minbaeva presentation
TRANSCRIPT
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Dana MinbaevaAssociate Professor in Strategic HRM
Center of Strategic Management and
GlobalizationCopenhagen Business School
Denmark
What drives knowledge sharing
behavior of individuals?
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My research
All papers are available upon the request
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Knowledge characteristics
Knowledge transfer and HRM
Sender ReceiverKnowledge
Organizational environment
Disseminativecapac
ity
Absorptivecapacity
Barren organizational context
Minbaeva and
Michailova (2004) inEmployee Relations
Minbaeva et al (2003) inJIBS
Minbaeva (2005) in
Personnel Review
Minbaeva (2008) in
ManagementInternational Review
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Governance of knowledge processes
Firm:
governance
mechanisms
Individual:
conditions of
individual actions
Individual:
individual knowledge
sharing behavior
Firm:
knowledge
processes outcomes
Gooderham, Minbaeva and Pedersen (2010), in Journal of Mgt Studies
Minbaeva and Pedersen (2010), in IJSCM
Michailova and Minbaeva (2011), forthcoming in International Business
Review
Foss, Minbaeva, Pedersen and Reinholt (2009) in Human Resource
Management
Minbaeva, Foss and Snell (2009), Special Issue of Human Resource
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(S)HRM in MNCs
Navrbjerg and Minbaeva (2009) in InternationalJournal of Human Resource Management
Minbaeva, Hutching and Thomson (2007) in
European Journal of International Management
Minbaeva and Muratbekova-Touron (2010) in
International Journal of Human Resource
Management
Employment Practices of Multinationals in Organizational
Context, international project, www.cbs.dk/mnc
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Dana Minbaeva and Torben
Pedersen
Center of Strategic Management and
Globalization
Copenhagen Business School
What drives knowledgesharing behavior of
individuals?
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Rationale
Whether knowledge sharing takes place in anorganization depends to a great extent on
individual organizational members decision to
share or not the knowledge they possess.
in any model of knowledge sharing the
knowledge sharing behavior of individuals
has to be explained endogenously and on
individual level there are not so many studies which managed
to do so empirically
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Why not? (1) The theories in which the discussion of intra-
organizational knowledge sharing is nested areusually collective ones (Felin and Hesterly, 2007).
Knowledge-based scholars should carefully revisittheir underlying philosophical and theoreticalassumptions about the primacy given to collectivesand to consider potential individual-level explanationsas antecedents to new value creation (Felin andHesterly, 2007: 214).
Hence to push further the empirical research onknowledge sharing, we need to integrate someind iv idual-level theoriesthose consideringindividuals and their actions as the basic units ofanalysis (Elstner, 1989).
Motivation theory
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Why not? (2) To empirically study knowledge sharing at the
individual level, we need ind iv idual level datacollected at various locations, organizationalunits, hierarchical levels, etc.
That is necessary since individuals are randomlydistributed within the organization.
Further, the data should be collected from varioussocial groups (gender, age, level of education)since individuals are a priori heterogeneous.
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In response
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) The TPB is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned
Action (TRA) introduced by Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975)
Aim: to explain behavior of individualsendogenously as determined by its predictors
(intentions, attitude, subjective norms and
perceived control)
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The motivation sequence
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The TPB in a nutshell
Source: http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~aizen/
http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~aizen/tpb.htmlhttp://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~aizen/tpb.html -
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Why the TPB?
The TPB was extensively used to studyhuman behavior and design appropriate
behavioral intervent ionsto change behavior
by affecting one or more of its determinants
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Knowledge governance mechanisms
KGA in Foss (2007): governance mechanisms are deployedin the belief that in f luencing the condi t ions of indiv idu alact ions in a certain manner will lead employees to take thosedecisions that when aggregated lead to favorableorganizat ional outcomes(knowledge acquisition andutilization).
Represents a reaction to what it regards as the "methodologicalcollectivism" of explanations of knowledge processes currently
dominating the KBV research (Foss, 2007)
Understanding of relations between governance mechanisms
and knowledge processes implies theorizing individuals (Grant,
1996), individual heterogeneity (Felin and Hesterly, 2007), andindividual interaction (Felin and Foss, 2005).
Intra-organizational knowledge processes can be influenced and
directed through the deployment of governance mechanisms
(Foss, 2007)
Knowledge governance mechanisms conditions of
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Knowledge governance mechanisms
We propose a number of knowledgegovernance mechanisms that can be appliedto influence the previously identified
antecedents o f behavio ral intent ion s(attitude, subjective norm and perceivedcontrol) and thereby affect knowledgeshar ing behavio r of ind iv iduals.
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Knowledge governance mechanisms
Ajzen(1991): it is at the level of beliefs thatwe can learn about the unique factors that
induce one person to engage in the behavior
of interest (p. 206-207).
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Knowledge governance mechanisms
three types of governance mechanismsinfluencing behavioral, normative and control
beliefs and label them accordingly as
extrinsic rewards (behavioral beliefs)
reciprocal schemes ( normative beliefs) and
communication mechanisms (control beliefs).
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Conceptual model
Rewards
Reciprocity
schemes
Communication
mechanisms
Attitude
Subjective
norm
Perceived
control
Intention to
share
Knowledge
sharing
behavior
H1
H2
H3
H4
H7
H6
H5
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Hypotheses H1. Strong intention to engage in knowledge sharing behavior positively
influences the extent of knowledge sharing behavior.
H2. A positive attitude toward knowledge sharing positively influences the
individuals intention to share knowledge.
H3. Strong subjective norms about knowledge sharing positively influence
the individuals intention to share knowledge.
H4. Perceived behavioral control positively influences the individuals
intention to share knowledge
H5. The more individuals are externally rewarded for knowledge sharing, the
more positive their attitude toward knowledge sharing is.
H6. The more individuals are reciprocally rewarded for knowledge sharing,
the more positive their subjective norm regarding knowledge sharing is.
H7. The more individuals use communication mechanisms, the stronger their
perceived behavioral control is.
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Data
Danisco and Chr. Hansen
MANDI Questionnaire on Knowledge Sharing
Response rate
Danisco: 77.94%; 219 respondents
Chr. Hansen: 72.75%; 251 respondents
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Measures
We usedperceptual
measures for
operationalization
of all variables inthis study
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Results
2[127] = 311.5
GFI = 0.93RMSEA= 0.05
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Goodness-of-fit statistics for three
competing specification of the model
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Results: antecedents
The decision not-to-share is individual, oftenrational and well justified from the perspective of
the individual
The intention to share knowledge is formed as a
combination of the social influence (social norms),an individuals confidence in her ability to perform
the knowledge sharing (perceived control), and
the individuals own attitude toward sharing of
knowledge (attitude).
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Results: governance
mechanisms
A posi t ive feedbackon past instances ofknowledge sharing, being acknowledged of their
contribution to the work of others and/or
organizational development
Availability and use of required resou rces and
oppor tuni t ies to carry out and successfully
complete that behavior
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Results: BUT!
Contrary to commonly accepted practices
associated with knowledge management
initiatives, a felt need for extr insic rewards
may very well hinderthe development of
favorable attitudes toward knowledge sharing
Such a finding might simply be a reflection of
the specific extrinsic rewards applied in two
organizations
Insights from Motivational Theory on the link
between extrinsic motivation and performance(e.g. Vroom)
Insights from Creativity Theory(e.g. Amabile)
Rewards and knowledge sharing (e.g. Bock et al,
2005; Minbaeva, Makela and Rabbiosi, 2010)
Performance
Rewards
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Limitations Our limitations
cross-sectional data
two MNCs from Denmark
using perceptual
instruments
Future studies longitudinal research
a wider variety of firms
the impact of the external
environment (formal and
informal institutions)
more elaborate measures,
combining perceptualones with some objective
indicators
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Implications
The use of external rewards seems surprisinglyenough to be counterproductive in creating a
positive attitude toward knowledge sharing.
The interactions of governance mechanisms -
complementar i ty effect(which could benegative, neutral or positive)
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To conclude
We need to push HRM scholars out of their
natural comfort zone(Becker and Huselid, 2006:900)
which assumes the aggregation of individuals,
existence of an average individual and no
differences in individual perception of external
stimulus and reaction to that.