labor ii cases ( digest )

8/18/2019 Labor II Cases ( Digest )

1/31

ATLAS FARMS VS NLRC

392 SCRA 128

POINT OF THE CASE

***Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation orenforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set upin the CBA, or brought to voluntary arbitration. But, where there wasalready actual termination, with alleged violation of the employee’srights, it is already cogniable by the labor arbiter.

Facts:

Petitioner contends that the dismissal of private respondents was for a just andvalid cause, pursuant to the provisions of the company’s rules and regulations. !talso alleges lac" of jurisdiction on the part of the labor arbiter, claimingthat the cases should have been resolved through the grievancemachinery, and eventually referred to voluntary arbitration, as prescribedin the CBA.

Private respondents, Peña and Abion contend that they were illegally dismissedfrom employment because management discovered that they intended to formanother union, and because they were vocal in asserting their rights.

The labor arbiter dismissed the petitioner’s complaints on the ground that thegrievance machinery in the collective bargaining agreement (!A" had not yet beene#hausted and for lac$ of merit, fnding that the case was one o iegadis!issa and did not invove the interpretation or i!pe!entation o an"C#A provision, stated that Artice $%& 'c( o the )a*or Code wasinappica*e to the case+

Private respondents availed of the grievance process, but later on re%&led the casebefore the '). They alleged *lac$ of sympathy* on petitioner’s part to engage inconciliation proceedings.

Their cases were consolidated in the '). At the initial mandatory conference, petitioner #led a motion to dismiss, on the ground of lac" of jurisdiction,alleging private respondents themselves admitted that they weremembers of the employees’ union with which petitioner had an e$istingCBA. %his being the case, according to petitioner, jurisdiction over thecase belonged to the grievance machinery and thereafter the voluntaryarbitrator, as provided in the CBA.

Thus, private respondents brought the case to the '), which reversed the labor

arbiter’s decision. +issatis&ed with the ') ruling, petitioner went to the ourt of

Appeals by way of a petition for review on certiorari, see$ing reinstatement of the


2/31


3/31

the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said

agreements.

A0T+ $34+ -rievance 5achiner" and 6ontar" Ar*itration+ The parties to a ollective !argaining Agreement shall include therein provisionsthat will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shallestablish machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising fromthe interpretation or implementation of their ollective !argaining Agreement andthose arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.

All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which are not settled within seven &'( calendar days from the date of its submission shallautomatically be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in theCollective Bargaining Agreement./or this purpose, parties to a ollective !argaining Agreement shall name anddesignate in advance a 4oluntary Arbitrator or panel of 4oluntary Arbitrators, orinclude in the agreement a procedure for the selection of such 4oluntary Arbitratoror panel of 4oluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of5uali&ed 4oluntary Arbitrators duly accredited by the !oard. !n case the partiesfail to select a )oluntary Arbitrator or panel of )oluntary Arbitrators, theBoard shall designate the )oluntary Arbitrators, as may be necessary,

pursuant to the selection procedure agreed upon in the CollectiveBargaining Agreement, which shall act with the same force and eect as if the Arbitrator or panel of Arbitrators has been selected by the parties as

prescribed.

VIVERO VS CA

344 SCRA 268

Point o the case

777*all other labor disputes* may include termination disputes provided thatthe agreement between the +nion and the Company states inune-uivocal language that the parties/ conform to the submission oftermination disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration.

There is a need or an e8press stipation in the C#A that iegater!ination disptes shod *e resoved *" a 6ontar" Ar*itrator or Paneo 6ontar" Ar*itrators, since the sa!e a within a specia cass odisptes that are genera" within the e8csive origina /risdiction o

)a*or Ar*iters *" e8press provision o aw+

09)IN-:

%he CBA clari#es the proper procedure to be followed in situations wherethe parties e$pressly stipulate to submit termination disputes to the

jurisdiction of a )oluntary Arbitrator or 0anel of )oluntary Arbitrators. 1orwhen the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving


4/31

grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed. 2on3compliance therewith cannotbe e$cused, as petitioner suggests, by the fact that he is not well3versedwith the #ne prints of the CBA. !t was his responsibility to #nd out,through his +nion, what the provisions of the CBA were and how theycould aect his rights.

As provided in Art. 456, par. &p(, of the 7abor Code 3&p( !t shall be the duty of any labor organiation and its o8cers to inform its members on the

provisions of its constitution and by3laws, collective bargainingagreement, the prevailing labor relations system and all their rights andobligations under e$isting labor laws. !n fact, any violation of the rightsand conditions of union membership is a ground for cancellation of unionregistration or e$pulsion of o8cer from o8ce, whichever is appropriate.

At least thirty percent &9:;( of all the members of a union or any memberor members especially concerned may report such violation to the Bureau

of 7abor


5/31

09)IN-:

Petitioners= main argument is that they are private corporations without originalcharter> hence they are outside the jurisdiction of respondents 6 and ?A.

)eliance is made on the @etro @B, %$&SC0A &?4(, The SC aread" red that a water district is a corporationcreated prsant to a specia aw P++ No+ %>@, as a!ended, and as schits oDcers and e!po"ees are covered *" the Civi Service )aw+


6/31

In another case 'Hagono" 4, Agst?%, %>@@, %3= SC0A$&$(, SC red once again that oca water districts are asip*iccorporations whose e!po"ees *eong to the Civi Service+

#O; SCO9TS OF TH E PHI )+ 6S N)0C%>3 SC0A%&3

POINT OF THE CASE

***Fmployees of petitioner B0 are embraced within the Civil ervice andare accordingly governed by the Civil ervice 7aw and


7/31

The same ode describes a *chartered institution* in the following terms0

Chartered institution 33 refers to any agency organied or operating undera special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to speci#cconstitutional policies or objectives. %his term includes the stateuniversities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the tate.

333SC *eieve that the #SP is appropriate" regarded as Ga govern!entinstr!entait"G nder the %>@& Ad!inistrative Code+ It ths appears thatthe #SP !a" *e regarded as *oth a Ggovern!ent controed corporationwith an origina charterG and as an Ginstr!entait"G o the -overn!entwithin the !eaning o Artice I '#( '$( '%( o the Constittion+ It oowsthat the e!po"ees o petitioner #SP are e!*raced within the Civi Serviceand are according" governed *" the Civi Service )aw and 0egation+

A5O0AS 6S S9

%@B SC0A $B@

POINT OF THE CASE

***An employee in an agricultural farm or plantation falls under the27 conseuently, the ') rendered a decision

reversing the abor Arbiter.


8/31

a!oras &led a petition, assailing the ')=s decision.

ISS9E:

-hether or not the ') or the ourt of Agrarian reform has jurisdiction over the

case.

HE):

The essential reuisites of a tenancy relationship are0 (1" the parties are the

landholder and the tenant> (2" the subject is the agricultural holding> (G" there is

consent between the parties> (H" the purpose is agricultural production> (I" there is

personal cultivation by the tenant> and (J" there is a sharing of harvests betweenlandlord and tenant.

%he element of personal cultivation of the land , or with the aid of his farmhousehold, essential in establishing a landlord%tenant or a lessor%lessee relationship,is absent in the relationship between u and Iamoras (o vs. DraLa vs. A, 1JG 6)A G", for Famoras did not cultivate any part of 6u=splantation either by himself or with the help of his household. ?n the other hand,the following circumstances are indicative of an employer%employee relationship pbetween them01. Famoras was selected and hired by 6u as overseer of the coconut plantation.2. Cis duties were speci&ed by 6u.

G. 6u controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. Ce determined towhomFamoras should sell the copra produced from the plantation.H. 6u paid Famoras a salary of P2,HKK per month plus one%third of the copra salesevery two months as compensation for managing the plantation. 333ince

Iamoras was an employee, not a tenant of u, it is the 27


9/31

-+0+ No+ &>&3$POINT OF THE CASE

***A dismissal as a corporate o8cer is a purely intra3corporatecontroversy over which the ecurities and F$change Commission &FC(

has original and e$clusive jurisdiction. (ection , par. &c( Kf 0residential>ecree 2o. ?:43A(

FACTS:

The / (/ortune ement orporation" !oard approved and adopted a resolutiondismissing agdameo as :#ecutive 4ice%President of the company, eMectiveimmediately, for loss of trust and con&dence.

agdameo &led with the 'ational abor )elations ommission (')", a complaint

for illegal dismissal against / alleging that his dismissal was done without aformal hearing and investigation and, therefore, without due process.

1CC moved to dismiss 7agdameoJs complaint on the ground that hisdismissal as a corporate o8cer is a purely intra3corporate controversyover which the ecurities and F$change Commission &FC( has original

and e$clusive jurisdiction. The )a*or Ar*iter granted the !otion todis!iss.

?n appeal, however, the ') set aside the abor Arbiter=s order and remanded thecase to the Arbitration !ranch *for appropriate proceedings*. The ') denied/=s motion for reconsideration.

+issatis&ed, / &led this petition for certiorari.

ISS9E:

-hether or not the ') has jurisdiction over a complaint &led by a corporatee#ecutive vice%president for illegal dismissal, resulting from a board resolutiondismissing him as such ocer.

HE):

The 6 &nd the petition with merit.

Section = o Presidentia ecree No+ >4$A vests in the SEC origina ande8csive /risdiction over this controvers":Sec+ =+ In addition to the regator" and ad/dicative nctions o theSecrities and E8change Co!!ission over corporations, partnerships andother or!s o associations registered with it as e8press" granted nder


10/31

e8isting aws and decrees, it sha have origina and e8csive /risdictionto hear and decide cases invoving:

A" N######!" N######C( Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,

o8cers or managers of such corporations, partnership or

associations.

The Soicitor -enera, decining to deend p*ic respondent FCC in its

peading entited G5aniestation in )ie o Co!!ent,G aptly observed :

The position of *:#ecutive 4ice%President,* from which private respondentagdameo claims to have been illegally dismissed, is an elective corporate oce.Ce himself acuired that position through election by the corporation=s !oard of+irectors> although he also lost the same as a conseuence of the latter=sresolution. ecree 2o. ?:43A, hence, within theoriginal and e$clusive jurisdiction of the FC. %he olicitor Heneralrecommended that the petition be granted and the Case be dismissed byrespondent 27


11/31

Private respondent 2vena )aKaga was employed as a )esearch Associate on a

probationary basis by the 6:A/+:%A5+ and was appointed 6enior :#ternal AMairs

?cer. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional is immune from suit owing to its international characterand the complaint is in eect a suit against the tate which cannot bemaintained without its consent.

ISS9E:

-hether or not, the ') has jurisdiction to decide a termination case of a local

employee hired by FA1>FC3AL>, an international organiLation in which the

Philippines is a signatory.

HE):

The petition is impressed with merit.


12/31

***0etitioner outheast Asian 1isheries >evelopment Center3A-uaculture>epartment &FA1>FC3AL>( is an international agency beyond the

jurisdiction of public respondent 27


13/31

0etitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that thetrial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee3employer relations that were e$clusively cogniable by the labor arbiter.

The motion was granted, however, the respondent judge, acting on the motion forreconsideration, reinstated the complaint, saying it was *distinct from the labor casefor damages now pending before the labor courts.*

%he petitioners then came to C for relief .

The petitioners invoe Artice $%& o the )a*or Code and a n!*er odecisions o this Cort to spport their position that the privaterespondents civi co!paint or da!ages as nder the /risdiction o thea*or ar*iter+ They particularly cite the case of DetL orporation v. ourt ofAppeals, where it was held that a court of &rst instance had no jurisdiction over thecomplaint &led by a dismissed employee *for unpaid salary and other employmentbene&ts, termination pay and moral and e#emplary damages.*

ISS9E:

-hether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction on all controversies involvingemployee%employer relationship.

HE):

The petition was denied+

***!t must be stressed that not every controversy involving wor"ers and

their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. %his will be soonly if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claimasserted and employee3employer relations to put the case under the

provisions of Article 46'. Absent such a lin", the complaint will becogniable by the regular courts of justice in the e$ercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.

The case involves a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution which was&led with the )egional Trial ourt by the employees of the defendant company.


14/31

matter which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve as theapplicable law is not the 7abor Code but the %POINT OF THE CASE

***Allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action and,conse-uently, the jurisdiction of the courts.

!t is not the 27


15/31

agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular courts%%not with the') or the labor arbiters.

777 Time and time again, we have held that the allegations in the complaintdetermine the nature of the action and, conse-uently, the jurisdiction ofthe courts. After carefully e#amining the complaintOposition paper of petitioner, we

are convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on auasi delict or tort.

-hile it is true that labor arbiters and the ') have jurisdiction to award not onlyreliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the ivil ode, thesereliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection withthe abor ode, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

?

POINT OF THE CASE

777In a*or cases concerning iega dis!issas, the *rden o proving thatthe e!po"ee was dis!issed with /st case rests pon the e!po"er+

Sch is the !andate o Art+ $&@ o the )a*or Code

09)IN-:

As hed in -o*e 5aca" Ca*e and 0adio Corporation v+ N)0C

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of ###### on loss of

con$dence" As we have held countless times, while loss of con#denceor breach of trust is a valid ground for termination, it must rest on

some basis which must be convincingly established " An employeemay not be dismissed on mere presumptions and supposition #############" While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty ofan employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis ofsuspicion derived from speculative inferences.


16/31

***Accusation cannot ta"e the place of proof. A suspicion or belief nomatter how sincerely felt cannot be a substitute for factual #ndingscarefully established through an orderly procedure.

Sch order" procedre was denied to petitioner (Austria" *"0espondent (PC and,(G" That he had the chance to obtain the assistance of counsel.

PA) 6S N)0C$@& SC0A 3&$POINT OF THE CASE

***urisdiction of the 27


17/31

damages respectively, attorney=s fees euivalent to ten percent of whateveramount is awarded, and the costs of suit.

27


18/31

HE):

27


19/31

09)IN-:

In ring that an order or award or reinstate!ent does not reire a writ

o e8ection the Cort is si!p" adhering and giving !eaning to this re+

Cenceforth, 3333we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is

self3e$ecutory. After receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the

employee=s reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re%

admit the employee to wor$ under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior

to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll.


20/31

777The Cort reaDr!s the prevaiing principe that even i the order

o reinstate!ent o the )a*or Ar*iter is reversed on appea, it is

o*igator" on the part o the e!po"er to reinstate and pa" the

wages o the dis!issed e!po"ee dring the period o appea nti

reversa *" the higher cort+

09)IN-:

!t settles the view that the 7abor ArbiterJs order of reinstatement isimmediately e$ecutory and the employer has to either re3admit them towor" under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their

dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to e$ercisethe options in the alternative, employer must pay the employee’s salaries.

The spirit o the re on reinstate!ent pending appea ani!ates theproceedings once the )a*or Ar*iter isses the decision containing anorder o reinstate!ent+ The immediacy of its e#ecution needs no furtherelaboration. )einstatement pending appeal necessitates its immediate e#ecutionduring the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose. At thesame time, any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its e#ecution,as observed in previous cases, should not be countenanced.

The new ') )ules of Procedure, which too$ eMect on Ranuary E, 2KKJ, now reuire

the employer to submit are port of compliance within 1K calendar days from receiptof the abor Arbiter’s decision, disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal toreinstate. The employee need not &le a motion for the issuance of the writ ofe#ecution since the abor Arbiter shall there after motu proprio issue the writ.-ith the new rules in place, there is hardly any diculty in determining theemployer’s intransigence in immediately complying with the order.

A0IS 'PH I)+( IN C+ 6S N)0C$44 SC0A $B3

POINT OF THE CASE

***F$ecution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision bythe 7abor

Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee is recognied.


21/31

09)IN-:

:#ecution pending appeal is interlin$ed with the right to appeal. ?ne cannot bedivorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a partywho is not satis&ed with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by theprevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, isnot a constitutional, natural or inherent right.


22/31

such petitions should be initially #led in the Court of Appeals instrict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.

09)IN-:

-hile we do not wish to intrude into the ongressional sphere on the matter of thewisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is agrowing number of labor cases being elevated to this ourt which, not being a trierof fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the ') for resolutionof unclear or ambiguous factual &ndings> that the ourt of Appeals is procedurallyeuipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its componentdivisions> and that there is undeniably an imperative need for e#peditious action onlabor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

%herefore, all references in the amended ection ? of B.0. 2o. 64? tosupposed appeals from the 27


23/31

0etrench!ent is one o the athoriKed cases or the dis!issa oe!po"ees+ 0esorted to *" e!po"ers to avoid or !ini!iKe *sinessosses, it is recogniKed nder Artice $@? o the )a*or Code+ The GossGreerred to in this provision cannot *e o /st an" ind or a!ontMotherwise, a co!pan" cod easi" eign e8cses to sit its whi!s andpre/dices or to rid itse o nwanted e!po"ees+

0etrench!ent is on" Ga !easre o ast resort when other ess drastic!eans have *een tried and ond to *e inadeate+

0etrench!ent is a !anage!ent prerogative consistent" recogniKed andaDr!ed *" the SC.

POINT OF THE CASE

***+nder the


24/31

petitioners, the )ules of ourt should not be strictly applied in this case speci&callyby putting them on the witness stand to be cross%e#amined because the ') hasits own rules of procedure which were applied by the abor Arbiter in coming upwith a decision in their favor.


25/31

PII 6S N)0C$%4 SC0A ??>

POINT OF THE CASE

***Managerial employees and con#dential employees are precludedto join or form union with the ran" and #le employees+

!f 5anageria e!po"ees would belong to or be a8liated with a +nion,the latter might not be assured of their loyalty, to the +nion in view ofevident conRict of interests. %he +nion can also become company3dominated with the presence of managerial employees in +nion

membership, and confdentia e!po"ees such as accounting personnel,radio and telegraph operators, who having access to con#dentialinformation, may become the source of undue advantage. aidemployee&s( may act as a spy or, spies of either party to a collective

bargaining agreement.

09)IN-:

?n the main issue raised before 7s, it is uite obvious that respondent ')committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the :#ecutiveabor Arbiter and in decreeing that P


26/31

In -oden Far!s, Inc+ vs+ FerrerCae/a, the 6upreme ourt e#plicitly made this

rationale applicable to con&dential employees0

This rationale holds true also for con&dential employees such as accounting

personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having access to con&dential

information, may become the source of undue advantage. 6aid employee(s" mayact as a spy or, spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement. This is

especially true in the present case where the petitioning 7nion is already the

bargaining agent of the ran$%and%&le employees in the establishment. To allow the

con&dential employees to join the e#isting 7nion of the ran$%and%&le would be in

violation of the terms of the ollective !argaining Agreement wherein this $ind of

employees by the nature of their functionsO positions are e#pressly e#cluded.

NAFT9 6S 5A)E CO99)-

$ SC0A =>@

POINT OF THE CASE

777%he test of grouping is community or mutuality of interests. %his is sobecause the basic test of an asserted bargaining unitJs acceptability iswhether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assureto all employees the e$ercise of their collective bargaining rights.

ertainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the 6awmill+ivision and the ogging +ivision. Their functions mesh with one another. ?ne groupneeds the other in the same way that the company needs them both. %here maybe dierence as to the nature of their individual assignments but thedistinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separatebargaining unit.

09)IN-:


27/31

consented and supported the petition for certi&cation election, thereby con&rmingtheir desire for one bargaining representative ()ollo, p. 1KH".0%nad @oreover, whilethe e#istence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be rec$oned with indetermining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive.?ther factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interests. This is so because *the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit=s

acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will bestassure to all employees the e#ercise of their collective bargaining rights.*(+emocratic abor Association v. ebu 6tevedoring ompany,


28/31

%he petitioner argues therein that, among others, a cooperative is notcovered by the


29/31

The right of the employees to self%organiLation is a compelling reason why theirwithdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed, the resignation ofthe member3employees is an e$pression of their preference for union

membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowedpoic" o the State to a.ord protection to a*or and to pro!otethe pri!ac" o ree coective *argaining !andates that thee!po"eesL right to or! and /oin nions or prposes o coective*argaining *e accorded the highest consideration. @embership in anelectric cooperative which merely vests in the member a right to vote during theannual meeting becomes too trivial and insubstantial vis%a%vis the primordial andmore important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of hischoice.

5E0A)CO 6S SEC+ OF )A#O0%>& SC0A $&=

POINT OF THE CASE

***ecurity guards may now freely join a labor organiation of theran" and #le or that of the supervisory union, depending on theirran".

09)IN-:

-hile therefore under the old rules, secrit" gards were *arred ro! /oining a

a*or organiKation o the ran and fe, nder 0A 3&%=, the" !a" nowree" /oin a a*or organiKation o the ran and fe or that o thespervisor" nion, depending on their ran+ #" acco!!odatingspervisor" e!po"ees, the Secretar" o )a*or !st iewise app"the provisions o 0A 3&%= to secrit" gards *" avora*" aowingthe! ree access to a a*or organiKation, whether ran and fe orspervisor", in recognition o their constittiona right to seorganiKation.

-e are aware however of possible conseuences in the implementation of the lawin allowing security personnel to join labor unions within the company they serve.

The law is apt to produce divided loyalties in the faithful performance of theirduties. :conomic reasons would present the employees concerned with thetemptation to subordinate their duties to the allegiance they owe the union of whichthey are members, aware as they are that it is usually union action that obtains forthem increased pecuniary bene&ts.

Thus, in the event of a stri$e declared by their union, security personnel mayneglect or out rightly abandon their duties, such as protection of property of theiremployer and the persons of its ocials and employees, the control of access to the


30/31

employer=s premises, and the maintenance of order in the event of emergenciesand untoward incidents.

@3, Pres+ CoraKon C+ Aino issed E+O+ No+ %%% whicheliminated the above%cited provision on the disuali&cation of security guards. -hatwas retained was the disuali&cation of managerial employees, renumbered asArt.2HI (previously Art. 2HJ", as follows0

Art. 45. !neligibility of managerial employees to joint any labororganiation.Q@anagerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organiLation.

333-ith the elimination, security guards were thus free to join a ran$ and &leorganiLation.

On 5arch $, %>@>, the present Congress passed 0A 3&%=+Section %@thereo a!ended Art+ $B=, to read as follows0

Art. 45. !neligibility of managerial employees to join any labororganiationP right of supervisory employees.=@anagerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organiLation.6upervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organiLationof the ran$%and%&le employees but may join, assist, or form separate labororganiLations of their own. (:mphasis ours"

As will be noted, the second sentence of Art. 2HI embodies an amendmentdisualifying supervisory employees from membership in a labor organiLation of theran$%and%&le employees. !t does not include security guards in thedis-uali#cation.

CO)-ATEPA)5O)I6E 6S OP)E-+0+ No+ &?3@%

POINT OF THE CASE


31/31

labor ii cases ( digest )

Documents