nationalism and its explanation

Nationalism and Its ExplanationsAuthor(s): Henk Dekker, Darina Malová, Sander HoogendoornSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 2, Special Issue: National Identity in Europe (Jun.,2003), pp. 345-376Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792354 .Accessed: 29/03/2011 02:24

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Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2003

Nationalism and Its Explanations Henk Dekker Department of Political Science, Leiden University, Netherlands

Darina Malova Department of Political Science, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovak

Republic

Sander Hoogendoorn Guest lecturer at Universidad de la Rioja, Logroio, Spain, during 1995-1996; works now as a business consultant for governmental and non-governmental organizations

This paper presents new terms for analyzing individuals' national attitudes and their con-

ceptualization and operationalization, a universal psychological structure in which these concepts interconnect, and a nationalism explanatory model. Three empirical studies using anonymous self-administered surveys served to test and improve national attitude assessment and its developmental theory. These empirical studies were conducted in a well- established state (the Netherlands), a recently established state (Slovakia), and a region in which a considerable proportion of citizens are striving to develop a new independent state (the Basque Autonomous Community of Spain).

KEY WORDS: nationalism, national identity, patriotism, socialization, elites, mass media, school, symbols, rituals, internationalism

The existing nationalism literature is a conceptual labyrinth characterized by questionable instruments, a lack of valid empirical data, and poor explanatory power (Dekker, 2001; Dekker & Malova, 1995). The concept "nationalism" has different meanings relating to various levels of analysis: nationalism as an ideology, a movement, the process of "nation" and "nation-state" building, and an individual's political orientation. Moreover, several different types and intensities of nationalism are distinguished in disconnected ways. A prime example is that the notion of nationalism is often confused with other national orientations, such as

345 0162-895X ? 2003 International Society of Political Psychology

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national pride. If 70% of the people are "nationalistic" because they are proud of their country, the concept loses its significance. A stricter conceptualization of nationalism is needed to prevent a continuing "inflation" of nationalism's con-

ceptual value. We have found that most of the contributions to the nationalism literature

include not one empirical paragraph. This lack implies that the notion of nationalism merely exists or grows within the literature, without adequate empirical data to support it. A possible explanation could be that there simply are no adequate tools for the measurement of nationalism. Hobsbawm (1990) echoed this senti- ment: "The view from below, i.e. the nation as seen... by the ordinary persons ... is exceedingly difficult to discover" (p. 11). The very few empirical studies that do exist in the literature also suffer from conceptual confusion, resulting in

differing operationalizations (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Loh, 1975). A lack of theory, combined with unclear exploratory factor analyses, has

resulted in scales with low face validity. For example, in Kosterman and Feshbach's 1989 study in the United States, a nationalist is characterized as someone who thinks that the first duty, among others, is to honor the national

history and heritage, that foreign aid programs should benefit the United States

politically, and that it is important that the United States win in international sport- ing competitions such as the Olympics. This epistemological chaos has alerted us to the urgent need for solidifying a clear conceptual understanding of "nationalism" through sound empirical analysis.

In what follows, we attempt to present a clear and consistent terminology of nationalism, as well as identify its main determinants, established through empirical data gathered from reliable cross-national measurements of nationalism. To achieve this, we developed a new set of terms characterizing national attitudes. These characterizations, coupled with their conceptualization and operationalization, help to create a structure in which these concepts are interconnected, as well as a set of hypotheses explaining national attitude development. We understood that any theory that aspires to universality must be tested in several culturally diverse areas. Therefore, to test and improve our assessment and hypotheses concerning national attitudes, we conducted three preliminary empirical studies in three categorical states: a well-established state (the Netherlands), a recently established state (Slovakia; see also Dekker, Malova, & Theulings, 1996; Hagendoor, Csepeli, Dekker, & Faren, 2000), and a region in which a considerable proportion of citizens are striving to develop a new independent state (the Basque Autonomous Community of Spain).

Expectations About Nationalism

We consider nationalism as an individual's attitude. An attitude is a particular amount of affection for a certain object, that is, "simply a person's general feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness" (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p. 54).

346 Dekker et al.

Nationalism and Its Explanations

National attitude differs in the type (positive or negative) and strength (moderate, very, and extremely positive or negative) of affection. We derived six expectations from these simple implications:

1. One neutral and five positive national attitudes can be distinguished on the basis of differences in type and strength of affection. The basic neutral national affection is the national feeling (feeling of belonging to one's own people and country). The five positive national attitudes are national liking (liking one's people and country), national pride [being proud of one's people and country (see Rose, 1985)], national preference (preferring one's people and country over others), national superiority (feeling that one's people and country are superior to others), and finally, nationalism (feeling a sense of belonging to a particular "nation" with a common origin, wanting to keep that "nation" as pure as possible, and desiring to establish and/or maintain a separate and independent state for that particular "nation"). We assumed that individuals' national attitudes can be inferred from the responses of (complete) agreement or (complete) disagreement to particular statements regarding one's country and people, and formulated 26 statements and survey items to cover the various national attitudes (Appendix A). Nationalism is thus expected to be one of the five different positive attitudes toward one's country and people. National preference and national superiority include-contrary to national feeling, liking, and pride-forms of intergroup comparison and even discrimination (nationalism). It can then be inferred that a positive national attitude gives an individual a (moderate, very, or extremely) positive national identity, and it also serves to satisfy the need for a sense of positive self-identity.

2. These individual national attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy. Each individual is expected to reach one of the following states of national attitudinal development: national feeling -> national liking - national pride -> national preference -> national superiority -> nationalism. Each stage requires the fulfillment of the previous one; it then incorporates it and prepares the individual for the suc- ceeding one(s). This expectation assumes that various national attitudes are related to one another in such a way that developing and maintaining one (e.g., national pride) is more "difficult" than developing and maintaining another (e.g., national liking). The development of the next higher national attitude requires more complex processes than the development of the lower one (see below). This state- ment is particularly reflected in the decreasing numbers of agreed responses in the higher states of the hierarchy (Figure 1).

3. If there is an absence of positive national attitudes, negative national attitudes can be found. They can be categorized as follows: national alienation (not feeling comfortable being among one's people in general and not feeling at home in one's country), national shame (being ashamed of one's people and country), national disgust (being disgusted with one's people and country), and national hate (hating one's people and country). As is the case for positive national attitude, a negative national attitude can give one a negative national identity and, as

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Dekker et al.

Regional European Nationalism nationalism \ / Unionalism

National /Regional-national / European Union / superiority superiority superiority

/ National \ / Regional-national / European Union / preference preference preference

National pride / Regional-national oride / European Union oride

N I

National liking

National feeling

-

Regional-national liking

European Union liking

Regional-national feeling European Union feeling

Internationalism

International feeling

Figure 1. Cumulative hierarchies of national, regional-national, European Union, and international attitudes.

a result, a sense of negative self-identity. These negative attitudes, like the posi- tives, also form a cumulative hierarchy, and these two hierarchies combine to form two separate scales (see Appendix A).

4. Besides national attitudes, several different positive or negative "regional- national" attitudes can also be distinguished (see Melich, 1986; Rovati, 1992). The hierarchies of the positive and negative regional-national attitudes are expected to be the same as the national attitudes.

5. International attitudes relating to particular regions of the globe, its people, the world, and humankind can also be distinguished. Examples would be the Euro- pean Union and its citizens (EUfeeling, EU liking, EU pride, EU preference, EU superiority, and European Unionalism), Europe (varying from European feeling to Europeanism), Slavic countries (from Slavic feeling to Slavism), and Arab countries (from Arab feeling to Arabism). The attitudes toward the world, or the "international community," and toward humankind can be characterized as an international feeling and internationalism, or cosmopolitanism (see Wittkopf, 1990).

6. Individuals combine moderate positive attitudes on one level with positive attitudes on another level [moderate positive regional-national attitudes with positive national attitudes, and moderate positive national attitudes with positive international attitudes (Druckman, 1994, p. 60)]. They do not combine very positive or extremely positive attitudes with positive attitudes on another level because of the downward comparisons included therein. Very positive and extremely positive attitudes are instead combined with negative attitudes on another level [e.g., Basque regional nationalism with negative attitudes toward

[ I I I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Spain; French and Danish nationalism with negative attitudes toward the EU (see Hewstone, 1986)]. It is also unlikely that individuals with very positive or

extremely positive attitudes toward their own region, country, or international region have an attitude of internationalism or cosmopolitanism. Thus, in the attitudes hierarchy, the step from pride to preference is expected to be crucial in combining or not combining the various regional-national, national, and international identities.

Hypotheses Explaining Nationalism

We distinguish three processes of national attitude development (building on Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Dijker, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993). Each of these processes includes a particular set of variables explaining a variance in national attitudes. The first development is the processing of one's affective observations and experiences in one's country and with one's people. The second process of attitudinal development is the processing of affective messages from others about one's country and people (i.e., national socialization). And the third process analyzes the development in which attitude is derived from the orientations that the individual earlier acquired and from the individual's early behavior. The national attitude in this instance is the internal inference derived from the individual's knowledge (national knowledge and insights), beliefs (national auto-cliches and auto-stereotypes), thoughts (national opinions), emotional experiences (national emotions), feelings (specific attitudes, other than national attitudes), needs and desires (values), intentions (national behavioral intentions), and previous actions (national behaviors) with respect to one's country and people. The most important process is national socialization, because the first national emotions and rudimentary beliefs that one acquires result from early socialization rather than from early perceptions, inferences, and experiences. Four main determinants establish the development of one's national attitude.

The first determinant is previously experienced national emotions. Finlayson (1998) cautioned that "to study nationalism and ignore its affective, emotional aspects would be folly" (p. 146). A national emotion is a strong feeling relating to one's country and people, and is accompanied by physical reactions and a change in readiness for action (Frijda, 1986; Ledoux, 1996). National emotions differ in kind (positive or negative) and intensity (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). National emotions are expected to influence national attitudes not only directly, but also indirectly through their influence on national beliefs. In general, national emotions, coupled with rudimentary beliefs, are often developed early in life (Davies, 1968; Jahoda, 1962a, 1962b; Lawson, 1963; Piaget & Weil, 1951). It can be said that what is learned first influences what is learned later; the first step is highly crucial. Information that comes later is attached to, and filtered through, these early-developed emotions. Emotions are acquired through experiencing

349

emotional events such as national rituals (part of national socialization). Individ- uals who intensely experience national rituals are those who tend to connect strong feelings to obvious and hidden national objects. These objects have the potential to become "self-objects" (Rothstein, 1994). Once an emotion is linked to an

object, it will be manifested in every instance when contact is made with that

object. This emotion can also be seen in occurrences when one reads about that

particular object, or even when that object appears in one's mind (Bem, 1970). Therefore, emotions form a potentially important variable in explaining attitudes because they last a long time and are more resistant to change than are cognitions.

The second determinant is salient national beliefs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Bar-Tal, 1993). A national belief is a characteristic that an individual links to a

country (cliche) and/or people (stereotype). Salient auto-cliches are related to one's country's history, its actual political, economic, and social-cultural situation, and that country's international political position. An individual who holds a higher number of more positive auto-cliches and auto-stereotypes tends to have a more positive national attitude. National beliefs are acquired through direct observations and experiences, as well as through selective mediated observations from relevant others such as parents, friends, teachers, journalists, political information officers, and politicians (national socialization).

The third determinant is previously performed national behaviors. With

varying intensities, the examples consist of orally defending one's people and/or country against criticisms from abroad, serving in the army on a compulsory or voluntary basis, and fighting in a war. A particular attitude may be developed as a result of perceived justification of that behavior. Previously performed national behaviors are expected to influence one's attitude directly and indirectly through their influence on national emotions and beliefs.

The fourth determinant is specific attitudes (excluding those under this study). These attitudes include those toward outgroups living within the country and toward foreign countries and their people; worry about one's (family's) future; and the individual's sense of positive self-identity. An individual who develops more extremely negative attitudes toward foreign national or "ethnic" minorities living within that country, and toward foreigners and foreign countries, will tend to develop an attitude of nationalism (Kleinpenning & Hagendoor, 1993). The presence or absence of concern about one's political, economic, social, and/or cultural future is also expected to be a determinant of national attitudes. One who worries less about one's (family's) future will tend to have a more positive national attitude (this only applies to national liking, pride, preference, and superiority). We expect that an individual with more of such worries will turn toward nationalism. The individual's sense of positive self-identity serves as another affective determinant. A low sense of positive self-identity (such as may result from a clear failure of one's "old" ideology) motivates individuals to develop a very positive or extremely positive national attitude (see Blank, 1997; Bloom, 1990; Csepeli &

Dekker et al. 350


Orkeny, 1993; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Smith, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Weinreich, 1991).

National emotions, national beliefs, national behaviors, attitudes toward ethnic minorities, and attitudes toward foreign people and countries can be explained as an important part of the individual's national political socialization (Breuilly, 1993; Csepeli, 1982; Desai, 1993; Frey, 1968; Gellner, 1993; Levine, 1965; Smith, 1992). The individual only acquires national emotions when the emotions are evoked. And the individual only acquires beliefs about one's country and people, ethnic minorities, and foreign countries and their people when such beliefs are offered. People participate in national activities only when they are stimulated or forced to do so. National socialization usually starts at an early age, when it catches the child with experiences of positive emotions during national rituals-in reality or via television. Positive emotions are then linked to national symbols. And these positive emotions are reiterated when individuals receive informative messages regarding their country and their people in conversations with their families (Seliktar, 1980) or via television programs. This socialization continues when the school (Ram, 2000), church (El-Wafi, 1993), other mass media (Deutsch, 1966), peers, people at the workplace, social networks, social move- ments, and politics serve as other sources of emotions and information (Dekker, 1991; Farnen, 1994, 2000; Wasburn, 1994).

Socialization through these agencies (and through the socializers within them) is in turn influenced by information, persuasion, or manipulation toward the goals and activities of political elites. The individual agencies and socializers possess an autonomy that is relative to the degree of freedom of expression within a given country. The level of autonomy is limited in autocracies and in countries with a high level of communication centralization compared to democracies with truly free mass communications. Political elites can influence the individual's national socialization directly or indirectly through other socialization agencies. In all political systems there is an intended attempt to transfer particular national attitudes, emotions, values, beliefs, and behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns from the elites to the masses (Gumbert, 1987). The elites in their speeches emphasize positive aspects of their country and people. This in turn initiates and supports other socializers that do the same (Billig, 1995).

Political leaders who are perceived as charismatic will have stronger influence. Political leaders who act as nationalistic "entrepreneurs/dealers" are expected to be the most important nationalistic socializers because of their ability to directly socialize through their writings, statements, and speeches (Ram, 2000). Nationalistic rhetoric is one of their tools, supporting and strengthening the belief in the existence of "one nation" with a common origin, ancestry, consanguinity, and the perspective of "one nation, one state." For example, such leaders may say that "our" community is conditioned by the fact of a blood relationship, that "we" have the same ancestors, "we" are the same family, "we" are all brothers and

351

sisters, that the same mother has given birth to "us," and that "we are part of the nation, flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood" (Connor, 1993). Other tools make use of religious notions such as "chosen people" and "promised land"; suggest that a national consensus exists on the country's goals and priorities; initiate and strengthen rumor conspiracies; introduce carefully chosen national "traumas" (Rothstein, 1994); and blame economic misfortunes, among others, on domestic or foreign "enemies." Such leaders use the issue of the "nation" to acquire, maintain, or extend their political power. Under the influence of charismatic and nationalistic political leaders, a considerable part of the population may have

strengthened positive national attitudes and thus may move upward in the national attitudinal hierarchy.

We expect that individuals first acquire a national feeling through national emotions developed through national rituals and initial motivation signals from parents. Because individuals need to have a positive sense of identity, they will be motivated to perceive predominantly favorable characteristics about their country and fellow-nationals (because they have no realistic choices of country and people, and also few realistic options to alter their circumstances). This motivates them to develop positive beliefs about one's country and people, and also to develop through these beliefs a national feeling. When such people develop a national liking, they will continue to strive for a sense of positive identity because they will be motivated to continue participation in national rituals, and hence strengthen their own positive national emotions. They also will be motivated to receive positive information about their country, people, history, and symbols (e.g., reading literature that honors the deeds of a national hero). In school, they may be educated in a single national history and culture that contradicts those of outgroups.

These emotions and new beliefs may result in national pride. Because individuals will continue to strive toward a positive self-identity, they will tend to observe more similarities among fellow-nationals than with other non- nationals, and also to develop less positive or even negative attitudes toward other nationalities. The positive attitudes toward their country and people may also be supported by highly positive information about them, and negative information about other countries and peoples, that may be received from parents or other relatives, teachers, or mass media personnel; by reading, hearing, and/or seeing information directly from mass media; or from political leaders emphasizing national successes in comparison to others. Once the negative attitudes toward other nationalities living in the country and foreign countries and their people have developed, individuals will tend to be less open to any contradictory information about these groups and countries, and will also tend to ignore, reject, distort, or forget this kind of information. People with a low sense of positive self-identity are more motivated than others to develop such negative emotions, beliefs, and attitudes toward minorities and foreign people and countries.

352 Dekker et al.


Perceptions of competition and conflict with these minorities and foreign countries and people-especially but not exclusively received from political leaders, mass media, and military service trainers-may enhance the favoring of one's country and people. This may result in the development of national preference. The stronger the preference becomes, the more negative the attitude toward others may become. National preference then leads to national superiority. National superiority may be acquired individually. However, it can also be conditioned by parents or other relatives, participation in service organizations with nationally oriented religious affiliations, national symbols such as the flag or the head of state (such as through enormous human reconstructions of the national flag at athletic events and huge portraits of national leaders on billboards), reading newspapers that express national superiority, listening to and/or singing national songs frequently, and observing (directly or through mass media) statements of

political leaders emphasizing national superiority. Finally, individuals may develop the attitude of nationalism. Nationalism is

developed when the contents of national socialization include the mention of a common origin, ancestry, or consanguinity, a wish to keep the "nation" as pure as possible and to establish or maintain a separate independent state-if neces- sary, incorporating within the borders of that state all groups that are considered to belong to that "nation." This action might force other nationalities or "nations" and ethnicities inside the country to leave, leading to the end of all international cooperation. These messages will be the most attractive for people who have a very low sense of positive identity or suffer from an identity crisis.

Systematic variables-relating to the political, economic, and social system, and its history-are background variables in a model that aims to explain why one individual is more nationalistic than another living in the same system (Figure 2). The person's attitude can be placed within the political, economic, and social context as the individual emotionally experiences and perceives it. The individual's social-demographic characteristics are also background variables. Variables such as age and gender do not wholly tell us about national attitude acquisition. Important elements that are linked to gender and age include experiences and socialization (Figure 2).

In sum, we hypothesize that the individual's development of nationalism can be considerably explained by the following: intense positive national emotions that were previously experienced; national behaviors with a high intensity that were previously performed; extremely positive beliefs about one's country and people; highly negative attitudes toward national or "ethnic" minorities living within the country, and other foreign countries and people; a strong concern about one's (family's) political, economic, social, and cultural future; and a very low sense of positive self-identity. These orientations are in turn influenced by aspects of the person's national socialization, including the frequency and intensity of national rituals as well as national (or nationalistic) education, information, and/or persuasion from various socializers, in particular from nationalistic charismatic

353

? National emotions National

socialization

by ? National values

political elites: /

directly / \ d y National beliefs National

and,

through . ~~~~~~~~~rituals~, ~attitude rituals,

school ? National behaviors

education, \ /

mass media, -

~etc.,m also ~Outgroup attitudes etc., also

indirectly

Concern about * future

+ Self-identity

Figure 2. National attitude explanatory model.

political leaders who have centralized national education and communication systems at their disposal.

Study 1: The Netherlands

The aim of the 1994 Dutch study was to test our first two expectations (see above) so that we could empirically distinguish the various positive national attitudes and confirm that these attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy. A quota sample of secondary school students with Dutch nationalities from the third, fourth, and fifth grades, ages 15 to 18, reacted to a selection of 14 of the 26 national attitude items. They were contacted through their schools, and all school types and denom- inations were included. After excluding questionnaires that were filled out by students with foreign nationalities or were unusable for other reasons, a sample of 849 respondents remained. Quota controls were based on data from the Central Statistics Bureau. Students from Catholic and Protestant Christian schools and middle general-education schools were slightly overrepresented relative to students from non-confessional public schools and pre-vocational, higher

354 Dekker et al.


general-education, and pre-university education schools. Data collection, using an anonymous self-administered survey, took place during regular school hours of 50 minutes. History/Constitution and Society classes were excluded so as to limit the proportion of "socially desirable" or "politically correct" responses.

We first checked whether the responses revealed a declining trend of support as national attitude rose in the hierarchy (i.e., as attitudes toward one's country and people grew more positive). This was clearly the case (Table 1). Next, we tested the statistical reliability. Most of the subscales indicated a weak reliability (Cronbach's as varied from .56 to .83).

The next step was to compute the correlation coefficients between the different subscales. Respondents who had not answered three or more of the 14 items were excluded (resulting in N = 567) because the following analyses cannot treat missing values. The missing values of others were replaced by a score of agreeing if a majority agreed, and a score of disagreeing if a majority disagreed. A separate treatment of the subscales is justified if none of the correlations exceeds the border of .80. The correlations did not violate the requirement; they were low to modest (Pearson's r varied from .11 to .50).

Table 1. National Attitudes Among Dutch Youth in 1994 (N = 849)

Attitude Response (%)

++ + Sum - - ? 0

National feeling 1. Feeling Dutch 66 26 92 4 2 3 1

National liking (a = .83) 2. Liking the Netherlands 26 41 67 12 4 16 1 3. Liking to be Dutch 41 36 77 7 3 1 13 4. Liking the Dutch 19 48 67 13 2 1 16 5. Liking the Dutch language 29 37 66 14 5 1 14

National pride (a = .67) 6. Proud of the Netherlands 15 36 51 18 6 1 23 7. Proud to be Dutch 26 33 59 16 6 1 18

National preference (a = .56) 8. Preferring the Netherlands 22 36 58 23 8 2 10 9. Preferring the Dutch 11 21 33 36 19 2 10

National superiority (a = .70) 10. Feeling the Netherlands is the best country 9 15 24 36 20 3 17 11. Liking Dutch people the most 8 12 20 39 27 3 12

Nationalism (a = .68) 12. Wishing Flanders part of the Netherlands 6 7 13 35 34 3 16 13. Wishing all Dutch in the Netherlands 6 6 12 39 35 3 11 14. Rejecting international cooperation 2 4 6 41 33 4 16

Note. a, Cronbach's ac; ++, strongly agreeing; +, agreeing; Sum, agreeing and strongly agreeing; -, disagreeing; --, strongly disagreeing; ?, don't know; 0, no opinion, no answer.

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We conducted a Mokken scale analysis using the computer program MSP (Molenaar, Debets, Sijtsma, & Hemker, 1994) to test the hypothesized cumulativity of national attitudes. We checked whether the correlations between the different attitudes at the shortest distance were higher than those between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy ("simplex model"; J6reskog & Sorbom, 1989, p. 182). With the exception of the liking-preference correlation, the correlations between the different attitudes at the shortest distance were higher than those between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy. All individual subscales contributed to the overall scale, and MSP revealed a medium scalability (H = .46; p = .77).

To validate the findings externally, we also measured political left/right self- scaling and preference for an extreme right-wing party. As expected, it appeared that the further the respondents placed themselves to the right, the higher their overall national attitude scale score appeared (r = .35). Among the respondents with a party preference (66%), the extreme right-wing party scored high among those with the highest overall national attitude score, and low among those with the lowest national attitude score (23% and 2%, respectively; n = 413). We thus conclude that the data did not reject our expectation that we can empirically distinguish six different national attitudes and that these attitudes form a cumulative positive national attitudes hierarchy. Yet the reliability of most of these subscales was too low.

Study 2: Slovakia

The 1995-1996 Slovak study also aimed to test the first two expectations listed above-that we can empirically distinguish different positive national attitudes, and that these attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy-and the nationalism explanation hypothesis.

The Slovak respondents reacted to all national attitude items named above, plus one additional question regarding the feeling of being or not being a Slovak. Students from the Political Science Department of Comenius University interviewed 635 respondents in their homes. The sample does not represent the Slovak population (half of the respondents were young people, ages 14 to 20, and more women than men were interviewed). Originally we planned to carry out the research among a quota sample of Slovak youth attending secondary school classes. However, at the time of the data collection, our study became a political issue and the Slovak Ministry of Education had forbidden the schools to participate in our research.

The responses to the 26 national attitude items indicated a declining trend of support as national attitude rose in the hierarchy. Five of the six individual attitudinal subscales were revealed to be statistically reliable; however, the nationalism subscale had a low Cronbach's a of .62 (Table 2). The correlations between individual subscales of positive attitudes were modest to high, but none exceeded

356 Dekker et al.


Table 2. National Attitudes Among Slovaks in 1995-1996 (N = 635)

Attitude Response (%)

++ + Sum - +/- ?

National feeling (a = .76) 1. Being Slovak 63 27 89 2 2 6 1 2. Feeling Slovak 44 33 77 5 1 13 4 3. Feeling Slovakia is my country 33 46 78 3 1 15 3

National liking (a = .81) 4. Liking to be Slovak 19 34 53 7 1 29 9 5. Liking the Slovaks 21 48 68 2 0 25 5 6. Liking Slovakia 34 45 79 2 1 17 2 7. Liking the Slovak language 39 43 82 2 2 11 3

National pride (a = .73) 8. Proud to be Slovak 9 24 33 22 7 22 16 9. Proud of Slovaks 10 24 33 14 5 39 10

10. Proud of Slovakia 4 10 15 27 12 41 5

National preference (a = .75) 11. Liking Slovaks more 4 8 11 38 21 21 9 12. Preferring Slovaks 9 32 41 14 4 19 23 13. Preferring Slovak citizenship 9 15 24 23 8 31 14 14. Preferring Slovakia 19 26 45 13 3 28 10

National superiority (a = .79) 15. Feeling Slovaks are better 2 5 7 35 26 21 11 16. Feeling Slovaks are the best 2 6 8 35 16 31 11 17. Feeling Slovakia is the best 4 4 8 35 22 27 9 18. Feeling Slovak nationality is the best 9 12 22 24 13 26 16

Nationalism (a = .62) 19. Feeling a Slovak common origin 4 4 8 47 24 16 6 20. Feeling a member of one Slovak family 4 8 11 39 21 21 8 21. Feeling of having Slovak blood 22 29 51 12 4 15 18 22. Wanting all Slovaks in Slovakia 3 8 11 34 22 29 4 23. Wanting Slovaks not to mix 4 6 10 35 32 15 8 24. Wanting non-Slovaks to leave 2 3 5 36 45 11 3 25. Wanting Slovaks protected 13 18 30 22 6 28 14 26. Rejecting international cooperation 1 0 1 24 67 3 5

Note. a, Cronbach's a; ++, strongly agreeing; +, agreeing; Sum, agreeing and strongly agreeing; -, disagreeing; --, strongly disagreeing; +/-, partly agreeing and partly disagreeing; ?, don't know, no opinion, no answer.

the border of .80, which justified a separate treatment of these scales (missing values, "do not know," and "no opinion" were excluded). The correlations between attitudes at the shortest distance were higher than those between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy, with two exceptions (feeling/preference and preference/nationalism). Respondents who gave no answer or a "do not know" or "no opinion" response to six or more items were

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Dekker et al.

excluded from the analysis, and the missing values of other items were replaced by the neutral alternative. MSP indicated that the items do form one scale (H = .39; p = .91).

To test our explanatory hypothesis, we asked the respondents to answer questions regarding their national emotions, national beliefs (auto-cliches and auto-stereotypes), previously performed national behaviors, negative attitude toward outgroups, concern regarding the future, sense of positive self-identity, and national socialization (see Appendix B). A stepwise multiple regression analysis, including all independent variables, revealed that national emotion had the most effect on national attitude (, = .54). Close behind were national auto-stereotypes (P = .18). Next came attitude toward outgroups (P = -.14) and the socialization variable of positive attitude toward nationalistic leaders (, = .16). The percent of explained variance was 61%.

We conclude that the data did not reject our two expectations in distinguish- ing empirically the different positive national attitudes, and that these attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy. However, the explanatory hypothesis had to be rejected in part. An individual's national attitude could be considerably explained by his or her national emotions, auto-stereotypes, attitude toward outgroups, and national socialization. Auto-cliches, previously performed national behaviors, concern about the future, and sense of positive self-identity were, contrary to our hypothesis, not "good" predictors for one's positive national attitude.

Study 3: Basque Autonomous Community

The 1996 Basque study aimed to test all six of our expectations and the nationalism explanatory hypothesis. A quota sample of secondary school students in the Basque Autonomous Community, ages 14 to 18, reacted to 37 positive and 8 negative Basque regional-national items. After excluding questionnaires that were filled out by students with foreign nationalities or were unusable for other reasons, a sample of 774 respondents remained. The respondents were contacted through their schools, and the 25 schools were selected on the basis of school type: private or public school, linguistic model of the school, and geographic loca- tion. The data set is available for secondary analysis at the NIWI Steinmetz archives in Amsterdam (number P1494).

The responses to the Basque regional-national items indicated a declining trend of support in the higher stages of hierarchy. However, there were some exceptions. Contrary to our expectations, more respondents had the attitude of regional-national liking than regional-national feeling. The relatively low support for the item "I feel the Basque Country is my country," which is one of the two regional-national feeling items, is understandable when we remember that there is in fact no independent Basque country. Three regional nationalism items indicated a considerable increase rather than decrease of support (items on Basque blood, common origin, and being part of one Basque family). All individual pos-

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itive subscales of regional-national attitudes were statistically reliable (Cronbach's as varied from .82 to .91; see Table 3).

Respondents who gave no answer or the "no opinion" response to six or more items were excluded from the following analysis. The missing values of other items were replaced by the neutral alternative. One of the items (non-Basques should leave the country) had negative covariances with other items and had to be excluded from the analysis. The remaining items formed a scale with a high scalability coefficient (H = .59). The correlations between the individual attitude subscales were high but not too high, with one exception (preference/superiority). Even the attitude of nationalism signified a high correlation with the neutral attitude of regional feeling (.59). Three nationalistic items were responsible for this: Basque blood, common origin, and being part of one Basque family. A new Mokken scale analysis, leaving out these three items, produced a strong scale (33 items, H = .58, n = 623). None of the new correlations between the subscales were too high, and the attitude of Basque nationalism no longer had extremely high correlations with the attitudes lower in the hierarchy. The correlations between attitudes at the shortest distance were higher than those between attitudes at a larger distance in the expected hierarchy, with the exception of the preference and feeling/nationalism correlations.

To test our expectations with respect to possible combinations of regional- national attitudes with national attitudes, we also asked the respondents to react

Table 3. Basque Regional-National Attitudes Among Basque Youth in 1996

Attitude Response (%) N

++ + Sum - -- ?

Basque regional-national feeling (a = .82) 1. Feeling Basque 44 40 84 5 3 8 749 2. Feeling the Basque Country is my country 41 32 72 10 4 14 746

Basque regional-national liking (a = .88) 3. Liking to be Basque 47 41 89 3 1 9 752 4. Liking the Basques in general 43 46 90 2 1 7 752 5. Liking the Basque Country 46 45 92 2 1 5 752 6. Liking the Euskera language 42 34 76 8 7 9 754

Basque regional-national pride (a = .82) 7. Proud to be Basque 46 37 84 4 1 11 750 8. Proud of the Basques 26 31 57 16 3 24 745 9. Proud of the Basque Country 26 31 57 16 4 24 745

Basque regional-national preference (a = .91) 10. Preferring Basques to Spaniards 23 22 45 24 9 22 741 11. Preferring Basques to other peoples 17 24 41 26 9 23 744 12. Preferring Basque citizenship to Spanish 30 25 54 16 9 21 743 13. Preferring Basque citizenship 24 23 47 20 9 24 741 14. Preferring the Basque Country to Spain 34 29 62 15 7 16 744 15. Preferring the Basque Country 24 23 48 23 9 21 745

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Table 3. (cont.)


++ + Sum - - ?

Basque regional-national superiority (a = .91) 16. Liking Basques more than Spaniards 28 17. Liking Basques the most 19 18. Feeling Basques are better than Spaniards 14 19. Feeling Basques are better 11 20. Feeling Basques are the best 17 21. Feeling the Basque Country is the best 23

Spanish region 22. Feeling the Basque Country is the best part 16

of Europe 23. Feeling the Basque Country is the best part 14

of the world 24. Feeling Basque nationality is the best 20

Basque regional nationalism (a = .90) 25. Feeling a Basque common origin 23 26. Feeling a member of one Basque family 25 27. Feeling of having Basque blood 31 28. Wanting Basques not to mix with Spaniards 6 29. Wanting Basques not to mix with others 3 30. Wanting an independent Basque state 22 31. Wanting Iparralda to unite with the Basque 22

Country 32. Wanting Navarra to unite with the Basque

Country 33. Wishing non-Basques to leave the Basque

Country 34. Wanting Basques in Spain protected 35. Wanting Basques in France protected 36. Rejecting cooperation with Spain 37. Rejecting international cooperation

Basque regional-national alienation (a = .83) 38. Feeling uncomfortable among Basques 39. Feeling not at home in the Basque Country Basque national shame (a = .68) 40. Ashamed to be Basque 41. Ashamed of the Basque Country

Basque regional-national disgust (a = .94) 42. Disgusted with the Basques 43. Disgusted with the Basque Country

Basque regional-national hate (a = .89) 44. Hating the Basques 45. Hating the Basque Country

21

24 25 15 14 24 31

51 21 8 19 746 44 24 9 23 746 29 36 12 24 745 25 38 12 27 743 41 26 10 22 738 54 21 7 19 740

18 34 31 9 26 739

15 28 35 11 26 742

17 37 27 10 26 736

37 39 39 7 5

17 20

60 11 4 26 735 64 11 4 21 738 69 11 5 15 742 13 46 25 16 744 8 49 28 16 738 39 19 18 25 741 42 16 12 30 744

21 42 17 12 29 739

2 4 6 43 38 13 739

9 9 4 2

23 26 9 6

32 24 11 34 731 35 22 10 33 739 13 33 18 35 741 8 36 19 38 739

2 5 7 24 63 6 753 2 4 6 25 64 6 754

1 2 2 24 68 6 754 1 6 8 24 58 10 752

0 1 1 25 68 6 751 1 1 2 25 68 5 753

0 0

2 2 27 65 7 749 1 1 26 67 6 753

Note. a, Cronbach's a; ++, strongly agreeing; +, agreeing; Sum, agreeing and strongly agreeing; -, disagreeing; --, strongly disagreeing; ?, don't know and/or no opinion.

360 Dekker et al.


to 25 items regarding Spain (the country to which the Basque Country belongs). Generally, there was a declining trend of support as the attitudes rose in the hierarchy. However, contrary to our expectations, more respondents had the attitude of national liking than national feeling. Moreover, two nationalism items (having Spanish blood, wanting Spaniards in France protected) also indicated an increase rather than a decrease in support. All individual subscales of positive national attitudes were statistically reliable (Cronbach's as varied from .81 to .93; see Table 4).

Respondents who gave no answer or the "no opinion" response to five or more items were excluded from the following analysis. The missing values of other items were replaced by the neutral alternative. MSP showed that two nationalism subscale items were weak indicators of the national attitudes scale (items 22 and 24); three other nationalism subscale items had negative covariances with other items and thus were excluded from this analysis (items 21, 23, and 25). To fully explore the methodological problems of the national attitudes scale, we com- puted the Pearson's correlation coefficients (including all 25 items, n = 572). Some of these correlations were too high (feeling/liking, feeling/pride, liking/pride, and preference/superiority). Most important for our analysis was that the attitude of nationalism indicated high correlations with the attitudes lower in the hierarchy (feeling, .63; liking, .58; pride, .65). The high levels of support for three of the nationalistic items (Spanish blood, common origin, part of one Spanish family) formed the underlying reason for this result.

In a new analysis with all items, excluding the three nationalistic items with negative covariances, we let the Mokken scale analysis program search for possible scales (instead of carrying out a test on all 22 items in one scale). This search produced two scales. One scale included all 17 national feeling, liking, pride, preference, and superiority items (H = .66). The remaining nationalistic items appeared to form a second scale with a low scale coefficient (H = .38). Two of the five nationalistic items could not be included in this second scale because of low individual scale coefficients (wishing Portugal united with Spain, wanting Spaniards in France to be protected). We conclude that the data simply confirmed our cumulative hierarchy expectations with respect to national feeling, liking, pride, preference, and superiority; nationalism was the exception. The very high correlations among national feeling, liking, and pride hardly justified a separate treatment of these attitudes. The highest stage in the hierarchy-nationalism- was a separate phenomenon. A possible explanation for these methodological problems could be that the connotations of these items stand too far from the political and social reality of a large group of Basque youngsters because their identity is predominantly Basque.

We expected that individuals would combine moderate positive Basque regional-national attitudes with positive Spanish national attitudes. The findings confirmed this expectation; large proportions of respondents with Basque liking and pride also have the attitudes of Spanish liking and pride. We also expected

361

Table 4. Spanish National Attitudes Among Basque Youth in 1996


++ + Sum - - ?

Spanish national feeling (a = .93) 1. Feeling Spanish 2. Feeling Spain is my country

Spanish national liking (a = .83) 3. Liking to be Spanish 4. Liking the Spaniards in general 5. Liking Spain 6. Liking the Castilian language

Spanish national pride (a = .81) 7. Proud to be Spanish 8. Proud of the Spaniards 9. Proud of Spain

Spanish national preference (a = .83) 10. Preferring Spaniards 11. Preferring Spanish citizenship 12. Preferring Spain

Spanish national superiority (a = .85) 13. Liking Spaniards most 14. Feeling Spaniards are better 15. Feeling Spaniards are the best 16. Feeling Spain is the best 17. Feeling Spanish nationality is the best

Spanish nationalism (a = .84) 18. Feeling Spanish common origin 19. Feeling a member of one Spanish family 20. Feeling of having Spanish blood 21. Wanting Spaniards not to mix with others 22. Wishing Portugal united with Spain 23. Wanting non-Spaniards to leave Spain 24. Wanting Spaniards in France protected 25. Rejecting international cooperation

Spanish national alienation (a = .71) 26. Feeling uncomfortable among Spaniards 27. Feeling not at home in Spain

Spanish national shame (a = .68) 28. Ashamed to be Spanish 29. Ashamed of Spain

Spanish national disgust (a = .86) 30. Disgusted with the Spaniards 31. Disgusted with Spain

Spanish national hate (a = .87) 32. Hating the Spaniards 33. Hating Spain

10 30 40 21 25 14 760 10 31 41 20 25 14 759

9 10 10 13

9 5 5

5 5 5

3 2 2 2 2

2 3 4 1 1 1 3 1

29 46 39 56

25 20 25

28 16 23

20 10 18 13 6

22 18 24 6 9 2

22 5

38 19 25 18 761 57 15 11 17 759 49 17 17 17 757 70 11 8 11 762

34 20 24 23 759 25 26 23 27 754 30 24 17 30 759

33 30 16 22 759 21 33 22 24 758 28 32 22 18 757

23 37 20 20 757 11 40 27 21 752 21 36 22 21 754 16 41 25 19 756 7 42 27 24 756

23 28 16 33 743 21 29 26 24 750 28 24 27 21 754

8 42 31 19 753 9 31 20 40 758 3 36 45 17 755

25 24 13 38 755 6 34 20 40 754

4 13 17 36 34 13 764 9 20 29 30 30 11 760

5 5

12 19

17 30 34 20 745 24 30 29 17 762

5 10 15 34 37 15 774 6 14 20 29 37 14 762

6 10 15 36 34 14 762 8 13 20 31 34 15 764

Note. a, Cronbach's a; ++, strongly agreeing; +, agreeing; Sum, agreeing and strongly agreeing; -, disagreeing; --, strongly disagreeing; ?, don't know and/or no opinion.

362 Dekker et al.


that very positive or extremely positive regional-national attitudes exclude such positive national attitudes. This expectation was not confirmed because large proportions of respondents with Basque preference, superiority, or nationalism also had Spanish preference and superiority.

We also expected that very positive or extremely positive regional-national attitudes would be combined with negative national attitudes. To test this expectation, we first had to examine whether negative national attitudes exist when positive attitudes are missing (such that positive and negative attitudes form two separate scales). We asked the Basque respondents to react to eight negative Spanish items (Table 4). A Mokken scale analysis, including both the Spanish positive and negative items, revealed that they form two scales. All covariances of the negative items had negative values with the positive items. The negative items together formed one cumulative scale (H = .82). The expectation that very positive or extremely positive regional-national attitudes are combined with negative national attitudes was confirmed: The numbers of respondents with negative Spanish attitudes tended to increase as their positive Basque attitudes increased. Quite high proportions of Basque youth combine positive Basque attitudes with negative attitudes toward Spain: About half of the respondents with increased attitudes of Basque nationalism had negative attitudes toward Spain.

These findings brought us to the notion that Basque youth could be classified into five groups with distinct combinations of Basque and Spanish attitudes. Group 1 combines a very positive Basque identity (preference, superiority, and regional nationalism) with negative attitudes toward Spain (30%). Group 2 has a highly positive Basque identity but no negative Spanish attitudes (31%). Group 3 has a combination of very positive Basque and Spanish identity (19%). Group 4 has an exclusively positive Spanish identity (8%). Group 5 has no very positive Basque or Spanish identity (12%; n = 561). A desire for an independent Basque state was clearly different between Group 1 and Group 2 (92% and 66%, respectively; n = 471). The two nationalist political parties also received the most support from Group 1 (64% would vote for the Eusko Alkartasuna or Herri Batasuna). The terrorist movement ETA and its goals and activities were also supported more by Group 1 (18% and 2%, respectively).

The Basque study also aimed to test our nationalism explanatory hypotheses. Using the method of multiple regression, we tested the explanatory power of several different independent variables per attitude (regional-national feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, and nationalism). The independent variables were regional-national emotions, beliefs (auto-cliches, history belief, and auto- stereotypes), behavior, values, attitudes toward Spain, attitudes toward foreign people, and Basque national socialization (see Appendix C). Regional-national emotion explained 13% of Basque nationalism. Six Basque auto-cliches also contributed to the variance explanation in the attitude of Basque nationalism: a foreign security threat, increased number of foreigners, growing difference

363

between rich and poor, increase in political liberties, economic deterioration, and diminishing international influence. These Basque cliches (together with the number of negative cliches) explained 20% of the variance in Basque regional nationalism. The history belief explained 10% of the variance in the attitude of Basque nationalism, auto-stereotypes a low 6%, and regional-national behavior also a low 6%. The four specific values relating to the Basque Country explained 32% of the variance in Basque nationalism. The neutral Spanish attitude and two of the five positive Spanish attitudes (feeling, liking, and nationalism) explained 55% of the variance in Basque nationalism. Three of the four negative Spanish attitudes (alienation, shame, and hate) explained 52% of the variance in Basque nationalism. Attitudes toward foreign countries explained more than one-third of the variance in Basque nationalism (37%). Yet all variance came from the sympathy score and ranking of Spain. Attitudes toward foreign peoples and minorities also explained more than one-third of the variance in Basque nationalism (38%). Again, almost all of the variance is explained by the sympathy scores and preference ranking for Spaniards. The explained effect of the linguistic model of the school was 17%. Reading a Basque nationalistic newspaper also had a positive effect. The same applied to reading about Basque politics in newspapers and watching the Basque television channels ETB-1 and ETB-2. Reading Spanish newspapers and watching Spanish channels, e.g. Television Espaiiola channel 1 (TVE1), had negative regression coefficients. The percentage of explanation by these mass media variables was a high 33%. A high 41% of the variance in Basque nationalism can be explained when taking into consideration the nationalistic leaders' charisma. Having heard or seen nationalistic statements explained 26%. The father appeared to be the strongest socializer. Together, the nationalistic statements and their socializers equated in the regression-having often heard or read the statements that "Lapurdi, Baja Navarra and Zuberoa, the parts of France where people speak Euskera, should unite with the Basque Country in a separate and independent state, Euskadi" and "Basques should not mix with other nationalities," and having heard nationalistic statements from one's father, best friend(s), brothers/sisters, and politicians on radio-explained 26% of the variance in Basque nationalism.

The relative effects of all the explanatory variables on Basque nationalism were tested using a backward multiple regression analysis. All variables we found in the separate regression analyses were entered, and one by one the variables that added least to the total explained variance were removed. Attitudes toward Spain (national liking, national shame, and nationalism), the value of maintenance of Basque culture, the auto-cliche of increase in political liberties, and the socialization variables of reading newspapers and having heard nationalistic statements from best friends remained in the regression. Positive and negative attitudes toward Spain best explained the variance in Basque nationalism. The total explained variance in the attitude of Basque nationalism was a high 64% (Table 5).

364 Dekker et al.

Table 5. Results of the Backward Multiple Regression Analysis With Basque Nationalism and Its Direct Explanatory Variables

Independent variables Basque nationalism (df residual) df

B1 B2 R2 ()

Removed from regression analysis: Value: Generosity -.003 -.003 69.8 (106) 48 Attitude toward outgroups: Sympathy score: Spain .007 .008 69.8 (107) 47 Socialization: Leader: Charisma: Jayme Mayor Oreja (PP) .009 .010 69.8 (108) 46 Socialization: Leader: Charisma: Xabier Arzalluz (PNV) -.010 -.009 69.8 (109) 45 Attitude toward Spain: National hate .024 .025 69.8 (110) 44 Socialization: Leader: Charisma: Javier Madrazo (IU) -.015 -.016 69.8 (111) 43 Beliefs: Auto-cliches: Number of negative auto-clich6s .017 .016 69.8 (112) 42 Beliefs: Auto-clich6s: Increasing difference rich and poor .019 .011 69.8 (113) 41 Socialization: Reading news about Basque politics -.017 -.016 69.8 (114) 40 Behavior: Basque national behavior .020 .016 69.8 (115) 39 Socialization: Watching TVE 1 -.017 -.017 69.7 (116) 38 Socialization: Watching ETB-1 .024 .022 69.7 (117) 37 Beliefs: Auto-clich6s: Suffers from foreign threat of security -.021 -.025 69.7 (118) 36 Beliefs: Auto-stereotypes: Number of positive auto-stereotypes .038 .035 69.6 (119) 35 Socialization: Having heard/seen: "Basques should not mix. ." -.026 -.026 69.6 (120) 34 Value: Willingness to fight for your country -.026 -.025 69.5 (121) 33 Socialization: Having heard nationalistic statements from father .036 .032 69.5 (122) 32 Value: Knowledge of Spanish politics -.028 -.031 69.4 (123) 31 Value: Knowledge of Basque politics .039 .036 69.3 (124) 30 Beliefs: Auto-stereotypes: Efficient .054 .035 69.2 (125) 29 Value: Good manners .037 .036 69.1 (126) 28 Attitude toward Spain: National feeling -.060 -.065 69.0 (127) 27 Value: Good health .036 .036 68.9 (128) 26 Value: Enjoyable work .039 .033 68.8 (129) 25 Socialization: Having heard: "Lapurdi... should unite with..." .052 .039 68.7 (130) 24 Beliefs: Auto-cliches: Increasing number of foreigners .045 .039 68.6 (131) 23 Beliefs: Auto-stereotypes: Number of negative auto-stereotypes .049 .043 68.4 (132) 22

z

i

I

I

0

tib

Table 5. (cont.)

Independent variables Basque nationalism (df residual) df

BI B2 R2()

Attitude: Sympathy score: Spaniards -.083 -.072 68.3 (133) 21 Socialization: Having heard nationalistic statements from brothers/sisters .044 .043 68.1 (134) 20 Value: Independence -.040 -.051 67.9 (135) 19 Socialization: Leader: Charisma: Carlos Rodriguez (HB) -.045 -.058 67.7 (136) 18 Value: Freedom .060 .052 67.6 (137) 17 Attitude toward outgroups: Preference ranking: Spaniards .096 .101 67.3 (138) 16 Beliefs: Basque national history belief .035 .052 67.0 (139) 15 Socialization: School linguistic model -.060 -.066 66.8 (140) 14 Emotion: Basque emotion .035 .064 66.5 (141) 13 Attitude toward outgroups: Preference ranking: Spain -.148 -.082 66.2 (142) 12 Attitude toward outgroups: Preference ranking: France .043 .058 65.8 (143) 11 Attitude toward Spain: National alienation .134 .135 65.5 (144) 10 Socialization: Heard nationalistic statements from politicians on radio -.066 -.071 65.0 (145) 8 Socialization: Watching TV channel most .069 .095 64.5 (146) 8

Kept in regression analysis: Beliefs: Auto-clich6s: Increase of political liberties .054 .093 63.8 (147) 7 Socialization: Having heard nationalistic statements from best friend(s) .082 .097 Socialization: Reading newspaper most .073 .150 Value: Maintenance of Basque culture .115 .153 Attitude toward Spain: Nationalism .228 .210 Attitude toward Spain: National shame .136 .273 Attitude toward Spain: National liking -.184 -.328

Note. The order in which the variables are displayed is the order in which they were removed from the regression analysis. B1 is the standardized regression coefficient when all independent variables were included in the analysis; B2 is the regression coefficient one step before the independent variable was removed. R2 is the variance, explained by the remaining variables at each moment in the analysis.


Conclusion and Perspectives

In each of the preceding studies we were able to improve aspects of our measurement instrument, such as the list of items measuring national attitudes (face validity, internal validity, external validity). The expectation that we could empirically distinguish one neutral and five positive national attitudes on the basis of differences in kind and strength of affection was confirmed by the data from the Dutch and Slovak respondents, and also by the data from the Basque respondents regarding Basque regional-national attitudes (but not their national attitudes toward Spain). The Dutch and Slovak data also confirmed that the neutral and

positive national attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy of positive national attitudes. This expectation was also established in the case of the Basque attitudes

among Basque youth (but not in the case of their attitudes toward Spain). The

Basque data also revealed that the expectation of negative national attitudes

forming a separate cumulative scale and that of positive and negative national attitudes forming two separate scales were correct. The Basque data also confirmed that moderate positive regional-national attitudes are combined with positive national attitudes. No confirmation was found for the expectation that very positive and extremely positive regional-national attitudes are not combined with positive national attitudes, because considerable proportions of respondents with the attitudes of Basque preference, superiority, and nationalism also had Spanish preference, superiority, and nationalism. On the other hand, the expectation that very positive and extremely positive regional-national attitudes are combined with

negative national attitudes was confirmed by the Basque data. Some of the explanatory hypotheses could not be rejected. The Slovak data

analysis indicated that national emotion, national auto-stereotypes, attitude toward

outgroups, and attitude toward nationalistic political leaders were the main determinants. The Basque data analysis confirmed that the attitude toward Spain best

explained the variance in Basque regional nationalism. One auto-cliche, one

regional-national value, and two national socialization variables also remained in the regression. In general, the cognitive explanatory variables-beliefs about the country and people-had only highly limited explanatory power. The conative variable (Basque national behavior) also was not highly successful in explaining individual differences in Basque nationalism. It was a surprise that emotion was not a strong predictor, and the reason may be that we included only one single- item emotion question in these studies.

Our research had several limitations and shortcomings. The studies concerned no more than two countries and one autonomous community in Europe. Replica- tion in more European countries and in countries in other parts of the world is an absolute necessity. The composition of these three samples was different. Future research should use similar populations and samples. All Dutch and Basque par- ticipants, and part of the Slovak sample, were young people. Future research using adult respondents is needed to increase external validity. The three measurements

367

were different as well, and future research should use the same measurements. The data did not allow for the testing of expected relationships between the national attitudes and international attitudes. The explanatory analyses included only possible direct effects of the independent variables. Future studies should include both direct and indirect effects.

Few other related empirical studies were published since the start of our project in 1992. Our research instruments were used in studies in Hungary and the United States (Kelemen, 1998; Saviano & Meinhold, 1999). In eight studies, new methodologies and/or instruments were developed (Blank, Schnieder, & Wittenberg, 1999; Citrin, Haas, Muste, & Reingold, 1994; Davis, 1999; Herranz de Rafael, 1998; Ka-Ying Wong & Tung-Wen Sun, 1998; Rossteutscher, 1997; Seiler, Maes, & Schmitt, 1999; Smith & Jarkko, 1998). Three studies built on Kosterman and Feshbach's 1989 study (Karasawa, 1994; Poppe, 1998; Schatz & Lavine, 1999; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999).

There are important differences and similarities between our research and the Schatz et al. (1999) study, which is the most recently published investigation. Instead of three affections (constructive patriotism, blind patriotism, and nationalism), we distinguish six national attitudes (national feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, and nationalism). However, the various attachments appeared to correspond with some of our attitudes ("constructive patriotism" with national

feeling, liking, and pride; "blind patriotism" with national preference; "nationalism" with national superiority and nationalism). Schatz et al. stressed orthogo- nality between constructive and blind patriotism and between constructive patriotism and nationalism on the one hand, and causality between blind patriotism and nationalism on the other, whereas we hypothesized and found empirical evidence for cumulativity. Finally, Schatz et al. wished to explain the origins of the various attachments to one's country, whereas we took the first step toward a theory explaining variances in national attitudes. There are, however, important similarities between the two studies. Both studies aimed to develop reliable and valid cross-national and cross-generational measures of attachments to one's country. Both also distinguished more national attitudes than the simple dichotomy of nationalism versus non-nationalism (or nationalism versus patriotism). Both studies saw a clear boundary line between national attitudes without intergroup comparisons, and attitudes that include these comparisons and even intergroup discrimination.

In general, we see a growing congruence in research designs, despite the many differences. A new, common, cross-national, and longitudinal empirical research project aimed at measuring and explaining the notion of nationalism is worth a try.

APPENDIX A: National Attitudes Measure in the Dutch Study

National feeling: "I feel I am Dutch," "I feel that the Netherlands is my country."

368 Dekker et al.


National liking: "I enjoy being Dutch," "In general, I like the Dutch," "I like the Netherlands," "I like the Dutch language."

National pride: "I am proud to be Dutch," "I am proud of what the Dutch people have done," "The Netherlands can be proud of what it represents."

National preference: "I prefer being a Dutch citizen more than any other citizenship in the world," "In general, I prefer to have Dutch people for my personal contacts moreso than people from other countries," "In general, I like Dutch people moreso than people from other countries," "I prefer to live in the Nether- lands moreso than in any other country."

National superiority: "The Dutch nationality is the best nationality to have," "In general, Dutch people are better than other nationalities," "In general, Dutch people are the best people to have for my personal contacts," "The Netherlands is the best country in which to live."

Nationalism: "I feel I share a common origin with other Dutch people," "I feel I am a member of one Dutch family," "I feel I have Dutch blood," "All the Dutch should live in the Netherlands," "The non-Dutch living in the Netherlands should leave the Netherlands," "The Dutch should not mix with other nationalities," "Flanders, that part of Belgium where people speak Dutch, should unite with the Netherlands," "The Dutch living in Belgium should have the Netherlands' protection," "International cooperation with other countries overburdens the Netherlands and, therefore, should be stopped."

National alienation: "In general, I do not feel comfortable being among Dutch people," "I do not feel at home in the Netherlands."

National shame: "I am ashamed to be Dutch," "I am ashamed of what the Dutch people have done," "The Netherlands should be ashamed of what it represents."

National disgust: "In general, I am disgusted with the Dutch," "I am disgusted with the Netherlands."

National hate: "In general, I hate the Dutch," "I hate the Netherlands."

APPENDIX B: Independent Variables in the Slovak Study

Slovak national emotions were measured by asking respondents whether they felt very emotional with respect to Slovakia when they listen to the national anthem, when they see the national flag, and/or when Slovaks are victorious in sports events. Respondents were considered to have a strong positive national emotion if they agreed with all three emotions.

National auto-cliches and auto-stereotypes were measured by asking respondents to indicate which of the displayed characteristics were applicable to Slovakia (and/or Hungary, the Czech Republic, Russia, and Germany) and which of the displayed attributes were applicable to "most" Slovaks (and/or "most" Hungarians, Czechs, Russians, Romanies, and Austrians). We included in the

369

analysis an equal number of positive and negative cliches and stereotypes: four positive and five negative auto-cliches (democratization, increasing political freedom, increasing comfort, and technologically highly developed; worsening social security, less security on the street, increasing criminality, wants to rule other countries, and is eager for war) and seven positive and six negative auto-

stereotypes (tolerant, sense of humor, friendly, reliable, helpful, intelligent, and honest; dominant, arrogant, aggressive, cruel, sly, and egoistic). Respondents were considered to have a positive set of cliches about Slovakia if they indicated at least three positive cliches and not more than one negative cliche, and a positive set of stereotypes about Slovaks if they indicated at least five positive stereotypes and not more than one negative stereotype. The variable "national belief' is the sum of all positive and negative auto-cliches and auto-stereotypes.

National behaviors were measured by asking respondents whether they had attended ceremonies in commemoration of the national dead, ceremonies in commemoration of national historic events, and rituals around the national flag, and whether they sing national songs. Respondents were considered to have a high level of national behavior if they answered all four questions positively.

The negative attitude toward outgroups was measured by asking respondents to react to five statements about Hungary, Hungarians, and Romanies: "I like

Hungary," "I like most of the Hungarians who live in Slovakia," "I would have no problems with Hungarians as my neighbors," "I like most of the Romanies," and "I would have no problems with Romanies as my neighbors." The responses did not form a reliable scale (Cronbach's a, .60). Respondents were considered to have a negative attitude toward outgroups if they disagreed with all five items.

A concern about one's future was measured by agree/disagree responses to six statements about expectations regarding the future of the Slovak economy and employment situation, the respondent's economic future, the respondent's family's financial situation, and the respondent's personal safety and educational opportunities. The responses did not form a reliable scale (Cronbach's a, .64). Respondents were considered to worry about the future if they agreed with all six statements.

Sense of positive self-identity was measured by reactions to five statements: "I have knowledge about the important things in life," "People like me do not have any say about what parents do," "I can help to bring about a change for the better," "I have opinions about the main problems in life," and "I can get further ahead in life by virtue of my own efforts." The items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's a, .72). Rrespondents were considered to have a low sense of positive identity if they disagreed with the four positive items and agreed with the one negative item.

The following national socialization variables were used: frequency of reading political information in newspapers, watching political news programs on television, talking about or discussing Slovakia/Slovaks with others, talking about or discussing minorities and foreign countries and peoples with others, frequency

370 Dekker et al.


of direct contact with minorities in Slovakia (talking with Hungarians and with Romanies living in Slovakia), positive attitude toward nationalistic political leaders, having often heard national(istic) statements, and having often heard national(istic) statements from political leaders. Positive attitude toward nationalistic political leaders was measured by asking respondents to evaluate the leaders of the Slovak Nationalist Party, HZDS, and the Hungarian parties. Respon- dents were considered to have a positive attitude toward nationalistic leaders if

they had a positive evaluation of the first two leaders and a negative evaluation of the other two. The variable "having often heard nationalistic statements" was measured by asking the frequency of having heard the statements "the Slovaks form one nation," "the Slovaks are all brothers and sisters," "the Slovaks have the same ancestors," "the minorities in Slovakia must leave Slovakia," and "the same 'mother' gave birth to the Slovaks" (Cronbach's a, .72). Respondents were considered to have often heard nationalistic statements if they answered "often" to all five questions. They were also asked the sources of these statements; answers were categorized into "family," "mass media," and "political leaders."

APPENDIX C: Independent Variables in the Basque Study

Basque regional-national emotion was measured by asking respondents whether they get tears in their eyes while seeing the Basque flag being hoisted at a sports ceremony.

Basque auto-cliches were measured by asking respondents which of the six positive and 15 negative displayed characteristics were applicable to the Basque Country (increase of political liberties, democratizing, increase of comfort, increase of job opportunities, increase of opportunities to make money, and technologically highly developed; increase of criminality, minority groups threaten the majority's interest, decrease of safety on the streets, domestic politics gets in disorder, economic deterioration, eager for war, losing international prestige, increasing number of foreigners, growing difference between rich and poor, suf- fering from a foreign threat of security, diminishing international influence, worsening of social security, worsening of education opportunities, wants to rule other countries, and worsening of health care). Two other variables were added: the numbers of marked positive and negative characteristics.

The Basque history belief was measured by asking respondents to indicate what they thought about the Basque Country's performance in the past on a 7- point scale ranging from extremely positive to extremely negative.

Basque auto-stereotypes were measured by asking respondents which of the 12 positive and 12 negative characteristics that were presented were applicable to Basques (industrious, sociable, sympathetic, sense of humor, intelligent, reliable, honest, easy to interact with, attentive, tolerant, efficient, and diligent; stubborn,

371

skillful, aggressive, suspicious, dominant, arrogant, egoistic, susceptible, cruel, sly, thinking hierarchically, and ambiguous). Again two other variables were added: the numbers of marked positive and negative stereotypes.

Regional-national behavior was measured by asking respondents whether

they had always, often, or never orally defended the Basque Country or its people against criticism from non-Basques.

To investigate specific values relating to the Basque Country, we asked the

respondents to indicate the five most important things in life out of a list of 19 values and the five most important things that parents should teach their children out of a list of 16 values. The lists included four Basque values: maintenance of Basque culture, Basque independence, knowledge of Basque politics, and willingness to fight for "your" country.

The attitudes toward foreign countries (all EU member states) were measured by asking respondents to give a sympathy score ranging from 0 to 100 for each of the countries, and to rank all the countries according to desirability of

living in them. The attitudes toward foreign peoples (the peoples of all EU member states) and minorities in Spain (i.e., Catalans, Andalusians, and Galicians) were measured by a sympathy score and a ranking in preference for having them as neighbors.

The Basque regional-national socialization variables included having experienced regional-national rituals (participation in the annual Aberri Eguna), knowing and singing songs about the Basque Country, speaking Euskera at school, reading a Basque nationalistic newspaper (Egin, Deia, or Egunkaria), reading about Basque politics in newspaper, watching the Basque television channels ETB-1 and ETB-2, watching television news about Basque politics, considering leaders of nationalistic parties charismatic, talking frequently about the Basque Country and Basques (with grandparents, father, mother, brothers/sisters, teachers, best friend, and/or the priest), and having often heard or seen nationalistic statements. Whether nationalistic political leaders were considered charismatic was measured by asking respondents whether the leaders of the three nationalistic parties had a good character and a vigor to convince. The variable "having often heard nationalistic statements" was measured by asking the frequency of having heard the statements "We, the Basques, should not mix with the rest of the Spaniards," "We, the Basques, should not mix with other nationalities," "Navarra should unite with the Basque Country in a separate and independent state, Euskadi," "Lapurdi, Baja Navarra and Zuberoa, the parts of France where people speak Euskera, should unite with the Basque Country in a separate and independent state, Euskadi," "Cooperation with other regions of Spain overburdens the Basque Country, and should therefore be stopped," and "International cooperation with other countries overburdens the Basque Country, and should therefore be stopped." The respondents were also asked the sources of these statements; they were allowed to mark as many socializers as they wanted. The list included 17 socializers (e.g., grandparents, father, mother, television news,

372 Dekker et al.


newspaper, poster, magazine, teacher, textbook, best friend, and politician on television).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Renze Portengen and Robert Straver for their assistance in col- lecting and analyzing the data in the Netherlands and Slovakia, respectively; Juan Andres Munoz Arau (Universidad de la Rioja in Logroio) for his assistance in data collection in the Basque Country; and Frits Meijerink (Leiden University) for his assistance in the data analyses. For their comments on earlier drafts of this contribution, we thank Rudy Andeweg (Leiden University), Louk Hagendoor (Utrecht University), Russell Farnen (University of Connecticut), Koen Koch (Leiden University), Hans Oversloot (Leiden University), Joop van Holsteyn (Leiden University), Cas Mudde (Leiden University), Gy6rgy Csepeli (E6tvos Lorand University, Budapest), Sergey Vladimirovitch Tumanov (Moscow State University), Dimitris Charalambis (National Centre of Social Research, Athens), the editors, and two anonymous reviewers. Portions of this research were presented at the 1995, 1997, and 1999 annual conferences of the International Society of Political Psychology, in Washington, D.C., Krak6w, and Amsterdam, respectively. We thank Hsuan Chou (Leiden University) for her general editing. Corre- spondence concerning this article should be sent to Henk Dekker, Department of Political Science, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, Nether- lands. E-mail: [email protected]

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