Nuclear Program of Iran -Nuclear Program of Iran -Current StatusCurrent Status

Olli HeinonenOlli HeinonenBelfer Center for Science and International AffairsBelfer Center for Science and International AffairsJohn F. Kennedy School of GovernmentJohn F. Kennedy School of Government22 November 201022 November 2010

This presentation is based onThis presentation is based oninformation publicly availableinformation publicly availablesince 2002 from since 2002 from 30 reports 30 reports ofofthe Director General of thethe Director General of theIAEA.IAEA.

- Iranian nuclear program originates from 1950- Iranian nuclear program originates from 1950’’ss- Pre-revolution:- Pre-revolution: = US, France and Germany were involved in the program = US, France and Germany were involved in the program = interested also to get fuel cycle technology = interested also to get fuel cycle technology- After the revolution:- After the revolution: program was in decline until it was revitalized in mid- program was in decline until it was revitalized in mid-19801980’’ss- Iran tried to acquire nuclear technology: Germany, France, Brazil,- Iran tried to acquire nuclear technology: Germany, France, Brazil,Argentina Argentina etcetc, but unsuccessful., but unsuccessful.- Attempts also included uranium enrichment and heavy water reactor- Attempts also included uranium enrichment and heavy water reactortechnology.technology.- Some success with China and Russia, but no real access to sensitive- Some success with China and Russia, but no real access to sensitivetechnologies apart from laser enrichment.technologies apart from laser enrichment.- Turned in mid-1980- Turned in mid-1980’’s to nuclear black markets to get technology.s to nuclear black markets to get technology.

Background

- Iran failed to report some of its uranium conversion activities from- Iran failed to report some of its uranium conversion activities frommid-1980mid-1980’’s.s.- Iran failed to report uranium enrichment activities from early 1990- Iran failed to report uranium enrichment activities from early 1990’’s.s.-The existence of Natanz enrichment facility revealed in August 2002.-The existence of Natanz enrichment facility revealed in August 2002.

Background contBackground cont’’dd

Iran continuesIran continues::

-Uranium exploration and -Uranium exploration and mining:mining: SaghandSaghand mine and mine and ArdakanArdakan Yellow Cake Production Plant under Yellow Cake Production Plant under construction construction GcchineGcchine mine producing yellowcake mine producing yellowcake-Uranium C-Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan:onversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan: Produced 371 Produced 371 tonnestonnes UF6 since March 2004 UF6 since March 2004 About 35 About 35 tonnestonnes UF6 UF6 sofarsofar used in used in NatanzNatanz-Uranium -Uranium Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Isfahan:Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Isfahan: Produced one assembly, small amount of fuel pellets and rods for Produced one assembly, small amount of fuel pellets and rods for IR-40 reactor IR-40 reactor Under construction Under construction

What We What We KnowKnow

What We KnowWhat We Know

- Uranium enrichment:- Uranium enrichment: Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in in NatanzNatanz Producing 20 % U-235 since February 2010 Producing 20 % U-235 since February 2010 Experimenting IR-2,IR-3, and IR-4 centrifuges Experimenting IR-2,IR-3, and IR-4 centrifuges Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in NatanzNatanz Since February 2007 produced Since February 2007 produced caca 3 3 tonnestonnes LEU UF6 LEU UF6 About 8000 IR-1 centrifuges; half of them operating About 8000 IR-1 centrifuges; half of them operating FordowFordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) Revealed in September 2009; under construction Revealed in September 2009; under construction Announced construction of additional facilities Announced construction of additional facilities Construction of the third facility begins in 2011 Construction of the third facility begins in 2011

What We KnowWhat We Know

- Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak:- Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak: In operation In operation-- Heavy Water Reactor IR-40 at Arak:Heavy Water Reactor IR-40 at Arak: 40 40 MWthMWth, under construction, under construction Stated to be operation in 2013 Stated to be operation in 2013 Originally Iran said it to be the replacement of the aging Originally Iran said it to be the replacement of the aging Tehran Research reactor (TRR) Tehran Research reactor (TRR)-- Light Water Reactor at Light Water Reactor at BushehrBushehr Fuel loading is being completed Fuel loading is being completed First criticality expected in coming weeks First criticality expected in coming weeks- Design - Design of of an an indegenousindegenous LWR at LWR at DarkhovinDarkhovin continues continues

Since IranSince Iran -is -is notnot implementing implementing the Additional Protocolthe Additional Protocol -does -does not provide early information not provide early information about design andabout design and construction of new facilities, construction of new facilities, -and is -and is notnot heeding to the requests of the heeding to the requests of the IAEA Board andIAEA Board and the UNSC resolutionsthe UNSC resolutions::

-Magnitude of current and future activities mentioned -Magnitude of current and future activities mentioned aboveabove-R&D on uranium enrichment, including laser -R&D on uranium enrichment, including laser enrichmentenrichment-R&D on -R&D on reprocessingreprocessing-Design of new research reactors-Design of new research reactors-Activities related to nuclear weapon design and -Activities related to nuclear weapon design and manufacturingmanufacturing

What We Do Not KnowWhat We Do Not Know

Unit Cascades Cascades TotalUnit Cascades Cascades Total (Centrifuges) (Centrifuges) (Centrifuges) (Centrifuges) fed not fed fed not fed

A24 17 1 18A24 17 1 18 (2788) (164) (2952) (2788) (164) (2952)A26 6 12 18A26 6 12 18 (984) (1968) (2952) (984) (1968) (2952)A28 0 18 18A28 0 18 18 (0) (2952) (2952) (0) (2952) (2952)Total 23 29+ 52+Total 23 29+ 52+ (3772) (5084) (8856) (3772) (5084) (8856)

As of 28 August 2010; situation is almost identical to February 2010.As of 28 August 2010; situation is almost identical to February 2010.All machines in Production Hall A are IR-1s.All machines in Production Hall A are IR-1s.Production Hall B has no machines installed.Production Hall B has no machines installed.

Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) –– NatanzNatanz

IR-1s - Natanz

As of 6 August 2010 it is estimated that since the start of production inAs of 6 August 2010 it is estimated that since the start of production inFebruary 2007 February 2007 caca 2803 kg (6080 2803 kg (6080 lbslbs) of LEU (< 5 % U-235) has been) of LEU (< 5 % U-235) has beenproduced.produced.

Note:Note:-Nuclear material in cylinders, cascade area, plus feed and withdrawal-Nuclear material in cylinders, cascade area, plus feed and withdrawalarea remain under containment and area remain under containment and surveillancesurveillance-Some particles 5.0-7.1 % U-235 were -Some particles 5.0-7.1 % U-235 were foundfound-Unannounced -Unannounced inspectionsinspections

FEP Cumulative ProductionFEP Cumulative Production

Single machine and small cascade tests:Single machine and small cascade tests:

-22 May 2010- 20 August 2010 84 kg natural UF6 fed into:-22 May 2010- 20 August 2010 84 kg natural UF6 fed into: -Single IR-1,IR-2m, and IR-4 -Single IR-1,IR-2m, and IR-4 centrifugescentrifuges -20-machine IR-4 -20-machine IR-4 cascadecascade -20 machine IR-2m -20 machine IR-2m cascadecascade -Product and tails recombined and -Product and tails recombined and recycledrecycled

Production of 20 % U-235:Production of 20 % U-235:

-On 9 February 2010 Iran started to feed LEU to a 164 IR-1 machine -On 9 February 2010 Iran started to feed LEU to a 164 IR-1 machine cascadecascade-On 23 July 2010 Iran started recycle material from another interconnected 164 IR-1 machine-On 23 July 2010 Iran started recycle material from another interconnected 164 IR-1 machinecascade to the first cascade to the first cascadecascade-As of 20 August 2010 22 kg UF6 of -As of 20 August 2010 22 kg UF6 of caca 20 % U-235 20 % U-235 producedproduced-Unannounced -Unannounced inspectionsinspections

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) –– NatanzNatanz

IR-2 with Components

IR-2s at the background

- On 21 September 2009 Iran notified the - On 21 September 2009 Iran notified the IAEA IAEA about the about the facilityfacility- Since - Since 26 October 2009 regular DIVs with environmental sampling26 October 2009 regular DIVs with environmental sampling- Iran yet to provide a complete design - Iran yet to provide a complete design information andinformation and clarifications regarding the clarifications regarding the chronologychronology- Currently designed for 16 cascades total of 3000 IR-1 machines- Currently designed for 16 cascades total of 3000 IR-1 machines;; installation of more advanced machines installation of more advanced machines plannedplanned- No - No nuclear material or centrifuges at the nuclear material or centrifuges at the facilityfacility- Iran- Iran: : ‘‘Since Since NatanzNatanz is under continuous threat, it was decided in is under continuous threat, it was decided inthe second half of 2007 a contingency plant would be built to one ofthe second half of 2007 a contingency plant would be built to one ofthe sites of the Passive the sites of the Passive DefenceDefence Organization Organization’’- Planned - Planned to be operational in 2011to be operational in 2011

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)–– Qom Qom

-On 18 August 2010, the -On 18 August 2010, the IAEA reiterated IAEA reiterated its request to have access toits request to have access toadditional locations related to:additional locations related to: -Manufacturing of -Manufacturing of centrifugescentrifuges -R&D on uranium enrichment incl. laser -R&D on uranium enrichment incl. laser enrichmentenrichment -Uranium mining and milling -Uranium mining and milling activitiesactivities

-On 21 August 2010, Iran did not provide the requested information, but-On 21 August 2010, Iran did not provide the requested information, butreiterated that it was reiterated that it was ““continuing to cooperate with the continuing to cooperate with the IAEA IAEA ininaccordance with the Safeguards Agreementaccordance with the Safeguards Agreement””

Other Enrichment Related ActivitiesOther Enrichment Related Activities

-IR-40 reactor construction ongoing.-IR-40 reactor construction ongoing.-Heavy Water Production Plant; seems to be operational, but no-Heavy Water Production Plant; seems to be operational, but noaccess access providedprovided-Sampling of produced heavy water not -Sampling of produced heavy water not permittedpermitted-Fuel Manufacturing Plant: no new assemblies, rods or pellets-Fuel Manufacturing Plant: no new assemblies, rods or pelletsproducedproduced

Heavy Water Reactor Related ActivitiesHeavy Water Reactor Related Activities

- In - In June 2010, Iran requested the June 2010, Iran requested the IAEA IAEA assistance to have fuel forassistance to have fuel for the TRR the TRR- Subsequently - Subsequently the US, France and Russia participated in the US, France and Russia participated in thethe negotiations negotiations- In - In October 2009, ElBaradei made a proposal to ship 1200 October 2009, ElBaradei made a proposal to ship 1200 kgskgs of of LEULEU to Russia for enrichment, and then processing it to fuel in to Russia for enrichment, and then processing it to fuel in FranceFrance- On - On 17 May 2010, Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Turkey and Iran signed17 May 2010, Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Turkey and Iran signed Tehran Tehran a Joint a Joint DeclarationDeclaration- Most likely to be discussed with P5+1 in talks in December 2010- Most likely to be discussed with P5+1 in talks in December 2010

Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)

1. Centrifuge components produced to substantial extent inmilitary workshops

2. Uranium Hemisphere Document- a 15 page document describes in generic termsconversion of HEU UF6 to uranium metal, its machiningand coating for uranium metal hemispheres- Iran stated that it got the document from the AQKnetwork, but did not ask for or use it

3. Military personnel, institutes, and companies involved inprocurement activities in nuclear area

Military Dimension

4. Green Salt Project4. Green Salt Project - - a process diagram for UF4 production in bench scalea process diagram for UF4 production in bench scale - - involvement of military related people, institutes, companiesinvolvement of military related people, institutes, companies5. High Explosive Studies5. High Explosive Studies - - fast acting EWB detonators fired fast acting EWB detonators fired simultaneously; simultaneously; 1 microsecond time1 microsecond time precision precision - - some information points to initiation of explosive in a hollow some information points to initiation of explosive in a hollow metalmetal hemispherehemisphere6. Missile Re-entry Vehicle6. Missile Re-entry Vehicle - - technical studies to reengineer a new payload for the Shahab-3technical studies to reengineer a new payload for the Shahab-3 - - mass and dimension are compatible with some parameters seen mass and dimension are compatible with some parameters seen inin high explosive testinghigh explosive testing- parameters indicate that possibly a nuclear - parameters indicate that possibly a nuclear payloadpayload

Military Dimension, cont.

- - Information Information provided by several provided by several IAEA Member StatesIAEA Member States- Some - Some information originates from Agencyinformation originates from Agency’’s own investigations and s own investigations and itsits findings in Iran and/or contacts with individuals and findings in Iran and/or contacts with individuals and companiescompanies- Information - Information appears to be appears to be generally consistent. consistent.- Information - Information seems to be pointing towards nuclear seems to be pointing towards nuclear weaponweapon development development..

IAEAIAEA’’s s Assessment on Military DimensionAssessment on Military Dimension

- - Baseless Baseless accusations and fabricated accusations and fabricated datadata- Some - Some of the technical information has of the technical information has mistakesmistakes- Documentation - Documentation does not follow Iranian confidentiality does not follow Iranian confidentiality practicespractices- Wants - Wants to have access to original information to be able to prove itsto have access to original information to be able to prove its case case- Claims - Claims that its work on detonators with high precision is for that its work on detonators with high precision is for civiliancivilian and conventional military and conventional military useuse- Challenges - Challenges the the IAEAIAEA’’s s authority to investigate military relatedauthority to investigate military related activities activities which it considers being beyond the which it considers being beyond the provisions provisions of of thethe safeguards safeguards agreementagreement- Considers - Considers the UNSC and the IAEA Board resolutions the UNSC and the IAEA Board resolutions illegalillegal

Iranian Assessment Related to Military Dimension

1. The 1. The IAEA IAEA continues to verify the non-diversion of the declaredcontinues to verify the non-diversion of the declarednuclear material, but the necessary co-operation to permit the nuclear material, but the necessary co-operation to permit the IAEA IAEA totoconfirm that all nuclear material is in peaceful activities is missing.confirm that all nuclear material is in peaceful activities is missing.

NoteNote: Article 2 of the SGs Agreement, authorizes and requires the: Article 2 of the SGs Agreement, authorizes and requires theIAEA IAEA to seek to verify both the diversion of nuclear material from theto seek to verify both the diversion of nuclear material from thedeclared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclareddeclared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclarednuclear activities (i.e. completeness).nuclear activities (i.e. completeness).

22. Iran has not co-operated in outstanding issues which give rise to. Iran has not co-operated in outstanding issues which give rise toconcerns on possible military dimensions to its nuclear program.concerns on possible military dimensions to its nuclear program.

Summary

3. Iran has not suspended enrichment related activities (i.e. operation 3. Iran has not suspended enrichment related activities (i.e. operation ofof current and construction of new facilitiescurrent and construction of new facilities).).

4. Iran 4. Iran is apparently still struggling with the enrichment program:is apparently still struggling with the enrichment program: The The UF6 throughput at FEP remains low albeit the production rate ofUF6 throughput at FEP remains low albeit the production rate of low enriched uranium has slightly improved during last one year. low enriched uranium has slightly improved during last one year. Great number of installed centrifuges has been replaced. Great number of installed centrifuges has been replaced.

5. 5. Progress with advanced centrifuges is also slow.Progress with advanced centrifuges is also slow.

6. 6. TThe fuel loading at the he fuel loading at the BushehrBushehr LWR continues; LWR continues; the first criticality isthe first criticality is expected expected in coming weeks.in coming weeks.

Summary cont’d