused

this dismissal to be broadcast over the radio, which caused the former to suffer shock and

physical and mental injuries such as social humiliation, besmirched reputation, wounded

feelings, moral anxiety, health deterioration and sleepless nights.

Thus, the filing of a case against petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. The Borjas interposed

the defense that respondents had no cause of action against them because the latter were

not their employees. The Borjas insisted that the Ballad spouses were allowed to reside

within the premises of the Borja Estate only as a gesture of gratitude for Rosita Ballad’s

assistance in the registration of a parcel of land; and that they were merely utilized to do

some errands from time to time. As to the money claims, the Borjas claimed the defense of

prescription.

As aforestated, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the Ballad spouses had been illegally dismissed,

after concluding that they had been employees of the Borjas.

Borjas filed their appeal on 26 November 1999 before the NLRC together with a Motion for

Reduction of Bond. NLRC dismissed the petitioners’ Motion for Reduction of Bond.

Petitioners’ appeal was likewise dismissed in the same Resolution for failure to post a cash

or surety bond within the reglementary period.24 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

was also denied for lack of merit in another Resolution.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action of

certiorari. On 31 October 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolutions of the NLRC

holding that the filing of a cash or surety bond is sine qua non to the perfection of appeal

from the labor monetary’s award.

RULING: The appeal bond is required under Article 223 of the Labor Code which provides:

ART. 223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and

executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)

calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. . . . In case of a judgment

involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the

posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by

the Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed

from.

Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC implements this Article with its Sections

1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 providing pertinently as follows:

Section. 1. Periods of Appeal.- Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter and the

POEA Administrator shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any

or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or

orders of the Labor Arbiter or of the Administrator, and in case of a decision of the Regional

Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer within five (5) calendar days from receipt of

such decisions, awards or orders . . .

Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal.–(a) The appeal shall be filed within the

reglementary period as provided in Sec. 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of

payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in

Sec. 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by memorandum of appeal which shall state the

grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a

statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award

and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforestated shall not stop

the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Section 5. Appeal Fee.— The appellant shall pay an appeal fee of One hundred (P100.00)

pesos to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Regional Office, or to the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration and the official receipt of such payment shall be attached to the

records of the case.

Section 6. Bond.— In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his

duly authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall

be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until

final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the

Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award,

exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.

The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the

amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the

period to perfect appeal.

Section 7. No extension of Period.- No motion or request for extension of the period within

which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the appeal from any decision, award or order of the

Labor Arbiter to the NLRC shall be made within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such

decision, award or order, and must be under oath, with proof of payment of the required

appeal fee accompanied by a memorandum of appeal. In case the decision of the Labor

Arbiter involves a monetary award, the appeal is deemed perfected only upon the posting of

a cash or surety bond also within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decision in an

amount equivalent to the monetary award.

Evidently, the posting of a cash or surety bond is mandatory. And the perfection of an

appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory

butjurisdictional.39 To extend the period of the appeal is to delay the case, a

circumstance which would give the employer the chance to wear out the efforts and meager

resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to give up for less than

what is due him.

The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his appeal is

apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive

the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It was

intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their

obligation to satisfy their employees’ just and lawful claims.42

In the case at bar, while the petitioners’ Appeal Memorandum and Motion for Reduction of

Bond, which was annexed thereto, were both filed on time,43 the appeal was not perfected

by reason of the late filing and deficiency of the amount of the bond for the monetary award

with no explanation offered for such delay and inadequacy.

Exceptions are not present in this case. Examples: the Supreme Court has allowed tardy

appeals in judicious cases, e.g., where the presence of any justifying circumstance

recognized by law, such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, properly

vested the judge with discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time; where on

equitable grounds, a belated appeal was allowed as the questioned decision was served

directly upon petitioner instead of her counsel of record who at the time was already

dead;45 where the counsel relied on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the labor

arbiter that the aggrieved party may appeal . . . within ten (10) working days; in order to

prevent a miscarriage of justice or unjust enrichment such as where the tardy appeal is from

a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; or

where there are special circumstances in the case combined with its legal merits or the

amount and the issue involved.

3RD ALERT SECURITY16

In a June 2012 decision, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the NLRC relative to reinstatement

and payment of monetary benefits.

      “We do not see any grave abuse of discretion after a close examination of the petition and the

attached records where 3rd Alert insists that a copy of the manifestation on reinstatement had been

sent to the security guard’s counsel”, the Supreme Court said.

       “In the absence of any attendant grave abuse of discretion, these findings are entitled not only to

respect, but to our final recognition in this appellate review. Since it was ruled that there had been no

notice of reinstatement sent to the security guard or his counsel, as also affirmed by the CA, we cannot

rule otherwise in the absence of any compelling evidence,” the Supreme Court stressed.

       This case started from an illegal dismissal complaint filed by a security guard against 3rd Alert.

       The labor arbiter issued a decision that the security guard’s dismissal was illegal. 3rd Alert

appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter. On appeal, the CA denied the

petition.  

        In the meantime, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that the NLRC resolution has

become final and executory. Thus, the security guard filed with the labor arbiter an ex-parte motion for

recomputation of back wages and an ex-parte motion for execution based on the recomputed back

wages.

        The labor arbiter then issued a writ of execution to enforce the recomputed monetary awards.

        3rd Alert appealed the recomputed amount stated in the writ of execution to the NLRC and

alleged that the writ was issued with grave abuse of discretion since there was already a notice of

reinstatement sent to the security guard.

        The NLRC dismissed the appeal, ruling that 3rd Alert is guilty of bad faith since there was no

earnest effort to reinstate the security guard. The NLRC also ruled that there was no notice or

reinstatement sent to security guard’s counsel.

        3rd Alert filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which found the petition without merit because

the security guard had not been reinstated either physically or in the payroll.

         Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that in case there is an order of reinstatement, the

employer must admit the dismissed employee under the same terms and conditions, or merely

reinstate the employee in the payroll. The order shall be immediately executory. Thus, 3rd Alert cannot

escape liability by simply invoking that the security guard did not report for work. The law states that

the employer must still reinstate the employee in the payroll. Where reinstatement is no longer viable

as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service could be

awarded as an alternative.

         Since the proceedings below indicate that 3rd Alert failed to adduce additional evidence to show

that it tried to reinstate the security guard, either physically or in the payroll, we adopt as correct the

finding that there was no earnest effort to reinstate the security guard. The CA was correct in affirming

the judgment of the NLRC in this regard.

         “The 3rd Alert resorted to legal tactics to frustrate the execution of the labor arbiter’s order; for

about four (4) years, it evaded the obligation to reinstate the security guard. By so doing, 3rd Alert has

made a mockery of justice,” the Supreme Court said. (3rd Alert Security and Detective Services, Inc.

vs. Navia, G.R. No. 200653, June 13, 2012)

-oOo-

Agabon vs. NLRC Case Digest19Jenny Agabon&VirgilioAgabon vs. NLRC G.R. No.158693November 17, 2004

Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners VirgilioAgabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. 

Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. 

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s dismissal is illegal and if not, entitles them benefits. 

Ruling: The Court ruled that the dismissal is legal and entitles them of payment of benefits. 

Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full back wages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted. 

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. 

From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. 

In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. 

The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. 

The Court ruled that respondent is liable for petitioners’ holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay without deductions. The evident intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same so as “to further protect the level of real wages from the ravages of world-wide inflation.” Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay is included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code. 

An employer is prohibited under Article 113 of the same Code from making any deductions without the employee’s knowledge and consent.

ABBOTT LABORATORIES 21FACTS: ON FEB. 12, 2005, respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz signed an employment contract with petitioner Abbott

Laboratories, Philippines, which stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for six months, from Feb.

15, 2005 to Aug. 14, 2005. On May 23, 2005, the respondent received a letter from petitioners stating that her

services had been terminated effective May 19, 2005, because she failed to meet the regularization standards for the

position of regulatory affairs manager. The respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against

petitioner Abbott and its officers. She contended that she should have already been considered as a regular

employee because the petitioners had failed to inform her of the reasonable standards for her regularization upon her

engagement as required under Article 295 of the Labor Code. Does this find merit?

Ruling: No.

Basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate performance of one’s duties is, by and of itself, an

inherent and implied standard for a probationary employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard that

need not be literally spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every case. In this regard, it must be observed

that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the nature of a management prerogative, which when

reasonably exercised—as Abbott did in this case—should be respected.

The Supreme Court ruled that Alcaraz’s status as a probationary employee and her consequent dismissal must

stand. Consequently, in holding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed due to her status as a regular and not a

probationary employee, the court finds that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) committed a grave

abuse of discretion. The NLRC based its decision on the premise that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job description and

Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance Modules was not equivalent to being actually informed of the

performance standards upon which she should have been evaluated on. It, however, overlooked the legal implication

of the other attendant circumstances as detailed herein, which should have warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz

was indeed a probationary and not a regular employee—more particularly the fact that she was well aware of her

duties and responsibilities and that her failure to adequately perform would lead to her non-regularization. 

UNIVERSAL ROBINA VS FERDINAND ACIBO23

PETITIONER Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. (URSUMCO) is engaged in the sugarcane milling business.

Respondents Ferdinand Acibo and 21 others were hired by the petitioner on various dates, in different capacities. At

the start of their engagements, they signed contracts of employment for a period of one month or for a given season.

URSUMCO repeatedly hired them to perform the same duties and for every engagement required them to sign new

employment contracts for the same duration.

Last Oct. 23, 2002, the respondents filed before the labor arbiter complaints for regularization, entitlement to the

benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and attorney’s fees. The labor arbiter (LA) dismissed the

complaint for lack of merit.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA’s ruling and declared respondents as regular

URSUMCO employees and granted their monetary claims under the CBA. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the

NLRC’s ruling finding respondents to be regular employees of URSUMCO but deleted the grant of monetary benefits

under the CBA. Did the CA err?

The Supreme Court (Second Division) ruling: Yes.

Under the system, the plantation workers or the mill employees do not work continuously for one whole year but only

for the duration of the growing of the sugarcane or the milling season. Their seasonal work, however, does not

detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases, this Court has already settled that

seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during the off–season are not

separated from the service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until re–employment. Be this as it may,

regular seasonal employees, like the respondents in this case, should not be confused with the regular employees of

the sugar mill such as the administrative or office personnel who perform their tasks for the entire year regardless of

the season. The NLRC, therefore, gravely erred when it declared the respondents regular employees of URSUMCO

without qualification and that they were entitled to the benefits granted, under the CBA, to URSUMCO’S regular

employees.

x xx

We find that the CA grossly misread the NLRC ruling and missed the implications of the respondents’ regularization.

To reiterate, the respondents are regular seasonal employees, as the CA itself opined when it declared that “private

respondents who are regular workers with respect to their seasonal tasks or activities and while such activities exist,

cannot automatically be governed by the CBA between petitioner URSUMCO and the authorized bargaining

representative of the regular and permanent employees.” Citing jurisprudential standards, it then proceeded to

explain that the respondents cannot be lumped with the regular employees due to the differences in the nature of

their duties and the duration of their work vis–a–vis the operations of the company. The NLRC was well aware of

these distinctions as it acknowledged that the respondents worked only during the milling season, yet it ignored the

distinctions and declared them regular employees, a marked departure from existing jurisprudence.

This, to us, is grave abuse of discretion, as it gave no reason for disturbing the system of regular seasonal

employment already in place in the sugar industry and other industries with similar seasonal operations. For

upholding the NLRC’s flawed decision on the respondents’ employment status, the CA committed a reversible error

of judgment (Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. and Rene Cabati vs. Ferdinand Acibo, et. al., G.R. No. 186439,

Jan. 15, 2014).

Maraguinot vs. NLRC Case Digest 26

Maraguinot v. NLRCFACTS:

Petitioner maintains that he was employed by respondents as part of the filming crew. He was laterpromoted as an electrician. Petitioners’ tasks contained of loading movie equipment in the shoothingarea.Petitioners sought the assistance of their supervisor, Cesario, to facilitate their request that respondentsadjusttheir salary in accordance with the minimum wage law. Mrs. Cesario informed petitioners that del Rosario wouldagree to increase their salary only if they signed a blank employment contract. As petitioner refused to sign,respondents forced Enero (the other petitioner who worked as a crew member) to go on leave. However, when hereported to work, respondent refused to take him back. Maraguinot was dropped from the company payroll butwhen he returned, he was again asked to sign a blank employment contract, and when he still refused,respondent’s terminated his services. Petitioners thus sued for illegal dismissal.Private respondents assert that they contract persons called producers to produce or make movies forprivate respondents and contend that petitioners are project employees of the associate producers, who act asindependent contractors. Thus, there is no ER-EE relationship.However, petitioners cited that their performance of activities is necessary in the usual trade or business of respondents and their work in continuous.

ISSUE:

W/N ER-EE relationship exists

HELD:

Yes.With regards to VIVA’s contention that it does not make movies but merely distributes motion pictures,there is no sufficient proof to prove this contention.In respect to respondents’ allegation that petitioners are project employees, it is a settled rule that thecontracting out of labor is allowed only in case of job contracting. However, assuming that the associate producersare job contactors, they must then be engaged in the business of making motion pictures. Associate producersmust have tools necessary to make motion pictures. However, the associate producers in this case have none of these. The movie-making equipment are supplied to the producers and owned by VIVA. Thus, it is clear that theassociate producer merely leases the equipment from VIVA.In addition, the associate producers of VIVA cannot be considered labor-only contractors as they did notsupply, recruit nor hire the workers. It was Cesario, the

Shooting Supervisor of VIVA, who recruited crew members. Thus, the relationship between VIVA and its producers or associate producers seems to be that of agency.With regards to the issue of illegal dismissal, petitioners assert that they were regular employees who wereillegally dismissed. Petitioners in this case had already attained the status of regular employees in view of VIVA’sconduct. Thus, petitioners are entitled to back wages.A project employee or a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a regular employee when:a.there is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after a cessation of projectb.the tasks performed by the alleged project employee are vital and necessary to the business of employer The tasks of petitioners in loading movie equipment and returning it to VIVA’s warehouse and fixing thelighting system were vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer.Wherefore, petition is granted.

CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE27G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner teacher was suspended without pay and was terminated of his employment “for Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher” which was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for termination.

ISSUE:

Was her dismissal valid?

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and or grave misconduct?

SUPREME COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:

“If the two eventually fell in love despite the disparity in their ages and academic level, this only leads to the truism that the heart has reason of its own which reason does not know.”

Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

KASAPIAN NG MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA COCA-COLA vs. CA and COCA-

COLA BOTTLERS’ PHILS.,31FACTS:

June 1998, the Contract Bargaining Agreement for the years 1995-1998 executed betweenpetitioner union and private respondent company expired.

Petitioner then submitted its demands to the company for another round of collectivebargaining negotiations.

After having some labor disputes, on 26 December 1998, both parties executed and signed aMOA providing for salary increases and other economic and non-economic benefits.

It likewise contained a provision for the regularization of contractual, casual and/or agencyworkers who have been working with private respondent for more than one year.

Pursuant to the provisions of the MOA, both parties identified 64 vacant regular positions thatmay be occupied by the existing casual, contractual or agency employees who have been in thecompany for more than one year.

Then, 61 employees passed the screening and extended regular employment status.

Consequently, petitioners demanded the payment of salary and other benefits to the newlyregularized employees retroactive to 1 December 1998, in accord with the MOA.

However, the private respondent refused to yield the said demands contending that the date of effectivity of the regularization of said employees were 1 May 1999 and 1 October 1999.

Thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the NLRC for the alleged violations of the subject MOAby the private respondent.

On 9 December 1999, private respondent closed its Manila and Antipolo plants.

NLRC dismissed the complaint. It stated that: Under MOA, the 61 regularized employees are notentitled to their claims only the employees who were regular in July 1998 and continued beingsuch upon the signing of the MOA on December 26, 1998 deserve retroactive payment. Sincethe 61

regularized employees were regularized only on May 1, 1999 and October 1, 1999, theyhave no right to claim entitlement to the MOA benefits.

ISSUE:

WON CCBP violated the terms and conditions contained in the MOA dated 26 December 1998 when itdid not recognize the regularization of the 61 employees as effective on 1 December 1998?

RULING:

Private respondent violated the provision of the MOA when it did not consider the regularization of the61 employees effective 1 December 1998, and accorded to them the full benefits of the MOA.According to the pertinent provision of the MOA:1. Non-regular employee (casual, contractual or agency worker) who has already served the companyand is presently occupying or has occupied the position to be filled-up for at least one (1) year shall begiven priority in filling-up the position by converting his non-regular employment status to regularemployment status, eff

ective 01 December 1998 without need of undergoing through the company’s

regular recruitment procedures such as interview and qualifying examination.It is erroneous for the NLRC to conclude that the regularization of the 61 employees does not retroact toDecember 1, 1998.We hold that the effectivity date of the regularization of the 61 employees was on December 1, 1998.

As stated in the MOA, only those who have worked with the company for one year as of 1 December1998 and are still working for the company as of the signing of the MOA, will be considered forregularization.Evidently, it is erroneous for the NLRC to conclude that extending to them the benefits of the MOAwould violate the principle of "no-work-no-pay" as they are actually rendering service to the companyeven before December 1, 1998, and continued to do so. They were accorded the status of regularemployees because they were rendering service to the company for the required period.Hence, even without the subject MOA provision, the 61 employees must be extended regularemployment status after the lapse of one year. All those who have been with the company for one yearby said date must automatically be considered regular employees by operation of law.

PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC., MARILES C. ROMULO and FRANCISCO

DAKILA,petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR

ARBITER EMERSON TUMANON, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR

UNIONS (PAFLU) SEPTEMBER (now UNIFIED PAFLU) and SERAFIN

AYROSO,respondents32

FACTS: November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local

labor union affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU)

September (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted among the rank and file

employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union, Philippine Skylanders

Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU) immediately protested the result of the

election before the Secretary of Labor.

settlement of the controversy, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation citing as reason

PAFLU’s supposed deliberate and habitual dereliction of duty toward its members. Attached

to the notice was a copy of the resolution adopted and signed by the officers and members

of PSEA authorizing their local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation.

PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers (NCW), changed

its name to Philippine Skylanders Employees Association -National Congress of Workers

(PSEA-NCW), and to maintain continuity within the organization, allowed the former officers

of PSEA-PAFLU to continue occupying their positions as elected officers in the newly-

forged PSEA-NCW.

17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining agreement with PSI which

was immediately registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.

PAFLU requested for the accounting. PSI through its personnel manager Francisco Dakila

denied the request.

PAFLU through SerafinAyroso filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against PSI, its

president Mariles Romulo and personnel manager Francisco Dakila. PAFLU alleged that

aside from PSI’s refusal to bargain collectively with its workers, the company through its

president and personnel manager, was also liable for interfering with its employees’ union

activities

Ayroso filed another complaint in behalf of PAFLU for unfair labor practice against

Francisco Dakila. Through Ayroso PAFLU claimed that Dakila was present in PSEA’s

organizational meeting thereby confirming his illicit participation in union activities. Ayroso

added that the members of the local union had unwittingly fallen into the manipulative

machinations of PSI and were lured into endorsing a collective bargaining agreement which

was detrimental to their interests.

PAFLU amended its complaint by including the elected officers of PSEA-PAFLU as

additional party respondents. PAFLU averred that the local officers of PSEA-PAFLU,

namely MacarioCabanias, PepitoRodillas, Sharon Castillo, DaniloCarbonel, Manuel Eda,

Rolando Felix, Jocelyn Fronda, Ricardo Lumba, Joseph Mirasol, NerisaMortel,

TeofiloQuirong, Leonardo Reyes, Manuel Cadiente, and HerminiaRiosa, were equally guilty

of unfair labor practice since they brazenly allowed themselves to be manipulated and

influenced by petitioner Francisco Dakila.

Dakila moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the issue of disaffiliation

was an inter-union conflict which lay beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. PSEA was

no longer affiliated with PAFLU, Ayroso or PAFLU for that matter had no personality to file

the instant complaint.

Labor Arbiter declared PSEA’s disaffiliation from PAFLU invalid and held PSI, PSEA-

PAFLU and their respective officers guilty of unfair labor practice.

As PSEA-NCW’s personality was not accorded recognition, its collective bargaining

agreement with PSI was struck down for being invalid.

PSI, PSEA and their respective officers appealed to the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC). But the NLRC upheld the Decision ofthe Labor Arbiter.

RULING: right of local unions to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as

separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and existence to

the national federation to which they areaffiliated but, instead, to the will of their members.

The sole essence of affiliation is to increase, by collective action, the common bargaining

power of local unions for the effective enhancement and protection of their interests.

Admittedly, there aretimes when without succor and support local unions may find it hard,

unaided by other support groups, to secure justice for themselves. Yet the local unions

remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own interests subject to the

restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free also

to renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought such

affiliation into existence.

nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local union was expressly

forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a

valid breakaway. As such, the pendency of an election protest involving both the mother

federation and the local union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation. Neither was it

disputed by PAFLU that 111 signatories out of the 120 members of the local union, or an

equivalent of 92.5% of the total union membership supported the claim of disaffiliation and

had in fact disauthorized PAFLU from instituting any complaint in their behalf.

It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with

PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly severed itself from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions

which could validly hinder it from subsequently affiliating with NCW and entering into a

collective bargaining agreement in behalf of its members.

The mere act of disaffiliation did not divest PSEA of its own personality; neither did it give

PAFLU the license to act independently of the local union.