iran nuclear programme report

8/3/2019 Iran Nuclear PRogramme report

1/53

IRANS NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

Facts, Dilemmas and the Political Debate

Background Paper on Irans Nuclear Programme

prepared for IKV and Pax Christi

by

Karel Koster with Barbara Brubacher#

March 2006


2/53

Iran and the threat of nuclear proliferation

A contribution to the discussion by IKV and Pax Christi Netherlands.

The UN Security Council deadline for Iran to give full openness about its nucle

ar programme elapsed on the 28th of April. This threatens to be the beginning ofa new phase in the escalating conflict with Iran. What has been lacking so far,is a concerted, credible and vigorous political strategy, that convinces Iran that the price of a nuclear weapons programme is too high.

IKV and Pax Christi Netherlands are seriously concerned about the escalating conflict with Iran. A nuclear weapons programme in Iran would pose a threat to theregional security and stability in the Middle East, but so would be a unilateralmilitary action on dubious grounds . Experience shows that threatening with military violence can initiate an irreversible escalating process that can only bereversed at the price of a great loss of credibility.

The research that has been conducted by both organisations Irans nuclear programme: facts, dilemmas and the political debate, confirms that there is not a single hint that Irans nuclear programme poses an actual and immediate threat. The lack oftechnical capacity for the development of nuclear weapons does not imply that Teheran lacks the political will to develop those weapons. Its better not to be nave about the real intentions of the rulers.

According to the Washington Post, the most recent National Intelligence Estimateof the CIA assumes that Iran will not be able to attain a nuclear weapon optionfor 5 to 10 years. Its very important that the policy with regard to Iran is based on accurate intelligence . The Dutch parliament should ask the government fora realistic image of the actual threat that Iran poses.

IKV en Pax Christi Netherlands reject preventive military violence, as long as there is no immediate threat against international peace and security. Preventive violence is politically counter-productive, unfounded and illegal under international law.

We advocate a concerted, credible and vigorous political strategy which should convince Iran to give its full cooperation to the IAEA and abandon the possibility of developing nuclear weapons.

This political strategy should, according to IKV and Pax Christi Netherlands, contain the following elements:

The U.S. should be willing to respect the sovereignty and integrity of Iran,as long as Iran respects the sovereignty and integrity of other states and abandons the development of nuclear weapons.

A successful political strategy that convinces Iran to abandon the development of a nuclear weapons option requires a multilateral approach. The support ofRussia, China, the EU and the Arab states is of vital importance in this respect.

Especially Russia and China should, as important trading partners, convinceIran that they are eventually willing to support UN sanctions an investment and

export stop to Iran in order to prevent nuclear proliferation and further undermining of the Non Proliferation Treaty.


3/53

The wielding of double standards undermines a credible strategy and prohibits broad international support of this strategy, not in the last place by Arab states. The nuclear powers should comply with their commitments under the Non Proliferation Treaty. Further undermining of the NPT should be stopped.

For the protection of the national security interests of Iran, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf States united in the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as other states in the region, the establishment of a regional security council shouldbe promoted. On the long run, it is important that the US and other permanent members of the Security Council actively support the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.

A strategy that is based on the improvement and insurance of regional security and stability should also be aimed at the promotion of human security to civilians and communities in the Middle East. Therefore, it is of vital importance that the interests and human rights of the Iranian population are an integral par

t of the political strategy aimed at convincing Iran to abandon a nuclear option. The security of states is after all inextricably bound to the security of civilians.

The nuclear programme of Iran requires, in other words, a political strategy that is based on the recognition that stability in the Middle East asks for a regional approach that is based on collective security for concerned states and humansecurity for civilians. For the mobilisation of Arabic states for this strategy, its important to see that the nuclear programme of Iran, security in the region, the nuclear status of Israel, the American policy in the Middle East and the Israeli-Arabic conflict are inextricably linked together.

Additionally, its important to promote contacts with the Iranian civil society. Its remarkable that one of the most reform minded student organisations in Iran has spoken out against the nuclear programme. Saber Sheykhlou, a spokesperson of the students, stated: The irrational and confrontational behaviour of the rulers has put the country on the verge of war and destructive sanctions. The referral of the case of Iran to the UN Security Council is the result of Irans biggest mistake in its foreign policy. This statement is not only brave, but also deserves political support. The Dutch government and other like minded states should becomeadvocates within the European Union and other international organisations of aconcerted, credible and persistent political strategy, aimed at collective security in the Middle East.

Jan van Montfort Jan GruitersDirector IKV Director Pax Christi Netherlands

24 April 2006

CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2


4/53

INTRODUCTION 4

I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THE PROBLEM 5II. THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

HISTORICAL NOTE 10

III. STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 14

IV. GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 19

V. DECISION MAKING ON MATTERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN IRAN 25

VI. THE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS 27

VII. POLITICAL CHOICES THE ACTORS 35

APPENDIX 39ANNEX I Selected Primary Sources 39

ANNEX II Contacts 47

ANNEX III to Chapter VI 48ANNEX IV Decision-making structures Iran 50

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is generally recognised that the NPT is an extremely important treaty for curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. However it has a built-incontradiction that at least partially defeats its purpose. That is, it explicitly encourages (in art. 4) the proliferation of nuclear technology suitable both for peaceful purposes and for building weapons.

The lack of verifiable and irreversible steps towards nuclear disarmament will make a stronger non-proliferation regime within a legal framework extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve.


5/53

The Iran crisis has renewed interest in the concept of establishing a central bank for nuclear fuel supplies. This would entail obvious political problems regarding access to such nuclear materials.The IAEA has the express aim of making nuclear technology for peaceful purposesavailable for al the world

Irans activities related to developing a nuclear programme started as early as th

e 1960s, during a period when the USA was a close ally to the Iranian regime under Shah Mohammed Reza PahlaviThe Iranian revolution in 1979 led to a downscaling of Irans engagement in nuclear research activities and investment in technology. Iran continued with activities for peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the 1980s and decided in 1983 to renew its activities in nuclear research.There is a large degree of overlap between a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes and one for the production of a nuclear weapon. In Iran no proof has been found by the IAEA that a bomb construction program has been initiated.

Iran is an important regional player, ideologically hostile to Israel but culturally uncomfortable with the Arab world. It has no true ally in the region but many

potential adversaries. This means there are built-in destabilising factors in its foreign policy. It is important when looking at Iranian policies to take intoaccount its national security concerns.The call for a nuclear weapon free Middle East is in principle supported by themember states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as it is by consistent majoritiesof the United Nations General Assembly. Numerous resolutions calling for such aNWFZ have been passed by the GA during the last few years

The power structure of Iran is very fragmented and complex. This lack of transparency is even more apparent in the case of national security policy, because ofits secret nature. This is relevant in evaluating Iranian policies.

The initiating event in the series of developments leading to the current crisis

was the public revelation of the Natanz enrichment facility and Iranian acknowledgement of this facility. The enrichment stage of the nuclear fuel cycle is ofparticular importance because of the technological difficulties that must be surmounted in order to set up a working plant and the long period required to produce sufficient enriched uranium to either make a bomb or run a nuclear reactor.EU and Iran initiated negotiations on the Iranian programme in 2003. In March 2005 there was apparently a shift in the EU position. The possibility of a compromise allowing enrichment in Iran under strict international controls (so as to guarantee that the enrichment process was not used to manufacture bomb-grade enriched uranium) was dropped. Negotiations broke down in August 2005.

At the February IAEA meeting a resolution was passed calling on Iran to cease its enrichment activities and announcing the decision to implement an earlier Board resolution to report Iran to the Security Council. This resulted in a presidential statement by the Security Council reaffirming earlier IAEA Board resolutions. The key legal point in this procedure is the separation of the IAEA inspection protocol commitments on the one hand and the enrichment activities on the other. By concentrating on the demand for ceasing uranium enrichment - legal under NPT commitments - further IAEA involvement is being cut out. This may result inone or more Security Council resolutions demanding compliance.

The conclusion regarding the program on the basis of public information is as follows:

There is no proof of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.

There are a number of unresolved problems mostly related to experimental work on parts of the nuclear cycle, many on issues or events which took place 10 or


6/53

more years ago. Part of the nuclear cycle were developed in secret, possibly because sanctions on the delivery of nuclear technology made disclosure difficultwithout compromising the otherwise legal programme

There are indications that the possibility of developing a nuclear weapons option has been looked at. However, these indications do not constitute proof ofan actual military nuclear programme. Furthermore the evidence for this is sketc

hy and comes from unreliable sources.

Even if Iran has the aim of producing a nuclear weapon, it cannot do so in aperiod less than

three and more probably five to ten years

On this issue the NGO community has three major concerns:

There is a strong possibility of a US pre-emptive strike on Iran by a US-led force. Such an attack would not be based on any convincing evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme, raise serious legal, moral and political questio

ns and could well result in an escalation of violence all over the regionIran has regional ambitions which themselves have far-reaching destabilisingeffects. In the long term these regional ambitions may well include a nuclear weapon programme. This justifies extra conditions being imposed on Irans nuclear programme, subject to negotiations. Part of these negotiations should be the pursuit of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. It is highly desirable to cooperate with regional powers, like Irans neighbours, who are also concernedabout Iranian ambitions.

The human rights situation in Iran gives cause for great concern. There areconsistent reports of human right violations and repression of legitimate opposition to the regime. Ethnic divisions inside and outside Iran are also a potential risk factor. These concerns should be taken into account in the negotiating process.


7/53

INTRODUCTION

This fact sheet gives an overview of the Iran/proliferation issue. In succeedingchapters it covers the key underlying problem: the dual nature of nuclear technology, the way this applies to Iran and the recent history of the crisis. Thereare strong misconceptions about the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem.The most important of these is the constant confusion about the nuclear infrast

ructure (like enrichment plants) for peaceful purposes as compared to the infrastructure for making nuclear weapons (which also involves enrichment plants). Thetechnology is to a large extent precisely the same.

Agreed international law and practice have put together an institution-the IAEA-and treaty Non Proliferation treaty - which bridge this contradiction (atoms fo

r peace versus atoms for war) without actually solving it. That is why these treaties should be seen as a kind holding action, rather than a proper blockade against the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

Because of this ambivalence it was necessary to list the published evidence about the Iranian nuclear programme, especially the IAEA sources and the conclusions

drawn from them. Our conclusions are summarised in chapter VII, where the key political actors are also listed. An important gap in the non-state actors list concerns the positions and activities undertaken by various religious bodies.

The appendices deal with the various sources on Iran and those that need to be consulted in order to follow the negotiating process.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THE PROBLEM


8/53

More than 50 years ago US President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented his Atoms forPeace speech before the UN General Assembly.# He called on the United States andthe Soviet Union to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international Atomic Energy Agency and then devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Although it was not his intention, his speech markedthe ebginning of the world-wide development and proliferation of nuclear energy

, the civilian by-product of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.#

This was an ideologically driven campaign to make the nuclear idea acceptable.#Because of the risks inherent in the spread of nuclear technology, knowledge and fissile material, a global nuclear watchdog and a treaty against nuclear proliferation were created. For that purpose the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 within the UN framework. Later the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated, entering into force in 1970.# To facilitate thepeaceful use of nuclear energy the US McMahon Act was amended via the 1954 Atomic Energy Act to reduce nuclear secrecy. This allowed nuclear technology, material and knowledge to be exported to friendly states, approved and authorised by what was then the Atomic Energy Commission, now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

# The IAEA was given the powers of implementing safeguards and inspection for the non-nuclear weapons states, the have-nots.THE NPT DILEMMA

The Iranian crisis and others before it clearly illustrates that the use of thistechnology for peaceful or military purposes cannot be separated. Furthermore,the existing international treaty obligations, which call for free access to nuclear technology for all member countries and for applying safeguards to nuclearmaterials, have in fact obfuscated an extremely important fact: the developmentof nuclear power as a source of energy makes it possible to create the basis ofa nuclear weapons program. A key part of this is the nuclear enrichment technology.

The production of any nuclear bomb depends on the import of technology, equipment and materials as well as the development of know-how. Existing legal arrangements and guidelines for stopping or controlling the export of the technology from the countries, which possess the necessary industrial infrastructure, have failed on many occasions. The widely held explanation of this failure is based on an analysis in which this exporting process is largely seen as a problem of illegality.

Hence the constant use of the term

black market

. The use of this terminology in itself suggests that the solution to the proliferation problem needs only be sought in the tightening up of the laws and export regulations. A key speech by President Bush on the proliferation issue was a clear illustration of this. He stated:

"Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and international controlsthat govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall, I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strictexport controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. The Security Council should pass this proposal quickly. And when they do, America stands ready to help other governments to draft and enforce the new laws that will help us deal with proliferation." #

However, the companies involved were largely operating perfectly legally. Eitherthey exported licence-free products, which could be used to build key parts ofthe uranium enrichment chain; or they exported dual use goods as permitted under

existing legislation. Alternatively and more controversially, key items were exported to third countries from where they were redirected to the final destination. It is, however, misleading to describe this solely as a gigantic black mark


9/53

et operation that avoided the scrutiny of various law enforcement agencies. It is more accurate to describe this as a collection of particular transactions, which were not looked at too closely because of the prevailing political winds.

Such transactions were made possible by the nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself, which in article 4 states the following: Nothing in this Treaty shallbe interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty t

o develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposeswithout discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

It therefore acknowledges the rights of all member countries to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as a quid pro quo for not building nuclear weapons.

Russia, for example, has in the last decade provided Iran with nuclear reactorsand the necessary technical expertise to run them. Iranian technicians were therefore also trained in this. Once these programmes are initiated the receiving country can develop them further. Israels nuclear programme, for example, was set up with French help, while India was supported by Canada.

The key point in this process is that the so-called civilian help laid the foundations for the military nuclear programme.

Besides this ambiguity there is another built-in barrier to effective counter proliferation policy, and that is the obvious co-existence of two sets of rules: one for the nuclear weapon states, the other for the non-nuclear weapons states.We distinguish four categories of involvement:

The five nuclear weapon states recognised by the Non Proliferation Treaty: US, Russian Federation, China, France, United Kingdom

The three, possibly four nuclear weapon states which are not signatories of

the NPT but have a substantial nuclear strike capability: Israel, India, Pakistan. Most public intelligence estimates give North Korea a small number of nuclearbombs.#

The states covered by a nuclear umbrella. This includes all the NATO (formal) non-nuclear weapons states, which are involved in NATO nuclear planning and doctrine. Six of these non-nuclear member states have tasked part of their air forces to carry out nuclear strikes with US nuclear weapons, in accordance with NATO nuclear doctrine.#

The states with a civil nuclear programme, which gives them the technical ability to build nuclear weapons if they were to make the political choice to do so. That would involve using the legal option to withdraw from the NPT. This group includes 44 countries, as defined in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It includes states like Japan, Republic of Korea and Brazil.# If Iran develops a full-fledged nuclear programme, it too will have this ability.

It is generally recognised that the NPT is an extremely important treaty for curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. However it has a built-incontradiction that at least partially defeats its purpose. That is, it explicitly encourages (in art. 4) the proliferation of nuclear technology suitable for building weapons. The measures suggested by President Bush in his February 2004 speech: curbing the export of the enrichment part of the nuclear cycle and agreeing to more international inspections, sound reasonable but have a fatal flaw. They would not apply to a substantial group of industrialised states included in th

e categories described above. Instead, the great majority of the signatories ofthe NPT would be affected. It would, in short, be another way of ensuring the continuation of the nuclear weapons status quo, with no attempt to comply with the


10/53

other part of the NPT which is rarely mentioned by spokespersons of the nuclearweapons states (NWS): the obligation to strive for nuclear disarmament (art. 6).

At the same time the US government has engaged in a strategic policy shift, which openly declares that pre-emptive warfare is legitimate. It reserves the rightto wage nuclear war against states, which threaten to arm themselves with WMD.#

In so doing the negative security assurances, promises made by the nuclear weaponsstates in 1995 not to attack the signatories of the NPT with nuclear weapons, are violated.#

The NPT review conferences (which are held every five years) are meant to reviewthe effectiveness of the NPT: i.e. the degree to which the signatories have adhered to their treaty commitments. In 2000, all the states parties except France(which abstained) recommitted themselves to nuclear disarmament. In May 2005 theReview Conference failed to even agree on a final chairmans statement. This reflected sharp disagreements between the nuclear weapons states and many of the other signatories (every country in the world, except India, Israel and Pakistan. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty), which agreed in 1995 to the unlimited

extension of the NPT. The former (most clearly the US) were regarded as havinglargely ignored their disarmament commitments, while at the same time developingcoalitions of the willing (like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the ProliferationSecurity Initiative) to counter horizontal proliferation. Moreover, the US continues to develop new nuclear weapons systems and means of deploying them.#

It is unfortunately logical that countries that see themselves threatened by USpre-empting policies (or by those of other nuclear weapons states) will, withoutproper security guarantees, strive to develop nuclear weapons, in order to deter conventional attack. Of course, in so doing, they will be providing an excusefor others to attack them.

The argument made by president Bush about the need to change the NPT is well tak

en. But it is of course an attack on the article 4 right to nuclear technology.It would create a de facto oligopoly of nuclear suppliers, which would in turn give rise to strong opposition from existing and potential NPT signatories.

Director ElBaradei of the IAEA agreed with President Bush to some degree: but headded the extremely relevant comment:

"Of course, a fundamental part of the non-proliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear States recognized under the non-proliferation treaty Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States to move toward disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."#

He reiterated this position in his Nobel Peace price lecture (10 Dec 2005)

Third, accelerate disarmament efforts. We still have eight or nine countries whopossess nuclear weapons. We still have 27 000 warheads in existence. I believe this is 27 000 too many.

A good start would be if the nuclear-weapon States reduced the strategic role given to these weapons. More than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, it is incomprehensible to many that the major nuclear-weapon States operate with their a

rsenals on hair-trigger alert - such that, in the case of a possible launch of anuclear attack, their leaders could have only 30 minutes to decide whether to retaliate, risking the devastation of entire nations in a matter of minutes. #


11/53

That is, the lack of verifiable and irreversible steps towards nuclear disarmament will make a stronger non-proliferation regime within a legal framework extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve.

The Iran crisis has also renewed interest in the concept of establishing a central bank for nuclear fuel supplies.# This would entail obvious political problems

: who would guarantee access to such nuclear materials? However it might be acceptable as an interim solution, provided there are also serious moves towards nuclear disarmament.ROLE OF THE IAEA

The IAEA is commonly represented in the media as an inspection organ for controlling the member states of the NPT (which has been signed by every country in theworld except India, Pakistan and Israel). This is partially true: the treaty imposes inspection obligations on its signatories, as a consequence of art 1 and 2(non transference of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons.# But in fact the IAEA predates the NPT, which came into effect in 1970. The IAEA was set up in 1957 to ascertain that fissile material for peaceful use was not diverted to milit

ary programmes. The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contributionof atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shallensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its requestor under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further anymilitary purpose# In fact this is still its main purpose. It also has limited scope agreements with India Pakistan and Israel, all nuclear weapon states whichhave not signed the NPT. In their case the IAEA mandate is simply to ascertainthat part of their nuclear material is under proper safeguard.

Furthermore, the IAEA has the express aim of making nuclear technology for peaceful purposes available for al the world. This right of access to nuclear technology was reaffirmed in art 4 of the NPT.# It is this article which forms the basisof all claims by Iran and other NPT signatories that they have an inalienable r

ight to full access to all nuclear technology for peaceful ends and therefore tothe full nuclear fuel cycle.

The IAEA # consists of the technical inspection organisation based in Vienna, which is steered by a political body, the Board of Governors.

This board is given its mandate by the General Conference of all (139 as of November 2005) member states, which meets annually in September. The Board generallymeets five times per year - in March and June, twice in September (before and after the General Conference) and in December. It can also be convened for special meetings, such as on 3 Feb 2006 concerning Iran. It has a mandate to refer members to the Security Council, on the basis of reports made by the technical staff. These reports, which deal with possible violations of the inspection protocols signed by members, are usually presented by the director, at the present timeDr. ElBaradei. In the case of Iran a number of reports have been presented from2003 onwards which have raised a number of questions concerning Irans nuclear program. It is noteworthy that the Iran issue has been taken further than that ofSouth Korea, Egypt or Brazil. All these countries have had similar questions raised on their nuclear programmes. Although the technical body provides the reports, based on the work of its inspectors, it is the political body- the Board - which decides whether to make an issue of such a report, to put it on the agenda and to keep it there or refer it to the UN Security Council. These are politicaldecisions formally made on technical grounds but in practice influenced by political lobbying. This is illustrated by the recent demands made in the resolutionpassed by the board on 4 Feb 2006, when it called on Iran to:

- re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing


12/53

activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;

reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;

and

implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in

GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement

and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to

procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and

development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations;#

These demands in fact contradict Art 4 of the NPT (see above).

The present membership consists of 35 member states, as designated and electedby the General Conference:

Member States represented on the IAEA Board for 2005-2006 are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Libya, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, and Yemen.#


13/53

THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

HISTORICAL NOTE

1960 1968 Birth of the Iran Nuclear Programme with Foreign Assistance

Irans activities related to developing a nuclear programme started as early as th

e 1960s, during a period when the USA was a close ally to the Iranian regime under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi#. It was during this period and within the Atoms for Peace Approach# that the US first offered research facilities and nuclear know-how to Iran, in exchange for a commitment not to use it in pursuit of military objectives.# In July 1968, Iran signed the NPT almost simultaneously with Egypt,Iraq, Jordan, Libya and Syria. Two years later, in February 1970, the Treaty wasofficially ratified by the majlis (Iranian parliament) and went into force.#

1970s Cold War and Oil Crises

In 1971, the British withdrew from east of Suez leaving a power vacuum in the Gulf region, which the US at that time was unable to fill due to their commitments

in Vietnam. An additional security commitment in this region was difficult. Theregional powers Iran and Iraq were competing intensively to fill the gap leftbehind by the British. Both states, further encouraged by high oil prices in theearly and mid-1970s, were seeking to buy larger scale nuclear facilities from Western suppliers with both civilian and potential military application.

The Israeli-Arab war in 1973 (the Yom Kippur or October war) boosted oil prices andled to an international oil crisis. The conflict as well as the crises gave incentives to both regional powers Iran and Iraq to further invest in the development of national nuclear technologies. In 1974, the Shah established the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI)#. In that year, also, Iran completed a full-scopesafeguards agreement with the IAEA which included a commitment to IAEA inspections on source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities w

ithin its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not divertedto nuclear weapons or other explosive devices#.

Throughout the early and mid 1970s, Iran continued to increase investment in nuclear research and technology and several contracts were signed with German and French companies. One was with the German Kraftwerk Union AG for a twin 1,300MWlight-water reactor and another with the French Framatome for twin 900MW light-water reactors. Whilst those projects were underway, Iran signed a letter of intent to buy six French reactors and four German, which would have added up to 22 reactors with the capacity of generating 23.000 MW electrical power. #

While such contracts meant lucrative business for Western companies, it did raise some concerns in Washington, about possible longer-term nuclear weapons ambitions, even though Iran abided by its commitment under the NPT. # More generally, USconcern about nuclear proliferation was further fuelled by Indias nuclear test in May 1975, as well as the start of the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.

This marked a shift in US policy, away from support for the Iranian nuclear programme. The Ford Administration decided in April 1975 to retain veto rights overany Iranian decision to reprocess US-origin nuclear fuel, but also encouraged Iran in developing a multinational reprocessing facility with US assistance.#

The Carter administration continued this policy from 1977 onwards and took an ev

en more reserved stand on nuclear cooperation with Iran and urged it to sign more comprehensive IAEA safeguards. In view of the risk of nuclear proliferation, the US prevailed on its European allies to limit the export of nuclear fuel facil


14/53

ities to both Iran and Iraq.# It made an effort to persuade France and Germany to stop their provision of nuclear assistance to Iran and other countries such asPakistan, Brazil, Iraq.

However, there has never been proof that the Iranian nuclear programme under theShah was intended to develop military capacities. Even though Iranian scientists were conducting research into technologies for fissile material production, su

ch as reprocessing and laser enrichment, this effort hardly got off the ground.In fact, the Shah depended on the alliance with the US as a sufficient guarantorfor Irans national security. In 1974 he stated: The present world is confrontedwith a problem of some countries possessing nuclear weapons, so the friendship of a country such as the United States with its arsenal of nuclear weapons is absolutely vital#

1979-1989 The Post-Revolution Downscaling Period

The Iranian revolution in 1979 led to a downscaling of Irans engagement in nuclear research activities and investment in technology. This was not only due to many Western trained scientists leaving the country and thus creating a kind of brai

n drain situation for the nuclear programme. The Iranian supreme leader AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini himself gave a low priority to further development of the nuclear programme, which he considered to be a Western-driven innovation. He was alsoopposed to the programme on theological grounds. And with the Iranian nationaldebt increasing after the revolution, the nuclear programme was soon left with few resources. Within a few months, the newly formed Islamic Republic cancelled its contracts with Framatome for two new reactors, and entered into a financial dispute with the German KWU for the construction of civil reactors in Bushehr.

The development of the nuclear programme was further hampered by Western countries becoming increasingly reluctant to cooperate with Iran. Not least because ofa US campaign under the Reagan administration aimed at imposing an internationalembargo on all forms of peaceful nuclear cooperation with Iran, on the ground th

at Iran would misuse its nuclear technology for military purposes#.

Iran continued with activities for peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the1980s and decided in 1983 to renew its activities in nuclear research. Most importantly, according to Irans later declarations to the IAEA#, it started researchinto uranium enrichment centrifuge technology in 1985, acquiring key design technology and sample centrifuge components from the A.Q. Khan network (Pakistan) in 1987.# However, the research activity was small-scale and hampered by many technical problems and failures and made little overall progress.# Although the activities were not declared to the IAEA, these first steps in the nuclear program were a long way from anything resembling a military nuclear program.#

1990 2002 The Rebirth of the Nuclear Programme

After the death of Irans Supreme Leader Khomeini in 1989 , the new leadership around President Rafsanjani and new Supreme Leader Khamenei started initiatives to revive the nuclear research and civilian programme in Iran. Instead of relying onWestern imports, Iran turned to Russia and China to obtain nuclear assistance in key areas which include uranium mining, milling and conversion#, as well as technology for heavy water production (heavy water is an essential component of the reactor type which produces plutonium as a by-product. This makes it particularly suitable as part of a nuclear weapons program) and heavy water research reactors. Irans re-investment in its nuclear programme and nuclear capabilities may w

ell have been fostered by revelations that Iraq had been able to conceal its ownnuclear weapon programme, and also because of the growing presence of the US inthe region (on perceived threats from an Iranian perspective see also chapter I


15/53

V). However, authoritative sources, Hosuch as the British IISS, take the position that the Iranian efforts did not constitute the pursuit of a dedicated nuclearweapons programme#. It was simply the beginning of a long-term effort to developcivilian technology to the point where it could be used to support a nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile US concerns about such a potential Iranian program grewand led to an increasing number of accusations against Iran.# Many other countries, including France, Germany and Britain, thought the American concerns were ex

aggerated and driven by political hostilities between both countries and calledfor a more constructive approach. Iran, in order to counter such accusations, allowed the IAEA to conduct voluntary visits to several facilities the IAEA foundno evidence of non-peaceful nuclear activities.#

The election of the reformist President Mohammed Khatami in 1997 did not changeIrans nuclear development policy, which remained under the control of the SupremeNational Security Council headed by Supreme Leader Khamenei. Whilst China had been the most cooperative in providing Iran with nuclear technology between 1991-1997, this support disappeared when several programmes were curtailed, mainly dueto US pressure. The final blow came in 1997, when China reached an agreement with the USA to halt nuclear cooperation with Iran, followed by the official appro

val by the US government for its own nuclear industry to export nuclear technology to China. Some exports were exempted from this agreement and some assistancecontinued.

Russia was another source of nuclear assistance for Iran, increasing in the period 1992-1995 when it offered to supply a full civilian fuel cycle. When the US learned of these developments, they put pressure on Russian President Boris Yeltsin to halt such assistance. This ban was not entirely followed through, though,until Putin took office and introduced a more restrictive regime.

In 1995, Iran moved its research programme from AEOI headquarters in Teheran toa location in one of the suburbs: the Kalaye Electric Company (a workshop ownedby AEOI). This later gave rise to suspicions that the change of location was a r

eaction to IAEA inspections. When the initial research into uranium enrichment proved successful#, Iran started the construction of centrifuge facilities in Natanz around the year 2000 and two years later moved the centrifuge research programme there. The pilot plant was configured for the production of low-enriched uranium, not weapons grader highly enriched uranium. (for further details see Chapter III).

When the existence of the Natanz facility was finally revealed on 14 August 2002during a news conference of the Iranian exile opposition group INCRI (closely affiliated with the MEK, an Iraq based militant group defined as terrorist by theUS State Department)#, this gave rise to serious questions about Irans claim that its program was for peaceful purposes only. This certainly provided proof of Irans interest in developing the technology for a complete nuclear fuel cycle.

According to the safeguard agreements Iran was not required to declare the facilities at Natanz until 180 days before material was to be introduced to the facility.# However, before the revelations government officials had at least given the impression to the IAEA that they were not constructing enrichment facilities,by stating that uranium hexafloride (Chapter III) produced by the Esfahan conversion plant, would be exported.#.

Nevertheless, under the NPT Iran is entitled to this technology, provided it issubjected to IAEA safeguards to control its peaceful application. Iran explainedits deception by stating that it had no choice but to conceal their enrichmentprogramme in order to avoid international pressure and American interdiction eff

orts#.


16/53

III. STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Introduction

As described in chapter I there is a large degree of overlap between a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes and one for the production of a nuclear weapon. This chapter will not deal with political intentions (see Chapters IV-VI), but re

strict itself to a short description of the various parts of the Iranian nuclearprogram, as described in open sources, as well as taking a look at the other components of a functional weapons programme. For each component Irans compliance with its IAEA obligations will be examined.

A. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The infrastructure required to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes or anuclear weapon consists of a number of stages of production: the process is complicated by the fact that certain products of this production cycle are separated from the product and recycled. Many of the dual-use aspects are connected withthe raw materials used and the recycling. Therefore much of the investigation o

f the Iranian programme has been concerned with investigating the nature of materials used in the programme and the way they are used.

The nuclear fuel cycles basically consists of the production of enriched uraniumand/or plutonium, both of which can potentially be used to produce a bomb.# Thequantities of material, which can be produced at each stage, are of decisive importance for the possibility of making a bomb. Therefore a large part of the IAEA investigative process and rules are concerned not only with the presence or absence of certain key materials, but also their quantity.

Conversion

The uranium needed in the production process is extracted from uranium ore throu

gh a process of conversion. In the first stage the ore is converted into yellowcake. This is then converted into Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) the basic feed for the next stage.

2. Enrichment

The feed contains two uranium isotopes, U238 and U235. Only the latter is suitable for the programme, the problem is that the UF6 feed only contains 0.7%. Thispercentage has to be increased drastically. For this there are a number of enrichment processes, using different types of technology (laser enrichment, gas centrifuge)

The fissionable product of enrichment can either be used as fuel or as bomb making material. The latter is only possible with a high degree (93 %) of enrichment.

3. Reprocessing

A chemical process for extracting plutonium and uranium from spent nuclear fuel.Tons of fuel are needed to provide sufficient quantities of plutonium to make abomb.

4. Fuel or bomb

The enriched uranium can then be used in nuclear reactors. Certain types of reac

tor will produce a by-product, plutonium, suitable for making a bomb.

The Iranian program


17/53

Conversion

The first stage mining and milling facilities at Saghand and Gchine will, when,operational, produce yellowcake from the uranium ore. This in turn must be converted to Uranium Hexafluoride. A number of experiments testing this have been carried out at Esfahan in a fuel manufacturing plant. This took place during part

of the period of the EU3-Iran agreement (Oct 2003 Aug 2005) and was part of thecontroversy between the EU3 and Iran. When in operation the plant will produce the UF6 feed, which could be used in the Bushehr light water reactor (see below).The actual quantities produced (6 tons a month) were well below the necessary design capacity of Bushehr of 20 tons a month. Furthermore, it was seen as beingtoo impure for use in the next stage of the cycle, enrichment with ultra centrifuge technology# .After the EU Iran negotiations broke down Iran resumed conversion activities from 16 Nov 2005. The documents from the stolen laptop (see below under B) also mention design drawings for an extra uranium conversion facility for producing green salt an intermediate product in the conversion process.#

Compliance

These processes were not in violation of the safeguards protocol that Iran had signed. According to the update brief by the IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards until 310106: Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act as if the Additional Protocolis in force, including by providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and access to locations.#

In the last report (GOV/2006/15 Date: 27 February 2006) the Agency stated:

53. As indicated to the Board in November 2004, and again in September 2005, allthe declarednuclear material in Iran has been accounted for. Although the Agency has not see

n any diversion ofnuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Agency is not at this pointin time in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materialsor activities in Iran. The process of drawing such a conclusion, under normal circumstances, is a time consuming processeven with an Additional Protocol in force. In the case of Iran, this conclusioncan be expected to takeeven longer in light of the undeclared nature of Irans past nuclear programme, and in particularbecause of the inadequacy of information available on its centrifuge enrichmentprogramme, theexistence of a generic document related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, and the lackof clarification about the role of the military in Irans nuclear programme, including, as mentionedabove, about recent information available to the Agency concerning alleged weapon studies that couldinvolve nuclear material.#

Enrichment

This is regarded as the most significant part of Irans nuclear infrastructure. Anenrichment plant at Natanz has been partially built. The Iranian planners haveexperimented with two types of enrichment but apparently settled on one, using

centrifuge technology. This consists of operating thousands of ultracentrifugesset up in such a configuration that the UH6 feed is enriched in stages to the level required. This level is roughly 5 % for a nuclear reactor (Low Enriched Uran


18/53

ium - LEU) and 93% for a nuclear bomb (Highly Enriched Uranium - HEU). In orderto produce sufficient quantities of enriched uranium the centrifuges have to beset up in a certain configuration ensuring that as little of the feed as possible is wasted. These cascades can involve the use of hundreds or even thousand of centrifuges. In order to allow optimum operation of this plant, a period of experimentation is needed in a pilot project. In Natanz a pilot plant consisting of 164 centrifuges has been completed. The plan is to expand this to 1000 centrifuges

. This would take a few years in itself. # Ultimately an industrial plant wouldcontain 50.000 centrifuges. This would only be enough to supply one nuclear plant with sufficient LEU, a fraction of the 350.000 centrifuges needed for the nuclear energy program which Iran plans to develop.#

The IISS study, which agrees with published intelligence agency estimates #, calculates that a period of 2 years is required simply to make the pilot plant runefficiently. After that a variable time period would be needed to produce enoughHEU for a bomb, depending on which production configuration is chosen (the number of centrifuges used and the feed loss rate accepted. It concludes that this production stage operating 1000 centrifuges would need between 2 years/8 months to 3 years/8 months to produce 25 kgs of HEU (sufficient for one bomb). Hence the

total production time would be between 4 and 5 years, depending on the basic production assumptions. This estimate assumes the following:

a political decision to produce a bomb

hardly any delays in development and testing of the production facility

No outside interference like IAEA inspections#

- existence of an institutionalised bomb-making programme

The estimate of the US intelligence community of 5-10 years is probably based on

a more realistic appreciation of the problems the Iranian scientists and technicians will run into.# In March 2006 ISIS provided yet another analysis, estimating 3-6 years, making similar assumptions to those noted above.#

Compliance: According to the IAEA inspection protocol Iran had ratified it was obliged to report the existence of the Natanz facility 180 days before it startedoperating. It actually acknowledged the existence of the facility on 9 Feb 2003, after earlier publications in the Western media based on reports by an Iranianexile organisation.#. Regarding the enrichment plant Iran was therefore in compliance. However a number of enrichment related activities over an earlier periodof about 15 years were not reported. Many of the problems reported by IAEA inspectors concern these problems. Some have been solved, others are disputed, and yet others remain unresolved. The most serious enrichment related questions concern the possible delivery of a more advanced type of centrifuge to Iran by the Khan network (referred to in the IAEA reports as intermediaries.# Director ElBaradeistated in a recent interview quoted in the Washington Post that Iran is not an imminent threat, ()To develop a nuclear weapon, you need a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and no one has seen that in Iran.#

Reprocessing

This involves the extraction of plutonium and uranium from spent reactor fuel. Iran has experimented with reprocessing but has no reprocessing plant. Furthermore, the spent fuel would have to come either from the Bushehr light water reactor, which has almost been completed, or the planned Arak heavy water research reac

tor. The Bushehr reactor (for the generation of electricity) has been built butnot quite completed by a Russian firm under very stringent non-proliferation conditions. These entail that the fuel for the reactor is delivered by Russia and t


19/53

hat the spent fuel is to be removed to Russia. It would be very difficult to secretly divert the fuel #. That is, it will not be possible to use it in a reprocessing plant, should one be built at some future date. The Arak reactor (for theproduction of industrial and medical isotopes#) is in the first stages of production and is scheduled for completion in 2014.

Compliance: According to the IAEA there has been no reprocessing beyond laborato

ry level experimentation. The amounts of plutonium separated were too small to support a nuclear weapons programme #

Diversion of nuclear materials for weaponisation

As described above it would be very difficult and time-consuming for the Iranians to build a bomb, assuming they would want to. If we follow the IISS logic thenin about 4-5 years sufficient fissile material might be available for making one nuclear device with an explosive force of 20 kilotons (the Hiroshima bomb hadan explosive yield of 15 kiloton, i.e. the equivalent of 15.000 tons of TNT).

Two kinds of bomb could conceivably be built:

- A gun type using 60-75 kg of HEU or

- An implosion type using 20-25 kg of HEU or 6-8 kg of plutonium.#

There is no proof that such a bomb construction program has been initiated. There was a reference by Dr. ElBaradei in November 2005# to a document made available by Iran to IAEA inspectors, in which the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium into hemispherical forms was mentioned. Mr Heinonen inhis 310106 report #, added that the document did not include dimensions or otherspecifications for machined pieces for such components. The implication is thatthis document was not connected to an actual building program, which is also the position of the Iranian government.

B. Delivery Systems

A nuclear bomb needs a method of delivery. Conceivably it could be hidden as cargo aboard some civilian means of transport or alternatively, the bomb componentscan be transported to the target and reassembled there. More conventionally anaircraft or missile can be used. According to IISS the Iranian armed forces deploy around 50 Shahab III missiles with a range of 1500 kms. as well as hundredsof missiles with a more limited range. The IISS report describes the Shahab IIIas a liquid-fuelled ballistic missile, capable of carrying a 760-1000 kg warhead. The question is whether it would be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead (asopposed to a conventional explosive warhead) and whether such a warhead is beingworked on. According to evidence presented to IAEA officials by the US intelligence services work has indeed been done on a re-entry vehicle.# Such a vehicleis designed to protect the payload of a missile once it re-enters the atmosphere. This payload could be a satellite or conventional warhead, not necessarily a nuclear warhead.# Furthermore, development of a nuclear warhead entails the solution of a large number of technical problems like: warhead protection against high temperatures on re entry, warhead separation, warhead arming, guidance to target etc.

Compliance: The drawings from the stolen laptop in themselves concern re-entry vehicles, which a regular space program (satellites) or conventional warhead wouldalso need. Formally there is no question of compliance because the IAEA mandatedoes not cover nuclear weapons or delivery systems, (only the diversion of nucle

ar material for weapons purposes, as covered under A above). However the sourceof this evidence is highly suspect: it was apparently obtained by US intelligence from a laptop computer stolen by an Iranian citizen in 2004.#


20/53

C. Infrastructure

A nuclear weapons programme, as distinct from a nuclear energy programme, requires an integrated infrastructure to develop an operational nuclear weapon, certainly if the aim is to create a deterrent force consisting of a nuclear command structure, delivery systems, and some kind of maintenance system. The programme th

erefore must have an administrative structure that not only develops and build abomb, but also cooperates closely with the military structure, which will deploy the weapons. In short a civil-military structure in which the cooperation between the armed forces and the scientists and engineers is regulated needs to be created.# Furthermore, the policymakers must coordinate and lead the programme, there has to be a budget and the security services would be heavily involved because of the obvious need for secrecy. Such a programme would be difficult to hide. None of the public reports on the Iran nuclear program suggest that there is acoordinated bomb development program. #


21/53

IV. GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

Geographically Iran is located between Iraq and Afghanistan, stretching from theCaspian sea down to the Gulf. Iran is one of the world richest countries in natural oil resources, which makes the Islamic republic a crucial player in the regional power game where much is at stake. Historically, Iraq has been Irans main competitor over power and influence the Gulf. However, after the last Gulf war, I

raq has itself become a source of instability since its newly elected, fragile government has to deal with a large scale insurgency and a continued presence onits territory of a large US-led military force. It still has to prove itself capable of governing and solving all the problems it inherited from the 2003 war.This makes Iran the key player in the region, while it is at the same time under increasing external pressure, making its national security a priority.

Ideologically hostile to Israel but culturally uncomfortable# with the Arab world,it has no true ally in the region but many potential adversaries. Iran is now surrounded by countries whose governments are sympathetic to the USA and/or hostlarge US military forces. There are more than 130,000 US troops based in neighbouring countries, and the weak but US-friendly government in Afghanistan also ha

s a substantial US troop presence# American air and naval units are also stationed at numerous bases in the region. For example, there is a constant, large US task force including aircraft carriers, escorts, as well as missile launching submarines and surface units permanently present in the Persian Gulf. Powerful US air units are based in several Gulf and Central Asian States#. Such a large-scalemilitary presence by the forces of a country whose government has condemned Iran as one of the three members of the axis of evil gives that country good cause for grave security concerns. This is all the more so given the fact that massive military force was recently used twice against Iraq, within a decade. Historically, the Anglo-American interference in Irans internal political affairs which resulted in the 1953 coup detat against Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Mossadeq, provideslittle incentive for the current Iranian regime to trust Western policy makers.#Iran itself has sufficient military capacity to dominate and intimidate its Gulf

neighbours, making them wary and suspicious. However, it does not possess enough military capacity to deter such powerful adversaries as the US and Israel. Allthese factors explain why Iran sees itself encircled and under threat #.

Other Perceived Threats to National Security: Turkey, Pakistan and Israel

Neighbouring Turkey is a NATO member state and a military, economic and political competitor. On its eastern borders, Teheran is worried about radical Sunni militant groups who are seeking support from Pakistan, a country with nuclear military capacities. But the main sources of insecurity is the immense conventional military capacity of Israel, which is also the only state in the Middle East which deploys nuclear weapons, with some estimated 200 nuclear warheads at its disposal.# Even before the recent Iranian threats directed at the existence of Israel, officials of that country often made public threats against Iran by suggestingthat air strikes against its nuclear infrastructure are possible, similar to the one undertaken in 1981 against Saddam Husseins Osirak reactor.#

Many Iranian analysts and government officials cite Israel and the U.S. as the biggest threat to Irans national security, according to a series of interviews conducted by the ICG, reported in March 2003.#

The experiences of the eight year war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, in which Iransuffered massive casualties to heavy artillery and chemical attacks, left thecountry defeated and scarred. Iran was a victim of Iraqs aggression under SaddamHussein, while Western states continued to sell weapons and other material to Ir

aq throughout the conflict.# The Iranian war effort was hampered by the tight USsanctions# and open military intervention by the US on the side of Iraq. Iran gained little from the later crushing defeat of Iraq by the US and its allies in


22/53

1991 and 2003. Twice within a decade the US army demonstrated that it could destroy a large field army, reminding Iran that its own conventional forces offer little protection in a conventional war.# It is therefore not very surprising thatIran feels vulnerable in the absence of any effective deterrence against powerful opponents like the USA and Israel.

It is important when looking at Iranian policies to take into account its nation

al security concerns. It would be by no means surprising if Iranian politiciansand military planners were keeping open the possibility of developing a nuclearmilitary option at some point in the future, given American foreign policy. Thishistoric and geopolitical context is relevant; the debate should not be reducedto a simple matter of the regimes ideological inclinations. This also raises other important questions, concerning the double standards in the interpretation ofthe Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the nuclear weapons states and their allies. After all, they have essentially dropped the art VI commitments to nuclear disarmament in the treaty (for more details see Chapter I). Furthermore it can beseriously questioned whether the EU3 took on the legitimate demand of Iran forguarantees regarding its national security during the negotiations process, which started in 2003 and broke down in February 2006.

International Interest in Irans Oil and Natural Gas Reserves

As was outlined above, the US has for many decades had a key strategic interestin the entire Gulf region. Control over the Iranian oil and reserves# and accessto them are key factors in explaining US policy on Iran. The American response to the nuclear programme is a part of the overall policy.

A global oil crisis would have an enormous negative effect on the US economy, which currently consumes some 25% of global oil production. Low oil prices are a guarantor for the American Way of Life. Therefore the US (and any US administration) is interested in keeping the oil price low. This is why securing access to large oil reserves (such as in Iraq and elsewhere) and bringing it under greater co

ntrol, is a key part of US foreign policy.# Nevertheless the Bush administrationhas at no point mentioned oil as a reason for embarking on its confrontation course with Iran. Just as in the case of Iraq, the overt rationale refers only toweapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a principal justification for possible military intervention. Bush stated in 2003, We will not tolerate the construction ofa nuclear weapon [by Iran]. The same justification was used in Iraq, although WMDwere never found, and should raise concerns over the validity of the argument used in Iran. Therefore a serious analysis needs to investigate the influence ofoil and wider geopolitical interests of the US and other industrialised statesin the region.

It is difficult to estimate exactly how much weight the oil interest carries within the Bush administrations decision-making process. But it is reasonable, especially after all the evidence revealed about the decision-making process leadingup to the Iraqi war, to assume that many factors and not just Irans nuclear programme and its potential use for military purposes account for the repeated American threats.

Iran lies on the north side of the Persian Gulf, which means that, if it were toso choose, it is in a strategically suitable position to threaten the oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates, which togetherproduce half of the worlds known oil reserves. Furthermore, Iran dominates the narrow Straits of Hormuz, through which some 40 percent of the worlds oil exports are transported daily by oil tankers.# Iran is still capable of increasing its annual output in natural gas and oil significantly# which makes it even more impor

tant as producer the coming 20 years, when global demand is expected to rise bysome 50 percent. That is due to significantly higher consumption, particularlyin the United States, India and China.#


23/53

China, India and Japan are becoming increasingly dependent on the import of Iranian oil and especially its natural gas reserves.# This gives Iran extra leverageon the global energy household, which is not just important for the US.

China, which has a fast developing national economy, will need a lot more natural gas and oil in future, and is paying particular attention to Iran. In October

2003, China signed a US$100 billion 25 year contract with Sinopec (a major Chinese oil company), # to cooperate in the development of one of Irans major gas fields and the subsequent delivery of liquid natural gas (LNG) to China. This will constitute a very important strategic linkage between the two countries.

India is also interested in Iran as a future supplier for their increasing oil and natural gas demands. In January 2005, the Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL)signed a 30 year contract with the National Iranian Gas Export Corp. for 7.5 million tons of LNG to India per year. The deal is worth some US$ 50 billion and also involves India in the development of natural gas fields in Iran.#

Even more important are ongoing discussions with Indian and Pakistani officials

on a natural gas pipeline stretching from Iran via Pakistan to India (costing US$ 3 billion). (An extraordinary step, considering the historic animosity betweenthe two states parties). In case this project is realised, the pipeline would provide the two with substantial natural gas supplies and Pakistan with about US$200-300 million transit fees. The pipeline is considered a win-win situation for all the parties involved.#

However, despite the pipelines obvious advantages (also as an incentive for reconciliatory measures between the two nuclear powers India and Pakistan), Condoleezza Rice condemned this project during her trip to India in 2005. The Bush administration remained unwilling to approve of in this case any project which couldbe economically beneficial to the Islamic Republic of Iran.# But India has not stopped the realisation of the pipeline project to this day.

Japan has also forged new ties with Iran. In early 2003, three Japanese companies have bought a 20% interest in the development of the off-shore fields in the Persian Gulf, believed to amount to 1 billion barrels of oil. Only a year later,an Iranian company awarded a US$ 1.26 billion contract to the Japanese JGC Corporation for the recovery of natural gas from Sroush-Nowruz and other off-shore fields.#

All these facts explain the growing importance of Iran in the global energy market, but it also helps to understand the concerns of the US administration regarding an Iranian regime which it considers hostile towards the US. The US has two strategic aims. First it would like to see American companies and firms benefitingfrom the large oil and natural gas reserves in Iran. Currently this is impossible as long as the US continues its sanctions policy towards the Islamic Republicof Iran# and can be expected to continue as long as there is no regime change in Iran, which is itself hostile to the US. Furthermore, the ban on US engagementin Iranian energy production and export is shifting Teherans focus to other nations. From the Bush administrations perspective, regime change in Iran would be the best possible solution out of this dilemma.# There is a possibility of a historic compromise between the US and Iran, because of shared interests (as in Iraq).However, there are no signs of such a policy change.

Even with stepped up efforts by the US, regime change fomented from the outsideis not very likely. There have been few signs of unrest directed at the regime since the student-led protests in summer 2003. Students groups lack the level oforganisation to pose a serious challenge to the regime. During the last year the

re has been significant unrest in parts of Iran, but not to the degree that it endangers the regime. Exile opposition groups lack a widespread and popular support base in Iran and high oil prices have provided a sufficient cushion for the


24/53

Iranian neo-conservative regime. As the ICG report states in 2004, For reformiststhe lessons is clear: years of US pressure and containment have done little tomodify the regimes behaviour, let alone bring its downfall.# Such conclusions arepaving the way for US military attacks on Iran.

There is growing evidence that the Bush administration has not only incentives but also plans in place for potential air strikes against Iranian nuclear sites.

Seymor Hersh, a distinguished investigative US journalist, revealed such intentions first in the New Yorker in January 2005. Interviewed by Der Spiegel in April 2005 #, he said that the hawks in the Bush administration are convinced that the EU3talks with Iran will fail and then such plans will be realised. Wir reden hier nicht ueber irgendwelche Positionspapiere des Nationalen Sicherheitsrats. Ueber diese Huerden sind wir laengst hinweg. Es geht nicht mehr darum ob sie [Bush administration, sic.] irgend etwas gegen Iran unternehmen. Sie werden es tun. (Hersh,quoted in Der Spiegel, April 2005).

Other American officials# made statements that Washington would like to see Iranreferred to the UN Security Council with the aim of having a resolution passesthat would oblige Iran to allow unlimited IAEA inspections to all its nuclear as

well as military sites without previous notice. Such an outcome would almost certainly be rejected by Iran on the grounds that it would constitute an attack onits national sovereignty. However, it would provide the US with sufficient legitimacy - with or without the UNs approval - to pursue its military plans againstIran.#

The government of Iran is well aware of such intentions and certainly does not underestimate the threats emanating from the current US administration. Teheran for its part is taking steps to counter any possible attack by the US. It is threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz and to obstruct oil shipping in the area.An attack on Iran will be tantamount to endangering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and, in a word, the entire Middle East oil, Iranian Expediency Council secretary MohsenRezai said on 1 March 2005.#

Iran and the Arab States The View from the Neighbours

The Arab States of the Persian Gulf have a long history of foreign forces influencing their regional power balance. As mentioned above, there is a powerful US military presence in the region. There is also Israel with its own military capacity including nuclear weapons.# A nuclear armed Iran would change the regional power balance and Arab states have several choices in reacting to such a new situation, if it arises. They could assume Iran poses no threat to their national security and regard it as a counter-balance to Israel, or they could try to seek shelter under the nuclear umbrella of another nuclear power. Alternatively they could themselves seek nuclear arms or attempt to create a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. An important consideration is that the Sunni governments of the neighbouring states very much fear increased influence by the Iranian Shiite government, especially if this is further strengthened by an Iraqi administration heavily influenced by Shiite forces.

Hence the recent militant language used by the Iranian president#, even if directed at Israel, has a destabilising effect in the region. When a head of state makes such statements, there is always a degree of uncertainty regarding the political aims of the state concerned (and the way the other state will react) . Theyare in and of themselves a dangerously polarising factor.

Gulf Cooperation Council - GCC

In 1981 the Gulf Cooperation Council# (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman) was formed as a means of self-protection against Iran and Iraq. Although protection from attack might have been the impetus, GCC lea


25/53

ders have used the organisation primarily as a sounding board for regional security issues and cooperation on economic policy. Along with many other regional states (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Israel) the members started actively expanding their armed forces during the 1980s. However, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the conceptof self-protection was shattered. The invasion was accompanied by a large-scaleincrease of the US military presence in the region. For a while the governmentssought only the protection of the US for their oil fields, their regimes and aga

inst hegemonic threats made by Iran and Iraq. #

However, 15 years after Iraqs invasion of Kuwait, the GCC states are showing a preference to return to the former - for them more comfortable - policy of power balance, at the same time keeping the US distant and developing a de facto partnership with Iran. Hence GCC states have welcomed all signs of moderation in Iran.

During the GCC summit in December 2005, the leaders of the member states calledfor a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The summit called also on Israel to adhere to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to open all its nuclear installations for international inspection.# The call for a nuclear weaponfree Middle East is in principle supported by the GCC member states, as it is by

consistent majorities of the United Nations General Assembly. Numerous resolutions calling for such a NWFZ have been passed by the GA during the last few years.#

Such an NWFZ would fit into a logical process in which such zones cover an increasing part of the world.# In the Middle East there is the specific problem of the Israeli nuclear weapons. Israels official position accepts that such a NWFZ isa legitimate aim, but holds it to be impossible until all regional security issues are solved. The question is whether a road map towards a nuclear weapons free Middle East can include Israel and still be achieved. On the other hand, an NWFZwithout Israel would not have great legitimacy. At best it might be possible toengage into intermediate steps towards such a zone, possibly involving part ofthe states in the region. #


26/53

V. DECISION MAKING ON MATTERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN IRAN

As the diagrams in annex IV of the appendix indicate, the power structure of Iran is very fragmented and complex. This lack of transparency is even more apparent in the case of national security policy, because of its secret nature# Regarding a potential nuclear weapons programme, both the formal and informal powerstructures are relevant.

Formal military power structure

The most influential person with regard to the formal decisions about national security is Ali Khamenei. He is supreme commander of the armed forces, can decideto declare war or peace, is responsible for the general policy direction of therepublic and appoints the key military figures of the country #. Execution of the national security policy of Iran is officially centred in the national security council, which has the following functions:

1.To determine the national defence/security policies within the framework

of generalpolicies laid down by the Leader.

To coordinate political, intelligence, social, cultural and economic activities in relation to general defence/security policies.

To exploit material and non-material resources of the country for facing internal and external threats.

It has the following membership:

Heads of the three Powers (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary)Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces (SCCAF)

The official in charge of the Plan an Budget Organization (PBO)Two representatives nominated by the LeaderMinister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Infor

mation (Intelligence)A minister concerned with the subject, and the highest authorities of the Ar

my and the Islamic Revolution

s Guards Corps (IRGC). #

The secretary of the council functions as the public spokesperson and as chief negotiator in international disputes. Ahmadinejad decided to appoint Ali Larijanito this post, supported by Khamenei and considered a hardliner. His policy decisions especially need to be approved by the heads of the three powers and the supreme leader. Both the Revolutionary Guards and the regular army possess missiles and aircraft that could potentially be used as a delivery system for nuclear w

eapons (although there might be considerable problems with the development of effective delivery systems, see chapter III). The Revolutionary Guards have gainedinfluence in Iran in the past years, both politically (highlighted by the elect


27/53

ion of Ahmadinejad, a former Revolutionary Guard, as president) and militarily.The Revolutionary Guard leadership is among the most radical in the Iranian power structure #. Both the regular army and the Guard are led by Khamenei appointees. Another official institution which must not be underestimated with regard tonational security policy, is the Expediency Council, headed by Ali Rafsanjani.Khamenei upgraded the role of the Expediency Council after the victory of Ahmadinejad in 2005. Finally, the Majlis has the power to disapprove the defence budge

t, although it most likely lacks specific knowledge about the allocation of funds for military purposes.Informal power structure

The military part of a possible nuclear weapons programme is the most transparent. Iran uses its missile capability as a deterrent against aggression from otherstates, a policy that has the consent of the entire formal political spectrum (including the reformists)#. The aim of deterrence needs a degree of openness about weapon programs, of course without releasing too much specific information. As discussed earlier, the nuclear programme, either civilian or military, benefits from secrecy, especially in view of the tight American sanctions regime. Thismeans decision-making regarding acquisition of technology is not dealt with in t

he National Security Council, with its constantly changing membership #. There exists a clandestine and semi-clandestine network ranging from Europe to China, engaged in the provision of potential nuclear material to Iran. Although the identities of some of the non-Iranian players in this network have been revealed recently#, the directing forces in the Iranian regime remain unclear.One can make educated guesses about those forces, by looking for accumulations of resources and power which are relatively independent from the official stateinstitutions. Such an inquiry points at two persons: Rafsanjani and Khamenei. Rafsanjani is known to be one of the richest men in Iran and has been linked to paramilitary forces several times, most notably by dissident journalist Akbar Ganji #. Khamenei directly controls several Islamic foundations that collect the different religious taxes. This provides them with a huge amount of money. He alsocontrols a network of representatives throughout Iranian society that is relativ

ely unaccountable to public scrutiny#. Even before the death of Khomeini both men were seen as the most important Iranian leaders, in a period that the Iraniannuclear programme was expanded#. While both leaders supposedly have the finalsay in the nuclear programme and any decision to stop it, there might be a few insiders with more military expertise who advise them. Among them would be Revolutionary Guards commander Rezai and perhaps long-time secretary of the National Security Council Rowhani and the new NSC secretary, Ali Larijani #

VI. THE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

The 2002 revelations

The initiating event in the series of developments leading to the current crisis

was the public revelation of the Natanz enrichment facility and Iranian acknowledgement of this facility. The enrichment stage of the nuclear fuel cycle is ofparticular importance because of the technological difficulties that must be sur


28/53

mounted in order to set up a working plant and the long period required to produce sufficient enriched uranium to either make a bomb or run a nuclear reactor.

The Iranian government acknowledged the proof of the existence of the facility on 9 Feb 2003 and this was confirmed by an IAEA visit to this location and others in the course of that year. The report to the June Board meeting stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards agreement and a stat

ement was issued expressing concern.#

The Iranian acknowledgment set into motion a train of events, which can best beunderstood in the context of the international events described in chapter IV.Of primary importance was the US-UK led coalition war against Iraq in the springof 2003 on the grounds that it possessed weapons of mass destruction. This wasfurther legitimised in the US and UK by a fictional relationship between the Iraqi government and the 11/09 terrorist strikes against the US. There were no WMDand it was subsequently proven that the evidence had been largely invented, exaggerated or taken out of context.# Other motives had led to the attack.# The mostimmediate consequence for Iran was that one enemy (with which it had waged an eight-year war) was now removed from the scene but replaced by another, potential

ly far more powerful one: the US forces in the surrounding countries and at seain Iranian offshore waters. (see Ch IV).

In the same period, driven by fears of WMD attacks on western targets, there were substantial developments regarding counter proliferation policy primarily driven by a US- led alliance of mostly industrialised nations, as described in Ch IV. Some of those developments were the consequence of the EU counter-proliferation policy decided on in the autumn of 2003#. This reflected a shift in the direction of US policy and is a key to understanding the EU stance on Irans nuclear programme.

EU-Iran Negotiations

The US-led coalitions intervention war in Iraq in 2003 created a rift in the diplomatic relations between an important part of the EU (Old Europe) and the US. However, in the course of 2003 closer USEuropean cooperation was restored on the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This included an Iran policy based on the following elements:

Iran had to engage in a transparent and trust-building process;

Iran had to be in full compliance with the IAEA conditions and to sign the additional protocol

Iran was to be referred to the UN Security Council if it failed to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, unless IAEA inspections proved peaceful use

According to Lawrence Wilkerson, the former chief of staff to General Powell, the neo-conservatives faction in the US government successfully blocked direct negotiations with Teheran on its nuclear programme in May 2003.# Instead, that year the so-called EU-3 (France, United Kingdom and Germany the first two are themselves nuclear weapons states) engaged in negotiations with Iran. The aim wasto find alternative solutions to direct confrontation. On 21 October 2003, the Islamic Republic of Iran represented by Dr Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran. and the EU 3 Foreign Ministers announced that they would settle outstanding IAEA issues with regard to the Iranian nuclearprogramme# on the basis of the following points:

That Iran (our summary and italics):

affirms its nuclear programme is intended for peaceful usage only.


29/53

agrees to additional ( to the regular IAEA inspections). and voluntary inspections of its nuclear sites by the IAEA.

agrees to sign the Additional Protocol and until its ratification by the Parliament will start cooperation with IAEA.

even though it has the right to access to all nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the NPT, Iran decided voluntarily to suspend its uranium enrichment programme and reprocessing activities until the end of the negotiations.

The phrase which caused severe tension during the negotiations concerned Irans commitment to voluntary suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities (4th point). The EU 3 insisted on a broader definition of all enrichment related activities, as called for in the September 2003 IAEA board resolution# and this nearly led to a break-down of the talks in summer 2004. In the end compromises were sought by referring definitions (of uranium enrichment activities) to the IAEA.

In return for Irans suspension of enrichment activities the EU 3 stated (our summary and italics):

that they would recognize the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful usage of the nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT.

that the Additional Protocol was in no way intended to undermine sovereignty, national dignity or national security of States Parties.

that the full implementation of Irans decision, confirmed by the IAEA Director-General, should enable the immediate situation to be resolved by the IAEA board

that they believe that this will open the way to a dialogue for longer-term

cooperation, which will provide all parties with satisfactory assurances relating to Irans nuclear power generation programme. Once international concerns, including those of the three governments are fully resolved, Iran could expect easieraccess to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas.

co-operate with Iran to promote security and stability in the region, including the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations.#

The EU 3 made it clear, that for them satisfactory assurances referred to the permanent suspension of uranium enrichment activities.

On 23 October 2003, Iran took the first step to implement the agreement and madea full disclosure of previous unaccounted nuclear activities to the IAEA. It alsodeclared its centrifuge experiments at Kalaye

iran nuclear programme report

Documents