logistics aloft - u.s. department of defense
TRANSCRIPT
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR WAR COLLEGE
Logistics Aloft
JOEL D. JACKSON Colonel, USAF
Air War College Maxwell Paper No. 71
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
October 2012
2
Disclaimer
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
3
Logistics Aloft
Col Joel D. Jackson, USAF
Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, Department
of Defense (DOD) investment in remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) has
exploded almost 700 percent to just under $4 billion per year in 2009.1
This expansion was primarily caused by the successful application of
RPAs in their role as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
platforms, but also as ISR/strike platforms because these particular
mission sets fit the capabilities of RPAs. Going forward with these
successes, the DOD should assess potential future RPA missions by first
determining what particular characteristics of the ISR and ISR/strike
missions made them successful as RPA missions and then determining
what other missions fit these same characteristics. Emergency and
mission-critical, time-sensitive (MCTS) intratheater logistical resupply
are missions which fit these characteristics of being advantageous to
persistent, efficient, modular systems integrated into a pervasive battle
space. Work is currently underway developing RPAs to accomplish these
missions, but these current applications do not focus on these specific
characteristics. Instead a RPA designed specifically as a logistical delivery
platform with modular ISR/strike capabilities and long endurance
should be developed to fill these missions.
4
Intratheater Resupply in Central Command
Intratheater resupply is conducted within a single geographic
theater. This type of resupply, often called “the last tactical mile,”
generally goes from forward supply bases out to the troops in the field.
The amount of supplies required for a deployed Army or Marine unit
throughout a theater are well defined. The Marine Corps, for example,
states a requirement of 20,000 pounds of supplies per day per company
for Afghanistan. Similarly, the Army states a requirement of 7,280
pounds per day per platoon or 170 pounds per day per person.2 This
resupply, however, may be broken down into classes and categories. The
classes of supplies are groups such as food and water (Class I), fuels
(Class III), ammunition (Class V), and repair parts (Class IX). Class I
consists of 53 percent of the daily requirement and Class V adds another
6 percent.3
Simply put, emergency resupply is the delivery of supplies which, if
not immediately received, will cause catastrophic consequences for a
unit.
Resupply can also be broken into three categories:
emergency, MCTS, and routine.
4 MCTS resupply, on the other hand, is the delivery of those
supplies needed on short notice or outside the normal resupply system.5
What exactly is considered MCTS varies from commander to commander,
but in general, it is any commodity needed to maintain operational
effectiveness. This definition is broad enough that it can include anything
from a 2,000 pound generator to 100 pounds of ammunition, but in
5
Afghanistan, food and water were added to the MCTS priority list with
class I, III (small quantities), V, and IX being the most common classes
flown as MCTS.6 Implied with MCTS resupply is the requirement to be
delivered in a timely manner. The generally accepted length of time for
the MCTS supply system is 24 hours from request to delivery compared
with 72 hours for supplies considered routine.7 Routine intratheater
supply has traditionally been accomplished by ground delivery with
emergency and MCTS supply accomplished by fixed-wing aircraft to
forward airstrips, but both of these methods have proven to be
incompatible with the ongoing operations in Afghanistan.8
The truck, the cheapest method of delivery, met resistance in Iraq
with the proliferation of improvised explosion devices (IED). Since 2003,
the goal of theater commanders has been to mitigate this threat by
decreasing truck convoys and increasing the movement of supplies by
air.
9 In Afghanistan, the IED problem has been exacerbated by poor
transportation infrastructure. While 84 percent of roads in Iraq are
paved, only 29 percent of roads are paved in Afghanistan.10
Unfortunately, the other common delivery method, using air assets
to locations with landing strips, is also not practical in Afghanistan.
While this method is achievable to some locations, the general lack of
landing strips where the units need the supplies has resulted in the
These two
factors contributed to the desire to move as little resupply over land as
possible.
6
inability to deliver a large amount of goods by traditional airlift
methods.11 Furthermore, the Army terminated the use of its C-23
Sherpas in Afghanistan. Historically the Army used these aircraft to
move small, MCTS cargo to forward troop locations, but the Sherpa lacks
the performance capabilities to operate in the high altitudes required in
Afghanistan.12
The increased use of airdrop and rotary-wing assets to support
resupply has resulted in some new challenges. First, the current
inventory of rotary-wing aircraft has been stretched too thin. The primary
mission of the CH-47 is to aid the air assault of dismounted combat
forces,
This inability to employ fixed-wing assets using traditional
airlift methods has dramatically increased the use of airdrop delivery and
rotary-wing aircraft to meet resupply requirements.
13 but by using them as resupply tools, the Army and the Special
Forces Command do not have enough aircraft to perform their primary
missions. In addition, the long flights associated with the vast distances
between supply bases, outposts, and available fuel bases in Afghanistan
add “substantial wear and tear”14 to the CH-47s and UH-60s used to
perform resupply missions. This adversely affects the aircrafts’
maintainability rates, further decreasing their availability for any
mission. To alleviate some of this shortfall in helicopter availability, the
Army increased their CH-47 fleet by 11 percent in 2005.15 Furthermore,
in April 2010 the deputy assistant defense secretary for special
operations and combating terrorism announced the fiscal year 2011
7
budget would include money for the special operations community to
procure eight MH-47Gs from the Army, purchase 16 new MH-60Ms, and
buy five additional CV-22 aircraft—all specifically for use by special
forces.16
While the initial purchase cost of the CH-47 and UH-60 can be
significantly less than the C-130J or C-27J (the C-27J is in procurement
to replace the C-23), the operating costs of the UH-60 is approximately
equal to a small fixed wing aircraft such as the C-23, C-130J, or C-27J.
Furthermore, CH-47 operating costs are four to five times that of these
fixed-wing aircraft.
Purchasing new rotary-wing aircraft obviously increases
availability, but even if there are enough rotary-wing assets to go around,
using them for logistical operations is simply inefficient.
17 In fact, when comparing the increased lift capacity
fixed-wing aircraft have over rotary-wing aircraft, using the cost to
transport tons per mile over long distances as the comparison metric, the
CH-47 is 10 times more expensive to operate than the C-27J.18
General Dynamics conducted a study in 2010 quantifying the total
cost per pound to deliver goods via helicopter and fixed wing aircraft in
Afghanistan-specific scenarios. Their study included many variables
including aircraft availability, weather cancellation rates, personnel per
In
addition, current Army tactics in Afghanistan dictate that all helicopters
must always be used in pairs, regardless of the mission. This restriction
can double the cost per ton-mile because each mission requires the use
of two aircraft, regardless of the scheduled cargo.
8
aircraft, operating costs, and projected loss rate per aircraft. They
determined the cost per pound moved was always least for the C-27J,
closely followed by the C-130. A distant third in all scenarios was the
CH-47 and the most expensive per pound moved was the UH-60.19 Not
only is the cost of using rotary-wing aircraft for intratheater resupply
high because it takes valuable assets away from their primary mission, it
is also an inefficient method of providing resupply over the distances
required in Afghanistan. Due to these high costs, a 2010 RAND study
recommended the use of fixed-wing aircraft for longer resupply flights,
specifically advocating fixed-wing aircraft with the use of “JPADs (joint
precision airdrop system) to deliver emergency supplies to FOBs (forward
operating bases) and COPs (combat outposts) when the ground situation
so requires.”20
Because of the high costs associated with using rotary-wing assets
to resupply in Afghanistan, the bulk of the routine resupply has been
accomplished cheaper by C-130 and C-17 aircraft. Along with direct
delivery to those locations with landing strips, these aircraft have been
airdropping almost 1,000 bundles per week at an average weight per
bundle of 1,700 pounds. Because of their size, these aircraft are able to
do airdrops in large quantities. For example, a C-17 drops between 25
and 30 bundles while the C-130 delivers 10 bundles per flight.
21 By
airdropping larger average payloads, these aircraft operate more
efficiently, but there is a serious disadvantage to using large aircraft.
9
Since they are in high demand to deliver large quantities of equipment,
personnel, and supplies by air, there is a very structured scheduling
system based on a 72-hour validation process and formalized priorities.
This system was developed to make the delivery of goods as efficient as
possible while maximizing the effectiveness for all users. However, even
with requests for important movements such as emergency airdrop or
MCTS, it still takes general officer intervention to validate supplies for
delivery inside the 72-hour validation window.22 Once the goods have
been validated for delivery, it still takes between six and 24 hours,
depending on aircraft availability and mission importance, for the
supplies to be made airworthy and loaded for delivery.23
By contrast the Army’s entire scheduling system for their aircraft is
developed to respond within 24 hours, enabling small tactically sized
resupply to fielded troops. In Afghanistan these two scheduling systems
have resulted in a resupply delivery that can be responsive to the troops
in the field by delivering emergency or MCTS items within 24 hours of
request, but at the cost of diverting rotary-wing assets from their primary
Once airborne,
the aircraft still must travel the distance from the supply base to the
troops requesting the supplies. Finally, depending on the priority of the
supplies, this time critical delivery could preempt the use of a mobility
asset from servicing multiple users to provide the single important
shipment. While this capability is effective in meeting the war-fighters
requirement, it is usually an inefficient use of a fixed-wing asset.
10
mission with general officer intervention. The systems can also efficiently
deliver goods using fixed-wing assets, but with a request validation time
of up to 72 hours.
These options are not good enough for our fielded troops. In
August 2007, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) published a memorandum back to US Special
Operations Command detailing the requirement for better emergency
resupply. CJSOTF-A outlined the need for a more responsive system to
resupply troops in contact (TIC) with the enemy with emergency
ammunition, medical supplies, fuels, and water—primarily classes I, III,
and V. For this mission, they request a RPA capable of delivering a
minimum of 1,000 pounds accurately within 150 meters of the TIC in
“high and hot” environmental conditions, for example, mountainous
areas and hot temperatures.24
Current RPAs
While CJSOTF-A specifically requested a
RPA for this mission, it is first important to understand what mission
types lend themselves to this air platform.
Both RAND and General Dynamics conducted studies in 2010
characterizing the likely mission types for RPAs using the three “Ds”:
dull, dirty, and dangerous. While the “Ds” are a catchy way to discuss
the missions advantageous to RPAs, the US Air Force in the 2009 RPA
flight plan explains it better. The flight plan says “UAS are compelling
where human physiology limits mission execution (e.g. persistence,
11
speed of reaction, contaminated environment).”25 It then expands on
this, specifying the attributes RPAs will capitalize on as “persistence,
connectivity, flexibility, autonomy, and efficiency.”26 It continues, RPAs
must be integrated with manned and other unmanned systems to
increase capabilities across the full range of military operations. They
also must be automated to perhaps lower cost, footprint, and risk.
Furthermore, they should have a final outcome of a vehicle with a
modular system of capabilities and not a particular platform for one
mission.27
The US Air Force and the rest of the DOD have many small RPAs
used for reconnaissance. The mission of logistical distribution lends itself
to larger systems in order to fit supplies; therefore this paper will only
use the DOD’s large ISR platforms for comparison. The DOD has two
primary large ISR platforms and one large strike/ISR platform: the RQ-4,
the MQ-1, and the MQ-9. The MQ-1 Predator is the work horse of the
current ISR RPA fleet. As the M denotes in the name, it is a multirole
aircraft versus the reconnaissance-only RQ-4. The MQ platforms are
In summary, there is a significant niche these missions
should fill; the more niches each platform can fill, the better. The flight
plan does not assume RPAs will be developed to replace manned aircraft
unless there is a compelling reason in either a mission niche capitalizing
on inherent RPA attributes or efficiencies gained by adopting a RPA
system. The success of the current large ISR platforms follows these
flight plan attributes and fit this niche.
12
primarily low-altitude ISR platforms capable of performing close air
support (CAS), combat search and rescue (CSAR) support, and precision
strike all during an ISR mission. The Predator has a max payload of 300
pounds and can loiter for 22 hours at speeds of up to 135 knots.28 The
MQ-9 Reaper is a larger platform capable of performing the same roles as
the Predator, but has an increased payload and speed capability
compared to the MQ-1. The increased size of the platform expands its
payload to 3,000 pounds but limits endurance to 18 hours at speeds up
to 200 knots.29 The RQ-4 Global Hawk is the largest of the three RPAs
with a commensurate increase in both payload and endurance. It is
purely a high-altitude ISR platform incapable of an attack mission,
though it is capable of a wide array of ISR tasks. Its size gives it a 3,000-
pound payload as well as an endurance of 28 hours at speeds over 300
knots.30
As previously noted, the flight plan described assumptions for the
future use of RPAs. These assumptions included mitigating the
limitations of human physiology while maximizing flexibility and
efficiency. Due to their long endurance capabilities, these platforms are
To determine other missions which may be right for RPAs, it is
important to understand why these three platforms have been successful
in their missions. First, these three platforms fit exactly into the niche
mission and efficiency construct of the US Air Force flight plan. Second,
they have been deployed in an environment void of regulatory or enemy
constraints.
13
able to persist, or maintain operational status, over the battlespace for
extended periods of time. They specifically have the characteristic of
persistence because they are not constrained by the physiologically-
based flight duty times associated with manned aircraft. Since the
primary mission of these RPAs is ISR, a major criterion for success is
duration over the survey area. Unlike missions requiring the movement
from point A to point B, these missions simply require persistence over a
desired area. Finally, the natural evolution of this persistent mission was
adapting munitions to the airframe, resulting in a concurrent attack
capability.
These three RPAs possess other advantages based on the flight
plan. They have modular systems integrated into the entire battle space
construct with complementary manned and unmanned vehicles. By the
word modular, the Air Force implies the ability to mix and match
payloads to attain desired capabilities. All three RPA platforms offer
complete flexibility to fill a variety of roles depending upon war-fighter
requirements. The Air Force also integrates the current RPAs by using
manned, unmanned, and satellite technology when conducting theater
ISR as well as manned and unmanned strike aircraft. This combination
of modular assets gives the war fighter complete flexibility of capabilities
and applications to use depending on the circumstances.
The second aspect to consider in determining why the ISR
platforms have been successful is cost. While cost is always important
14
and seems to be listed as a RPA advantage in any study, the flight plan
only assumes the automation of RPAs could potentially reduce costs.31
While none of the current ISR platforms can be considered cheap, they
either fill a niche mission and are thus fiscally incomparable, or they are
significantly cheaper than their manned counterpart. The least expensive
platform is the Predator which has a cost of $20 million (in 2009 dollars)
for each set of four aircraft, ground control station, and satellite link.32
The Reaper costs $53.5 million (in 2006 dollars) for a set of four
aircraft,33 while the RQ-4 has the highest per unit cost of between $55
and $81 million per aircraft.34
What is significant for these RPAs, however, is their cost compared
to manned systems. While the Predator at $5 million per airframe has no
comparable manned aircraft, the Reaper could be compared either to the
legacy strike aircraft, the F-16, or the new strike aircraft, the F-35—both
of which are considerably more expensive. While the F-16 costs $23
million in 2006 dollars, only twice as much as the Reaper, it is beginning
to be phased out the inventory due to its increasing age and
maintenance costs. The F-16s replacement, the F-35, on the other hand,
is currently estimated to cost approximately $120 million in 2010
dollars, or almost 10 times more than a Reaper. Finally, while the Global
Hawk is the most expensive RPA, the cost of its closest manned
counterpart, the U-2, is still classified. Additionally, RPAs also have less
expensive operating costs. Northrop Grumman, the manufacturer of the
15
Global Hawk, stated that the costs of operating the Global Hawk is
quoted as one-third that of the U-2,35
One of the main criteria for the lower acquisition and operating
costs over their manned equivalent is the extra cost associated with
building an environment for a human. Aircraft cost is directly
proportional to weight and aerodynamic shape. Each extra pound built
into the aircraft requires added lift to get airborne; each reduction in
aerodynamic shape increases drag that must be overcome driving costs
associated with the design and operation higher. A Stanford University
study based on a summary by R. S. Shevell breaks out these costs for
the different components of an airliner. While this is not a direct
comparison to a fighter or reconnaissance aircraft, it does give a
significant factor worth considering. This study attributes weight directly
to both manufacturing and operating costs and then attributes over 28
percent of the weight of an airliner to the climate control system,
avionics, and navigation systems associated with having human pilots.
with similar lower operating costs
for the Predator and Reaper as well. Understanding why RPAs are
cheaper goes beyond just looking at these lower costs, however.
36
As such, any RPA system trying to achieve cost supremacy over a
manned system should be designed purely as an unmanned system from
the start. Any “optionally manned” RPA drives higher acquisition and
operating costs.
16
There is more to cost, however, than simply the acquisition and
hourly operating cost of the platform. Another important aspect of overall
cost is the cost associated with the personnel required to operate the
aircraft. There are three important aspects to consider in personnel
costs—the number of people required to operate and pilot the aircraft,
the cost to train the pilots, and the number of aircraft each crew can
operate at a time. While the Air Force has not fully decided how all RPA
pilots will be trained, the current plan is to develop pilots by sending
them to specialized RPA training and not specialized undergraduate pilot
training (SUPT). This decision is driven by both the long timeline and
high cost of SUPT. To send one pilot to SUPT costs the Air Force
$888,900 and takes approximately one year plus follow-on specialized
aircraft training which often takes six months to a year to complete. RPA
training costs the Air Force $32,800 per student and takes only 10
months from the beginning of training until they are qualified to fly
combat missions.37
A second cost advantage to the current RPAs is the number of
missions each operator can fly concurrently. Due to the generally
simplistic loiter-type mission these aircraft fly and the automation
associated with the aircraft’s technology, two pilots are generally used to
operate three missions and occasionally run four separate missions
concurrently. These advantages drastically lower both the personnel and
training costs associated with these ISR RPAs.
17
Finally, ISR RPAs are successful because they operate in a friendly
regulatory environment as well as an environment free from air-to-air
enemies. Current airspace regulations by both the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as well as the international equivalent, the
International Civil Aviation Organization, put tight restrictions upon
RPAs operating in airspace with manned aircraft. In 2006 the FAA issued
a certificate of authorization granting Predators and Reapers access to
US civilian airspace in order to search for survivors after disasters, but
this allowance is narrow and currently the exception rather than the
rule. Until technology solves the dilemma of how RPAs avoid collisions
with manned aircraft, whether the manned aircraft is equipped with
traffic collision avoidance systems or not, RPAs will not have access to
regulated airspace. This restriction drastically limits the missions RPAs
can train for and fly. Lastly, if the US did not have air supremacy over
Afghanistan, it would severely limit the success of these RPAs due to
their lack of defensive systems. While the ISR RPAs have been very
successful in Afghanistan, it is not for one particular reason but a
combination of various reasons. To determine other potential missions
for RPAs, there must be an evaluation of these missions against the same
factors that capitalize on the current RPAs strengths.
18
Future RPA Mission
To be truly successful, any new RPA should meet a niche mission,
meshing with the inherent advantages of an RPA and be cost effective. In
stating the current problems with emergency and MCTS supply delivery,
General Dynamics defined one challenge as needing the flexibility to
respond to changes in the operational environment. The two factors they
determined that account for the responsiveness of a logistical system are
the distance-terrain interaction and the planning cycle time leading up to
mission execution.38
The current assumption in resupply is that people request goods
which are then loaded on a resupply vehicle and taken to the point of
need. Conceptually, this is akin to waiting until troops in contact request
air support prior to loading the weapons on the aircraft and then working
the mission into the planned events. While this logistical planning model
works fine for low priority, noncritical goods, it does not work well for
emergency/MCTS requirements. To meet the needs for these critical
Both these factors are generally predetermined. The
supply depot location is usually fixed, and the distance required to travel
is determined by the location of the troops. While the planning cycle can
be sped up thru general officer involvement in the validation phase or a
complete process improvement of the planning cycle, it is currently set at
either 24 or 72 hours. However, if the advantages of RPAs are exploited,
they can overcome both of these shortcomings.
19
supplies, they need to be available and ready for delivery when requested
by the user.
Also, in today’s combat environment, a unit may not know in
advance when it wants goods delivered. What may now seem to be a good
time to receive supplies may rapidly become a bad time 24 hours later. A
goal of the logistical system should be to minimize the lead time from
request to delivery of these critical emergency/MCTS requests by
reducing both the distance-terrain interaction as well as the planning
cycle while maintaining effectiveness for the receiving unit. In order to
accomplish this task, an RPA preloaded with approximately 1,000
pounds of common emergency/MCTS cargo along with modular ISR
packages could maintain long loiter times over the battlefield, providing
ISR coverage until called in by units in need of the supplies. The RPA
could then either use low-cost, low-altitude (LCLA) airdrop or JPADS to
deliver supplies before returning to its ISR orbit, awaiting relief by the
next cargo-loaded RPA. As the Air Force is planning on providing 50 ISR
RPA orbits by 2011,39
While prepositioned logistics cannot account for every type of
critical delivery requirement, the most common requests can be
accommodated. Of the top five classes of short notice requests
determined by the General Dynamics study
the proximity of these orbits to the units in need of
supply should be close, reducing the time from request to receipt and
providing the goods when and where desired.
40 only Class IX, repair parts,
20
could be hard to preplan into standing cargo loads. Class I (food and
water), Class V (ammunition), Class VIII (medical supplies), and Class III
(petroleum products) could all have prepositioned stocks ready for
delivery. By taking some of the most common requests out of the current
delivery system and into this niche delivery capability, it would also
reduce the drain on the current system.
Airlift is inherently expensive and loitering with cargo is not within
the normal thought process of how to efficiently provide airlift. The
mixture of ISR/CAS and resupply missions, coupled with the
effectiveness of the instantly deliverable emergency supplies added to an
otherwise lightweight efficient RPA, make the costs of loitering with
additional cargo acceptable. New technologies are emerging to lower the
weight of aircraft reducing the overall weight increase. For example, the
new advanced composite cargo aircraft is a flying test bed designed to
investigate less expensive and easier methods to integrate composites
into aircraft. By integrating these new capabilities with the cost
efficiencies of training RPA pilots separately from manned aircraft pilots
and using new technologies allowing up to a 4:1 airframe per pilot ratio,
the added effectiveness of instantly deliverable emergency or MCTS goods
will far outweigh the costs. The US Transportation Command recently
awarded a $450 million dollar, 5-year contract for manned civilian
rotary-wing lift in Afghanistan.41 While the cargo RPAs would not be able
21
to fill this entire mission set, it could provide a cheaper and better
response to the customer for the right mission niche.
Recommendation
Currently, there is only one RPA with similar capabilities to
partially fill this mission, the Boeing A160, but even it does not possess
all the required capabilities to truly capitalize on the RPA strengths. The
A160 is an $8.5 million rotary-wing aircraft, specifically designed to be
an RPA capable of providing all-weather vertical takeoff and landing
(VTOL) delivery of goods with payloads of about 1,000 pounds and
endurance of approximately 18 hours.42
Some advantages the rotary-wing A160 has over a potential fixed-
wing cargo RPA are the ability to provide all-weather precision delivery
using VTOL as well as the ability to bring back people or cargo after
making a delivery. The General Dynamics study estimates only a 3.4
percent weather delay rate for fixed-wing aircraft providing low-altitude
air-drop;
Unfortunately, while the A160
does have a long endurance capability, it is at the expense of cargo
weight. While maintaining 18 hours of endurance, its cargo capability
reduces to only 300 pounds, negating the ability for it to load ISR
modules on board during its loiter time.
43 airdrops using LCLA bundles would meet the needs of half of
the resupply precision requirements.44 This 50 percent includes the
delivery of large quantities of fuel and water that are still being delivered
by ground convoy. So while goods occasionally do need to be delivered
22
with the precision only a VTOL aircraft can attain, LCLA is able to
cheaply provide the accuracy required for the vast majority of supplies
while JPADS has recently improved its accuracy providing pinpoint
delivery at a higher price if this trade off is desired by the user.
One benefit of the A160 is the ability to hover and not land when
delivering goods that do not require a landing zone. By capitalizing on
this capability, however, it negates the ability to carry return goods or
passengers. So while the A160 meets some of the requirements to
maximize its strength as a RPA, it is not able to fully capitalize on all of
the advantages laid out by the flight plan. To truly capitalize on these
strengths, a fixed-wing aircraft, specifically designed as a RPA with the
ability to airdrop 1,000 pounds on standard pallets and hold an ISR
array while having a 24-hour loiter time, should be developed.
Conclusion
There is no doubt ISR RPAs have been successful in Iraq and
Afghanistan. There can equally be no doubt that troops in Afghanistan
are in need of an emergency and MCTS resupply system capable of
delivering goods as soon as possible after they have been requested.
While it may be a short-term gain to simply design a nonpiloted version
of a current rotary-wing aircraft or make an evolutionary step forward by
designing an new rotary-wing RPA for this single mission, unless all the
tenets of the flight plan are enacted and a fully modular system is
23
designed capitalizing on the persistent capabilities of the RPA, the DOD
will be failing to fully meet the potential for an intratheater resupply RPA.
Notes
1. Brien Alkire, James Kallimani, Peter Wilson, and Louis Moore,
Applications for Navy Unmanned Aerial Systems (Santa Monica: RAND,
2010), 1, https://www.rand.org.
2.General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission For
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) (Fairfax, VA, February 2010), 52.
3. Ibid., 51.
4. Ibid., 47.
5. Ibid.
6. Kenneth Horn, Elvira Loredo, Steven Cram, Lewis Jamison,
Christopher McLaren, William Phillips, and Jeffrey Sullivan, Use of the C-
27J Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Conducting Army Mission Critical, Time
Sensitive Missions in Counterinsurgency Operations (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2010), 2, http://www.rand.org; and General Dynamics, Future
Modular Force Resupply Mission, 36.
7. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review
Report (Washington DC, January 2009), 38, http://www.deic.mil/cgi-
bin/gettrdoc?ad=ada493403&location=u2&doc=gettrdoc.pdf; and Horn,
Loredo, Cram, Jamison, McLaren, Phillips, and Sullivan, Use of the C-
27J, 13.
24
8. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 29–
30.
9. Ibid., 23.
10. Ibid., 29.
11. Ibid., 30
12. Horn, Loredo, Cram, Jamison, McLaren, Phillips, and Sullivan,
Use of the C-27J, 5.
13. Ibid., 7.
14. Ibid.
15. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 33.
16. Megan Scully, Officials Say Special Ops Forces Face Helicopter
Shortage (CongressDaily, AM, National Journal Group, April 2010), 1.
17. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 72.
18. Horn, Loredo, Cram, Jamison, McLaren, Phillips, and Sullivan,
Use of the C-27J, 7.
19. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 76.
20. Horn, Loredo, Cram, Jamison, McLaren, Phillips, and Sullivan,
Use of the C-27J, 8.
21. Col David Almand, Air Mobility Division director, Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC), Central Command (CENTCOM), e-mail to the
author, 16 Oct 2010.
25
22. Col Dave Almand, Air Mobility Division director, CAOC,
CENTCO), Type of Airlift, (Validation Method) and Responsiveness,
PowerPoint slide, Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks, 2010.
23. Ibid., e-mail to the author, 19 January 2011.
24. Col Edward Reeder, Jr., commander, Combined Joint Special
Operations Command-Afghanistan, to Southern Command,
memorandum, Combat Mission Needs Statement for emergency resupply
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), 8 August 2007.
25. US Air Force, United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047 (Washington DC, 2009), 14. The Air
Force uses remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) in lieu of unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS).
26. Ibid., 15.
27. Ibid.
28. US Air Force, Predator fact sheet, Air Combat Command (ACC),
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=122
(accessed 20 July 2010).
29. US Air Force, Reaper fact sheet, ACC,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405,
(accessed 18 August 2010).
30. US Air Force, Global Hawk fact sheet, ACC,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=13225
(accessed 19 November 2009).
26
31. USAF, Flight Plan, 14.
32. US Air Force, Predator fact sheet.
33. US Air Force, Reaper fact sheet.
34. US Air Force, Global Hawk fact sheet.
35. Dave Majumdar, “High Altitude, High Stakes,” C4ASR Journal,
13 September 2010. Ed Walby, Northrop Grumman director of business
development for Global Hawk, was quoted in the article.
36. Aerodynamics and Design Group, Stanford University,
Operating Cost study (based on summary by R. S. Shevell), 7.
37. Maj Casey Tidgewell, Headquarters Air Force/A3O-AT, RPA
career field manager, e-mail to the author, 15 October 2010.
38. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 37.
39. Michael Hoffman, “UAV Pilot Career Field Could Save $1.5B,”
Air Force Times, 2 March 2009,
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_uav_audit_0301
09 (accessed 29 November 2010).
40. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 37.
41. “AAR Awarded $450 Million Task Order under New
USTRANSCOM Contract,” AAR Corporation press release,
http://www.aarcorp.com/news/aar_transcom_100510.htm (accessed 29
November 2010).
27
42. Boeing, “A160 Hummingbird,”
http://www.boeing.com/bds/phantom_works/hummingbird.html
(accessed 29 November 2010).
43. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 72.
44. Ibid., 60.