military review february 1969

7/27/2019 Military Review February 1969

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UNITED STATESARMY COMMANDAND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH,KANSAS

COMMANDANTMajor General John H. Hag, Jr.

DEPUTY COMMAND~TBrigadier General David S. Henderson

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and GeneralSt af f College in close associat ion w it h t he Unit ed St ates Army War College. It providesforum for the expression of mi l i tary thought on national and mil i tary strategy, nationalsecuri ty affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.


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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

Judge Not Lest Ye Be,Judged , . . . . COL Samuel H. Hays, USA 3Czec hosl ovak i a . . . . . . . . . . . . PhiHipA Karber 11The New Soviet High Command . . . . . . . , M ic haelParri sh 22Arms in t he DevelopingWorld . . . . . . . John H. Hoagland 28Quart erl y Review and Analysis . . . . MG David W. Gray, USAj Ret 40Terror in Venezuela , . . . . . . COL Edward F. Call anan,USA 49Reader Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Projec t ion of Sovie t Power . . . . . . . . ThomasW. Wol fe 63Geographic alPat t erns of Confl ic t . . . . . . Roger A Beaumont 73M aster Plans f or Nat ionbui ldi ng . . . COL M auri ce D. Roush, USA 77The Western Sold ier . . . . . BRIG C. N. Barc lay,Br i t i sh Army, Ret 86Reader Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65M i f i t aryNot es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96M i l it ary Book s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106


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Editor In klhiafCOL Donal d J. Oel aney

Atiockate EditorslOL John B. B. Trussell , Jr. Am7y War College

Assistant EditorLTC A. Leroy Covey

Featrsras EditorLTC Robert G. Main

Production EditorHeien M. HaiiSpanish.Amarissn Editor

MAJ Juan t iorta-MeriyBrasilisn Editors

LTC Ssmuei T. T. PrimoLTC Romero Lepesqueur

Publication SupervisorAMOS W. Gaiiaway

Art and DesignCharles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Publi@sd monthly by the U. S. Arm Scmmrsndand General Staff Wege Fort Leavenworth, Kaeas$ in E heh, Spanish, and Portwese. i se of funds for printing of this pukstion hasbeen approved by H3 quertersj Da!Mond-s@ poataga rid at m: of tha AmsY, 25 JIIIY WI.aewth, Kmrs5a. Subscr ipt ii rats.h $4.00 (US currency) aaar m the Umted Stsfeq nitad States rni li~WtoRws,andWaWi=tikh~e mandrsrsof{ha Pa-Arnaricsn Postal Union (inclodiog $s , $S.00 a rear in all other smmtrieai single sorIY wise50 sents. Addrass subscr iption mail to tlm S@ Depsrbnati, U. S. ASMY Command and Ganersl StaffSollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas SS027.


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(Extractedrom a speesh by General W. C. Westmoreland,PROFESSIONALISM Chief of Staf f, Unit ed Stat ea A rm y , Washington, D.C.,29 October 196G)

Our soldiers today-and I refer to all of our f i ght ing men of al lservices-are professionals in every sense of the word. They have theski l ls required, even though tha major i ty of them are not career mil itary men, They acquire thi s professionali sm quick ly becausa they possess the essenti al att r ibut es of personal charact er+nd because theyare will ing to discharge their obligations as cit izens. They have the nat i ve abit it y and the educational background necessary f or learning. Ouryoung men i n Vietnam have received an extra measure of maturi ty alongthe way: f rom their parents, f rom their churches, and f rom their teachers, In addit i on, t hey receive the best t raining possible f rom a topf l i ghtcareer professional base on which soundly rests our national sacurity.i have yet to talk to a man who has been honorably discharged from themilitary sarvice who did not believe he had personally profited by thetraining and experience.

And w e, the Army, must ratai n the experience we have gained f romour operations in Vietnam-and profi t from the lessons we have Iearnad.Yet, we must exercise caut ion in this applic at ion of exper ience andiessons bacauae our operations in the environment of Southeast Asiaare unique. Many of the lessons have broad applications, but some donot. We must have an Army that is versatil e-versati le enough to carryout its assigned mission in any tarrain, in any climate, and against anyenemy. We must continue to work toward making the Amry stronger andmore responsive to all challenges, and we must ba prepared to meetand handle ali future tasks.


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Colonel Sa muelH. Ha Y&U nitedS ta tes .4rmu

The m ewa expnwaed in this article are the wthoraa n d do not n.eceseamlureflect those of the Departnwntof Defense or its agmea .l h i i t o r .D E SP ITE th e obvious w isdom of t he B iblied injunction a ga inst judging oth ere, for some ysa rs w e ha vebeen embarked upon the diametrically opposite course. Wejudge beemw e w e also a re bsing judged. In fa ct , in thesedays of expending organizational st roetures, wi th their vereeious a ppetite for tr a ined a nd qua lified personnel w hopaea eas speeific a ptitudes, se well a s t he potent ia l for devel


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JUDGE NOTWe have an ever-growing requirement for th e ca pability of mea suring

accurately the quati ty of individualperforma nce a nd the a bility ta predictperformance under future conditions.With this requirement in mind, weha ve underta ken the ta sk of eva luat ing performance against various typesof criteria. We ha ve devised a va rietyof taste designed to measure skilfs,apti tudes, and personal i ty characteristic. Yet with all our labors over thelast 30 years, we have not succeededin devising an evaluat ing system thatmeets our requirements . J udgmentsbased essentially on efficiency reporteare subject to serious question, andtheir use ma y w ell have a n impact onour oilicer corps which could result inseriously reducing its effectiveness.Reasons for Pradioament

How did we get into this predicament ? I t a ppears tha t i t did not resultfrom a single decision, but graduallycrept up on us a s one of th e ma ny results of the increasing size and complexity of our organizations. Prior toWorld Wa r II , a dva ncement th roughofficer grades was beeed almost entirely on seniority. Initially by regiment, later by branch, for a century

Colonel Samuel H. HaV8 k Director,Militaw p8Uch0fOgW and Leadefehip,US MUitarU Academy, We8t Point. Heis a graduate of USMA, the US ATWCemmaud a n d Geneml Staff CoEege,the US Army War CoUege, and re-ceived hia Masters degr ee in PoliticalScience frem Columbia University. Hewaa aseigned to the 94th ItifantW Di-vision in Europe dunng World WarII. Other 8ervise iaelude8 duty ua A8-eietant Plane O&er, 7th Fleet, We8&ern Pacific; with the Ofis of the Dep-uty Chief of Stuff for Personnel,Washington; and ua Chief of Staff,Berlin Brigade, Germany.

a nd m ore, th e officer corps ma rchedin locketep through the officer gradesundisma yed by w orries of relat ive efficiency in comparison with their peereor of how popular they w ere w ith t heircommanders.Characters, individualists, and nonconformists flourish ed equa lly w iththe ha rd w orking, t he ef ficient , a nd theconformists. Such selection as existedin t hoee da ye wa s u sed in picking colonele and genera l of ficere, in making a esignmenta , a nd in a t t empting to el im

inate those very few whose performa nce w a s felt to be una ccepta bly poor.E ven t heee effort s w ere not un iversa llya ccla imed a s complete successes.Selection SystemIf qu estioned, a personn el officer ofthoee days would have stoutly deniedtha t t he Army w a s even interested ina selection syst em. Yes, perha ps a fewofficers were carried along who hadlitt le to cont ribute, but th e a dva nt a gesin ca reer securit y, officer independence, an d lack of t ension a nd competition grea t ly outweighed a ny adva nta gewhich might accrue from a selectionprocess. H e could point a t t he a llegedlyha rsh competition wh ich resulted w henthe Navy had adopted eelection. Thelack of security resulting from nonelection a nd t he curry ing of fa vor ofth ose in high pla ces w ere not for th eArmy . I f th ese a rgument s w ere notenough, the personnel officer couldha ve pointed to t he wea kness of th eexisting efficiency report a s a ra tiona lobjective basis for any type of usefulevaluation.

H e would ha vd been quite r ight asfar es he w ent, but, as subsequentevent a w ere to show , he did not gofar enough. The Army w a s SU M. Officers capabilities and capacities, asw ell a s t heir w eaknesses, w ere fa irly


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JUDGE NOTwell known to their peers and superiors who knew them either personallyor by reputa tion. The dema nd to investigate and develop improved systems of officer evaluation was insufficient to trigger serious action.Wartime Promo&msThen, World War II arrived withits ma ssive mob]iiia tion a nd expa nsiona nd t he comm issioning of officers inw holesa le lots. After a br ief period inw hlcla promotions w ere ma de by blocin order of seniority, the old systemgave way, and the authori ty to pre-mote was delegated to subordinatecomma nders w ith relat ively few limita t ions. In the f inal event , wart imepromot ion depended on cha nce of a esigmnent, available vacancies, and thesuperiors know ledge of t he a bilitiesof his subordinates.

I t w a s found, somew ha t to everyones surprise, th a t w e ha d been ca rry ing more than a few loads of deadw ood. Officersw ho a ppea red to be ma rginally effective un der th e prewa r conditions of garrison duty proved te heincapable of etandlng up under therigors and uncerta int ies of wart imemobilizat ion a nd comba t. E fficiency reports on file, as suspected, proved tobe of little predictive value. The badha d been promoted wit h th e good, a ndmany errors of assignment and eelection for key positions were the result.

Select ion dur ing the wa r wa s la rgelyexercised by subordinate commanderson a trial-and-error basic. While somewhat waete ful and inequi table , th issystem provided adequate leadershipin most units during th e w a ra t lea stin those unite that had t ime to makethe t r ia ls and take advantage o f theerrore.

With the demobilisetion and reconstruction of tbe career Army, an ef-February 1969

for t w a e ma de to prof it f rom w a filmeexperience, as well es from the growing stock of know ledge of t he beha vioral ecientista. During World War II,psychologieta , in PrMcula r, ha d ueedthe Army as a vest laboratory to testtheories, investigate motivations, aptitud es, Ieedershlp cha ra cterietica, a ndpeer-ra ting a yst eme. Thie ga ve a tr emend ous lift t o scient ific personnelmanagemeaa&and the psychologistsnow felt that they could contributesomething in the way of scientif icmeth od to t he problems of huma n evaluation and prediction.SelectionandEliminationThis possibility, plus memories ofdead wood and promotion stagnationproduced by w a r-creat ed hum ps of officere, provided tbe incentive to incorpora t e int o our Otlicer P ersonnelAct of 1947 t he principles of promotion selection and forced elimination.It was felt that selection would reduce t he num ber of ineffect ive, a nd,by elimina tin g t hose tilce not selectedfor promotion, we could introduce anelement of forced a tt rit ion w hichwould avoid the fear of promotionstagnation. Since accuracy of sekwtion depende la rgely on a ccura cy a ndobjectivity of evalua tion a nd ra tinge,t he psychologist w ere a eked t o produce a ra t ing instrument which w oulddo the job. Unfortunately, we neverfound out w heth er or not th e new formwould turn the trick. Its forced choicequestions and the inabili ty of ratersto know the reeults of th eir ra tingscaused commanders on all eides to request i te withdrawal . So we returnedt o a n im proved vereion of t he old subjective-type rating.

We have now been on the eeleetionsystem for 20 years. Any judgmentof the results would have to conclude5


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JUiSE HOTthat they have been mixed. We havelost in some areas what we gained inothers. It would probably be ssfe tosay that , through selection for bothpromotions snd elimination, we havebeen abIe to eliminate the worst of thenonproducer. In general, one couldalso say that promot ions to higher

pletefy some emerging factors on thedebit side of the ledger.Perbspe the meet valuable Ieesonw e ha ve lea rned a bout seit i}on is th eimport a nce of eva lua t ion. Accura te

evaluation is a sine qua won of effect ive seleeticm. The fa ct is, w e do n othave i t . Bating forms simply do not

Subjective efficiencyreport s t end t o exa lt conformity , pleasing perewm lity ,and t heskills of comm un ica t iona nd int erpersona lma nipula t iongra des ha ve included meet of th e better off icers a l though few claim tha tthey have invariably been the best .

In human terms, the actual resul tsof the system have been greatly softened by th e expa nded mili ta ry structure required eince 1960 to cope withhostilities in Korea, the Berlin crisis,th e Cuba n crisis , a nd th e w a r in Vletnsm. B ut even these mit iga t ing factore have not been able to cover com-S

stand up under the preesures of cereer selection. They might provide areasona bly a ccura te evalua tion of a nofficer if not inv olved in promot ion.B ut w hen one adde to t he already subjective view point of ra ter a nd endorserth e knowledge tha t future ca reer opportunities of the rated oflicer dependon th e compa rison of his etflciency reports with those of others, the inevitable occurs.

MllibiyRlvfna


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JUDGE NOTNea rly a ll effective officers get ra teda s superior or outet a ndbg, Inst ead ofa n orma l dhtr ibution, w e get a cluster , and the dependabil i ty of the ratings diminishes sharply. Even if the

rat ing forms are changed frequently,efficiency report s a re a n exceedinglyweak foundation upon which to con.struct a selection system.Rating Oftkara StandardaPerformance reports made out bysuperiors a re inefficient inst rument sfor fine discrimination between individuals for severa l rea sons. Rat ing officers have different standards. Theyare subjectively involved in their subordinates performance, their morale,and future career chances. They seeonly one aspect of their subordinatew hen th ey observe him from a bovea nd tha t only in the light of their ow nb i a s .

Ra ters w ho a re th emselves highlyra ted a nd see t hemselves es successfultend to rate their subordinates similar ly. L ow-ra t ed officers incline t o th ereverse. A few officers ra t e subordinates on the basis of bow the rat ingsref lect on tbe rat ing, rather than onrated, officers. Objective raters, commenting fearlessly on the strong andweak points of their subordinateswhom they rate l i teral ly according tothe words of the regulat ion and thera t ing form, ha ve da ma ged the ca reers of count less t rust ing subordina te .

Ra tings a re di ff icult w hen outst a nding officers a re grouped in sta ffs a sthey often are. Since common persona l ity tra i ts w ill be ment ioned repeat edly in efficiency report s, w e tell our selves tha t tbe va riat ions a nd l imita tions of ra ting officers do not ma tt er.The high and low, the friendly andunfriendly, w ill ca ncel ea ch oth er out.

We delud e ours elves int o t hinking th a tthe sum of subjective inaccuraciesequa ls object ive rea lity . F or a ssignment, such a theory might work. Forpromotion selection a ga ina t r estrictivera tesit does not. One ba d a djective,one vindictive, poorly informed or ina fiiculat e ra ter frequent ly spells t hedifference between selection and nonelection.Side Effects of SelectionAn even more serious aspect lies inside effects of selection on the officercorps. As predicted by our prewarpersonnel officers, t he feeling of career security, especially in upper fieldgra des, a ppears t o ha ve been substa ntially diminished, thereby increasingthe sense of competition between contempora ries a nd th e need to curr yfavor with the rating officer.Althoughone could proba bly not produce empirical evidence to support i t , many witnesses feel t ha t th e sense of independence and wil l ingness to stand up andbe count ed is a stea dily declining cha racterist ic among those who havegained successive promotions throughtbe selection system.

while independentrecommendationsand opinions not necessarily in consonance with those held by a superiorw ill bring a ti lra tion a nd recognit ionfor some, in the longer run, the independent thinker, the innovator , andth e determined fighter for ca uses w illinevita bly ea rn t he displea sure of somesuperior w ith results ta nta mount toiionselti lon w hen selti lon ra tea become restrictive in the Idgher grades.Even the most astute selection beardspass over officers w ith crit ica l report sw hen fa ced w ith ba rd decisions toma ke on a l ist of th ousa nds of superiorand outstanding officers.

On e ca n plea d for m or a l cou ra g e a n d


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JUDGE NOTf ighting character, but, in tbe longrun, salection based on subjective efficiency report a t a nds to exa lt conformity, pleasing persona lity , a nd the skillsof communication and interpersonalma nipula t ion. The officer w ith int erpersonal skills and pliable opiuionsseems likely to succeed more often

qnately to support the welfare of hiscomma nd or a ccura tely report bis situation.If i t is true that selection based onefficiency report s breeds excessive com-petition, toadying, conformity, fear offa ilure, oversu pervision of subordinates, and indecisiveness or overcen :!~A\ ..\4

Selection boa rds need a l l t he help th ey ca n get a nd frequent ly th ere is tooi t t leval id evidenceto suggest w hich of ficerha s more potent ia l t ha n othersth a n th e officer w ith tbe m ore forceful,dogmatic, and determined personalityfrequently sought for comma nd a ssignments.

Thus, the clever and intuitive staffofficer w ho produces KIS w ork for th edecision of oth ers st a nds a m uch bett ercha nce of success tha n t he officer w hois personally responsible for a command with all the pitfalls involved,a nd w ho must oeeesiona lly oppose theviews of his superior if he is ade

tr a liza tion of decision, w e ar e, indeed,paying a heavy cost for selection. Toth e degree tha t w e ma y be forcing outor nonselecting onr individualists, innovat ors, a nd fighters, we a re seriouslyda ma ging our fut ure effect iveness. Tothe extent we inhibit risk-taking anddecisive initiative in oursubordinates,we are weakening the qual i ty of ourfuture leaders.

Selection boards are faced with anearly insuperable task. From a list


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of t housa nds of officers w ith d ifferentskil ls , dif ferent career patterns, anda great d iversi ty of a ss ignments , theymust select a lesser number of officershased only on the aubjeetive ratingsof th eir superiors w hose own egos a ndcareer effectiveness were involved intheir rat ings .

Those closely conn ected wit h promo.tione w ill testi fy a s to th e tend ency touse a ny t ype of compa ra tive da ta , suchas relat ive s tandin ervice schools

Yr r ela tive t ime in co ma nd, a s abasia for consideration. one can saywithout exaggerat ion that the selection boa rde need help-a ll t he helpth ey ~ n get . Only too frequently , th ereis little valid evidence to suggestwhich off icer hae more potential thanothers.Evaluation of 8ystemWhat, then, can one say about personnel eva luat ion a nd selection ? First ,one must a dmit that i t i s here to at ,a y .Few would be wil l ing to go back toa , seniority system. Next, i t is certa intha t w e must evaluat e. w hether w elike it or not, the immediate comma nder of th e officer ra ted ha s view swhich should be made a matter ofreeord and which should be consultedw hen the o5cer he ra tes is consideredfor assignment or promotion. Onecould a lso say tha t w e have an urgentrequirement for more objective meansof otlt cer perform a nce evaluat ionw hich w ould supplement or even replace efficiency report s in t heir rolea a th e prima ry fa ctor in selection. Wealso have a need for an instrumentwhich would have some predictive capabil i ty .

Recent conclusions of beha viora l science a nd ma na gement researchers indica te t ha t the most val id performa ncerat ings are made when the perform-February we

JUD6E NOTante ie measured against specif ic jobreqniremente rather than subject ivecompa rison w ith a ll ot her officers ofthe sa me gra de. New th ey tell usthat peer rat ings have proved morevalid than superior ratings in predicting fut ure officer perform a nce. H ow.ever, neither indust ry nor governm enthas today the means readi ly avai lableto meet fully these requirements.While considerable research hasbeen underta ken in t est ing a nd eva luation, we have yet to discover aneffect ive a ll-purpose syst em. As it n owetands, any modification to the present syetem would be a temporary expedient ba sed on insufficient resea rchand inadequate development .Areas for InvestigationThe potential seriousness of a situation resulting from continued inaction clea rly ca lls for a rem edy, evenif only a tempora ry one. S omehow, w emust t a ke the pressnr e off th e et %ciency report by reducing its importance as the basis of selection. Thefollow ing suggest t hemselves a s possible areas to investigate:

Consider an interim solution ofa w a rding bonus puinte for ra t ingsduring comm a nd time to a djust fort he obviously increas ed opport unit y toearn the displeasure or peer rating ofa superior while holding such positions.

The forced choice type of ratingused in 1947-48 might be improvedand reintroduced as a periodic supplement to the normal annual subjectiveefficiency report . I f a dequa tely interpreted, this could provide selectionboa rds w ith va luable a dditiona l information which might reinforce or contradict normal rat ings .

D evelop a system of peer ra tingsmade at appropriate s tages in an of9


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JUB6E NOTficers career. Ratings of this type, ifmade under reasonably objective circumst a nces, could give selection bea rdsvaluable insight into how the oilicerscontemporaries view him. It shouldhelp elimina t e some of t he more obvious errors that occur now when weonly use the view from the top.

We never have exploited the potential which exists in the area oftesting. We a w a rd skil l pay to enlistedmen an d even give them m a jor promot iow considera t ion on t he basis of roil .ita ry occupa t iona l specia lty proficiencytests , but seem to have felt that simila r t echn iques w ere ina pplica ble t o officers. Tests have obvious and wellrecognizsd w eaknesses, but t hey a rea n object ive resins of eva lua t ing people and do not have tbe unfor tunateside effecte of our present system ofefficiency ra tin g.

It would seem possible to devise, tests w hich might mea sure cert a inatt i tudes, apti tudes, and personali tytra i ts on one han d, a nd such technica lknowledge of broad mili tary or poli t ical af fairs on the other as mightbe appropriat e to the ra nk an d experience of t he officer test ed. S uch tests

should not be the only criteria forselection. They could be an effectiveecreening device and would supplement other mwms to give a muchmore rounded and accurate est imateof the individuals being evaluated.

Modern, large-scale organizations,w ith t heir requirements for a n infinitevariety of individual ekWs and chara cteristics, dema nd a va st r efinementin our current personnel evalua tiona ndmea surement techniques. hecurrent rapid technological an1 secialchange places increased premiumson innova tion, independent th ought ,mora l coura ge, a nd even a uda city. Thismakes sslection for assignment andpromotion not only desirable, but essential .

Yet if it is to be done w ith out long-t erm da ma ge to our officer corps, itmust be based on instruments moreobjective than the present efficiencyreport . If we are to insure individualindependencea nd crea tivity in our officer ra nks, w e should a ct fast to d evise a l terna te mea ns of eva luat ion tosupplement or even to repla ce t he officer efficiency report.

Military R@Vim


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A

T HE RE ha s been a f lood of a na lyses following the Soviet invasion of Cz echoslova kia . Yet a ll t heanalytic verbiage in the Free Worldw ill not un do t he Soviet fa it a ccompli.I t is w ith this regret tha t w e mustask ourselves: Was the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakiaa scena rio of th e futu re? U nt il w e ca nbe sure th a t a ggressive Soviet milita ryaction will not be repeated, it is neeessary to etudy the possibili ty, extent,

Scenarioof the Future?PhilIip A. Karber

and likely success of a similar Sovietaggression in central IlurOpe.The occupation of Czechoslovakiaw a s one of t he meet slyly execut ed operations in recent history. The Czechoslovak Defense Minister, GeneralMart in D;ur , w a s said to ha ve commented tha t the prepara t ions for a ninvasion of such magnitude had tostart some six months before. Thiseuggested, he said, that the SovietU nion ha d begun contempla t ing a mil


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Czechoslovakiai tary invasion shortly after the Czeehoslovsk pa rt y deposed t he conserva t ivelea dership of Ant onin Novot ny in J a nuary 196S.Preparing for AationThe expertise of this planning wasvisible not only in t be complet e military success of the invasion on 20 and21 Auguet, but also in the stealth ofthe preinvasion maneuvering underthe noses of the Western alliance. Theappointment of General Sergey M.Sht emenko to replace a w eak a nd a ging Chief of S ta ff of t he Wa rsa w P a ctforces t ook pla ce t he da y follow ing t heSoviet eigning of the Bratielava communiq ue tha t supposedly endbrsed th ebroad lines of policy adopted by thereform ist leaders hip of AlexanderD ub&q First S ecreta ry of t he Czcchoslovak Communist P a rty .

Sht emenko, a Sta l iuist general , wa scredited with conceiving a winningstrategy for the decisive tank battlea t Kursk in 194S. E ven a s t he Sovietaseemed to be signing a truce at B ra t islava , the Soviet High Commandwaspreparing for action.The ultimate coordination of planning and deception culminated one

hour before the invasion when an unscheduled Soviet Aeroflot commercial a irliner land ed a t the Ruzy ne,Tad S*UIC, ,s&viets to Lea.. Bloc Divisions on::h Soil, Tlw NW Ycrk TJ me., 29 Ausust 196S,

PhiUip A. Karber is a ReeearchFeUow w-ih the Center for StrategicStudie8 in Wwhington, D. C., and isworking on advanced a%greee in international law at Georgetoum University. He woa a Reeearch Aesociate mthPeppwdine Reeearch Institute in LoeAngels.% California, and ha served aea Reeearoh (%wuZtunt on muttere ofmwlenr strategg and proliferation toa congreseionat member of the JmntCommittee oa Atomis Erwrgg.

Int erna tiona l Airport in P ra gue. Ca moufla ged with in t he air l iner w a s a mobile air traffic control post which began directing the landings of otherunscheduled Awojlot planes loadedwith para troops w ho then secured thefirat Soviet airhead just four milesfrom the center of Prague.sThe mobilization of troeps and thecoordin a t ion of five na t iona l a rmiesinto a successfully orchestrated invaeion under complete secrecy and withminim um suspicion fr om t he West a re,indeed, a tribute to Soviet militaryplanning.Viable MilitaryForoeThe capabilities of the satellite armies under the Soviet Unions leadership within the Warsaw Pact are certa inly much great er t ha n the Westernpreinvssion estimates. They weret hought t oo politica lly unr elia ble t o beused against the West, but now theyhave gone into action witbout protestaga inst an a l ly .The invasion was in the beet tradit ion of mecha nized w a rfar e w ith empha eie on sh ock a nd epeed. The S ovietfa i th in and expert ise with a rmoredforces have obviously proliferated toa ll th e pact count riee. Over ha lf of th e30 invading divisions were armoredand at ful l s trength.S ince 1927,t he S oviet Army ha s employed a nd developed t he us e of a irborne eesau lta . The a irlift of t he hugeinva sion vangua rd t ha t w ee flow n intoP ra gue wa e the la rgest ever conductedby the Soviet Union outside her frontiere250 aircra ft put d own a fulla irborne d ivision complete w ith a rmored vehiclee, fuel, and supplies.Within houre of t he inva eion, t hea irlifted t roops ha d completely secur ed

,Cbde E Fmtnc.watb. c-seven n- of Inwven t imi. Czechmbvskis,. Th@ New York Timen.2 s ,Pb Ik 19 6e , P I .


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CZECHOSLOVAKIAP ra gu% ita a irport , a nd all th e entrances to the city, including thebridgea over the Vltava; surrounded?@ristries, th e Communist P a rtyH eedqua rt ers, the post off ice, a nd t henewspapera; and controlled the cityswater and power eources. The speeda nd eff t i lveneas w ere as smooth a ndeffortless as the heat oneration of

Atlantic Treaty Organization forcesare believed to be capable.Prague was occupied and sur

rounded w ithin tw o da ys by 100,000troops and 2,000 tanks, yet the realpotentia l of t he Wa rsaw P a ct w a sdemonstrated in the tactical applications of Soviet blitzkrieg throughoutCz echoslova kia. The S oviet, E a st G erman, Pol i sh , Hungar ian , and Bulgarian armored columns entered Czechoslovakia dispersed along 1S crossingpoints from the north, northwest,south, and east , All of the groundforces were completely mechanized,with each tank division consisting of

a pproxima t ely 9,000 men end 360 T55a nd T62 medium tanks. The motorizedrifle divisions, consisting of shout 10,500 men w ere equ ipped w ith mediumta nks a nd a rmored personn el ca rrierswhich enabled the entire division tospeed across country.*The Wa rsa w P a ct a ccomplished suchcomplete paralyzation of the DuMiek

sha dow a puszlhg f question: Wha tha ppened to the Czechozlovak Army ?The CzechoelovakArmy of four ar

mored divisions a nd 10 motorized rifledkisions was considered by mostmili tary experts prior to the invasiontn be a t near par i ty wi th P oland andoversh a dowed only by tbe S ovietU nion. W%le t he t ot a l nu mb er of Wa rsaw Pact troops of the Soviet Union,P oland , Ea z t G erma ny , Hunga ry , a ndBulgar ia would cer ta inly have overw hebn ed t he Cz echoelovak ArmY in aprolonged conflict, the initial Warsaw T h e k f i l i t i m B.al.ma,1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 , l%= lm t h t ef or Stmtiic LUudi.a London, D 7.{Ib id , D S .


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Pact invasion force barely reecbed astra tegic ra tio of tw o to one duringthe first week of the invasion. Thisw ould not ha ve been enough force ha dt he C zeehoslova k Arm y fought ba ck,and the invasion certakdy would nothave had the same degree of succeseif i ! ba d succeeded a t a ll .Advantageous PositionIt could be argued that , even if theCzechoslovekeha d fought th e inva dere,the eurprise and epssd of the actiondid not give them time for mobilizat ion. Yet t he C zeehoslova k D efeneeMinistry issued a commun ique a nnouncing maneuvers in divisionstrength would take place on 21 and22 Auguet in central and western Bohemia. Whether or not tbeee maneuvers were called because Czeehoslovakintelligence got wind of the invasion,or i f they were just a training exercise, t he fa ct remaine tha t these ma neuvers put t he Cz echoslova ke in amost advantageous f ighting positionshould a surprise attack be launched.

So the questione remain. Why didnot Dub&k order the army to resist?D id he feel it fut ile? D id he hope t oprevent needless bloodehed a nd destruction of Czechoelovakla? Or didhe doubt the loyalty of the Czeehoelovak Army a nd i te comma nder tochoose and fight for nationalism overcommuniem?The Wa rsa w P a ct inva sion of C zechoslovakia came ae a total surprise tothe US public and news media. Were

the Free World intelligence and decieion-makirig communities totally eurprieed ?Weetern intelligeilce agencies haverepeatedly claimed knowledge of theexact location and number of Sovietballistic miseike through electronicmonitoring systems, spy in the sky

CZECHOSLOVAKIAsatel l i t es, and agenta. However, thepreparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which enti ] led massivetroop movements and stockpiling ofthe necessary fuel and supplies, seemingly w ent unn oticed. U r&es 811 ofthie was known to US intell igencea gencies, but clas sified from t he public,th e NATO ear ly w a rning eystem muetbe revised and lese reliance placed onita accuracy.War-limitingol icy

Ha r lan Cleveland ,U S reprwenta t iveto NATO, eta ta d ehort ly a fter th e invas ion tha t a government tha t canmove t roops so efficiently behind z osloppy a political plan might be capable of misreading Western determination too. D&enta and flexible reeponse, ae the recent coraeretenes ofWestern polit ica l a nd mili ta ry stra tegy, have greatly decrea sed th e thr eatof immedia t e nuclear response t o aSoviet conventional tbruet. While thiew a r-limiting policy ma y prevent a g eneral conflagr a tion, it a lso ha s increasedthe ambiguity of the Western deterrent to conventional attack, thus increasing the l ikelihood of that typea tt a ck end resting t he security of central Europe on the perceptions andmotivations of the Soviet Union.B efore th e inva sion, there ha d beenmuch debate within the Weetern all iance as to whether the Moscow Leadership was beceming increasinglymoderate. whatever the ideologicalclimate witldn the Kremlin, i t seemsclear that the Soviet ati lone were dicta ted by :

An aknost pathological Sovietfea r of Wea t G erman y a nd her ini luence in east ern E urope. Fear of a liberalized Czeehoslo

aAr.thow Lewis, .NATO BnJ M-UD DoubtedDeaplte the Pram. Crisis,. TAmNew York Times,8 Septembr 19SS,D 1.


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domination of political deeision-mak ing a uth ority, a nd eeonomic exploita tion of east Europe. In this respect ,th e inva sion of Czechoslova kia w a snothing new to t he Soviet U nion. Conquest by invasion was used in Hungary in 1956; political stooges likeWa iter U lhricht a re notorious; a nd th epreinvasion economic exploitation ofCzeehoslovak uranium alone has beenpla ced a t 170 million dolla rs a nnua lly.

The S oviet U nion has a cted like a ny*Peter (ktw.e, U.S. to Ask M.v- by NATO 1.wake cl Prame Crisis. The NW York T-.9 ZeptemMr 196S, D 1., c.~=hd.dh & * M&or TJ 1.a.im ptitbr,. .

Ch r i a t im Sc imce Mon i t o r , 1 A . JCUSt 1 9 6 8 , B 1 .

which claim that , in the Federal Republic, anticommunism is, se it was inH itlers t ime, t he officia l sta te doctrine, part of the psychological preparat ion for war. Leonid I . B rezhnev, P a r ty G eneralSecreta ry of the USS R, w a rned Europea n Communis ts tha t :Bonn is hoping to involve the USAand @ other NATO parfnsm moredssplg in its revengs-aseking plans andthereby secure a revision of the Secomi World War {n its favor?%I f o rm . 4b I Bd&tin.N.mkr 70-71. .auoted byStephen R. J ohIM60n, AU Intm6mtion to tbe Soleof Pmxfes { n Sov i e t S t r a t e g i c Planr&c,,, PAdanaVol.rne 1, Summer 1667, P 60.


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Ma rsha l Va sili D . Sokolovsky declared tha t :The main role in th tm.5eashing ofa new w ar Lspla~ ed bg West Gervnuny,

where revanchiam hae been nrude etatepolicy. For thie reason United Stutes,Bmtieh, amt French imperialists havepermitted West G e rm any to huve thestrowgest army in NATO a nd are pla nning t o g i ve her nuc l e a r weape r r e , ew cm t r a g i n g in everp wag poseible therevanchbt aepiratiorw of Weet Germark militarism.Soviet CommentaryThIS t heme hae inc reased in severitysince th e Csa ehoslova k inva sion as evidenced by a S oviet broa dca st commentary proclaiming:The a rrne ra ce a nd cla ims of theBonn militarists to a leading role inNATO are evio%we of the growingWv-iveness of the foreign politicalpolicy of the German Federal Republic. The interest of peace and secuntyin Europe demand a decisive counteraction by atl peace-loving force8 toBonn8 most evil plans.The Weet was shockingly remindedon 18 September 1968 by Pravda, t heSoviet Communist Party newspaper ,tha t , under the Uni ted Nat ions Cha rter, the Soviet Union claims the legala uthority t o inva de West G erma ny:

The Soviet Union proceeds f rom thefact that, in accordance with their obl igation under the Potedam a nd otherinternational agreements, the powersof the anti-Hitler coalition continueto bear the responsibility for preventing the revival of German militiw-iema nd Na ziem.

As a pa rt ic@a nt in ths PotsdamOMsmhal D. %kolowky. .Slmtemr,asili ?dititiwFrederick A Praeser. Inc., New York, 196S, D 2 7 6 .10 , D . ! J I v Ijeport+?avlet Unjon,,, Brosdcsst by

m.dio fmm Moscow in English to eastern NorthAmeric% 19 Sezdmnber 1968. Fore&n BroadcastIn fmmatjon &r.Ace. Volume III.

CZECHOSLOVAKIAagreement, the Soviet Union will cowtinue to stand ready, together withother peaee-loving stute8, to take thenece88aeqf effective measures, if theneed a riees, to etop the dangerorw activities of namaziem and milituriem.According to atilcle 53 of the UNCha rter, the only mili ta ry a ct ion lega lwithout the authorizat ion of the Security Council is a ction a ga inst a nysta te w hich, during World Wa r 11,h a dbeen a n enemy of a ny signat ory of thecha rt er. Art icle 107decla res th a t noth ing in the charter shall invalidate orpreclude a ction ta ken or a uth orised a sa result of World War II by the governm ent involved. An inva sion ofWeet Germany by the Soviet Unionwould, according to Soviet interpretation, be legal. Western diplomats dispute this claim.Imperialism and FearThe reasons why the Soviets wantWeet G erma ny under their hegemonyare the same overriding motivationstha t w ere beldnd t he C zechoslova k inva sionimperia lism a nd fea r.If t he Soviet U nion contr olled WeetG erma ny, i f only up to t he Rhine, theshift in the milita ry a nd economic ba la nce w ould he deva sta ting to th e Weet.St ra tegica l ly , the U SS R w ould hold th ebeet defeneive position on the Continent , w ith a n unstoppable mili ta ry ca pability to coerce any neighbor andthue at tain many long-standing Com

,~V]aden K.met.wv, .


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saw P act through a ct ion a gainst a t ra dit iona l na tionel enemy.In 1956, in fear of an anti-Commu

nist upsurge, the Soviet Union ma de apreemptive invasion of Hungary. In1968, in fea r of na tiona l devia tion w ithpossible etr a t egic conseq uences, t heS oviet U nion la unched a preemptiveoccupation of Czechoslovakia.Already in mortal fear of a revenge-seekhg West Germ a ny, th e S oviet Union is showing increased alarmover the relationehlp of B onn to nuclezarweapons.

NATOs conv ent iona l infer iorit y t othe Warsaw Pact t rad i t ional ly has

t e r r e n t to, and thereb~ an indirect protedio?t agai~t, nUCleaTatttwk 80 longas the caparity for retaliation is sufficient to ensure that any surprise blow-any attempt at a nuclear Pearl Harbor strike-is likely to prove mutuallySUicidd. But it hue become doubtfulwhether this former Grent Deterrent remains a s-ujfcient deterw.nt tolesser forma of aggression, or even toa etrong invasion and conventiqndforce.=

Considering the present st a te of t heNATO forcee, a Warsaw Pact conven,~B. H. LiddeU Em% Dat-t or Defense ,Frederi.k A. Praecer, Irm., New York, 19SS, v 48.


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t iona l surprise a tt a ck could meet w ithinitial success, leaving nuclear response the only option left.If th e West ia deterred from usingnuclear weapons and i t refuses tomainta in a par i ty in heavy convent ional forces , with what wil l i t deterthe Soviet conventional capability?One a nsw er-a llow Weet G erma ny todevelop a n independent n uclear deterrent . I t is undoubtedly this a newerthat prompted the Soviet Union tepush so herd for a t reaty to ban thesprea d of nuclear w ea pons. The S ovietU nion bee indicetd th a t sh e w ill stopWeat Germany from acquiring independent cont rol of th e bomb s omehowthrough diplomacy or coercion, and, ifthese fail , she hints at preemptiveat tack.Esceiit tntCapsbiiitiosThe prospect of r educed nu clea r riskha s led to S oviet rea ssessment of military cQnllkts in Europe. Beginningaround 1960, a distinct change tookplace in Soviet policy. In MarshalSokolovskys work, Militaw Strateg#,th e one exa mple of a futu re limitedwar involves a full-wale nonnuclearattack init iated by the West in centralEurope. This a ppa rent reappraisal ha sbeen noted by the Soviet analyst ,Thomas W. Wolfe:Under the new regime, there huvebeen further indications of a do.$trinalreappraisal of the po8sibditzl of rl.onnuclea thenter warfare, the impltitien being that the theater forces mustbe bettm prepared for a 8ituation inwhich itmight notbe expedient tobring Swet mwlenr power to bear>Wolfe bee a lso not ed the S oviet d iscussions of th e a dva nt a ge of sur prisea nd t he n ew empha sis on the n eed for

,,~ - w . w &,?..V4* Ma oa lypm a n dEwm FM. SmI? i t # . -d COIWm t i m . =u *Mcm f c a . Ck u f . n l k , 1 9 s 6 . P 4.

prompt seisures of the init iat ive andrapid offensive expiration.The latest Soviet principles havea lso ca tt ed for a cont inuous offensive

developing rapidly throughout thedepth of the theater a t an averagespeed of 60 miles per day. All of theWa rsaw P a ct divis ions that w ould bea ssigned G erma n a ct ion a re mcdmnized, w ith belf of them armored, a ndth e pa ct forces ha ve enough tr a nsportaircraft to drop four airborne divisions simultaneously.ls~ ssi Nuci esr WesptISsThe Soviets, while hoping for ana bsence of a ny nuclea r w eaponry, ha veshown preplanning for possible tacticnl nuclear warfare. Dispersal offae~moving armored thrus ts s tar t inga t ma ny points end fol low ing eepar etetransportation lines, messing onlywhen in bat t le or in capturing an enemy city, mea ns t liat ta ctica l nuclea rweapons cannot be used effectively onthe attacking forces witbout eliminating thousands of civilians, importantpositions, and friendly forces.I t must be remembered tba ~ in theear ly sta ges of. a surprise at ta clq itwill be the defender whose stat ic posit ions will offer the best targets totactical nuclear weapons. The employment of airborne troops in ccmjunction w ith ma jor conventiona l groundunits wonld allow for a quick oscuPstion and give the Sovieta major hostages : Over th e past 13 year s, th e Wa rsa wP a ct ha s cha nged i ts empbeeia radically from defensive te offensive. Pre-gra ms w ere underta ken to reequip th eeast E uropea n forces up to S oviets ta nda rds, to esta blish integra ted comma nd for conduct ing joint w a rfa re in


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CZECHOSLOVAKIAthe European theater , and numerousjoint exercises were held. The largestof th ese milita ry ma neuvers w a s conducted in September 1966 in Czechoslovakia. Operation Molulm demonstrated the belief within the WarsawPac t tha t a nuc lear s t r ike a t a war soutact was improbable. The success ofthese exercises was demonstrated inthe perfeet coordination of the Czecboslovak invaeion.StrongAdvant&aaThrough the stationing of Soviett roopa in Czechoslova kia , t he Wa rsa wPact hae achieved etrong advantsgeeover the NATO alliance in positiona nd forces. P rior to the eecupa t ion,the conventional military balance incentral Europe appeared stable. Analysts generally concluded that, toa chieve a, blit zkrieg effect, t he Wa rsaw P a ct w ould need a n over-a l l a uperiorit i in divieione of t hr ee t o one,a nd tha t, beca uee of a reliability fa ctor , the eatel li te a rmiee with the great eet Soviet integration would be themost successful.

I t w se usua l ly considered that theWarsaw Pact could secretly move atleast 10 more Soviet divisions and thebulk of the Polish Army into EaetGermany becauee there were alreadyS oviet divisions a nd logistics perma nent ly eta t ioned t here. Since no S oviettroops were stationed in Czechoslovakia, the chance of a buildup beingnoticed was much greater.Considering t hese fa ctors, t he likelySoviet buildup would occur in East

Germany and, consequently , theweight of tbe attack would be in thenort hern pa rt of G erman y, with aP olieh th rust towa rd I@, a ma rchby the East German and Soviet divieions to the Rhine north of Frankfurt , w hile th e Czechoslova ke w ould

esteblieb basically a defensive linethrough Bavaria . NATO has met t fdspotential tbreet by placing the bulkof its 24 divisions b etw een D enma rkand Frankfurt . This northern strategy has been rendered inefficientsince t he CzeehosIovsk inva sion because:. With Soviet forces perma nent lyeta t ioned a long t he Ba varia n frontier ,additional tronps can now be addedfor a surprise at tack without drawingsuspicion from the Weat.. With t he S oviet occupa t ion, t he14 C zechoslova k divia iona ca n be reeduca ted on t he G erma n threa t a ndintegrated within the Warsaw Pactfor greater reliabili ty.

. With t he post inva zion buildup inCzechoslovakia, the etrategic balancea long t he Iron Curta in has r eached aSoviet advantage.The Warsaw Pact has greatly increased ita options and capability. Tocover this new and flexible Sovietstrategy, the addition of conventionalpower by repositioning and rebuildingof present NATO forces, along withchanges in doctrine, are necessary.

Future ScenarioConsidering the current Soviet mo

ti vati on, t he newly apparent WarsawPact viabi l i t y, and the strategic advantages achieved through the occupati on of Czechoslovakia, the f utureof stabi l i ty in central Europe leeksbleak.

The Soviet propaganda campaignthat has a lready star ted against WestGermany can be expected to incresee.The rise of the neo-Nazi NationalDemocratic Party , no matter howsmall , and the West German relucta nce to sign th e Trmt y on th e Nonprolifera t ion of Nuclea r Wea pene, nomatter how logical , will , undoubtedly,

Military Review0


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CZECHOSLOVAKIAbe claimed a a pruof tha t the W-t G ermane are secret ly manufacturing nuclea r w eapona a nd a re fol low ing Hitler s pat h by s ta rt ing w orld wa r I I I .Even the US public ia fert ile groundfor th e sowin g of skillful propa ga ndabuilt on long-stendlng preconceptions.For the Communist propaganda machine, it is, indeed, an easy step toconfuse the nonproliferation trsatyw i th nuclea r wa r a nd pa t r iot ic G ermans wi th Nazis .After a n intensive propaga nda ca mpaign eprezidover severa l months, th epeace-loving Soviet Uniow with theunanimous support from the Warsaw Pact , would make a l imited convent ional at tack to remove the Gsrma n threa t to world pea ce.Only minut es before th e midnightat tack, Soviet Ambasaadora in al lWestern capitals with nuclear capabilit ies w ould notify th e hea ds of sta tethat, since the West had not curbedthe mili taris t aims of the Germans,the Warsaw Pact was , under the UNCharter, removing the threat withconventional arms.They would stress the limited aimsand means of the at tack, but wouldlea ve no doubt tha t a ny use of nuclearw ea pons wha tsoever would tr igger anuclear holocaust. The various Ambassa dors might even suggest t ha tNATO bases and airdelde were beingmonitored, and, as long as they rema ined uninvolved, th ey w ould not bea tt a cked. The overr iding empha sis to

the U S P resident w ould be on t he immediate and fatal results of escalationonce th e nuclea r thr eshold w a s crossed.Meanwhile, over the night skies ofWest G erma ny, the Sovieta w ould a ttain air superiority, with tbe majorityof NATO cra ft still on th e groun d.Four airborne divisions would belanded simultaneously so that the Soviets could contr ol the key bridges a ndroads. Fa st-moving Soviet a rm ored diviaiona dispersed in t he da rk count ryside would take city after city se hostages and uee westward f lseing refugees as shields.Within hours, the conventionalpha a e of flexible reepense w ould beplayed out , leaving the US Presidentwith the decision to employ or not toemploy ta ctka l nuclear w eapons. AsGeneral Hana Speidel bas s tated:It is he a&me who hokls the pcnesrand respmwibility-the gravest of alldecisions: when, where, a nd with whatweapons the counter blow is to be8truck.Tbe only decision left would be tochoose between a Soviet G erma ny a nda n uclea r w orld w a r I II . The necessityfor this decieion will have been thelega cy of th e 1968 eccupht ion of C zechoslovakia, for, if we do not study, review, a nd project its r eoccurr ence int ocentral Europe and then make thenecesea ry polit ica l a nd stra tegic a djustments, the Warsaw Pact invasionof Czechoslova kia w ill ha ve, indeed,been a scena rio of th e future.


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TheNewSovietHighCommaMichsel P a rrish

DES P ITE fa ctiona lism, differences of opinion on qua st ionsof s t ra t egy, a nd professiona l jea lousies, t he post +%elinSoviet H igh Comma nd ha s been rela tively free from ext ensivepurges. E ven such event a a s t he ra moval of Marsha l Ga orgi K .S hukov, t he Cuba n missile crisis, a nd the 1967 w a r in th e MiddleEa st ha ve fa iled to produce w holw a le r a shuill ing in the highcommand.Nikita S. Khrushchevs ramoval, despite the dire predictionsof some obeervera , did not r esult in a purg e of t he so-calla d St a l in~ a d group of ganera ls w ho a l lega dly ow a d their r ise to th e

fa llen cha irma n. E ven his foremost a pologist such se Va sili I .C huikov, A. A. E pishev, a nd Kiril S. Moska lenko ra ma insd un touchsd. Neither has the comeback of Marshal Shukov meant tl iasilencing of his critice such as Ivan S. Konev, Chuikov, end M. 1.Kazekov.The slow neaa of chan ge in th e high comma nd could be a ttr ibuted prima rily to th e msmoriea of th e most t ra uma tic event2f


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in the history of the Red Army-thepurges of the 1930s. Many of thepresent commanders eaw their comrades, no less loyal Communists, destroyed in the holocaust. These memoriee, and the wart ime camaraderie ,ha ve cont ribut ed to solidify t he highcommand to an extent that, despitema ny centrifuga l forces, ext ensivepurging both fr om inside a nd out izdehas been discouraged.SeniorCommandaraSuch unity, althongh beneficial tothe military establishment, has notbeen a complete blessing to the RedArmy . I t ha s kept t he comm a nd in theha nd s of old World Wa r 11 comm a nd ers whose conservatism and leek oftechnica l knowledge could ha mper t heprogress of th e a rmed forces. In theea rly 1960e, w hen World Wa r II reg imental commanders were holding thetop poeitione in the West, the commsnd of th e Red Amy rema ined a lmost tota l ly in the hands of men whohad been senior generals and armycomm a nders in t he S econd World Wa r.

Since that t ime, a gradual changehas been tak]ng place in the Sovietmilitary leadership se younger mena re promoted to higher positions. Thkchange, however, has been slow. Theaverage age of a sample 45 Sovietcomma nders has been low ered by onlyone and one-half years, from slightlyover 61 to slightly under 60, between1965 and 1967.

The most significa nt event follow ingMichael Parrish i-c a Research Associate in Rw8ae-German militmy hiatorg and probleme with the Div&ioaof Univerwty Ext-oa of IndianaUniverattw He attendia% school in NewYork City and holds degreee fromBerea CoUege, Kentucky, and f~ I*diana Univereitzi.

NllitiCOMMSIrDefense Minister Redion Y. bfalinovekys dea t h in Ma rch 1967 w ee not hisrepla cement by Ma rsha l Andr ei A.Greebko, but the rise of severalyounger generale to the highest echelone of command. Despite rumors oft he poseible a ppoint ment of a civilian) i t w a e logica l tha t the ra therdull , military bureaucrat Malinovskybe replaced by another oflicer of thesame temperament.

Near ly 25 yenre before, in t he da rkda ys of J uly 1942, G reebko ha d received his f irst ma jor comma nd, th e12tb Army, in the battered remnantaof Malinovskye South Front. Later,he showed himself to be a tenaciousdefender in t he Ca uca sus w here hecommanded three different armies.After tha t, h e comma nded, w ithouta ny special distinction, the let G ua rdsArmy with both the 1st and the 4thU krainian Fronts . H ie postw a r ca reerbad shown a steady progress both inthe mil ita ry hiera rchy a nd in the C ommunist Party. At 64, and reputedlysuffering from poor hea lth , he is a tth e tw ilight of his ca reer an d, perha ps,the last of the senior World War IIcomma nders to hea d th e Minietr y ofDefense.NowGenerationIn t he chan ges of comm a nd follow ing Ma linovskys d eat h, th e new genera tion w a s represented hy promot ionof Iva n I . Ya kuboveky to t he rank ofMa reha l of th e Soviet U nion, his a ndArm y G enera l S ergei L. Solcolovs a ppointm ent a s First Deput y Minietere,a nd Army G enera l Iva n G . P a vlovskyspromotion to a Deputy Minister ofDefense.

These men, along with Army General Pavel F. Batiteky (57), comma nder of a ir defense forces; ColonelG enera l Vla dimir F. Tolubko (53),


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HIGH COMMkD

many in April 1962 and the Kiev MiIitery District in February 1966-poeitions which were previously held byG recbko. Hia view s a re not w ell know n,but seem to he on the conservativeside. He has a dvoca ted tha t , a long withnuclear ca pability, th e Red Army musthave strong forces trained to wageconventional war.Sokolov, who has had a meteoricrise, came to hie new post from comma nd of the Leningrad Mii ita ry District which he had held since Novem

ber 1966. Pavlovsky, the new DeputyMinister of Defense, was commanderof the Volga Milita ry D istrict fromOct ober 1961 unt il J a nua ry 1964 w henhe took over the Far East MilitaryDistrict .Most of the new men have closeFirst Deputy C omm a nder in Ch ief oft he etra t egic rocket forces; Air Ma rsha l Yevgeniy Y. Sa viteky (57) of t heAir Defense Comma nd; a nd ColonelG enera l V. V. Oku nev (47), commander of the Moscow Air DefenseDistrict ; a nd severa l younger milita rydistrict commanders, are the men onthe rice in the military establieinnent.They are all under 60, and none ofthem w ere generala in the last w a r .Iva n I . Yekubovsky (65), a t thetime of h ie a ppointm ent, w a s nineyears younger than the next Marshalof the Soviet Union. A war hero andone of t he few groun d officers t o ha vetwice received the title of Hero of theS oviet U nion, he distinguished h imselfas the deputy commander of the 6tbGuarde Tank Corpe in the Sovietbridgebeed across the Vistula at Baranov in J uly 1944. At t he end of t hewar, he wae a colonel.He ha d a steady r ise in the postw a rperiod, cutilna ting in his comm a ndof the Group of Soviet Forces in Ger-


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H16HCOMMAHOeleeted to th e Cent ra l C ommit tee ofthe Communist Party of the SovietUnion in October 1961, and was reelected at the 23d Congress in April1966. B a tit eky w a e elect ed to t he C entral Committee in the latter congress,while Sokolov beeame a candidatemember. Bati teky and Okonev havebeen a ctive in th e Moscow P a rt y Commit t ee. Tolubko, of t he str a t egic rocketforces, however, does not hold a highparty post and, a t one t ime, was evencritfeal of too much party activity onthe part of hie highly professionaltroops,*

Despite t he emergence of t heseyounger genera la, th e old gua rd eti lloccupy important positions in the military hierarchy. Next to Grecbko,th ese forces a re represent ed by t heChief of t he G enera l St a f f Marsha lMatvey V. Zekharov (69) whose importance ean be gauged by his activit ies as the roving ambassador to theArab countries and his exchange of Admira lof t he Fleet Sergey G . G erebkovvisits w ith the fa t e G enera l of theArm y Ch a rles Ailleret, form er Fr enchChief of Staff .

Zakharov, unlike meet Soviet generale, served 0U2Yin staff pusitionaduring th e Second World Wa r a nd wa sin continuous combat from the verybeginning as the Chief of Staff ofthe Odessa Mil ita ry Distr ict . He w a sCh ief of St a ff to Konev a nd Malinoveky a nd culnina ta d his w a rt ime ca reerin August 1945 with the impressiveplanning of the Tranabaikel Frontsadvance through the Gobi Desert .

After a st eady rise during t he poshw a r period, including t he comm a nd oft he Leningrad Wllitsry District andth e Soviet forces in G erma ny, he w eaappointed the CMef of the GeneralStaff in 1960. Following the Cuban


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Will COMMAND

missile crisis, he was dismissed fromthis post under mysterious circumstances only to regain i t af ter Khrushchevs fa ll, w hen kds repla cement ,Ma rsha l S ergei S. B iryuzov, w a s killedin an air accident .06rer P ostw a rLea dersAnother old guard military leaderis Marshal Nikolay I . KryIov (64)who wac Chief of Staff of the 62dArmy during the St a l ingra d ca mpaignand now commands the etrategicrocket forces, an important position tobe held by one whose military education appears to be limited. The positione of First Deputy Chief of theSoviet G eneral Sta f f an d Chief of Sta f fof the Warsaw Pact forces are heldby Arm y G enera l Ka za kov (66) w hoheld both comm a nd a nd sta ff posit ionsduring the war and is the author ofan impressive book of memoirs.The post of Assistant Minister ofD efense is held by Ch ief Ma rsha l ofTank Troops Pavel A. Rotmistrov(66) w ho w a s a n outsta nding ta nkcommander in the las t war and nowservee a s a epokesma n of th e conservative forces in the military estab-Iiehm ent . Ma rsha l Moskelenko (65),th e foremost milita ry opera tor during the Khrushchev years , maint i lnshis posit ion as a Deputy Minister ofDefense, while Marzbal Ivan K. Bagramian, one of the last of the SecondWorld Wa r front comma nders, hea dethe rear area services.

Two aging arms marshals , Pavel P.P oluboya rov (66) a nd Konsta nt in P .K a zekov (65) r espect ively, comm a ndthe tenk and artillery forces of theRed Army . The milita ry educa tion a pparatua remains in the hands of theold guar d. ArmY G enera l V. D . Iva novcomma nds the General Staff Academy,a nd the outspoken Army G enera l P a vel

A. Kur ochkin hea ds th e Fr unze Military Academy.

In the air force, despite the retirement in recent years of MarshalsVladimir A. Sud ets a nd S tepan A.Krasovsky, the command remains inthe ha nde of a ging Chief Ma rshalKonst a nt in A. Versh inin (66) a ndMa rsha l S ergey I . Rud enko (63). Thenavy situation is much more promising. The Comma nder a nd the FirstD eput y Comma nder of t be SovietNavy, Fleet Admirals Sergey G.Gorebkov and Vladimir A. Kesatonov,a re both 54; a nd severa l a dmira ls commanding different fleets are in theirmidfiftiee. The positione in the Centra l P olit ica l Depart ment of t be a rmya nd na vy un der Army G enera l A. A.E pishev (59) a re a lso held by r elatively y oung er m en, some of t hem wit hexperience in the security organizations.Promotions OividedSince the fall of 1967, new appointments a nd promotions ha ve been ca refully divided between the old guarda nd t he y ounger comm a nders. The r eluct a nce of t he form er t o give up positions could be seen in th e fact tha t , inOct ober 1967, th e a ging C olonel G eneral A. Kh. Babajanian, a perennialSxtur e of postw a r mili ta ry comma nds,was promoted to the Marshal of TankTroops and appointed as Director ofthe Tank Troeps Academy in Moscow.Thie is despite the fact that the RedArmy must ha ve a n unusually lar genumber of younger armor specialists .Two other men also promoted to tbemarshal of their arms were ColonelG enera l of Art Wery P . N. Kuleshovand the Minister of Civil Aviation,C olonel G enera l of Air Force YevgeniyF. Laginov.

On 23 Febru a ry 1968, seven men


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HIGH COMMAND

were promoted to the rank of armygeneral : Georgiy I . Kbetagurov, S. P .Iva nov, N. G . Kya shchenko, P . N.Lashchenko, S. S. Maryakbin, SergeyM. Sht emenko, a nd Iosif I . G usa kovsky. These are some of the new facestha t a re reaching th e pinna cle of comm a n d .

The first f ive of th e new ar my genera le a re import a nt m ili ta ry districtcommanders. Gusakovsky, who spenttime in la bor cam ps during th e purges,is the head of the Central PersonnelDepartment of the Defense Ministrya nd ha s a n; import a nt voice in questione of a ppointm ents a nd promotions.In view of the partial rehabil i tationof J oseph St a lin in milita ry circles, itis interesting to note the promotionof Sh temenko, th e present D eput yChief of Staf f , and an old Stal in favori te w ho ha d been shunned a nd demoted during t he Khr ushchev year s.Also promoted in F ebrua ry to the ra nkof Marshal of Arti l lery was G. F.Odintsov.On 17 April 1968, for the firet time

since Yakubovskys promotion, twomen received the coveted ra nk of Ma rsha l of the Soviet U nion. P etr K.Koshevoy, comm a nder of th e G roup ofSoviet Forcee in G erma ny, w a s a Lieutenant genera l in tbe l as t war and a t66 is past his prime. The other newmarshal , Pavel F. Bat i teky, is the energetic comm a nder of th e air defenseforces and, with his new promotion,a lea ding cont ender for being t he nextMinister of Defense.All eigns now indicate a gradualpha seout of th e older comm a nders inall branches of the Red Army. Thenew men taking over the leading positione a re direct products of t he Communist society. Their experiences,both during the purges an d wa r years ,have been different from the oldercommanders , and, above al l , they arefa r bett er educa t ed. The quest ion, a syet una nsw ered, is w ill they prove tobe more a dventurous a nd restless tha nt heir predeceesore on such issues a sglobal etrategy of the Soviet Uniona nd the pa r ty-mili ta ry re la t ions ?

SUBSCRI BERSAvoid t he inconvenienceof renew ing your subscript ion ea ch yea r. Writs toThe B ook Depa rtm ent , U . S. Army Comma nd a nd General St a f f College,Fort Lea venworth ,K a nsa s 66027. requesting cOnversiOno th e Automa ticRenewalP l an .


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A mn$cdFrom Orbi.9

World

J ohn H. E ea gla nd

A , N E XAMI NATIO N of loca l military confl]cte in the developingw orld since World Wa r II reveals onepredomina nt but eca rcely surprising,fact-tha t the w eapone with wh ichthese wars have been fought were obt a hed from sourcee out eide t he coun triee involved. Even in the aggregate,the military cnpebilitiw of the developing count riee ar e a ma ll in compa rison w ith t hoee of t he ma jor powers.Six countriee-theSoviet Union, theFrance, Germeny,China + ccount for

Uni ted S ta tea , theUnited Kingdom,and Communistabout S6 percent

of the worlds military expenditures;the remaining countries, shout 130 innumber, account for only about 15percent.Yet in epitc of their limitations, themilitary capabilities of the developingcount riee poee import a nt probleme forinternational eecurity. In a period ofdelicately balanced strategic deterrence between Eaet and Weat, localmilitary preparations and conflictshave become a frequent source of international teueion.For what they have felt to be com

pelling political a nd eeonomic rea sons,MMtarj Review8


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TNE0EVELOPIN6 WORI.Ot he ma jor pow ers ha ve been w ill ing tosupply large quantities of wespone tot he developing coun t &e a nd occa sion.a lly to ent er their cont liet e direct ly.In the came period, the developingw orld ha s beem a etorm center ofideological competition and a risingsense of nationalism, both of whichhave led to a greatly increased demand for modern weapons.For th e foreseeable fut ure, a nd certainly throughout the 1970s, the developing countries will continue to belar gely dependent on industr ial sta tesfor the supply of mil i tary hardwarea nd t echnology. To un dersta nd w hyand how their mil i tary forces maycha nge in the next d eca de, i t is, th erefore, neeeesary to unders ta nd the process by which weapons and mil i tarytechnology are transferred.SmallArms

A rea listic look at t he diffu eion process must ded not only with obviousand well-publicised cases such as theMiddle Eastern or South Asian interstate competitions to procure majora rma menta , but a lso with the moreobscure a rese of t he a rm e tr a dic, especially the transfer of l ight weapons-a ut oma t ic rifles, subm a chineguns,and small mortars . Unlike the larger

This article was ctiedfrom the origiwal which appearedin Omua, No. 1 SWng 1968, published by the Foreign Pol@ Re8eaYeh Ins t i tute of the i%ivermtyof Pen?w@ania. Co.o@ghted @1968 by tha Tnwteee of tb Univermtg of [email protected]. Heaghwtd is Ezecutive VicePresident of Bmmw & Shaw Research Gwporation and directsepwwored research in the fieldsof daf ctwe planning, 8 t r a t e g y , a n da r m s control.

February 1969

w eepone, smeU a rms ca n be obtilnedfrom a multitude of sources, including priva te t ra ders, a nd th eir movement in relat ively sma U numbers fromcountry to country ie easily concealed.Neverth eless, t he bulk of t he smella rms tr sSic t o developing count riessince World Wa r II ha s coneieted oflar ge-sca le tr a nsfers, n orma U y involving hund reds of th ousa nds of w espone,in a single tr a nedion under milita rya id a greements. C onnect ed w ith thispoint a re the relat ed facts tha t sma llarms, once introduced into the worldinventory, are l ikely to remein therefor a long t ime and to change handsrapidly, in ways totally uaforeeeen bythe supplying power.

Change in OwnershipAn exa mple of the w a y smaU a rmsma y cha nge ow nerehip in surprisingwa ys, 5ding ueee tha t are diametrically opposed to the suppliere intention, ie th e pat h ta ken by wea ponsfrom B elgium a nd the U nited Sta tes,via Cuba , to ineurgente in Venecuela .

Du ring 1959, i ta f irst y ear in pow er,the Castro government a ppealed to numeroue sources for arms to equip itagrowing national army. I t was eventually succeeeful in purchasing 65,~00eta nda rd Nort h Atla ntic Tr.w dy Organisa t ion r i fles from a B elgian manufacturer, 1,000 Uzi submeehinegunema de in B elgium under Isra eli l icense,and 200 mecbineguns, all repreeenting the then current level of techn.oogy in ema ll a rme. In a ddition, F ld &Castro inheri ted a large areenal ofweapons tha t the Uni ted S ta tes hadeupplied t o th e regime of Fu lgencioB setists y S a ldhmr under a mili tar yassistance pact.As t he new Cuba n Army grew ineice, Soviet and Czech a rme-including 125,000 automatic rifles, 10,000

m


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THE DEVELOPIN6 WORLDsubrna cMneguns,an d hundreds of fieldw eapons-bega n a rriving. With th ea rmy st a nda rdized on Soviet w eapons,the B elgian and Uni ted SMez a rmswere gradually rendered surplus.Witbin a short t ime, t hey foun d usesin Venezuela w hich neither the U nitedStates nor Belgium would have considered appropriate at the t ime oftheir init ial transfer. An arms cache.

pa rt ure in 1949. S ome of t hese B ritishweapons have, undoubtedly, foundtheir way by now to other parts ofAfrica , a nd th eir potentia l for futur emiscldef is considerable.The regular forc~ of nat iona l governments in the developing countrksha ve most often been equipped w ithsmall a rms obta ined as pa rt of a n overa l l mili ta ry a ssis ta nce agreement . In

Cowtasm o f E . nQIW M .r l i ?wz Cod6A S oviet-msn efactu redRP G 2 rocket project ile ra ptur ed from Csst roite guerrillasin Argent ina in 1967discovered in Venezuela in 1963, intendpd for use by Communist irrsurgenta, consisted of automatic riflesmade in Belgium, Uzi submachine-guns, 60-millimeter mortars made inth e U nited Sta tes and ident i f ied a shaving been given to the Batiste government , as well as US bazookas andrecoilless riflez.

This is n ot a n isolat ed ea se. To men tion one oth er exa mple, milita ry a ssistance from the Soviet Union tothe United Arab Republic probablybrought on the retirement of the approximately 100,000 .Lee-,EnfieZdifleseupplied to th e E gypt i?? Arm y pr iort o th e B ritish MWa rY Missions de-

all of these cases, international at tention has focused mainly on the moresophistica ted w eapons included in th eagreement .In the case of the United Arab Republic, the Soviet transfer of mediumbombers, jet fighters, and tanks hasheen well publicized. However, thehun dreds of th ousa nds of Soviet ema ll

arms included in the agreement havegone comparatively unnoticed, eventhough their intluenceon regional stability may be felt for yeare to come,in many different countries wheretheir introduction even in small mrmbers will , in turn, prompt large buildups by the opposing forces.


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store up enough a mmun ition for a prolonged cotilct . Consequently, a few na tions have, for some time, been producing their own small arms and ammunition. To the extent that morecountries follow suit, the worldssources of supply w ill mu ltilply, a ndthe arms market will be even moreaccommodating than i t is today.India manufactures not only smalla rms, but a leo a rtMery, t a nks, a nd air .craft, usually on the beeis of importeddea igne or foreign licenses. S imilar ly,

throwers, 81-millimeter mortars, and92-millimeter ba zooka s.It is not possible to estimate witha ny confidence th e size of th e int erna tiona l tr tic in sma ll a rms. The num bers of riflee, mechinegun e, a nd oth erlight w eepone tr sneferred out dde t hemajor alliances since World War IImight lie an yw here betw een 10 milliona nd 50 million. It ie a lso ditlicult t ogauge the effects of thh tratlic on thesecurity and stabili ty of the developing world.


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a nd ta rget Ioea tors of va rious kkds,wil l inevi~ bly f ind th eir w a y into th ede~ eloping w orld, consigned both toregula rs a nd insurgents-a nd muchsooner than we may expect.In contract with the lack of dataon transfers of sma ll a rms (ss w ellas battlefield weapons and artil lery),a great deal is known about transfersof la rger w eapons from t he industr ialto the developing natione. For severalreasons, transfers of tanks, aircrafta nd na val veesels a t t ra ct considera blepublicity. To varying degrees, tbesslarger weepone extend the range,speed, and scele of potential contlict,bringing w ider a rea s under th e threa t

a high governmental level. The highcost of sophisticated systems, thema ny eecurit y a spects surrounding thetechnology they represent, and theneed for policy decieions rega rdin g t hepolitical and economic impacte of thetransfere abnoet inevitably requiregovernment participation in the negotiation. In some of the more heatedregional arms races, notably in theMiddle Eaet, the spiraling buildup ofcomba t a ircra ft hoe been t he foca lpoint of t he comw ]t ion, a roundwhich al l other mil i tary preparationsare cluetered.Four suppliers-t he S oviet U nion,the Uni ted Sts tea , the Uni ted King-


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THE 0EVELOPIN6 WORI. Odom, a nd Fra nc+ ha ve a ccounted forabout 98 percent of all jet combat aircra ft shipped to th e developing w orldsince the end of World War II, a totalof over 5,000, including at least 500bombers. Aecofding to available date,th e breakdown , as of 1966, w a s a bouta s follow s: t he S oviet U nion, 1,870;tbe United States, 1,540; the UnitedKingdom, 1,280; France, 420.Other SourcssIn addit ion, several other nationshave strong exieting or future potentials as sources of military jet aircra ft for th e developing w orld. Import a nt a mong these a re S w eden, WestG erma ny , Ca na da , I te ly , J a pa n, Czechoslovakia, and Communis t China .Their most potent ia ls do not, how ever, match those of the four mainsuppliers.

Clearly, large air forces are costly-costly not only in moneta ry term s,but in absorbing the energies of someof the most competent people in thecountries involved. It ie important,therefore, to ask what eecurity theyprovide to either country or to theregion generally.For obvious milita ry reasons, th ea irpow er of one side ,must be ma tched,at least quali tat ively , by the other.Therefore, competing buildups in air-power tend to occur in an upwardepiraling pattern. Yet tbe net gainin eeeurity, if a relative balance ofpower is maintained, may be negligible. Furthermore, the strategies imposed by t he possession of high ly effective offensive a ircra ft , ba sed on highlyvulnerable airfields, may be especiallyunstable, favoring tbe use of surpriseat tack.

Even more basic, however, is thequeetion of how the influx of aircraft , tanks, and other large weapons

affects the perceptions of the nationalI eederehip. The experience of t he Mid dle E a et in 1967 a nd KesW1r in 1965indkat es tha t t he peeeeseion of a va etarmory may give the leadership unw a rra nt ed confidence in its a bility toinit iat e a nd w in a w a r. The experienceof th e Suez w a r in 1966 ma y furt herindicate that a rapid mili tary buildupby one party can s t imulate a preem~tive attack by other parties.Range of Expression

Conversely, i t can be argued thatthe possession of modern combat aircra ft gives developing count ries agrea ter ra nge of expression, a n abilityto communicate degrees of intentionand to make chows of force to theadvereary which conventional groundforces could not provide. It seemslikely, for exam ple, th a t tbe TurkishAir Force, by carrying out sofiles overCyprus in 1964, was able to communicate Turkeys most serious concernabout the Cyprus s i tuat ion to theGreeks and to convince them of herrea dhess to intervene w ith t roops ifit dld not improve.

In some ca ses, t hen, the limit ed commitment of airpower across nat ionalborders may eerve as a substitute forattack by ground forces, with all thepotential for escalation that would involve. It is far more likely, as theEgyptia n a irs trikee a gainst Yemen indica te, tha t such uses of a irpow er simply tend to downgrade the whole concept of sovereign and inviolate national borders.Of growing importance is the question of retra nsferth a t is , th e secondor lat er interna t iona l t ra nsfer of cOmbat aircraft following their init ial export from tbe country of manufacture.During tbe 20 years from 1945 to1965, retransfers represented only


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THE DEVELOPING WORLOa bout one percent of a ll t he jet comba ta ircra ft tr a nsferred t o th e developingcount ries. S ince 1965, th e num ber ha sbeen increasing rapidly. Obviously,th e cont inuing reequipment of a irforces around the world is beginningto create a relatively large surplus ofjet fighters and bombers, aircraftwhose longevity is impressive.

To counteract their overdependenceon outa ide suppliers for spare par taand maintenance, some of the moreadvanced developing countries eitherhave established licensed productionof foreign a ircra f on th eir soil ori ign and developave at tempted to dtheir own combat aircraft .Egyptian ProjectIn recent years , the Egyptian Government has attempted to develop itsown supersonic fighter bomber, theHA-900.eThe Egyptian experience hasdemonst ra ted how difficult i t is for aless-industrialized country to mountsuch a n effort w ithout ]a rge qua nt it iesof outeide support , therehy defeatingthe programs main purpose. It became necessary to set up recruitinga nd procurement activit ies in S w itzerlan d in order t o obta in qua lified personnel, techn ology, a nd ma terial fromWestern Europe to keep the programmoving forward. Even with considerable outside participation, the projectmet with little success.

Even in India, whose aircraft industr y is well esta blished, th e a tt emptto develop indigenous, high-performa nce comba t a ircra ft ha s been, for th emost part , unsuccessful. In the mid1960s, the watilme chief designer ofFocke-Wulf emigrated to India andled a design team made up mainly ofGerman engineere in the preliminarydevelopment of th e HF..% supersonic,all-weather fighter. The effort has

progressed a t a much slow er pace th a ncorresponding programs in the industrial countries.E ven for less complica ted part s a ndeubsy st eme-for exa mple, cockpk canopies or flight cont rols-th e pa rt icipation of foreign suppliers has been anessent ia l element . Alth ough tbe H F-24program has resulted in the manufa ct ure of severa l subsonic preproduction versions of th e a ircra ft , i t ha s notsucceeded in ita m a in purpeee of providing a w holly independentcapa bility.

licensed ProductionLicensed production, on the other

hand, appears to be a compromi se so-lution in that i t provides at least aslight a mount of domestic contr ol ovsrt he source of supply. A curr ent exa mple is the establishment of licensedproduction in India of the SovietMiG-f!l fighter. Successful licensedproduction efforts have also been undertaken in Israel who manufacturesth e Fr ench Ma ui-ster jet tr a iner under license, and in South Africa whois establishing licensed production ofthe Italian M.B.926 jet trainer. InAugust 1967, t he Isra elis teek th e unusua l step of purcha sing a n ent ire USa ircra ft ma nufa cturing firm in Order to move its production facilitiesto Israel.Although licensed production assures the availability of spare partsand, undoubtedly, helps to raise thelevel of domestic industr ia l technology,it has also proved to be estremelycostly, ditlicuit, and time-consuming.E ven w ithin a s ingle U S a ircra ft company, the init ial unit cost of manufa ctur e a t a second fa cility is muchhigher th a n a t t he origina l source. Therate at which costs at the secondsource approximate those of the prima ry source depends, to a great ex-


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tent, on the skill and experience ofpersonn el. When t ha t source is a different country, all of the various management, industr ia l , and technicalproblems a re .mukiplied great ly.Ther efore, a lt hough licens ed produ ction programs may slowly becomemore import a nt in t he a dva nced developing count ries such as I ndia , t he sa le

resea rch rocket w hich ha d cont ributedto the French ballistic-missile program.The excha ng e of sta t ement illustra tes tw o intereat ing pointa . The firstis tha t t he dhwct tra nsfer to a developing country by a major power ofcomplete and ready-to-operate offensive ballistic-missile systems ie an ex-

I tam%inOne of 72 Isr a eli Mirage 11/.CJ mult imissionfight erspur chssedfrom Fr a ncesince 19s3of completed aircraft will almost certainly continue to be the predominantform of transfer to the developingworld.Early in 1966, i t was reported inthe American press that Israel hadentered into an a greement w ith Fra nceto purchase a large number of Frenchballistic missiles. The report was immediately and convincingly deniedbot h in P a ris a nd Tel Aviv.. Fr enchspokesmen w ere a lso quoted as eay ing,how ever, tha t the French G overnmentwould not object if French privatecompanies were to cooperate with Israel in reeket research and development. In part icular , Ierael appearedto be interested in developing a twoetage vehicle based on the ToPsze, a

tr emely eensitive ma tt er, virtua lly certain to stir up etrong political reactions. The second is that the transferof technology to support an ostensiblyindigenous effort may rouse lees opposition because many of the detailsca n be h eld secret a nd beca use t he r esults a re not immedia tely a ppa rent .The preew s of ba llistic-missile diffu sion is just beginning, and it is notlikely to a dva nce ra pidly. The problemsencount ered by th e U nited Ara b Republic, similar to problems in her aircra ft development, i llustra te th e complexities.B eginning a hout 1960, t he Egy ptia nG overnment recruit ed rccket designers in Weat Germany and elsewhere,and brought them together a t a mis


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THE DEVELOPING WORLOsile complex in Heliopolis. By 1962,there were over 260 Weat Germanrocket experta and technicians in theUnited Arab Republic, along with at ot a l la bor force of a bout 1,000. Thedevelopment of th ree different l iquid-fueled ballistic missiles, somewhatreminiscent in their configuration oft he V-2 miseilee, w ee u nder t a ken. Thelargest of these was to be a two-stagemissile ca pable,of propelling a w a rhea d of 2,000 poun ds a croes a d ista nceof about 500 miles.

The first publicly a nn ounced t estfl ight s of E gyptia n miesilea cccurr edin J uly 1962. Sh ort ly therea fter, th et w o sma ller of t hese missiles, of 200mile and 325-mile range respectively,were displayed in the annual Revolution Day Parade in Cairo. PreeidentGamal Abdel Neeser c la imed, a t thatt ime, that both were in quanti ty production. A few months later, however,one of th e G erma n technicians w a sreported se saying that i t would beseveral years before the rockets werereedy for military use.Pol i t ica l Impl icat ionsIt is obvious that the perfection ofan effective ballistic weapon systemhas remained beyond the capabili tiesof a l imited design team operating under adveree cireumetances. However,t he initiat ion even of a t echnica llyunpromising effort involving ballisticmissiles has enough political potencyto create etrong repercussions.

The Israelis program of terrorism. a gainst th e Germa n personnel , as w ella e t heir politica l preseur ee on WestG erma ny to reca ll her scientists, a resufficient evidence of the political implications of bellietic-miesile preeurement. Furthermore, the cost to theUnited Arab Republic wee clearlyenorrn oue in excha nge for w ha t sheaa

received. Some of the eenior personnel are said to have been paid over$100,000 a nn ua lly for t heir cons ult ingservicw on th e progra m. S ]milar ly, th eprices pa id for equipment a nd ma terials prccured in Europe were obviouely int la ted.

In tota l , the Egyptian experiencealweare to indicate that developingcountries will be faced with almostinsurmount a ble difficulties if t hey a tt empt t o develop effect ive ba llist icmiseile systems on a relatively autonomous ba sis. ,

The high coet of development ,a dd edto the uncertainties of trying to undertake such a program without theneceseary domestic industrial base,may lead some developing countrieseither t o seek t he procurement of complete miesile systems from abroad orto carry out what would be, in effectonly a domestic facade for a foreign-executed program.Potential SuppliersBy 1970, there wil l be f i ve countr iescapable of supplying complete bal l iet kmissile eystems and about 10 additiona l n a tional euppliers of subsystemembracing guidance and control, propulsion, or a erodyna mics. B y 1976, itseeme l ikely tha t th ere w ill be a s ma nya s eight euppliers of complet e syst emsa nd 11 add itiona l euppliere of subsystems. B y 1980, th ere could be as m a nyas 16 euppliers of complete systemsa nd 12 a dditiona l suppliers of subsystems (see chart).This expansion will result not onlyfrom mil i tary programs, but a lsofrom the increase in space activitiesth roughout th e w orld. J a pan, for example, has already supplied soundingrockets t o Yugoslavia , In donesia, a ndot her count ries. As t he nu mber of potential missile suppliers grows, the

MNtery Rsvlsw


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THE 0EVE10PlN6 WORMbargaining power of potential recip. ta in to st imulate interest in weaponsient s w i13 increase, a nd t he enforce- pow erful enough te d estroy la rge a ndment of cont roIs over m issile diffusion, valua ble ta rgets . In a ddit ion, the in-in the event controls are attempted, product ion of be33ist icmissiles in t o re-WW grow sta qdily more d ifficult . gional environments will atmost cer-Although th e ultima te effects of ba l- tc inly introduce new and unfa miliarlist ic-mis~ ile diffu sion developing strategic considerations among advero

POTENWAL SUPPLIERS OF MISSILESYSTEMSANOSUBSYSTEMS

%&m3 S@teme Subemtemsro 1970 United States United States ItalyU S S R U S S R C a n a d a France France East @~yUnited Kingdom United Kingdom AuetreliaChina China SwedenU nited Ara b Republic Sw itzerlan dWeat Germany IareelJ a p a n1970-75 Aboos Plue Above PlueU nit ed Ara b Republic The Neth erla ndsJ a p a n BelgiumIsrael CzechoslovakiaIndia1975-80 Abeve PIM Abeve Plea

West Germany Sou t h AfricaI t a ly PolandC a n a d a Norway Ecst Germany YugoslaviaAustralia Pakis t anSweden IndonesiaSwi tzer land ArgentinaThe Netherlands Braz i l Chile

count ries is unknow n, a t lesst some sariee which could, at least initially,uossible effeeta ca n be ident ified. B e- produce marked instabilities.cause the cost of the fully deployed It is pefilnent to note that the endsyst em is eo greet, i t ma y dema nd tbe of a loca l intersta te w a r usual ly ma rksselection of targets such as cities or a n import a nt t a keoff point for th e nextla rge economic complexes wh ose va lue round of an arms race. The terminais comm ensura t e w ith t he cost of th e tion of f ighting in the Palestine Warsystem. (1948), S uez (1956), t he S ine-Ind ia nMissile procurement is virt ua lly cer- w a r (1962), a nd K a shm ir (1965)


42/116

THE DEVELOPING WORLDma rked th e beginning of a ma jorstepup in a rms procurement by one orboth sides involved in these conflicts.In each ease, there were importantchanges in the quanti ty and qual i tyof weapons procured, accompanied, insome cases, by changes in suppliera lignment (for exam ple, P a kista n-Cbina).

The rea sons ar e obvioue. Aft er corn .- ba t exper ience, bet t er ea seesmenta ca n

Air Farm awl Smwe DigestE gypt ia n medium -ra ngemissile fired in19s4be ma de a bout th e performa nce of different types of weapens, and there isa lso a pressing n eed for reequipmentdue to use a nd at tr i t ion. Furt hermore,in the wake of tbe crisis, the leadership is pafilcularly responsive to mili tary requeata .

Why do major powers supply armst o t he developing w orld? Cert a h eoonomic motivations are apparent. Tbedesire to sell surplus equipment, toaesure orderly and sustained prodtict

military review february 1969

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