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NATOPublished under the authority of theSecretary General, this magazine isintended to contribute to a constructivediscussion of Atlantic issues. Articles,therefore, do not necessarily representofficial opinion or policy of membergovernments or NATO.

EDITOR: Christopher BennettASSISTANT EDITOR: Vicki NielsenPRODUCTION ASSISTANT: Felicity BreezeLAYOUT: NATO Graphics Studio

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FOCUS ON NATO

4Alliance news in brief.

THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TODAY

6Lasting liaisonSimon Serfaty places the transat-lantic relationship in its historicalcontext.

9Steady as she goesJames Dobbins sees continuity intransatlantic relations.

12Starting over againChristoph Bertram assessesEuropean concerns and expecta-tions at the change of tenant in theWhite House.

NATO review2 Spring 2001

DEBATE

15Is the fundamental nature of thetransatlantic security relationship changing?FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

VS ROB DE WIJK

Where is NATO headed? Whatimpact are ESDP, NMD and RMAhaving on the Alliance?

FEATURES

20Fresh faces at NATO

21CIMIC Reconstruction

INTERVIEW

22Andras Simonyi: Hungarian herald

contentsNATOreview

ON THE COVERColin Powell and Lord Robertsonface the media on Powell’s first visit toNATO as US Secretary of State on27 February.

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OPINION

24Great expectationsAndrei Zagorski examines the thawin NATO-Russia relations.

REVIEW

28Understanding NATOMichael Rühle reviews recentliterature on the Alliance.

MILITARY MATTERS

30Speeding deploymentElinor Sloan examines NATO forcemobility and deployability, as wellas the impact of programmes aimedat improving capabilities.

STATISTICS

34Defence spending

Spring 2001 NATO review 3

edito

rial Judging by readers’ letters, the new-look NATO Review

seems to have struck a chord. This issue contains severalmore innovations, including an interview feature and astatistics page. Otherwise, the central theme is the transat-lantic security relationship, the basis of the AtlanticAlliance, in the wake of the change of administration inthe United States. Simon Serfaty, director of WashingtonDC’s Center for Strategic and International Studies,places the transatlantic relationship in its historical con-text. Ambassador James Dobbins, assistant secretary ofstate for European affairs, tells in an interview how,despite the changeover, he expects continuity in this keyrelationship. And Christoph Bertram, director of theBerlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, assessesEuropean concerns and expectations. In the debate,François Heisbourg, director of Geneva’s Centre forSecurity Policy, and Rob de Wijk, professor of interna-tional relations at the Netherlands’ Royal MilitaryAcademy, explore the changing nature of the transatlanticsecurity relationship. Features include articles on NATO’sPartnership for Peace Internship Programme and civil-military cooperation in Kosovo. In the interview,Ambassador Andras Simonyi, Hungary’s first permanentrepresentative to NATO, talks of the impact of NATOmembership on his country. In the book review, MichaelRühle, the head of speech-writing and policy planning inNATO’s political affairs division, considers some of therecent literature on NATO. Elsewhere, Andrei Zagorski ofthe EastWest Institute analyses recent developments inNATO-Russia relations. And Elinor Sloan of theDirectorate of Strategic Analysis at Canada’s NationalDefence Headquarters examines NATO force mobilityand deployability. Statistics illustrating NATO’s defenceexpenditure round out the issue.

Christopher Bennett

Volume 49Spring 2001

The NATO 2000 CD-ROM helps usersfamiliarise themselves with the role andworkings of NATO. It charts the evolutionof the Alliance and describes the adaptationit has undergone to address the securitychallenges of the 21st century. Free copiesare available on request from theDistribution Unit,Office of Information and Press,NATO, 1110-Brussels, Belgium.

NATO Secretary General LordRobertson visited Skopje, the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* on26 March and met with PresidentBoris Trajkovski and leaders of thecountry’s political parties. LordRobertson reaffirmed support for thegovernment in its struggle with ethnicAlbanian rebels, but also urgedrestraint and appealed to the insur-gents to lay down their arms.

Lord Robertson set out NATO’s prior-ities in southeastern Europe in thekeynote speech of a conferenceexamining security challenges insoutheastern Europe and regionalperspectives in Rome, Italy, on 26March.

Lord Robertson unveiled a packageof measures on 21 March designed toenhance stability in the southernBalkans and demonstrate support forthe multi-ethnic government of theformer Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia.*

President of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross JakobKellenberger met with LordRobertson at NATO on 21 March andaddressed the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council.

Bosnia briefing

High Representative WolfgangPetritsch met Lord Robertson atNATO on 19 March and briefed ameeting of SFOR troop-contributingnations on the situation in Bosnia andHerzegovina (Bosnia).

On 14 March, Yugoslav troopsentered entered the Ground Safety

Zone, a five-kilometre strip of south-ern Serbia bordering Kosovo, for thefirst time since the Yugoslav Army’swithdrawal from Kosovo in June1999.

Lord Robertson visited Athens,Greece, on 16 March, meetingPresident ConstantinosStephanopoulos and Prime MinisterCostas Simitis, as well as the Greekforeign and defence ministers.

The situation in and around Kosovodominated talks between the NorthAtlantic Council and the EU Politicaland Security Committee in Brusselson 14 March.

Submarine rescue and medicalexperts from 13 NATO countries par-ticipated in Phoenix 2001, an exer-cise to rehearse procedures for deal-ing with submarines in distress, heldat the NATO headquarters atNorthwood, England, from 13 to 15March.

NATO mediators brokered a cease-fire between the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia and ethnic Albanians insouthern Serbia on 12 March.

US tripLord Robertson visited the UnitedStates from 6 to 10 March. He metUN Secretary-General Kofi Annanand attended an informal meeting ofthe UN Security Council before meet-ing US President George W. Bushand top officials in the new adminis-tration, as well as several senatorsand congressmen. He also addresseda symposium organised by theAmerican Enterprise Institute onCapitol Hill.

On 8 March, Lord Robertsonannounced measures to restore sta-bility in southern Serbia and the for-mer Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia* and prevent ethnicAlbanian extremists abusing theGround Safety Zone.

NATO and Russian parliamentariansmet at NATO on 5 and 6 March to dis-cuss political, military, scientific andenvironmental cooperation and theneed to reinforce dialogue.

Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanovdiscussed concerns over increasing

violence in the neighbouring formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia*with NATO Ambassadors on 5 Marchat NATO.

Exercise Cooperative Osprey 2001took place at Canada’s PearsonPeacekeeping Centre in Halifax, NovaScotia, involving six NATO and 13Partner countries from 1 to 9 March.

Newly appointed UN SpecialRepresentative Hans Haekkerup, theformer Danish defence minister, visit-ed NATO on 28 February to briefNATO Ambassadors on the situationin and around Kosovo.

Powell visit

US Secretary of State Colin Powellmet Lord Robertson and Allied for-eign ministers during a visit to NATOon 27 February. Secretary Powellstressed the new administration’ssupport for the development of aEuropean Security and DefenceIdentity and its commitment to con-sult Allies on plans for a NationalMissile Defense.

EU, OSCE, NATO, UN and UNHCRofficials met at NATO for the first timeon 27 February to discuss how toaddress the problems of increasingviolence along Kosovo’s boundaries.

Lord Robertson met PresidentVáclav Havel, Prime Minister MilosZeman, and the Czech foreign anddefence ministers on 21 and 22February in Prague, the CzechRepublic.

New command arrangementsIn line with new command arrange-ments unveiled last year, Allied

Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH),a regional headquarters based inNaples, Italy, took over day-to-daycommand of the Stabilisation Force(SFOR) from Supreme AlliedHeadquarters Europe (SHAPE) on 20February. The command of theKosovo Force (KFOR) transferred toAFSOUTH on 18 January.

Moscow office

Lord Robertson inaugurated theNATO Information Office in Moscowon 20 February, a visible sign ofimproving relations with Russia.

NATO parliamentarians discussedNATO’s current agenda with the North Atlantic Council on 19February.

New Hungarian ambassadorAmbassador János Herman suc-ceeded Ambassador Andras Simonyias permanent representative ofHungary to the North Atlantic Councilon 19 February. A career diplomat,Ambassador Herman, 48, was for-merly deputy state secretary for mul-tilateral affairs.

More than 1,500 people from sevenNATO nations trained in a disasterrelief exercise, Relieve Discomfort2001, on the Caribbean island ofCuraçao from 18 to 22 February.

Twelve NATO countries participatedin the world’s largest annual anti-sub-marine warfare exercise, Dogfish2001, which took place in the IonianSea east of Sicily, Italy from 15 to 28February.


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Serbian Deputy Prime MinisterNebojsa Covic and Yugoslav ForeignMinister Goran Svilanovic met LordRobertson and NATO Ambassadorson 15 February at NATO to discussproposals to resolve tensions insouthern Serbia.

NATO’s annual crisis managementexercise, CMX 2001, took place from15 to 19 February at NATO, involvingPartner countries for the first time.

Implementation of the treaty onConventional Armed Forces inEurope was discussed by its 30 signatory countries at the NATO Verification CoordinatingCommittee’s annual seminar from14 to 16 February at NATO.

Newly appointed UN HighCommissioner for Refugees RuudLubbers met Lord Robertson atNATO on 6 February.

The first meeting of the EU Politicaland Security Committee and theNorth Atlantic Council under newpermanent EU-NATO consultationarrangements took place on 5February in Brussels, Belgium.

Lord Robertson outlined key itemson NATO’s agenda at the annualInternational Security PolicyConference held in Munich,Germany, from 2 to 3 February,where he also met new US Secretaryof Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

Lord Robertson met Prime MinisterJens Stoltenberg and Norwegianforeign and defence ministers on 1 and 2 February in Oslo , Norway.

On 2 February, NATO’s highest mili-tary authority, the MilitaryCommittee, visited Northwood,England, the headquarters of boththe regional Allied East Atlanticcommand (EASTLANT) and theAllied Naval Forces North(NAVNORTH).

Lithuanian Prime Minister RolandasPaksas met Lord Robertson at NATOon 31 January to discuss relationswith Russia, peacekeeping in theBalkans and Lithuania’s preparationsfor NATO membership.

Kouchner Farewell

Marking the end of 18 months inoffice, former UN SpecialRepresentative to Kosovo BernardKouchner addressed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council andrepresentatives of other KFOR con-tributing countries on 30 January atNATO.

Lord Robertson met German DefenceMinister Rudolf Scharping on 25January in Berlin, Germany, where healso delivered this year’s ManfredWörner Memorial Lecture.

Romanian Prime Minister AdrianNastase met Lord Robertson atNATO on 24 January to discussRomania’s preparations for NATOmembership and its contribution toKFOR and SFOR.

Mongolian Prime Minister NambarynEnkhbayar met Lord Robertson atNATO on 22 January.

Depleted uraniumSet up in the wake of public concernabout possible environmental healthrisks associated with the use ofdepleted uranium, the Committee onDepleted Uranium, made up ofNATO officials and representatives ofpast and present SFOR and KFORcontributing nations, met for thefirst time on 16 January to discussmedical and scientific evidence.NATO’s senior medical advisorybody, the Committee of the Chiefsof Military Medical Services metthe day before to exchange informa-tion on the issue.

Lord Robertson visited Armenia,Azerbaijan and Turkmenistanbetween 15 and 18 January, meetingheads of state and foreign anddefence ministers.

On 11 January, Lord Robertson visit-ed Sweden, which currently holds theEU presidency, for talks with ForeignMinister Anna Lindh and DefenceMinister Björn von Sydow aboutestablishing robust EU-NATO links incrisis management.

First Yugoslav visit

The first Yugoslav minister to visitNATO since the ouster of formerYugoslav President SlobodanMilosevic, Foreign Minister GoranSvilanovic, met Lord Robertson andNATO Ambassadors on 10 January.

New UK ambassadorAmbassador David Manning succeed-ed Ambassador Sir John Goulden aspermanent representative of theUnited Kingdom to the North AtlanticCouncil on 8 January. A career diplo-mat, Ambassador Manning, 51, wasformerly deputy under-secretary ofstate at the Foreign andCommonwealth Office between 1998and 2000. Before that, he was UKambassador to Israel (1995-1998).

On the fifth anniversary of NATO’sdeployment in Bosnia, Lord Robertsonvisited SFOR troops and met Bosniac,Croat and Serb political leaders inSarajevo, Bosnia, on 20 December.

Allied foreign ministers met inBrussels, Belgium, on 14 and 15December and tentatively agreed anapproach to permanent arrangements

between the Alliance and the EuropeanUnion but noted that practical arrange-ments still needed to be worked out.Ministers also held meetings with theircounterparts from Russia and Ukraine,and other Partner countries.

Trajkovski visit

Boris Trajkovski, President of the for-mer Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia,* met Lord Robertson on7 December at NATO to discuss secu-rity in southeastern Europe, relationswith KFOR and preparations for pos-sible future NATO membership.

New confidence-building measuresbetween Greece and Turkey, wereannounced on 6 December, wherebyeach country will give the other advancenotification of military exercises.

Allied defence ministers met inBrussels, Belgium, on 5 and 6December and discussed, in particular,the Defence Capabilities Initiative andEU-NATO relations. Ministers alsoadopted a five-year force plan,reviewed the Allies’ national defenceplans for the period 2001-2005 andapproved new ministerial guidance forNATO and national defence planning upto 2008. Ministers also met with theircounterparts from Russia and Ukraine,and other Partner countries. UNSpecial Envoy Carl Bildt briefed minis-ters in the Euro-Atantic PartnershipCouncil on recent developments in theBalkans and the Supreme AlliedCommander, Europe, General JosephRalston, gave an update on the KFORand SFOR operations.


For more information see NATO Update at www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm.

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policy of the administration of President Harry S. Truman,have contributed to the evolution of a responsible Euro-Atlantic community of interests and values, without whichneither the United States nor Europe could live as well, asfreely, and as safely as they do today. Moreover, even afterthe Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO) and the European Union remain the institutionalpillars of this community.

Despite the many accomplishments inspired by thetransatlantic link, Americans and Europeans remain deeplysceptical about each other. Indeed, reported US ambiva-lence over Europe’s evolution towards a union of states andEurope’s alleged ambiguities over US leadership withinNATO continue to generate concern about a rift in transat-lantic relations. Predictably, apprehension among Europe’snation-states is largely to do with the consequences of theirtransformation. In the United States, however, the appre-hension has to do with the feared emergence of Europe as acounterweight that could act independently of, or evenagainst, the United States. However exaggerated suchapprehension may be, it cannot be ignored. Four times in

Simon Serfaty is professor of US foreign policy at OldDominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, and director ofEuropean Studies at the Center for Strategic & InternationalStudies in Washington, DC. He is author of, among others,Taking Europe Seriously (Palgrave, 1992), Stay the Course(Praeger, 1997), Memories of Europe’s Future: Farewell toYesteryear (CSIS, 1999), and Europe 2007: From Nation-States to Member States (CSIS, 2000).

When future historians look back to the year 2001,they will likely be in awe of what was achievedin the second half of the previous century. What

was a daring vision – and even, many warned, a dangerousillusion – gradually became an irreversible reality. Historychanged its ways, and geography moved, as the states ofEurope developed an integrated personality à l’américainewhile the United States was adopting a security identity àl’européenne.

The institutions formed in the wake of the Second WorldWar, which were, in part, inspired by the “Europe first”

Lasting liaisonSimon Serfaty places the transatlantic relationship in its historical context and

considers issues likely to shape it in the coming years.

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Visonary words: President Truman’s ideas served as a beacon to light up post-war darkness and still illuminate the way forward

the 20th century – in 1917, 1941, 1949 and 1989 – USpower and leadership helped save Europeans from them-selves to the benefit of all, including the United States.Nevertheless, too many in Europe remain willing to ques-tion US leadership as intrusive, deceptive, ineffective andeven dangerous.

European anxieties were especially evident during themost recent presidential elections in the United States.Then, the language used in some European media to pres-ent the two main contenders, and especially the Republicancandidate, bordered on the offensive. Much concernseemed to reflect a simplistic belief that changes in politi-cal majorities or presidential leadership would inevitablyresult in shifts in the country’s foreign and security poli-cies. However, experience of the past 50 years suggests thatpolicy changes during the life of an administration areoften more profound than those from one to the next, asexternal events have frequently caused presidents tochange directions. In this way, Jimmy Carter’s foreign pol-icy effectively turned 180 degrees in January 1980, a yearbefore his successor’s inauguration, in the wake of theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution.Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan changed course as the “evilempire” he had battled earlier unravelled. And his succes-sor’s def ining interest for world leadership was relin-quished in autumn 1991 when George Bush assumed thathis re-election required a new presidential image. Thatimage, however, suited Bill Clinton better until 1994 when,in the wake of the congressional elections of that year, here-invented himself as a world leader and embarked uponmany of the policies, whose consequences have now beeninherited by his successor.

To think that in 2001 a new American president might,by design or inexperience, turn away from Europe is to pre-sume a luxury of choice that ceases to exist once a politicalcampaign is over. The US presence in Europe has becomeso complete as to end any prospect of disengagement. Inshort, the partition line carefully built across the Atlantic inthe 19th century has been swept away by the repeatedEuropean storms of the 20th century. Although the UnitedStates is not a European power, either by vocation or bychoice, it is a power in Europe, by position as well as byinterests.

Early in the 21st century, both NATO and the EuropeanUnion face a full and complex agenda. While the tasks andpriorities differ from one institution to the other, the gener-al principle remains the same: widen in order to deepen,deepen in order to widen, and reform in order to do both.Neither institution, however, can expect to address its agen-da independently of the other. Each institutional agenda isseparable from the other, but neither can be separated fromthe broader transatlantic agenda to which it belongs.

High on the transatlantic agenda are prospects of aNational Missile Defense (NMD) and a European and

Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which each side ofthe Atlantic is prone to present as a test of post-Cold Warcohesion. The test, however, is hardly convincing as bothNMD and ESDP continue to raise too many legitimatequestions with too little evidence to offer enough credibleanswers. Can it work? Assuming it does work, is it afford-able? Assuming it is affordable, is it cost-effective?Assuming it is cost-effective, is it necessary? Assuming itis necessary, will its impact exceed whatever gains it per-mits? And so it goes for both NMD and ESDP – a paralleldebate over intentions that are so misrepresented on andabout each side of the Atlantic as to risk consequencesthat neither side wants or can afford. Moreover, for thenext several years such a debate will be premature, asEurope is no more likely to rely on its virtual ESDP tofight without the United States than the United States islikely to distance itself from Europe behind its virtualNMD. Instead, both ESDP and NMD will likely remain,above all, the source of debate among Europeans andAmericans respectively, rather than between them.

In any case, ESDP is what every US administrationsince 1945 has expected of Europe – namely, an enhancedmilitary capacity that would lighten the US burden by act-ing with or without, but not against or in spite of, theUnited States. Moreover, conversely, NMD is whatEurope wants out of the United States – enhanced protec-tion that would reduce the consequences of failure shoulda conflict, started accidentally or by design, spread to theUnited States, its allies and friends.

Rather than threatening to decouple the United Statesfrom Europe, launch another Cold War, accelerate a newarms race, and destabilise deterrence, as its critics haveargued, NMD seeks to ensure continued US engagement,bury the Cold War, avoid military competition, and sta-bilise deterrence. The United States understands thattoday’s unipolar world is transitory, and that ascendingpowers and nuisance states will eventually challenge thepost-Cold War order and, therefore, the interests of theUnited States and its allies. By choice (Alliance cohe-sion), necessity (radars in Greenland and England), andforesight (the rise of rogue states and other unspecifiedthreats), the states of Europe would do well to reconsidertheir objections to NMD. Meanwhile, the United Stateswould do well to expand the concept into that of a multi-lateral system that would cover Europe and others,instead of deploying a more limited system, in spite ofallied opinion.

Improving EU-US and EU-NATO relations have beenhidden features of both NATO and EU enlargement. Sincethe Washington and Rome Treaties were signed in 1949and 1957 respectively, there has been an implicit assump-tion, in the United States as well as in Europe, that bothinstitutions would be enlarged in a way that broughtNATO members into the then European Community andEC members into NATO. The initial six EC countries



were all founding members of NATO, and four of the sixcountries that joined the European Community between1973 and 1986 were already members of NATO(Denmark, Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom),while a fifth late entrant (Spain) joined the Alliance in amatter of weeks. Indeed, by 1986, Ireland was the onlyEC country that was not a member of the then 16-mem-ber Atlantic Alliance, while Turkey, Norway and Icelandwere the only European NATO members that were notpart of the European Union of 12. Since the end of theCold War, however, this gap has widened, with all threenew EU countries in 1995 being non-NATO members(Austria, Finland, and Sweden) and all three new NATOcountries in 1999 being non-EU members (CzechRepublic, Hungary, and Poland).

Closing this membership gap between the twoWestern institutions would facilitate the institutionalcomplementarity sought by both Europe and the UnitedStates. It could also serve as an implicit guideline forfuture enlargement – creating whatthe late Italian prime minister, AldoMoro, would have called paralleleconvergente, with the point of con-vergence reached when all EU coun-tries are also NATO members, andall European NATO countries arealso EU members. By spring 2002,some applicant countries shouldhave made enough progress to per-mit NATO and the European Union,meeting in separate or joint sum-mits, to enforce their respectivecommitments to enlargement.

EU-NATO complementarity is notonly a matter of membership. It isalso a policy question. Since neitherinstitution addresses all issues, both can attend to sepa-rate, though not separable, functions. In this way, NATOcan protect its members from external aggression, whilethe European Union can attend to the soft-securityissues that might otherwise disrupt the peace. In severalprimary areas of instability and even conflict – includ-ing southeastern Europe and the Aegean – better coordi-nation between these two institutions and their memberswould be desirable. Arguably, some of the horror thatplagued the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s couldhave been avoided had not only NATO but also theEuropean Union been involved earlier, and hopes toescape further terror hinge decisively on a Europeaninvolvement in a way that the United States has occa-sionally failed to recognise.

There is more to the transatlantic agenda, to be sure.Russia is a case in point – too close to ignore, too big tointegrate, and too nuclear to offend. Russia can still beexpected to try to exploit any opportunity to build a



wedge between Europe and the United States – whetherover NMD, NATO enlargement, ESDP or EU enlarge-ment. Here, it is critical to convince Moscow that theexpansion of the Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood alsohelps widen the area of NATO security and EU affluenceto non-NATO and non-EU countries, including, aboveall, Russia. Outside Russia, Europe’s institutionalorphans, countries outside both the European Union andNATO, which may have to learn to live on their own fora longer period of time should not be abandoned either.Enhanced cooperation is imperative, not only with mem-bers of a reinforced NATO Partnership for Peace, butalso with bold and generous EU associate status.

The Greater Middle East, extending from NorthAfrica through the Middle East and into the Gulf, isanother area which would benefit from a coordinatedtransatlantic approach. Here, even though interests arenot always common, whether within Europe or betweenEurope and the United States, goals are usually similar

and policies, even when not com-mon, can be compatible. Moreover,even though capabilities are uneven,they are sufficiently complementaryfor compatible policies to achievecommon goals more effectivelywhen the United States and thestates of Europe act jointly, ratherthan separately.

Asia, too, is an area about whichAmericans and Europeans mustlearn to think in unison, if they are toact jointly or in a complementaryfashion. This is especially the casewith respect to China, a countrywhich must feature in any discussionabout NMD and the future of nuclear

deterrence. But working in unison outside the Euro-Atlantic area requires enhanced mechanisms for transat-lantic policy coordination and consultation.

This cooperative transatlantic agenda and the respon-sive dialogue it requires are not about new visions.Rather, the vision is the same as that which inspiredthose European and US statesmen who created NATOand the European Union and whose ideas served as abeacon to light up the post-war darkness. On both sidesof the Atlantic, post-war leaders shared a comparablevision of a failed past and, accordingly, pursued similarambitions to escape their respective histories and startanew. Under another set of post-war conditions, the bea-con held by President Truman and others still illumi-nates the path forward, as President Bush and otherpolitical leaders complete their predecessors’ vision of awhole and free Europe moving as a counterpart of theUnited States within a strong and cohesive Euro-Atlantic community. ■

Despite the manyaccomplishmentsinspired by thetransatlantic link,Americans andEuropeans remaindeeply sceptical abouteach other


Steady as she goesJames Dobbins, US assistant secretary for European affairs, tells Review editor

Christopher Bennett that he sees continuity in transatlantic relations.

CHRISTOPHER BENNETT: Everytime there is a change in US adminis-tration, analysts on both sides of theAtlantic debate its significance forthe transatlantic relationship. Howmuch continuity and how muchchange should US Allies expect incoming years?

JD: Every time the administrationchanges in Washington there isindeed debate about the exact bal-ance of continuity and change. As faras the Atlantic Alliance is concerned,the new administration is going to beunequivocally and strongly support-ive. That is evident in everything thatPresident George W. Bush, Secretaryof State Colin Powell, Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld and oth-ers have said on the subject. In termsof the Balkans, there will be a contin-ued effort to review the scale offorces necessary to carry out NATO’stasks. However, the review will takeplace within a NATO context. It isimportant to review commitmentsperiodically and ensure that they arein line with developing circum-stances. The commitment to worktogether in the Balkans is evident.Secretary of State Powell made thatclear when he visited NATO inFebruary and President Bush hassimilarly made it clear in the meet-ings he has had in Washington withNATO Secretary General LordRobertson and other NATO leaders.

CB: As a result of comments madeduring the US electoral campaign,media have speculated that the newUS administration is keen to explorethe possibilities of a “new division oflabour” with its Allies. In such a sce-nario, Europeans would likely con-centrate on stabilising Europe and its

periphery, leaving the United Statesto focus its energies on more strate-gic threats. How prevalent is suchthinking in the new US administra-tion and what considerations arelikely to govern relations with Allies?

JD: The administration recognises thatthe task that we have taken on jointlyin the Balkans is a task to which bothEurope and the United States are andshould remain committed. I can’t ruleout longer-term policy planning dis-cussions of the type that you have sug-gested, although I haven’t seen anyproposals to that effect as yet.

CB: The peace processes in Bosniaand Herzegovina (Bosnia) andKosovo have seen a number of break-throughs and conditions on theground are improving. It is increas-ingly clear, however, that the interna-tional community will have to investmany years, massive resources andconsiderable political capital if it isto rebuild functioning societies in theBalkans. Given your experience ofthe region, what opportunities do yousee for creating a self-sustainingpeace? And how will the new USadministration seek to re-energise theprocess?

JD: The most important develop-ments of the past year and the mosthopeful developments are thechanges that have taken place inZagreb and Belgrade. In the 1990s,much of the tension in the region,particularly as regards Bosnia, camefrom the centrifugal pressure thatthese two capitals put on Bosniansociety, effectively tearing it apart.We now have an opportunity to seeboth Yugoslavia and Croatia playinga constructive role in helping to sus-

tain and build a viable Bosnian stateon a multi-ethnic basis in line withthe Dayton Accords. The kind ofcooperation which Zagreb hasexplicitly committed itself to andwhich we can look to and demandfrom Belgrade is the best hope forstability in Bosnia and the region asa whole. Clearly, southern Serbiaremains volatile, but NATO is work-ing effectively and interacting con-structively with the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia,* withSerbia, and with moderate Albanianleaders in Kosovo to defuse the situ-ation. Otherwise, the basic elementsfor building stability in the regionare already in place. These are theStability Pact, UN Security CouncilResolution 1244 concerningKosovo, which lays out a pathtowards substantial autonomy butpostpones a decision on theprovince’s f inal status, and theDayton Accords, their gradualimplementation and the building ofmulti-ethnic structures in Bosniathat do not rely on the nationalistparties that were in power during thewar. It’s less a question of new initia-tives, than of continued commitmentin all of these areas. The administra-tion has indicated that it intends tocontinue to work on the StabilityPact, on the NATO-led peacekeepingefforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and onthe issue of NATO enlargement,which over the longer term offers away of stabilising and integrating theBalkans as well as northeasternEurope. Here, Europe has an evenmore daunting task, as it movestowards integrating these societies inthe European Union. We recognisethat the European contribution is, inmany ways, the most important oneand we appreciate the efforts that theEuropean Union and its members aremaking in this regard.

CB: Many Allies and Partners havemade it clear that they have reserva-tions about the new administration’splans for building a National MissileDefense. How does the new adminis-tration intend to take this project for-ward? And how will it reassure Alliesand Partners that NMD is both intheir interests and will help make theworld a safer place?

JD: The administration has alreadybegun the process of consulting itsAllies on issues of missile defenceand how missile defence fits into apolicy of deterrence, which also inte-grates other aspects of defence aswell as arms control and non-prolif-eration. Secretary of State Powell gota very good response from Allies onthese issues when he visited NATO inFebruary and he committed theUnited States to consult early andoften on these issues, indeed, to con-sult before we make basic decisionsabout the architecture of a missiledefence system. We have also made itclear that we want to work with theAllies on missile defence arrange-ments that protect them as well as theUnited States. And we have alsomade clear that we want to consultclosely with others, including theRussians and the Chinese. Indeed,Secretary of State Powell has alreadydiscussed this subject, among otherissues, with the Russian foreign min-ister.

CB: For a variety of reasons, theUnited States has failed to endorseseveral international agreementsin recent years. These include theLand Mine Treaty, the treaty estab-lishing the International CriminalCourt and the Comprehensive TestBan Treaty. In addition, plans forNMD risk undermining the ABMTreaty. What approach will the newadministration adopt towards thesetreaties?

JD: The United States has globalresponsibilities which are in someways unique, reflecting our defencecommitments in Korea, in the Gulf,

in Europe and elsewhere. In address-ing some of these issues, the UnitedStates has had concerns which someof our Allies have not felt or have notfelt as keenly. We will continue toconsult our Allies and work withthem as regards the ABM treaty,which will also, obviously, be amajor element of the discussions wehave with Russia. Concerning theInternational Criminal Court, it’simportant to recognise that PresidentClinton’s signature of the treaty wasessentially a technical step, ratherthan an expression of an intent tosubmit the treaty to ratification. TheClinton administration indicated thatit had problems with the treaty andthat it did not believe that it would beable to bring it into force. Clinton’ssignature was not intended to reversehis administration’s position on thatpoint. It was intended rather as atechnical step to include the UnitedStates in continued consideration ofsome aspects of the treaty’s adminis-tration. Even before coming intooff ice, the new administrationexpressed concerns about this agree-ment which paralleled and were, ifanything, even stronger than those ofthe Clinton administration. I expecttherefore that it will continue toexpress such reservations and con-cerns in the future.

CB: Russia is an important Partner ofthe Alliance, but one that has at timesin recent years been disgruntled.How does the new administrationintend to engage Russia? How muchpotential does it see in the PermanentJoint Council? And how might thatinstitution be developed?

JD: The administration intends tohave a good working relationshipwith Russia. Already, Secretary ofState Powell has had a preliminarymeeting with the Russian foreignminister and President Bush has hada conversation with RussianPresident Vladimir Putin and therelationship will be developedthrough the normal pattern of bilater-al and multilateral meetings over the


coming months. There are a numberof issues to address in the relation-ship, but there are a number of pointswhere cooperation can be reasonablyanticipated. We certainly supportNATO’s engagement with Russia as acomplement to these bilateral con-sultations, including the PermanentJoint Council, and look forward todeveloping it further during the com-ing months.

CB: Successive US administrationshave urged their European Allies toincrease defence expenditure. As theEuropean Union builds a crisis man-agement capability, Europeansappear f inally to be taking on agreater share of the burden for theirown security. Despite this, manyAmericans now appear suspicious ofthe European Security and DefencePolicy (ESDP), even fearing that itmight undermine NATO. What con-cerns does the new US administra-tion have about this project and whatmust the Europeans do to overcomethem?

The administration has made clearthat it supports the development of aEuropean security and defence poli-cy that strengthens the Alliance, thatcontributes to overall capabilities andavoids duplicating existing Allianceplanning structures. This is howESDP is developing and the way inwhich we hope and expect that it willcontinue to develop. There are stillunresolved issues, however, whichhave to be worked through in thecoming months in the ongoing talksbetween NATO and the EuropeanUnion. These unresolved issuesinclude the mechanism by whichforce planning is carried out in theEuropean Union and NATO. Therelationship between the force-plan-ning processes of the two organisa-tions is therefore under discussion, asare arrangements for operationalplanning and the issue of whetherNATO can assure the EuropeanUnion access to NATO planning inall circumstances. Further discussionis also necessary to identify process-


es by which NATO assets could bemade available to the EuropeanUnion. And finally, the issue of theparticipation of non-EU Allies in EUactivities and operations still has tobe resolved.

CB: The nine countries taking part inNATO’s Membership Action Plan areall hoping to be invited to join theAlliance at its summit at the end ofnext year. Although Washington does

not make unilateral decisions onNATO enlargement, the new USadministration will have a large sayon who is and who isn’t invited, orwhether anybody is invited to join theAlliance. What factors will be takeninto consideration in making thisdecision and how can aspiring mem-bers maximise their chances ofadmission?

JD: The key to future Alliance mem-bership is the Membership ActionPlan. All aspiring members have


established Membership ActionPlans, are currently working onimplementing them and will bejudged according to them, when thetime comes. Countries’ readiness andthe degree of effort that they have putinto preparing themselves for NATOmembership are certainly major cri-teria for decisions on future mem-bers. Otherwise, the degree to whichcountries have irreversibly estab-lished democratic institutions and theprospects for democratic stability arealso important considerations. ■


James Dobbins (left) was sworn inas US assistant secretary for Europeanaffairs in January 2001, a post he hadf illed on an acting basis since May2000. A 58-year-old diplomat, he hasspent more than two decades workingon European affairs during a careerspanning more than 30 years at theState Department.

Prior to becoming assistant secre-tary for European affairs, betweenFebruary 1999 and May 2000,Ambassador Dobbins served as specialadviser to the president and secretaryof state for Kosovo and Bosnia andHerzegovina. In this capacity, he hadlead responsibility for managing theBalkans crisis throughout NATO’sKosovo air campaign.

Earlier in his career, AmbassadorDobbins acted as the State Department’ssenior manager for peace operations inHaiti, coordinating the diplomatic andcivil aspects of the 1994-96 interven-tion, and Somalia, overseeing the dis-engagement of US forces in 1993-94.Between 1996 and 1999, Ambassador

Dobbins was special adviser to the president and senior director on the National Security Council Staffresponsible for Latin America.

In addition to his official posts, Ambassador Dobbins has held appointments as a senior fellow withthe Rand Corporation in 1993 and with the Council on Foreign Relations in 1995-96. Prior to joiningthe State Department, Ambassador Dobbins served three years as an officer in the US Navy, includingtwo tours of duty in the Vietnam theatre.

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Christoph Bertram is director of the Berlin-based StiftungWissenschaft und Politik. He is co-author, together withGilles Andréani and Charles Grant, of Europe’s MilitaryRevolution (Centre for European Reform, 2001).

Starting over againChristoph Bertram assesses European concerns and expectations at the change

of tenant in the White House.

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Back to the future: President Bush has assembled a foreign policy team that is largely the same as the one which left office with his father eight years ago

Whenever a new face moves into the White House,European governments hold their breath. Themassive turnover of key individuals that accom-

panies all presidential changeovers means that many in thenew administration are inevitably finding their feet in theearly months. Moreover, while every US presidential can-didate promises to outdo the incumbent in “strengtheningrelations with our allies”, Europeans have learned to becautious. They have never had reason to doubt the goodwill of a new president, but have sometimes felt uneasyabout the qualifications of some of the new team or suspi-

cious of the seemingly irrepressible urge to reassess theprevious administration’s policies and develop new visions.

This time, however, things are different. PresidentGeorge W. Bush has assembled a foreign policy team that islargely the same as the one which left office with his fathereight years ago. That administration was highly respectedfor its deft handling of German reunification, the demise ofthe Soviet Union, and the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait. But familiarity with this team has failed to reas-sure Europe’s foreign policy community. It is not the com-petence of the new administration that causes concern, butits new agenda. Many Europeans fear they may face awk-ward choices on Euro-Atlantic issues like missile defenceand NATO enlargement, as well as issues further afield,where the United States is adopting a tougher stance, suchas policy towards Iraq and China, on Russia and on globalwarming.

Such fears are largely unjustified when it comes to themore traditional Alliance issues. They appear divisive butshould turn out to be perfectly manageable. The real prob-lems lie beyond NATO’s agenda. On such wider securityissues, no coordination exists between the United Statesand its European Allies and there is a genuine risk that thegap in transatlantic policy perceptions, which has openedin recent years, will widen.

Looking at the traditional security agenda, US plans fora National Missile Defense (NMD), one of the new presi-dent’s priorities, have generated the most controversy todate. Yet the issue is already waning, as European govern-ments realise that they can do little about Washington’sdecision to proceed. Many Allies had opposed NMD out ofconcern about the Russian reaction. However, with RussianPresident Vladimir Putin sending out signals of a possibledeal, combining drastic cuts in Russian and US offensivestrategic forces with an adjustment of the ABM Treaty,Europeans are beginning to recognise that NMD may actu-ally offer new opportunities for strategic arms reductions.They are becoming aware, as are the Russians, that the pro-liferation of ballistic missiles will one day be a real threatto their own security. If the introduction of NMD is recon-ciled with a formal regime of restraint and accompanied bysignificant cuts in nuclear arsenals, the grounds for oppos-ing it disappear. Even active participation in an Alliance-wide system becomes an attractive, if distant, prospect.

We are, of course, not there yet. Real negotiations withRussia on amending the ABM Treaty need to take placeand suggestions for deep cuts in nuclear warheads are nomore than tentative. But now, at least, there is an objectivethat Europeans can share. The NMD project, which still hasto prove its viability, need not necessarily divide theAlliance as long as any decision on abandoning the ABMTreaty is delayed.

Many NMD supporters in the United States wonder whytheir European Allies attach such importance to a treaty,which they regard as an anachronism from a time when theSoviet Union existed and limitations on missile defencesseemed a key element for the transparency of nuclear deter-rence between the super powers. Europeans readily concedethat the world has changed, but feel that the rules of nuclearcompetition are no less important in the new security envi-ronment. Formally, the ABM Treaty may be a bilateralagreement between Russia and the United States, but itshapes the calculations of existing and future nuclear pow-ers and offers a measure of predictability in internationalnuclear competition. Europeans would, therefore, not objecteven to major revisions of the treaty, but would be deeplytroubled by its demise. The United States should take thisconcern seriously, and can well afford to do so. The longlead-time for any realistic NMD system means that there isno hurry to quit the treaty. Since the Russian governmentappears inclined to consider some revision, European wishescould well be satisfied without hobbling US plans.

NATO’s second round of enlargement is another poten-tial cause for transatlantic strain. A decision on which, ifany, candidate countries to invite to join the Alliance is dueat the next NATO Summit in Prague in 2002 and fewEuropean governments are pushing the issue. However,they realise that simply postponing the decision is not anoption because of commitments made at the 1999Washington Summit. Enlargement is on the Alliance agen-da because all members have put it there, not just theUnited States.

While no clear line is as yet emerging, the contours ofthe debate are becoming clearer. But Allied leaders can-not wait until Prague to make up their minds. This isbecause the Baltic republics will inevitably be on theagenda, whether or not they are invited to join theAlliance in the next wave, as a result of Russia’s proteststhat their membership would pose an unacceptableaffront to its own security. The decision to include orexclude them from the next membership round should,therefore, be communicated to Russia and to the Balticrepublics well in advance of the Prague Summit and notsprung on them at the last minute. If the Baltic republicsare admitted, Russia needs to be reassured about theabsence of any hostile intent. If the Baltic republics areput on hold, they will need clear reassurances that thiswill not weaken their existing, more indirect securityties with the West. There is therefore not that much timeto prepare the consensus needed within the Alliance,generate the necessary US domestic support, particular-ly in the Senate, and develop a common strategy toimplement the decision.

Another potential candidate for transatlantic misgivingsis the European Union’s intention to establish a rapid reac-tion force by 2003. Already circumspect under the Clintonadministration, US support is likely to remain somewhatless than enthusiastic under the new leadership. The UnitedStates continues to see NATO as the central instrument ofits European policy and does not want to see the organisa-tion weakened by any separate European defence project.Nevertheless, within weeks of coming to power the newadministration was picking up roughly where the previousone left off: no overwhelming welcome for the Europeaninitiative but no obstruction either. The only caveat is thatwhatever new European coordination structures are createdshould remain anchored to NATO.

The reasons for the Bush administration’s relativelyrelaxed attitude are those that guided its predecessor. If theEuropean Allies strengthen their military effort, even undera European flag, this will serve the Alliance as a whole.Moreover, since the Europeans will continue to depend onUS assets for any serious operation for the foreseeablefuture, the United States will retain a powerful veto. Theadvantages clearly outweigh the risks. President Bush’sdeclared position is now to give European governments thechance to live up to their word.



Ironically, the real risk to transatlantic relations may bethe failure of the Europeans to meet their self-imposed tar-get, rather than their success. The project will be judged noton the institutions it builds, but on the additional militarypunch it delivers. While new EU bodies dealing with secu-rity matters have been set up remarkably rapidly, the goal ofa credible autonomous military capability remains elusive.

No one expects miracles by 2003. But to be credible, theEuropean venture requires at least a measurable increase,matched by necessary funds, in force intervention capabili-ties. In their commitments to the future rapid reaction force,EU countries have largely drawn on the existing pool offorces. They have yet to increase the number of operationalsoldiers and devote real money to improving militarymobility. Unless they do so in the next two years, their cred-ibility in the United States and in Europe will surely sufferseverely. The failure to meet targets, after all the promisesmade in NATO and EU communiqués, could lead to majortransatlantic misgivings as well as to recriminations amongEuropean countries. The United States can afford to adopt await-and-see attitude. The Europeans cannot.

If the Europeans do produce some-thing tangible by 2003, their successwill add to the military options of theWest in general. European govern-ments may then feel encouraged to gofurther in pooling their militaryresources and policies and US appre-hension about a NATO that is less US-centric may then gain some ground.But the challenge of adapting theAlliance to changing times and cir-cumstances has to be met in any case.Indeed, a greater European contribu-tion to crisis management on the continent would only helpmeet it more effectively. But these are matters that need notbe addressed in President Bush’s first term.

While NATO’s current structures will thus prove, onceagain, capable of addressing and defusing any of the poten-tially divisive Euro-Atlantic issues on the horizon, the sameis not true for security items outside NATO’s geographicremit. Two examples, those of Iraq and China, may illus-trate the general problem.

On Iraq, frustration is common. Neither sanctions norno-fly zones have succeeded in forcing Baghdad to drop itsrearmament plans or to readmit UN inspectors.Meanwhile, support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein isrising in the Arab world in the wake of the breakdown ofthe Middle East peace process, weakening the West’s influ-ence in this petroleum-producing region. Neither theUnited States nor the European Allies have an answer to theproblem. However, their instincts point in very differentdirections. Europeans prefer a “political solution” withoutbeing able to formulate it. The new US administration is



leaning towards tougher military action. It is difficult to seehow this gap could be bridged.

While welcome, efforts to devise “smart sanctions”,which would target the regime rather than the Iraqi people,are unlikely to produce tangible results quickly. Otheravenues will, therefore, have to be pursued. Here, theunderlying European and US preferences are likely tocause friction, with the United States potentially blamingthe failure of military action on the lack of European sup-port, and the Europeans responding by blaming US unilat-eralism for frustrating their political approach.

China is another case in point. Here, the differencesbetween the two sides of the Atlantic are less pronounced,largely because Europeans do not have much of a China pol-icy, unless the pursuit of commercial interests and a generalwish not to isolate China qualifies as one. The United States,on the other hand, is one of the pillars of stability in Asia andits relationship with China affects the region as a whole. Theapparent toughening of the US approach to China under theBush administration could have wide repercussions. Europe

might see it as another example of USunilateralism, doubly resented becauseit highlights the absence of any realEuropean strategy.

Areas of potential transatlantic dis-cord in traditional Alliance issues, suchas missile defence, enlargement andEuropean defence integration, appear tobe on the road to resolution. Togetherwith its European Allies, the Bushadministration will handle them no lesseffectively than previous administra-tions. However, Iraq and China under-

line the fact that security for the West has become a muchwider brief than that addressed in existing Alliance structures,as well as the desirability of closer policy and crisis coordina-tion between the United States and its European Alliesbeyond NATO’s geographic remit. Here, the United Stateshas little practice of consulting Europe on its policies, andperhaps little inclination. But an increasingly confidentEuropean Union, which through its own enlargement processis being drawn closer to crisis regions further afield, willgradually develop a sense of its own responsibility for inter-national order. And achieving such order will largely dependon the two major Western power units working together.

The Clinton administration seemed instinctively willingto begin thinking of evolving the relationship with Europealong those lines, even though it is far from clear how suchcooperation could be organised. The Bush administrationand its supporters in Congress have not revealed a similardisposition and seem both unprepared and unwilling todevelop one. It is on these wider, global issues then, ratherthan the familiar Alliance themes, that the European-USrelationship will face its greatest challenge. ■

Security for the Westhas become a widerbrief than thataddressed in existingAlliance structures


Debate

Is the fundamental nature of the transatlantic security

relationship changing?

Yes:François Heisbourg

is director ofGeneva’s Centre for

Security Policy.

No:Rob de Wijk is professor ofinternational relations atLeiden University, the RoyalMilitary Academy and theClingendael Institute.

Dear Rob

Given NATO’s success in provingits relevance and its worth vis-à-visthe challenges of the post-Cold Warera in Europe, it may be tempting todraw the inference that the AtlanticAlliance need only adapt at the mar-gin in the coming years. After all, ithas successfully passed the test ofwar and peace in the Balkans. Were itso simple! NATO will have to under-go a major transformation, if it is tocontinue to ensure the strategic part-nership between its North Americanand European members. The first andmost obvious reason for advancingsuch a view, is the sudden and sub-stantial emergence of a EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy (ESDP)in the framework of the EuropeanUnion. From the standpoint of NATO,this is a revolutionary development. Itis true that ESDP emerged not leastbecause the United Kingdom decidedin 1998 that this would be a good idea

and London isn’t in the business ofundermining NATO. Yet, ESDP is anagent of radical change if theEuropean Union’s institutional andmaterial targets are met, because itimplies that the Atlantic Alliance willbecome a two-pillar organisation,with a collective EU political andmilitary persona. Such a visionshould not, in itself, pose a metaphys-ical problem for NATO in general andthe United States in particular. Afterall, this would be the belated realisa-tion of President John F. Kennedy’svision of a two-pillar NATO formu-lated in 1962. The fact remains, how-ever, that this will be a traumaticdevelopment, since NATO has neverfunctioned on this basis.

The other source of potentialupheaval flows from US choices.National Missile Defense (NMD)comes most readily to mind. But thisis not, in my view, the principalsource of the United States’ challenge

to the “old” NATO, even if it is themost visible and politically charged.NATO will be challenged morebroadly by major and inevitablechanges in US force structure anddoctrine flowing from budgetary andstrategic considerations. Europeangovernments, which are constantlyreminded of the deficiencies in theirdefence spending by their US friendsor by European analysts, such as youand I, will now have to come to termswith the consequences of US budgetconstraints. Not only has US defencespending dropped below 3 per cent ofGDP in the current fiscal year, for thefirst time since the creation of NATO,but, more importantly in the comingdecade, the US military will be facedwith the block obsolescence of majorweapon systems acquired during theReagan era. The replacement of suchsystems on the basis of a steady-stateUS force structure and doctrinewould imply an annual increase ofdefence spending by some $50 bil-

lion. This is unlikely to happen, par-ticularly in the context of massive taxreductions. Force structure and doc-trine will have to change. The factthat Andy Marshall, whose name islinked to the Revolution in MilitaryAffairs, has been entrusted with apolicy review, is a portent of deepchanges.

At the strategic level, the forces ofchange are no less radical. The mostserious risks of really major militaryconfrontations involving US interestsand partners are essentially in Asia,from the Middle East and the Gulf toTaiwan and Korea. Now that formerYugoslav President SlobodanMilosevic has fallen from power inSerbia, the United States may find itreasonable to do away with theapproximate parity which existstoday between US forces stationed inEurope and those committed to Asia,by focusing on the latter.

Budgetary pressures and strategicrealities will reduce the absolute andrelative level of the US military pres-ence in Europe. Moreover, that pres-ence may also change in nature, if, asa result of the Revolution in MilitaryAffairs, the United States concludesthat the traditional centrepieces of USforce structure (the divisions of theUS Army, the carrier task forces onthe US Navy, the wings of the US airforce) need to be replaced by some-thing different. In this context, missiledefence will act as an accelerator, byemphasising the shift away from thepost-Second World War centrepiecesof US force structure and by drawing

on scarce defence spending. TheClinton administration’s version ofmissile defence was assessed as cost-ing $60 billion over a five-year period,i.e. substantially more than plannedincreases in defence spending.

ESDP, on the one hand, and US-driven change on the other may wellprove to be compatible. But, whateverthe case, these are deeply disruptiveforces vis-à-vis the first 50 years ofNATO’s history. In a sense, it is nowthat the organisational and doctrinallegacy of the Cold War is f inallybeginning to wear out.

Yours,François

Dear François,

You have argued that NATO willhave to undergo a major transforma-tion because of the rapid progressmade in ESDP and US policy choic-es. I agree with most of your analysis,but do not share your conclusion. The“old” NATO you referred to nolonger exists for the following rea-sons.

First, NATO has already undergonean impressive transformation. Sincethe Cold War, NATO has transformeditself from an alliance for collectivedefence and transatlantic consultationinto an organisation with moreemphasis on defence cooperation andcooperative security. In this way,NATO has launched new initiativessuch as the North AtlanticCooperation Council, the predecessorof today’s Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil, the Permanent Joint NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukrainedialogue and the Partnership forPeace. And the Alliance has taken innew members. In numerous commu-niqués, NATO leaders have arguedthat cooperative security requiresclose cooperation with Partners as aprerequisite for a peaceful, stable andundivided Europe.

Second, NATO has taken on newmissions. The European revolution of1989, the Gulf War and the wars ofYugoslav dissolution paved the wayfor the execution of peace-supportmissions and crisis-response opera-tions outside the NATO area.Moreover, this new mission took on afurther dimension when Partnerswere invited to contribute to multina-tional coalitions led by NATO, suchas SFOR and KFOR. The Planningand Review Process seeks to har-monise the defence planning ofNATO member countries andPartners with the aim of improvinginteroperability for combined opera-tions.

Third, NATO has alreadyembraced the idea of a European pil-lar. In the 1991 Alliance StrategicConcept, NATO’s political strategy, itwas agreed that within NATO “aEuropean security identity” should bedeveloped. The 1994 NATO summitendorsed concepts of “separable butnot separate forces” and CombinedJoint Task Forces (CJTFs) that couldbe made available for European-ledoperations other than collectivedefence. In Berlin in 1996, NATOforeign ministers decided to build aEuropean Security and DefenceIdentity (ESDI). During their 1998 StMalo meeting, French PresidentJacques Chirac and UK PrimeMinister Tony Blair took the initiativeto set up a capability for autonomousEuropean action, which led to theEuropean Union’s Helsinki HeadlineGoal of creating a 60,000-strongrapid intervention force by 2003.During the 1999 Washington summit,Alliance leaders adopted the neces-sary arrangements to allow EU accessto NATO collective assets and capa-bilities for crisis-response operationswhere the Alliance as a whole is notengaged militarily. Moreover, it isimportant to remember that theUnited States fully supported thesearrangements. In other words, NATOreached consensus on ESDI and its


FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

ESDP is an agent ofradical change because itimplies that the AtlanticAlliance will become atwo-pillar organisation

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURGversusROB DE WIJK

embracing the reality rather than theidea, things are far from straightfor-ward.

The primary variable in determin-ing NATO’s ability to move from aone to a two-pillar construct is USpolicy. Of course, if, as you suggest,the United States was going stronglyunilateral, then the prospects for atwo-pillar NATO would indeed bepoor. After all, Washington did notgreatly enjoy the constraints imposedby the multilateral nature of NATOduring the Kosovo air campaign. The“war within the war” between theNATO chain of command and that ofthe United States was illustrative ofthis. If a one-pillar NATO appearsonerous to some in the United States,there would seem to be little chanceof a two-pillar Alliance, with aEuropean caucus, enjoying muchsupport in Washington.

However, radical military changein the United States opens scope for anew modus operandi between theUnited States and Europe in NATO.Washington will want to focus moreon Asia – where the more serious mil-itary risks and strategic states are –and it will reduce its forward-basedforce structure for budget and RMA-related reasons. Missile defence willalso act as an accelerator of thesedeep changes in the US force struc-ture and doctrine, since defencebudget increases will presumably besiphoned off into this area. Giventhese budgetary constraints andstrategic shifts, Washington will havereason to press for more, not less,ESDP.


ROB DE WIJK

The Americans have tofeel at ease with the speed

of the process leadingtowards ESDP

role in the development of theEuropean Union’s Common Foreignand Security Policy (CFSP), includ-ing the ESDP.

I support your remarks on thepotential upheaval stemming fromUS policy choices. Missile defencecould create division within NATO.Moreover, the United States willundoubtedly put more emphasis ondefending its interests in central Asia,especially in the oil-rich Caspian Seabasin. Indeed, the United States willhave to invest in expeditionary armedforces for this purpose. But movingaway from expensive mechanisedunits and platforms (aircraft andships), which were highly relevantduring the Cold War period, to smallerand more flexible units with sub-stantial firepower and better mobilityfor power projection abroad couldalso save money. I expect AndyMarshall to put forward new ideas inthis f ield. Nevertheless, I am opti-mistic about President Bush’s abilityto convince Congress to increase thebudget should Marshall come up witha new strategic vision.

The greatest source of upheaval isa different one. Until 1998, multilat-eralism was a dominant feature of USforeign policy. The United States tookinitiatives to strengthen cooperativesecurity in Europe and to create a sys-tem of complementary and mutuallyreinforcing institutions. For variousreasons, US foreign policy put lessemphasis on the strengthening ofcooperative security in 1998. Instead,more emphasis was put on the promo-tion of national interests. This has ledto a more selective involvement in therest of the world. Interventions in1998 in Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq,NMD and the Senate’s refusal to rati-fy the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty underscore this change in USforeign policy. Moreover, NATO’sKosovo air campaign made clear theextent of European dependency onthe United States for large-scale mili-

tary operations. In this way, the shiftin US foreign policy and the technol-ogy gap have caused Europeans tofear the decoupling of US andEuropean security and helped spurCFSP and ESDP.

In sum, the “old” NATO no longerexists, there is consensus on the wayforward, including the developmentof a European defence identity, andthe potential source of upheaval is theperception that the United States hasembarked upon a policy of selectiveengagement that could lead to decou-pling of US and Europe’s security.The real question, therefore, is how tokeep the United States fully involvedto ensure that NATO retains its rele-vance in the future.

Yours,Rob

Dear Rob,

Your emphasis on NATO’s capabil-ity to adapt to new circumstances isone I share. However, there is a quali-ty to these changes which is reminis-cent of the sentence in GiuseppeTomasi Di Lampedusa’s TheLeopard: “Everything has to changeso that nothing changes.” The chal-lenges I am referring to will force theAlliance not simply to adapt, but totransform itself into a two-pillarorganisation, in deeds and not only inwords. ESDI could hardly becomesubstantive as long as there was noEuropean-wide policy to sustain it,and the absence of such a policy wasnot NATO’s fault. Now that ESDP isbecoming a reality, NATO Allies arefaced with the challenge of fulfillingthe pledges adopted at the 1999Washington Summit to give theEuropean Union access to NATO col-lective assets and capabilities. As youwell know, at least one prominentmember country, Turkey, has notproven enthusiastic in this regard.NATO may have embraced the idea ofthe EU pillar, but when it comes to


I may be too optimistic. Maybe theBush administration will mark a uni-lateralist break with US strategic andmilitary engagement on the interna-tional scene, and that would be trulybad news for NATO. But the compo-sition of the new administration secu-rity and defence teams doesn’t pointin that direction.

Yours,François

Dear François,

You have correctly argued thatwhen it comes to embracing realityrather than the idea, things are farfrom straightforward. I also agreethat the United States is likely to putmore emphasis on its security inter-ests outside Europe. This shift would,indeed, require Washington to pressfor more, not less, ESDP.

I have argued that the accelerationof both CFSP and ESDP was, amongother things, caused by Europeanfears that shifts in US foreign policyand the technology gap would lead toa decoupling of European and USsecurity. The further development ofESDP, however, no longer depends onUS strategic choices. The reason isthe process started in St Malo in1998. The St Malo declaration hascomplemented the debate on institu-tional matters with decisions on capa-bilities. Since St Malo, several crucialsteps have been taken to adaptAlliance structures to the new ESDI.During the 1999 Cologne EuropeanCouncil, it was decided to establish a

permanent EU Political and SecurityCommittee, an EU MilitaryCommittee and an EU military staff.The importance of these decisionscan hardly be overstated.

The establishment of new perma-nent politico-military structures inBrussels will lead to the creation of anew bureaucracy. Indeed, theEuropean Union’s military staff hasalready grown to more than 130 per-sons. This bureaucracy will inevitablydevelop policies, which, in turn, willcreate a momentum of their own. Inother words, the establishment of newpermanent EU structures, togetherwith the catalogue of forces for EU-led operations agreed during lastyear’s Commitment Conference inBrussels, has created a momentumindependent of US policies, withpotentially far-reaching conse-quences for transatlantic relations.

It is because of this that the UnitedKingdom has become the key player.Where France always favours speed-ing the process towards ESDP, PrimeMinister Blair is hesitant because ofthe potential consequences fortransatlantic relations. This under-scores my earlier remark that the realchallenge is how to keep the UnitedStates fully involved, to ensure thatNATO retains its relevance. As a firststep, the EU member states shouldagree a strategic concept, spelling outmember states’ common interests,where they may be at risk and howthey can be protected. This shouldserve as a basis for defence and oper-ational planning.

This brings me to the issue of lead-ership. Probably the greatest obstacleto developing and deploying anautonomous European capability isthe absence of a clear leader.Leadership is a prerequisite both foreffective defence and operationalplanning. So far, the major players –France, Germany and the UnitedKingdom – are all playing the game

by different rules. From a theoreticalperspective, Javier Solana, theEuropean Union’s foreign policyHigh Representative, should be lead-ing the ESDP. But as long as theEuropean Union pursues intergovern-mental security and defence policies,this is unlikely. If the Europeans mis-manage this process, a two-pillarNATO could emerge, consisting of apolitical forum for transatlantic con-sultation, with the much-praised inte-grated military structure dividedbetween the North Americans and theEuropean Union. This is not theNATO I wish to see. On the one hand,I am in favour of keeping the integratedmilitary structure, so that unneces-sary duplication can be avoided. Onthe other hand, I believe we shouldmake it more flexible, so that EU-ledCJTFs with “separable but not sepa-rate forces” and using collectiveNATO assets will be possible. Forthis, the Americans, and of course theTurks, have to feel at ease with thespeed of the process leading towardsESDP.

Yours,Rob

Dear Rob,

Although ESDP is intergovern-mental in nature, it faithfully followsthe “Jean Monnet” method ofEuropean integration: first one estab-lishes a solidarité de fait – the newdefence and security institutions andthe headline force – and then, butonly then, does one approach theissue of what it is for, the finalitéstrategique as it were. The time hasnow come for the European Union –perhaps under the incoming Belgianpresidency – to embark on a strategyreview. This is crucial not only for thesake of ESDP per se but also for thetransatlantic relationship. Both theEuropean Union and the UnitedStates will have to make up their col-lective minds as to whether they wishto emphasise division of labour –


FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

The time has nowcome for the EuropeanUnion to embark on a

strategy review


“The Europeans do Europe, theUnited States does the world” – or tounderscore the sharing of risks insideand outside the NATO area. I wouldclearly prefer the latter, but there is nofirm consensus on such a view as yetin either the United States or in theEuropean Union.

Then there is the existential prob-lem of leadership in the EuropeanUnion. NATO has operated on a one-pillar basis, with the United Statesbeing more than a primus inter pares.This model is obviously not appropri-ate to the European Union, in whichno single member can consistentlybear alone the burden of leadership.ESDP’s new institutions, whichresemble NATO’s institutions, cannotwork like NATO’s. As a result,ESDP’s capability to function effec-tively as a second pillar of NATO willdepend on the European Union’sinstitutional, and possibly constitu-tional, review which is slated for2004, at a time when neither France,Germany nor the United Kingdomface the pressure of imminent generalelections.

In the meantime, it is reassuring tosee that NATO and the EuropeanUnion are actually learning to operatetogether in a synergistic fashion in theface of the extraordinarily complexsituation in the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia.* This devel-opment gives some hope that a two-pillar model can be achieved overtime.

Yours,François

Dear François,

I was happy to read that you favoura strategic concept for the EuropeanUnion. I, too, believe that we do notneed a division of labour between theEuropeans and the Americans. Whatwe need is a strategic concept whichtakes collective interests as a starting

point. The prosperity of EU memberstates depends on a stable and secureglobal environment, which may bethreatened by events in Asia orAfrica. As a result, the EuropeanUnion has no choice but to play anactive role in world affairs with theaim of defending its interests andstrengthening the international rule oflaw. A strategic concept should there-fore def ine the European Union’splace in the global power distribution.If the European Union muddles onwithout a sense of direction, its influ-ence will likely decline and a powervacuum could emerge.

I am not in favour of a division oflabour, where “Europe does Europeand the United States does the rest ofthe world.” We, Europeans, needpower-projection capabilities todefend our interests. These capabili-ties should also be used to project sta-bility, that is to carry out peace-sup-port operations. As a f irst step,European members of NATO shouldimplement NATO’s DefenceCapabilities Initiative, preferablythrough joint European ventures.Only through close cooperation willwe be able to generate greater outputfor our money.

A strategic concept would help usdef ine the so-called “Petersbergtasks”, which are incorporated in theTreaties on European Union: human-itarian and rescue tasks, peacekeep-ing tasks and tasks of combat forcesin crisis management, includingpeace-making. Within the EuropeanUnion there are still divergent politi-cal views. On the one hand, EU mem-bers with strong transatlantic lean-ings, such as my own country, theNetherlands, traditionally favour alimited interpretation of thePetersberg tasks. To ensure US partic-ipation in more demanding crises,they wish to take on only small-scaleoperations at the lower end of theconflict spectrum. On the other hand,EU members with a strong European

orientation, such as your country,France, favour developing militarycapabilities to take on these tasksthroughout the entire conflict spec-trum.

Things are changing, however. TheDutch government is becoming moresympathetic to the idea of strengthen-ing European defence. In my view,people like you and me should try toconvince politicians that a EuropeanUnion with global interests requires amaximalist interpretation of thePetersberg tasks. We should makeclear that this will not undermine, butwill strengthen NATO. Therefore, weshould emphasise that unnecessaryduplication should be avoided. A two-pillar NATO, with two bureaucraciesdealing with similar tasks and ulti-mately two integrated military struc-tures, would be regrettable.

I share your view that it is reassur-ing to see that NATO and theEuropean Union are learning to oper-ate in a synergistic fashion in the for-mer Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia.* This is a critical testcase. If NATO and the EuropeanUnion fail to manage it properly, thepotential for escalation is enormous.If they handle the situation skillfully,it will again demonstrate that NATOand the European Union are indispen-sable for peace and stability inEurope and can work together effec-tively.

Yours,Rob


ROB DE WIJK

The EuropeanUnion has no choicebut to play an activerole in world affairs


FEATURES


New faces have appeared inNATO’s Brussels headquar-ters in recent years as

Partner nationals have seizedopportunities to witness Alliancedecision-making and operations forthemselves. Since 1999, more than20 young civil servants fromPartner countries have benef itedfrom a Partnership for Peace (PfP)internship programme enablingthem to work at the very heart of theAlliance.

The programme, which wasunveiled at a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council inNovember 1998, has provedincreasingly popular since the firstPartner interns arrived at NATOheadquarters immediately after theAlliance’s 1999 Washington Sum-mit.

Eight positions on NATO’sInternational Staff have been creat-ed for the programme in divisionsinvolved in PfP-related activities,two each in Defence Planning andOperations, Defence Support, CivilEmergency Planning and PoliticalAffairs.

Costs of the internship pro-gramme are the responsibility ofPartner countries. However, in orderto ensure that individuals from allPartner countries have an equalopportunity to benefit from the pro-gramme, some NATO membershave sponsored selected interns. AUkrainian intern, who is just aboutto join, will, for example, be sup-ported f inancially by the UnitedKingdom.

All PfP-designated posts areopen to nationals of all Partnercountries, but prospective internsare expected to have a good knowl-edge of one of the two NATOworking languages. Moreover, par-ent divisions have the f inal say in

appointments, which is based onprospective interns’ qualif icationsand a fair geographic distributionof posts. To provide interns withthe most valuable experience andensure regular rotation of posts,internships are offered for a periodfrom a few months up to one year.

The terms under which Partnernationals work at NATO is gov-erned by a special policy, whichseeks to marry the intern’s need forinformation with NATO’s securityregulations. Although many provi-sions were drawn from existing

arrangements for interns fromNATO member states, Partnernationals do not have access toclassif ied information or evenparts of NATO headquarters. As aresult, “non-escorted visitor” pass-es were issued to Partner interns toenable them to move between theiroff ices, located outside NATO’ssecure areas, and their parent divi-sion. In addition, special arrange-ments have been put in place togive Partner interns suff icientaccess to restricted information tocarry out their duties.

Eric de Labarthe, PfP internshipprogramme coordinator, explained:

“Special authorisations wereissued to permit interns to attendmeetings relevant to their dailywork. Moreover, as a result ofongoing efforts towards the har-monisation of classif icationbetween NATO and PfP docu-ments, interns already have accessto a wide range of newly declassi-fied information.”

In addition to hands-on training,interns are given the opportunity tomake a personal contribution toAlliance operations. In agreementwith their parent division, Partnercivil servants are able to take onindividual projects, from the pro-duction of NATO publications tothe preparation of in-depth analysesand case studies on PfP-related sub-jects.

According to Marie Holmberg, aSwedish intern who studied Partnercountry involvement in NATO landarmaments and safety-related activ-ities for the Defence Support divi-sion, “These individual projectsdemonstrate the unique possibilitiesoffered by the PfP InternshipProgramme.”

Experiencing cross-culturalcooperation and acquiring an in-depth understanding of the way inwhich NATO operates help dispellmyths about the Alliance. MsHolmberg said that she now viewsthe Alliance in terms of “the nine-teen nations behind it” and appreci-ates “the value of consensus in deci-sion-making”.

With a maximum of eightPartner interns at any time, the PfPinternship programme is modest incomparison with similar pro-grammes in the military f ield.Nevertheless, the initiative hasproved popular both among staff atNATO headquarters and Partnerparticipants, with the result that itmay be expanded. “The idea hasbeen warmly welcomed, althoughfurther consideration is requiredfor such an endeavour to be imple-mented”, Mr De Labarthe said. ■

FRESH FACES AT NATO

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Ms Holmberg: unique possibility

FEATURES


Duge is a remote village inKosovo’s Crnoljeva moun-tains lying near the cross-

roads between the towns of Urosevacand Prizren. It has a population ofabout 200, is largely cut off from therest of the province in winter and, incommon with much of Kosovo, suf-fered large-scale destruction duringfighting in 1998 and 1999. Today,life is beginning to return to normal,in large part because of the efforts ofa KFOR civil-military cooperation(CIMIC) team.

War damage to the main road outof Duge meant that villagers found itextremely difficult to get in and out,had no immediate access to healthcare, and were unable to take theirchildren to school. Repairing thethree-kilometre stretch of road link-ing Duge with the outside world wascritical for the revitalisation of vil-lage life and one of some 1,000reconstruction projects identified bya CIMIC team last year.

CIMIC is the process of coopera-tion and coordination between aNATO commander and the civilianpopulations and civilian organisa-tions within his theatre of operations.The process involves the establish-ment of liaison mechanisms and thecoordination of the needs of the mili-tary and civilian organisations. It canalso lead, under exceptional circum-stances, to military involvement intasks that would normally fall undera civilian mandate.

CIMIC’s involvement in recon-struction was key to the strategy ofKFOR’s second commander, SpanishGeneral Juan Ortuño, who aimed to“provide a long-term economic per-spective to the province” and toendow it with “a mechanism to facil-itate the flow of international donorfunding to regional and municipallevels”. Moreover, not only has thisapproach been welcomed by civilianorganisations, international agencies

and local authorities, but it has alsohelped build mutual understandingbetween them and the military.

Following a f ield assessment inMarch 2000, which identif ied thatthe international community lacked aKosovo-wide capacity to assessreconstruction needs, planners atSupreme Headquarters Allies PowersEurope (SHAPE) set up the KosovoDevelopment Group. This wasdetached under the authority of theEuropean Union’s Kosovo recon-struction department. Belgium,Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,Greece, Italy, and Spain volunteereda staff of 18 trained off icers, whohave worked in teams of three in theprovince’s five sectors as well as inPristina. Costs have been sharedamong the parties involved with par-ticipating nations covering salaries,KFOR providing lodging and work-space and the European Union ensur-ing transport, as well as stationeryand supplementary expenses.

Starting in July 2000, KosovoDevelopment Group teams travelledthroughout the province, identifying

and prioritising reconstruction proj-ects, like that in Duge, in cooperationwith local authorities and the 120 orso non-governmental organisationsoperating in Kosovo. These projects,which cover all aspects of recon-struction, from repairing infrastruc-ture to regenerating the economy,have now been allocated EU funding.

The Kosovo Development Group’soriginal staff left the province at theend of January as their tour of dutycame to an end. Their successors willbe overseeing projects until July ofthis year, by which time EU civilianstructures should be ready to takeover the task.

Since NATO-led peacekeepersarrived in the Balkans in December1995, the range of activities whichthe military has become involvedwith has steadily expanded.Although the demands on soldiersand the skills they require haveincreased, CIMIC experience ofreconstruction has proved extremelypositive, helping improve relationsboth with the local population andother international agencies workingin the field.

Based on experience in bothBosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo,SHAPE has prepared a policy docu-ment, laying down broad guidelinesfor CIMIC, defining the concept andsetting out operating principles. Mostimportantly, it establishes the checksand balances to ensure that involve-ment in civilian tasks occurs onlywhen there is no alternative. Thisdocument has already been agreed byNATO member states and shouldsoon be endorsed by the NorthAtlantic Council.

In an effort to improve field coor-dination, SHAPE has also developedworking relations with the keyCIMIC-oriented international organ-isations and NGOs, such as theEuropean Union, the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross and UNagencies. Moreover, another, morecomprehensive CIMIC doctrine doc-ument has been drafted, setting out indetail how CIMIC should operate intheatre. This paper is currently beingcirculated for agreement amongmember states. ■

CIMICRECONSTRUCTION

General Ortuño: long-term perspective

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dom of NATO expansion becauseour presence did not make the deci-sion-making process more diff i-cult. Here, it’s important to paytribute to the Hungarian publicbecause Hungary was actually theonly member state whose popula-tion could see the impact of the aircampaign directly. Indeed, thoseliving on the Hungarian-Yugoslavborder could see and hear thebombings and often had relativeson the other side of the border.Despite this, support for the cam-paign never fell below 50 per cent.The Hungarian public had a goodunderstanding of what NATOstands for and why we launched thecampaign.

NR: At the time Hungary joined theAlliance, analysts opposed toNATO enlargement expressed vari-

ous fears, including the impact it might have on relationswith Russia, whether the North Atlantic Council would stillbe able to operate effectively, and whether Hungary andother new members were militarily ready to join theAlliance. How have these fears panned out in practice?

AS: Some fears were totally unfounded and some stemmedfrom worries about whether an enlarged Alliance of 19would be able to be as strong and effective as it was at 16.The Kosovo campaign demonstrated that it is perfectly pos-sible to take extremely difficult decisions at 19 because,despite Czech, Hungarian and Polish membership, the sol-idarity, efficiency and cohesion of the Alliance was notdiminished, but enhanced. My message is that the ability totake decisions does not depend on the number of countriessitting around the Council table, but on their attitude andwhether they understand that, in the end, they have to pullin the same direction. As a result, I’m not worried aboutfuture Alliance enlargement and would want to see as many

NATO review: What impact hasHungarian membership of NATOhad on Hungary and how has theHungarian public responded?

AS: The idea of Euro-Atlantic inte-gration has had a huge impact onmy country. Hungary inheritedstructures from communist timesand a sick economy that had to bereformed. Ultimately, the best wayto reform is to aim at integrationinto the two main institutions thatstand for modernisation, namelyNATO and the European Union.Preparing for NATO membershiphas therefore been of enormoushelp for us, since it has maintainedmaximum pressure on Hungarianinstitutions, on Hungarian societyand on Hungarian politicians toensure that they execute the neces-sary reforms so that Hungary cancatch up and join the most modern, democratic nations ofthe world, many of which are NATO members.Membership has not come without a price tag. It hasdemanded many sacrifices both in human and in monetaryterms. But in the end, Hungary has gained stability andHungary has gained a great deal of influence in formingEuro-Atlantic policies. Hungary now has a place at theNorth Atlantic Council where the most important decisionson European security are made.

NR: How did Hungary and the Hungarian public respond tothe Kosovo air campaign?

AS: After just over a week of joyful celebrations markingHungarian membership of the Alliance on 12 March 1999,the NATO air campaign came as a huge shock. But what isimportant is that Hungary stood the test. Indeed, the way inwhich Hungary, and for that matter the other new members,performed during the air campaign demonstrated the wis-

Andras Simonyi: Hungarian heraldAs Hungary’s ambassador to NATO from 1995 and his country’s first permanent representative to the Alliance from 1999, Andras Simonyi

played a key role first in steering Hungary to NATO membership and thenin overseeing the transition. Ambassador Simonyi, now 49, left Brussels in

January after nine years to start a new career as a consultant, working toattract international investment to central and eastern Europe.

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new members come in as possible, with the proviso thatthey understand the importance of maintaining the effi-ciency, cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance. ConcerningRussia, the Hungarian position has always been that NATOenlargement has nothing to do with fear of Russia. Rather,NATO is enlarging because we want to extend the zone ofstability and security towards the East. Indeed, we think itis in the interests of Russia that it sees more stable coun-tries emerging on its western borders. The past couple ofyears have proved that the zone of stability has in effectgrown and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland aremuch more stable, their economies are growing muchfaster, and even those countries that are not yet members ofthe Alliance but are bordering the new members have ben-efited from a sense of security and stability.

NR: Have any problems proved more difficult to overcomethan anticipated?

AS: As NATO enlarges, it must stay strong with propercapabilities. I have never been satisfied with the pace ofmilitary reform. This is an ongoing process, which willprobably never be completed, but is critical to meeting thesecurity challenges of the modern world. I regret that wedid not have the tools at our disposal during the preparatoryprocess, which are now available for aspiring Alliancemembers and the deep engagement, which Partners nowhave with NATO. I also wish that we had benefited fromthe deep sharing of information, which is now routinelyavailable to candidate countries, because that might haveeased the preparatory process. But the bottom line is thatwe will have to continue to reform because Hungary needssmaller, more effective, more mobile and more commu-nicative armed forces, which are better able to serve bothHungarian and NATO interests.

NR: Are there any lessons to be learned from the timingand way in which Hungary joined the Alliance?

AS: The most important lesson we learned is that militaryreform should be fast and effective. Doing it slowly willnot ease the pain, but will exacerbate it and make it lastlonger. It is important to concentrate efforts on priorities,which have to be identified at an early stage and restrictedto a handful, which are then executed. The most importantpart of military reform is downsizing, and then restructur-ing, and here it’s critical to concentrate on the human ele-ment. Human resource management is the key to success-ful military reform. All the money in the world can bepoured into an outdated system and the effect will be total-ly invisible. The way to reform militaries is to restructure,reorganise and prepare your manpower to be receptive tothe process, before putting money in. We have had to learnthe hard way that military reform should not be carried outbecause NATO demands it, but because it’s part and parcelof the democratic reform process, in which the publicscrutinises government expenditure and makes the coun-try more efficient.

NR: How is Hungary ensuring that its armed forces areequipped to meet the challenges of the 21st century?

AS: We’re downsizing. We’re reorganising. We’re puttingthe pyramid back on its feet, meaning that we want to havean army of fighting men, which is not over-burdened by anexcessive number of officers and generals. Our militarywill also need better equipment, which, whether we like itor not, we will have to procure. But reform is not onlyabout money. Ultimately, it’s about political leadership. Ittakes political will, devotion, and clarity of leadership fromthe government to achieve successful military reform. Youcan put huge sums of money into military reform, but, inthe absence of a good concept, political will and politicalleadership, the process is always going to fail.

NR: Based on Hungary’s experience, what lessons for futureNATO enlargement can be drawn both for the Alliance andfor other aspiring members? What preconditions shouldNATO set and what steps should aspirants already be taking?

AS: The criteria for the three first new members were veryclear. They were first, political democracy and stability;second, economic reform and the establishment of a full-fledged market economy; third, full respect for humanrights and good neighbourly relations; and fourth, militaryreform and civilian control over the armed forces. Theseare the four crucial criteria that we have to stick to, what-ever the country, because it’s important that, as NATOenlarges, the Alliance develops into a community of like-minded nations. When it comes to ranking these criteria,the most important criterion should always be that in whicha country is weakest. My message to nations which wish tobecome members of the Alliance, therefore, is that theyhave to understand that entry criteria will be very tough,but that they are not on their own when it comes to meetingthem. Partnership for Peace, the Membership Action Planand the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council offer so muchmore than was available to us during our preparatoryprocess five years ago. In addition, Hungary is ready toshare its experiences, both positive and negative, with anynation in order to help it meet the criteria.

NR: After the best part of a decade at NATO HQ, what last-ing impressions do you take with you?

AS: NATO is about many things, but, above all, it’s aboutmaintaining the transatlantic relationship. The Alliance isthe key tool keeping the two sides of the Atlantic together,but promoting this link is not only a task for governments,but also for individuals. As a private citizen, I intend tomake the greatest possible use of the experience I havegained at NATO, to promote the concept of North Atlanticcooperation and educate the public on the importance ofthe transatlantic relationship. When I left this Alliance acouple of months ago, I said in my farewell speech to theNorth Atlantic Council that this is a great Alliance, whichmust be kept strong. ■

INTERVIEW



prospects for the NATO-Russia dialogue may be influ-enced by external developments. As a result, there mayonly be a narrow window of opportunity to reconcile theinterests of Moscow and Brussels and build a vigorous dia-logue on security issues.

Having agreed a comprehensive work programme at theministerial meeting of the Permanent Joint Council inFlorence in May 2000, NATO-Russia relations underwent alengthy process of rehabilitation, which was largely com-pleted by the beginning of 2001. The work agenda hasexpanded to embrace a wide range of issues of mutualinterest including ongoing cooperation in and consultationon peacekeeping in the Balkans, discussions of strategyand doctrine, and cooperation in arms control, prolifera-tion, military infrastructure, nuclear issues and theatre mis-sile defences, as well as the retraining of discharged mili-tary personnel and search and rescue at sea.

Andrei Zagorski is director of the EastWest Institute’sNetworking Early Warning Systems Project in Prague and awidely published writer on Russia and security issues.

Since the resumption of dialogue in May last year, rela-tions between NATO and Russia have steadilyimproved. Solid progress and an expanding pro-

gramme of cooperation activities were evident at the meet-ings of the Permanent Joint Council at NATO headquartersin December 2000, which brought together Allied defenceand foreign ministers with their Russian counterparts,Marshal Igor Sergeyev and Igor Ivanov. But recentimprovements mask underlying differences between theAllies and Russia in their perceptions of the evolution ofEurope’s security architecture and of the nature of theNATO-Russia partnership. Moreover, since Russia’s rela-tionship with the West is played out in many arenas, the

Great expectationsAndrei Zagorski examines the thaw in NATO-Russia relations

and the reasons for both optimism and caution.

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Partners in peacekeeping: NATO-Russia cooperation in the Balkans has been a particularly positive experience

The practical experience of Russian and NATO soldiersworking together in the NATO-led peacekeeping opera-tions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo hasbeen particularly positive. Moreover, Russian officers haveplayed an increasingly constructive role in the planning ofjoint operations at Supreme Headquarters Allied PowersEurope. The opening of the NATO Information Office inMoscow in February 2001, after a year of tough negotia-tions, is another visible sign of improving relations.

Although Moscow generally seeks to avoid overtones inpublic statements, the spirit has changed notably in recentmonths. Foreign Minister Ivanov, known for his reticence, haspublicly acknowledged that successes at the practical levelare beginning to spin off in other areas and are improving theNATO-Russia relationship in general. Even MarshallSergeyev has sounded more optimistic recently, praising, inparticular, closer cooperation in the planning of joint opera-tions. That said, he has also cautioned that the relationship hasnot yet been fully restored and that the page has yet to beturned on the sorry chapter in relations between Moscow andBrussels characterised by NATO’s Kosovo air campaign.

There are reasons for both optimism and caution. The2001 Permanent Joint Council work programme is almostas broad as the one that existed at the end of 1998, duringwhat appears to have been the honeymoon period inNATO-Russia relations. This, however, does not substanti-ate expectations of the beginning of true partnership, butseems rather to identify items on the agenda of a forthcom-ing bargaining process. A tough road lies ahead. Fixingeven simple things takes months and years. The protractednegotiations that eventually led to the opening of the NATOInformation Office and those still ongoing to establish aNATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow reflect unre-solved differences between both sides in their perceptionsof how European security should be organised. Such dif-ferences have not been reconciled in the rapprochementsince the Kosovo crisis. Indeed, they predate the crisis. Thisbegs the question whether NATO and Russia have actuallyachieved enough in terms of confidence-building, whichhas been the centrepiece of activities over the past months,to lay the foundations for a true partnership.

When the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in1997 and the Permanent Joint Council was created, theRussian élite saw it as a damage-limitation exercise in thecontext of the first wave of the Alliance’s eastward enlarge-ment. In the first instance, Moscow sought to prevent theeventual deployment of nuclear weapons, the extension ofthe Alliance’s military infrastructure and the stationing ofNATO troops in the new central European member states.For their part, NATO member countries tended to regardthe Founding Act as part of a deal to make NATO enlarge-ment more palatable to Russia.

Yet, the Founding Act itself was more ambitious. ThePermanent Joint Council was supposed to “provide a mech-

OPINION


anism for consultation, coordination and, to the maximumextent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions andjoint action with respect to security issues of common con-cern”. The declared “shared objective of NATO andRussia” was “to identify and pursue as many opportunitiesfor joint action as possible”. Unfortunately, the envisagedjoint decision-making process has failed to materialise.Dialogue has remained at the level of regular consultationsand lost much of its initial purpose, after the launch of theKosovo air campaign. Unwilling to share responsibility foran action it could not endorse yet was unable to prevent,Moscow found it better simply to withdraw.

Things have clearly changed for the better since then.The increased involvement of Russian officers in jointoperations planning has improved significantly in recentmonths and there is greater consultation before NATOdecisions are taken. Moscow has no power of veto, but itspositions and concerns are given a fair hearing. However,while this mode of cooperation is working at the moment,it is not clear whether it would still work if more controver-sial issues were at stake, as in March 1999.

Lord Robertson’s first trip to Moscow as NATO SecretaryGeneral in February 2000 was aimed at re-energising theNATO-Russia relationship. He and Russian PresidentVladimir Putin agreed that NATO and Russia should pursuea “vigorous dialogue on a wide range of security issues....toaddress the challenges that lie ahead and to make their mutu-al cooperation a cornerstone of European security”. However,the two sides continue to pursue notably different concepts ofEuropean security, which have become more divergent sincethe Kosovo crisis. Similarly, while the joint statementreleased at the ministerial meeting of the Permanent JointCouncil in December 2000 welcomes progress achieved andreaffirms the “commitment to build, within the framework ofthe Permanent Joint Council, a strong, stable and equal part-nership”, Brussels and Moscow still have different under-standings as to the ends of such a partnership.

NATO member countries see the Alliance as the centre-piece and as the single most effective military arm of anyEuropean security system. They remain open to improvingcooperation with Russia and with other Partner countries inways which strengthen NATO’s unique role in cooperativesecurity. In this context, the Permanent Joint Council isregarded, in the words of Lord Robertson, as “one of themost important new institutional arrangements that haveemerged in the aftermath of the Cold War”.

Moscow, on the other hand, would like to see the devel-opment of a pan-European security architecture withinwhich each country could feel equally secure and has con-sistently sought to boost the role of the Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe. The new RussianForeign Policy Concept, signed by President Putin on 28June 2000, emphasises the need to improve and deepencooperation with the Alliance and recognises the important

role NATO plays in European security. But it is also unusu-ally explicit about the problems Moscow has with NATO:“The current political and military postures of NATO donot coincide with the security interests of the RussianFederation, and sometimes even run contrary to them.”This basically refers to the provisions of NATO’s 1999Strategic Concept, which do not exclude coercive “out-of-area” operations with no explicit mandate from the UNSecurity Council, and to the possibility of a second wave ofNATO enlargement, particularly if parts of the formerSoviet Union are included.

Russia, therefore, does not want to see the Alliance as thecentre of the European security dialogue, but as one of sev-eral partners for such dialogue. The Permanent Joint Councilprovides a forum where Russian positions on security issuescan be voiced, but it does not give Moscow the power directlyto influence events. For this reason, Foreign MinisterIvanov, even while praising recent progress in cooperation,has described the role of dialogue through the PermanentJoint Council as limited to “an important channel forexchange of information and for theexploration of certain issue areas”.

These different perspectives leadRussia and the Alliance to pursue dif-ferent agendas for the NATO-Russiadialogue. During the past year,Moscow has pushed for the exchangeof views on issues such as military doc-trines, military infrastructure develop-ment and theatre missile defence, andfor cooperation in science and technol-ogy. For its part, the Alliance hasemphasised the importance of practicalcooperation in areas such as militaryreform and has sought to motivateRussia to take a more active part in Partnership for Peaceactivities. These different agendas are not irreconcilable. The2001 Permanent Joint Council work programme covers allthese areas, as well as a number of others. However, unlessunderlying differences are reconciled, it will be more diffi-cult and less likely to achieve substantial progress on any ofthe more controversial issues.

In the meantime, progress can be achieved in less con-troversial areas. In addition to the successful cooperationthat has developed between KFOR and SFOR troops on theground in Kosovo and Bosnia (the rationale of which isnevertheless questioned in Russia each time things appearto go wrong in the Balkans), other success stories can beidentified in areas such as search and rescue at sea and theretraining of discharged officers. The importance of evenmodest practical collaboration or the significance of open-ing a NATO Information Office or seeking to establish aNATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow should not,however, be underestimated. Real partnership, if ever pos-sible, can only grow out of such projects.

OPINION


However, as recent history has revealed, the up-and-down cycles in NATO-Russia relations may prove to beshort and could easily fall victim to worsening mutual rela-tions resulting from developments in areas outside thePermanent Joint Council framework. Practical cooperationthrough joint ventures may not have sufficient time tomature and yield spin-off effects. A brief look at Russia’sprincipal concerns helps understand how difficult it may beto reconcile the interests of Moscow and Brussels.

The fundamental concern, which was brought into sharpfocus as a result of the Kosovo crisis, is the shape of thefuture world order and Russia’s position within it. WithNATO seemingly challenging the authority of the UNSecurity Council, in which Russia enjoys the status of apermanent member and a veto, and with it proving difficultto develop the Organisation for Security and Cooperationin Europe into an effective regional collective securityorganisation, Moscow faces a difficult choice. Either givein to closer cooperation with NATO, or risk the further ero-sion of Russia’s status as a great power, albeit one inherited

from the previous bi-polar world andno longer backed up by real capabili-ties, apart from its nuclear arsenal.Upcoming decisions on NATOenlargement and on National MissileDefense (NMD) are likely to producedisturbances in Russia’s relationshipwith both NATO and the United Statesbecause they will be seen as furtherchallenges to Russia’s status in theworld order.

With regard to enlargement,Russian officials repeatedly confirmMoscow’s opposition, particularly topossible NATO membership for the

Baltic states. Military considerations are probably of lessconcern than the fact that a future NATO with an almostEurope-wide membership and links that stretch into theCaucasus and Central Asia through the Partnership forPeace would undermine the chances for developing anincreased pan-European security role for any other institu-tion. Moscow would be left with little alternative to closercooperation with NATO.

On missile defence, Russia is concerned that its statusas a global nuclear power would be threatened should theUnited States be unwilling or unable to f ind a compro-mise on the modalities of its NMD project and on thefuture of the ABM Treaty. Such concerns are magnifiedby Moscow’s expectation that US foreign policy under theBush administration will become increasingly unilateral.This, Moscow fears, could undermine the role of theUnited Nations and also impact on US cooperation withRussia, which might in turn limit Russia’s possibilities forbargaining within the framework of the NATO-Russiadialogue.

Different perspectiveslead Russia and theAlliance to pursuedifferent agendas forthe NATO-Russiadialogue

So far, Moscow seems to be adopting a more unilateralpolicy approach and expressing a determination to main-tain its freedom of choice and action. At the same time,Russia is showing its readiness to pursue ad hoc coopera-tion with both NATO and the United States in areas wherethere is no conflict of interest, while repeatedly stressingthe supremacy of the United Nations and the rule of inter-national law. Should Russia prove unable actively tooppose developments that it believes would undermine itsgreat power status, it is likely to fall back to a more absen-tee stand in international politics.

The key decisions on enlargement and on NMD, whichcould potentially have a major impact on the NATO-Russiarelationship, are likely to be taken sooner rather than later.This leaves little time for the development of the “vigorousdialogue” agreed between President Putin and LordRobertson. Both sides have a long tradition of tough bargain-ing with each other. If no results are achieved in the nearfuture and no progress is made in reconciling fundamentaldifferences, the dialogue between Moscow and Brussels risksstagnation and the future direction of NATO-Russia relationscould be held hostage to external developments. ■

OPINION


NATO Information Office

Ceremonial opening: Lord Robertson unveils a plaque commemorating the inauguration of NATO’s Moscow Information Office

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertsoninaugurated a NATO Information Office in centralMoscow on 20 February.

The office will provide Russians with informationabout the Alliance and its missions and reinforce coop-eration between NATO and Russia. It will be staffed bytwo senior NATO employees with local support.

Its opening is a reflection of the improvement inrelations between NATO and Russia since the 1999Kosovo air campaign.

The agreement to open such an office was reachedat the December 2000 ministerial meeting of thePermanent Joint Council, after a year of toughnegotiations, and was followed by an exchange ofletters between Lord Robertson and RussianForeign Minister Igor Ivanov.

“More than ten years after the end of the ColdWar, at the start of the 21st century, NATO-Russiarelations must evolve into a true strategic partner-ship,” Lord Robertson said at the inaugurationceremony.

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Understanding NATO

not knowing exactly what NATO’s Combined Joint TaskForces Concept (CJTF) is. Yet, to mistake CJTF for the(worldwide) US Military Assistance Program requires aspecial effort in getting things wrong. The same holds truefor turning the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council intothe “NATO Russia Forum”, or for his claim that the Sovietswere hiding SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles inEast Germany. His discussion of NATO’s Balkan engage-ment does not fare better: Ibrahim Rugova, a symbol ofKosovo’s peaceful road to independence if ever there wasone, would surely be surprised to learn that he was infavour of Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia.

In getting all his facts wrong, Duignan shows at leastsome consistency. In his political judgements, however, noteven a modicum of consistency remains. While Duignantakes NATO enlargement critics to task and argues thatenlargement was the right thing to do, he changes his mindlater in the book, warning the reader that “diluting” NATOwith more members might jeopardise its decision-makingprocess (page 115). In a similar vein, he argues that LordIsmay’s famous characterisation of NATO as an instrumentto “keep the Germans down” was still applicable today, yetas the book proceeds, he again changes his mind, arguingthat “leadership of NATO ... should pass from theAmericans to the Europeans early in the twenty-f irst century” and that “Germany is a logical choice to take overfrom the United States” (page 119).

This intellectual rollercoaster is further aggravated bythe absence of a structure (for example, the Committee onthe Challenges of Modern Society is discussed under theheading of NATO enlargement). Instead, the narrative flip-flops between the past and the present, between facts cob-bled together from the NATO Handbook and personal mus-ings, all of it carrying the ring of someone who doesn’treally know what he wants to say. Indeed, “say” is theappropriate word here, because much of the book reads likeit was spoken straight into a dictaphone.

Bad books are legion, and yet there is a sense of tragedyhere. After all, Duignan is a pro-NATO Atlanticist.Apparently, he wanted to write a defence of the US engage-ment in Europe. That he failed so spectacularly in crusad-ing for such a laudable cause is saddening.

That the case for NATO’s undiminished relevance canindeed be cogently argued is demonstrated by David Yost’sNATO Transformed (United States Institute of Peace Press,

Monographs on the post-Cold War AtlanticAlliance are a challenging task. They attempt topin down a moving target. However, compared to

edited volumes, which often are just hastily assembled con-ference papers of uneven length and quality, monographsshould at least offer consistency and clarity of argument.With only one author in charge, the problem of too manycooks should not arise.

But what if the cook has no recipe? Such is the case withthe monograph by Peter Duignan, a scholar at the HooverInstitution in Stanford, California. His NATO: Its Past,Present, and Future (Hoover Institution Press, 2000)brings to mind the immortal words of Ambrose Bierce:“The covers of this book are too far apart.” Indeed, the cov-ers of Duignan’s 150-page book are too far apart by about150 pages. Already as early as page 9, we learn thatNATO’s famous Lisbon force goals of 1952 were apparent-ly agreed in Boston. We learn that: “The NATO powersagreed on enlargement in 1998” (page 61), apparently oneyear after the 1997 Madrid Summit. The 1945 “Yalta sell-out” has been moved to 1946 (page 71). A map on page 78dates NATO’s creation three years ahead of its time, to1946, and we also learn that Slovenia, Romania and Austriaare likely to be the next members in an alleged “2003tranche” (pages 115 and 118).

In discussing NATO’s post-Cold War adaptationDuignan displays appallingly poor knowledge. For exam-ple, based on sources from 1990 (!) he opines that the WEUwill have an expanded role to play in European security —blissfully unaware that the WEU has, to all intents and pur-poses, been dismantled. He also seems to believe that ESDIis an institution rather than a policy. And so he offers somesweeping policy advice: “The WEU, therefore, should beencouraged to take on more of NATO’s responsibilities andto work with the ESDI for a Europe-wide defense systembacked up by NATO. Let the WEU, the Anglo-French“Euro force”, OSCE, and ESDI handle most of the peace-keeping and conflict resolution functions of NATO inEurope. Activities outside Europe should also be shared ifthe EU wants to participate” (page 119).

This travesty continues across the entire spectrum ofNATO’s activities. Perhaps the author may be forgiven for

Michael Rühle is head of policy planning and speech writingin NATO’s Political Affairs Division.

Michael Rühle reviews some of the best and the worst recent literature on the Alliance.

REVIEW


1998). Although published nearly three years ago, i.e.before the Kosovo air campaign, it still ranks among thef inest monographs on the subject. Painstakinglyresearched, Yost’s book takes the reader through NATO’sCold War history before examining NATO’s post-Cold Waradaptation — an adaptation marked by a shift from collec-tive defence only towards a mix of collective defence andcollective security.

Yost leaves no doubt as to where he sees trouble brewing.He is concerned that NATO’s venturing into col-lective security might risk undermining both thecapabilities as well as the cohesion needed to pro-vide for its core function of collective defence.Hence, his rather elaborate treat-ment of the idea ofcollective securityand its pitfalls.Indeed, given the dif-ficulties of sustainingNATO’s current mili-tary engagement in theBalkans, Yost’s warningsare to be taken seriously.

The well-known diffi-culties of NATO’s Kosovocampaign may even addmore credibility to Yost’swarnings about NATO embarking on the slippery slopetowards over-extension. Still, is it really so important toachieve conceptual clarity as to what NATO “is”? Shouldwe not be more concerned with what NATO “does” — anddoes right? Collective defence may be a less challengingconcept than collective security, but can NATO reallyafford to fiddle while the Balkans are burning? Indeed, Yosthimself acknowledges that the Allies have little choice butto follow a dual strategy of pursuing collective securityaspirations to the extent that this is feasible and prudent,while maintaining their collective defence posture and ori-entation. Thus, one cannot help but suspect that his lengthytreatment of collective security may be something of astraw man. However, Yost employs it in such an effectiveand enlightening manner that it is highly worthwhile.Those not deterred by the book’s hefty 430 pages will learnmore about the NATO of today than from any other bookon the subject.

One of the victims of NATO’s Kosovo campaign was theAlliance’s 50th anniversary. The Balkan tragedy thatunfolded in spring 1999 did not leave much time for reflec-tion on NATO’s first half-century. That the Alliance ulti-mately prevailed in Kosovo was certainly worth the cancel-lation of this or that commemorative event. For those whoare nevertheless interested in NATO’s history, Lawrence S.Kaplan’s The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years(Praeger, 1999), will be a treasure chest. It is not a mono-graph, but a collection of 12 essays written over almost two

decades. Yet it remains highly consistent, and the fewinevitable overlaps and repetitions do not matter much.

Kaplan is a historian. The reader should therefore notexpect too much on NATO’s present or future. Indeed,whenever Kaplan tackles current issues he becomes vagueand evasive. Moreover, as the title implies, Kaplan’s focusis very much on US foreign policy. But none of this dimin-ishes the value of this collection. Indeed, his focus on thepast is a healthy antidote to those “experts” who believethat the world began with the end of the Cold War in 1989.

Kaplan also proves wrong those who believethat history must always be boring. Forexample, his essay NATO: A Counterfactual

History offers a thought-provokingspeculation aboutthe path Europemight have takenhad NATO neverbeen created. Even ifthe reader may notalways agree withKaplan’s extrapola-tions of “what wouldhave happened if ...”,this chapter alone isworth the price of theentire book.

Yost and Kaplan offer good, solid writing on NATO andtransatlantic relations. But these are books for the NATOaficionado, not for the average reader. The NATO “primer”has yet to be written. The student of international relationswho is looking for a readable monograph of modest lengthstill has to wait. ■

Two hits and a miss

NATO offers a limited number of research fellowships each year

to both individuals and institutions. Both NATO-member and

Partner-country nationals may apply.

Full details can be found on the NATO web site:

http://www.nato.int/acad/home.htm

F e l l o w s h i p s


fessionalization process is now well underway and is to becompleted by 2002, by which time more than 90 per cent ofthe French military will be careerists, as compared to lessthan 60 per cent in 1996.

By contrast, in the first post-Cold War decade successiveGerman governments steered clear of any talk of reducingor eliminating conscription, arguing that national service isan important part of German defence culture that effective-ly binds the military and civilian society together. Thisviewpoint has only recently softened. In May 2000, in thewake of glaring evidence provided by Operation AlliedForce, NATO’s Kosovo campaign, that a conscript forcewas ill-suited to today’s international security environment,the government-mandated Commission for CommonSecurity and the Future of the Bundeswehr (theCommission) recommended significant changes to theconscript system. As a result, the number of German con-scripts is to be reduced to 80,000 per year, much less thanthe previous level of 135,000, though still significantlymore than the Commission’s recommendation of 30,000.

Over the past decade, several other NATO nations havechanged the composition of their militaries by increasingthe proportion of professional forces. Belgium and theNetherlands have eliminated conscription altogether, whileItaly, Portugal and Spain have plans to do so over the nextfew years. The Czech Republic and Hungary plan to elimi-nate or reduce conscription once they are in a financialposition to do so, and Poland recently announced its inten-tion to reduce and professionalize half its forces by 2003.

Changes in the heavy force structures of the Cold Warera are also central to enhancing the deployability andmobility of NATO forces. Part of this involves the reduc-tion in size of large Cold War armies. The French armedforces are being reduced from a 1996 level of 500,000 to357,000 personnel by 2002, while Germany’s force levelswill be reduced from the current 320,000 to about 275,000over the next three or four years. Other NATO nations, suchas Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, car-ried out similar force reductions of the order of 25 to 30 percent in the early to mid-1990s.

More important is the organisational restructuring of theremaining forces into more rapidly deployable units, whichare still highly lethal. Here again, there have been signifi-cant developments over the past few years. The UnitedKingdom’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review set in train a

Elinor Sloan is a defence analyst with the Directorate ofStrategic Analysis at Canada’s National DefenceHeadquarters and author of Bosnia and the New CollectiveSecurity (Praeger, 1998) and The Revolution in MilitaryAffairs: Implications for Canada and NATO (McGill-Queens Press, forthcoming 2001).

F or much of the past decade, military and security lit-erature has been filled with discussion of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. This notion

immediately conjures up visions of high-tech warfare filledwith advanced sensing, communications and computingcapabilities, stealth technology and precision-guidedweapons. However, what is often lost in the debate is thefact that there will be no revolution until such time as tech-nological wizardry is combined with dramatic doctrinaland organisational change. Central to NATO’s ability torespond effectively to the challenges of the new interna-tional security environment, is the increased deployabilityand mobility of its forces. Not surprisingly, NATO’sStrategic Concept calls deployability and mobility an“essential operational capability” of Alliance forces, andthe Defence Capabilities Initiative, NATO’s high-level ini-tiative to improve and update military capabilities, includesthe deployability and mobility of NATO forces as a keyarea of focus for transformation.

Force deployability and mobility can be seen as a func-tion of the readiness of forces, their training, organisation-al structure and equipment. Legal hurdles to deployingconscript forces outside national boundaries, combinedwith the requirement for highly skilled and thereforelonger-serving troops mean that force deployability is moreeasily achieved by professional armies. Many NATOnations, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and theUnited States have always had a professional force, or atleast have had one for several decades. But others have tra-ditionally had conscript forces and here the past few yearshave seen significant changes.

Perhaps most notably, in 1996 French President JacquesChirac made the dramatic decision, after more than 200years, to eliminate conscription and in this way to profes-sionalize the French armed forces. France had for its impe-tus the Gulf War and the rapid reaction force that went intoBosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) in 1995. In both cases, itcould only provide a force contribution by “skimming off ”professional soldiers from many disparate units. The pro-

Speeding deploymentElinor Sloan examines NATO force mobility and deployability, as well

as the impact of programmes aimed at improving capabilities.

shift from a continentalEuropean strategy toone of expeditionaryforces for power pro-jection during a crisis.The British Army hasbeen reorganised intotwo deployable divi-sions, each made up ofthree flexible, mobilebrigades. The UnitedKingdom is also creat-ing a Joint RapidReaction Force, a poolof “powerful and versa-tile” units from allthree services set tobecome fully opera-tional this year.

In accordance withits 1996 MilitaryProgramme Law,France is restructuringits army into 51manoeuvre regiments,supported by 15 logis-tics regiments and 19specialised supportregiments, all groupedinto 11 combatbrigades. The regi-ments represent thebasic modular unitsthat can be broughttogether in varyingcombinations depend-ing on the nature of thecrisis to which they areresponding. Francealso aims to have inplace, by 2002, a RapidReaction Force ofbetween 50,000 and60,000 troops to bequickly deployable toareas around the world.Meanwhile, Germanyhas created its ownCrisis Reaction Force,comprised of six fullyequipped brigades, 18squadrons and roughly40 per cent of thenavy’s ships at any onetime. Made up entirely of professional troops, in accor-dance with the Commission’s recommendations, this forceof 50,000 is to be transformed into a 150,000-strong

Readiness Force inwhich sailors, soldiersand airmen will beavailable in three50,000-man rotations.

Meanwhile, the USArmy, stung by itsinability to deploy rap-idly its Apache heli-copters into Albaniaduring OperationAllied Force, hasundertaken its own dra-matic overhaul of forcestructure. To round outits heavy and lightcomponents, the serv-ice is creating a medi-um-weight strike forceto be comprised of atleast f ive rapid-response brigade com-bat teams by the end ofthis decade. In addi-tion, the US Air Forcehas completely reor-ganised its combatforces into ten AirExpeditionary Forcesthat are designed to beable to deploy rapidlyanywhere in the world.Several other NATOnations, including Italy,the Netherlands, Spainand Turkey, have alsorestructured theirforces over the pastdecade to increasedeployability andmobility.

NATO as a wholehas undertaken initia-tives to adapt its forcestructure to the post-Cold War securityenvironment. In theearly 1990s, NATOestablished the AlliedCommand Europe’sRapid Reaction Corps(ARRC), a mobileheadquarters of some

1,000 multinational military personnel. In addition, since1994 the Alliance has been working to implement theCombined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. This entails

MILITARY MATTERS


Big bird: NATO nations are dependent on the United States for long-range air transport

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the development of mobile command and control head-quarters that can be detached from the Alliance’s permanent,standing command structure, and will allow units from dif-ferent services and nations to be brought together and tai-lored to a specific contingency. NATO’s standing commandstructure itself has been significantly modified, with thetransition to a new command structure well underway.

While the CJTF concept is proceeding, it has yet to befully implemented. Moreover, there is a growing recogni-tion that the ARRC — which was deployed to both Bosniain 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 — needs to be augmented byat least a second such mobile corps headquarters. AdmiralGuido Venturoni, chairman of NATO’s MilitaryCommittee, has argued that the figure may be closer tothree land corps headquarters and forces at high readiness,and six such headquarters at lower readiness for sustain-ment operations. Comparable forces and headquarters areneeded for the navy and air elements. Member countrieshave already offered a dozen head-quarters that would have to becomemultinational (or more multination-al) to operate at Alliance level,among them the f ive-nationEurocorps and the German-Dutchcorps. Decisions on these issues willno doubt figure in the conclusionsand recommendations of NATO’scurrent force structure review. Inthis way, a number of national andAlliance measures are underway toaddress the organisational andrestructuring demands of a rapidreaction capability.

In terms of equipment, two ele-ments are central to increasing thedeployability and mobility of mili-tary forces. First, there is the requirement for more mobilearmy platforms that are still highly lethal and do not reducetroop protection. Many NATO nations have equipped orplan to equip their crisis reaction forces with light armouredvehicles, such as the LAV III (Canada and the UnitedStates), the future armoured infantry combat vehicle(France) and the All-Protected Carrier Vehicle (Germany).These wheeled platforms are much lighter than a trackedmain battle tank, can be deployed by plane in greater num-bers and are more versatile once on the ground. Yet, they donot offer the same levels of troop protection and firepoweras a main battle tank. As a result, NATO nations continue toupgrade and/or f ield new tanks, such as the Leclerc,Leopard 2, Challenger 2, and M1 Abrams.

Projects are underway to develop light combat vehiclesdesigned to suit the transport requirements for rapiddeployment. They include Canada’s Armoured CombatVehicle, Germany’s New Armoured Platform, andAmerica’s Future Combat System. But these systems will

MILITARY MATTERS


not be operational for at least a decade. The United Statesis most inclined to the shift from a heavy to lighter, moremobile and deployable ground force, as a result of itsgeostrategic position and global security interests. It hastherefore signif icantly cut its Abrams upgrade andCrusader self-propelled howitzer programmes, and chan-nelled these funds into its Future Combat System. By con-trast, European investment programmes continue to main-tain heavier armoured vehicles, such as tanks,self-propelled howitzers and artillery.

Even more important for increasing deployability andmobility is strategic air and sealift. Here, Canada andEuropean NATO members lag far behind the United States.Although several countries have fleets of C-130 and C-160transport aircraft, these are considered more of a tacticalthan a strategic platform. Moreover, many larger transportaircraft, like the French and German C-160s, are old anddue for replacement. With no equivalent to the US C-17 or

C-15 heavy transport aircraft, NATOnations are almost completelydependent on the United States forthe long-range air transport of theirtroops and “outsize” equipment.

Measures are being taken toaddress this problem. SeveralEuropean members of NATO —including Belgium, France,Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey andthe United Kingdom — have signedon to buy about 200 AirbusIndustries A400M heavy lift airtransporters, otherwise known asthe Future Large Aircraft. But theaircraft is not expected to be in serv-ice before about 2007 and currentdesign specifications indicate it will

not be built to transport “outsize” equipment. To fill thisstrategic airlift gap, the United Kingdom has undertaken tolease four C-17 aircraft, with the first due for delivery tothe Royal Air Force later this year. To meet short to medi-um-term requirements, France and Germany may alsolease some C-17 aircraft, or perhaps the Russian-UkrainianAN-70 airlifter, though a decision has yet to be taken.Canada is also exploring options to improve its airlift capa-bility. In 1999, France backed a German initiative to form aEuropean Military Airlift Command to pool across nation-al boundaries airlift resources such as strategic transportand air-to-air refuelling tankers. This initiative is beingconsidered in the European Air Group, which as a first stepis establishing an Airlift Coordination Cell.

To increase sealift capabilities, the United Kingdom isplanning to build two new, larger, aircraft carriers by about2015 and is increasing the number of its roll-on/roll-offcontainer vessels from two to six. France has cut back itscarriers to just one, the Charles de Gaulle, but has plans to

To date, Canada andEuropean members ofNATO have made littleprogress towardsequipping their militarieswith the means of movingtheir armies swiftly intoplace by air and sea

acquire more roll-on/roll-off ships and has agreed with theNetherlands to pool shipping capacity to move heavyequipment to trouble spots by sea. Canada is progressingwith its Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability project,which is designing a multi-role ship geared in part tostrategic lift for the army. Germany is focusing not somuch on strategic lift but rather on building a flexiblenaval force, with new frigates, U-2 boats and supply shipson the way.

For those countries that are members of both theEuropean Union and NATO, a major incentive to increasethe deployability and mobility of their military forces is theEuropean Union’s Headline Goal of creating a 60,000-strong rapid intervention force by 2003. The force is to bemobile, militarily self-sustaining and deployable to a far-off crisis within 60 days. Whereas NATO’s responsibilitiesrange across the full spectrum of conflict, the EU force willlikely focus on peace-support operations and crisis-man-agement missions. The differing tasks make it conceivablethat the EU initiative could divert EU members of NATOfrom improving their military capabilities in those areasthat are more relevant to high-end collective security oper-ations, like precision engagement and suppression ofenemy fire. However, whether responding to war or con-flicts of an intensity less than war, EU members of NATOwill want to be able to get their troops to the crisis quicklyand to be mobile once in theatre. Indeed, the primary incen-tive for France and Germany to lease heavy-lift assets inthe next few years would be their EU commitments, with-out which the 2003 deadline will not be met.

The impact of the EU initiative on developing a lighter,yet still highly lethal, ground force is more difficult togauge. The European Union’s focus on lower-end tasksmay speed up the acquisition of wheeled armoured plat-forms that, by virtue of their greater battlefield mobility,are better suited to peace-support operations. But by thesame token, it may slow the development of systems akinto the Future Combat System.

Much of what happens will depend on defence budgetsand particularly on the proportion allocated to equipmentacquisition. The defence budgets of all NATO nations felldramatically during the 1990s, a trend that has only recent-ly been reversed. Canada, the United Kingdom and espe-cially the United States have registered real increases intheir defence budgets over the past couple of years. By con-trast, Germany’s has continued to fall, while the Frenchdefence budget has remained essentially static. Elevenother European members of NATO have indicated that theyplan real increases in defence spending in 2001, but theincreases will be small and it will be some time before theycan be translated into concrete capabilities. As armies pro-fessionalize, more money will presumably be freed up fordefence acquisitions. However, this is also a long-termproposition. France, for example, has found that the pro-fessionalization of its army is costing a lot more than orig-inally expected.

A pragmatic examination of the deployability andmobility of NATO forces reveals a mixed picture. In somecountries, significant progress has been made in the pro-fessionalization and restructuring of national forces, whiletransformation has been much slower in others. This istrue, too, of NATO’s force structure. Armies are beingmade lighter and more mobile, but there continues to be astrong emphasis on preparing for heavy armoured warfare.Generally speaking, the EU initiative can be expected toboost the deployability and mobility of NATO forces.Moreover, there are several important projects on thebooks. But the fact remains that, to date, Canada andEuropean members of NATO have made little progresstowards equipping their militaries with the means of mov-ing their armies swiftly into place by air and sea. It will besome time before planned defence budget increases can betranslated into concrete capabilities. Even the UnitedStates, hampered by the costs of current operations andreadiness, could be constrained in its army transformationefforts. The revolution, while underway, is still many yearsfrom fruition. ■

MILITARY MATTERS


THE NATO SCIENCE PROGRAMME“Bringing scientists together for progress and peace”

The NATO Science Programme supports collaborative projects between scientists from Allied and Partner countries.

The programme - which is not defence-related - aims to stimulate cooperation between scientists from different backgrounds, to create enduring links between

researchers, and to help sustain scientific communities in Partner countries.

Full details can be found on the NATO web site:

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Defence expenditures as % of gross domestic productCountry Average Average Average Average

1980 - 1984 1985 - 1989 1990 - 1994 1995 - 1999 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000e(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Based on current prices

Belgium 3.2 2.8 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4Czech Republic // // // // // // // 2.2 2.3Denmark 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5France 4.0 3.8 3.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7Germany 3.3 3.0 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5Greece 5.3 5.1 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9Hungary // // // // // // // 1.6 1.7Italy 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9Luxembourg 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7Netherlands 3.0 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6Norway 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.2 1.9Poland // // // // // // // 2.0 2.0Portugal 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2Spain 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3Turkey 4.0 3.3 3.8 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.4 5.4 6.0United Kingdom 5.2 4.5 3.8 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4NATO - Europe 3.5 3.2 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 | 2.1 2.1

Canada 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2United States 5.6 6.0 4.7 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0North America 5.3 5.6 4.4 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9

NATO - Total 4.5 4.5 3.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 | 2.6 2.5

Defence expenditures of NATO countriesCountry Currency unit

(million) 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000e(0) (-) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Current prices and exchange rates

Belgium Bf 115754 144183 155205 131156 131334 131796 133007 136252 140256Czech Republic CZK // // // // // // // 41167 44022Denmark DKK 9117 13344 16399 17468 17896 18521 19079 19428 19349France FRF 110514 186715 231911 238432 237375 241103 236226 239488 243936Germany DEM 48518 58650 68376 58986 58671 57602 58327 59854 59617Greece GRG 96975 321981 612344 1171377 1343276 1510684 1724621 1853189 1981984Hungary HUF // // // // // // // 187672 218023Italy 1000 ITL 7643 17767 28007 31561 36170 38701 40763 43062 43002Luxembourg LUF 1534 2265 3233 4194 4380 4797 5197 5330 5468Netherlands NLG 10476 12901 13513 12864 13199 13345 13561 14534 14192Norway NOK 8242 15446 21251 22224 22813 23010 25087 25809 25675Poland PLN // // // // // // // 12599 14065Portugal PTE 43440 111375 267299 403478 401165 418772 420654 452843 475178Spain ESP 350423 674883 922808 1078751 1091432 1123046 1124054 1180075 1266429Turkey 1000 TRL 203 1235 13866 302864 611521 1183327 2289430 4167636 6998960United Kingdom GBP 11593 18301 22287 21439 22330 21612 22477 22548 22823NATO - Europe USD 111981 92218 186189 184352 186821 172732 175184 | 179671 164559

Canada CAD 5788 10332 13473 12457 11511 10831 11716 12360 11948United States USD 138191 258165 306170 278856 271417 276324 274278 280969 296373North America USD 143141 265731 317717 287933 279860 284146 282176 289288 304441

NATO - Total USD 255122 357949 503906 472284 466681 456879 457360 | 468960 468999


Defence spendingSTATISTICS

0 200 400 600 800 1000

Belgium

Czech Republic

Denmark

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Spain

Turkey

United Kingdom

NATO - Europe

Canada

United States

North America

NATO - Total

NATO releases defence expenditurefigures once a year. The complete fig-ures, which have hitherto been repro-duced in NATO Review, now insteadappear on the NATO web site. In view ofthe difference between NATO’s defini-tion of defence expenditures and nation-

al definitions, the figures may divergefrom those quoted by national authori-ties or given in national budgets. Datarelating to France is indicative onlybecause France does not belong to theintegrated military structure and doesnot participate in defence planning.

Iceland has no armed forces. Figures forthe Czech Republic, Hungary andPoland begin in 1999, when these threecountries joined the Alliance.

// not applicable| break in continuity of seriese estimate

The complete financial and economic data relating to NATO defence can be found atwww.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-107e.htm.

Defence spending per capita

(1995 prices and exchange rates)

1995

2000e

USD

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