military review may 1965

7/27/2019 Military Review May 1965

1/114

kP!_lMilitary ReviewP rofessiona l J ourn a l of . t he U S Arm y

The DktriCt Advisor . . . . . . . , . . CCSPf James F. ROY, usA 3Red lXdISiISNuclear W13POISS. . . . . . . . . . Cherrg chu.yuan 9FOrWard.paUSe Defense . . . , . . . . . . . . Hcrrce/d B. Mcalmgren 16NATO and Flexible Response . . . . . . . . . . . omo Heilbrunn 22Defense of Europe . . . . . Gerr Hans Speidel, German Army, Ret 27Geri rran Defeat in t he ~ast . . . . 0 . - . 0 Earl F. Ziemke 33Guerri l la war in Guba . . , . . . . u Cal Harald R. Aaron, USA 40Red China and Lat in Ameri ca . . . . . . . . . . , Joseph J. Lee 47The Gorps of the Army . . . Col M. Drague MacCarthy, French Army 54International Staf f Off icer . . . . . . Lt cOl Jdck E. Carter, USAF 68Of plagues and pennafft s . . . . . . Lt Cal Rabert H. Maser, USA 71Indian Ocean . . . . Wg Cdr M. K. Chopra, Indian Air Force, Ret 85Mi l i t aryN odes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...96Mi l i t aryB oaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...106

The Military Review, a publication of the UNITEO STATESARMY, provides a forum for the expressionof militar~ thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning the division and higher levels of command.The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarilY those of theUS Army or !he Command and General Staff College.


2/114

Editor in ChiefCot Donald J. Delane# s

Assistant EditorLt Cd Albert IV. Garland

Features EditorMaj Robert L. Burke

Layout Editor18t Lt Robert K. Lindgren

Acting Spanish-American EditorLuis A. Monaerrate

Brazilian EditorLt Col Luiz A. Araripe

Associate EditorLt Cal Algin J. HugliesArmrt War College

Production OfAcerMaj Norman-C. MurratI

Staff ArtistCharles A. Moore

I

I

I

I

II


3/114

... . . . ..,..-. ----- . . ,.. . . .. ,..

The District AdvisorCaptain James F. Ray, United States Arm&!

In late 1964 Captain James F. Ray, ods were transferable, others wereUnited States Army, ,Wbsector Ad- not. General Stilwell wrote:visor, Nha Be District in Gia Ditih The real value of this brief ?-e-Province, South Vietnam, prepared a port lies in its perceptiveness-asreport which was a distillate of his witness the jinal paragraph. Forlitie months experience and of his ap- Captain Ray was a singularly perproach to solving the key problems ceptive and dedicated soldier. Hiswhich he had encountered in his par- successive superb records+t theticular area. Military Academy, at Oxford as ath 12 January 1965 Major General Rhodes Scholar, and in initial troopRichard G. Stilwetl, United states assignmentswere those of oneArmg, then Chief of Staff, United headed for the verg top of the pro.States Militarg Assistance Command, fession of arms.Jietnam, circulated Captain Rays re- Just three days before, on 9 Januport throughout US elements in South ary 1965, Captain Ray had been killedVietnam. In a covering letter, General in action while accompan~ing hisStilwell pointed out that while some of counterpart on a night reconnaissanceCaptain Rags conclusions and meth - patroL-Edftor.


4/114

DISTRICT ADVISOR

ANY attempt ~o discuss the position ofthe advisor to. a distr ict chief in Vietnam must perforce take account ofthe variety of the job as among the hetero.geneous @lection of distr icts which comprise the nation. Perhaps no other advisoryrole is so conditioned by the local si tuationwhich, indeed, together with the personalityof the distr ict chief himself, determines thelimits within which tbe advisor functions.

Thus, in those areas where Wet Cong con.trol is extensive and government suzeraintylimited, one is strictly (as the terms of ref.erence imply) a subsector advisor, a militaryadvisor. But in others, where the mili tarysituation is more under control and thesphere of governmental involvement is ac.cordingly broader, the scope of advisoryactivity opens to embrace not only securityin the strict sense, but also the errtire spectrum of public welfare and administration.

This paper, which attempts no more thana synthesis of my own experiences, is, therefore, a reflection only of condit ions in NhaBe District, and may afford slim basis forgeneralization.agrarian district

Nha Beis one of tlsesix distr icts of Gia.Dhdl, and lies at the hub of the Hop Tac

area, It has a population of some 55,000 inan area of roughly 100square kilometers ofpaddy land. Although contiguous with Saigonon its northern border, it is almost entirelyagrarian. Over 90 percent of its work forceis engaged in growing rice (of which, forwater reasons, it gets but one crop annually).Roughly one-quarter of tha distr icts 34hamlets are completely pacified, and thegovernment is in effective mili tary controlof the remainder.One Regional Force company is under !heoperational control of the subsector cornmander, who also directs the activit ies of4

over 400 Popular Forces. These troops establish ambushes each night msd conductsmall (two or three-platoon) operations vir.tually every day. Thus, the errtire district iscovered once every two or three weeks, and,in consequence, there are no permanent WetCongbaseswithhr our limits.

Yiet Cong activity is confined to terrorismby indigenous guerrillas and raids, typicallyof squad size, by units based near the di$trict s borders. Roads are, in general, notsafe at night; during daylight one can, witha small bodyguard, enjoy freedom of thedistrict.security problem

The major-security problemderives fromthe presence in the distr ict ofa tank farmin which is stored petroleum, oils, and Iub.ricants stock. A crit ical sector, Yeu Khu NhaBe, has been created which includes partsof Nha Be and Nhan Trac (Bien Hoa) Districts, and three Regional Force companiesare under the operational control of thecrit ical sector commander for the defenseof the installation.

The Nha Be distr ict advisor is addition.ally charged with overseeing the tank farmdefenses. I,therefore, work with twocoumterparts. since the problems of securing thetank farm can neither logically nor pragmatically be separated from thosa of defend.ing the distr ict, coordination of efforts between these two counterparts is a majorfocus of advisory effort.

Perhaps the nature of the job can bestbe described through an investigation ofhow the advisors time is spent. I haveeveraged nearly three hours daily with thedktrict chief. In one sense, this is inadequateit would have been far better if thetwo of us could have spent more tima to.gether outside the office, visiting hamletsand supervising the activit ies of pacification

Military Review

1


5/114

DISTRICTADVISORcadre. as well as conducthw operations.

Bu~ the fact ia that this ~isfict chieftied himself to his desk, in spite of strongadvisory pressure to do some field supervision, and, under such circumstances, hehad a limited capacity for absorbing advice.Of the many hours so spent, perhaps afourth were concerned with matters of mili

- tary security; the bulk of the remainder wasaddressed primarily to pacification problemsand the administration of United StatesOperations Mission (USOM) projects.de facto agant

In this regard, I have, in my dealings withthe distr ict chief, served as a de factoagent of USOM, alike in the drafting ofprojects, fol lowup on the approval process,and supervision of their execution. indeed,such matters have, in terms of time, formedby far the largest part of my job.

Additionally, my assistant and I haveaveraged two to three hours daily withsubordinate district officials. Most militarymatters have been coordinated through thecommander of the subsectors RegionalForce company, who acts as the deputy forsecurity (although this position has not beenformalized). One or more members of theadvisory team accompany him on militaryoperations whenever practicable. The subjects of advisory effort with him are assentiahy identical with the area of interest toadvisors of any tactical unit.

S~cond, we have spent a great deal oftime working with the aspirant who directsthe Hamlet Pacification Service. In his case,advice has amounted virtually to completetraining in the responsibili ties and techniques of his job. It has been through him,rather than the distr ict chief, that the crit ical problem of translating reports, submitted by pacification cadre, into goods andservices for the people has been directed.

Third, we have worked in some detailwith the district police chiefmainly in anattempt to influence his allocation of themanpower resourcas at his disposal, especially in the direction of increased emphasison a program of population and resourcescontrol measures.

Finally, we have stayed in close contactwith the subsector staff. Here, we haveexperienced some success in improving thefunct ioning of the operations center, regularizing logistical procedures, and, perhapsmost important, infusing the notion of staffcoordination (even, on occasion, cooperation). ,staff functions

Indeed, I have taken as a major objective of this teams efforts the initiation ofproper staff functioning with mission-typeorders, intrastaff liaison, and the presentation of coordinated plansthe overambitiousness of which goal may be only tooobvious to those having experience withthe Vietnamese system of personal rule.Nonetheless, the degree of inexperienceof subordinate district and subsector officials is the greatest obstacle in the pathtoward a viable, properly functioning armof government at this echelon (with, perhaps, the, exception of the obstacle posedby those who have too much experience).It may well be that over the long run thegreatest contr ibution that our advisory effort makes at the district level will be interms of the training of this new generation of officials.

Advisory work with the district chief andhis staff has been accomplished almostexclusively by the teams two officers.have not carved out special areas of interest reserved exclusively for one or theother of usrather, we have shared participation in all facets of the. work.

May 1965

I

5


6/114

DIST~lCTADVISORThe one specialized member of the team

is the medical advisor, the extent of whoseactivities merits consideration in detail.Essentially, he has served as advisor to theDistrict H#alth chief who has proved to bean exceptionally receptive counterpart. Themedical advisor has averaged more than sixhours a day with this man. Jointly, they havefirmed hamlet sick call hours, correctedmedical supply procedures, improved treatment records, and generally raised thestandard of treatment and the number ofpatients seen daily. Also, the medical advisor has worked quite closely with USOMPublic Health Division officials, most ofwhom have expressed surprise and pleasureat finding someone with his technical credentials permanently based in the district .Through them he has been able to obtainsubstantial material benefits for the districts medical program.refute doubts

The medical advisor would seem to haverefuted the doubts which USOM is allegedto have voiced concerning his posit ion. Hehas also worked as a mili tary medicforexample, medical teams have, for the firsttime, begun visi ting paramilitary dependent

. housing. He has organized training in theelements of first aid for selected PopularForce members, and has caused to be init i.ated supply procedures to obtain basicessential first aid suppl ies for each separatePopular Force unit.

Independently of his counterpart, themedical advisor has also performed treatment using US medical suppl ies, althoughcertainly not on a routine basis. First, hehas performed rout$re first aid for persorr

net living in the same compound with ourteam. Second, he has consistently been thefirst medic to arrive and administer emer.gency treatment when friendly forces have

been wounded. He has probably done morethan any other member of our team, bothto create good will among the people forthe U~ited States and to enhance amongthe people the notion that their governmentis, indeed, for the people.some success

The teams operations sergeant, init ially,was able to do little advisory work, mostof his time being involved in the administrative and logistical support of our team,but he is now becoming quite active. as atraining advisor. Recently, we have enjoyedsome success with the notion of training as a continuing requirement. Jfany of theoperational Weaknesses of the Regional andPopular Forcesmost notable, the deplo~able standard of marksmanship proficiencycan be corrected by training at the unitlevel. However, their most serious deficiency, the weakness of subordinate ieaders, is rather beyond our capability forformal training. We are working out a modified Army Training Program built largelyaround individual and squad proficienciesfor gradual presentation to these units.

The Regional Force companies defendingthe tank farm began training in December.The operations sergeant has bean given themission of acting as a kind of training sergeant to oversee the implementation ofplans worked out between the commanderand the senior advisor and, where appro.priate, to assist in obtaining training aidsor in presenting classes. Finally, he typicallyaccompanies one of the maneuver elementson as many operations as practicable.

Having considered the nature of our workas it has evolved over a period of somefour months, it is appropriate to examinesome of the diffi cult ies we have encoumtered.

The first of these is the language prob.Militaryeview


7/114

DISTRICT ADVISOR

lens, although in this regard we have beenparticularly fortunate. I am able to communicate with both my counterparts in (akind of) French; we have for some time hadan interpreter which enables us to spli tour advisory effort; and the District HealthChief speaks a rudimentary English thatsuff ices for routine purposes therefore,we are able simul taneously to funct ion inthree separate directions.language training

This is largely fortuitou: Probably agreater percentage of people at the districtlevel do not speak English than at anyother echelon in which w; fiave advisors.The raw fact is that. there can be no moreadvisors than there are p&ople able tocommunicate. More than this, a di$rict advisory team is constantly thrown into contact with the common manhamletchiefs, patients on sick call, policemen atcheckpointswith whom even a basic Vietnamese capability counts for a great deal.I consider it almost imperative to the success of the district advisory effort that asmany distr ict team members as possibleget three months of language training, andthat persons having this background receivepriority in assignment to district teams.All our team members are currently study.ing the language, but in terms of availabletime it is decidedly a second-best solution.

Second, there is an inexorable urge totry to command through US advisory channelsa tendency noticeable at vir tually allUS echetons, however sincere their desireto resist it. It arises from a very properdesire to correct a myriad of deficiencies,and is nurtured by our system of inspections and reports. However laudable themotives which sustain it, it has to be resisted; whatever advantages it might yieldin the short run would be more than offsetMay 196a

by the more permanent harmful effects.We must be prepared to tolerate a certainlevel of inefficiency in the name of a largergoal: training the new generation to run thenation.The third problem is one familiar to alladvisors in whatever capacity, and followsfrom a tradition of centralized powers andpersonal rule. These have resulted in alack of staff initiative and both introducetotally unnecessary delays and unresponsiveness into the system. They also havemost unfortunate consequences wheneverthere isa power vacuum, I have unhappilyexperienced tha replacement of a distr ictchiefregrettable, essentially, because themanner of its execution left the districtwithout an effectively funct ioning leaderfor nearlya month, a month characterizedchiefly by marking time, if not actual rvgression.logistical role

A fourth difficulty is a tendency on thepart of some Vietnamese-although, fortunately, neither of thetwocommandersto consider the advisor as a combinationgenie and supply officer. This we have hadsome success in countering, largely througha stubborn insistence on making the Vietnamese system work. Some officials arestill wont to think that requisitions are tobe submit ted to the adviso~ we, therefore,have been at some pains to stress that ourlogistical role begins when someone intheir system either delays or says No.

From discussions with other district advisors one gathers that many have experienced cllfficulties with their own housekeeping, although most of these appear tobe the one-time function of init ially gettingorganized. Since ours was, I believe, thefirst to be fully manned and equipped inthe field, these transitional problerrk have

,, 7


8/114

DISTRICTAOVISOR.,bynowbeen resolved, and our propinquityto Saigon makes it eo to solva such problems as arise. It would be most advantageous to have a second jeep, and we areless -than convinced that a GRC-87 is theanswer to the district teams communication problems, although one can appreciatewhy teams are currently equipped as theyare.

We have distilled certain conclusions fromour experiences thus far which I would liketo posit in the form of suggestions to beconsidered. The first concerns specializedtraining to be given district advisory personnel. Language training seems the singlemost important prerequisite for succes$the foundation in the language given in a12-week course would be indispensable.Most of the other background materialneeded could be woven into the fabric ofthe language course, and would ideally bepresented using the case study methodaImost exclusively.

Second, i feel that the medical advisorshould be accorded greater latitude-by

which 1 mean extending him supplies ofmedicine commensurate with his state oftraining for his own use in treating Vietnamese, not as a competitor with thair ownsupply system. He should also be given afreer hand to participate, along with theDistrict Health Chief, in providing properoutpatient medical care to the rural popu.Iation. This, 1 think, would have a signifi.cant impact on what distric t teams can doto win support for the United States amongthe people of Vietnam.

In conclusion, I think there could be nofiner job in Vietnam, in terms of the back.ground one acquires in what PresidentJohnson has $alled the stubborn realitiesof the pursuit of peace. The district ad.visory team is directly involved in three ofour most pressing international problemsthe delicacies of dealing with allies whodesire our support while resenting any hintof interferenc~ the grassroots administra.tion of foreign aid (in terms of ensuringthat our aid gets to the people who needith and the military confrontation of Corn.munist revolutionary warfare.

Military Review


9/114

PROGRESSFNUCLEARWEAPONSNCOMMUNISTHINA, $3

&Cheng Chu-yuan

C OMMUNIST China began developing nuclear weapons in1953.* Initially, the developmentcame under the heading of makingpeaceful use of nuclear energy. InMay 1953, however, a Committee ofAtomic Energy was established withinthe Chinese Academy of Sciences(CAS) ; the committees function wasto accelerate research and experimentation in this field.A year later, in 1954, China and

Udew otherwise indicated, .11 references toChin. t. th,s .rtwle are to Communist Chki-the People% Republic .f Cb,m.

the Soviet Union signed an agreement to cooperate in science and technology, and in April 1955 an agreement was reached in Moscow whichprovided that the Soviets would aidthe Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR)in building an experimental nuclearreactor and accelerators. The SovietUnion also agreed to give CommunistChina the technical documents whichpertained to the reactor and accelerators,

When China published her FirstFive-Year Plan in 1955, the peacefnlMay1965 9


10/114

NUCLEAREAPONSuse of nuclear energy was listed asthe first principal task for the CASto tackle. In 1~56 a 12-year plan forthe development of science and technology was formulated; this againput thd peaceful use of nuclear energy as the foremost aim of Chinesescientists and engineers.

During 1955-57 the membership ofthe research staff in the Institute ofPhysics of the CAS expanded substantially. By the end of 1957 theInstitute was reported to have employed more than 200 persons, including 80 scientists and 70 technicians.In 1958 the Institute changed itsname to the Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE ) and added the functionof supervising the experimental reactor. It has since become the organization responsible for the buildup ofnuclear weapons in China.Experimental Reactor

Tbe first experimental reactor provided by the Soviet aid program wentinto operation on 1 July 1958, the37th anniversary of the birth of theChinese Communist Party. A cyclotron was also completed and readiedfor research work. The reactor, whichwas of the heavy water type, producedthermal power ranging from 7,000 to10,000 kilowatts. Since then, the reactor has gradually increased itspower. The cyclotron was designed toaccelerate alpha particles to an energy as high as 25 million electronvolts. At the same time, a pressurized

Cheng Chu-yuan is a ResearchEconomist at the Center for ChineseStudies at the flniversitfi of Michigan. He holds a Ph. D. degree in Economics from Georgetown University,Washington, D. C. Borw in China, heis the author of many books and aWiclee on the subject of CommunistChina.

electrostatic accelerator built by Chinese scientists and engineers was alsocompleted, an important step in thedevelopment of the Chinese nnclearbomb.By a secret agreement signed between Peking and Moscow in late1957, the then Soviet Premier, NikitaKhrushchev, promised to provideCommunist China a prototype nuclearbomb together with the technical dataconcerning ite manufacture. This secret agreement stimulated the development of nuclear weapons in China;during the following year, Chinas investment in scientific projects cameto nine times the amount she had invested in .1955.

Research WorkAt the same time, more than 20prominent Chinese physicist participated in research work at the JointInstitute for Nuclear Research (JINR ) which had been eet up in Dubno,USSR, hy 12 Communist countries.In fact, a top Chinese nuclear physicist was elected as deputy director ofthat Institute. Chinese scientistsmade great progress in theoreticalresearch and experimental nuclearphysics between 1957 and 1959.

In late 1958, in view of Chinasgrowing ambition to become a greatmilitary power, the Soviet Ieadcra putforward demands deeigned to bringCommunist China under Soviet military control. Mao Tse-tung rejectedthe demands. Khrushchev then backedaway from his earlier pledge to provide China a prototype nuclear bomb,a refusal which, while it dealt Chinaa hard blow, did not etop her endeavors.

In the years following, China increased her scientific expenditurestremendously. In 1960 the statebudget for scientific purposes rose toMilitaryReview0


11/114

459 million dollars, a figure nearlythree times that of 1958 and almnat28 times the amount allocated in 1955.This reflects the regimes determina.tion to develop nuclear weaponathrough its own resources.In November 1960, Liu Shao-chi,Chairman of the CPR, proclaimed atthe Moscow Conference of Communist Parties that China has fouratomic reactors in operation. Thesereactora can be used for war ae wellas for peaceful purposes. When Brit-.ish Field Marehal Sir Bernard L.Montgomery visited Peking in 1961,Chou En-lai solemnly told him thatChina would develop nuclear weapons with her own scientists,These official statement clearly indicate that, despite the eetbacl? in theeconomy caused by three years ofnatural calamities, the disasters ~fthe Great Leap Forward, and the totalsuspension of Soviet economic andtechnical assistance, Chinas leadershave determined to continue a top-priority nuclear weapons program.Equipmentand Manpower

Chinese authorities have reportedthat the reactor and the cyclotronbuilt in Peking with Soviet assistance are performing well. Accordingto Cbien San-chiang, Director of theIAE, the intensity of the neutron current of the reactor and the intensityof the ion current of the cyclotron areup to advanced international standarde. The 2.5-million electron-voltelectrostatic proton accelerator, thehigh-teneion multiplierboth designed and built by Chinese scientistsand the induction electron accelerator eupplied by the Soviet Union havebeen in operation since 1959. By theend of 1960, three other reactore hadbeen constructed in Lanchow, KaneuProvince, in northwestern China;

NUCLEARWEAPON;Paotow in Inner Mongolia; and atShanghai. But their total capacity hasnot been disclosed.Uranium 235 is used as fuel material by the Chinese reactore, indicating a stage of development aheadOf tbe first nuclear bomb made inthe United States, which used plutonium.By 1949 the Soviets had discoveredrich uranium ores in Sinkiang. Large-scale exploitation began in 1960 whentwo SinO-Soviet joint-stock companieswere set up for developing oil andnonferrous metals in that Province.Thie enterprise in its early atages established 11 modern mines and onehighly mechanized ore selection plant.Some 5,000 Chinese workers and technicians, as well ae several hundredSoviet experts, were engaged in production.The enterprise was taken over bythe Communist Chinese Governmentin 1955 and, since then, large-scalecapital construction has beenlaunched. Until 1959 the productewere shipped mostly to tbe SovietUnion.Test SiteIn October 1957, when Moscowpledged aid to China in developing anuclear bomb, a small team composedof three Chinese geologists and oneSoviet geologist began to search fora proper test site. The team investigated the northern shore of Lake LopNor in the Takla Makan Desert ofSinkiang.

Lake Lop Nor situated north ofCharkhlik and south of Hami andTurfan, is in the very heart of central Asia, far from traveled places. Itis surrounded by uninhabited areaswhich stretch for hundreda of kilometers. Local hunters rarely visit thisparticular region. The team found it


12/114

NUCLEARWEAPONSto be the ideal site for nuclear testing, probably ,b~sed on two considerations:

Being uninhabited and remotefrom populated areas, falIout elfectswould be minimized. Its remote location in tbe hinterlands reduced the chances of surveillance by Taiwan-based reconnaissanceairplanes.ScientistsBefore the Communist takeover,China had at least 12 nuclear phyejcists who had been trained either inWestern Europe or in the UnitedStates, The best trained of these physicists now form the hard core of thetop brains in charge of the currentnuclear weapons program.

The most eminent nuclear physicistin Communiet China is Chien Sanchiang. Chien received his Ph. D. inPhysics in 1943 from the Universityof Paris where he was a collaboratorof Fr6d6ric Joliot-Curie; in 1946 hewon the physics prize of the FrenchScientific Institute for his work innuclear physics. One year later he returned to China and was appointedDirector of the Atomic Research Department of the Academia Sinica, the. predecessor of tbe CAS. When theIAE was set up in 1958, he becameits director. His major contributionshave been the discovery of the thirdand fourth phases of nuclear fission.

Next to Chien are two other prominent nuclear physicistsWang Kanchang and Chao Chung-yao, both Deputy Directors of the IAE. Wang received his Ph. D. in Physics from theUniversity of Berlin in 1943. In 1948he worked at the University of California as a research associate and returned to China the same year: Afortier Deputy Director of the JINR,Wang returned to China in 1961 and

is believed to be the top scientist whodesigned the bomb. In the first session of the National Peoples Congress which convened in late December 1964, he wae elected one of theexecutive chairmen, a pOsitiOn ofhonor which was not shared by ChienSan-chiang. This snggests thatWangs contribution to tbe first explosion probably exceeded that of theother nuclear physicists.

Chao Chung-yao has attended several famous institutions in the West.He received hie Ph. D. degree fromthe California Inetitute of Technologyand has also attended the Universityof Halle in Germany and, CambridgeUniversity in England. He has beencredited with the discovery of gammarays, and has participated in the Scientific Council of the JINR.Theoretical ResearchTwo other Deputy Directors of theIAE, Peng Huang-wu and ChangChia-hua, are also Western-trainednuclear physicists. Peng is a Pb. D.from Edinburgb University in Scotland and is presently in charge of theoretical research in atomic nuclei andfundamental particles. Cbang receivedhis doctorate from Washington University in 1952 and is tbe youngest

~ among the deputy directors.Under these top nuclear physicists,about a hundred other scientists whocurrently hold positions as researchfellows in the IAE in other institutesor in the universities are consideredto have participated in Chinas nuclear weapon project. About 500 top-ranking scientific and engineeringspecialists have been involved in tbenuclear weapons program. Amongthese people, at least 50 hold Ph. D.degrees from Western countriee.

Along with the development of anuclear weapon, Communist ChinaMilitarfReview2


13/114

NUCLEARWEAPONShas also conducted a program to de.velop rockets. Since early 1956, whenPeking mapped out the 12-year planfor the development of ecience andtechnology, jet propulsion hae beenlisted ae one of the 12 major tasks,exceeded only by the use of nuclearenergy. The project is under the supervision of the Institute of Mechanics in the CAS.In 1959 several new institute wereset up within the Academyan Institute of Upper Atmosphere Phyeicsin Wuhan; and an Inetitute of Automation and Remote Control and anInstitute of Mechanice and Electronics both in Peking. All of theee institute participate in the rocket program.

.Information Is ScantThere ie still little information concerning the current progrees of therocket project. The Communist Chinese decision for completing such aprbject, bowever, was clearly disclosed by Chen Yi, Vice Premier andForeign Minieter, who, in an interview with a group of Japaneee correspondence in Peking on 28 October1963, indicated that:

The testing of atomic bombs is thenatural result of ths rising of Chinasindustrial standard. Atomic bombs,missiles, and supersonic airplanes arereflections of the standard of the ad~,anced industries of a nation; therefore, if China fails to reach the goalin several ~ears, she will remain asecond or third class nation. We areapproaching this goal. . . .Some recent data does reveal thatCommuniet China has been strivinghard to attain this goal. During 1963and 1964, China imported a greatquantity of precieion instrumentsfrom Western Europe and from Czechoslovakia and East Germany. A part

of theee are believed to have beenused to develop r?ckete.Chien Hsueh-sen, one of the worldsnoted aeronautical and jet propulsion

engineers, heads the over-all project.Director of the Institute of Mechanics eince he returned to china in 1955from the United States, he receiveda Master of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering from Maeeachusetts Institute of Technology in 1936and a Ph. D. in Aeronautical Engineering from the California Instituteof Technology three yeare later. Chienwas a Professor of Aeronautic atMIT during 1947-49. After WorldWar II, as a consultant to the USNavy, he was sent to Europe to investigate German rocket development.After hie return to China in September 1955, he immediately initiated theprogram to develop Chinese rockets.Another top ecientist involved inthe rocket project ie Kuo Yung-huai,Deputy Director of the Instit/te ofMechanics. A Ph. D. from the California Inetitute of Technology, Kuois also a noted aeronautical engineer.Important Centers

The Science and Technology University of the CAS, the Tsinghua University in Peking, and the PekingAeronautical Engineering College arethe three important centere for training engineers and technicians in rocketry. During the past 10 yeare, morethan 3,000 college etudents, specialistin aeronautical engineering, havebeen graduated. In 1963 the ChinaAeronautical Engineering Society waeformally established, indicating therapid growth of technical manpowerin this field.

Since Communist China has eeveralcapable men with long years of experience in the rocket field, and einceChina began her rocket project al


14/114

NUCLEARWEAPONSmost in the same period with thenuclear weapons program, the development of a rocket booster might soonbe anticipated. It is quite possible thatChina may launch her first rocketwithin the next two or three years.SignificanceTb= successful explosion of the firstnuclear bomb by China has certaindefinite effects not only in the FarEast but in the whole world as well.The impact nf the Chinese bomb onAsian countries was prompt and profound. Under tbe ehadow of Chinasnuclear threat, there is growing pressure on the governments of India andJapan to follow suit. If in the comingyear Communist China could makeanother test and successfully launcha rocket, both India and Japan mightbe forced to enter the race.

To several underdeveloped countries, such as Egypt and Indonesia,where the leaders are feverishly seeking international power position, Chinas effort in developing nuclear weapons has acted as a model. EgyptianPresident Gan,al Abdel Nasser haa recently hinted that he will put moreemphasis on developing nuclear weapons, while reports from Indonesia disclose that China may be preparing tohelp President Achmed Snkarno torealize his ambition to make Indonesia a nuclear power. The spreading ofnuclear weapons throughout the worldseems to be inevitable.

Inspired by tbe first expiosion, itis certainly true that China is nowundertaking a more intensive effortto create a large nuclear stockpile andto accelerate her rocket program. Tbedevelopment of Chinese nuclear weapon.e, though, is still limited by severalfactorsthe supply of equipment aidtbe general condition of the nationaleconomy.

While tbe supply of raw materialsfor producing nuclear weapons hasincreased during the past few years,the supply of technical equipment basnot kept pace. In the early fifties mostof Chinas nuclear raw materials wereshipped to the Soviet Union, only aportion was retained for domesticpurposes. According to recent Chinese statistics, during the period1949-62, China furnished the SovietUnion more than 1,4oo million newrublee (or about 1.5 billion dolIars)worth of mineral products. Amongthe most important items were 100,,000 tons of lithium ore concentrates;34,000 tons of beryliium concentrates;51,000 tons bf borax; 270,000 tons ofwolfram concentrates; 32.9 tons ofpiezoelectric quartz; 7,730 tons ofmercury; 39 tons of tantalum-niObium concentrates; 37,000 tons of molybdenum concentrates; and 180,000tons of tin.

Many of these mineral products areraw materials for tbe manufacture ofrockets and nuciear weapons. Thelithium concentrates are especiallyimportant in the development of hydrogen bombs. As a result of thesharp decline of Sino Soviet trade in1963, the mineral products are nowavailable for domestic use.Imports ReducedPrior to 1961, Communist Chinaimported a great quantity of technicalequipment and precision instrumentsfrom the Soviet Union. The suspension of Soviet aid in 1960 has reducedthat supply to a negligible amount.Although China still can obtain manyprecision instruments from otherCommunist countries and from WestEurope, the supply of technical equipment for Chinas major industrieshas become a critical problem. Thisshortage will hinder Chinaa capacity

Militaryeview

?

f1114


15/114

NUCLEARWEAPONSto develop long-range missiles andhydrogen bombs and will impede hertimetable to become a world nuclearpower.One crucial factor in Chinas development of nuclear weapons, as wellas the development of a delivery sYstem, lies in the general condition ofher national economy. Since the collapse of the Great Leap Forward in1960, capital investment in heavy industry has been greatly curtailed. TheChinese Communists have given pri

ority to the nuclgar weapons program,but continuing development would belimited if the general economic condition does not show aubstantia] im:provement.Although it poseesses many outstanding nuclear physicists and hasabundant raw materials, CommunistChinas economic capacity will inhibittbe rapid development of nuclearweapons and a rocket program. Tobecome a major nuclear power, Chinahas a long way to go.

,

MILITARY REVIEW FILE BOX@,Designed to hold 12 issnes

Ready file referenceBlack with gold lettering ,Send us your order togetherwith a check for 80 cents($1.00 for foreign countries)Mail to the Book Department,U. S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas 66027

May1965 15


16/114

,.

A FORWARD-PAUSEEFENFOREUROP

Harald B. Malmaren

N ORTH Atlantic Treaty Organization defense strategists havefor 15 years debated European defense strategy. Some argue that tactical nuclear weapons must be usedautomatically in the event of an attack to prevent any lose of territory.Others feel that a defense characterized bya pause is essential and thatthis can be achieved by making conventional forces much stronger.It has been argued that if all NATOforces depIoyed in centrai Europewere fully combat ready and highlymobile, and there were some increasein the number of divisions, conventional defense of Europe would be pos

sible. This posture requires addltionddivisions so as to maintain some de-l;fense in depth, but basically it in.!volves a fluid defense which will allow\trading space for time during which :CL

This article was digested from 1the origitzal which appeared inORBIS,No. 8 Fall 196A zwb~ishedby the Foreign Poltcg Re8earch #Inetitute of the University of ~Pennsylvania. Copyrighted @)196.$ by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania.Mr. MalmgrenkJ with the Of-fice of the Special Representativefor Trade Negotiation, Execn-tive Ofice of the President. 1

16


17/114

the forces for a counteroffensive canbe organized.However, many Europeans considertrading space for time inadmissible,because it would permit the overrunning of NATO territory and wouldprobably convert most of West Germany into a battlefield. It requires increased conventional contributions bythe NATO nationsa step that is nnlikely to be taken.Since such a force is also capableof large-scale offense, many arguethat it would compel the Soviets toincrease their combat forces deuloved..

1in East Europe with reeultant adverse

~effects On the political situation ii thebloc countries and on the stable military situation. A large-scale fluid de~ fense capability would also tend topreelude thinning out of forces in central Europe in possible arms controlnegotiating, since it would take 25~to 3(I divisions to provide defense in1depth or coverage of the front undera i%fiddefense strategy.fThe Static DefenseOn the other hand, a deploymentwhich placee some of the total force

in a static defense posture well for-r ward, with a substantial portion inmobile reserve at the rear, is much$sore favorab,e in these respecte. Me#static defense posture would have toinclude substantial digging in, barriades, fortification, and alternative+ equipment. Thus, static defense mayemploy equipment and tactical con epts completely different from thosef the mobile forcesfor example,F~emphasizing antitank weapons as oposed to tanks for antitank warfare.f barricades raise enemy penetrationequirements, they would be equivaent in that een~e to the alternativef increasing the number of divisions.

Static defense does not depend so1v 1965

FORWARD.PAUSEEFENSEmuch upon trading space for time.Rather, time is bought by forcing theenemy to give etrategic warning inmassing for penetration and by elov.+.ing the pace of his penetration. Staticdefense can reduce the number of divisions required to hold a position,and thus accords more closely to therealities of Europes defense contributions. It ia not as capable of offenseas the fluid defenee posture, but, consequently, it may tend to be less provocative. Thinning out of forces under arms control agreements wouldbe more feasible behind a static defense posture.

If the other NATO nations do notincrease their conventional contributions, or even further reduce theircontributions, the development ofcomplementary militia forces alongSwiss lines for a static defense rolemay be an acceptable means to builda plausible defense posture.With regard to the trade off between militia and regular forces, thefluid defense concept requiree a verylarge, well-trained standing army,larger than that which presently exists; static defense does not impose

such stringent requirements. The importance of continuous experienceamong men and units for effectivemobile combat cannot be overemphasized; again, static defense is not sodemanding. The functions of eachman in a static defense postnre arefar more limited in number thanwhen he is being used in mobile combat formation.The Forward PauseA static defense concept with alternative combinations of fixed forward forces and mobile reeerve forces,standing forces and militia forces,and defeneive equipment and positioning may consequently be described as

17


18/114

FORWARD-PAUSEEFENSEa strategy of forward pause: for- tions wilI be far less vulnerable towird defense, conventional, with ,a self-kilY by nuclear weapons ere.built-in pause. ployed in close proximity by the de.Tactical nuclear weapons could be fendera. The enemy will, therefore, /used to create gaps in a static de- tend to remain a prime nuclear targetfenee formation, but this would place for a substantial period of time goI

Arnw New, Fed..The author says a static defense, emphasizing antitank weapons rather than tmk$would be less provocative ?the onus of first use on the attacker. that the opportunity to use tacticaljIf the enemy does not use nuclear nuclear weapons in defense would notweapons at the outset of a military be entirely lost as a consequence of4engagement, the static defense POS. any pause.ture would compel him to mass his In a tactical context, delay buysforces for penetration. Even during several things, Additional time m.the course of penetration it will be ables intelligence to improve. Thef

necessary for the attacking force to longer the pause, the greater are th? :remain compressed in order to main- chances of obtaining and confirmingtain momentum through a etatic de- correct information and rejectiuf fense area and to deal with mobile incorrect information. With add.reserve forces if the etatic areb ie bro- tional time, better sources of intelli.ken through. , gence can be employed, such as acridDefensive forces in prepared posi- photographic reconnaissance, whid

MilitaryWiwI

18


19/114

4 is slower but more accurate thanmany other typee of information ac-Iuisition. With additional time, in~ other words, there is a better chance~ Oflocating an enemy, defining his pos; ture, identifying his likely pattern ofattack, acquiring targets, and identifying them with greater precision.

1 Delaying or slowing up the attackers penetration makes defensive tac? tics more effective. The enemy losesthe advantages of mobility and momentum; targeting is much easier~with a slowly moving enemy; counter\ deplowent by mobile reserve units~ at points of intended penetration is enhanced; attrition of attackingforces is likely to rise more rapidlyr than that of defending forces as the~ fighting is prolonged; and, in relatmn to tactical nuclear weapohs, additional time enables defensive forces

to maneuver in order to assume a tactical nuclear mode when necessary.1 Tac)ical Nuclear RiposteIf the aggressive move appears to!/h e an attempt at mass penetration~ rather than a limited (accidental orintentional ) border incnreiona fact$ that can be established only over a

period of tires-then the defensive~ forcee can redeploy for a possible tac~ tical nuclear riposte. Slowing the

I j speed of the enemys attack ie a]so~ J important in terms of the safe andsuccessful use of nuclear weapons. If! the aggressors rate of advance is so~ swift that the defender cannot ac. quire a target, and then fire and hit~~it at a range beyond the minimum, safety distance, it will not be possiblee to strike at the enemy with tacticalK nuclear weapons.K In the strategic or politico-military, context, time is critically valuable.I Additional time produces better deci~ sions and reducee the need for auto1,1ay1965

FORWARO-PAUSEEFENSEmatic reeponse and reliance on pre-planning or hasty judgments nnderfire. Additional time means time tonegotiate, or at leaet to make threateand demormtratione of intent to moveto a higher level of conflict. Additional time enablee the adversaries tofeel each other out and determine justhow far the other is prepared to goand what the objectives are.

Tt has been argued that once overtconflict begins it must be assumedthat, the attacker has weighed all therisks and costs, otherwiee the conflict would not have been initiated.But that need not be true. An attacker may have misjndged the defenders resolve or the defendersview of his vital interests in varionsparts of the globe. Once a limitedconflict is underway, the probabilityyof general war rices perceptibly, andthe reactions of governments whenconf renting the imminent specter ofgeneral war are likely to be qnitedifferent than when general war appears remote or inconceivable.Important EffectsAs the conflict continues, longerrun effects become more importantin particular, the ratio of friendlyto enemy reserve and mobilizableforces which can be bronght to bear,and the risks of escalation in prolonged stalemate. The length of delaya defender ought to be willing to buyis, therefore, limited by the constraints impoeed by enemy reservesand the risk that etalemate will leadto escalation. Although a defensesystem should be constructed toachieve a significant delay or significant pause: the duration of thatpause will depend upon how Ioqg thedefender estimates any limited central war can laet in the modern eraand what he will do with the time.


20/114

FORWARD-PAUSEEFENSE. .There are important reasons for aserioue dis~ision of the forward-pause concepL There is, for instance,a very real question whether any defense bther than a full forward defense along the border between Eastand West Germany will be acceptableto the West Germans in the long run.The European configuration offorces is also likely to change sub

stantially in the next few yeare. TheFrench are not only reducing the sizeof their army by one-third; they arealso shifting to a territorial deployment concept for a substantial per-,tion of their ground forces (the so-called Operational Defenee of the Territory (DOT) forces ).

The British may well find the world-

Delay gives intelligence agencies more time

forces, and this may weIl be the pat.tern of further development beyondthe present 12 standing divisions. Aconcept of defense which fits in withthis coming configuration of forcesmay be better than one which ig.noree it.

With regard to questions of armscontrol and military stability in ten.tral Europe, th~ forward-pause concept may turn out to have certain ad.vantages over other poeeible defenseconfigurations. A defense conceptwhich increases defensive capabilitywithout increasing the dangers of es.calation would make thinning outsafer for the defender. *

If the defense concept providesstrategic warnirw and substantially

US A{, For,,to acquire information. Aircraft such asthe F-4C can conduct a detailed photoreconnaissance.

wide demands on their fighting forcesso burdensome as to compel them toreduce further, or at best not to fulfill the target strength of, the BritiehArmy of the Rhine. The Germa& arenow beginning to develop a TerritorialArmy in addition to the standing

raises the enemy requirements forpenetration, so that the ratio of of.fense to defense needed for an attackwould virtually preclude attack, thenstability would have increased measufrably. Thus, a ehift to a forward-pause defense strategy for the forcesMilitsryReti?w,0


21/114

FORWARD.PAUSEEFENSEremaining in central Europe may permit a reopening of the question of disengagement and supply new impetusto a consideration Of other forms ofEuropean arms control.

Moreover, if domestic pressuree forsome reduction in US forces hased inEnrope grow, the adminietrationmight find it poesible to argue thatthere are sOme realistic defense concepts which do not require euch extensive US commitments in Germany.Finally, if there is any way inwhich a forward defense capabilitycan be achieved without reliance onthe automatic use of tactical nucleardefense in a provocative mobile defense-offense mode, then substantialurozress toward avoidimz escalation=vill have been achieved.It should be remembered, how&er,hat simple calculations of offenee-to-Iefense ratio for achieving variousevels of defense effectiveness can bemisleading. Requirements for pene,ratioh vary greatly with terrain,veather, morale, strategy of attack,)ace of attack, and their relation tohe various elements which make uphe defense system.

Measures of combat effectiveneeencombat firepower of attacking andIefending units can only be crude esimatee for average conditions. Other:onsideratione may be of equal im)ortafice, such as an increase in the!nemys uncertainty of the possibili

ties for successful attack. In the modern context, where the risk of escala.tion is so great, any increase in theaggreseOrs uncertainty about hisability to penetrate is a gain to beeought in iteelf.No defenee system can be considered adequate if there is no offensivecapability whatsoever. If an enemydoes penetrate and consolidate hie position, the defender must have themeans to take the offensive and regainthe lost territory, or to seize enemyterritory and bargain for the loet territory. A defense posture must notencourage the enemy to make a concerted push to achieve a fait accompli.If the enemy should break throughthe static defense system, the defending forces must have a rapid counterattack capability to prevent consolidation of the enemy position. Thereis no getting around tbe need for fluidtactice involving space-time tradesonce a large-ecale penetration isachieved. This capability must existso as not to tempt the enemy to concert all his energies for one large-scale penetration, after which hemight be free to disperse and harassthe static defense as well as increasethe momentum and area covered inhie attack. There is, in other words,a limit to the degree to which staticdefenee forces may replace mobile reserve forces capable of taking theoffensive.

hy1$65 21


22/114

NATOandThe Flexible Response

Otto Heilbrunn

HEN United States planners tional attack on a NATO membew discarded the conceDt of mas. would not automatically be met witsive retaliation and adopted the doc- nuclear weapons but, if possible, wittrine of flexible response, they be- conventional means.lieved that the European North At- The French, however, refused to allantic Treaty Organization allies eept the new doctrine; they still atwould fall readily into line and ap- here to the doctrine of massive retalprove the new strategya conven- ation. The Germans, after some initi~

,.

MilitaryReiie2


23/114

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

esitancy, now v~er to the view thathe flexible response concept has itserits. The British basically supporthe US view.Mr. Denis W. Healey, the Brit ishefense Minister, declared in theouse of Commons on 17 December964 that, precisely because we knowhe terrifying consequences of nuclearar, we cannot arm ourselvee to atrategy, such as that of maesive re-Iiation, which does not allow us analternative in any circumstances. Hewent on to say that NATO must haveconventional forces which can raisee threshold at which nuclear weapns are brought to bear to a pointhigh enough to be credible if an en-Y is thinking of a major attack.

he present state of NATOs strategy has been neatly described by the\German Minister of Defense, Kai

)L%e von Hassel. The old concept isstill officially accepted, he says,eventhough most of the members of!NAT(Yno louger consider it binding.NATO, at the moment, is without

an approved strategic concept, or, asthe LX congressional study group put1it in its report of January 1965,NATO was now possessed of twostrategiesa de facto strategy offlexibleresponse and the official stra~W of massive retaliation.Force GoslsBut that is not the only unresolvedNATO problem. It is also dOubtfulwhether its force geals are still valid.When all NAT() members still subscribedto tbe massive retaliation doc-

Otto Heilbrunn, is the author ofWar in the Enemys Camp, whichWpeared in the July 1964 Gxue of theMILITARYREVIEW. He is a rni[itaryhistorian residing in England and a9tudent of irregular warfare forfi!anyyears.May965

trine, they agreed that a atamfingforce of 30 divisions wae required,When the United States switched tothe flexible response strategy, she asserted that 30 divisione were requiredfor the new role.NATO now has 25 divisions. At themeeting of the alliances Defensehfhisters in December 1964, thechairmen of the NATO StandingGroup and of the military committeerecommended an increase of forces.The US Secretary uf Defense, undoubtedly referring to the total of 30planned divisions, concluded thatNATOS conventional force strengthwas sufficient. Mr. Healey, on theother hand, apparently thought thatthe present strength of 24 or 26 divisions should not be increased.New Concept NeededIn view of these differences of opinion, there is certainly an urgent needto work out a new NATO defense concept. It also seems pertinent to findout how the planners arrived at the30-division-force goal, whether NATOcan repel with conventional means aconventional attack by numericallysuperior forces, and whether NATOshould increase the strength of itsstanding forces to 30 divisions.

In NATOs early days, plannersheld that, in order to succeed, an attacker would need a threefold superiority over NATOs defense forces.The then current estimates of Sovietstrength made it certain that NATOwould have to have a 25 to 30-divisionstanding force on the Central Front,and a somewhat higher number of divisions in reserve capable of mobilization witbin 15 to 30 days. Theeeforcee would fight a conventional war.

When the Soviet Union quickly developed her nuclear capabilities in thefollowing years, however, a review be

23


24/114

j

ELEXIBLEESPONSEcame necessary. In 1956 NATOsplanners decided that a standing forceof 30 divisions was required, but theyagreed that the number of reserveforces could be reduced. While theprimary role of these forces would beto fight under nuclear conditions, itwas also felt that they could deal withan enemy probing attack,

These calculations were based dnthe assumption that the attackerneeded a threefold superiority overthe defense. One NATO commander,though, raised a warning voiceagainst calculations of that type. General Hans Speidel, who then headedLand Forces Central Europe, felt thatin a nuclear war it was no longer essential for the attacker to have a 3or 4 to 1 superiority over the defender. He felt that firepower wouldmake up the difference.limited AttacksWhile the alliea have hitherto beenassessing the force strength requiredto deal with an all-out attack, theforce goals for convectional forceswhich the allies are now discussinghave been set with a different contingency in mind. The 30 divisionsdeemed necessary by the Americans,or the 25 divisiona considered sufficient by tbe British, are not meantto defeat a massive invasioninwhich case, NATO would use nuclearweaponsbut to repel a small ormedium-sized attack.

If, instead of the 3 to 1 ratio offorces, a 3 to 2 ratio is accepted, asone writer has suggested, 30 NATOdivisions could effectively deal with anattack by 45 aggreseor divisions. Yet,the maximum strength which the Soviets could put into tbe field immediately before D-day, without attracting NATOs attention, is usually estimated at only 40 divisions.24

Within one month the Soviets COUI~build up their forward strength to O!divisions, while NATO could mobilire12 divisions, thereby raising its totalstrength to 42 divisions. The respwtive ratio of strength would then he~almost exactly 3 to 2.

Thus, presumably, the NATO forcescould fight conventionally for over amonth in any case, and for a longs!period if, tbe level of attack werelower.Three Factors

But is it really permissible to as.asume that 30 NATO divisiona couldsuccessfully fight against 40 or 45 divisione, and that 42 NATO division9could do so against 65 divisions? Theanswer, it appears, must be in thenegative.It is generally agreed that troopsfighting a conventional war againsta nuclear power must be deployed asif they were fighting a nuclear war,simply because they do not knmwhether or when the opponent willuse nuclear weapons and they mustprepare against this eventuality anddeploy accordingly. The troops must,therefore, fight a mobile war in dis.

persed order on a vastly extendedbattlefield. All three factorsmobilewar, dispersion, and the wide expanseof the battlefield-greatly influencethe calculation of tbe number oftroopa required for the defense: MobiIe war means that the ds.

fense no longer enjoys the numerousbuilt-in safety devices found in astatic defense system. What is more,a mobile defense must be conductedofferreively. The purely mobile defenseis, therefore, almost as exposed mthe attacker who takes his protectionwith him in the form of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and selffiropelled guns. The Soviets recogniss

MilitaryRe~i


25/114

hat the sharp distinction between of.ensive and defensive missions is nonger valid. They rightly stress that:. . . fhe bsllige~ent. in the landheaters will attempt to achieve thei?ims ?nairdy in offense. . . . De feneeill not dieappear entirety, but theistinction betureen offense amd de-,erwe will not be as clearlv expressed8 in pact wars.

a Dispersion means.that there wille much less mutual support on theattlefield than wae possible in theast, Neighboring units will no longere in cloee touch; they will probablyosecontact with each other. Further! ore, while conventional firepower ie: eared to frontages of UP to 16 kiloeters, the 30 NATO divisions wouldch have to cover, in the event ofwar, a frontage of 40 kilometers.he effectiveness of the defendersrtillery would be, therefore, eharplyrednced.c T~e wide expanse of the battlefieldmeans that reservea will have topove over considerable dietarmes.,Sinceartillery support for the defensetroops already in contact with theenemywill be weak, the power of rebstance of those troopa will be eharplyIeduced. The reserve. might not reach

the battlefield in time to boleter thehont.ReducedAdvantagesThu., the advantage. of the defenderover the attacker are either reduced,or done away with completely!fthe defender conducts a mobile warindiepersed order on vastly expandedbattlefield.. The defense also must berepared to wage a counteroffensive.

It follows from all this that in openw,rfare the defense must be as strongm the offense. Thie means that the10NATO divisions which the UnitedStates considers neceseary cannot be

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

expected to repel an attack by morethan 30 aggressor divisions.Is it likely that tbe Soviete wouldwage an offensive in Europe with 30or fewer divieione ? They would notdo eo if they wanted to start a majorwar, becauee they would have 40 RedArmy divisions and a fair number of Idivieions from the other Warsaw Pactmembers at their dispoeal right fromthe beginning.

ContingencyWell, then, which contingencywould fit into the 30-divieion frame?It appears that we muet exclude hostilities which start eomewhere outsideEurope but then spread to Europe;hostilities which etart in Europe ifRed China puehes the Soviet Unioninto war there; hostilities that seekto procure the unification of Germany; and, in all likelihood, hostilities over Berlin. In all these caeee,the Soviets would undoubtedly commit more than 30 divieione to battleon D-day. There are other possiblecontingencies in which the Sovietstarting effort would be above the 30divieion level.The Soviet. might begin hostilitieswith 30 division. or lees only if. theyintended to carry out a limited probe.Such a limited probe of uncertainobjectives was considered by Mr.Healey as the meet likely form of anenemy attack when he spoke at themeeting of the Defenee Ministers ofthe Atlantic Council in December1964. He added that NATO ehouldplan for this contingency and resignitself to making the beet use of themanpower it already had.

When considering only a limitedprobe by an aggressor, it doe. notseem, at first sight, to make much difference whether the NATO conventional f rce designed to meet this\


26/114

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

threat consists of 25 or 30 divisions.An attack by 25 divisions is abovethe limited-probe size anyway. But wemust not Ioee sight of another aspectthe length of the frontage to becovered by the defense.if there are only 25 NATO divisions, each division must bold a frontage of no less than 48 kilometers. Thedivisional frontage could be reducedto 40 kilometers if 30 divisions wereavailable. Even in the latter case, thedivisions would require a high degreeof mobility to fulfill their mission. Inview of the sharply reduced artillerycover mentioned before, tbe frontagemust not be larger than 40 kilometers.Therefore, a standing force of at least30 divisione is required, should thepresent dc%ente not be lasting.It may be said that it is not necessary to cover the entire NATO frontso intensively because an aggressorsobjective would soon become apparent, and the NATO divisions couldthen be moved to block the meet likelyroutes of advance. That may be so.

But as long as the aggressors objtive remains uncertain, 30 divisiall of themwill be necessaryscreen NATO territory effectively.We must be clear about one thiNATO defense forces cannot fig!conventional war against an aggre.dsor who holds a two or threefold s{periority. Because of thie, the deter.rent value of the NATO conventionalforces is smaller than has been ~Iieved. They will deter only a convemtional attack by an equal force or by

less wumerous forcee.Even so, those forces are essentiiif the West wante to, maintain, wit must; its freedom of action. Ydthey must become more mobile, anltheir administrative support must himproved. In addition, NATO needmore combat-ready reserves immediately available so that a conventionswar, if it should come, can be foughfor a longer period of time andagainst stronger enemy forces than ispreeently envisaged by most of ths1allies.

MilitsrYReii6


27/114

D&ln!3eof

E Qn&DJpeGeneral Hans Speidel,Germ an A rm& Ret i r ed

UR military and political situa.tion is still characterized by agulf bet een tbe East and the West.It would e dangerous to nourish anyO

1illusions on that score. The shifts in *the Soviet attitude toward the Westexpressed in the policy of peacefulcoexistence are entirely tactical innature.The strategic and tactical conceptsof the Soviets and the organizationof their forces all indicate that theirwar objectives in Western Europe

27


28/114

TFiE DEFENSE OF EURDPE

would be the, destruction of allied nuclear capabilities and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, andthe capture of European territory.The Soviets believe that nuclearweapons will extend war in space andtime rather than shorten it. This iswhy they have both strategic long-range weapons and = conventionalforces. By keeping a balanced military posture, they can deal with bothnuclear and conventional war.For tbe crucial -central European

front, the Soviets have deployed 20armored and mechanized divisions in.central Germany, two divisions in Poland, end four in Hungary. They canbe reinforced with 50 additional divisions from the western part of theUSSR. Thirty of these divisions arecategory 1 forcesthat is, theirstrength exceeds 70 percent. After deployment, a total of 70 Soviet divisions must be reckoned with. The Soviet Union can eventually muster between 145 and 150 divisions withmodern equipment. aDffensive ForcesThere are 11 Polish, nine Czechoslovakian, and six East German divisions available for offensive employment with Soviet forces. A strongtactical air fleet and numerous medium-range missiles threaten all theimportant targets in Western Europe.The modern Soviet Navythe secondstrongest, in the worIdrelies uponsubmarines and rocket weapons. Thf

This article was translated wtddigested from the original, pub-lished in the REVUE MILITAIREGfiNfiRALE (France) November196.L, under the title, Die Ver-teidigung Europas/ .General Speidel is a formerCommander, Allied Land ForcesCentral Europe.

2a

Baltic Fleet can move into the Atlanh,and, along with the Arctic, Black Seaand Pacific Fleete, strike at the greaseapowers.In the event of war Soviet strateg,might seek to annihilate tbe allkforces east of the Rhine. It may b,assumed that their main axes of attack would be in the north German lowlands along the Berlin-Hanover-Rubline and along the Leipzig-EisenaciFrankfurt Iine. Operations in the d]rection of Schleswig and Meininger

Karlsruhe or Hof-Nuremberg COUIalso be expected. An encircling operetion through Austria and Hungary tbreak through the southern flank onorthern Italy and seize the Medite!ranean with tbe aid of the Black SeFleet would also be a possibility.The armed forces of the West mu!protect the NATO infrastructure antbe navigation aids of the air forceThe land forces must confront, sto]and break up an enemy attack at ttIron Curtain. Any attempt of the S(viets or their satellites to achievelocal breakthrough must be frustrate!This is the only way to counter tlaggressor initially and defeat hldecisively.The Communityof FeteBetween the Iron Curtain and ttSeine are concentrated 125 minipeople and almost the entire industriand economic potential of Weste]Europe. This 850,000-square-kilomter area includes the Ruhr and Rki]industrial districts, the coal minesBelgium and the Saar, the iron minof Lorraine, several heavy industcenters, and many important Eurpean ports.Reinforced by this enormous indutrial and economic potential, and thof northern Italy, the Soviets woube superior to tbe United States-

Militarylcti


29/114

,

fact which links the destinies of theUnited States and Free Enrope.Of the 29% divisions from nine na~

,tions required as mobilization-day~orces for the central fluropean secltor, only 24 are available. When Itook cOmmand of the NATO land!forces in central Europe in April~1957,the line of defense was stillIalong the Rhine. West Germany, in~themeantime, has made it possible

NA To PhotoA NATO radar site in west Europeto move the line forward to the Ironcurtain by contributing 11 divisionsto the central sector and one to thenorthern sector. But the present levelof troop strength is not enough toI!ay19s5

THEDEFENSE OF EUROPE, .

stop an attack; therefore, the immedi-.ate employment of nuclear weaponsmay be required. The eituation willimprove only when the Epropean natione live up to the full extent of theirobligations.The ~nited States has stored equipment for two divisions in the centralEuropean region. The airlift reinforcement capabilitythat is, the abilit y to move mobilized ~ersonnel quicklyfrom the United Statee to Europe byairwas successfully tested in Operation Long Thrust in February 1962and in Exercise Big Lift in October1963. It should be kept in mind, however, that such amofvement of tro6psis only possible well before the operring of hostilities, since the airliftingof reinforcements to the sensitive central European region in periods ofgreat tension may produce an immediate threat to the peace.Airlift ProblemsThere are some similarities betweenthe eending of troops to critical areasin times of crises and the dangerouseffects which military mobilizationmeaeures had in the past. It will require great political tact to determinewhen an airlift of combat troops toa critical area will have a deterrenteffect and when it might trigger off awar. Moreover, such a movement iedifficult after the outbreak of war because airfields, communication lines,and the means of land transportationmay be destroyed by enemy action. Inthis connection it should be remembered that, in the two airlift exercises, only personnel were transported. Most weapons and equipmentwere already stored in Europe.

The difficulties of command whichwere obvious in coalition warsfromthe Napoleonic Wars to World WarIIdemonstrate that the fast and

I .29


30/114

THEDEFENSE OF EUROPEsmooth functioning of an alliance inwar can be improved by integratedcooperation practiced in times ofpeaca. The force de f rappe (nuclearstrike force) which places a heavy tinancial burden on France, representsas yet no French contribution to thesecurity of the West. On the contrary,it serves to underline Frances political independence and to raise her national prestige.French OoctrineThe French strategic doctrine of thetotal nuclear counterstrike, recentlypresented by General of the ArmyCharles Ailleret, Chief of Staff of theFrench Armed Forces, does not go intoparticulars in several important aspects.* Since no one can predict whatforms future wars will aesume, wemust he prepared for all contingencies,even though this places heavy burdens on West Germany. We must beprepared to wage a general nuclearwar, limited nuclear war, or conven-,tional war. Since an aggression by theWeet ie inconceivable, the enemy holdsthe initiative in this area.The disadvantage of the Weet atthe beginning of a war can be overcome only if the political leaders react promptly. Each minute will be precious. But stronger armed forces thanthose presently available in centralEurope are required. Once those forcesare muetered, the Soviets will be lesstempted to fan crises or to seize apiece of Western territory ae a hoetage.

We should not cherish hopes thatmobilization alone can provide enoughadded manpower. Forces that are notorganized and available at the outbreak of war will come too la%e forthe decisive first phase, because of theGene..l of the Arnw Charlee Ailkret, ,,TheFlexible Rewmns+ A Fmn.b View,)) Mtiit.ru Re-.,.,.. T-eb,.ww9w,.p 7&

proximity of the border along thee attire European front. The days of cla ]sic mobilization are gone. illIIitai ttreliminary work must, them. e

Soviet m iss i l es a r e a significant threat Mrtto NATO members IegI+ore, be undertaken in all civil and roil. ngitary sectors in order to be ready for asan &mergency. Although the 15 NATO UI

MilitarywitH ?!I0
http:///reader/full/Mtiit.ruhttp:///reader/full/Mtiit.ru


31/114

ates will have a tOtal of 81 divisionsmobilization day, the Soviet blocII have 208 divisions, 120 of which

even nOw at 70 percent of theirartime strength. Furthermore, slough strong conventional forces mayduce the danger of nuclear war,eir activation will be only a part ofe nuclear deterrent.In 1960, under the Eisenhower adinistratiom a plan was advanced tomit a number of Polaris subma.

Tt lE DEFENSE DF EUROPE

surface vessels armed with Pokzmsmissiles. This plan coste less, can bemade available faster, and has thesame advantage of greater freedom ofaction.The United States conducted extensive studies on this subject and concluded that such a system would bemilitarily effective and that it is unlikely that tbe MLF could be destroyedhy a Soviet counterstrike.The MLF is designed to strengthen


32/114

THEDEFENSE, OF EUROPEsmooth functioning of an alliance inwar can be improved by integratedcooperation practiced in timee ofpeace The force de frapgre (nuclearstrike force) which placea a heavy financial burden on France, representsas yet no- French contribution to theeecurity of the West. On the contrary,it servea to undwline Francee political independence and to raise her national preetige.French DoctrineThe French strategic doctrine of thetotal nuclear counteretrike, recentlypresented by General of the ArmyCharles Ailleret, Chief of Staff of theFrench Armed Forces, doee not go intoparticulars in several important as.pects. Since no one can predict whatforme future ware will aeeume, wemust be prepared for all contingencies,even though this places heavy burdens on Weet Germany. We must beprepared to wage a general nuclearwar, limited nuclear war, or conventional war. Since an aggression by theWest ie inconceivable, the enekrry holdstbe initiative in this area.The disadvantage of the West atthe beginning of a war can be overcome only if the political leaders react promptly. Each minute will be precious. But stronger armed forces thanthose preeently available in centralEurope are required. Once those forcesare mustered, the Soviets will be lesstempted to fan crisee or to eeize apiece of Western territory as a hostage.

We should not cherish hopes thatmobilization alone can provide enoughadded manpower. Forces that are notorganized and available at the outbreak of war will come too late forthe decisive first phaee, because of theGeneral of the Amy Chmles Ailleret, ..TheFlexible R.sPo..*A French View,,, Mtiiteru %./.,,!,.Februay 1966, D 78.

proximity of the horder along the Q atftire European front. The days of ck r1 illVital preliminary work muet, therj. esic mobilization are gone.

{Irl, OudueileIn, irr

Soviet missilee are a significant threat Stto NATO membersfore, beundertaken inallcivilandmil. nitary sectors in order to be ready for aarr#mergency. Although the15NAT0 u

MMt , y Revi t l0


33/114

tes will have a total of 81 divisionsmobilization day, the Soviet bloce1ib,[ ill have 208 divisions,


34/114

THE QEFENSE. OF EUROPE ,

British to complement the MLF, isworthy of consideration, but it shouldmot delay the creation of the MLF.From the military and polit>:l,

point of view, the MLF represe t? a,reinforcement and an additional u)r


35/114

GERMANIN THE

1942-45

Earl

p HE most striking aspect of the1 German-Soviet conflict in Worldir II was the vastness of its dimenns. With scarcely an interlude, thehting lasted for three years, 10nths, and 16 days. From autumnH to autumn 1943 the length of: front was never less than 3,860Ometers; for a time late in 1942reached 4,900 kilometers. The con-t seesawed iicross eastern and cen

DEFEATEAST

F. Ziemke

tral Europe between the Elbe and theVolga, the Alps and the Caucasus. TheGerman armies thrust 1,900 kilometers into the Soviet Union and Soviettroops countermarched 2,400 kilometers to Berlin.The total number of troops engagedaveraged between eight and nine million, and the losses were appalling.The German dead from all causes apparently numbered between three and


36/114

6ERMAN DEFEATthree and one-half million. The military eervice ifehths on the Soviet sidemay have gone as high as 12 to 13million. The much larger Soviet lossescan be ~ccounted for by the extremelyheavy casualties of the 1941 campaign, less efficient medical services,and the Soviet tactics, which throughout the war tended to be expensive interms of human life. The Germans,on the other hand, although they oftendeliberately sacrificed masses of men,by doctrine expended manpower sparingly.

Tbrougb the war and the occupation, the Soviet Union lost some sevenmillion civilians and Germany about1.5 million. The losses+ ivilian andmilitary-of Finland, the BalticStates, and, eastern and southeasternEuropean countries added millionsmore,ConsolidationThat great struggle completely unhinged the traditional European balance of power,. and the line on whichit ended retained all the essentialcharacteristics of a military front.The war consolidated the Soviet regime in Russia, and enabled it to impose its system on the neighboringstates of eastern Europe, Finland excepted, and on the Soviet occupationzone in Germany. The victory made

Earl F. Ziemke is Deputfi Chief,Current Branch, Ofice of the Chiefof MilitarV History, Department ofthe Army, Washington. He receiwedhis Ph. D. degree from the Universityof Wisconsin and is the author ofThe German Northern Theater of Operations, 1940-1945 published bv theO/j7ce of the Chief of Military Historyin IQ59. This article is based upon achapter in the authors soon to be Wb-tished volume, Stalingrad to Berlin:The German Defeat in the East, 19421945.

,,the Soviet Union the secOnd-rankinwor[d power.

The Soviet victory was a victoq of raw manpower and industrial prduction used by a regime that couexploit both with complete ruthlness. The Germans contributedin two waysafter their initial blitt :krieg attempts failed, by trying b tforce a stalemate in the World WNtI style; and by the extreme and UD.compromising nature of their IYUaims.Nigh PriceThe one placed a price in blood anmateriel on ground; bpt the priccould not be set higher than the Ss.viet Union could pay. Consequently,Soviet Ieadersbip was guaranteedvirtually unbroken seriee of victoriu iwithout which it might not have been.able to extract the eacritices it didfrom its people. The other gave theSoviet people no choice except thabetween an indigenous and a foreign,tyranny.

But those in eum counted for failess than the genuine, spontaneousheroism, self-sacrifice, and industry ofthe Soviet people. The Soviet bureaucracy proved itself capable of mobiliPing manpower, industry, and agricu1ture for the war effort even under thetremendous handicap of having Iosin the first months one-third of ihreeource;, industrial plant capacitY,and agricultural production. The principal achievements were the relocationand rebuilding of existing plants, theopening and construction of neumines, plants, and agricultural lands,and, far from least, the unprecedentedand unequaled concentration on warproduction.

, The absolute increase in Soviet pro


37/114

GERMAN DEFEAT

tiucing the implements Of land war-fare, guns, ammunition, tanks, andighter and ground-eupport aircraft.~IFI attaining that concentration, theoviet Union posseseed advantagesone of the other major belligerents8d to an equal degree. She foughtn one f rent. Except to a minor exnt in the Far East, she did not havecontemplate the emergence of other

,1 She fought an exclusively land war.She fought on her own or immediatelyadjacent territory and hence didnotneed to establish lengthy ne~, sup-dtdv lines. Particularly over water, or

Additionally, the Soviet Union received 10.2 billion dollars of lend-leaseassistance-mostly from the UnitedStates. The Soviet Army fought thewar with Soviet-designed and Sovietmanu factu red weapons; it could do soonly because of the great support itreceived through lend-lease. Between22 June 1941 and 20 September 1945the Soviet Union received, amongother iteme, 409,526 jeeps and trucks,12,161 armored vehicles, 325,784 tonsof explosives, 13,041 locomotives andrailroad cars, and 1,798,609 tons offoodstuffs.

Against the Soviet quantitative ad

.Ie ~gain~tthe soviet quantitative advantage in manpower and materieL Germany had a~ generalqualitative advantage derived principally ~rom a hkher level of military pro-ficiencydl~ construct and stock remote bases. Her vantage in manpower and materiel,troope and civilian population gener- Germany had ,a general qualitative ad,. ated economic demande of a much vantage that derived principally from,t lower order than most of the other a higher level of military proficiency.,, belligerents. The ratio of the one to the other was

i

35


38/114

GERMAN TIEFEAT Inot corrstar$- and the shift was in theSoviet favor. The qualitative gap narrowed and, as the war progressed, decline? in significance. The quantitative gap widened. In 1941 and 1942the Germans advantage was provedinadequate to get them the victory.Accept TermsBy late 1942 the quantitative element had moved to the fore, and theGerm~ns accepted the terms it imposed even though they ran directlycounter to the principles under whichGermany had fought the war thus far.The German Command did not aftempt again to exploit the qualitativeadvantage strategically. To have doneso would have required at the outseta decision to fight for a draw.As the war continued, the qualitative advantage that remained. to theGermans was in the middle and lowercommand echelons where its effect wasmitigating but not decisive. Thehigher German Commands passed tothe bands of generals who used it asan arithmetical substitute for quantity.By then the Soviet Union had developed commanders, Georgi K. Zhukov, AIeksandr M. Vasilevski, Ivan S.Koniev, and possibly others, and formationsthe tank armies in particularthat, although they lacked theingenuity and professional expertnessof the better German generals or theeasy coordination of tbe GermanPanzer armies in their prime, hadachieved full effective parity in performance with tbe Germans. Thequantitative advantage was sufficientto accomplish the rest and compensatefor a slower and more uncertain risein average capability.Every assessment of the Germandecline and defeat inevitably encounters Adolph Hitler, his leadership, and

his responsibility. The single natio~leader was a distinguishing featoof World War II. The tendencyward fusion of the military and poliical authority in wartime was nnew. What was unusual was theverywhere popular opinion stron~finclined toward entrusting the PO!ers of military decision to the politialeadership rather than the reverse,Franklin Roosevelt generally d~clined to intervene in military operations. Winston Churchill did whencould and would gladly have done.\more often had be not heen discou1aged by his own and, the combinistaffs and by the example of his Arnican colleague. Joseph Stalin leftmark on Soviet strategy but, athe painful lessons learned earlthe war, apparently contentedself with a largely counterfeit military image. Hitler, however, decidedGerman strategy from the outbreaof tbe war to its end, and after December 1941 he was in direct comand of the German ground forces,Responsible for DefeatThe responsibility for the Germamistakes was chiefly Hitlers as wa major share of the credit for thsuccesses. Undoubtedly, the formewere both greater than the latter anmore decidedly his own; therefore, athe highest command level be was responsible for the German defeat. Mofundamentally, be also bore the responsibility for the root causes nf thdefeatthe attempt to pursue unliited objectives with limited meanand the creation of a political systethat by every means made itself intolerable to most of the rest of thworld,

But Hitler was no mere incomptent accidentally propelled into a comanding position from which he CO

MilitaryRelie6


39/114

GERMAN DEFEATotatrehe efforts of the military . The Soviet contribution to theofessionals. His conduct of the war war at sea was small, so small that,tu isplayed adevastating logic that even the Baltic Sea remained a Germanmwt destructive found at Ieast lake and the German naval trainingny convinced adherents as it did ground until 1945.

nts among the leading military The Soviet Union profitede inspired public confidence and through being relieved of the secondnted the will of the nation to front threat in the Far East without,er degree than any other per- until very late, making any contribugroup. He gave Germany the tion to the war against Japan.leadership she wanted. He Strategic Initiative Endsnot possessing the ability to The perspective can be completed bythe results he promised; that examining how the German defeatwas accomplished on the ground. Stame than by others, but by all tuo Iingrad and the North African campaign put an end to the period of German strategic initiative and demon-h~~ Iu terms of conventional statistics strated that both the Allies and then ground warfare, the eastern thea- Soviet Union had achieved the capar dominated the war against Ger- bility of bringing superior strengthany. On the basis of those statk - to bear at decisive points. In the after-IiIi.tics, the Soviet Union has laid claim math of Operation ZitarZeUe, the So-

to the preponderant contribution to viet Union took the strategic initiathe victory in Europe. That claim ig- tive in the east. In the west the Alliesnores in its fundamental premise the began exercising their strategic ini-Omenormous influence of geography in tiative with the iuvasion of Sicily.es. determining the character of the thea- Subsequently, in their strategic deter. The Germans were aware before ployment, the Germans rated theac they began the invasion in 1941 that threats from east and west as about,a$spacecould eventually be their worst equal and were inclined to regard the~ht enemy.Once tbe battle was joined and Allied thrust from the west as moreer the original Barbarossa plan had dangerous because of tbe shorter dis*nd failed, and given the leadership and tances to Germanys vital centers. Un~t capabilities of both sides, the war was til the Allied landing in Normandy inhound to become a struggle of mass June 1944, even though the Allies;;; against mass on an unprecedented were actually engaged only in a secre sca[e. ondary theater in Italy and the greatTo determine the true proportions battles were being fought on the East-them. of the Soviet contribution to the vic- ern Front, on the balance the Allied~~ tory,the theater must be looked at iu and Soviet strategic accomplishments~m its strategic perspective, In establish- were about equal. The Germanin. ing that perspective, three significant strength was split about evenly be;be limiting features can be identified im. tween east and west.mediately. Essentially, then, until the late The Soviet Union contributed spring of 1944 the Soviet Union and]em. nnthing to the employment of stra- the Allies were maneuvering into Po,,~ tegic airpower against Germauy. sition to deliver the crucial blows.

OW May1965t 37


40/114

IERMAN DEFEATThe environments were different. Forthe Allies the war had a global aspect in which air, sea, and logisticsoperation weighed heavily. Theirswas tihs problem of staging a giganticamphibious invasion, a one-shot, door-die undertaking that afforded nolatitude for preliminary sparring andan appallingly black ?nd wh]te prospect of victory or defeat.Reduce BufferThe Soviet problem was to reducethe sti]l substantial bu

military review may 1965

Documents