F

Myth or Reality?

English Privateers and Their Effect upon Veniceat the End of Elizabeth’s Reign

Joseph Davies

Discussions of the Venetian Republic are inevitably shrouded in a myriad of myths:’ those

of the Republic’s legendary autonomy and democracy, of the competency of her citizenry, of her

shrewd businessmen and cunning diplomats, and of her great maritime prowess and naval

strength. As with many myths, these originated in some level of reality. But as the Republic

aged, so did her reality, leaving her nothing but myth. Crucial pieces of this Venetian Myth are

called into question by examining English privateering in the Mediterranean and its effect upon

Venice.

Myths are equally inescapable in discussions of pirates and privateers. The words “pirate”

and “privateer’2 may conjure romantic visions of Captain Blood and the Crimson Pirate,

flamboyantly dressed, faces to the wind, women by their sides. These were honorable rogues with

a hearty laugh, a zest for life and a flagrant disregard for rules. “Pirate” and “privateer” may also

bring forth an equally vivid vision of opportunists roaming the sea, seeking booty and prisoners

for ransom. Neither of these myths is without base. To an Englishman, the holder of a letter of

marque was a swashbuckler doing his duty for God, country, and king while simultaneously

enlarging his purse. To a Spaniard or a Venetian the holder of a letter of rnarque was a vile sea

‘For discussions of the myth of Venice see Edward Muir’s Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice; Fredric C. Lane’sVenice: A Maritime Rc’pubtic, and Myron Gilmore’s essay in Renaissance Venice, ed. J. R. Hale.

‘The choice to use the word “pirate” or “privateer” can prove somewhat problematical for the modemhistorian. In many circles there is no difference between the two. In the past, however, a privateer was anindividual who was given a commission by the state to privately arm a ship and, as a naval auxiliary, engagethe expressed enemies of the state. As reward for his service to the state the privateer was allowed to takebooty during these engagements. A pirate was an individual who had taken it upon himself to arm a shipand, without state approval, attack vessels solely in pursuit of profit. This often involved assaulting one’sown countrymen. But these separate definitions coLild easily blur, as a fully commissioned privateer couldact against neutrals or the allies of the state which he served. How one defined ‘pirate” or “privateer”depended a great deal upon one’s perspective. Thus it is often difficult for the historian to describe a manof the past as either a pirate or a privateer in absolute terms. To that end, I have tried to use the terms asthey would have been applied in the past. That is, a privateer is a sanctioned auxiliary acting in the interestsof the state, and a pirate is an outlaw acting strictly in his own interests. It was not always possible tomaintain this distinction and the terms are occasionally used somewhat interchangeably.

2 ex post facto

dog roaming the ocean seeking defenseless merchantmen. One man’s outlaw was another’s

patriot, depending upon one’s position relative to the sword or cannon.

A more realistic image, however, is one of privateers and pirates as instruments of foreign

policy and economic corn petition for the burgeoning nation-states of the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. During this period, the English used privateers and pirates to carry out foreign policy

objectives.3

Alberto Tenenti and fredric C. Lane have discussed the detrimental effects that piratical

practices had upon the Venetian Republic. Tenenti pays special attention to the pirates of

Northern Europe. Although both Tenenti and Lane acknowledge the role piracy played inthe

decline of Venice, neither uses it to question the myths surrounding Venice. Had they done this,

they would have revealed the true relationship between piracy, foreign policy, and economics,

while exposing the myth of Venice.

Priva teering

England had a long tradition of privateering. It was expensive to outfit and maintain a

navy that could both defend the island’s shores and protect England’s interests in distant seas.

The problem was solved by supplementing the standing navy with privateers. The Tudor navy

relied upon issuing letters of marque. Letters of marque commissioned individuals to arm

merchantmen and put to sea to fight enemies of the Crown. The admiralty relied upon these

privateers to provide coastal defense while the regular navy carried out operations on the high

seas. In time of war additional letters of marque would be issued to further augment the regular

navy for operations against the enemy. Some privateers served directly under the command of

the Lord Admiral while others were unleased to wreak what havoc they would upon the enemy.

There were, of course, risks involved with accepting this type of commission. After all, it

involved seeking out and engaging the enemy. The incentive to do this lay in the allure of prizes.

Ships and cargoes captured in combat were kept by the privateer. The more aggressive a ship’s

commander, the more profit he could make and the more damage he could do to the enemy.

This system worked because round ships could easily straddle the line between

merchantman or man-o’-war. Because of the ease of heavily arming a round ship without

sacrificing cargo space, many were both.4 This blurred the line between trading ships and war

3This can also be said of the Dutch.

1See Appendix 2.

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English Frivateers 3

ships,5 prompting a Venetian Senator to add this comment to a motion: “[S]eeing that many of

her Majesty’s subjects, who in port appear as merchants, but on the open seas are nothing but

public pirates. tt6 The Venetian ambassador to Constantinople reported a comment made by

the English Ambassador at the same court that accurately depicts the position privateering held

in England:

The Ambassador said that in truth very few ships did sail for tmding but theKingdom of England, though a very rich feeding ground, was not able to supportthe whole nation, therefore they had to take to the sea, and to be fully armed, onaccount of the Spanish, their powerful foes; besides, these ships were the bulwarksof the country. Sometimes they did not find any booty on the open sea, and sopushed further. .

.

This also demonstrates the English turn to the Mediterranean in search of profit and adventure.

This would hold dire consequences for the Republic, as Englishmen began to prey upon Venetian

ships with impunity.

Once the privateers put to sea it became difficult for the commissioning government to

control their actions. Often privateers ceased to function in the spirit of their commission,

assaulting neutral and ally ships. This often caused them to be outlawed at home.8 This could

also work to the advantage of the commissioning government, as they could not be held

responsible for their citizens’ actions. This aspect would come to play a large role as England

inserted herself into the Mediterranean.

Fredric C. Lane’s essay National Wealth and Protection Costs discusses the costs and

benefits incurred by nations who utilized violence to compete with their economic adversaries.9

Lane examines two distinct views of the use of violence as it relates to economies. The first is the

view of the mercantilists, who saw power as a means to wealth and wealth as a means to power.

5The Venetian ambassador to Constantinople had this to say concerning that subject: “I replied that the bestway would be for the English ships to abstain from coming here [the Mediterranean]; for they had but littletrade, nor cotild I distinguish those that came for trading only; for all of them were hampered with artillery,and provisioned for a year, even to the water, and in order that they might be handy in fighting they werekept clear, leaving not only the quarter deck but also the main deck, where goods are usually placed, freefor artillery. Theft is their proper business and the object of their voyage. Horatio F. Brown, ed., Calendarof State Papers. Venetian 7592-7603 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1897), 433 #931.

6lbid., 418 #896.

7lbid., 433 #931.

5This is somewhat of an empty punishment, especially prior to the end of the first quarter of the seventeenthcentury. Capturing and disciplining these outlaws was not trtdy taken up with sincerity until that time.

Fredric C. Lane, Venice and I-listorL/: The Collected Papers of Eredric C. Lane (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsPress, 1966).

4 ex post facto

That is to say, victory in violence brought victory in the marketplace. The competing view,

associated with Adam Smith, states that the use of violence incurs costs that may equal or

outweigh the profits gained in commerce.1°

Lane’s discussion sheds light upon the hidden economic consequences of a violent foreign

policy used to influence commerce. Lane argues that such policies can be a double-edged sword.

This relates to an evaluation of privateering, as the primary goat of privateers was not to engage

hostile navies but rather to disrupt the economies of antagonist nations. England used this

technique to great success against the Spanish in the Atlantic.

Lane’s argument suggests that England should have incurred great costs in perpetrating

this disruption. England, however, had found a means of getting around this paradox by using

privateers. Privateers cost the English Crown nothing, yet they achieved the political and

economic objectives of the Crown. This would imply a third view which applies the mercantilist

model of the use of violence in economic competition without incurring the costs of the Smithian

model. Lane’s equation must be expanded to include the English solution which successfully

combined the mercantilist and Smithian arguments. The evidence would suggest that the English

applied this philosophy in usurping Venetian trade in the Mediterranean.

The Myth of Venetian Autonomy

The Venetians had had no diplomatic ties with England since 7557h1 Treating with

England would have been an act of heresy distasteful to a Catholic State such as Venice and

would surely have displeased the Pope and the King of Spain. Horatio f. Brown suggests that

maintaining an ambassador in England was something that the Republic would normally have

done.12 This assertion is supported by the abundance of Venetian Ambassadors and envoys

throughout the rest of Europe and Levant. In September of 1592 the Republic considered sending

an official envoy to England for the ostensible purpose of purchasing grain. This date

corresponds to the beginning of increased English depredations in the Mediterranean. When the

Pope teamed of the proposed envoy he sent for the Venetian Ambassador in Rome. The

Ambassador, Leonardo Donato, related his audience in a dispatch to the Doge and Senate:

makes it clear, however, that evaluations of cost and benefit must be made from both short- and longterm perspectives before a final conclusion can be rendered.

“It was at this time that the anti-Catholic laws of Henry VIII were re-enacted in England.

‘2Brown, LXII.

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English Privateers 5

His Holiness said that he was aware that not long ago your Serenity had thought ofsending an Ambassador but had abandoned the idea. If this agent went now itwould cause great suspicion in his own mind and that of the King of Spain, andpeople would say that grain was not the only object of the mission.13

This prompted the Ambassador to conclude his dispatch with the observation, “Undoubtedly theobjective of his Holiness is to prevent your Serenity from sending a representative to the courtof that most heretical Queen.”’4 No envoy was sent.

fear of the wrath of the Pope and King of Spain was apparently enough to keep theVenetians from sending an official representative to England. This calls the legendary autonomyof the Republic into question. Relations with England would have been in the Republic’s bestinterest, especially as English incursions into the Mediterranean increased in the late sixteenthcentury. Outside influences prevented the Republic from acting as she would. This was not loston Elizabeth, as she commented in 1603 to the first official Venetian envoy to her island kingdomin forty-four years:

I am well aware, and so far excuse the Republic, that in the many discussions on thissubject [lack of a Venetian Ambassador to England] she has not been able to obtainleave from certain Sovereigns.’5

Because of outside opposition to her proposed policies, the Republic was forced to treat with theEnglish through the various courts of Europe and the Levant at which they shared Ambassadors.The evidence weakens the myth of Venetian autonomy.

The Myth of Venetian Diplomatic Effectiveness:Diplomacy without an Ambassador

By the end of the sixteenth century, the great galleys’6 that had been victorious at Lepantosat idle within the arsenal, waiting for the command to sally forth to defend the Republic.Venetian diplomats relied upon the leverage that the earlier success of these galleys and theVenetian Navy’s reputation of omnipresence afforded them in many of their dealings.’7 Venetian

‘3lbid., 47 #103.

‘4lbid.

151b1d., 533 #1135.

‘6See Appendix 1.

‘7The Venetian navy, with its legendary galleys, was also part of the larger Venetian Myth, another part ofthe myth that would be destroyed by the realities of the seventeenth century. On July 14, 1616, a squadronof six Spanish galleons, under Admiral Francisco de Ribera, engaged and handily defeated a force of 45Turkish galleys Gulian S. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean: 1603-1713, vats. 1-2. [London: Longmans,

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6 ex post facto

diplomats had earned a reputation for efficiency in securing whattheir Republic needed for her

well-being.

As the English onslaught into the Mediterranean continued, the damage to Venetian

commerce became more severe. The Republic used what diplomatic resources were available to

it. Ambassadors at several courts beseeched their English counterparts to appeal to their Queen

to halt her subjects’ acts of piracy. The following passage from the Venetian ambassador in

France is typical of the negotiations conducted at foreign courts:

At present there is no resident English Ambassador at this court, but an agent, who

seems to be a very discreet person. To him, in obedience to your Serenity’s orders,

I addressed the complaints against the acts of violence committed byEnglish vessels

in the waters of the Republic, pointing out to him what a serious effect such actions

had upon the navigation of those seas, and reminding him that the English had

always been well treated in Venetian ports, in virtue of the amity that exists between

the Republic and the Queen, from whom were expected the necessary steps,

especially the punishment of the offenders.18

Despite the courtly wording of this passage, it contains a thinly veiledthreat to make things

inhospitabte to English merchants within the Venetian sphere of influence.

Within the same dispatch is the English agent’s response:

The Agent gave signs of displeasure, and said that what had happened was contrary

to the intention of the Queen. She had given orders to her subjects to damage the

King of Spain.. . but the actions complained of were in excess of those orders. The

Agent promised to write vigorously on the matter, and, if the guilty parties are in

England, he assures me that your Serenity shall be satisfied. . . . He added, “I am

sorry that people of this sort [piratesJ usually delay their return for many months.19

This is typical of English responses to Venetian complaints. The Englishmen would offer many

platitudes and much concern over the depredations and then dismissthe depredations as the

actions of unruly individuals. The English response was one of evasiveness. It seems that the

English had little interest in stopping the assaults. It is true that the Venetian diplomatic endeavor

Green, and Co., 19041, 31). This signified the beginning of the end for galleys as ships of war. Yet the galley’s

reputation of invincibility continued, On July 11, 1628, Sir Kenhelm Digby, an Englishprivateer, encountered

eleven Venetian galleys with four ships of his own at Scanderoon. Digby wished to sack several French

merchantmen that lay at anchor. The Venetians refused him access to the road in order to protect the French.

Combat ensued in which the Venetians were badly mauled (Sir Kenhelm Digby, Journal of a Voyage into the

Mediterranean [New York: AMS Press, 1968], 38-9). This victory was widely hailed in English circles dueto

the reputation of galley invincibility. These two incidents, however, are more indicative of the galley’s

inability to compete with armed round ships and Venice’s misplaced trust in galleys.

8Brown, 301 #641.

‘9lbid.

rEnglish Privateers 7

was hampered by not having an ambassador at the court of Elizabeth, but just how much ithampered them would not be apparent until later.

Unable to achieve headway with English ambassadors at foreign courts, the Venetiansattempted to gain the aid of the Turkish Empire. English depredations were also affecting theTurks and it was logical that the Turks would be willing to aid in the effort to make theMediterranean inhospitable to Englishmen. The Turkish response, however, was much the sameas the English one. The Turks promised to prohibit English ships in the ports of the Empire andto sequester those ships identified as pirates. In reality very few English ships were denied accessto Imperial ports and even fewer were detained.

finally, the Republic made good on its threats to make Englishmen unwelcome in Venetianterritory. The Republic went so far as to hold English merchants financially responsible for theactions of their fellow countrymen. Often English merchants were imprisoned to atone for theattacks of privateers. The Venetian sequestering of Englishmen was ineffectual as can be seenfrom this petition to the Senate:

The interested parties appealed to your Serenity, begging you to order thesequestration of English vessels lying here. That was done, but in spite of thesequestration the English escaped, and the goods, for reasons not vouchsafed to usto know, were set free.2°

The inability of the bureaucracy to find restitution was compounded by the failure of the Venetiannavy to curb the pirates at sea. The depredations continued unabated. The Venetian diplomaticcorps became the chief instrument of securing protection from English privateers and pirates. Inthis the Venetians also failed.

Venetian citizens realized the severity of the English threat and the monetary loss. InDecember of 1602 a petition was presented before the Venetian Senate by a group of merchantswho had suffered from the depredations of English privateers. They sought to find restitutionfrom Elizabeth for their losses with the dispatch of an official Venetian envoy to England.

We are convinced that we shall easily obtain these favours from the Queen whenthey are demanded by a public agent in the public name; for we gather that herMajesty looks to deal with public officials seeing that she takes no notice at all ofprivate agents. . . . And certain remarks made here, lead us to think that no betternor more efficacious remedy can be found than the dispatch of a representative ofyour Serenity, through whose agency the goods may be recovered, and matters

20Ibid., 511 #1105.

r8 ex post facto

arranged for the future, as this is a favour greatly desired by her Majesty, as we areinformed. And with this we humbly kiss your robe.21

Ultimately the Venetian Senate sent an official envoy22 in response to the pleas of their

constituents. On January 8, 1603, Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli received a commission from the

Venetian government to go to the court of Queen Elizabeth and seek restitution.

The Queen’s Pride

Queen Elizabeth had made no secret of her disappointment in not having a Venetian

ambassador at her court. The Venetian ambassador at the French court made this report from

what he was told by a French diplomat:

[H]e mentioned that she asked questions about the Republic and showed great regretthat there was no resident Venetian Ambassador at her court, as there used to beduring the reigns of her predecessors.23

No matter how much concern she demonstrated over the Republic’s complaints regarding English

depredations in the Levant, she took little action to curb the privateers. Elizabeth’s pride was hurt

at the absence of a Venetian ambassador. She made her disdain very clear when the Venetian

envoy finally came to England:

I cannot help feeling that the Republic of Venice, during the forty-four years of myreign, has never made herself heard to me except to ask for something, nor for therest, prosperous or adverse as my affairs may have been, never has she given a signof holding me or my kingdom in that esteem which other princes and otherpotentates have not refused. Nor am I aware that my sex has brought me thisdemerit, for my sex cannot diminish my prestige nor offend those who treat me asother princes are treated, to whom the Signory of Venice sends its Arnbassadors?

It was only after the arrival of an official Venetian envoy to the English court that English stalling

diminished. By the end of February, 1603, Elizabeth had ordered the beginning of reparations to

21Ibid. It should be noted that some Venetian merchants had attempted to find redress for the depredationsin the court of Elizabeth prior to this envoy being sent. Some Venetian merchants who had sustained lossescontracted foreign merchants to attempt restitution as well. The success of these endeavors was minimal.

22j is important to note that Scaramelli was not an ambassador of the Republic. He was a special envoy sentto England with the duty of expressly seeking restitution for the damages already perpetrated and an endto English corsairs attacking Venetian shipping. That he was not an ambassador but an envoy may beinterpreted as yet another sign of Venice’s acquiescence to the wishes of Spain and the Pope.

23Brown 311 #662. The report continues: “She declares that the reason for this is the Republic’s regard forthe Pope” ftbid). This adds to the argument against the myth of Venetian autonomy.

24lbid., 533 #1135.

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English Privateers 9

Venetian Utizens. By March of 1603 Elizabeth had declared the Mediterranean off limits to

English privateers. Violators of this decree would be declared rebels subject to

imprisonment.V

The course of English actions and Elizabeth’s obvious disdain over the lack of a Venetian

envoy at her court would suggest that she had little interest in stopping English depredations

against the Republic until her pride was satisfied. The informal relations at foreign courts and the

ultimate way in which the situation was resolved call into question the myth of effective Venetian

diplomacy. The outcome depended upon Elizabeth’s whim and her desire to exact revenge for

being snubbed for so many years and not upon the efforts of Venetian diplomats.

Conclusion

Overtly, English privateers were not sent specifically against the Republic. Venice was the

unfortunate victim of larger European conflicts. The English wars with Spain and later with

France had severe repercussions for the Republic, which was actively engaged in neither conflict.

The evidence suggests that English privateers given letters of marque during these conflicts were

used to aid England’s economic entry into Mediterranean trade. It would also suggest that this

was done with the tacit approval of the Crown. The Venetians were aware of the threat that

loomed over them. Maffio Michiel, Governor of Zante wrote to the Doge and the Senate:

The English are becoming absolute masters of these waters [the Mediterranean]; forapart from rapine and robbery perpetrated daily on all sorts of vessels, and moreespecially upon those of your Serenity’s subjects, they are utterly supplanting yoursubjects in the carrying trade, weakening your customs and ruining the merchantservice, as your excellencies must be well aware of. The English are not satisfiedwith having absorbed Venetian trade in the West entirely, but are devotingthemselves to a similar object in the Levant?

But neither Venetian myth nor reality could stop the English onslaught. Further work needs to

be done to determine the rate and magnitude of Venetian trade siphoned off by the English

Ibid., 537 #1142.

26Elizabeth died shortly thereafter. James I assumed the throne of England on March 24, 1603. Under James,peace was concluded with Spain and the issuing of letters of marque was curtailed. It was also under Jamesthat the English navy began a more rigorous campaign against piracy.

271b1d., 551 #1154.

It would not be too bold to suggest that Elizabeth’s curtailing of privateering in the Mediterraneancoincided with her new willingness to seek peace with Spain.

29lbid., 536 #1140.

[

10 ex post facto

during this period, including a comprehensive quantitative analysis of trade being carried from

the Levant. One would need to look at tonnage carried, the number of ships sailing and, most

important, the nationality of the vessels. Correlating this data with the activity of English

privateers, pirates, and merchantmen3° in the Mediterranean for the same time period would

yield a clearer picture of the English usurpation of Venetian trade.

As one delves further into the subject of piracy in the Mediterranean, the myths of Venetian

autonomy, naval strength, and diplomatic skill are weakened. Myths that have traditionally

explained the success and longevity of the Republic yield to the reality that Venice was not

mistress of her own destiny and was very much subject to the whims of other states and

sovereigns. Piracy thus becomes the catalyst through which the myths of Venice are questioned

and overturned.

30Not that either of these is easily separable from the other, as we have seen.

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Appendix 1

Long Ships

Galleys typify long ship design. The peoples of the Mediterranean had long favored the

galley, and Venice was no exception to this. Galleys were laid out on a long keel with a narrow

deck and low sides. They were propelled by both oar and sail. The number of each varied with

the size of the ship. Outriggers were provided to support the oars. The greatest flaw in this

design was its single deck with its inherent limitations. A single deck severely limited a galley’s

cargo capacity. This meant that galleys were of little use as merchantmen and could not carry

enough provisions for extended voyages, having to put in to port frequently to revictual. A single

deck also meant the crew was exposed to the elements. This made many voyages uncomfortable

and often led to illness. Because of their low sides and open decks, galleys were unable to take

to the sea during the winter months.

Galleys were lateen-rigged.31 Lateen rigging combined with oars made galleys highly

maneuverable, which was a great advantage on the coastline of the Mediterranean.32 Oars meant

that a galley would never be becalmed, but they also required a larger crew, compounding the

provision problem.

Galleys were designed for speed. This limited the shipwright’s ability to increase their size.

As displacement was increased, speed decreased, and a larger ship required a larger crew. Before

the advent of naval artillery, grappling and boarding were the chief forms of naval combat.

Galleys were well suited to this style of warfare. Their speed and large crews made them quite

formidable. These factors all led to the galley’s use primarily as a combat vessel.33

3tLateen sails were triangle-shaped. One side of the sail was attached to a single spare which layperpendicular to the mast. The loose point was then anchored to the ship. Different-sized sails were neededfor different weather conditions. Lateen rigging required more deck hands than square rigging. Lateenrigged ships were able to sail windward and thus were better for coastal voyages (Fredric C. Lane, VenetianShips and Shipbuitders of the Renaissance [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1934]).

32tbid., passim.

BThere was one exception to this nile. Very valuable cargoes were more secure in a galley, as a galley wasbetter able to out-run pirates. The galley’s larger crew also meant more defenders. Naval artillery wouldchange this condition.

Appendix 2

Round Ships

The round ship design was known by various names in different parts of Europe. The

Italians called them bertoni. Others called them carracks. Perhaps the name that would sound most

familiar to the modern mind is galleon. Round ships were favored by the northern powers

because they were better able to withstand the adverse conditions of the Atlantic Ocean.

Traditionally, the Venetians had used round ships to haul bulky, less expensive cargoes.

Round ships were shorter, wider and had higher sides than a galley, and had two to three decks

allowing them to carry more cargo. They were powered solely by sail, but instead of being

lateen-rigged they were square-rigged. It is the combination of shape and square rigging that

allowed round ships to take to the sea throughout the entire year. Unlike the galley, they were

at the mercy of the wind and lacked maneuverability without it. It is with the advent of naval

artillery that the round ship came into its own. The cargo space that a round ship possessed

allowed it to be heavily armed while still carrying a sufficient cargo.

Lane, 6.

Appendix 3

Technological Advances

There are two key items that turned the tide against the usage of the galley: naval artillery

and square rigging. Naval artillery required deck space, a commodity the galleys lacked.3 The

limited cargo capacity of the galley also hampered its ability to provide sufficient powder and

shot for combat. Round ships were not hampered by either of these problems. Having two or

three decks allowed for the placement of numerous pieces of ordnance and sufficient powder and

shot while not compromising the merchandise carrying ability of the ship.

Before the advent of naval artillery, the Venetians had used round ships to haul less

precious cargo and protected them with escorts of galleys. Artillery made the round ship capable

of carrying cargo and defending itself. Although the Venetians were aware of the advantages of

a round ship equipped with artillery, they continued to use galleys and round ships in their

traditional Venetian mles.

Square rigging had several distinct advantages. It was better in adverse weather conditions.

It required only one sail that could be adjusted for weather conditions.37 Square-rigged ships

were far easier to tack and required a smaller crew of sailors to handle the sails than lateen-rigged

ships. A well-armed and crewed round ship could present a continual rain of fire by alternately

tacking to port and starboard, presenting broadside after broadside.

As the use of naval artillery became more prevalent, the galleys were unable to carry enough cannon in aconfiguration that would make it effective. Creating a larger deck would increase the size of the galley andreduce its speed, a key in its design philosophy.

The Venetians did build or purchase some bertorti for use as men-o’-war but by and large they continuedwith the galley as their principle ship of the line.

37This is in contrast to the lateen-rigged ship which necessitated the actual changing of sails for variedweather conditions.

Appendix 4

Engagement Philosophies

Even after the introduction of naval artillery, the Venetians stuck to their tried-and-true

methods of engagement. The time-honored method of naval engagement was to close upon one’s

opponent, grapple, and then board, slugging it out with marines and sailors. The Venetians were

not alone in adhering to this philosophy. The Spanish, Dutch and French also used the grapple-

and-board methodology.

There is also what is sometimes referred to as the Drake school of naval combat. This

school revolves around the maxim that a ship should first and foremost be a floating gun carriage.

It was the English that perfected the technique of sitting back and banging away at an opponent

until that opponent withdrew or could be safely boarded. Drake’s philosophy never allowed

galleys to get close enough to grapple and board.39 It would also allow English privateers in

their round ships to dominate their Venetian opponents in their galleys.

Joseph Davies wilt graduate from San Francisco State University in December of 1992 with

a Master ofArts in History. His major emphasis is Europe after 1500. Davies graduated from

the University ofAlaska, Anchorage in 1986 with a Bachetor Degree in History. He plans to

enter a doctoral program in history in the fall of 1993.

This can be seen quite clearly in the manner in which the Spaniards fought the battles of the Great Armada.

3’>This is the same way that the English fleet approached the Spanish Armada with such success.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Brown, Horatio, F., ed. Catenthir of State Papers. Venetian 1592-1603. London: Her Majesty’sStationery Office, 1897.

Digby, Sir Kenheirn. Journal of a Voyage into the Mediterranean. Camden Society, 1868; reprint,New York: AMS Press, 1968.

Manwaring, G. E., ed. The Life and Works of Sir Henry Manwaring. Vol. 2. NavyRecords Society, 1920.

Secondary Sources

Corbett, Jullian S. England in the Mediterranean: 1603-1713. Vols. 1-2. London: Longmans, Green,and Co., Ltd. 1904.

Lane, fredric C. Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance. Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1934.

________

Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Fredric C. Lane. Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1966.

Manwaring, G. E. The Life and Works of Sir Henry Manzuaring. Vol. 1. Navy RecordsSociety, 1920.

Tenenti, Alberto. Piracy and the Decline of Venice: 1580-1615. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.,Ltd., 1967.

Additional Works Consulted

Davies, D. W. Eliztzbethans Errant: The Strange Fortunes of Sir Thomas Shertey and His Three Sons.Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967.

Lloyd, Christopher. English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast. London: A. Wheaton and Co., Ltd., 1981.

Mattingly, Garret. The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959.

Williams, Gomer. History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marqua zuith an Account of theLiverpool Slave Trade. New York: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers, 1897; reprint, 1966.