8/13/2019 Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan Vs

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Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan vs.Simeon DumdumDoctrines: Be that as it may, a difference lies betweensuability and liability. Where the suability of the stateisconceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially,the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether tosatisfy the judgment or not.

Facts: Respondent, doing business as KD Surplus wascontacted by petitioner Ople. Respondent hadenteredinto an agreement with petitioner municipality throughOple for the delivery of motor vehicles,which supposedlywere needed to carry out certain developmentalundertakings in the municipality.However, despite havingmade several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heedrespondents claim for payment. Petitioners filed aMotion to Dismiss claiming that the action wasunenforceable under thestatute of frauds. Petitioners alsofiled a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ ofPreliminary Attachment Already Issued, invoking amongothers, immunity of the state from suit.

Issue:Whether as a municipal corporation, theMunicipality of Hagonoy is immune from suit, and thatitsproperties are by law exempt from execution andgarnishment

Held: The general rule spelled out in Section 3, ArticleXVI of the Constitution is that the state and itspoliticalsubdivisions may not be sued without their consent.Otherwise put, they are open to suit butonly when theyconsent to it. Consent is implied when the governmententers into a business contract,as it then descends to thelevel of the other contracting party; or it may beembodied in a general or special law such as that foundin Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the LocalGovernment Codeof 1991, which vests local governmentunits with certain corporate powers one of them is the

power to sue and be sued.Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability andliability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, where thesuability of the state is conceded and by which liability isascertained judicially, thestate is at liberty to determinefor itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Executionmay notissue upon such judgment, because statuteswaiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure ofproperty to satisfy judgments recovered from the action.These statutes only convey an implicationthat thelegislature will recognize such judgment as final andmake provisions for its full satisfaction.Thus, whereconsent to be sued is given by general or special law, theimplication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdicton the action before execution of the judgment.The

functions and public services rendered by the Statecannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by thediversion of public funds from their legitimate and specificobjects. The writ of attachment in this case would onlyprove to be useless and unnecessary under thepremises, sincethe property of the municipality may not,in the event that respondents claim is validated,besubjected to writs of execution and garnishment unless, of course, there has been a correspondingappropriation provided by law

Municipality of Camiling vs. Lopez 99Phil 187 (1956)

The Estate of Pedro Gonzales vs. MarcosPerez G.R. No. 169681 November 5, 2000

Land Bank of the Phil. vs. CacayuranG.R. No. 191667 April 17, 2013

Municipality of Kananga vs. MardonaG.R. NO. 141375 April 30, 2003