military review june 1967

7/27/2019 Military Review June 1967

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GadsdenVillage Armisticein Korea ~+ one war. Two~etnams

LmMRYTEXAS A&M LJNTVERSITY

MAY 291967 June 67DOCUMENTS


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UNITEII !WES ARMY IXIMM#ND/l ND 6ENERALSTAFf tXlLtE6E, FORT LMWWOR?H, NANSAS

80MMAHDMIMajor General Michael S. Davhon

ASSSTARF COMMANDANTZMaadier General Robert C. Taber

The Mili tary Review is published by the United States Army Command and Gener~Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides iforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, natiomsecurity affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of commati ,


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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

Neutral i t y and Armist ica in Korea . . . . . . . . Mart in Blumensort 3

An MRSpeci al Feature

Environmental Research on Nigh Elevat ions . . . . . . . Hoyt Lemons

Tribal Ctt l t ures and Communism . . . . . . COL Bernard B. Sapp, USA B4

Sovi et Ai d t o Vi et nam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al be rt Par ry 13 Clausewit i on Limi t ed War . . . . . . . . . . Wi l l iam D. Frankl i n 23Forecast Al l . 2000 . . . . . . . . . COL Ric hard S. Ware; Jr. , USA 30

6adsden Vi l l age . . . . . . . . . COL Mason J. Young, Jr., USA 40

and Leonar d E. Wood 45The Commander and t he Computer . . . . . MAJ Daniel K. M alone, USA 51

Thai land: Another Vietnam? . . . . . . . . Donald E. Nuechter lei n 59

Nucl ear Prol i f erat ion . , . . . . , MG W. G. F. Jackson, Bri t ish Army 72One War Two Vie tnams . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vi c t o r Ba tor 82Tha Inner Soldi er . . . . , . . . MAJ Eugene W. Massengal e, USA 89M i i i t ery Not es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

~i l i tary Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Iiihe VIEWS expressed in this ma eaine ASETHEAUTHORSnd not neceaasrilythose of thefrmyor the Commandand Genera Staff Collage.


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E#t@iacikfCOLW J. Da18ney

AuuJate E$ttafCOLGewge S< PappasArmy war colleg13

AsaiatmtiterLTCA. Leroy CoveyFMures Edltar

LTC Charles A GatzkaProdnctios EdttorHelen M. HallSpanlalt-AasaricarrEditor

M&J Juan Horti%MerlyBraItltstr Editors

LTC Paulo A F. VianaLTC Samuel T. T. Primo

Pubitc#ties (ltftcerMAJ Norman C. Murray

Art and DaaJgoCharles A. MooreDonald L Thomas

MILITARY monthlyby the U.S. kmEVIFW-Publlsh8d Canmandand GeneralStaffCollege,FortLeavde for rhrtingof this publicationhea:z:;2F$H3%zFs2?rEkY,iPhY Is&Sacamklass postage id at Fort Lqnwert& Kansas.subacriptionrak $4.00(UScurrencyiarK22FkYa?u& Gi?;L%% $a?Mw eante. waaa s@srI@im mail to tfn B@Collage,Fort LeavamvM, Kansas66027. DeP*@f$-~ti&E?d2:G;:u. s. Am ~ WJ G~eml ~ff

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AIItd ktirbThe Military Review announces the selection of the following articlefrom the April 1967 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTICLE:

Ground Warfare in V]etnamAnthony HarnganThe author describes the men, equipment, and the battles of the Vietnamese War. He concludes that the essentials for victory are the age-oldqualities of weil-traindd and worthy ground forces, familiarity with personal weapons, physical conditioning for combat, leadership at all levels,andthe will to win that is born of the proud traditions of an Army mindful of the concepts of duty, honor, and country.

* * *COMING:Lieutenant Colonel Joseph K. Bratton, in


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IUeutrctlityand Armistice in KoreaMartin Blumenson

CONFRONTATION, the act offacing a hostile adversary, hasbeen a constant factor in the post-World War II period. The reality remains present and threatening although the loci have shifted, the issues have changed, and the hostilityhas taken many forms, ranging overa wide spectrum of intensity.The threat operates on all nations,for the bipolarization of world powerhas created forcee that pull in variousdlreetione. Although alignments moveand groups split, the problem forsmaller natione to remain neutral haebecome more complicated. Their desire. to remain uncommitted ia evenmore difficult, if not impossible, toattain. The pressuree, centrifugal andcentripetal, are simply too strong toresist.Bipolarization and confrontation areold stories, but the major impulseethey generate tend to ohecure theireffects on nations that have no wishto be caught up in tbe struggle.June1967

The arrangements made to restoresome kind of peace in Korea and howthey were carried out to preeerve anuneasy truce illuminate the problemfaced not only by the smaller nations,but also by would-be neutrale. Theyforeshadow some of the complexitieshampering negotiations today for asettlement in southeast Asia.On 27 JUIY 1953 the belligerents inKorea signed an armistice bringingan end to three yezre of fighting andtwo yeare of often frustrating negotiation. On the same day, the 16United Nation member natione thathad cent combat forces to Korea issued a joint declaration-they wouldtolerate, they said, no renewed Communist aggression.The declaration reflected miegivingeover the ability of the agreement tokeep the peace. Yet the provisioiie reflected, in large part, the United Natione Command (UNC) demands. The,demarcation line corresponded to thebattleline, a demilitarized zone existed,

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KOKEAK MI!ISliCEthe rfdnforccment ofthe armed forcesin Korea was prohibited, reasonablyaatiafaetory arrangements were designed to insure iMpdiOII, and nopriaonem of war were repatriatedfomibty against their desire. One UNCposition had failed to be accepted, andthat was the curtdmerrt of the rightto racanatmct and rehabilitate airtlelda.DlalIeeBat SebariarSome UNC ol?icere doubted privately the eftieacy of the armisticeagreement. Long-term frustrations atthe conference table led them to axfk?ct similar conditions during the period of enforcing the truce. Incidentseecurring during the negotiation implied a continuation of dishonest behavior on the part of the Communists.They had deliberately violated neutralsonss, faked evidence and coachedwitnesses. Furthermore, their generalintransigence and their practice oflaunching bitter and irrational denunciations were hardly conducive to cooperation. And, finally, it appenred impassible for inspection teams to prevent a Communist military buildup.

According to the armiatice agreementwhich epelled out in great daWI1 the composition of groupe, theirfunctions, authorities, and proceduresthe senior military commander ofMartin Blumsnmn, Staff Historianwith the Ofie of the Chief of MiUtarII Hi.stor#, Department of the

ATMII, Washington, holde advanceddegreee in History from Bucknd andHarvard Universities. The authdr ofnumerous artfcles in miMaW a&histaricel jatwnale. his recant book Kaeeerine Paae, is ~eviewed in the ~7itmy Books Section of thie &zeue. Hisarticla :TZOrI&rmaniee or @W?*l]~aSthe MILXTARYREVIEW Award A&lefor the April 1966 &ewe.

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the UNC and of the Cammunist command formed the Miiitary ArmisticeCommission. This body had the responsibility for carrying out the provision of tbe truce.Reporting to thh commission of balligerenta, and, therefo~ subordinateto them, was a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) .composed of four senior ofiera-two appointed by the neutral nations nominated by the UNC and two by thenations named by the Communists.The central headquarter of theNNSC included commimioners, altar.nate conuniesionere, a secretariat,staff assistants, administrators, andinterpreters. Drivera, clerks, commu.nicatiorre epecialiata, together with facilities and equipment, were to he fur.niched by the belligerents although theNNSC could provide additional pcreonnel of the came neutral nationalitiesNeutral Inspection TeamsThe principal tack of the NNSCwas to supervise and inepect the arrivale and departure of personnel andcombat materiel in Korea in order toinsure the continuing equilibrium ofthe military strength exieting on thedate of the armistice agreement.Since the opposing aides had pledgedthat they would rotate trcmpe and raplace equipment only through certaindesignated ports of entry and departure, the NNSC would operate bymeans of Neutral Nations InspectionTaams (NNIT) etetioned at thoseports-five in North Korea and thecame number in South Korea.Ten additional mobile inspectionteams would he held in reserve to investigate alleged violations elsewhere,violations reported by the belligerents.Each team would have no less thanfour members, two from each eide.

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KOREAN ASMISTICENNIT reports to the NNSC were tobe submitted from the team ae a wholqbut, in the absence of agreementamong teem members, individualscould submit .reporte w~lch would haveno official statue. The NNSC was toforward copies of all NNIT reportsto the Militem Armistice Commission

cation between the Swiss-Swedieh andCmch-Polieh elements until they metin Korea. The binetional groups thendiscovered that their organizationswere quite different, both in numbersand in concept.The Swedec and Swiss envisionedsmall inrmection teams usin= facili-

Confrontation at Panmunjom over s violation of the Koraen Armistice Agreementof evaluating all reports and forward- furnished by the Communist in Northing ite own findinge to the commission. . Korea and by the UNC in South Ko-The Swedish and Swiss Government drew up eimilar organizetione,and both groups traveled togetheracross the United States and Japanto Korea. The Czech and Polish Goverrunenta created contirtgenta whichtraveled together acroae the USSRand Ch]na to Korea.

Swedieh and Swies members of the ,,NNSC had coneulted American authorities; Polish and Czech membersbed been in touch with Chinaee and,North Korean officials. There was noprior coordination or even communi-Jme 1H7

rea. Each of their groups totaled 80pereone. The Cseche and Polce countedon receiving little support from thebelligerence, and they had broughtnearly self-sufficient gronps, each numbering 299 individuals.Tbe NNSC met on 1 Auguet 1953in an atmosphere of great cordialitywhich began to dissolve ae early asthe eccond ec@ion, when the membersatartcd to argue, with incr~ing heat,over matters of security, transportation, communications, supply, andgeneral procedures.

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KOREAN ARMISTICEThe Czechs and Poles disliked thearrangement made by the UNC andinsisted on the right to carry weapons, to drive their own vehicles, totake photographs as they wished, andto move without security guards. TheSwiss and Swedes made no protestover Czech and Polish use of their owntransportation and communicationspersonnel and equipment, but insistedthat all members of the NNSC taketheir meals together as a demonstra.tion and reminder of tbe corporate na

ture of their task.Conditions VasyThe differing concepts of the neutral nations stemmed, in part, fromthe very different conditions in Northand South Korea. In the south, manyKoreans in crowded cities publicly expressed hostility to the Czechs andPoles, held demonstrations againsttheir presence, threatened violence,and made several attempts against thelives of team members who, theycharged, were spies and eaboteurs,The strict seeurity measures imposed by the UNC to protect the neutral nations members provoked resentment from the Poles ,and Czechswho demanded full protection and, atthe same time, the freedom of movement and other privileges normally accorded diplomatic personnel.In the north where war destructionwas far more severe, and a sparse anddisciplined, perhaps apathetic, civilianpopulation made no hostile demonstrations, the Communist command impesed stringent aeeurity measures. Inthat land of primitive facilities andservices where communications andtransportation were uncertain andslow, the vehicles and drivers, radiosand operators brought by the Czechsand Poles, while superfluous in SouthKorea, were advantageous.

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There were also procedural discrepancies between the two parts of thecountry. In South Korea, the UNCsubmitted daily reports to the NNITsstationed at the designated ports.Made available at least 24 hours inadvance of scheduled movements,these reports showed the personneland combat materiel entering and leaving Korea and made it possible forthe teams to inspect and to make surprise spot checks se they pleased.In North Korea, the NNITa hadnothing to do for the first seven weeksafter their arrival. The Communistcommand, perhaps because it lackedthe administrative sophktkztion andmachinery of the UNC, submitted noreports of entering or departing personnel or equipment. Subsequent reports were patently incomplete, for itwas obviously impossible to maintahand sustain the armed forces in NorthKorea with the small movements reported, particularly in that area devoid of war production capacity.Constant DisagraemsntThese differences soon developedinto sharply contrasting outlooks audattitudes that led to almost constantdisagreement between the Swedea apdSwiss on the one hand and the Czechsand Poles on the other. Unable to agreeon messages and reports, teem members invariably filed separate informational dispatches that were widelydifferent in context and often completely contradictory. The defection ofa Polish interpreter in September1953, at the beginning of the NNSCoperations, did little to improve relations, patilcularly when the Poles andCzechs accused the UNC of kidnapping.The Swedee and Swiss pointed outthat the inspection teams in SouthKorea were receiving adequate infor-

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mation on shipments and had accese torecords of movements while the teamsin the north had no control over entries and departures because they werekept in ignorrmce. When the Communist command refused or was unableto improve ite reporting procedures inNorth Korea, the Swedish and Swiesmembers of the NNSC prevailed upenthe UNC to change its methods inSouth Korea to conform with thosein the north.

Over the violent opposition ofCzechs and Poles, the Swiss andSwedee accepted lessened control andsupervision in Sonth Korea in the interest of fairness-to secure approximately equal treatment and similarinspection procedures for both sides.Otherwise, they maintained, the diesimila;lties gave advantage to theCommunist command and imposed ahandicap on the UNC.Escessive OelaysAdditional difficulties coon arose.The mobile inspection teams couldvisit other than the designated portsonly if all the neutral nationa agreedon the neeeasity for an inspection andonly if the eide charged with the violation assisted and cooperated in theinvestigation. Thus, argument withhthe NNSC often prevented inspectionand usually resulted in, exceseive delays in getting an investigation underway. During one period of 16 months,all the mobile teams were inactive because the NNSC, despite requests byboth belligerence, was unable to agreeon the need of an investigation of analleged violation.

The strong identification of Czechsan! Poles with the Communist command eventually produced strongleaninge on the part of Swedes andSwiee toward the UNC. An unbridgeable gulf separated the two binationallone1ss7

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KOREAN ARMISTICEgroupa. On at Ieaet foui occaeions,when the UNC requested investigations of alleged violations in NorthKorea, the Poles and Czeche rejectedthe requeste ae unreasonable, contrary to the proviaione of the Armistice Agre~ent, and exceeding thescope of the Agreement.Opposite SidesIn the conduct of inveatigationa, inthe facta revealed, in the competencyand thoroughness of the investigation,in the interpretation of the evidenceconsidered, and in the findings, conclusions, and subsequent reporta rendered, the Czechs and Poiee were onjJi;site sidea from the Swedes and

When the Communiet commanderreported an alleged UNC violation, theCzeche and Poles were quick to agreethat the complaint was justified andthat the testimony of UNC witnessesto the contrary was untrustworthy.The Swedes and Swiss tended to conclude that Communist complaints ofUNC behavior were greatly exaggerated, imprecise, or untrue.Investigation of an alleged UNC vi-elation of airapace in North Koreaproduced two dissimilar reports. TheCzechs and Poles confirmed the viola.tion as charged; the Swedes and Swissfound thetestimony teo pat, the witneseee coached, and the charge ludicrous on technical grounde. The Czech-Polish report:

On the bwa of thorerkgh inspection. . . hearings of wtnesses and. . . amticulanalgaisof the whole mutcrialpresented. . . combat aircraft of theVNC 8ide violated the a$rspace.The Swedish-Swiss report:A coherent evaluation of tlLe wholematerial of both eidee showe thut the \charge . . . not only must be CO?W{CLered ae not proved, but there are aem-

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KOREM ARMISTICEoue reasons b befieve that the ae8ertioice of this [Communist] side are incontradiction with the truth.When the UNC acsuead the Communist eomraend of having illegally introduced combat aircraft into NorthKo~ it submitted what seemed likeirrefutable evidence in support of thecharge-photos taken by pilots, radarsurveillance dosumenta, and informa@\:,L>w . :+1 .. * -,:.,,,.:. .,;2?:*%-%.+ - ,.., ~ ,$,, ,,*G.k:>,.~L-.*: ... .. f ..: ;.!*.:.-,. ,: ,.,~.1>,.. . ..$..< ,.. + v, :>,. , ., :, 1 ,? 1u?...:---:.-.. .. . .,: ,:, :;..,, ,,, ~. ;. . it. - . .,!.3 $, .,,.4.*...:; .::,. ,J. ,. ;l,.,:+Y.,r. *4. .?. -~f-L.* ., ,., ,,. ., . ...--~~;+me


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proved a single violation charged byeither side. Since the NNSC could onlydiscuss, dkagree, and argue over different interpretations and contradictory data, the only conclusion it couldmake was that, accordhg to reportsreceived from the inspection teams,neither eide had violated the armistice agreement.Although Swedish and Swiss members wrote a joint letter to the UNCto point out what they called the regrettable loopholes in the armieticeagreement and proposed that the bel-Iigerente reexamine the supervisoryproblem, the belligerence could reachno agreement. They were still at war.Political Efforts FailPolitical efforts to end the war hadfailed. The Foreign Ministere ofFrance, the Soviet Union, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States metin Berlin from 15 January to 18 February 1954. They agreed to hold aconference of representatives from theUnited States, the United Kingdom,the Soviet Union, the Chhese PeoplesRepublic, the Republic of Korea, thePeoples Democratic Republic of Korea, and other countries that hadarmed forcee in Korea and wished toattend. Thk conference at Genevafrom 26 April to 15 June was unableto discover a peaceful way to unifyKorea and withdraw the troope offoreign powers.

The following September, the NewChina News Agency announced a voluntary, patilal withdrawal of Chinesetroops from Korea. Movements beganlets that month and continued formore than a year. By October 1955,nineteen divisions had paesed throughthe port of Sinuiju, inspected by aneutral nations team.Meanwhile, in December 1954 theUnited States had explicitly informedSlse1SS7

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KOREAN ARMISTICEthe Political Committee of the UNGeneral Assembly of the difficultiesobstructing the work of the neutralnations-there was no activity atthree of the designated porte in NorthKorez and extremely limited trzllic atthe other two; authorities in NorthKorea were aided and abetted by theCzeche and Poles; no train timetablesor shipping documents were avqilable;.four rail lines linkiug China and NorthKorea crossed the border at pointswhere inspection wae not specificallyauthorized; and there was no way tosupervise air and maritime traffic. Inshort, there wae no parity in the supervisory operation in tbe two partaof Korea. The supervisory machinerywas paralyzed and ineffective.The delegates of the Soviet Unionand of the Ukrainian Soviet SocialistRepublic claimed this was not eo. Theyinsisted that the NNSC wae performing a useful function and needed noreform.The supervisory machinery was substantially reduced in 1955. What remained in operation was a ekeletonand nominal force.Violations Apparent-By then, Communist violations oftbe agreement were more than apparent. Although the Communist command had nev r reported introducingcombat aircra !?t into North Korea,eight MiG-15..%rcraft attacked, on 5February 1955, several UNC planesperforming a training mission over international waters of the Yellow Sea.When preesed for an explanation, the ~senior Communiet commander admitted inadvertently that the MWSwere baaed in North Korea.Deepite the baeic concept of holdingthe military balance in Kore% theCommunists resorted, as a senior UNCsaid candidly, to every poeeible eub

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KORfAN ARMISTICEterfuj& to avoid compliance. Theirfigures on personnel and materiel shipments were incredibly false; they hadno syetem or established procedures;they failed to use the designatedporta; and they utillized pretext to circumvent inspection.Witbdrswal RequestedFirmly convinced that a large military buildup wae taking place inNorth Kores and that the Czech andPolish members of the inspectingteems in South Korea were primarilyengaged in espionage, the UNC in May1966 euepended those provisions ofthe armietice agreement that regulated the activities of the NNSC. Inthe following month, the UNC requmted the NNSC to withdraw iteteams ,from South Korea on the basisthat the supervisory inspection machinery, se then constituted, was unworkable. At the same time, the UNCpromieed to continue to report to theNNSC honestly and fully all movements of personnel and shipments ofmateriel.In the following year, the UNCstated categorically that the Communieta had given no indication of willingness ta seek a political settlementof the Korean iesues and had, inetead,increased the eize of the armed forces.Since the armistice agreement had become the sole instrument for zhaintaining peace, comparable militaryetrengthe on both sides of the linecomprised the only effective bar torenewed war.Citing figuree to show a Communistbuildup, the UNC renounced ita obligation to that part of the agreementconcerned with restricting the numbers of the forces committed. Until theCommunicate demonstrated their intention to comply with the armieticeagreement, the UNC would have to

build up ita own forcez to restore thebalance es a guarantee of the stabilityof the truce until a tinal peaceful settlement could be reached.In December 1957, Kim H-sung, Premier of North Korea, announced thefinal withdrawal of all Chinese troops.He took the occasion to charge theUnited States and the Republic of Korea with %yatematicdy wreckhrgthe armistice agreement. Suggestingthat all foreign nations withdraw

their armed forces from Korea, hethen proposed free elections throughout the country, to be supervised byan organization formed of neutralnations.The Chinese Communist Government echoed these sentiments in October 1958 and charged that the Americans and South Koreane:

. . weed every poaeible mearw ton~if y all the etipulatiena in the Korean amnietice . . . cmwtantlg obstrzwted and eabotaged the work ofthe Neutrai Nations Inspection Team8,subjecting ite members to humiliationand threatening a..?te . . . frequentlyintroduced van-we En& of wenponaiUegally.Siiation PublicizedBlandly stating that the UNC hsdviolated the agreement 792 times, theChinese publicized the situation inthie way:The Mil$taw Armistice Cmnmizeienand the Neutral Nations InspectionTeams have conducted man~ investigatimw into US-Syngnmn Rhee [Pre8idant of the Republic of Korea] violation of the Armiat$ce Agreement. Oneach and evwy occasbn, the representatives of the Ammcan eide havebean reduced to eztrarne embamassmant bg the witneseea and the iwefu~abk emdwwe. . . . The Korenn-Chine8eaide Ire-z from the beginning .qtri

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.,abided bg and camed out the ~oviaims of the Agreement.In the same-way that the war failedto resolve the issues of the confllct,the armietice terms failed to settle theissues of the truce. The belligerentsremained in opposition, and the bipolarization imposed a similar splitamong the neutral nations.Open-Armed HostilityThe armistice agreement, whilebringing open-armed hostility to aclose, simply perpetuated the basicdisagreements. Neither belligerenttrusted the other sufficiently to turnover control of the truce to so-celledneutrals. Both belligerence were thueparties to withholding power from theNNSC. Keeping in their own handethe right to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreementand to settle through negotiations anyviolations: the belligerents gave theNNSC only an informational function, denied it an executive role, anddeprived it of the authority to puniehviolators.They limited the NNSC geographically to the designated ports of entryand gave it no freedom of movementor initiative, no power to investigatethe possibility of shipments being rerouted to other ports. They surrounded insptilon team memberswith guards to insure their personalprotaetion and safety and thus further restricted their independence.Finally, the belligerence imposed athoroughgoing immobilization on theNNSC by requiring unanimo ,S actionand by failing to provide Iti th member to break deadlocke.If the belligerence had been able toagrea on selecting a fifth member, theywould probably have bean able to eettle more basic ieeuee. The claeeic tradition of a neutral state disintegratedkm leal

KOREAN ARMISTICEunder the obligation of the neutralnationa to the aide appointing them.

In accepting appointment to theNNSC, the Swiee Government pointedout to the United Statee that Switzerland considered herself tm be permanently neutral, that ehe had renouncedwar as a meene of settling international disputes, and wae impartial.Therefore, she could not be q representative of either belligerent aide.Sweden had the same policy and viewpoint.Equality MaintainedThe representatives of both thesenations made continuous efforts to co.operate with the Poles and Csechs,trying to reach honest agreement andhonest disagreement with them. Occasionally differing between themselves and sometimes criticizing theUNC, the Swiss and Swedes found itnoceasa~, in the face of the unitedand uncompromising stand of thePoles and Czechs, to take a strong opposing position in order to maintainsome kind of parity of treatment accorded to both eides.

The Communist neutral nationswere unable to be neutral, impartial,and objective. Precommitted, theycould not judge. They had no pubSicdoubts over their role. UNC accusation were, per ae, groundleee fabrications while Communist commandchargee were, a priori, proved andtrue. UNC accusations, they said,were slanderous charges, propagandadesigned to deceive the public opinionof the world.The Communist command was always and unquestionably innocent.Not a single disagreement marred theaccord betwean the Czeche and Polesduring the period of the armistice supervision, and not a single criticismof the Communist command was eo

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KOREAN ARMISTICEmuch as intimated. They followed aconsistent policy to annoy, irritate,embarrass, and discredit the UNCwhile following a collateral policy ofcollueion with the Communiet command to conceal incriminating evidence in North Korea. To expressionsof Swedish and Swiss indignation andresentment, they replied that theSwedes and Swiss were dupes of theUnited Statee.The binatfonal composition of theNNSC reflected the division betweenthe belligerents in Korea. In the absence of a cleer-cut victory on the battlefield, the stalemate continuedinother terms. Agreement wss as difficult to reach during the truce as ithad been during the war.The belligerents, not the neutral na

tions, held the power to regulate thearmistice. The weapon they held wasthe implicit threat of using the military forcee they controlled. Neitherside hae choeen to make thbr decisionthus far, apparently beeeuee of a tacitunderstanding that the relatke military balance remains unchanged.The Korean Armistice Agreementand the responses it hae provoked andthe preesuree it hae generated havebeen prompted and conditioned notonly by local factors, but also by forcesouteide the immediate framework ofthe Korean Conflict. The battlegroundfor contending ideologies ie everywhere, and it is difficult to be neutralon a battlefield. It is difficult also tofind agreement when reciprocal goodfaith may turn out to be an illusion.

The Repubfic ef Korea is making remarkable economic pregress both industrially and in agricultural production. At the same tima it continues to bea major contribute to the security ef free Asia. Its treofrs stand shoulder toshoulder with ours not only on the northern rampart of freedom but on theneutbern frent.SecretarV of State Dean Rwek

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Soviet Aid to VietnamAlbert Parry

L AST summer, Ivan Shchedrov ofPravda accompanied a Viet Congunit es it made its way through theSouth Vk$mameee jungle some 35miles northwest of Saigon. He wrotein Pr&vdQ about hie experience although without revealing many vitalfeete. More recently, two Soviet mo, tion-picture eameremen, Oleg Artaeu-

Iov and Vledlmir Komarov, returnedfrom South Vietnam where for weeksthey lived and traveled with the guerrillas of the Mekong Deltas swampsand rice paddies.In September 1966, Komsorno18kayaPravda ran four long ati]clee on Artseulovs adventures. In late Octoberand early November, Komarov wroteh lm7&,. 13


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SOVIET AIOof his South Vietnam impressions inZzve@@. Judging from the 16 photos in both papers, all interesting andsome forceful despite their murky reproduction, the two Soviets broughtback a notable pictorial haul.SoYirJt Pmssrlc9It is from reports like these thatone gets an impression of the growingSoviet presence in Vietnam. The picture can be tilled out by bita andpieces of information, some casualand scattered yet significant, in theSdviet and other East European press;the monitored texts of tbe surprisinglyfrequent broadcasts on the subjectemanating from sundry East European radio stations; and the reportson the topic reaching us from a widerange of non-Communist diplomata,soldiers, seamen, newsmen, travelers,and other observers in southeast Asia.And one thing is clear: the Sovietaare stepping up their aid to Vietnam.The cheer logistics of getting aidand supplies into the country is aproblem for the Soviet Union. Increasingly, she is sending them via the7,500-mile sealanes from Eastern Europe instead of relying on dubiousChinese cooperation in allowing menand materiel to proceed overland.

Thi8 article waa dige8ted fromthe on-gird, published in THEREPOItTEE, 1.9 January 1967.Copyrighted @ 1967 by The Reporter Magazine Company.Dr. P(tw ie PTOfS880Tof &8dan (%iliration and Languageand Chah-mun of the Departmentof Rue8ian Studies at ColgateUniver8itg, Hamilten, New York.He is the author of the booksRuesiae Rockets and Missilesand The New Claes Divided: Science and Technology Veraus Communism.

Until recently, while the bulk ofSoviet aid still arrived by rail andtruck via Communist China, each USraid on the Vietnamese made leadingsouth fmm the Chinese border gavePeking one more excuse to halt orelow down the Soviet shipments, thento blame the Soviets for the sluggiehtrickle. Chief among Peking>e aimewas to force Moscow to increase itsseaborne aid and thus cause a USblockade of tbe Soviet sea traffic sewell ae US raids on the port of Haiphong. Such a development, the Chinese hoped, would lead to a break between Moscow and Washington.No BlockadeIn spite of come angry insistence inthe Congrese and elsewhere in theUnited States, there ia no blockade sofar. But the United States did startbombing the outskirts of Haiphong,and her shell and shot have fallen closeto the Soviet ships; a few Soviet seamen have been wounded or injured.Also, US naval units insistently follow and query, by semaphore, Communist vessels en route to Vietnam.

Nevertheless, despite a few angrynotes of diplomatic protest, the Sevieta are relieved that the UnitedStates has not resorted to anythinglike the etringent sea-and-air meae.ures of the 1962 Cuban crisie, andthey continue to increase supplies tiNorth Vietnam by sea.It is not so generally known thaithe Chinese, too, are in this eea commerce with North Vietnam. In mid.August 1966, word from Hong Konaindicated that the so-celled SOcialidtraffic coming into Haiphong consietedin an average month of 10 to 15 RedChinese ships in addition to six tceight Soviet vessele and five fromother Eastern European nationa, cdship bringing from 6,000 to 10,OM

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SOWET AIOtone of cargo. The Soviet Government,however, claims a larger share of tbiesea trrdlic to Haiphong. Last August,it declsred that more than half of allthe ships thert entering Haiphong wereof Soviet regietry.Odessa-BfammaY as the Sovietsfondly call the port, is the foremostsource of s11 this traffic. An English-Ianguage Imoadcaet from Moeeuw tosouthern Asia on 23 December 1965exulted:Odessa ia the biggest port oa th8Black Sea. It8 busiest rovte h theone leading to Haipheng. A conetantcaravan of big merchant 8hip8 is pllIing this lane.At tbe empires eastern end, Vladivostok plays a role too. The local stevedores morale is kept up by frequentrallies.Sevist Saiiors AssistOfficial Soviet statements praise Soviet sailors for helping North Vietname Iongehoremen unload their shipsin record time. It may be surmised,however, that part of the seamenaeagerness to help eteme from a desireto cut short their own dangerous stayin North Vietnams ports. Unofficialaccounts from Soviet ports tend toconfirm this. Not only reasons of security but also of the seamens morale seem to be involved in the prac.tice whereby some Soviet ships areannounced ae eailing for Letin-American deetinatione-until they resehtbe Mediterranean, where the creweare told that the course has beenchanged from Havana to Haiphong.

The overland route acroes Cldna ieby no means abandoned even if itno longer carries se much of the Soviet aid as before. The hletory of thedispute over Soviet arms has beenColorful.Early in 1965, Hanoi urgeritly asked

Moscow to help with antiaircraft defenses. Ho Chi-minh wanted not onlygune, but also surface-to-air missilee.In February 1965, the Soviets agreedtu send the first important shipmentsof weapone and groups of technicians,on the condition that China clear theirpassage. China demanded the right ofinspection. The Soviets agreed, butbegan to complain that China took hertime about the job. China c6unteredthat she was sending the Soviet military loads and pereonnel across hersoil with all paesible dispatch, but thatthe Soviet materiel sent to Vietnamwas either obsolete or so damagedthat it was useless.Materiel CopiedThe Soviets were accused of usingthis aid to Vietnam as a handy chanceto clear damaged materiel from theirwarehouses. Moscow retorted that theChinese often removed for themselvesthe best of the Soviet arms destinedfor Hanoi. A contact in Weebingtonsaid that much of the delay in Sovietshipments wae due to the Chhesepractice of copying, rather than keeping, certain piecee of Soviet equipment. He said:In some caees the Soviet equipment-was indeed damaged, but it was damaged by the Chineee experts, whowerent too expert. Ths# didnt knewhow to-reassemble the Soviet materielafter taking it apart for [email protected] March 1966, in reply to Chinesecharges that the Soviet help to Hanoiwas all too scant, the MOSCOWkderssent a confidential letter to all fraternal Communist Partiee. CarefullyIeeked out to the world at large via theEast German Connuuniete, the letteretressed that in 1965 North> Vietnamreceived from the Soviet Union armsand military equipment worth 556 million dollars. The list included missile

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; SO!fiET AIDinstallations and antiaircraft guns,MiGs and other aircraft, tanks,coastal atilllery, and small warships.On 21 April 1966, MarshaI RodionY. Malinovsky, the Soviet DefenseMinister, delivered a public speech inwhich he again accused CommunistChina of obstructing Soviet aid on

The hrisieet route from Odessa, the largest

The truth seems to be that the Chinese railroads and truck roads aregenerally inadequate to the suddenburden of Soviet shipments. Thefreight cars are poorly ballasted; thetrains are small and slow. Furtbermore, the changes from the broad Soviet and Outer Mongolian gauge of

port on the Blsck See, is the one leadingto Iiaiphongher overland route to North

In an indignant rejoinderPekings Foreign Ministrythat, from February 1966Vietnam conflict was firet

Vietnam.of 3 May,claimedwhen theseriouslystepped up, to the end of that year,

the Soviet Union shipped to Hanoiacross China a total of 48,000 tons ofwar materiela pittance, in Pekbrgsscornful opinion. Peking insisted thatit was helping, not hindering, Sovietaid. Furthermore, the Chinese claimedthat in one period they provided 1,780Chinese freight cars, of which the Soviets used only 666.

~-.- .. .. .. ---- . . -.. . . . ,.

five feet to Chinas four feet eight anda half inches and then to North Vietnams even narrower roadbed involvea lot of lifting and shifting of the carbodies.Nevertheless, the Chinese have madean attempt to cope with the problems:it ie the well-disciplined and hardworking railroad troops they sent toHo Cbi-minh wbo keep the Vietnamese part of the supply route going inthe face of US raids. These are regular soldier-builders, In uniform, organized in divisions, but not armed,They repair tracke and brldgom nnd

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--ySOVIET Alll :

build alternative routes. Some havebeen reported to be laying out smallairstrips near the border.A very few man the antiaircraftbatteries guhrding North Vietnamamain transport centers, but usuallythis teak is a jealously guarded pre

rogative of the Vietnamese. LastJuly, officiale in Washington estimatedthe number of such Chinese roadbuilders at from 30,000 to 40,000. In August, the guese went up to 50,000 andin December to 100,000 (while thenative Vietnamese busy on road worknumber a quarter million).Air TransportThere is, of course, a third way ofsending help to Hanoi: by air. Butthis would mean flying Soviet cargoplanes over China, and. Pel@ng doesnot like this at all. It insists on clearing each plane separately, rather thanissuing a wholesale permit for overflight. And so the sea is more andmore the answer. US reconnaissanceplanes flying over Haiphong have photographed more and more supplies being unloaded from Soviet ahipa-notonly peaceful machinery, but also missiles and launching equipment, as wellas antiaircraft guns.

Since the fall of 1965, the numberof antiaircraft guns in North Vietnam has risen from 1,500 to at least5,000; one unofficial estimate in Washington puts tbe figure at 7,000. In thefall of 1965, there were only fourNorth Vietnamese batteries firingsurface-to-air missilee. By early October 1966, this number had risen to26 or 30, each with eix launchere.There were then some 130 sites fromwhich the batteries could operate; 20percent were occupied and active atany given time.An interesting domestic radiobroadcast in Czech, devoted, in part,hne 1967

to the military problems. in Vietnam,wae monitored in the West as it cameout of Prague Iaat 29 July. Czech officers were asked questions that ehoweddissatisfaction on the part of localCommunists with the surface-to-airmieeile performance in Vietnam. Onequeetion wee:

Is there no more effective anti-aircraft defenee in eziste?we that wonldpvevent U.S. aircraft from bombingNorth Vietnam, and ?tave the socialiststates [meaning Czechoslovakia, ofcourse] such meaws ?

In reply, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Novak of the Czech Military Academy reassured the listeners that, naturally, Czech radar and missile defenses were better. He explained:Thie is because orw defense is harrdled by me?t who have had years oftraining awd aleo. because we have aperfect ground warning eystem oflong standing. This dues not eziet inthe Democratic Republic of Vietnam.I wonld nut sag that the number ofAmeracanplanes brought down is low.Several dozew have been shot down.Many more hnve been ehot dovnr byartiUeW and some by aircraft. The

. reasmc is that Tockets demaud gearsof expemence and tTaining. InoidentaUg, it is wrong to assume thatheintroductiw of missiles means the endof anti-aircraft artilleqt. Missilee aretoo expeneive and costly to be ueedagainet just any aircraft. They areused against aimv-af t that are camyring pmticukntll ohgeroue bombs orattacking veru impovtant targets. Forthis reaeon it cannot be expected evenin the future that this would changesubetantiatly-tkut ?niest7ee would bc- ,come the eels defense against airraid-r. Theg ars rather the exception. . . .

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SOViETNOThus, via Prague, we gamer onemore hht that the Sovieta do not wantto escalate the Vietnam war if they

eon help it-and surely not by sendingin a substantially greater number ofsurface-to-air missiles than they already have there, nor hy training farlarger numbers of North Vietnameseotllcers and soldiers to operate thosecomputers and launchers.Sorht Rocket Men

It ia believed in Washington thatsome of the Soviet military personnelassigned to surfeee-to-air missile sitesin North Vietnam may have beenwounded or even killed eince theyserve beside their native pupils in combat conditions. The Soviet expertstrain their etudents in or near Hanoi,then go with them to the, actual battlestations to see how they do under fire.More coaching follows on the spot, soit ii almost inevitable that the Sovietofficers and soldiers actually man theradar screens and the missile-launching devices, at least in the initialstages of instruction.According to Kraenaga Zvezdn, theSoviet rocket mens working day inVietnam officially lasts 13 hoursunofficially, far longer. The extra timeis devoted to individual consultation between the Soviet teachersand their charges. The trouble at firstwas that some of the you,ng Vietnamese soldiere turned out to be deficientnot only in technical knowledge neededfor radar operation and missile firing,but also in general education: as theSoviete gently put it.And so the spare hours were usedto teach the Vletnameee their mathematics, chemistry, and elements ofelectrotechnology. The group hadnative Vietnamese on the staff whospoke Russian, but many of the teachers and their pupils %vorked out a18

language all their own4 wondrousmixture of Russian and Vletnameaewords with technical terms. Bothcomponen~ of the group learned tounderstand one another very well, saidthe Kraarwya Zvezdu correspondent inHanoi.Training in USSRMuch of the Soviet training of theVletnameee goes on amid safer circumstances-in the Soviet Union. Thesheer numerical record is impressive.Speaking in Mandarin te Chine on 16March 1966, Radio Moscow boastedthat at the time nearly 3,000 youngVietnamese men and women werestudying in the Soviet Union, and thatwhile a total of 2,300 Soviet expertaworked in North Vietnam in the years1965-64, some 4,500 Vietqamege experts had been trained in the Sovietcolleges and universities by the springof 1966.In the eummer and fall of 1966,these Vietnamese included enrolleesin Odessas higher Maritime Engineering Scheel, training to be captilnsand engineers of North VietnamsFleet. Nor would the Soviet Union letChina remain the sole patron of Vietnams railroad construction: anmngrecent arrivals in Moscow are a groupof North Vietnamese young men andwomen studying at the Inetitute ofRailroad Transport Engineere.The full course lasts six years, andone might suppose that thk projettrepresenta long-range Soviet plana ofaid to Hanoi. But Communiet hietoryis replete with eases of emergencygraduation of experte long before theset dates. These young studenta maybe flown back home any day.The most significant case of training involves the North Vietnamese aircadets now being taught by Soviet AirForce veterans to fly supersonic

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SOVIET AIO~iG-21 jets. One group of ~adets suc- its unofficial estimate of the numberccqds another at graduation ceremo- of MiGs in Vietnam to 180 or evennies near Rostov-on-Don-at the So- 200, the latest being some deltaviet Air Force School of Bataisk. winged MiG-, l ! lC s and MiG-ZID8.Photos and motion pictures made Also great is the need for inter-public in the Soviet Union show wel1- preters to accompany the Soviet lac-fed and smartly uniformed North turers. A Soviet film recently releasedVietnamese cadets as they march or showed a Soviet military inatruatorlisten @ lacturee. The faces and fiu- teaching North Vietnamese flying ca

;

Itemvi!lSA-2 (Gwdeline) missile. The number of surface.to-air missile batteries in North Vietnsm increased from four in the fall of 1985to 35 or 30 in October 1986.ures are youthful, but an official So- deta without any vieible aid from inviet report reveals that at least a few terpreters. This apparently meant thatof the trainees are seaeoned jungle either at least one of the Soviet infighters in their thirties. structors speaks fluent Vietnamese orThe need for flying cadets is ur- some of the etudente learn Russiangent if we are to befieve tbe Western quickly.estimate of mid-October thst Ho Cbi- As Moscow sende its experts tominhs air force then conaistad of Vietnam to help the natives in mat-some 50 older MiG-15s and MiG-1 7s ters both military and peaceful, theand 20 MiG-21s, but that the Sovieta gain is, of course, in the fact ,tbat suchwere about to increase the number of specialists return home with a vastly ,the later modele. Indeed, in mid- expanded knowledge of Vietnam. OfDaeember, Western intelligence raised an older yet very valuable vintage are

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SOVIETMOthose Soviete who leerned Vietnamand her ways and language in the1940s and 1950s, and who, in fact,are veterans of the jungle warfare ofthat remote time.Do$wtersSuch a man is P1aton Skrzhinsky,44 years old and a native of theUkraine now residing in Moscow.After World War II he enlisted in theFrench Foreign Legion. But when theFrench shipped his unit to Saigon,Skrzhinsky made plans to desert. Ittook him a year to establish contactswith the guerrillas. In his new Vietminh ranks, he found other desertersfrom the French: one Austrian, twoGermans, and several Algerians. Hereceived a Vietnamese name, Than,meaning Ioyal One. He married anative girl, and they had a baby. By1950 he commanded a guerrilla artillery unit.He returned to Moscow in 1955 withhis six-year-old Vietnamese daughter.For nearly 10 years he has been employed as an editor with Radio Moscow, possibly helping with thosebroadcasts in Vietnamese to southeastAsia. Present-day survivors of suchdesertions from the French ForeignLegion include a Pole, a Czech, and anEaat German. Most of this romanticgroup may still be used for whatevertraining, advising, or interpreting isrequired in their countries in connection with Vietnam.

Of the peoples democracies contributing to Ho Chi-minh today, EastGermany is probably the most active.Military aid from Walter Ulbrichtegovernment includes arms and electronic equipment specially made tostand up in tropical weather. Also included are motorcycles and tilcycleswhich are so important for messengerservice on North Vietnams war-torn

roads where automobiles cannot getthrough easily. Lest September, thewriters union in Eeat Germanylaunched a fund drive to buy a thousand bicycles as a gift to Hanoi. Themoney comes by setting aeide a percentage of the writers honoraria.The major part of Ho Chi-minhsmedical supplies seems to come fromEast Germany, and a hundred EastGerman doctors are reported to beserving in North Vietnam. In addition to the 800 Soviets reportedly already present in North Vietnam onair defense missions, some Eeet Ger.man officers and men are rumored tobe employed in North Vietnams missile training. In goods and capital aidnot directly of the war materiel kind,Ulbrichts government is thought tohave delivered to Ho Chi-minh fromJune 1966 to October 1966 a total offour million dollars worth.Economic AidBut the blocs largest economic aid toand trade with Hanoi is, of course, extended by the Soviet Union. Gatheredat a summit meeting in Moscow inmid-October 1966, the Soviet Unionand her eight allies agreed to giveabout one billion dollars worth of additional help to Hanoi in materiel andmoney, of which 800 million dollarsare to come from the USSR. Contributions from the others are typified bythe Polish pledge of 30 million dollars.Ingenious Soviet deals to helpNorth Vietnam began in the middle1950s, right after the Geneva divisionof the country, with the celebratedtriangular deal. In this transaction,Burma, to pay for Soviet cement, delivered 150,000 tons of rice to Haiphong, thus, in Bernard B. Falls opinion, saving North Vietnam from star.vation.The first Soviet engineer came to

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the Haiphong cement plant in September 1955, and it was he who showedthe natives how tu dig up the machines buried by the retreatingFrench. In November of that year,the first cement was produced, andby 1958 the output was twice as highas in the French era. In the summerof 1966, deepite US bombing raids,the Soviets claimed that productionwas three times as great.Although precise figures are difficult to obtain, it is eetimated that, inthe 10 years through 1964, Soviet eeonomic aid to North Vietnam totaledsome 360 million dollars. It falteredsomewhat in 1963 and 1964 when Nikita S. Khrushchev apparently wasreeigned to seeing the country in ChLnas orbh (in 1956-64, Chinas economic aid to North Vietnam amountedto about 460 million dollars).Sovist bstsrest RevivedHowever, Khrushchevs successorshave revived the Soviet interest in HoChi-minh. Moscows exports to NorthVietnam rose from 47.6 million dollars in 1964 to more than 74.8 millionin 1965-thk, of course, in additionto some 565 million dollars worth ofarms sent in 1965 alone. The figuresfor 1966 promise to be stiii higher.In its German-1anguage broadcastto Germany on 21 June 1965, RadioMoscow declared that, of the fundsthat North Vietnam was then gettingfrom all Soeiaiiet countries, nearlyhalf -came from the Soviet Union. Athird of this Soviet aid, the broadcastsaid, was given free of charge. Some60 industrial enterprises had hy thenbeen built or rebuilt with Soviet techuieal aid. Such Soviet-assisted plantsproduced all of North Vietnams apatite and superphosphates, about 90percent of her coal, and more thanhalf of her machine tools. The counJnne1S67

SOVIETIDtrye power, mining, engineering, andtechnieel industries were all helped orrun by the Soviet donors and advisors.From other Soviet sources we learnthat the eeonomic division of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi is in chargeof all this aid. It is claimed that theHanoi machine-turd plant, severing 14acres, is entirely fitted out with Sovietequipment. Forty Soviet engineers andtechnicians are aiding in the erectionof a hydroelectric plant at Tkbak Ba.A Dslicats BalanceWhatever facts and figures the Soviets officially reveal about their aidto North Vietnam are being made public not in order to taunt tbe UnitedStates, but to impress Pekingandeven more to refute to the rest of theCommunist world the Chinese chargesthat Moscow is not helping Hanoienough.Wherever possible, Moscow citeshigh-minded generalities rather thanhard details. And this is not only forreasons of security, but also, mostdefinitely, so as not to anger theUnited States too much.

Yet Moscow is not equivocal aboutits part in the conflict, even if it allote the quantities of arms it sendsextremely gingerly. Obviously, the Soviet Union wants neither the UnitedStates nor China to win. Still, shewants no third world war to resultfrom tbe struggle in Vietnam. So herstream of arms is speeded up onlyafter the United States escalates herinvolvement in one way or another,as sbe did in February 1965 by striking at North Vietnam, and last sum.mer by tdtting Haipbongs and Hanois installations more direetly.The official word is that the SovietUnion and her East European alJieshave offered to send volunteers to fightin North Vietnam, but that Hanoi bas

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I

SOVETAIDpolitely and gratefully declined theoffer. The chances are that, fearingstill another escalation of the war,Moscow has, in fact, refrained fromeuch an offer, and that, for reasonsof propaganda and diplomacy, it wasagreed between Moscow and Hanoithat a fiction of offer and refusalwould be maintained although not tooloudly or repeatedly.An American colonel conversantwith the situation put it this way:Hanoi wmdd like to get all thoeevolunteers but doeent dare to a-sk forthem. For were she to ask Rueeia andher allies, 8he WOUCWhave to inviteChina, too, and this ehe wants to avoid.It8 one thing to tolerate those Chineee railroad con8tnmtian m8n withno guns, but quite another to have awhole armg of Chine8e with weapons.No, not in North Vietnam.Informed US officiala feel that Hanoi does not fear the Soviets even if

they come armed. And, perhaps, thisis so, beesuse Hanoi knows that Moscow is not eager to send armed menso far away to so many risks ofgreater conflicte. In fact, Moscow mayyet return to its pre-October 1964 attitude even in economic matters. Itslarge and growing investment inNorth Vietnam may be curtailed ifthinga calm down in southsaat Asiafor instance, if China should relaxin her pos&Mao Tee-tung phase andan accommodation with Maos moresensible successor became possible. .A Washington obeerver speculated:

If thi8 happww, Khrushchev8 heir8~11 cOme to believe, as Khrushchevapparently did, that North Vietnami8 after all too distnnt frO?tZRu88ia,and why not make a deal with Peking,8xchanging, cay, that wonderful machine-tool plant in Hanoi for come farmore de8ivable properties cloeer tohome+n Shdciang, for instance?

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CLAUSEWITZONLIMITED WAR

William D. Franktin

T HE strategic genius of Karl von Clausewitzis one that is often quoted, seldom read,and little understood. Many viewed classicalstrategy, aa interpreted by Claueewitz, as a Kafkaesque landacape of violence and brutality,when, in actuality, it was a conscientious effortto tranelate the surrealistic tableau of war tothe concrete reality of political intercourse.

Clausewitz was eeeentially a student of war,and after his death his collected worke were published in 10 volumes, the first three of which contain his masterpiece Vent Kriege or On War. Bythe beginning of the 20th century, his influencehad become so pervasive that his ideas, and avenhia phrases, had found their ww into the thinking and writhg of the general stzffe of all thegreat armiea of the world.

The greateet contribution which he made tomilitary thought was toshow there can be nosingle, tactical pattern or strategic eyetem bywhich victory can be insured. Much of the blamefor the misunderstanding of Clausewitz mustrest with those individuals who read his startlingsentences out of their context and without thequalification that invariably accompanied them.

Karl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 and entered the Prussian Army as an eneign in 1792. Heserved in the Rhine eamuaism of 1793-94 and thenentered the Berlin Miiita;y Academy in 1801.He eerved in the Pruseian Army until the outbreak of the Russian campaign of 1812. He thentransferred to the Russian Army, and, duringNapoleon Bonapartee retreat from Moscow, hehna 1937 23


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Cuusm

negotiated the Convention of Tauroggen which led to the War of Liberation. During his long military career,he was present at numerous historicbattles whose raw material he distilledinto his strategic theories. In 1=1 hedied of cholera.Snalysis UnexcelledHis penetrating analyeis of the relationship of war and policy has neverbeen excelled and is, perhaps, moreimportant today than when first expounded. Many are familiar with hisstatement that . . . war is an actof force, and to the application of theforce there is no limit. The depreeaing result is that words like these havebeen construed as not only justifyingruthlessness in certain caaeq but actually advocating it ae the most natural form of warfare.

This form of completely unrestrained violence naturally fits intothe theoretical framework of totalthermonuclear conflict wherein destruction is the strategic object, butit is incompatible with a strategic concept Of limited war. But was unre.strained violence the only alternativeoffered by Clausewitz ? It is interesting to examine carefully exactly whatClausewitc meant when he indicatedthat war is a continuation of politicalintercourse, a carrying out of the sameby other means. He actually drew analmost perfect blueprint of modern-

WiUiam D. Franklin is an AssistantReeearch Ecmunniet in the Department of Economise, Te$wa Transportation Institute, Texas A&M Vniversitg, College Station, Texas. He. hokfaa B.S. degree in Hintorg and Econom~ its, and an M.S. in Economice. He isths author of Maokin&ra Heartlandand Eaeafation Ratchet which appeared in the November 1966 issue ofthe MILITAEYRmnaw.

day irregular operations, and his theories have exerted tremendous influence on almost all major strategicthoughtboth that of tbe West andof the Communists.Clausewitz befieved that war is aserioue means to a serious end. It always arises from a political conditionand is called forth by a political motive. It is, therefore, a political act.We have to think of war not as anindependent thing, but as a politicalinstrument.No war is begun, Clausewitsthought, or at Ieaet no war should bebegun if people acted wiselywithoutfirst finding an answer to the questionof what was to be a~lned by and inwar. War never breaks out eudderdy,and its spreading is not the work ofa moment. But we must sometimes

choose war, and thus also make preparations beforeband, because peace isnot alwaye an acceptable answer.No SeparationWar can never be separated frompolitical intercourse. It has, to besure, its own grammar, but not itsown logic. Wars are, in reality, onlythe manifestations of policy itself.Philosopher Immanuel Kant saidthat innocence is a splendid thing, onlyit baa the misfortune not to keep verywell and to be easily misled. In anage like ours, states, classes, passions,and intereete clash in such confusionthat war and not peace seems to bethe natural order of things.War has, nevertheless, alwayscaught Americans unprepared intellectually, emotionally, and materially.This innocence, unfortunately, doesnot correlate with the harsh face ofreality. Claueewitz goes out of hisway to axplain that war is not madewith an abstraction, but with a reality.The advantage of a neo-Clausewitzian

Military Review. ...--..=s

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type of analysis is a preservtilon ofthat elusive quality of reality. Thereis no doubt that Clausewitz was areatist.AK civiliz~tione-the Greek citystetez no 1sss that the ItaSian citiesof the Renaissance or the nation-states of Europe-have had the sametask: to limit violence. The method

Karl von Clausewitzof the eecond half of the 20th century is the differentiation betweentypes of war. The fragmentation ofthe diplomatic field has a militaryequivalent in the diversity of warspossible in our time. Theory has,therefore, says Clausewitz, to consider the nature of means and ends.

Wkh the possession of thermonuclear weapons and means for theirdeliveW, victory, in one eense of tbeword, is no longer attahable. It issometimas argued that limited war,which involves nuclear powere evenindirectly, is impossible because eachside, rather than loee, would expandIICB1*7

1CI.AWWITZ\

the scope and character of the con- ;flict until it would end in mutual nu- ~clear destruction.Victory in limited war is not gainedby putting the existence of the oPposing stat+-snd our own too-in issue. It does not seek unconditionalsurrender. The aim of limited war isto stop the infringement upon our intereeta. The aim of war, according toits inception, is always eupuosed tobe the overtbrow of the enemy. Cbmse

witz claimed that thk need not always imply the complete conquest ofthe enemys country. He felt that, ifour opponent is to do our will, we mustput him in a position more disadvantageous to him than the eacrifice wouldbe that we demanded.Degrees of War

If the aim of the military action isan equivalent for tbe political object,that action will, in general, diminishas the political object diminishes. Themore the object comes to the front,the more this will be so. This explainshow, according to Clausewitz, therecsn be wars of all degrees from oneof extermination down to a mere stateof armed observation.

Not every war admite of a completedecision and settlement. Discussion,must contemplate a vaet spectrum ofviolence-et one end, the destructionwhich one thermonuclear power mayhurl at another, to the hard and bitterfighting now involved in southeastAsia. War does not consiet in killingas many men as possible at the smallest cost, nor is it merely reciprocalslaughter. Wars effect is more a killing of the enemys courage than ofthe enemys soldiers, but still bloodis always its price.The aim of the West is not eimplyto avoid war, but to do so withoutlosing vital positions, without allow

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CIAUSSWITZing the Communist giants to expandcontinuously into the rimlande. Whatcombination of political and militarymeane will prevent total war and allow an effective conduct of diplomacyunder thermonuclear condltione ?The conduct of the confllct in Vletmun has followed a neo-Claueewitziapstrategy patilcularly suited to condition of limited war. Clausewitz saidthat there were two thinge which, inpractice, could take the place of theimpossibility of further resistance aemotives for making pezca. The firstwas the improbability of success; theeeeond an excessive price to pay forit. A war need not, therefore, alwayebe fought out until one of the partiesis overthrown.Expenditure of ForceClausewitz apptied himself to thequestion of how to influence the enemys expenditure of strengththatis to say, how to raiee for him theprice of euccess. He concluded therewere three special ways of directlyincreasing the enemys expenditure offorce. The first was invaeion; the seeond was to direct enterpriees preferably at thoee points which do the enemy the meet harm; and third, andby far the most important to Claueewitz, wae the wearing out of the enemy. The idea of wearing out in astruggle implies a gradual exhaustionof the physical powers and the willby the long continuance of action.

Dr. Henry A. Kissingar has pointedout that no condition ehould be soughtfor which one is not willing to fightindefinitely, and that the eide whichis willing to outwait its opponentwhich is Iese eager for a settlement-can tip the psychological balancewhatever the outcome of the phyeicalbattle. In any concept of limited war,according to Dr. Kieeinger, it is imfs

. . ....... ., .

perative to find, a mode of operationand to create a psychological framework in which our impetuosity doesnot transform time into an enemyally. Henceforth, patience and subtletymust be ae important components ofour strategy as power.Tlrree-Part StrategyGeneral William C. Westmoreland,US commander of military forces inVietnam, says that our strategy inthat conflict consists of three parts:eustained. operations against V]etCong main-force and North Vietnamese Army unite in South Vietnam;support of the government of %ietnams nationbuilding process, and thebombing campaign against militerytargete in North Vietnam.According to General Westrnoreland, The enemy thinks in terms ofprotracted conflict. He givee a further indication of neo-C1aueewitzianconcepts of a wearing out of the enemy by adding, . . . I am confidentthat we must gear ourselves for thelong pull.The first eerioue attempt to blueprint the characteristics of irregularoperations was undertaken by Clausewitz. An inner front was added h theouter front. He pointe out that, although the influence on war of a single inhabitant is barely perceptiblethe total influence of the inhabitantsof a country in war is anything butimperceptible.

Claueewitz believed that a resistanceso widely distributed is not suited togreat blowe requiring concentrated sotion in time and epace. Its action, likethe process of evaporation, depends onthe extent of the eurface exposed; thegreater this ie, the greater the contact. The condition under whichClaueewitz thought insurgency couldbecome effective were that:

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Ct.mmmz. The war is carried on. in the interior of the country. It is not decided by a single ca

tastrophe.. The theater of war embraces aconsiderable extent of country. The national character supports

the measures. The country is of a broken andinaccessible nature either from beingmountainous, or by reason of woods

and marshes, or from the peculiarmode of culth+ation in use.Operational LimitationsIn sketching the operational limitation of the insurgent, Clausewitz observed that a poor population accustomed to hard ~ork and privation usually chows itself more vigorous andbetter suited to war. He draws apicture that could almost be viewedwhole cloth as that existing in southeast Asia today, He illustrates the advantages and limitations of what hecalls tbe peoples war conductedwithin the inner boundaries of a nation. He felt that:

Masses of armed peaaants cannot,and 8hould not, be employed againstthe main body of the enemye army,or even - againet any considerablefarcee; theg must not attempt tocrunch the core; theu must mdu nibble at the surface awd the edges.

It was Clausewitz belief that armedpeasanta muet seize the enemys linesof communication and prey upon thevital fbread by which hia existence iesupparted.Armed inaurgente make the marchof every small body of troops in a

mountainous, thinly wooded, or otherwise ditlicult country become very dangerous, for at any moment the marchmay became an engagement. Theyshould, like a kind of nebulous vapory@eeencqnowhere condense into a eolid

body; otherwise an adequate force canbe sent to crush it. But it is necessarythat this mist should according toClausewitz:. . . gatheT at some painte intodeweeT maesee and form threateningchafe from which now and again aformidable flush of ltghtning may

/i&v New,F.mcwm,General William C. Weetmoreland

buret forth, and serve to create a feeZ,ing of uneaeimee and dTead.The enemy has no means to prevent

this action except the dataehment ofnumeroue troopa to furnish escortsfor convoys and to OCCUPYmilitarystations, defiles, and bridges. For example, the magnitude of such operations can be illustrated by the situation in South Vietnam. BY July, 120South Vietnamese infantry battalionsare slated to fan out into the countryside in small unite to prot@ someS,000 hamlets from guerrillas in areasthat US troops have cleared of majorenemy foreee. The eaeieet way to support insurgency activities is to eend

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CIAUSEWITZsmall datachmente from the army.Without such support of a fewregular troops as an encouragement:said Clausewitz, the inhabitants gen.erally lack the impulse and the con.fidenceto take up arms. This is thethinkhg hehind the military operations in Vietnam; if the support ofthe regular army units from NorthVietnam can be curtailed, the innerconflict will gradually abate, andeventual cessation of overt militaryoperations in South Vietnam will occur.Decisive EngagamentaFor insurgency to succeed, situations must never develop into decisiveengagements. Clausewitz beiieved thatthe insurgents should, therefore, de.fend the approaches to mountains, thedikes of a swamp, and the passageaover a river, as long as possible. Butwhen an engagement was broken, hefelt that they should disperse, and continuetheir defense by unexpected attacks rather than concentrate and allow themselves to be shut up in somenarrow, last refuge in a regular defensive positicm.

The psychological and organiza.% tional characteristics of armed civiliangroupesuggest to Clausewitz that, although they form aweapon of strategic defense, they generally or evenalwaye must be tactically on the offensive. As Mao Tse-tung was to write acentury later, The ability to runaway is the very characteristic of theguerrilla.

The influence of Clausewitz on Communist miiitary thought ie profound.War is not a laat resort to he invokedif all else faile; rather, it is one formof a continuing struggle. Karl Marxwrote that Communists everywhereeuppert revolutionary movementagainet the exiettng eoeial and pcdit.

ical order. According to him, the Communists openly deeiare that their endscan be attained only by the forcibleoverthrow of exieting social condi.tions.Soviet military doctrine rejects thenotion that there is such a thing aspurely military consideration. War~wrote Nikolai Lenin, is part of thewhole. The whole is politilcs. . . . Ap.pearances are not reality. Wars aremeet political when they seem mostmilitary.Lenin, like Friedrich Engels andMarx, was fascinated by Clausewitzwar theories; he not only studied themwith insight, but annot@ed his booksextensively. That Engele, Marx, Mao,and Lenin, the most noted exponentsof the Communist philosophy, acknowledged their debt to Clausewitz, whowas a non-Communist thinker, is undoubtedly the highest compliment everpaid to his insight on the nature ofwar.Sialectic QuelityThe dialectic quality of Clausewitzargumentation attracted Lenin to him.The passage which most appealed tohim concerned the relationship of warto politics. This wae emphasized byJoseph Stalin in 1946 as a cardinaitenet of Marxist thought. It has alsobeen subjected to typical verbal inversion by a leading Soviet military authority who said that, if war ie acontinuation of politics by othermeans, so also is peace a continuationof struggle by other means.

Communiet statecraft turns inpeacetime to what are, in effeet, lesserpoints on the conflict spectrumnamely, subversion, eabotage, colonialrebellion, and satellite aggression.They have become masters in combining and operating various nonmilitaryforme of warpolitical, economic, and

n Military RevkIvm-a.. . . .. .. . .. -4


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psychological. Mao Tse-tung has saidtbatj without a political goal, guerrillawarfare must fail.in mobilization for insurgency,Marxists, perhaps, derive an advantage from their philosophy. To the traditional motives for popular action of

patriotism and self-interest, the Corn.munists have joined an aggressive,supranational political theory incorpumting a view of history that claimsinevitable success for ita policies.There is, however, a major difference between the theeries of Clausewitz and those of the Communist practitioners. Whereas Clausewitz neverquestioned that morality, as under-

CLAUSEWITZstood by civilized society, was a fatterin social life, Comnmnista such asLenin eschewed it and thereby reducedwar to a purely animal struggle.KarI von Clausewitz was a profonndmilitary intellectual who applied himself to the pure theory of war. He visualized a spectrum of conflict thatmoved all the way from simple, unarmed belligerence through the brutality of total war. Further study indicatea that he offered another alternative to unrestrained violenc%thatof limited war. His work was an earlyblueprint for insurgency and counter.insurgency of the type being conducted L.today in Vietnam.

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,.,.

FORECAST/7A.D.2000Colonel Richard S. Ware, Jr.Um#ed Stat ea ArmvT NO other time in the 10,000

A years of men% recorded Metorybae tbe future offered sreater rewardefor sueceee or great8r pens~iee forfailure. Many would etreee tbe dengers-and, inti~ the perils are ,sjrsa+but msn bee emlured sevsre ~als in-Q ~ tbe pest and bse not only I@wivsd,/ .-... but .pt@M&EHi.[-y Witbem (@m tbeee Wii .ffret$jj+ brqught SW ~ tbe cam~~were---- dsmn@ for inipmting dfee@j@,imd... .: . . tbsmewboused di3mii@lstv &iXkW3

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1 Mt. 2atlo~ An industrial revolution sired byi the release of nuclear and thermonu~ dear energy ia in the making. It ie~ so significant that only a small portion of it can be pareeived and understood. By the end of the century, thevision will have cleared. The fear of1r nueSear annihilation will have abated,f and, although more aeleetive, ingenious means of force will have beenj developed, man will fete the future:, with greeter confidence.; Major Trendsa l%o major trends must be notedc before discussing the conditions ex$, peeted by the year A.I). 2000 sincek how they develop will largely shapej the direction and timing of futuresventq. One of these is the effect ofthermonuclear militsry power and itspossible application during the next99 years,

Even now it appears reasonable toassume that proliferation of nuclearweapons will continue. Consideringthe fact that many of the countries wenow claseify as developing will be. capable of producing weaponsand anumber of nations probably will do so.,, -it ap~re reasonable t~ assume~ that, through poor judgment, miscalculation, or accident, some weapons,in fact, will be used. ,}, It dose not appear logical to as2Z mme, h~wever, that superpowers willwe them arsenal of almost complete

~. destruction on each other because of..;.f Cokmcl Richurd S. Ware, Jr., is


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Lo. maproduction. The subsequent rate ofgrowth of conventional power sourcesand fission plants will be affectedlargely by progreee in the development of fusion power, fuel cells, andother methods of power generationand storage.The development of fusion powerwill be infinitely the most impertant.If protons collected from hydrogen in... .

water could be assembled with neutrons to produce helium nuclei, the release of energy would be 10 times thatof fiseion power, and would have noneof its radioactive properties or thecritical mase limitation which willcontinue to reetrict fission power tolarge applications. Experta hope tohave developed the baeic principles by1986. If small fusion enginee can thenbe developed which can be producedat reasonable coet, the worlds powerproblem will be solved, the force ofgravity largely overcome, and the

,,..,-. .G.

. . .limitation of natural fuel resourcesforgotten.The future of other power sourcwis similarly predicated on improvements, but euccess can be foreeaet witha much higher degree of assurance.Heat pumps which utilize thermionicand thermeeketric generaters for con.verting solar heat to electricity are onthe verge of economic practicability.-l...-?

Within the next decade, these deviceswill be used in tropical countries forboilers, irrigation pumps, and otherlow-power uses.In moderate climates, wholesale useof solar energy will be initiated whennew and more efficient means of storing electricity are developed. These areexpected to appear before 1985, and,by the end of the century, moat modern homee will uWise thie source of energy for year-round air conditioning.Fuel cells operating from a cartridge of gaseous fuel soon will power

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.

portable radios and other small applirmtes. Larger, more powerful cells willfollow, and their arrival promieee radical changes in transportation andother fields before the end of thewntury. Other power sources will proiuee energy in novel forms. For eximple, the recently developed lasers,concentrated beams of light energy,will soon be used for cutting and welding, and ultrasonic energy will be usedfor shaping preciee designe in [email protected] subject of miniaturization alsodeserves special notice. During the1950s, electronic experts could put100,000 components in one cubic footsnd at the beginning of the 1960sme tnillion. When todays experimental techniques of microscopic engineering have been perfected in the1970s, 100 million components maybe reached. It is fairly certain, therefore, that most electronic devices inwldch size ie important will be oneone-hundredth of their present sizeby the end of the century.

During the coming 33 years, sciefitiste will produce thousande of timesas many heW substances as they havemade thus far. Furthermore, the materials of the near future will havemany new properties which will revolutionize entire industries.Man, for example, has known forsome time that internuclear forces arein tlie region of a thousand tons persquare inch while strengths encountered in nature are only in the tensof tons per square inch. Strengthswhich more closely approach thebigher theoretical values soon willbe achieved. A tenfold increase instrength will render almost everything now being manufactured obsolescent either in eize or weight.hai 1367

,A.D.fOMl

In the electrical field, the materialeof today are only a crude beginning.New superconducting materials willenable very high magnetic fields to begenerated without dissipation of largequantities of electric power. These materials, in conjunction with fuel cellsor improved electrical storage devices,will permit great increases in powercapabilities. The new materials willalso have improved cbaratteristics ofa less r~volutionary nature such aseurfaces which show an almost totalabsence of friction, without lubrica.tion, at any temperature.ComputersComputers of all kinds will be partof everyday life by the end of thecentury. Master computers will be oncall for a multitude of businees andpersonal uses, and automatic machinesor robots, with built-in memory devicee, will accomplish many routinemechanical and domestic chores.Computers will be capable of responding to dial coding, and printedor verbal requests for information.They will be capable of providingtranslation from one language to another in script or voice and, if desired,will record, print, or direct transmission of data through satellite relay toany desired location.Memory banks of computers willrender many other sources of information obsolete. Newspapers, books,and dramatic presentations will be oncall through computers for display onelectronic panels in the o~ce or home.In addition, computers will continueto be used, in a greatly expanded faehio~, for solving intricate probleme andcorrelating complicated statistics forscientific and research purposes.The timetable for the exploration ofspace in the. next decade or so ie common knowledge. However, develop

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M. 2mam!3ta toward the end of the century deposits are known to be found on the, st be considered since their ima ct on the environtnent will be sign cant. By A.D. 2000, a permanentYbase will be eetabfiahed on the moon,and small research etations probablywill be operating on near planets. Reusable rocket epaceeraft will servicethem on a routine basis. Orbital spaceIaboratoriw will have become commonplace, and electrical propulsion enginen powered by nuclear generatorswill be etandard for flights in deepepaee.Scientific tlkcoverlmBy the end of the century, signit3cnnt scientific achievement will havebeen uccompliebed through epace rlctivity. In all probability, alien or extraterrestrial intelligence will havebeen discovered; tbeoriee concerningthe nature, origin, and ai~ of the univeree will be validatid; and the beeicetructure of matter understood. To theaverage man, however, these discoveries will not be ae meaningful ae thecommercial application of technological advances in epace engineering,Hovercraft, vertical lift vehlclcs, andflying eul@ developed for apace expl- ration will find wide commercial uneas prtvate traneport.ntion, and cnrgoand peasenger rockete will be commonplace.Where sp~ce servee to etimulate theimagination in scientific possjbilMe@,the weans will be ueed increasingly toaatiefy mane phycdcal needs. In foodproduction, the ocoarre hava unlimitedmaourwe which are largely untnpped.Psldable food wil l be processed fromthe billions of tone of plankton andsmall fish awdlnble in most meanmean.In the arm of mlnhrtr, the undersearegioue will kome fertile fmntlamfor eaploltation. Alrmdy, vast mlrmml

ocean floor in the form of noduleswhich probably were concentrated byliving organiems. These and other deposits of natural origin will be economically mined by undersea f rontieremen by the end of tbe century.

The population of the United Stateswill have increnaed. from 216 millionto about 380 million by the year A.D2000, and massive city complexee willhave developed. New approaches tourban development will form elementeof the expanded complex; however, inthe older seetione, modernization islikely to be fragmentary, incoherent,and contradictory. New meane of interurban transportation will be in use,new typea of superhighways wjll havebeen built, and computers will maintnln the most effective traflic flow, butthe increaee in trafIlc density will result in conditions more frustratingthan ever before.Erpanslon ol IndusbyIn the past, modernicetlon and ex.paneion of industry created more jobsthan they destroyed. A crossoverpoint, brougbt about by automation,will be reached in the United Stateswell before the end of the century. ByA,D. 2000, tbe rntio of people to jobswill have caused a considerable changeIn mrmy aspectn of American liftiMeeeuree to mjnimlr,e the sim of thelabor force will have keen adopted.

Educational requirements wIII beraised to keep the youth occupied until es late in life as peeelble, and EWtirementa will become mandatory atan earlier nge. Birth control meaeumsin the form of tax Incentives or otherpreferential treatment for emrdl fnmi.II= will be in eUecL and mom leiuuretime In the form of a shortar workW* or fomert vacetlonn will benormnl.

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Am 2MHISince many Americans still will prefer added income to more leisure time,legislation will make a second job unprofitable. The excese labor pool will

make a substantial contribution to themilitary semcee mid to the large number of US personnel who will be required by assistance programs in de. . .

of population will gain a greateryearning for outdoor life, such activity will become more and more ra.etricted.

The use of chemical and electronictranquilizers will be widespread, but,in general, man will be outwardlymore conformist, but inwardly moretense. When disorder does break out,

States will continue to rise in cOmpsriaon to $he coat of living, with thestandard of living of the average family tripling by the year 2000. New.. . .personal tensions will be heaped uponthose already plaguing urban society.The combination of a higher etandardof living, more Ieieure time, andsmaller families will accentuate theancient search for creative outlets forhuman energy. While the great masslene 1967

violent. Physically, the population willbe heaklder while individually theAmerican male will lack stamina andthe ability to withstand hardship.Predictions of world environmentare less certain than predictions inscientific or technological areas. However, excluding catastrophic mistakeson the part of the powerful nations,tbe world of the year 2000 can be foreseen reasonably WCS.

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Am mlPopulation hrcreaeee which outetripeconomic ridvanc~ in the countries ofAsia, Africa, and South America will

keep most of the countriee in thmqeareaa deproeeed, On the other hand,the Industrlallzod nations of NorthAmericn; Europe, to hrcludo theUSSR; Japan; Auntmlia: and a fewother countrien will experience a wm.tinued rine in per capita income. Thedinpnrity between the haven and thehave note will become commonknowledge through th~ medium ofworldwide tetcvinirm and will rcnultin widenpreed turmoil in the lm~developed areas.Udmtt CentercAe in the United Steten, the pnpu.Iation in thene arena will gravitate tourtxtm centers, The overcrowding, unmrdoytrrent. and uenerd conditions ofpoverty will result in an inflammable$wcinl atmonphcre which, in gencrnl,will ctmcentrats the unrest and violence in these arcn.n. The fro-t that thecleavage betw,een the two types ofnations dlvlden the world twwernllyskxng tha Iinw! dencrlbcd by Chine-cCmmmuninl Idenlogy m city andcountry will rmult in n cwmirtcrnhlpadvanteuc to China In exporting herCOncxrptof worl[J communism.

The renult}ng inrucct~ into thrnrrwly emxmglnet nrrw by Chinn, r,rthe rfevehrpment af sc]me utber cohe.niw force In the rankn Qf thr h~~cnot nmtlons, vrlll mnvince tho rich wt.tkmxthatorrfftlve action moml betaken. The dwlsimr to ntts.k tbe prvb.Iem on s mwive Knle In plitical,~MoIodcAl ~knt ilk. and erormmirtmvrw drmxkt ornir bvf.m 1976.

I& magrrl[uds nmt asrimmnmrn .fthe prdrlem will rvdt in n joint ef.fart try rnmxt of tlw indudrhdiw+.d rm.tierw hi m nWerrpt. ftrut. la prmwnttvhokaab ntnrvnt km and. m-and, I-

improve economic conditions in thecountrke throuuh the reimlation ofpopulation hrcreneee nnd the develop.mcnt of a eeurxd industrial baee.

By the year 2000, tha populationcrieia tvill have paesed. However, limited ware, rcbcllione, and riote in thedeveloping ureas will continue to bea major problem, In many areas ofAEin and Africa, new nations withgreater ethnic nnd economic viabilitywill hava emerged through led warn,Political instability will be commonsince preseuree to accolorate economicdevelopment will tend to l-d to un.ntable eutwratic reglmee. Even thoughthe aid mxd developmimt progr8m willbe at its peak+ bittemem and restmtment will characterlw the nttltude oftho recipients.Military Impact

Military concepte and dectrlne ofthe yurr 2000 wili be t.ailorod w twowidely divergent mllitnry nxirwirms,The firnt will b-a to maln@in worldorder during t.be perhxd of minor wnm,revnl!x, nnd vkdmrcu that will chamc.tmixe the developing nrens of theworld before n mhdmum Iovol of ~wmrmic inability h nchioved, Tho svcmrd wjli be tn maintain mllitnry m.poriority nmong the highly ndvancrdnationri through a period of acct.].mating erlmtific twhnologicalnd&chicvemrnt, wbon unexpr.rtmt brrsk.thrm:gh* in either dcfwwlve or Qffm.sivc wenpmr qwtemn rrrny upset thotmlnnce uf pmrar.

Kwri if * mrieeiw nicl and papulmtimr rcmtrol progrnrn i~ Itwtltutd {nn cw)y dints to relieve tho imtxntanemtrtrfrwen tk rich m$d the pwr rrntkmx.widwpmad hmbili{yn,nd amowr.the tett*r will r%qulre thu malnwnxrmof ln~, mreiw.gimdt~ rrmbilri ~mmdfWer4a. l-tw rer@rltW!? X4We W@ Wiutraweemf W r~~btllt> e!td will me.


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ccasitatc agreements among the ~advanced nations to insure military participation by all.Tbie could b

military review june 1967

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