marine salvage capabilities: responding to terrorist attacks in u.s. ports: actions to improve...

C O N F E R E N C E P R O C E E D I N G S 3 0

Marine SalvageCapabilitiesResponding to Terrorist Attacks in U.S. Ports—Actions to Improve Readiness

MARINE BOARD

Chair: R. Keith Michel, Herbert Engineering Corporation, Alameda, CaliforniaVice Chair: Geraldine Knatz, Port of Long Beach, California

Larry L. Daggett, Waterway Simulation Technology, Inc., Vicksburg, MississippiPeter Finnerty, American Ocean Enterprises, Inc., Annapolis, MarylandPaul S. Fischbeck, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PennsylvaniaMartha R. Grabowski, Le Moyne College, Syracuse, and Rensselaer Polytechnic

Institute, Troy, New YorkRodney Gregory, IBM Global Services, Fairfax, VirginiaI. Bernard Jacobson, IBJ Associates, Shelter Island Heights, New YorkRonald K. Kiss, Webb Institute, Glen Cove, New YorkSally Ann Lentz, Ocean Advocates, Clarksville, MarylandPhilip Li-Fan Liu, Cornell University, Ithaca, New YorkMalcolm MacKinnon III (Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired), MacKinnon-Searle

Consortium, LLC, Alexandria, VirginiaReginald E. McKamie, Sr., Houston, TexasRobert C. North (Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Retired), North Star Maritime,

Inc., Queenstown, MarylandCraig E. Philip, Ingram Barge Company, Nashville, TennesseeEdwin J. Roland, Elmer-Roland Maritime Consultants, Houston, TexasJerry R. Schubel, Aquarium of the Pacific, Long Beach, CaliforniaRichard H. Vortmann, National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, San Diego,

CaliforniaE. G. “Skip” Ward, Offshore Technology Research Center, College Station, TexasDavid J. Wisch, ChevronTexaco, Bellaire, Texas

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD2004 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OFFICERS

Chair: Michael S. Townes, President and CEO, Hampton Roads Transit, Virginia Vice Chair: Joseph H. Boardman, Commissioner, New York State Department of

Transportation, AlbanyDivision Chair for NRC Oversight: C. Michael Walton, Ernest H. Cockrell

Centennial Chair in Engineering, University of Texas, AustinExecutive Director: Robert E. Skinner, Jr., Transportation Research Board

C O N F E R E N C E P R O C E E D I N G S 3 0

Marine Salvage CapabilitiesResponding to Terrorist Attacks in U.S. Ports—Actions to Improve Readiness

Report of the Committee for Marine Salvage Response Capability: A Workshop

August 5–6, 2003Washington, D.C.

TRANSPORTATIONRESEARCH BOARDWASHINGTON, D.C. 2004WWW.TRB.org

Transportation Research Board Conference Proceedings 30ISSN 1073-1652ISBN 0-309-09459-3

Subscriber CategoriesIV operations and safetyIX marine transportation

Transportation Research Board publications are available by ordering individual publicationsdirectly from the TRB Business Office, through the Internet at national-academies.org/trb, or byannual subscription through organizational or individual affiliation with TRB. Affiliates and librarysubscribers are eligible for substantial discounts. For further information, contact the TransportationResearch Board Business Office, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001 (telephone 202-334-3213; fax 202-334-2519; or e-mail [email protected]).

Copyright 2004 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.Printed in the United States of America.

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of theNational Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academyof Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members ofthe committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competencies and with regardfor appropriate balance.

This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to the proceduresapproved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy ofSciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.

This study was sponsored by the Maritime Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Army Corpsof Engineers, U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, Office of Naval Research, U.S.Department of Energy, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National ScienceFoundation.

Committee for Marine Salvage Response Capability: A Workshop Malcolm MacKinnon III, Chair, Managing Member, MacKinnon-Searle Consortium, LLC,

Alexandria, VirginiaPaul S. Fischbeck, Director, Center for the Study and Improvement of Regulation, and Department

of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PennsylvaniaSally Ann Lentz, Executive Director and General Counsel, Ocean Advocates, Clarksville, MarylandReginald E. McKamie, Sr., Houston, TexasR. Keith Michel, President, Herbert Engineering Corporation, Alameda, CaliforniaRobert C. North, President, North Star Maritime, Inc., Queenstown, Maryland

Transportation Research Board StaffJoedy W. Cambridge, Marine Board Staff DirectorBeverly M. Huey, Senior Program OfficerPeter Johnson, ConsultantMary Kissi, Staff Assistant

TRB Publications OfficeNaomi Kassabian, EditorDeborah Uffelman, ProofreaderJennifer J. Weeks, Senior Editorial AssistantJuanita Green, Production EditorJavy Awan, Director of Publications

Cover inset photographs courtesy of (clockwise, from top) Donjon Marine Co., Inc., Hillside, NewJersey; Titan Maritime, LLC, Dania, Florida; and Smit Salvage, Annapolis, Maryland.

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguishedscholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science andtechnology and to their use for the general welfare. On the authority of the charter granted to it by theCongress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on sci-entific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the NationalAcademy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in itsadministration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciencesthe responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering alsosponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research,and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is president of theNational Academy of Engineering.

The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to securethe services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters per-taining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the NationalAcademy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, onits own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Finebergis president of the Institute of Medicine.

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to asso-ciate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furtheringknowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policiesdetermined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both theNational Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to thegovernment, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administeredjointly by both the Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. WilliamA. Wulf are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council.

The Transportation Research Board is a division of the National Research Council, which serves theNational Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. The Board’s mission is topromote innovation and progress in transportation through research. In an objective and interdisci-plinary setting, the Board facilitates the sharing of information on transportation practice and policyby researchers and practitioners; stimulates research and offers research management services thatpromote technical excellence; provides expert advice on transportation policy and programs; and dis-seminates research results broadly and encourages their implementation. The Board’s varied activitiesannually engage more than 5,000 engineers, scientists, and other transportation researchers and prac-titioners from the public and private sectors and academia, all of whom contribute their expertise inthe public interest. The program is supported by state transportation departments, federal agenciesincluding the component administrations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and other orga-nizations and individuals interested in the development of transportation. www.TRB.org

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Preface

Malcolm MacKinnon III, Chair, Committee for Marine Salvage Response Capability: A Workshop

The U.S. Navy (USN) Office of the Supervisor ofSalvage and Diving (SupSalv) maintains a capa-bility to respond to maritime accidents and

provide ship salvage services in emergencies.Although the office was established primarily to meetmilitary needs for search and salvage, it also providesservices to meet certain commercial emergency sal-vage needs. The Navy has overall responsibility forensuring that the nation has salvage capabilities on allcoasts to respond to disasters and to protect the pub-lic interest. Within this context, SupSalv is responsi-ble for emergency marine salvage preparedness in theevent of a terrorist incident in U.S. ports and water-ways, and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has a broadresponsibility for homeland security, including thenation’s seaports.

The United States is a world trade leader with aneconomy increasingly dependent on ocean transporta-tion and the vitality of ports and waterways. If a terror-ist-related or other incident results in the blockage of aharbor or waterway, emergency towing vessels, salvagevessels, experienced divers, and other professionals mustbe available to respond. In recognition of this need, itwas decided to evaluate the status of U.S. marine salvageresponse capabilities, particularly with respect to poten-tial terrorist-related incidents that could affect commer-cial and military operations in U.S. harbors andwaterways. The National Academies’ Marine Boardwithin the Transportation Research Board was asked bySupSalv to assist in the evaluation by conducting aworkshop involving salvage experts in both industry

and government to consider the status of preparednessand suggest steps for improvement if needed.

An ad hoc committee was appointed to plan andconduct the workshop addressing national salvageresponse capabilities, with particular attention to theconsequences of potential terrorist incidents affectingoperations in U.S. ports and waterways. Issues thatwere considered include organizational and interagencycoordination as well as response capabilities. The work-shop addressed economic, legal, forensic, environmen-tal, and human casualty issues related to salvage. Theprincipal goals of the workshop were (a) to share infor-mation among relevant agencies, organizations, andother interested parties concerning current salvageresponse capabilities and (b) to determine if there areany major gaps or concerns with respect to currentcapabilities and agency roles.

The committee membership included experts inmarine salvage, port and waterways management, portand harbor safety, ship operations and management,marine and transportation engineering systems, riskassessment and management, and environmental issues.Members had backgrounds in marine salvage responseand capability as well as in legal, economic, and envi-ronmental issues; and they understood agency missionsand interagency coordination and communicationsefforts required for effective, efficient salvage response.

The committee met before the workshop to developthe workshop agenda and prepare a list of invitees. Inmeetings following the workshop, the committeereviewed information presented at the workshop and

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developed resulting conclusions and recommendationsfor future action. These proceedings contain a summaryof workshop discussions and committee recommenda-tions highlighting important topics and issues that war-rant further, more detailed inquiry by the responsiblefederal agencies.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The work of this committee has been greatly helped bythe thoughtful advice and background information pro-vided by all of the participants in the workshop (who arelisted in Appendix B) as well as by other government andindustry officials who were consulted during the study.The committee gratefully acknowledges the contributionsof time and information provided by the sponsor liaisonsand the many individuals within and outside governmentwho are interested or involved in port security and salvageissues. The committee would particularly like to thank theliaison representatives Capt. James R. Wilkins, USN, andRichard Buckingham, Naval Sea Systems Command, whoresponded promptly and with a generous spirit to thecommittee’s requests for information.

The committee is especially indebted to the salvageindustry representatives, researchers, and scientists whoprovided input to the committee. In particular, the com-mittee thanks Capt. Richard P. Fiske of the MacKinnon-Searle Consortium, LLC, and Richard Fredericks, Directorof the American Salvage Association, for their helpfuladvice. Special thanks are also extended to RADMThomas Gilmour, USCG; Michael Kidby, U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers; Mark Johnson, Department of Home-land Security; Steve Krueger and Mark Whitworth,Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Capt. James R.Wilkins, USN, who participated in the federal agencypanel at the workshop, and to Cappy Bisso, Roger Elliott,Mauricio Garrido, James Shirley, Jr., Robert Umb-denstock, and J. Arnold Witte, who participated in theindustry panel at the workshop.

The project was conducted under the overall supervi-sion of Joedy Cambridge, Marine Board Staff Director.Beverly Huey and Pete Johnson managed the project anddrafted the report under the guidance of the committee.The committee gratefully acknowledges the work and sup-port of Suzanne Schneider, Associate Executive Director ofTRB, who managed the review process; of NaomiKassabian, Editor; of Jennifer J. Weeks, Senior EditorialAssistant; and of Javy Awan, Director of Publications.

The report was reviewed in draft form by individualschosen for their diverse perspectives and technicalexpertise, in accordance with procedures approved bythe National Research Council’s Report ReviewCommittee. The purpose of this independent review isto provide candid and critical comments that will assistthe institution in making the published report as soundas possible and to ensure that the report meets institu-tional standards for objectivity, evidence, and respon-siveness to the study charge. The review comments anddraft manuscript remain confidential to protect theintegrity of the deliberative process.

The committee thanks the following individuals fortheir review of this report: Stephen E. Flynn, Council onForeign Relations, New York; Jacqueline Michel, ResearchPlanning, Inc., Columbia, South Carolina; RADM JohnBrad Mooney, Jr., J. Brad Mooney Associates, Austin,Texas; and Malcolm Spaulding, University of RhodeIsland. Although these reviewers provided many construc-tive comments and suggestions, they were not asked toendorse the findings and conclusions, nor did they see thefinal draft before its release.

The review of this report was overseen by C. MichaelWalton, University of Texas, Austin. Appointed by theNational Research Council, he was responsible formaking certain that an independent examination of thisreport was carried out in accordance with institutionalprocedures and that all review comments were carefullyconsidered. Responsibility for the final content of thisreport rests entirely with the authoring committee andthe institution.

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Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................................7Background, 8Approach, 8Hypothetical Terrorist Scenarios, 9Panel Discussion Topics, 9Organization of the Report, 10

SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS......................................................................................................11Physical Salvage and Harbor Clearance Issues, 12Financial, Economic, and Political Issues, 14Legal, Forensic, and Human Casualty Issues, 16Environmental Issues, 17

COMMITTEE ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSE CAPABILITIES BASED ON WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS ...........................19Status of Physical Salvage Response Capabilities, 19Overview of Current Response Plans, 24Current Response Organizational Structures, 24Utility of Exercises or Drills, 25

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SALVAGE READINESS............................................................28Inventory of Salvage Assets, 29Marine Salvage Response Exercises, 29Revision of Salvage Response Organizational Structures, 30Study of Legislative, Regulatory, and Policy Issues, 30

APPENDIX AMARINE SALVAGE RESPONSE CAPABILITY WORKSHOP: AGENDA...................................................................32

APPENDIX BMARINE SALVAGE RESPONSE CAPABILITY WORKSHOP: PARTICIPANTS ...........................................................34

STUDY COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION .....................................................................................37

1

Federal officials and industry leaders have recentlyfocused national attention on the security of U.S.seaports and posed serious questions about how

best to prevent future terrorist incidents in and aroundthese facilities. Equally important, however, are ques-tions about U.S. capabilities to respond adequately toa terrorist incident should one occur. Ports and water-ways are vital to the nation’s economic well-being, andthe closure of major harbors would have an enormousimpact on both commercial and military operations.The response to such incidents would involve manygovernment agencies and organizations at the federal,state, and local levels. With this in mind, the U.S. NavyOffice of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving(SupSalv) asked the National Academies’ MarineBoard within the Transportation Research Board toconvene a workshop of marine transportation and sal-vage professionals as well as organizational stakehold-ers in government and industry. The workshop wasdesigned to explore and evaluate current capabilities torespond to terrorist incidents in major U.S. seaportsand to report on the current readiness posture andstrategies to improve deficiencies.

Given the current elevated threat level, the restruc-turing of parts of the federal government with the estab-lishment of the Department of Homeland Security(DHS), and variations in response missions of differentfederal agencies,1 it is timely to consider whether U.S.

marine salvage capabilities are adequate for respondingto terrorist-related incidents. It is critical that ports andwaterways be kept open to provide services with mini-mal interruption. If a terrorist-related or other incidentresults in the blockage of a harbor or waterway, clear-ance of the channel, waterway, or harbor, or all three,will be a major focus of the response efforts. In addi-tion, many other issues, such as organizational andinteragency coordination, must be addressed, especiallyif there are human casualties and public health impacts.The principal goals of the workshop were to shareinformation among participants concerning currentmarine salvage response capabilities and to determine ifthere are major gaps or concerns regarding the currentcapabilities and agency roles.

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard(USCG) has given increased emphasis to maritimehomeland security to reflect its leadership role in thatmission area while continuing to have responsibilityfor maritime safety, protection of natural resources,maritime mobility, and national defense (e.g., portsand waterways security). Thus, for maritime incidentssuch as collisions, groundings, and shipboard fires,USCG usually takes the federal lead responsibility forresponse. If salvage response is needed, USCG typi-cally relies on the responsible party to provide com-mercial salvage capability. In the absence of adequateaction by the responsible party, as well as in any case

Executive Summary

1 The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and other agencies within DHS, theNavy, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the FederalBureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA), the Maritime Administration (MARAD),the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), and the NationalTransportation Safety Board (NTSB).

requiring salvage expertise, USCG calls upon the Navyfor salvage assistance.

Traditionally, the Navy has been the federal agencythat maintains the ability to respond to maritime acci-dents requiring professional marine salvage services.SupSalv was established to meet military needs formaritime salvage and underwater search operations,and that remains its primary mission. To meet itsresponsibilities, SupSalv augments the Navy’s internalresources through competitive long-term contractswith commercial salvors to provide additional assets,personnel, and cutting-edge technology as needed.Because of its unique capabilities and recognizedexpertise in the field, SupSalv also has the discretionaryauthority, under the Salvage Facilities Act (P.L. 80-513,10 U.S.C. Sections 7361-–7367), to provide and pro-mote domestic marine salvage facilities and capabilitiesfor private-sector as well as public-sector vessels. TheNavy’s ability to exercise that authority with respect tothe private sector has been, and continues to be, con-strained by budgetary considerations and shrinkinginternal salvage resources.

In 1982, the Marine Board conducted a comprehen-sive study of U.S. salvage needs and capabilities andpublished Marine Salvage in the United States. Thisreport was followed by a 1994 Marine Board report, AReassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of theUnited States, which describes the Navy’s salvageresources and its contribution to the nation’s salvagecapabilities. The overall organization of the Navy’s sal-vage mission has remained much the same since 1994,but there has been a continuing decline in the numberof vessels and other resources. In addition, the 1994report found that there is not enough marine salvagebusiness to support a commercial salvage industrysolely dedicated to traditional salvage work, and thatreality continues today. Since the 1994 study, substan-tial changes have occurred in public and private sal-vage capabilities as well as in public expectations forthe nation’s ability to respond to major incidents atsea. The major U.S. salvage companies recently formedthe American Salvage Association (ASA) with theintent of agreeing to and defining joint interests ofsalvors for representation before federal agencies andthe general public.

In summary, there has been no significant increase inthe number of domestic salvage vessels or their capabil-ities in recent years. Although marine casualties in U.S.waters are at a historically low rate, recent events—notably the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centerand the Pentagon in the United States and the attack onthe USS Cole in the Port of Yemen—suggest that issuesrelating to national salvage capability have importancenot only in terms of transportation, economic, andenvironmental concerns but also for homeland security.

THE WORKSHOP

The Workshop on Marine Salvage Response Capability,held at the National Academies on August 5–6, 2003,brought together experts in salvage response, govern-ment officials responsible for incident response, and rep-resentatives of stakeholder organizations. During theworkshop, the role of salvage and the response to poten-tial terrorist incidents affecting U.S. ports and waterwayswere discussed, including the issue of organizational andinteragency coordination. Specifically addressed werephysical salvage and harbor clearance issues; financial,economic, and political issues; legal, forensic, and humancasualty issues; and environmental issues.

Before the workshop, the Committee for MarineSalvage Response Capability developed two scenariosinvolving terrorist incidents through a process of inter-views with experts and industry officials familiar withthese ports and their vulnerabilities. At the beginning ofthe workshop, the committee introduced the partici-pants to the results of the hypothetical maritime terror-ist scenarios, which were developed for the purpose ofexploring and testing salvage response capabilities—one in the Port of Houston, Texas, and the other in thePort of New Orleans, Louisiana. The committee madeassumptions concerning what determined terroristswith sufficient assets could accomplish. The two portsselected are major, world-class commercial shippingcomplexes—both along the U.S. Gulf Coast—handlingsignificant international and domestic waterborne com-merce. The Port of Houston is the second largest in theUnited States by tonnage carried and conducts a majortrade in petroleum, chemicals, and other hazardous car-goes with large refineries and petrochemical plantsalong the waterway. The Port of New Orleans andother ports along the Mississippi River from BatonRouge south handle more combined tonnage than anyother U.S. port and accommodate a huge variety oflarge ocean-going ships, barges, tugs, and other vessels.

The hypothetical scenario for Houston concerned aterrorist attack causing a collision between a cruise shipand a chemical tanker. Both vessels were sunk and wereblocking the Houston ship channel. The chemicaltanker exploded and the result was mass conflagrationwith a spill of an unknown mix and quantity of haz-ardous chemicals. The passenger ship was carrying2,100 passengers plus crew. It became engulfed in fire,was flooded, and suffered an unknown number ofhuman casualties. The prevailing winds carried a cloudof toxic chemical vapors and smoke from the collisionsite toward the city of Houston.

The hypothetical incident for New Orleans resultedfrom a terrorist-caused explosion aboard a producttanker and sinking of the vessel in the Mississippi River,the disabling of the Algiers locks in the Gulf

2 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S

Intracoastal Waterway (GICW), and the destruction ofa state highway bridge across the Mississippi River. Theproduct tanker was sunk across the river blocking thechannel at Southwest Pass, and the GICW andMississippi River were blocked at New Orleans becauseof the disabled locks and destruction of the bridge.There was a mass conflagration on the product tanker.

After discussing these incidents, designated workshopparticipants divided into two panels—one governmentand one industry. These panels assessed likely salvageresponses. The first panel included representatives of keyfederal agencies with authority and responsibility torespond to these types of incidents and specifically theirmarine salvage component. These panel members dis-cussed their anticipated overall salvage response and iden-tified their respective agency’s role in such an incident.They also described existing procedures for managing andimplementing a coordinated response and providing theneeded resources. The salvage industry panel first com-mented on the salvage problem presented and then dis-cussed the expected salvage response drawing on theirknowledge and experience.

At the end of the panel presentations, a general dis-cussion was held with questions or comments from theentire workshop. The results of these panel discussionsset the stage for more detailed discussions with fourbreakout groups: (a) physical salvage and harbor clear-ance issues; (b) financial, economic, and political issues;(c) legal, forensic, and human casualty issues; and (d)environmental issues.

Each of the four breakout groups used the informa-tion presented in plenary sessions to discuss the sce-nario results, responses, and likely impacts from theirperspective. A moderator in each group summarized theresults of the group discussions and presented it to thefull workshop. Each group prepared a final summary ofdiscussions including the participants’ views as to whatthe most useful next steps might be. A final plenary ses-sion gave all participants an opportunity to commenton each group’s results and offer other observations.The committee used these workshop results to preparethese proceedings, which include summaries of eachgroup’s discussion, overall observations about the keyissues, and committee recommendations for actionsthat the responsible agencies should take to improvefuture marine salvage readiness to respond to seaportterrorist incidents.

Workshop participants considered the adequacy ofsalvage assets to respond to the hypothetical scenarios.Although many participants from the salvage industrybelieved that past performance on marine salvage prob-lems of similar magnitude shows that the industry hasthe needed capabilities, the question could only beaddressed in a very general way given the time and lim-ited information available for the workshop. Perhaps a

more pressing question was whether necessary capabili-ties will be maintained into the future given the natureof the industry and the overall business climate.Workshop participants, including experienced membersof the marine salvage community, were not able to iden-tify specifically the existing physical capabilities thatwould be available to government responders and plan-ners for the hypothetical scenarios. Consequently, theywere not able to provide an anticipated time frame forresponse, which is a critical component of readiness pos-ture. It is clear that physical salvage capabilities in theUnited States have not been documented and evaluatedin sufficient detail to define whether the nation has anadequate readiness posture for responding to terroristincidents in major seaports.

The status of organizational capabilities2 for ade-quate salvage response was also addressed at the work-shop. Many participants believed that readiness in thisarea is improving but needs sustained attention in thefuture. A number of areas were discussed in which sal-vage input to the planning process could be enhancedfor the purpose of improving readiness and the abilityto deploy and utilize salvage assets when needed torespond to terrorist incidents. Several specific sugges-tions were offered for modifying ongoing planningefforts with homeland security initiatives.

The workshop participants considered whether fur-ther tests and evaluations would help address remain-ing questions about the U.S. readiness posture.Whether the nation has adequate salvage resources,capabilities, and organizational structures to respondto a major terrorist incident in U.S. seaports remainsan open question, particularly considering the magni-tude of economic and social impacts that might occur.The participants discussed the value of conductingdrills and exercises as a method of more specificallyevaluating capabilities and identifying needs. Theseexercises were considered a useful step to evaluatemore completely where improvements in salvage readi-ness would bring concrete results. Both tabletop andfield exercises have been used in similar fashions andcould be designed specifically to answer questionsabout salvage assets as well as organizational issues.

Also addressed at the workshop were a number ofother issues of concern to the marine salvage commu-nity and those responsible for planning and managingsalvage response. Participants identified unresolved reg-ulatory and policy issues that could affect the ability ofgovernment and industry to maintain an acceptablereadiness posture. These issues included questions

3E X E C U T I V E S U M M A RY

2 Organizational capabilities are defined as the makeup and capabil-ities of intra- and interagency planning groups, the adequacy ofresponse plans, the expertise of the planners and responders, and themethods of implementing response actions when needed.

about funding, liability, planning processes, and proto-cols for addressing impacts not directly a part of salvagebut having an effect on salvage operations. All of theseissues could not be covered during the time given forthe workshop. Therefore, these issues remain an impor-tant aspect of future work to improve capabilitieswithin the government and private sector.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The workshop discussions and the results of eachbreakout group’s consideration of the questions posedfocused on two general areas of concern regardingcapabilities—physical capabilities and organizationalcapabilities. Although discussions about responses tohypothetical scenarios were not detailed enough tohighlight the need to obtain or maintain specific phys-ical assets, they did provide an overall sense that,although U.S. commercial salvage capabilities are sig-nificant, more work is required to define the physicalassets and organizational competency necessary tomeet a terrorist threat. In reviewing the workshopresults, the committee concludes that further work infour areas is necessary to improve the nation’s readi-ness posture regarding marine salvage capabilities: (a)maintaining an inventory and evaluation of availablephysical salvage assets, (b) conducting tabletop exer-cises to test physical and organizational readiness pos-ture, (c) improving salvage expertise and input to theplanning and response networks, and (d) conductingfurther study of related legal, regulatory, and policyissues. The committee’s recommended next steps in these four areas are described in more detail in thefollowing sections.

Inventory of Marine Salvage Assets

Because the workshop did not have the time orresources to conduct a comprehensive review of phys-ical assets in the marine salvage industry and the rele-vant government agencies, definitive conclusionsabout readiness were not possible. In addition, manyworkshop participants believed that specific answersto questions about the adequacy of response or readi-ness are very dependent on the specifics of the incidentand are difficult to generalize. Nevertheless, the com-mittee believes that response planners need to haveaccess to an inventory of salvage assets maintained byresponsible government agencies and the salvageindustry and that a gap analysis—an assessment ofsalvage needs compared with available assets—shouldbe conducted, taking into account the need for timelyresponse.

Therefore, the committee makes the following rec-ommendations:

• SupSalv, in consultation with USCG and the com-mercial salvage industry, should maintain an inventoryof available marine salvage and firefighting assets. Theinventory should be updated at regular intervals withsufficient frequency to maintain current information.

• SupSalv should conduct a series of gap analyses bycomparing available assets with those required torespond effectively to a range of potential marine ter-rorist activities as well as other major marine salvageincidents. The analyses should consider all critical sal-vage response measures including rescue towing, harborand channel clearing, dredging, search and recovery,patching and refloating of vessels, and marine firefight-ing. The adequacy of anticipated response times on aregional basis should be included in the gap analyses.

• The USCG should promulgate final rules for ves-sel response plans as soon as is practical to provide nec-essary guidance on effective response times for salvageoperations.

• If the gap analyses show that current marine sal-vage assets are insufficient to respond to plausible ter-rorist threats in U.S. seaports and waterways,responsible federal agencies should consider revisingthe existing national salvage policy to provide for thenecessary salvage capability in the future.

Marine Salvage Response Exercises

The committee believes that a logical next step in eval-uating marine salvage readiness is to conduct detailedexercises using plausible terrorist incidents, the realisticcomplements of response systems and equipment, andthe complete response organizational structure. Such anexercise would be designed to assess the U.S. readinessposture in the event of a terrorist act affecting U.S. har-bors and waterways with a particular focus on themarine salvage component. Specifically, the committeerecommends the following:

The responsible federal agencies should plan andconduct a high-level tabletop salvage response exer-cise. Participants in the exercise should be seniormembers from the relevant agencies and private orga-nizations who are capable of making the decisionsnecessary to ensure proper responses. The exercisecould follow scenarios similar to those used in theworkshop. The exercise should be carefully plannedand led by an experienced facilitator. Additional exer-cises should follow the first for the purpose of testingdifferent scenarios in different locations.

Responsible agencies should conduct a supplementalexercise utilizing the same scenarios as those for the high-


level tabletop exercise to test the interactions necessary toidentify and mobilize the salvage assets necessary to clearharbors and channels so that the ports can be reopenedin the most efficient fashion. This exercise should includerepresentatives from the Navy, the salvage industry, andother related stakeholders.

In addition, individual agencies should conduct theirown exercises, designed to test the responses necessaryto support the opening of the port or ports in the mostefficient manner. An example would be an exercise con-ducted by the FBI to determine the most efficient han-dling of the crime scene, thereby allowing clearanceoperations to proceed in a timely fashion. Other agen-cies might include USACE, USCG, NSTB, and local fireand police departments, among others.

Public affairs specialists from the various federalentities participating in the exercises should also beinvolved. Such a procedure would acquaint publicaffairs specialists with salvage efforts and should pre-pare them to handle the myriad public affairs challengesin an actual salvage operation.

Salvage Response Organizational Structures

The committee considered the results of workshop dis-cussions and concerns about how existing organiza-tional structures are implemented within the responsiblefederal agencies and how these organizations receive andutilize expertise and advice about marine salvage opera-tions and capabilities. The committee concluded thatresponse readiness could be significantly enhanced byimproved interagency coordination. Organizationalstructures need to be revised at several levels in order toinclude salvage expertise in both planning and responseoperations. Specifically, the committee has the followingrecommendations:

• The membership of the Secretary of HomelandSecurity’s National Maritime Security AdvisoryCommittee should be modified to include a marinesalvage expert.

• The Coast Guard Director of Homeland Securityshould develop a liaison position with SupSalv.

• The structure of the National Response Planshould provide for the inclusion of salvage expertise inthe National Incident Management System (NIMS).

Legislative, Regulatory, and Policy Issues

The workshop participants identified a number of unre-solved legislative, regulatory, and policy issues associ-ated with marine salvage operations resulting fromterrorist acts. The committee noted that marine salvage

companies are not guaranteed immunity duringresponse operations and thus there is the potential forcivil or criminal liability if pollution incidents occurduring salvage operations. Industry participantsbelieved that this potential is a serious disincentive forsalvors to undertake some salvage operations. Otherparticipants were concerned that there are inadequatefunding methods in place to cover effective salvageresponse resulting from terrorist attacks. A number offunding options could be explored, including expansionof existing systems or development of new ones pat-terned after successful funding mechanisms that arenow in place. Workshop participants, noting the use of“standby” salvage in other parts of the world, discussedthe potential for increased use of standby salvage capa-bility as a mechanism to fill the gap in salvage capacityin the United States and to ensure timely response inemergency situations.

Another issue identified by workshop participantswas the absence of a process for designating places ofrefuge or safe havens when a vessel has experiencedserious damage. Past experience has shown that thisdeficiency can present a critical obstacle to effective sal-vage operations. Some issues were also identified in theworkshop that relate to topics other than salvage butaffect the conduct of salvage operations. For example,environmental impacts and public health considera-tions need to be an integral part of any crisis manage-ment decision-making process. Participants noted that aprotocol for addressing public health impacts of a ter-rorist event or consequent salvage operations is notclearly defined and that this lack contributes to thepotential vulnerability of the public during a terroristevent. In addition, the absence of a protocol foraddressing human casualties in maritime incidentscould result in potential confusion over jurisdiction andlogistics for effectively addressing decedent affairs.

Because these policy issues need to be resolved beforesalvage response readiness can be ensured, the commit-tee recommends that a study of outstanding legal, regu-latory, and policy issues be conducted to determine howbest to address the following concerns:

• The development of an appropriate process withinthe emergency response organizations to fund adequatelysalvage operations resulting from a terrorist event;

• The development of a process to designate places ofrefuge or safe havens for the conduct of salvage operations;

• A perceived need for responder immunity andconsequent civil liability for nonnegligent salvage oper-ations that result in pollution or other unintended orunavoidable damages;

• The establishment of a protocol for addressingpublic health impacts of a terrorist event or consequentsalvage operations;

5E X E C U T I V E S U M M A RY

• The establishment of a protocol for addressinghuman casualties and decedent affairs for maritimecasualties; and

• The establishment of standby salvage capability insome particularly vulnerable and busy port and harbor.


7

Introduction

The United States is a world trade leader with aneconomy increasingly dependent on oceantransportation and the vitality of the nation’s

ports and waterways. U.S. ports and waterways, how-ever, are remarkably diverse in terms of the vessel traf-fic served, the types of services provided, geography,and environmental conditions. Because ports must beable to provide efficient, rapid turnaround capabilitiesto accommodate not only expanding trade but also theincreasing size and speed of ocean-going ships, it iscritical that ports and waterways be kept open to pro-vide these services on a continuous, uninterruptedbasis. If a terrorist-related or other incident results inthe blockage of a harbor or waterway, emergency tow-ing vessels, salvage vessels, dredging equipment, andsalvage personnel must be available to respond.

Traditionally, the U.S. Navy has been the federalagency that maintains the ability to respond to mar-itime incidents requiring professional marine salvageservices. Within the Navy, the Supervisor of Salvage andDiving (SupSalv) was established to meet military needsfor maritime salvage and underwater search operations,and that remains its primary mission. To meet itsresponsibilities, SupSalv augments the Navy’s internalresources through competitive, long-term support con-tracts with commercial salvors to provide additionalassets, personnel, and cutting-edge technology asneeded. Because of its unique capabilities and recog-nized expertise in the field, SupSalv also has the discre-tionary authority, under the Salvage Facilities Act (P.L.80-513, 10 U.S.C. Sections 7361–7364), to provide andpromote domestic marine salvage facilities and capabil-

ities for private-sector as well as public-sector vessels.The Navy’s ability to exercise that authority withrespect to the private sector has been, and continues tobe, constrained by budgetary considerations andshrinking internal salvage resources.

Although the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has increasedits emphasis in maritime homeland security to reflect itsleadership role in that mission area, it also has responsi-bility for maritime safety, protection of naturalresources, maritime mobility, and national defense. Formaritime incidents such as collisions, groundings, andshipboard fires, USCG usually takes the federal leadresponsibility for response. However, if salvage responseis needed, USCG typically relies on the responsible partyto provide commercial salvage capability. For example,USCG maintains requirements for marine salvage andfirefighting resources in vessel response plans for tankvessels carrying oil. The existing requirements are cur-rently being revised to clarify what services must beidentified in vessel response plans. In some instances,USCG calls upon the Navy for salvage expertise andcapability.

In recent years, there has been no significantincrease in the number of domestic salvage vessels andno significant enhanced capability or availability ofexisting vessels (Volpe 2001). Although marine casu-alties in U.S. waters are at a historically low rate(NRC 2003), recent events—notably the September11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and theattack on the USS Cole in the Port of Yemen—suggestthat issues relating to national marine salvage capabil-ity have importance not only for transportation, the

economy, and the environment but also for homelandsecurity.

Given the current variations in salvage missions of thedifferent agencies, the restructuring of some parts of thefederal government with the establishment of theDepartment of Homeland Security, and resulting changesin agency missions, it is timely to discuss and considerwhether there is a need to reexamine U.S. marine salvageresponse capability, particularly with respect to potentialterrorist-related incidents that could affect commercialand military operations in U.S. harbors and waterways.

BACKGROUND

In 1982, the Marine Board conducted a comprehensivestudy of salvage needs and capabilities, the findings ofwhich appear in the report Marine Salvage in theUnited States (NRC 1982). This report was followed byA Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of theUnited States (NRC 1994), which contains a descrip-tion of the Navy’s salvage resources and contribution tothe nation’s salvage capabilities. The overall organiza-tion of the Navy’s capabilities has remained much thesame since that report, but there has been a continuingdecline in the number of vessels and other availableresources (Volpe 2001). In addition, the 1994 reportfound that there was insufficient marine salvage busi-ness to support a commercial salvage industry solelydedicated to traditional salvage work. This lack of sup-port continues to be a concern today. Since the 1994study, substantial changes have occurred in public andprivate salvage capabilities as well as in public expecta-tions for the nation’s ability to respond to major casu-alties at sea. In 2000, the major U.S. salvage companiesformed the American Salvage Association (ASA) withthe intent of agreeing to and defining joint interests ofsalvors for representation before federal agencies andthe general public. The plans and policies of this groupwill be important to consider in any assessment offuture salvage capabilities.

Significant changes have also occurred in maritimetraffic and shipping in general in major U.S. ports andwaterways. The state of Washington now requiresescort tugs for certain tankers operating in Puget Soundand standby tugs for areas in which emergency towingservices might be needed. USCG also conducted a for-mal risk assessment as well as a regulatory assessmenton the use of tugs to protect against oil spills, whichincluded an analysis of the costs and benefits for vari-ous prevention and mitigation measures (Volpe 2001).The Puget Sound situation is illustrative of the issues insalvage and rescue tug operations that can arise whenthe perceived risk of accidents and oil spill pollution ishigh. The additional complexities associated with ter-

rorist-related incidents make the need to examine theseissues even more apparent.

In addition, many other maritime nations haveexpressed an interest in emergency response to tankeraccidents that might cause pollution. (A recent exampleis the Prestige incident off the European coast.) Onescheme has been to station salvage vessels or tow vesselsin strategic locations to reduce response time and pro-vide needed emergency capabilities. In Europe, theUnited Kingdom and France have adopted this stand-byapproach as a way of protecting against future tankerspills; they have stationed emergency towing vessels atstrategic locations in the English Channel and elsewhere.

SupSalv has recognized the changing nature of mar-itime traffic, the need for increased port security in lightof the threat of terrorist activity, the importance of keep-ing ports and channels open, and the continuing declinein U.S. salvage assets. These factors led SupSalv to seekthe assistance of the Marine Board to evaluate currentsalvage capabilities and to investigate the U.S. salvagereadiness posture including organizational issues withinthe responsible federal agencies. The Board agreed toconvene a workshop with participation from both thecommercial salvage industry and the federal agencies.

APPROACH

The workshop brought together professionals withexpertise in U.S. marine salvage response capabilities,particularly with respect to potential terrorist incidentsin U.S. ports or waterways that could disrupt or haltcommercial shipping operations and affect the environ-ment or other transportation operations, as well as rep-resentatives of various stakeholder organizations.During the workshop, the role of salvage and U.S.response capabilities to the consequences of potentialterrorist incidents affecting operations in U.S. ports andwaterways was discussed. This discussion included orga-nizational and interagency coordination as well asresponse capabilities. The workshop addressed (a) phys-ical salvage and harbor clearance issues; (b) financial,economic, and political issues; (c) legal, forensic, andhuman casualty issues; and (d) environmental issuesrelated to salvage. The principal goals of the workshopwere (a) to share information among relevant agencies,organizations, and other interested parties concerningcurrent salvage response capabilities, and (b) to deter-mine if there are any major gaps or concerns withrespect to current capabilities and agency roles.

The committee met before the workshop to discusshypothetical terrorist scenarios and decided to use thescenario strategy to focus and direct the workshop.The initial conditions that resulted from the scenarioswere presented to workshop participants for their


response and reaction. The committee also developedthe workshop agenda and identified panelists whocould address likely responses to the scenarios. Atmeetings following the workshop, the committeereviewed the information presented at the workshopand developed key findings and recommendations.These proceedings contain a summary of workshopdiscussions, the approach used to identify marine sal-vage capabilities and possible problems, and commit-tee recommendations highlighting important topicsand issues that warrant further, more detailed inquiryby the Navy, USCG, and others.

The workshop began with a brief description of theresults of hypothetical terrorist scenarios in two U.S.ports. Following this description two panels were con-vened. The first comprised federal agency representa-tives from USCG, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, theOffice of Maritime and Land Security, TransportationSecurity Administration, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI), and SupSalv. The second panel con-sisted of marine salvage industry representatives. (SeeAppendix A, page 32, for the workshop agenda; panelparticipants are listed in Appendix B, page 34.)

Following the panel sessions, four topical breakout ses-sions were held concurrently. Each group discussed thescenario results, responses, and likely impacts from thetopical perspective of their respective breakout session.

HYPOTHETICAL TERRORIST SCENARIOS

At the beginning of the workshop the committee pre-sented the results of two hypothetical maritime terror-ist scenarios that were developed for the purpose ofexploring and testing salvage response capabilities—one in the Port of Houston, Texas, and the other in thePort of New Orleans, Louisiana. The committee devel-oped these scenarios through a process of interviewingexperts familiar with these ports and the members ofthe local commercial maritime industry and consideringthe possible vulnerabilities that exist. Assumptions werethen made concerning what a terrorist group with suf-ficient assets could accomplish. The two ports selectedare major, world-class commercial shipping com-plexes—both along the U.S. Gulf Coast—handling sig-nificant international and domestic waterbornecommerce. The Port of Houston is the second largest inthe United States by tonnage carried (about 185 milliontons per year), accommodates 6,600 major ships eachyear, and conducts a major trade in petroleum, chemi-cals, and other hazardous materials cargoes with majorrefineries and petrochemical plants along the waterway.The Port of New Orleans and other ports along thesouthern Mississippi River handle more tonnage thanany other U.S. port at about 359 million tons per year

and accommodate a huge variety of large ocean-goingships, barges, tugs, and other vessels.

The hypothetical scenario presented for Houstonconcerned a terrorist-caused collision between a cruiseship and a chemical tanker. Both vessels were sunk andblocking the Houston ship channel. The chemicaltanker, loaded with 17,000 tons of mixed but unknownchemicals, exploded, resulting in mass conflagrationand a spill of unknown hazardous chemicals. The pas-senger ship was carrying 2,100 passengers plus crew. Itsuffered fires and flooding and an unknown number ofhuman casualties. The prevailing winds were from thecollision site toward the city of Houston.

In the incident for New Orleans, terrorist activityresulted in a product tanker explosion and sinking inthe Mississippi River, the disabling of the Algiers locksin the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GICW), and thedestruction of the State Highway 90 bridge across theMississippi River. The product tanker was sunk acrossthe river blocking the channel at Southwest Pass, andthe Mississippi River access was blocked at NewOrleans because of the disabled locks and destructionof the bridge. There was a mass conflagration on theproduct tanker.

After presenting and discussing the major factors ofthese incidents, the workshop participants, organizedinto one government and one industry panel, addressedtheir assessment of key elements of a likely response—especially related to how the salvage activities would becarried out and how they would relate to the otheractivities anticipated during such an event.

PANEL DISCUSSION TOPICS

The first panel included representatives of key federalagencies with authority and responsibility to respond tosalvage incidents in U.S. ports and waterways. Panelmembers were asked to discuss the anticipated overallsalvage response to the incidents presented and to iden-tify their agency’s respective role or roles in such inci-dents. They were also asked to describe the existingprocedures for managing and implementing a coordi-nated response and providing the needed resources. Inparticular, to the extent possible, they were asked toaddress the following questions:

• What are the specific roles and responsibilities ofyour agency in responding to an incident such as those pre-sented to the workshop? Are these roles and responsibilitiesformally established and have they been updated recently?

• Has your agency developed a comprehensive planfor such a salvage response and clearly defined its rela-tionship to that of other responsible agencies as well as tothe private sector? Has this plan been tested?

9I N T R O D U C T I O N

• How will the National Response Plan, currentlyunder development, affect your roles, responsibilities,and agency relationships?

• Would you anticipate any problems or shortfalls incapabilities to respond to the incidents presented basedon your knowledge of both government and privateequipment and resources available?

• What organizational or procedural problems wouldyou anticipate in responding to the incidents presentedand how might these be addressed?

• What steps would you suggest be considered inorder to improve the overall readiness posture of thenation for responding to incidents such as those presentedor similar threats?

The second panel included representatives of themarine salvage industry. These panelists were asked tofirst comment on the salvage problems presented andthen discuss the expected salvage response drawing ontheir knowledge and experience with the required typeof salvage actions and any local knowledge they mayhave had of the Houston-Galveston and LowerMississippi port complexes. In particular, they wereasked to address the following issues:

• What equipment and personnel are likely to beimmediately available to respond to the scenariospresented?

• What are the key steps and the major types ofresources that would be required for an adequateresponse effort?

• What would be the best estimated times for initialmobilization, first emergency response, and final channelclearing?

• What shortfalls of either equipment or personnelmight be expected and how might these be addressed?

• What organizational or procedural problemsmight be expected and how might these be addressed?

• What steps might be useful to consider in order toimprove overall readiness posture before incidents suchas these?

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The Summary of Workshop Discussions, page 1,offers a brief description of the workshop discussionsand a distillation of the key issues. The next chapter,Committee Assessment of Response CapabilitiesBased on Workshop Discussions, page 19, presentsthe committee’s assessment of existing responsecapabilities, as well as of the nation’s organizationalcapabilities (within both government and privateentities) and physical capabilities (equipment andpersonnel). The chapter concludes with commentsabout whether further steps such as drills or exer-cises or additional study might help to evaluate morecompletely and accurately the status of capabilities.On the basis of the knowledge gained from the work-shop, Committee Recommendations to ImproveSalvage Readiness, page 28, presents the committee’ssuggestions regarding steps that might be taken toimprove the nation’s readiness posture regardingmarine salvage capabilities and identifies a sample ofkey action items.

REFERENCES

NRC National Research CouncilVolpe John A. Volpe National Transportation

Systems Center

NRC. 1982. Marine Salvage in the United States. NationalAcademy Press, Washington, D.C.

NRC. 1994. A Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States. National Academy Press, Washing- ton, D.C.

NRC. 2003. Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and Effects. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

Volpe. 2001. Regulatory Assessment: Salvage and Marine Firefighting Requirements (Draft). John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass.

1 0 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S

1 1

Summary of Workshop Discussions

The Marine Salvage Response CapabilityCommittee of the Marine Board within theTransportation Research Board held this work-

shop on August 5–6, 2003, in Washington, D.C. Theworkshop agenda is shown in Appendix A, page 32.The workshop included three plenary sessions inter-spersed with two breakout sessions to allow a full andopen discussion of the issues by all attendees as well asto focus attention of both federal agency and industryrepresentatives on the readiness to respond to terror-ist attacks on U.S. maritime facilities and how toimprove the nation’s response capabilities. In theopening plenary session, the purpose and goals of theworkshop were presented and two hypothetical ter-rorist attack scenarios were described. Next, two pan-els (one of federal agency representatives and one ofmarine salvage industry representatives) responded toprepared questions about response capabilities.

During the federal agency panel discussion, panelmembers described their respective agency’s roles andresponsibilities. During the industry panel discussion,panelists described the industry’s probable salvageresponse actions following the scenarios presented tothe group. Each panel member was then asked torespond to several questions regarding how theiragency or industry would probably respond andwhether adequate capabilities are available. The ques-tions that were posed to each set of panelists can befound in the Introduction, on page 7. At the end of thepanel presentations, a general question-and-answer

period was held. The plenary sessions were intended toinform participants about federal agency and industryroles, responsibilities, and resources and to set the stagefor more detailed discussions in the four breakoutgroups.

Workshop attendees participated in one of fourbreakout groups:

• Physical Salvage and Harbor Clearance Issues;• Financial, Economic, and Political Issues;• Legal, Forensic, and Human Casualty Issues; and• Environmental Issues.

Using the information presented in plenary sessions,each group discussed the scenario results, responses,and likely impacts from the perspective of each grouptheme. The moderator of each group summarized theresults of the group discussions and presented them tothe full workshop during the second plenary session.Using feedback from the full session, each group thenprepared a final summary of discussions, including use-ful next steps. The breakout group summaries, whichare presented in the following sections, represent thekey results of the workshop and the observations by theworkshop participants about how federal agencies andthe salvage industry would likely respond to terroristattacks of the nature presented in the two scenarios aswell as the response capabilities that are available andthe response capabilities that are needed to attain anadequate readiness posture.

PHYSICAL SALVAGE AND HARBORCLEARANCE ISSUES

The physical salvage and harbor clearance groupreviewed and discussed the most critical such issues fac-ing the salvage industry, including the physicalresources available, the time frames most likely for aresponse (e.g., would it be within months or years in thesituation presented?), questions about where the sal-vage community fits in the Department of HomelandSecurity of the Transportation Security Administration(DHS-TSA) structure in responding to terrorist events,and the level of resource capabilities that might beavailable if the nation were faced with multiple events.

In considering a proper marine salvage response,decision makers must assess the situation, including thecircumstances surrounding it. For example, in the eventof a fire, extinguishing it immediately may be inappro-priate because salvors may not have all the needed dataabout the burning materials and how they might reactwith water or other agents used to fight the fire. Salvorsmust also give adequate consideration to an evolvingsituation that may have multiple needs and require-ments. Because salvage is a dynamic situation, the sal-vage plan may change a number of times, perhapsabruptly, during the course of a typical operation.

One key factor to consider is that there will be pres-sure after a serious event to reopen the waterwayquickly if it is closed by the incident. For instance, par-ticipants estimated that about one week’s crude oil sup-ply is usually available to the refineries above theHouston incident site, and pressure to resume crude oildeliveries to these refineries will be great. One methodthat might be used to expedite reopening a waterway isopen-water dredging of a new channel (without concernfor disposal).1 This operation might be possible in somewaterways and may be the fastest means for opening achannel to shipping. Clearing a channel by salvaging awreck might take much longer.

The group then discussed the physical salvageresources that would be needed and their availabilitygiven the scenarios presented. Most of the commercialsalvors at the workshop believed that they currentlyhave sufficient salvage equipment to effectively carryout the needed salvage response even though they didnot have specific details about all components and theirlocations. However, concern was expressed about thefuture because current needs for salvage do not justifytraining of new people or acquisition of additionalassets, and thus salvage capabilities may diminish with

time. For example, today there are few young salvagemasters, and for most salvage companies, salvage isnow a small part of their overall business (industry par-ticipants estimated 10 to 25 percent). In addition, thereis an issue regarding provision of salvage services byinternational salvors within U.S. waters (in the 3-mileand 12-mile limits) without specific waivers in certainU.S. laws that prohibit foreign flag operations here.There are costs involved in maintaining U.S. equipmentand infrastructure, but customs can waive the U.S. flagrequirement. There is concern, however, that arbitrarywaiving of this requirement will diminish U.S. salvagecapability.

Time to mobilize assets was another issue that wasraised. Even if there is no capability problem, there isconcern about whether equipment can be mobilizedquickly enough to respond to multiple incidents in sev-eral locations. Permission and ability to get the assetsthat are needed are crucial. In most cases, if an incidentresults in a national crisis, the question is mostly one ofmoney and details.

Oil companies own heavy lifting equipment andother assets that they ordinarily will not lease for sal-vage because of liability concerns and prior commit-ments. Although it was believed that such equipmentwould be made available in case of a national emer-gency, it was suggested that including a liability releasein the National Response Plan would facilitate procure-ment of equipment. However, although salvors regu-larly cooperate with each other, procuring equipmentpreviously committed to other projects could be a con-cern. Many thought that cooperation is the key, andsome issues can be resolved by the terms of a contract,most of which contain a deviation clause in the event ofterrorism, war, or government requisition. The partici-pants suggested that there is a need to investigate possi-ble standardized contract language that might be putinto place before an event occurs. Existing U.S. NavyOffice of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving(SupSalv) contracts with commercial salvors were givenas an example of a system that works well.

In discussing a time line for salvage and wreckremoval operations, the group estimated that dredgingto open another channel in Houston, where barge chan-nels are already available outside the main channel,may take only 24 hours once equipment is ready.Furthermore, if a broadside collision results in vesselsremaining upright in relatively shallow water and with-out extensive damage, patch-and-float operations cantypically be carried out in two or three weeks. Whenvessels cannot be patched and floated, cutting andremoval may take two to three months, possibly longer.

Much information from prior salvage events is avail-able on which to base these time estimates. One key fac-tor affecting time lines in a terrorist event is the extent


1 Although disposal of dredged material is always a significant envi-ronmental concern during normal operations, for this situation theworkshop participants assumed that environmental impact issuescould be set aside for the duration of the emergency.

of human casualties. For example, immediate issuesrelating to loss of human life and the rescue of sur-vivors, concerns over toxic chemicals, and treating thearea as a crime scene could significantly affect salvageoperations and thus extend the time required.

The group also addressed organizational concernsrelated to salvage response. First, there is a concern thatthe proposed Initial National Response Plan (DHS2003) should balance prevention and response. In addi-tion, there is a critical need to incorporate institutionalsalvage knowledge into the federal government side ofthe Unified Command System (UCS). Within any majorsalvage operation, communication is a key factor and iscritical given the large number of parties involved.2 Themechanism used for transmitting information is impor-tant, and not just for informal communication, andthere are special considerations relative to a terroristincident. Commercial salvors believe that they wouldneed to communicate and coordinate with someonewho understands the industry. One approach might befor the National Response Plan to include a directivethat the salvor be involved early in the process.

A concern was also raised about the high turnoverrate of key government personnel [e.g., the U.S. CoastGuard (USCG) and SupSalv], and it was noted that sal-vage requires experienced people. It was also noted thatthe Supervisor of Salvage is typically quite experienced,but many other agencies may not be aware of SupSalvresources both in house and under contract.

With regard to conducting an exercise to evaluatesalvage capabilities, most participants believed that itshould focus on the interaction of a terrorist attack andthe salvage operation and should identify where thereare interferences. If DHS sponsored an exercise, it couldraise awareness of problems relating to communica-tions and decision making among DHS and other keyagencies. For example, many thought that it would beuseful to involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) in an exercise scenario and include a realistic por-trayal of how the communication and interplay occursbetween that agency and its counterparts. It should alsoinvolve the major salvage companies with different lev-els of capabilities and the key government agencies thatwould need to work together.

An exercise will be most valuable if it replicates all ofthe actions (e.g., reaching the location of the incident,arriving at the Unified Command Center, contendingwith roadblocks) that will be required if a terrorist inci-dent occurs. The process is what is important. There

could be 140 to 160 persons at the Unified CommandCenter during an event, with only a few being salvors.Salvors’ position on the list of key decision makersshould reflect the extent to which salvage is important tothe response. It is necessary to have experienced peopleon the spot to make the critical decisions.

One important outcome of an exercise would be toincrease awareness to other responders of the role ofsalvage. The exercise could highlight issues relating tosalvage—teaching others what this part of the opera-tion involves and its importance. The fact that maritimecommerce might be severely affected could elevateinterest in this exercise among industry membersinvolved. In many past incidents, pollution concernshave overshadowed concerns about salvage operations,but in the case of the terrorist scenarios presented,channel clearance because of its potential impact on thenation’s economy seems to be paramount. Inclusion ofthis issue in an exercise would allow it to be evaluated.

When an exercise is proposed, industry participantsbelieve that the American Salvage Association (ASA)should be involved in planning the exercise scenario toensure that practical issues are addressed. For example,ASA could prepare a particular component of the exer-cise with a very complex salvage challenge. The exercisecould also be of value for training personnel by high-lighting problems related to the interruption of com-merce. A two- to three-day exercise with adequateresources to support the effort appears appropriate.Questions to be addressed would include the following:What do we know? What don’t we know? What do weneed to know? How do we get the needed information?What decisions can’t wait for all the information to beavailable?

One other useful facet of an exercise would be toprepare a comprehensive inventory of what is availablein the salvage industry and what type of assets would beneeded for this type of event. ASA, through its mem-bers, could develop a list of what each member hasavailable (pumps, compressors, equipment, etc.).SupSalv has some of this information, but a fully docu-mented and verified inventory prepared by the industrycould be more comprehensive and up to date. Existingcapabilities are extensive, but it would be helpful toknow more detail about what capabilities the commer-cial salvage sector has, the types of ships and equipmentthat could be brought to bear, and what would berequired to mobilize and move them.

There are two components to a proper salvageresponse—equipment and the people to actually run theoperation. To date, an adequate gap analysis—an assess-ment of salvage needs versus available capabilities forboth these components—has not been done. A numberof questions need to be answered: Are there any obviousgaps that can be identified today? What requires addi-

1 3S U M M A RY O F W O R K S H O P D I S C U S S I O N S

2 This same issue was discussed and similar conclusions were reachedin the context of marine salvage response to air crashes at sea such asthe TWA Flight 800 accident in 1996 and reported in a Marine BoardRoundtable that included many of the same participants (NRC1997).

tional analysis? Are there adequate marine firefightingskills? For example, only a handful of people in thiscountry can extinguish fires on ships, and marine fire-fighting capability in major port cities varies consider-ably. There is a similar situation in retainers andcontracts with respect to firefighting. A survey of vari-ous port cities to determine if there is a need to upgradeskills in marine firefighting might be useful. The issue ofwho has control also arises in this situation. In manycases, the local firefighting unit has control; however,control varies among jurisdictions. There needs to bemore communication among jurisdictions. Many munic-ipal firefighting units are not prepared or allowed to goaboard a vessel. The workshop participants suggestedthat marine firefighting issues need more careful analy-sis to determine what might be available for response inthe event of a terrorist incident.

The pool of people to perform specialized salvagework is small and may be shrinking—the lack of quali-fied people could be the most critical gap between needsand capabilities. This group travels a great deal andthus is not always readily available. If an exercise ordrill is conducted, issues related to the availability andqualifications of salvage personnel could be investi-gated in more detail. Any subsequent gap analysis mustlook at both people and equipment. For example, somegaps may be geographical—assets needed and whetherthey are readily available in a particular area—andshould be part of the gap analysis.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) reliesheavily on the commercial sector and has an extensiveinventory of salvage assets including dredging equip-ment. For this reason, USACE should be a part of anygap analysis. The workshop participants noted thatdredging may be the quickest means to get channelsreopened to commercial traffic, and an evaluation ofhow to do this in an emergency situation would be ofsignificant value.

In any exercise, it is important to get the salvage com-munity at the table with high-level officials so that theycan provide information on available assets. It was notedthat the list of people to be called for response to an inci-dent should include the salvage community as well as thesalvage leadership (including SupSalv) and must be iden-tified within any protocol for incident response. SinceSupSalv is a U.S. Navy agency and, in many cases, isinvolved in domestic salvage events only by invitation,the agency’s role tends to be omitted in planning docu-ments. Therefore, their role must be explicit and well-defined. In addition, by law, USACE is responsible forsafety, maintenance, and clearing of channels. However,the Corps no longer has the in-house technical expertiseto carry out these operations and generally contracts forthese services. USACE is often left out even though it isthe Corps’ function to restore navigation. Because inter-

agency coordination issues are often complex, it isimportant to bring these agencies together in planningexercises to resolve problems before an event occurs.

FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ISSUES

The group discussing financial, economic, and politicalissues began by defining the terms “financial” (theactual cost of response efforts), “economic” (theimpacts of the incident on local and nationaleconomies), and “political” (management of publicfear, quest for information, and restoring trust and con-fidence). The scenarios as presented in the plenary ses-sion appeared to stretch existing capabilities in all ofthese areas.

Financial Issues

Several mechanisms exist to fund responses to suchemergencies as natural disasters, oil and hazardousmaterials spills, accidents, and other maritime inci-dents. The case of a terrorist attack, however, is decid-edly different and brings new challenges. Existing fundssuch as those in the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund(OSLTF) and the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)can be accessed under the system when the threat ofpollution exists. Under a federal disaster declaration,the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)can be called in. In case of a major maritime incident,the U.S. Captain of the Port can respond immediately.In the case of a terrorist incident, however, it is not clearat this time how funding would be handled. In practice,it appears that immediate emergency funding for amajor disaster comes quickly, whereas funding forlonger-term activities such as salvage and wreckremoval could be more difficult to obtain. One impor-tant issue the group identified is how to best access var-ious existing funding mechanisms given the fact thatmany exist for various purposes but none fit the partic-ular situation of a terrorist attack. Following theattacks of September 11, 2001, insurance coverage forterrorist incidents became difficult to obtain. However,enactment in late 2002 of the Terrorism Risk InsuranceAct (TRIA) generally restored the availability of suchinsurance because TRIA provides a Federal backstop tohelp pay for damage to insured property caused by for-eign-sponsored terrorism. As a result, marine insurersare making terrorism coverage available. However,TRIA does not cover U.S. domestic-based or sponsoredterrorism, and it generally allows insurers to excludedamage or loss caused by use of nuclear, biological orchemical devices. Consequently, private insurance may


not provide a source of funding for emergency responseto all terrorist incidents.

The decision on whether the Federal Governmentwill respond under TRIA involves a threshold determi-nation by the Secretary of Treasury, with concurrencewith the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, tocertify that an “act of terrorism” has occurred. This cer-tification triggers federal payments covering 90 percentof the damage up to a maximum of $100 billion, withthe insurer retaining 10 percent. (Federal paymentswould subsequently be recouped through surcharges onpolicyholders.) Therefore, unless TRIA is allowed toexpire at the end of 2005, in which case insurance cov-erage for terrorism may again become difficult toobtain, marine insurance can be expected to cover atleast some terrorist-caused losses.

One concern related to how funding would be han-dled is who makes the decision that the incident is a ter-rorist attack, how that decision is made, and how fast itis made. It was noted that a process is needed to definea terrorist incident and that the process should leaddirectly to a funding mechanism to cover all aspects of aresponse. The process would also need to involve inves-tigative agencies so that a correct decision would result.Regarding the necessary marine salvage response, underthe existing system, the needed salvage assets would bemoved under the aegis of the Principal Federal Official(PFO) or Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) desig-nated by the Initial National Response Plan.3

Participants cautioned, however, that proposed new sal-vage regulations would need to be revised to allow thePFO or FOSC to activate salvage response if necessary.The existing unified command approach appears to besatisfactory, but it may be necessary to strengthen theauthority of the FOSC and define more clearly the fund-ing responsibilities. The experience of the World TradeCenter attack shows that initial emergency responsescan be initiated quickly regardless of existing fundingschemes, but funding of long-term response becomesmore difficult. The National Response Plan that is underdevelopment may address some of these issues.

The group also discussed whether and how the finan-cial issues could be identified and evaluated using table-top or field exercises to model incidents and responses.Within such an exercise, experts in existing funding sys-tems and new proposals could participate. Using theOSLTF as a model, it may be possible to explore othermechanisms for funding and decision making that incor-

porate all aspects of a unified response. It may also bepossible to use the existing National Response Planstructure by including another layer for terrorist inci-dents. Drills are useful to explore liability issues, insur-ance issues, and the extent of an owner’s responsibilities.Participants also observed that adequate funding isneeded to conduct in-depth exercises, which can be usedto explore the adequacy of authorities for funding andthe coordination of funding systems.

In summary, although existing funding mechanismsare designed for other purposes (e.g., OSLTF), mostparticipants thought that they provide useful models onwhich to build a new terrorist response fund. In addi-tion, the need was cited for a process to declare that anincident is caused by a terrorist attack in which (a) keydecision makers would be identified, (b) the agencywith authority would be specified, (c) direction wouldbe given to response funding, and (d) access would beprovided to salvage resources.

Economic Issues

Economic issues related to the given terrorist scenarioswere discussed including (a) the direct and immediatelocal effects of a port shutdown, (b) the impact on thenational economy caused by a prolonged port closure,(c) the effects on other ports caused by the need to han-dle diverted cargo and to meet new security measuresthat would naturally follow the attack, and (d) the rip-ple effect on all transportation modes, especially thosethat move waterborne cargo to and from the ports.

Many participants believed that total economic con-sequences are incalculable at this time but that a thor-ough detailed analysis that provides some estimates ofspecific impacts would be instructive. This analysis,however, could be a very complex undertaking. It couldinclude impacts on all port facilities and terminals;refineries and chemical facilities; rail, truck, and bargeoperations; local populations; and nearby industry. Oneunique impact related to the New Orleans region is thepossibility of catastrophic flooding caused by damageto the locks on the Mississippi River and the shutdownof all coastwise barge traffic along the Gulf Coast usingthe Gulf Intracoastal Waterway.

A key question related to reducing the economicimpacts is how much time would be needed for a fullsalvage and wreck-removal operation. In addition, thelevel of effort that would be needed to reduce the totalresponse time significantly is unknown. If the economicimpacts were large enough, it might be cost-effective tospend much more to clear channels faster in order toresume the flow of commerce. A trade-off analysiswould provide good guidance for decisions on thisapproach. It might also be helpful to consider the use of


3 Workshop participants noted that an interim plan for terrorist inci-dents has been published and will be in effect until a final plan isdeveloped. The interim plan calls for a PFO, whereas other emer-gency response plans in effect (such as one for oil spills) have desig-nated an FOSC. Details of these plans and how salvage issues areincorporated will need to be addressed in the future.

government (military or other) assets within theresponse plan in order to respond more quickly or bringin needed equipment faster.

Political Issues

Several aspects of political issues were discussed thatwould be critical to an adequate emergency and salvageresponse to the hypothetical incidents. One politicalissue relates to legal and regulatory systems that are inplace or are needed. The existing National ContingencyPlan for pollution incidents establishes a process forassuming no specific liability and a vessel’s insurancecovers emergency funding but calls for a responsibleparty to recover costs later. With a terrorist incident, theresponsible party will only be identified through lawenforcement actions, and no response funds are usuallyavailable. Although vessel owners are required to havea response plan, in the case of a terrorist event thereappears to be a need for a clear definition of liability forthe plan to be adequate.

Another political aspect is whether the public is satis-fied with how a response is being conducted, how toaddress questions about what happened and what isbeing done, how to respond to pressures for action,when and how to handle public fears and the restorationof confidence, and how to conduct and manage relationswith the media. These questions and others can be iden-tified through advance planning, and the adoptedresponse plan needs to incorporate all of these aspects.4

The subject of restoring public confidence was alsocited as a most important consideration in addressing aseries of economic impacts. With regard to salvageresponse, an overriding question is how soon an all-clear signal can be given so that it will be safe to enterthe site and begin salvage operations—how respondersare equipped and trained to identify risks and work inareas with hazardous chemical spills. USCG is develop-ing a new CERCLA response manual that will be usefulto train responders in terrorist or chemical incidents. Itincludes considerations about trade-offs between victimrescues and responder safety. Currently, only a limitednumber of certified responders are readily available,and it may be necessary to evaluate these capabilitiesand determine what improvements might be needed.Both improved training and field exercises might beuseful to consider. It was noted that proper training forhazardous materials responders, a key consideration inany readiness improvement program, could be veryexpensive.

LEGAL, FORENSIC, ANDHUMAN CASUALTY ISSUES

The legal, forensic, and human casualty issues groupbegan its discussions with reference to existing legisla-tion and possible legislative solutions to problems iden-tified. When faced with an emergency response,equipment owners might need protection from contrac-tual or consequential damages with respect to equip-ment and personnel assets moved by government order.In such cases, it might be useful to provide legislativeprotection. Some participants were also concernedabout liability issues and believed that responding to aterrorist incident could lead to situations in which cer-tain existing laws might conflict with a need to actquickly and decisively. Therefore, under some circum-stances there may be a need to provide some form ofresponder immunity for salvors similar to that availableunder the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).

On the subject of preparation for salvage response,many believed that it is necessary to provide affordableterrorism risk insurance rates for salvors and for work-ers’ compensation coverage and third-party liability.Another issue of concern was immunity for provision ofinformation to government investigators in the absenceof criminal intent and possibly class-action immunityfor responders. Finally, salvors might need antitrustimmunity for collective action in a crisis.

The group also discussed issues related to govern-ment policies that affect responders and their ability tomeet the challenges presented by the scenario effec-tively. Many thought that field exercises or tabletopdrills involving both industry and government would bea useful way to prepare for terrorism incidents. In thesedrills, it would be important to include coordination offamily assistance and forensic recovery, to includeforensic plans within salvage plans in coordination withthe FBI, and to consider these in ranking recovery tasksby priority. It was noted that the exercises should alsoinclude complete after-action reports.

With respect to improving readiness posture, manyparticipants believed that basic ordering agreementsshould be used as the contractual instrument for salvorssince they provide advantages such as prompt pay-ments, which are necessary to ensure that work movesahead expeditiously in emergency situations.Importance was also given to defining the responsibili-ties and roles of key agencies and private industry whena national transportation emergency is declared. Thesedefinitions could logically be addressed in the NationalResponse Plan.

The group also suggested that a salvage advisorycommittee of salvage industry representatives (includ-ing the U.S. Navy) be established to serve as a liaison toDHS. In addition, such a salvage advisory committee


4 For a similar discussion of public response and confidence issues,see the Marine Board Roundtable on Search and Recovery of AirCrashes at Sea (NRC 1997).

could be useful to coordinate with state emergencymanagement officials in a local-level exercise.

The group discussed the responsibilities and roles ofvessel owners and operators when the Secretary ofHomeland Security declares a national transportationemergency. Many participants thought that these rolesand responsibilities should be clarified so that responsesare efficient and effective. In addition, some suggestedthat a forensics plan should be prepared by the FBI andbe a required part of a salvage plan. Such a plan wouldinclude

• Awareness at the time of the incident,• Plan at the time of salvage, and• Domestic emergency support plans.

The salvor needs basic awareness of document con-trol and the chain of custody through preplanning withtrade associations. The plan must recognize that life-saving efforts take precedence over preservation of evi-dence and that there are many difficulties in victimrecovery, such as dealing with hazardous chemicals andincluding families of victims in decisions and plans. Forexample, although it is usually both essential and diffi-cult to address the needs of victims’ families, thisprocess may also complicate actual salvage operations.

Another value in conducting a field exercise is toevaluate how to address local-level participation. Localdrills with salvors and local briefs to and from salvorsshould be part of the overall response plan. In past inci-dents, the National Transportation Safety Board(NTSB) has assumed the lead until it has been deter-mined that a crime has been committed.5 However,many issues related to investigation of a crime scenemust be considered, including whether a retrieval pro-tocol is needed and how is it assigned; how to ensurethat evidence that can be easily lost is secured as soonas possible, whether and how to move the scene whenneeded, and how to provide secure communicationsand vessel traffic services.

Finally, some key issues for the industry include howto ensure adequate effort by the salvage community ina declared national emergency without fear of antitrustviolations, how to provide responder immunity forsalvors (both civil and criminal), and whether and howto provide immunity for master, crew, and owners toassist in salvage.

Perhaps a key to improving readiness is to addressthe issue of realistic insurance coverage premiums forterrorist acts that could perhaps be provided by the

government or through subsidies. It was also noted thatit is important to address worker protection and third-party coverage in the event that a salvor’s equipmentand personnel are attacked.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

The environmental issues group discussed environmen-tal aspects of salvage response from the standpoint ofboth impacts from the incident itself and those from sal-vage operations. The group also addressed humanhealth issues because of the potential for health impactsas a consequence of environmental effects.

Some of the potential environmental issues arisingfrom maritime terrorist incidents such as the ones underconsideration by the workshop include the need forcontainment and cleanup of hazardous materials in thecourse of the salvage operations, the potential need tojettison cargo to achieve vessel stability and limit fur-ther releases, and proper disposal of firefighting waste.Human health issues arise in the context of potentialimpacts on the general public as well as on respondersto hazardous materials from both direct contact andairborne contaminants.

Many in the group believed that it is important tofactor environmental concerns into the decision processfor salvage response to terrorist events. Specifically, itwas recognized that integrated crisis decision makinglends itself to the inclusion of environmental considera-tions. It was suggested that such a process be exploredas an effective approach for resolving potential envi-ronmental and economic trade-offs in the context ofsalvage operations in response to incidents.

Participants also recognized that decisions regardingthe priority of salvage operations and response mustcarefully account for the environmental consequencesfrom the incident itself as well as those from theresponse efforts. In addition, it was acknowledged thatenvironmental concerns must be accounted forthroughout the response to a terrorist event. Manythought that public health impacts are of paramountimportance in responding to terrorist events.

The need for transparency in decision making andintegration of interagency roles and responsibilities toensure appropriate consideration of human health andenvironmental factors in response and salvage operationswere also discussed. It was suggested that critical opera-tions including salvage, mass rescue, and public healthand environmental concerns should all be managed at theoperational level.

With regard to effective planning and decision making,the group also expressed concern about personnelturnover, especially in agencies like USCG. Many believedthat the importance of building and preserving long-term


5 The Marine Board Roundtable on Salvage Responses to Air Crashesat Sea describes this process of NTSB leadership in the initialresponse while the question of whether a crime was committed isbeing determined (NRC 1997).

expertise for maintaining readiness was frustrated by frequent personnel changes.

The group discussed the issue of a “salvage gap” intwo contexts. One is the question of whether there is asignificant gap between needs and capabilities in salvageresponse. Many considered that there was a need to getmore information about existing salvage capabilities andthat any salvage gap should be closed. Another form ofsalvage gap was raised by some participants, who definedit in the context of a prevention and response continuumunder the circumstances of a pollution incident. Thiscontinuum begins with the occurrence of an event thatmay not immediately result in pollution but ends with apollution incident. The gap between these two events wasdefined as a salvage gap because it represents the timeperiod during which an effective salvage response may beutilized to prevent the pollution incident from occurring.Some suggested that the potential for timely and effectivesalvage to contribute to pollution prevention is notaccounted for in current plans.

In this context, many believed that the current regu-latory structure does not provide for adequate mainte-nance of salvage capacity and readiness. In order toprovide the most effective response in a terrorist inci-dent and to thereby close the salvage gap, many partic-ipants suggested that readily available (e.g., standby)salvage assets could be strategically positioned foremergency response in vulnerable coastal areas.

Many participants expressed the opinion that, froman environmental perspective, it is important to provideincentives for salvage operations that focus on pollutionprevention. Several disincentives for salvors were identi-fied. First, the issue of potential criminal liability is aconcern for salvors, who may inadvertently pollute inthe course of a salvage operation. Therefore, there may

be a need for immunity provisions in the event of a ter-rorist or other maritime incident. Second, the pollutionprevention compensation provisions under current regu-lations may not be sufficient to provide an incentive forsalvage operations aimed solely at pollution prevention.Third, it was noted that there is a need to address at thenational, state, and local levels the provision of places ofrefuge or safe havens for vessels in dire situations. In theevent of a maritime casualty, whether induced by terror-ism or some other cause, it may often be desirable toundertake salvage in a protected area. The failure toprovide a safe haven in the case of the Prestige oil spill,for example, is recognized as a major contributor to thedisastrous outcome of that incident. Many thought thatthis critical issue should be addressed in the short termto facilitate more effective salvage in maritime incidentsand to avert more serious environmental and other con-sequences during terrorist attacks. The establishment ofsafe havens may increase the effectiveness of responseoperations (e.g., salvage, mass rescue) and thus reduceenvironmental consequences and public health impacts.

REFERENCES

DHS Department of Homeland SecurityNRC National Research Council

DHS. 2003. Initial National Response Plan. September 30, 2003. Available online at www.dhs.gov/interweb/asset library/Initial_NRP_100903.pdf.

NRC. 1997. Marine Board Roundtable on Search and Recovery of Air Crashes at Sea. A Summary of Meeting Discussions including Key Issues and Questions Related to Future Needs. Marine Board, Washington, D.C.


1 9

Committee Assessment of ResponseCapabilities Based on Workshop Discussions

In this chapter several key issues are discussed thatresulted from the committee’s review and evalua-tion of workshop discussions and from the break-

out group results. Also presented are the committee’sassessment of the status of existing marine salvageresponse capabilities based on workshop results andthe committee’s evaluation of what is and is not knownabout that capability (in terms of both physical andorganizational response). Physical capability addressesequipment and personnel; organizational capabilityfocuses on current response plans as well as organiza-tional structures. In the final section of the chapter, sal-vage response exercises or drills are addressed. Fromworkshop discussions, the committee believes thatthese procedures offer the best opportunity to developa more detailed and accurate evaluation of capabilitiesand thus to determine the most pressing issues thatneed to be addressed to improve the nation’s marinesalvage response readiness posture.

STATUS OF PHYSICAL SALVAGERESPONSE CAPABILITIES

The U.S. marine salvage industry has significant capa-bilities to respond to seaport terrorist incidents, but it isnot known if that capability is adequate for a widerange of specific threats and can be sustained over timeto meet future threats. The historical role of the marinesalvor has been to save property, typically the vessel andits cargo, at sea. This role has expanded to includeefforts to minimize environmental damage and wreck

removal and harbor clearance. The latter functions maybe of particular importance in the event of terrorist actsinvolving U.S. marine waterways because such actionsmay be specifically designed to inflict economic distressby impeding or blocking use of the waterway. The mod-ern salvor has a responsibility for minimizing the pub-lic (e.g., economic) consequences of an event, whichplaces increased importance on rapid and effectiveresponse. In its expanded role, salvage capabilitiesinclude

• Emergency towing of a stricken vessel,• Ability to patch and refloat a sunken vessel,• Ability to right and refloat a capsized vessel,• Internal transfer operations to mitigate stress in

the vessel’s hull and to enhance seaworthiness,• Lightering of liquid cargo and offloading of other

hazardous cargoes,• Dredging to free a stranded vessel or open an

impeded waterway,• Heavy lift capability,• Firefighting, and• Deep water search and recovery.

Over the last two decades, there has been a steadydecline in marine incidents, resulting in a reduction inrequests for traditional marine salvage services (NRC1994). This issue was raised by many salvors at theworkshop, who stressed the difficulty of maintainingappropriate physical resources and trained personnelshould the reduction in salvage workload continue.Unfortunately, data on salvage response efforts in U.S.

waters were not collected during this period. The U.S.Coast Guard (USCG) maintained a marine accidentdatabase (CASMAIN) through 1990 and replaced itwith the Marine Safety Information System (MSIS)database. It is difficult to assess trends in salvage needson the basis of these data since they were not collectedconsistently over the time period.

USCG has collected data on large oil spills in a rea-sonably consistent manner since 1973, and these dataprovide an indication of accident rates and salvageneeds. The decline in spills is illustrated in Figure 1,which shows the number of oil spills over 1,000 gallonsin size that have occurred in U.S. waters since 1973.The statistics suggest that the decline in incidents hasaccelerated following the implementation of regulationsassociated with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).The recent adoption of additional international mar-itime safety codes such as the International SafetyManagement Code (ISM) and Standards of Training,Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) suggests thatthe number of maritime casualties could continue todecline in the coming years.

The decline in demand for traditional salvage has ledto fundamental changes in the way the salvage industryoperates. Representatives from the major U.S. salvagecompanies attending the workshop indicated that only10 to 25 percent of their business comes from marinesalvage. The diversification of the salvage companies islikely a result of both reduced demand and the sporadicnature of incidents. Since compensation for salvage isnot sufficient to sustain personnel and salvage resourcesduring the growing interval between salvage incidents,salvors have sought other sources of income and now

provide a variety of services including towing andmarine engineering. This diversification may be a posi-tive development because it allows companies to main-tain physical assets and personnel that can respond intimes of need.

Other ways that the salvage industry has adapted tothe reduced demand for its services and the increasedpublic expectation for quick and effective response isthrough enhanced cooperation between salvage compa-nies and the use of pre-positioned fly-away packages(equipment designed for rapid mobilization and ship-ping by air). The sharing and dissemination of salvage-related information has been fostered through theestablishment of the American Salvage Association(ASA). The major U.S. salvors are members of ASA andparticipate in its meetings, at which salvage-relatedcommercial and technical issues are openly discussed.When the size of a job exceeds the capabilities of a com-pany or there is a need for specialized skills, the U.S.salvage companies regularly cooperate and shareresources. The salvors maintain an awareness of outsideresources and are prepared to contract for equipmentand personnel to supplement their own assets.

Fly-away packages are strategically located aroundthe United States. These packages, consisting of salvageequipment such as pumps, oil spill booms, firefightingequipment, and diving systems, are maintained by theoil spill removal organizations (OSROs) as well as bythe U.S. Navy Office of the Supervisor of Salvage andDiving (SupSalv) and USCG.

Another way salvors have enhanced their responsecapability is through the increased use of advanced toolsfor salvage engineering. Although there is no substitute


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FIGURE 1 Oil spills of more than 1,000 gallons in U.S. waters. (SOURCE: NRC 1999.)

for good judgment refined by prior hands-on experi-ence, analysis is playing an increasingly important rolein salvage response. Traditionally, salvors have relied onback-of-the-envelope calculations, but today there aresuites of commercially available software for personalcomputers that can perform a wide range of analysessuch as stranding calculations, lightering evaluations, oiloutflow projections, and hull girder residual strengthassessments. Examples of commercial salvage engineer-ing packages with widespread use within the UnitedStates are Herbert Engineering Corporation’s salvagesoftware (HECSALV) and the General Hydrostatics Sys-tem (GHS) developed by Creative Systems. The salvagecompanies and their engineers have become skillful inusing these packages and applying them to a variety ofsalvage scenarios. SupSalv has sponsored developmentof the Program of Ship Salvage Engineering (POSSE),one such software program that is used to perform real-time engineering analyses of complex ship salvage situa-tions, including assessment of ship stability, draft andtrim, structural strength, ground reaction and freeingforce, oil outflow and flooding, tidal effects, and soforth. POSSE is used by the Navy, USCG, and the BritishMinistry of Defense.

The traditional approach, in which salvage compa-nies maintained large, dedicated vessels and personneltrained to operate the vessels, is no longer commerciallyviable, and few such vessels remain in service. Similarly,over the last two decades, the Navy has disposed ofnearly all its salvage tugs. To some extent, this loss ofdedicated salvage tugs is offset by the introduction ofescort tug requirements, particularly on the West Coast.For example, the states of California, Washington, andAlaska have implemented requirements for escortingladen tankers in state waters. These tugs tend to be highpowered and highly maneuverable and are frequentlyfitted with firefighting equipment. However, the geo-graphic location of escort tugs is dependent on oiltransport paths (e.g., Long Beach and San FranciscoBay, in California; the Strait of Juan de Fuca, betweenthe United States and Canada; and Valdez, in Alaska)rather than the perceived need for salvage capability.Furthermore, there is no certainty that such vesselswould respond to a stricken vessel other than the vesselunder escort.

Notwithstanding this phasing out of dedicated sal-vage vessels, the 1994 NRC report Reassessment of theMarine Salvage Posture of the United States found that“in general, the nation’s salvage capability and readi-ness appears to have increased in the decade since1982” (p. 1). Similarly, the commercial salvors whoparticipated in the workshop believed that they cur-rently have sufficient salvage equipment to effectivelycarry out a salvage response in U.S. waters. However,both in the 1994 NRC report and among the salvage

community attending the workshop, concern wasexpressed about the future; it was noted that furtherdeclines in salvage activity could negatively affect theability of the industry to respond in a timely manner.

Availability of Personnel

There is considerable concern in the salvage industry thatsalvors are a graying community and that the next gen-eration of salvors is not being groomed to take over. The1994 NRC study concluded that with “few opportunitiesto practice the salvage profession, the next generation ofsalvors is not being trained or attracted to the industry”(p. 5). This, of course, is a problem for any industry indecline, but it is exacerbated in the salvage industry, inwhich on-the-job training is critical to success.

SupSalv maintains a training program at its facilityin Panama City and regularly trains its engineeringdesign officers in salvage engineering. This program,combined with opportunities to participate in salvageoperations related to government and commercial ves-sels, has produced some experienced salvors within theNavy. The Supervisor of Salvage and Diving is selectedfrom this group of experienced personnel within theNavy and is a valuable resource when the governmentis called upon to make salvage-related decisions.Similarly, USCG trains its strike team members in sal-vage engineering, although USCG personnel generallyhave less continuity of service in salvage-related areas.Unfortunately, upon retirement from the military, fewNavy and USCG personnel assume positions in thecommercial salvage industry.

Salvage Assets and Readiness

Salvors who participated in the workshop could notrecall an incident in which they were unable to respondeffectively because of a shortage of equipment.However, salvage and firefighting equipment is gener-ally located in regions where vessel traffic is concen-trated, and there is concern that rapid and effectiveresponse may not be possible in all geographical areas.

Salvage-Capable Tugs

To effectively tow a large tanker or similar vessel in heavyweather, a tug of at least 6,000 horsepower is needed. The1994 NRC study concluded that the management of dis-abled vessels within U.S. waters could in large part beaccomplished using existing tug assets. These tugs are incommercial use, usually engaged in point-to-point service,and can be diverted for emergency salvage service. The

2 1C O M M I T T E E A S S E S S M E N T O F R E S P O N S E C A P A B I L I T I E S

study did identify a potential shortage of high-poweredtugs in the Pacific region, noting the long distancebetween ports.

OPA 90 authorizes USCG to require and regulatevessel response plans (VRPs). Currently, VRP regula-tions are focused on planning for oil recovery. USCGhas decided to enhance the salvage and marine fire-fighting provisions of VRPs to ensure that salvage andfirefighting resources are identified and available. TheNotice of Proposed Rulemaking for VRPs, which wasdisseminated for comment in May 2002, is contained in33 CFR Part 155, but implementation of the rule hasbeen delayed.

The proposed rulemaking sets response times foreach salvage and marine firefighting requirement. Forinstance, for near-shore and inland areas, on-siteresources would be required for emergency towingcapability within 12 hours, for external emergencytransfer operations and emergency lightering operationswithin 18 hours, and for specialized salvage operations,including heavy lift capability, within 72 hours. In itsregulatory assessment for this proposed rulemaking,USCG concluded that current salvage and marine fire-fighting assets were inadequate to meet these responsetimes and estimated an initial capital cost of about $130million to finance needed physical assets. The mostcostly salvage equipment are tugs, vessels, barges, andheavy lift systems. In order to meet the proposedresponse times, the USCG regulatory assessment identi-fied the need for about 10 new high-powered tugs in theUnited States.

Marine Firefighting

Marine firefighting expertise within the United States isconcentrated in a few companies, which have well-trained personnel and adequate assets. They maintainfly-away packages of firefighting equipment, ready fordeployment. In the event of a major fire, it is expectedthat one or more of these larger companies wouldrespond. These companies have been effective in han-dling fires that have occurred in U.S. waters over thelast 20 years. In the 1994 NRC study, however, a lackof fireboats or tugs with fire monitors was noted in cer-tain port areas. The study also expressed concern thatlocal fire departments frequently lack sufficient trainingin marine firefighting. There are notable exceptions—for instance, the Port of Houston has made significantinvestments in firefighting equipment and personneltraining. Also, subsequent to the events of September11, 2001, communications between local fire depart-ments and ports have improved. However, in manyareas there remains a lack of funds for training localfirefighting personnel in marine firefighting.

USCG proposed rulemaking for salvage and marinefirefighting requirements in VRPs also sets minimumrequirements for response to fires. The proposed regu-lation calls for external firefighting teams to be on sitewithin 8 hours and for external vessel firefighting sys-tems to be on site within 12 hours. Pre-positioning offly-away packages in locations on the East Coast, WestCoast, and Gulf Coast and in Alaska and Hawaiishould be sufficient to comply with these responsetimes. This level of response can, in most cases, beachieved by existing companies and their assets.

In the event of a fire on a passenger vessel or ferry,in which large numbers of people are at risk, quickerresponse times will be expected. The ability to respondto such incidents in a timely manner needs furtherconsideration.

Availability of Heavy Equipment

Heavy lift equipment is needed for a variety of pur-poses: to assist in righting capsized vessels, to raisesunken vessels, and so forth. USCG regulatory assess-ment for the proposed rulemaking for VRPs identifieddeficiencies in heavy lift capability in inland areas,Alaska, and Guam.

Because of the episodic nature of major salvage inci-dents, most heavy equipment suitable for marine sal-vage is employed for other purposes and requisitionedfor salvage when needed. During the workshop, con-cern was raised as to availability of certain equipmentfor emergency response. For instance, in the Gulf Coastregion heavy lift equipment is frequently under contractto oil companies and their contractors, and there are noguarantees that these assets could be secured for emer-gency purposes. However, in the event of a major inci-dent such as a significant terrorist attack, a release fromcontracts could likely be secured.

Dredging Capability

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as well asprivate contractors maintain dredges at various loca-tions around the country. Dredging has important sal-vage uses, potentially to free a stranded vessel and alsoto open a waterway impeded by a sunken vessel orother debris. Dredging, however, can have negativeimpacts on the environment that may preclude a timelyresponse in some areas.

For the maritime terrorist scenario developed by thecommittee in which multiple vessels are sunk in theHouston ship channel, it was estimated that a patch-and-refloat salvage effort might be accomplished in twoto three days. If the vessels were too severely damaged


to be refloated, wreck removal could take months.However, workshop participants estimated that widen-ing the channel adjacent to the incident site could beachieved in as little as 24 hours.

Minimum response times for dredging capability arenot incorporated into the USCG proposed rulemakingfor VRPs. Because of the potential role of dredging inemergency harbor and waterway clearance, the avail-ability of dredging equipment and personnel at majorports should be assessed further.

Hazardous Materials Response

The 1994 NRC report found that the marine salvagecommunity lacked expertise in performing salvage inthe presence of hazardous materials. The report noted

that USCG strike teams are trained in hazardous mate-rials response, although their role in commercial sal-vage is not well defined. The events of September 11,2001, as well as the subsequent anthrax incidents high-light the critical role that government teams play in sup-porting a response when hazardous materials areconcerned.

As a quick resource for information on the capabili-ties of the various government special teams to respondto incidents related to oil, hazardous materials, andweapons of mass destruction, the National FireProtection Association produced the HazardousMaterials Response Handbook (2002). A summary ofthe salvage-related capabilities of these special teams isgiven in Table 1. SupSalv participants explained to thecommittee that their office does not have specific in-house expertise for response to biological or radiological


TABLE 1 Special Team Salvage Capability Matrix

SupSalv NSF EPA/ERT USACE NOAA

Vessel Fire AssessmentOil xChemical Commercial xChemical Warfare Agent xBiological xRadiological x

Vessel Damage AssessmentOil x x xChemical Commercial x x xChemical Warfare Agent x x xBiological x xRadiological x x

Vessel SalvageOil xChemical Commercial xChemical Warfare Agent xBiological xRadiological x

Vessel Plugging/PatchingOil x x xChemical Commercial x x xChemical Warfare Agent x xRadiological x

Diving ExpertiseOil x x x xChemical Commercial x x x xChemical Warfare Agent x x xRadiological x x x

SupSalv: U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and DivingNSF: U.S. Coast Guard National Strike ForceEPA/ERT: Environmental Protection Agency Emergency Response TeamUSACE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Rapid Response TeamNOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Response and Restoration, Hazardous Materials Response Division

incidents but can turn to appropriate military compo-nents to help formulate the best response. This capabil-ity to access specialized expertise as needed forbiological and radiological incidents applies to allaspects of salvage response. According to SupSalv repre-sentatives at the workshop, the failure of the specialteams handbook to properly reflect that capability forSupSalv in the area of vessel plugging and patching wasmerely an oversight (J. Wilkins, U.S. Navy, personalcommunication, August 6, 2003).

Findings

Salvage and marine firefighting companies in the UnitedStates have a proven track record over the last 20 years.Response has generally been timely and effective,although recent events such as the stranding and even-tual breakup of the M/V New Carissa suggest thatrapid response could be enhanced if more salvage-capable tugs were available. The M/V New Carissa, a639-foot bulk freight ship, was grounded off the coastof Coos Bay, Oregon, in February 1999. Within hoursof the incident, various spill and salvage experts wereen route to the scene. There were no salvage-capablevessels in the vicinity of Coos Bay, the closest being onebased in Astoria, Oregon, approximately 170 miles tothe north. Heavy weather in Astoria delayed departureof the salvage vessel for two days, thwarting efforts toquickly refloat the New Carissa. Eventually, the NewCarissa broke apart, spilling a portion of its fuel oil.

USCG proposed rulemaking for VRPs requiring on-site emergency towing capability within 12 hours of anincident would likely require the addition of up to 10high-powered tugs. Promulgation of the final rule onVRPs will be helpful in setting performance standards fortimeliness of salvage response and will provide importantguidance in assessing salvage readiness capability.

A complete inventory of available salvage assets thathave access to U.S. waters is not maintained, and there-fore it is difficult to fully assess needs. Such an inven-tory would be valuable for identifying and allocatingsalvage assets in the event of a major salvage incident.There is also a need to conduct a gap analysis, match-ing available assets with needs. Such an analysis shouldinclude dredging and heavy lift capabilities, whichmight be needed to quickly clear an impeded waterway.

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT RESPONSE PLANS

Federal emergency response authority, responsibilities,and activities in the United States are found in a varietyof contingency plans involving a wide range of federalagencies. For maritime contingencies, the National

Maritime Search and Rescue Plan (NMSARP), adminis-tered by USCG, deals with locating and rescuing sur-vivors of maritime disasters; the National ContingencyPlan, administered by the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA), deals with response to spills of oil andhazardous substances, but USCG is the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) in coastal areas; and theFederal Response Plan, administered by the FederalEmergency Management Administration (FEMA),includes a number of annexes dealing with various dis-aster scenarios, including natural disasters (such as hur-ricanes and earthquakes) as well as response topollution incidents and terrorist incidents. Although theNMSARP and the National Contingency Plan areimplemented generally for any such contingency, theFederal Response Plan is only implemented in responseto a Presidential Disaster Declaration.

A recent addition to this family of response plans isthe Initial National Response Plan (INRP), adminis-tered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)(DHS 2003). DHS has been tasked with development ofa single integrated National Response Plan (NRP) forall types of contingencies and disasters covered by therange of existing plans, including those outlined above.The INRP has been developed as an interim measureand is administered by the Transportation SecurityAdministration (TSA).

CURRENT RESPONSEORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

Search and Rescue Operations

Under the NMSARP, USCG is the principal federalagency with responsibility for maritime search and res-cue. The maritime search and rescue policy is developedat USCG Headquarters, in Washington, D.C. Field oper-ations are executed by a wide range of multimissionships, boats, and aircraft that are capable of search andrescue. These operations are coordinated from national,area, district, and local search operations centersdepending on the scope and complexity of the situation.

Pollution Response Operations

In contrast to search and rescue operations, the NationalContingency Plan involves the activities of a wide rangeof federal agencies with authority, responsibility, andexpertise in the various aspects of pollution response.USCG, as previously noted, serves as the FOSC forcoastal response operations. Overall response organiza-tion includes various federal, state, and local govern-ment agencies and the party responsible for creating the


pollution incident, known as the responsible party.Response operations are managed under the NationalInteragency Incident Management System (NIIMS)using the Incident Command System (ICS), UnifiedCommand System (UCS) approach, in which the federaland state on-scene coordinators and the responsibleparty form a triangular command structure for decisionmaking, with the FOSC directing the response and hav-ing ultimate decision-making authority. For spills ofnational significance that affect or threaten to affect awide geographical area, a response organization reflect-ing an expanded UCS is used.

Response planning and technical recommendationsfor decision making are vested in the NationalResponse Team, Regional Response Teams, and areacommittees at the local level. Within USCG, the Chiefof the Office of Response under the AssistantCommandant for Marine Safety, Security, andEnvironmental Protection serves as the cochair of theNational Response Team and develops overall responsepolicy within USCG.

SupSalv acts in an advisory capacity to the FOSCwithin the UCS if requested and works through the U.S.Department of Defense member of the NationalResponse Team. Professional salvors have no specifiedrole in the National Response Team or within the UCSstructure.

Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents

Much like the National Contingency Plan, under theFederal Response Plan, Annex 10, numerous federalagencies have a role in the response to a terrorist inci-dent. In this case the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) is the lead agency. Under the new INRP, the NIIMSwas created and employs the UCS for response; the FBIhas the ultimate decision-making authority for a terroristincident, as the FOSC does for pollution incidents.

In a maritime terrorist scenario, USCG would be aprincipal supporting agency to the FBI and would carryout various roles, as required, involving law enforce-ment, search and rescue, pollution response, and water-ways management. Organizationally, within DHS,USCG homeland security prevention activities andplanning for response activities are under the manage-ment of the Director of Homeland Security, on the staffof the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety,Security, and Environmental Protection. A NationalMaritime Security Advisory Committee has been char-tered by the Secretary of Homeland Security to adviseUSCG on maritime security prevention and responsematters. Currently, the INRP simply provides anumbrella over existing plans until such time as a finalNational Response Plan may be promulgated.

Response Plans and Organization

In the case of an incident like that described in theworkshop scenario involving the need for salvage aftera terrorist incident has resulted in the sinking of a ship,existing plans such as the NMSARP, the NationalContingency Plan, and potentially the Federal ResponsePlan would be implemented under the INRP. Althoughsalvage would be a critical function to reestablish theuse of the navigation channel, no formal considerationof salvage needs and capabilities forms any part of theexisting planning process, nor do salvors or SupSalvtake any formal part in that process. There is currentlya Notice of Proposed Rulemaking dealing with salvageand firefighting planning requirements for tankers trad-ing in the United States, but no other requirement forsalvage contingency planning exists.

UTILITY OF EXERCISES OR DRILLS

The complexity of coping with the aftermath of any ter-rorist attack is daunting, and the economic impact ofclosing a port or ports will only compound that com-plexity. Terrorist attacks could be coordinated to affectmore than one port, could cause extreme damage, orcould simply close a channel. The planning to enable aresponse effort that is flexible enough to address differ-ent scenarios in different geographic locations musttherefore be diligently pursued, particularly since thereare myriad agencies and organizations involved. Theconduct of carefully planned exercises and drills hasproved to be extremely helpful in the past for preparingfor a disaster response.

The utility of holding exercises or drills emergedfrom discussions in two of the workshop breakoutgroups (the one on physical salvage and harbor clear-ance issues and the one on legal, forensic, and humancasualty issues). The problems of initiating interagencyactions necessary to coordinate, assess, and handle theaftermath of the closings of major ports can best beunderstood by using these exercises or drills, involvingthe relevant local, state, and national agencies as well asorganizations outside government. In particular, theissues involved in the mobilization of the proper salvageand harbor clearance resources might also be bestunderstood by well-planned exercises.

The interagency aspects of any response must be aprecursor to the mobilization of salvage assets.Different scenarios involving different geographic loca-tions must be a part of any overall plan since the agen-cies and organizations involved are, to some extent,dependent on the location and the nature of the inci-dent, as is the response itself. This aspect is especiallytrue for salvage response and will determine the type of


salvage assets needed. Therefore, exercises that areundertaken should be designed to allow interaction attwo levels: one high enough to enable all relevant agen-cies to interact and the other low enough to allowdetailed-enough interactions to assess the issuesinvolved with supporting matters such as the mobiliza-tion of the proper salvage assets to restore port trafficin the most efficient fashion.

It is envisioned that a high-level exercise be conductedinitially as a tabletop interaction and involve decision-making high-level representatives from the key agenciesand organizations literally gathered around a large tableand connected by telephonic communications to relevantsupport from their individual organizations.

On the basis of these considerations, the committeehad the following suggestions for designing such anexercise:

• Allow participants to self-organize, establishleadership, and develop a response;

• Identify conflicting priorities among commercialinterests (which want to open the port), security forces(which must deal with an ongoing potential threat), andforensic organizations (which are investigating andreconstructing the crime scene);

• Include environmental and public health interests,which want to minimize loss of lives, public healthimpacts, and ecological impacts;

• Demonstrate the importance of having sufficientsalvage capability available when needed and demon-strate the coordination required to allow salvage assetsto clear the port efficiently;

• Consider the financial and legal (liability) issues;• Include participants who are actual decision makers

from participating organizations;• Establish working relationships between command-

level personnel who will work together during an event;• Assign facilitators to keep the exercise on track;

and• Identify a funding source or assign fair-share assess-

ments of common costs to participating organizations.

Suggested participants (including federal organiza-tions with an interest or that would participate in anactual event) were the following:

• DHS-TSA: USCG–Captain of the Port/On-SceneCoordinator;

• FEMA;• FBI;• NTSB;• Navy:

– SupSalv;– Salvage community;

• Department of Commerce;

• USACE (for dredging);• EPA;• Public affairs specialists; and• Experienced facilitators from organizations well

versed in interactive gaming exercises, such as theNational Defense University or the Naval War College.

Steps to establish the exercise starting point shouldbe as follows:

• Select a major port or ports (e.g., Houston, NewOrleans) that is

– Vulnerable to blockage and– Nationally prominent;

• Assume a breach of port security (shoreside,waterside, or both);

• Assume suicide terrorists; and• Feature successive disclosure of new information

(to highlight conflicting priorities).

Scenario results should include the following:

• Blocked channel (with multiple ships if possible),• Restricted physical access to the casualty site,• Civilian casualties,• Landside issues such as transporting the injured to

hospitals,• Pollution,• Contamination,• Impact (contamination and casualties) on local area,• Potential for ongoing activity (delayed explosives),

and• Demand for interviews by the press.

Questions to be answered are as follows:

• How is the response funded?• What is the role of the National Response Plan (or

Interim Plan) in this event?• Does another national plan suited for this disaster

response exist already?• What organizations, groups, or plans are already

in place or available to be implemented?• What organizations or groups need to be developed

or planned for?• How are interagency communications handled?• What information is needed to establish priorities?• How are decisions made? By whom? Who sets

priorities?• How are decisions promulgated and implemented?• How are assets brought to bear on the problem?• How is progress monitored?

Evaluation of results should include these follow-upquestions:


• What were the deficiencies in the existing plans?• How will deficiencies (e.g., organizational, financial)

be addressed?

Following the top-level interagency exercise, an exer-cise should be conducted to test the interactions neces-sary to mobilize the salvage assets required to restorethe port or ports to normal operation. A series of exer-cises with differing scenarios and geographic locationswill demonstrate the organizational issues as well asidentify whether sufficient assets are available for therequired response and whether these assets can bemobilized and brought into action in a fashion timelyenough to meet the requirements for port restoration.

Key features of this exercise are as follows:

• The exercise should be specific to a particular areaor port;

• The scenario should be tailored to exploit localvulnerabilities in terms of

– Port blockage, and– Ship types that have the most dangerous or vul-

nerable cargoes (e.g., explosives, liquid natural gas, tox-ics such as chemicals and petroleum, and passengersand crew on cruise ships);

• A salvage plan should be developed;• Specific salvage assets to be used should be identified;

and• Impediments should be identified.

Participants should include the following federalagency representatives and state and local officials whohave an interest or who would participate in the case ofan actual incident:

• Federal representatives from agencies listed earlier(not necessarily decision makers but familiar withresults of the top-level exercise, including public affairsspecialists);

• State agencies such as the Department ofEmergency Services and environmental protection;

• Local agencies such as the following:– Mayor’s office,– Port authority,– Police and fire departments, and– Pilots’ association;

• Private-sector participants from the– Salvage industry and– Off-shore oil industry.

Questions to be answered include the following:

• How is the response to be funded?• Is there a national-level plan that incorporates

state and local organizations?

• What is the interaction of federal, state, and localofficials and organizations?

• What organizations, groups, plans, and equipmentare already in place or available to be implemented?

• What organizations and groups need to be developedor planned for?

• How are interagency communications handled?• What information is needed to establish priorities?• How are decisions made? By whom? Who sets

priorities?• How are decisions promulgated and implemented?• How are assets brought to bear on the problem?• What are the impacts of previously existing con-

tractual and other agreements and commitments of theparticular salvage resources identified as needed for thisexercise? In general, how do previous commitmentsaffect the availability of salvage ships and equipment,particularly those needed from other industries, such asoff-shore oil?

• How is progress monitored?

Evaluation of results should cover the followingquestions:

• What were the deficiencies in the existing plans?• What are the deficiencies in resource availability?• How will deficiencies (e.g., organizational, financial)

be addressed?

Additional similar exercises should be conducted atthe agency or organization level, (e.g., FBI, USACE,USCG, TSA, state and local).

REFERENCES

DHS Department of Homeland SecurityNRC National Research Council

DHS. 2003. Initial National Response Plan. September 30, 2003. Available online at www.dhs.gov/interweb/asset library/Initial_NRP_100903.pdf.

National Fire Protection Association. 2002. HazardousMaterials Response Handbook. Quincy, Mass.

NRC. 1982. Marine Salvage in the United States. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

NRC. 1994. Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

NRC. 1999. Spills of Nonfloating Oils: Risk and Response.Committee on Marine Transportation of Heavy Oils. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.


2 8

Committee Recommendations to Improve Salvage Readiness

The United States has considerable capabilities torespond to a terrorist attack on major seaports.Physical assets and professional personnel are

available within responsible federal agencies or can bereadily mobilized from the private sector, and organiza-tional capabilities are in place or under active develop-ment within the new homeland security infrastructure.Nevertheless, the committee concludes from the evi-dence presented that more needs to be done to retainconfidence that the United States will continue to havean adequate readiness posture. These needs arise fromthe fact that terrorist threats are complex and couldhave widespread impacts and the fact that detailedassessments of marine salvage response readiness havenot been conducted.

In addition, little attention has been given to com-prehensive training or drills involving the myriad gov-ernment and industry entities that are necessary for amajor marine salvage operation (NRC 1994, 1997).For example, salvage and marine firefighting companiesin the United States have had a proven track recordover the last 20 years. Response has generally beentimely and effective, although some recent events sug-gest that rapid response could be enhanced if moresalvage-capable tugs and other major equipment wereavailable. Nevertheless, a complete inventory of salvageassets that have access to U.S. waters is not currentlyavailable and such an inventory is vital to fully assessneeds. An inventory could be used to allocate salvageassets in the event of a major incident. It also could pro-vide the basis for a needed gap analysis that wouldmatch available assets with needs.

With regard to organizational readiness, there is aneed to more completely address salvage response plansand to upgrade the organizations that implement them.For example, in the case of incidents like those describedin this workshop, existing plans would be implementedunder the Initial National Response Plan. Although sal-vage would be a critical function to reestablish use of anavigation channel, no formal consideration of salvageneeds and capabilities exists as any part of the existingplanning process, nor do salvors or the U.S. Navy Officeof the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SupSalv) takeany formal part in that process. There is currently aNotice of Proposed Rulemaking dealing with salvageand firefighting planning requirements for tankers trad-ing in the United States, but no other requirement forsalvage contingency planning exists.

To address deficiencies in the current organizationalreadiness posture, the committee endorses the need tocarry out a series of comprehensive exercises or drillsthat would identify problems that can only be under-stood partially with existing data. For example, thecomplexities of coping with the aftermath of any ter-rorist attack are daunting, and the economic impact ofclosing a port or ports will only compound those com-plexities. Terrorist attacks can be coordinated to affectmore than one port, can cause extreme damage, or cansimply close a vital shipping channel. The planning toenable a response effort flexible enough to address dif-ferent scenarios in different geographic locations musttherefore be diligently pursued, particularly since thereare myriad agencies and organizations involved. Theconduct of carefully planned exercises and drills has

proved to be extremely helpful in the past for preparingfor similar disaster response.

The necessity to hold exercises or drills emergedfrom much of the workshop discussions. The problemsof initiating interagency actions necessary to coordi-nate, assess, and handle the aftermath of the closings ofmajor ports can best be understood by exercises ordrills involving the relevant local and national organi-zations. In particular, the issues involved in the mobi-lization of the proper salvage and harbor clearanceresources might also be best understood by well-planned exercises. Different scenarios involving differ-ent geographic locations can be included in theexercises to determine the type of salvage assets neededand to identify mobilization needs. Exercises will bemost productive if they are conducted to allow interac-tion at two levels: one to enable all relevant agencies tointeract and the other to allow detailed interactions toassess the issues involved with supporting aspects suchas the mobilization of the proper salvage assets torestore port traffic in the most efficient fashion.

The workshop discussions and the results of eachgroup’s consideration of the questions posed focused ontwo general areas of concern regarding capabilities,both physical and organizational. Although discussionswere not specific enough to highlight the need to obtainor maintain specific assets, they suggest that more workis needed to accurately define the extent of both physi-cal assets and the organizational competency to meet aterrorist threat.

The committee reviewed the workshop results andconcluded that several key steps could address a num-ber of unanswered questions and improve the nation’sreadiness posture regarding marine salvage capabilities.These key action items are (a) maintaining an inventoryand evaluation of available physical salvage assets, (b)conducting tabletop exercises to test the physical andorganizational response readiness posture, (c) revisingorganizational structures to include salvage expertiseand input in both planning and response operations, (d)and conducting further study of related legal, regula-tory, and policy issues. The committee’s recommendednext steps in these four areas are described in moredetail in the following sections.

INVENTORY OF SALVAGE ASSETS

Because the committee did not have the time orresources to conduct a comprehensive review of physi-cal assets in the salvage industry and the relevant gov-ernment agencies, conclusions about readiness lackedgood documentation. In addition, many workshop par-ticipants believed that any answers to questions aboutthe adequacy of response or readiness were very depen-

dent on specific assumptions about the incident and theneed for specific capabilities. Therefore, the committeeconcluded that it would be highly valuable for responseplanners to have access to an inventory of salvage assetsthat would be maintained for reference by the responsi-ble agencies and the salvage industry. In addition, thecommittee concluded that a gap analysis should be pre-pared to assess salvage needs and compare them withavailable assets, taking into account the need for timelyresponse.

Specific committee recommendations are as follows:

• SupSalv, in consultation with the U.S. CoastGuard (USCG) and the commercial salvage industry,should maintain an inventory of available salvage andmarine firefighting assets. The inventory should beupdated at regular intervals with sufficient frequency tomaintain current information.

• SupSalv should conduct a series of gap analysesby comparing available assets with those required torespond effectively to a range of potential terroristactivities as well as to other major salvage incidents.The analyses should consider all critical salvageresponse measures including rescue towing, harbor andchannel clearing, dredging, search and recovery, patch-ing and refloating of vessels, and marine firefighting.The adequacy of anticipated response times on aregional basis should be included in the gap analyses.

• USCG should promulgate final rules for VesselResponse Plans as soon as practical to provide neces-sary guidance on effective response times for salvageoperations.

• If the gap analyses show that current salvage assetsare insufficient to respond to plausible terrorist threats inU.S. seaports and waterways, responsible federal agen-cies should consider revising the existing national salvagepolicy to provide for the necessary salvage capability inthe future.

The committee believes that the inventory and gapanalyses are necessary first steps in an overall process ofreadiness enhancement. The workshop discussionsshowed that only general observations are possible withthe current level of knowledge about specific assets, andit is difficult to move beyond these generalizations with-out concerted efforts to prepare an inventory and matchit against needs.

MARINE SALVAGE RESPONSE EXERCISES

The committee concluded that a logical next step to eval-uate marine salvage readiness more completely and accu-rately would be to conduct detailed exercisesincorporating plausible terrorist incidents, the entire

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complement of response systems and equipment, and thetotal response organizational structure. Such exerciseswould be designed to assess U.S. salvage readiness pos-ture in the event of a terrorist act affecting U.S. harborsand waterways. Specific committee recommendations areas follows:

• Responsible federal agencies should plan and con-duct a high-level tabletop salvage response exercise.Participants in the exercise should be senior membersfrom the relevant agencies and private organizations whoare capable of making the decisions necessary to ensureproper responses. The exercise could follow scenariossimilar to those used in the workshop. The exerciseshould be carefully planned and led by an experiencedfacilitator. Additional exercises should follow the first for the purpose of testing different scenarios in differentgeographic locations.

• Responsible agencies should conduct a supplemen-tal exercise utilizing the same scenarios as the high-leveltabletop exercise to test the interactions necessary toidentify and mobilize the salvage assets necessary to clearharbors and channels so that the ports can be reopenedin the most efficient fashion. This exercise should includerepresentatives from the Navy, the salvage industry, andother related stakeholders.

• In addition, individual agencies should conducttheir own exercises designed to test the responses nec-essary to support the opening of the port or ports in themost efficient manner. An example would be an exer-cise conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation todetermine the most efficient handling of the crime sceneso that clearance operations could proceed in a timelyfashion. Other agencies might include the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers, USCG, National TransportationSafety Board, and local fire and police departments,among others.

• Public affairs specialists from the various federalentities participating in the exercises should also beinvolved. Such a procedure would acquaint publicaffairs specialists with salvage efforts and should pre-pare them to handle the myriad public affairs challengesin an actual salvage operation.

REVISION OF SALVAGE RESPONSEORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

The committee considered the workshop discussionsand concerns voiced about how existing organizationalstructures are implemented within the responsible fed-eral agencies and how these organizations receive andutilize expertise and advice about marine salvage oper-ations and capabilities. The committee concluded thatresponse readiness could be significantly enhanced by

improving interagency coordination and agency plan-ning and comprehension of marine salvage work. Theexisting organizational structures need to be revised atseveral levels in order to include salvage expertise inboth planning and response operations. The committeemade the following specific recommendations:

• The membership of the Secretary of HomelandSecurity’s National Maritime Security Advisory Com-mittee should be modified to include a marine salvageexpert.

• The USCG Director of Homeland Security shoulddevelop a liaison position with the Supervisor ofSalvage and Diving.

• The structure of the National Response Planshould provide for the inclusion of salvage expertise inthe National Incident Management System (NIMS).

STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE, REGULATORY, ANDPOLICY ISSUES

Finally, the committee recommends that further studyof certain important policy issues is critical to main-taining an adequate readiness posture. The workshopparticipants identified a number of unresolved legisla-tive, regulatory, and policy issues associated with sal-vage operations resulting from terrorist attacks. Thecommittee noted that marine salvage companies are notguaranteed immunity during response operations andthus there is potential for civil or criminal liability ifpollution incidents occur during salvage operations.Many industry participants believed that this potentialliability is a serious disincentive for salvors to undertakesome salvage operations.

Concern was also expressed that adequate fundingmethods are not in place to cover an effective salvageresponse to terrorist attacks. A number of funding optionscould be explored, including expansion of existing sys-tems or development of new ones patterned after success-ful funding mechanisms that are now in place. Workshopparticipants, noting the use of standby salvage in otherparts of the world, discussed the potential for increaseduse of standby salvage capability as a mechanism to fillthe gap in salvage capacity in the United States and toensure timely response in emergency situations.

Another issue identified by workshop participants wasthe absence of a process for designating places of refugeor safe havens for the conduct of salvage operations. Pastexperience has shown that this lack can present a criticalobstacle to effective salvage actions. Some issues identi-fied in the workshop relate to topics other than salvagebut have an effect on the conduct of salvage operations.For example, environmental impacts and public healthconsiderations need to be an integral part of any crisis


management decision-making process. Participantsnoted that a protocol for addressing public healthimpacts of a terrorist incident or consequent salvageoperations is not clearly defined and this deficiency con-tributes to the potential vulnerability of the public duringa terrorist incident. In addition, the absence of a protocolfor addressing human casualties in maritime incidentscould result in potential confusion over jurisdiction andlogistics for the effective handling of decedent affairs.

Because these policy issues need to be resolved beforesalvage response readiness can be ensured, the commit-tee recommends that a study of outstanding legal, regu-latory, and policy issues be conducted to determine howbest to address the following concerns:

• The development of an appropriate processwithin the emergency response organizations to fundadequately salvage operations resulting from a terroristincident;

• The development of a process to designate placesof refuge or safe havens in which to conduct salvageoperations;

• The potential need for responder immunity andconsequent civil liability for nonnegligent salvage oper-

ations that result in pollution or other unintended orunavoidable damages;

• The establishment of a protocol for addressing pub-lic health impacts of a terrorist incident or consequent salvage operations;

• The establishment of a protocol for addressinghuman casualties and decedent affairs for maritimeincidents; and

• The establishment of standby salvage capability insome particularly vulnerable and busy port and harborareas.

REFERENCES

NRC National Research Council

NRC. 1994. A Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

NRC. 1997. Marine Board Roundtable on Search and Recovery of Air Crashes at Sea. A Summary of Meeting Discussions including Key Issues and Questions Related to Future Needs. Washington, D.C.

3 1C O M M I T T E E R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S T O I M P R O V E S A LVA G E R E A D I N E S S

3 2

APPENDIX A

Marine Salvage Response Capability WorkshopAgenda

AUGUST 5, 2003

8:30 a.m. Opening Session Malcolm MacKinnon III, Committee Chair• Welcoming Remarks and

Introductions• Setting the Stage

– Purpose and Goals of Workshop – Initial Conditions

Panel Discussions—Response to Scenarios

9:15 a.m. Panel 1: Federal Agency RepresentativesModerator:Robert C. North, Committee Member

Panelists:Rear Admiral Thomas Gilmour,

U.S. Coast GuardEdward Hecker, U.S. Army Corps of

EngineersMark Johnson, Office of Maritime and

Land Security, Transportation SecurityAdministration

Steve Krueger, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Captain James Wilkins, U.S. Navy

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. Panel 2: Marine Salvage Industry RepresentativesModerator:R. Keith Michel, Committee Member

Panelists:Cappy Bisso, Bisso MarineRoger Elliott, Smit Americas, Inc.Mauricio Garrido, Titan Maritime, LLCJames Shirley, Jr., Holland & KnightRobert Umbdenstock, Extreme Marine

ServicesJ. Arnold Witte, Donjon Marine

12:15 p.m. Lunch

1:30 p.m. Breakout Discussion Groups

Participants will break out into four top-ical groups to address issues the steering committee has identified as key to the theme of the workshop. Each group will discuss the scenario results, responses, and likely impacts from their perspectives on these topics. The group moderator will summarize the discussions at a plenary session at the end of the day.

Group 1: Physical Salvage and Harbor Clearance Issues

Moderator:R. Keith Michel, Committee Member

Group 2: Financial, Economic, and Political Issues

Comoderators:Paul S. Fischbeck and Robert C. North, Committee Members

Group 3: Legal, Forensic, and Human Casualty Issues

Moderator:Reginald E. McKamie, Sr., CommitteeMember

Group 4: Environmental Issues

Moderator:Sally Ann Lentz, Committee Member

4:00 p.m. Plenary Session—Initial Results of Group DiscussionsModerator:Malcolm MacKinnon III, CommitteeChair

6:00 p.m. Reception

AUGUST 6, 2003

8:00 a.m. Breakfast

8:30 a.m. Plenary Session—Discussion of Group Results Moderator:Malcolm MacKinnon III, CommitteeChair

9:30 a.m. Breakout Groups Meet to Draft Findings

12:00 noon Lunch

1:15 p.m. Final Plenary Session—Summary of Workshop Results and Discussion of Next Steps Moderator:R. Keith Michel, Committee Member

2:00 p.m. Adjourn

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APPENDIX B

Marine Salvage Response Capability WorkshopParticipants

COMMITTEE

Malcolm MacKinnon III, Chair, Managing Member,MacKinnon-Searle Consortium, LLC

Paul S. Fischbeck, Director, Center for the Study andImprovement of Regulation, and Department of Socialand Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University

Sally Ann Lentz, Executive Director and GeneralCounsel, Ocean Advocates

Reginald E. McKamie, Sr., Houston, TexasR. Keith Michel, President, Herbert Engineering

CorporationRobert C. North, President, North Star Maritime, Inc.

TRB STAFF

Joedy W. Cambridge, Marine Board Staff DirectorSteve Godwin, Director, Studies and Information ServicesBeverly Huey, Senior Staff OfficerPeter Johnson, ConsultantMary Kissi, Staff AssistantMark R. Norman, Director, Technical ActivitiesRobert E. Skinner, Jr., Executive Director

PANELISTS

Cappy Bisso, Bisso MarineRoger Elliott, Smit Americas, Inc.Mauricio Garrido, Titan Maritime, LLCRear Admiral Thomas Gilmour, U.S. Coast Guard

Edward Hecker, Homeland Security Section, U.S.Army Corps of Engineers

Mark Johnson, Department of Homeland Security,Transportation Security Administration

Steve Krueger, Headquarters, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

James Shirley, Jr., Holland & KnightRobert Umbdenstock, Extreme Marine ServicesCaptain James Wilkins, Office of the Supervisor of

Salvage and Diving (SupSalv), U.S. NavyJ. Arnold Witte, Donjon Marine

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Richard C. Asher, Supervisor of Salvage and Diving,Naval Sea Systems Command

Tim Beaver, Global Diving and Salvage, Inc.Captain J. H. (Huntly) Boyd, U.S. Navy (Ret.)Alan Becker, PCCI, Inc.Joanne Bintz, Ocean Studies Board, National AcademiesCaptain Ronald Branch, U.S. Coast Guard Marine

Safety Office, New OrleansAmy Brandt, American Waterways OperatorsRichard Buckingham, Naval Sea Systems CommandGregory Buie, Team III, Case Management Division,

National Pollution Funds Center, U.S. Coast GuardPeyton Coleman, Maritime/Land Directorate (TSA-8),

Transportation Security AdministrationBill Cooper, Counsel, House Committee on Energy

and CommerceMichelle Daigle, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Commander Steve Danielczyk, U.S. Coast GuardDavid A. DuPont, Standards Evaluation and Analysis

Division, U.S. Coast GuardRichard Fiske, MacKinnon-Searle Consortium, LLCRichard Fredricks, American Salvage AssociationCaptain A. J. Gibbs, Crescent River Port Pilots

AssociationDevon Grennan, Global Diving and Salvage, Inc.John Harrald, Department of Engineering

Management, George Washington UniversityCommander David Hawes, Captain of the Port, HoustonJeff High, U.S. Coast Guard Mike Hokana, Maritime Administration, U.S.

Department of TransportationCommander Rob Holzman, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.),

Inspection Coordination and Review, Marine SafetyOffice, New Orleans

J. Bernie Jacobsen, IBJ AssociatesLaura Johnson, Environmental Protection AgencyMichael Kidberg, U.S. Army Corps of EngineersAlex Landsburg, Maritime Administration, U.S.

Department of TransportationScott Linsky, Transportation Security Administration,

U.S. Department of TransportationMarjorie Murtagh, Office of Marine Safety, National

Transportation Safety BoardRebecca Nadel, Ocean Studies Board, National

Academies

Captain Roy Nash, U.S. Coast GuardJim O’Brien, O’Brien’s Oil Pollution Service, Inc.Michael Park, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New

OrleansMike Rampolla, Crowley Marine Services, Inc.Dragos Rauta, INTERTANKOAled Roberts, Matthews DanielGary Root, Technical Salvage Advisors, Inc.Bob Rzemieniewski, Department of Homeland

Security, Transportation Security AdministrationThomas Salmon, Naval Sea Systems CommandLieutenant Derek Schade, U.S. Coast Guard Marine

Safety Center, Salvage Engineering Response TeamCaptain Willard Searle, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.)Doug Slitor, Safety and Enforcement Branch, Minerals

Management ServiceMalcolm Spaulding, University of Rhode IslandTed Thompson, International Council of Cruise LinesSteven Tomisek, Strategic Policy Forum, National

Defense UniversityKathleen Toone, Strategic Policy Forum, National

Defense UniversityThomas Waite, Environmental Engineering, National

Science FoundationAnn Hayward Walker, Sea ConsultingW. Mark Whitworth, Federal Bureau of InvestigationJohn Witte, Jr., Donjon Marine Co., Inc.George Wittich, Weeks Marine, Inc.

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Study Committee Biographical Information

Malcolm MacKinnon III, Chair, is Managing Memberof MacKinnon-Searle Consortium, LLC, a firm thatspecializes in ship design and acquisition, salvage, tech-nology insertion, and shipyard management, amongother things. Admiral MacKinnon served in variousexecutive and command positions with the U.S. Navyfrom 1955 until his retirement in 1990, includingDeputy Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command(NAVSEA) Ship Design and Engineering, ChiefEngineer of the Navy, and Vice Commander, NAVSEA.He was Project Officer for the design and constructionof SeaLab II, an underwater habitat, and directed theconceptual design efforts for the Trident and SSN 688classes of nuclear submarines. He is active in the Societyof Naval Architects and Marine Engineers and theAmerican Society of Naval Engineers. AdmiralMacKinnon received a BS in naval science from the U.S.Naval Academy and an MS in naval architecture andmarine engineering from the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology. He is a member of the National Academyof Engineering and has served on several NationalResearch Council (NRC) committees, including theMarine Board Committee to Review NOAA’s FleetReplacement and Modernization Plan and Committeeon Marine Transportation of Heavy Oils.

Paul S. Fischbeck is Director of the Center for the Studyand Improvement of Regulation and AssociateProfessor of Engineering and Public Policy and Socialand Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University.Widely published, Dr. Fischbeck has served on a num-ber of national research committees and review panels,

including the Transportation Research Board (TRB)Committee on School Transportation Safety, theNational Science Foundation Decision, Risk, andManagement Sciences Proposal Review Committee andSmall Business Innovative Research Proposal ReviewCommittee, and the TRB Marine Board Committee forEvaluating Double-Hull Tanker Design Alternativesand Committee on Risk Assessment and Managementof Marine Systems. He is involved with a number ofprofessional research organizations including theAmerican Society for Engineering Education, theInstitute for Operations Research and ManagementSciences, the Military Operations Research Society, andthe Society of Risk Analysis. He holds a BS in architec-ture from the University of Virginia, an MS in opera-tions research and management science from the NavalPostgraduate School, and a PhD in industrial engineer-ing and engineering management from StanfordUniversity.

Sally Ann Lentz is the Executive Director and GeneralCounsel of Ocean Advocates, Clarksville, Maryland, anational, nonprofit environmental organization dedi-cated to the protection of the marine environment. Sherepresents environmental interests in national and inter-national forums on ocean dumping, vessel source pollu-tion, and other marine public policy issues. She hasserved as advisor to the U.S. delegations to theInternational Maritime Organization and develops andcoordinates policy positions for coalitions of domesticand international environmental organizations on ship-ping, coastal, and marine issues. Ms. Lentz represents


these organizations at international conventions relatedto oil pollution from tanker accidents. Previously she wasStaff Attorney for Friends of the Earth and the OceanicSociety and conducted a private practice. She has a BAfrom Oberlin College, a postgraduate degree in Europeanintegration from the University of Amsterdam, and a JDfrom the University of Maryland. A member of theDistrict of Columbia and Maryland Bars, Ms. Lentz isalso a member of the TRB Marine Board and has servedon a number of Marine Board committees. She has pub-lished extensively in professional and legal journals onmarine and ocean environmental protection issues.

Reginald E. McKamie, Sr., is a practicing maritimeattorney in Houston, Texas. He is also a certified pub-lic accountant (CPA). He received a BS from the U.S.Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point in 1975, anMBA from the University of Southern California (USC)in 1976, and a JD from the University of Houston in1986, where he was a member of the Phi Delta Phi legalfraternity. He served as lead counsel for the Port ofHouston Authority in a case involving a major mar-itime casualty and oil spill in Galveston Bay, which wasconsidered by the court a case of first impression for theFifth Circuit and is reported in American MaritimeCases. Following graduation from USC, he accepted aposition as an able-bodied seaman aboard an ocean-going vessel. While pursuing a seagoing career, he alsoworked with the accounting firm of Cook & Robinson,CPA. In 1981, Mr. McKamie earned his license as bothUnlimited Master Mariner and CPA. He also workedfor Exxon Shipping Company, where he held the posi-tions of Assistant Fleet Manning Supervisor and SeniorFinancial Specialist. He returned to sea in 1986 andserved as Captain of the S/S Exxon North Slope, S/SExxon Philadelphia, and the S/S Exxon Benicia. He is amember of the American, Texas, and Houston BarAssociations and the Texas and Houston Chapters ofthe Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants.

R. Keith Michel is President of Herbert EngineeringCorporation, Alameda, California. In his 30 years withthe company, he has worked on design, specificationdevelopment, and contract negotiations for container-ships, bulk carriers, and tankers. Mr. Michel has servedon industry advisory groups developing guidelines foralternative tanker designs, including groups advisingthe International Maritime Organization and the U.S.

Coast Guard (USCG). His work has included develop-ment of methodology, vessel models, and oil outflowanalysis. He was a project engineer for the USCG reporton oil outflow analysis for double-hull and hybridtanker arrangements, which was part of the U.S.Department of Transportation’s technical report toCongress on the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. He has alsoworked on the development of salvage software used bythe U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards, the Navy, theNational Transportation Safety Board, the MaritimeAdministration, the American Bureau of Shipping,Lloyd’s, and numerous oil and shipping companies. Mr.Michel holds a BS in naval architecture and marineengineering from the Webb Institute of NavalArchitecture. He was first appointed a member of theMarine Board in 1998 and is currently serving as chair.

Robert C. North is currently President of North StarMaritime, Inc., Queenstown, Maryland, specializing inmarine industry consulting in merchant marine safety,port safety and security, waterways management, mer-chant marine personnel qualifications and training, andmarine environmental protection regulatory issues. Heserved for 34 years as a USCG commissioned officer.His career culminated with service as the USCGAssistant Commandant for Marine Safety andEnvironmental Protection, directing national and inter-national programs for commercial vessel safety, mer-chant mariner licensing and documentation, port safetyand security, and waterways management. He led theeffort involving 14 federal agencies and public- andprivate-sector stakeholders to develop the concept ofthe Marine Transportation System, a project aimed atensuring that U.S. ports, waterways, and intermodalconnections are able to support anticipated increasedlevels of maritime trade in the coming years in a safe,secure, and environmentally sound manner. He directedthe creation of Qualship 21, a unique safety and envi-ronmental protection quality incentives program forforeign vessels calling in U.S. ports. He also manageddevelopment of the Marine Information for Safety andLaw Enforcement project to consolidate USCG com-mercial vessel databases for merchant marine safety andmaritime law enforcement programs. RADM North isa graduate of the State University of New YorkMaritime College with a degree in marine engineeringand is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College of theNational Defense University.

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