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Myths of the Air War over Serbia

Some Lessons Not to Learn

DR. GRANT T. HAMMOND

Whenblowsareplanned,whoevercontrivesthemwiththegreatestappreciationoftheirconsequenceswillhavegreatadvantage.

EditorialAbstract:Didairpowerwin thewarinKosovo? Inthiscompanionpiecetohisar-ticleontheGulfWarintheFall1998issue,Dr.Hammondchallengesopinionsabout the suc-cessofOperationAlliedForce. Airpowermayhaveachievedallthemilitaryobjectivesasked

of it, but the resulting end state inKosovo isunsatisfying. He warns that this apparentsuccessofairpowermayleadtoitserroneousfutureuse in lieuofvalidnationalobjectivesandstrategy.

FredericktheGreat

THISARTICLEISasequeltomyear-lier piece Myths of the GulfWar:SomeLessonsNottoLearn(Air-power Journal, Fall 1998), which

caused some consternationanddiscomfitedmany, foritseemedthatIwascriticizing air-

power

.Iwasnot.

Iwas c

riticizing thosewhodonotunderstand itsstrengthsand its limi-

tationsandwhoaskittosubstituteforstrat-egy. Thisarticletakeslargelythesamemythsandteststhosepropositionsagainsttheback-dropoftheairwaroverSerbiaandthe 78-day

78

DISTRIBUTION A:Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Aerospace Power Journal - Winter 2000

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86 AEROSPACEPOWERJOURNAL WINTER2000

nology involved in future air campaigns. Ifthesearenotforthcoming, thenthe capabili-

tiesw

illbecomeho

llow, anda

irpowe

r

will

be-

comeincapableoffulfilling thetasksaskedofit. Itmatterslesswhethertheseareofalethalnature (as in theGulfWar and OperationsDeliberateForce andAlliedForce) ornon-lethalnature(asinmilitaryoperationsotherthanwarorhumanitarianreliefoperations).Airpowerisfiniteandultimatelylimited.

Ina curioussortofway, themythsoftheairwaroverSerbiaarepartoftheproblem, notpartofthesolution insustaining our invest-

Notes

1. Anoft-quotedandparaphrasedremarkmadeoriginallybyFranklinC. ChuckSpinneyatanArmyWarCollegeStrategyConference, April 1999.

2. AnthonyH. Cordesman, TheLessonsand Non-LessonsoftheAirandMissileWarinKosovo(Washington, D.C.:CenterforStrategic andInternationalStudies, 8 July 1999), 9.

3. Seetheessays contained inNATOsEmptyVictory:APost-mortemontheBalkanWar,ed. TedGalenCarpenter(Washington,D.C.: Cato Institute, 2000), particularly those by Radu,Mearsheimer, Dempsey, andRizopoulos.

4. MessagefromSecretaryofDefenseWilliamS. CohenandChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffHenryH. Sheltonthatac-companied theirKosovo/OperationAlliedForceAfter-ActionReport:ReporttoCongress(Washington, D.C.:DepartmentofDefense, 31January 2000), 1.

5. PresidentBillClinton, 24 March 1999 StatementofOb-jectives, quotedinHeadquarters UnitedStatesAirForce, InitialReport, TheAirWaroverSerbia:AerospacePowerinOperationAlliedForce,April 2000, 5.

ment inairpower. Claiming more than is itsdue is to be avoided. As thejoint force air

component commander

himse

lfL

t GenMikeShort, USAF, Retiredhas commentedabouttheairwaroverSerbia, Thiswaslittlemore thanrandombombing ofmilitary tar-getsthatachievedvictorybyhappenstance.14

Thatis, luckmayhavehadasmuchtodowithour successas skill. Next timeout, moreat-tention to strategy and strategic effect andlessonapplicationof force todemonstrateresolvewithoutregardtosecond-andthird-orderconsequenceswouldserveusallwell.

6. Cordesman, 9.

7. Ibid., 34.

8. Jeffrey Record, Operation Allied Force: Yet Another

Wake-Up Call for the Army? Parameters 29, no. 4 (Winter

19992000): 16.

9. EarlH. TilfordJr., OperationAlliedForceandtheRole

ofAirPower,Parameters29, no. 4 (Winter 19992000): 37.

10. MajGenJ. D. LynchJr., TruthinKosovo:IsItHalftime?

UnitedStates NavalInstituteProceedings125, no. 8 (August 1999):

2.

11. IvoH. DaalderandMichaelE. OHanlon, WinningUgly:

NATOsWartoSaveKosovo(Washington, D.C.:BrookingsInstitu-tion, 2000), 210.

12. Ibid., 211.

13. SeeEliotCohen, TheMystiqueofAirpower,ForeignAf-

fairs73,no. 1 (January/February 1994): 109.

14. Commentsmade inanaddresstotheAirWarCollege,

MaxwellAFB, Ala., 23 August 2000. Usedwithpermission.

Thetheoryofwarandstrategyisthecoreofallthings.

MaoTse-tung, 1954