Malabang vs BenitoFACTS:

Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of Malabang before it was created into a separate municipality thruan executive order.

The Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality of Balabagan for having been created under an invalid EO 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective offices.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: Petitioner relied on the ruling of the Pelaez case that Sec. 68 of the

Administrative Code is unconstitutional (a) because itconstitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b)because it offends against Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved onMarch 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS The Respondents on the other hand argue that the Mun. of

Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation for having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected orappointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action.

It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quowarranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual likethe petitioner Balindong.

The method of challenging the existence of a municipalcorporation is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quowarranto or other direct proceeding. But the rule disallowingcollateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation isat least a de facto corporation.

For where it is neither acorporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that itsexistence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any actionor proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affectedthereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unlessthey are estopped by their conduct from doing so.

ISSUE:W/O the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.HELD: No, because there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation when EO 386 was subsequently declaredas unconstitutional.

The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de factomunicipal corporation may be:

1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.

2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a)been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declaredvoid; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found insome other valid law or in the recognition of its potentialexistence by the general laws or constitution of the state.

In the case at bar, there is no other law that could give color of authority to the validity of the existence of the municpality of Balabagan when EO 386 was later on invalidated.

Hence, such municipality is not a de factor corporation. the inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is

reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or otherdirect proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government.

But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation.

For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct fromdoing so.

A de facto municipal corporation is recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, rests upon the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate validity to the organization.

Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a defacto corporation, as, independently of Section 68 of theAdministrative Code, there is no other valid statute to give colo rof authority to its creation.

Thus, Executive Order 386 creating the municipality in question is a nullity pursuant to the ruling in Pelaez ruling.

This is not to say, however, that the acts done bythe municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporatepowers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legalcontemplation, as inoperative as though it had never beenpassed."

Note, the existence of Executive Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored."

The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, in an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.

The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be

considered in various aspects — with respect to particular

relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.

PADILLA V COMELECFACTS

Republic Act No. 7155 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to becomposed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.

Pursuant to said law, the COMELEC issued a resolution for the conduct of a plebiscite.

The said resolution provides that the plebiscite shall be held in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of Labo, majority of the votes cast were against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.

Thus, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted throughout theMunicipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a

complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC, should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e.the 12barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa.

Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

Insupport of his stand, petitioner argues that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segregated should be included in the plebiscite.

ISSUE: WON the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and theremaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo validHELD: Yes.

When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.

Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.

Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

Thus, it was concluded that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the resolution.

Griño vs. COMELECFACTS:

Griño and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in relation to the May 11, 1992 election.

Griño is a candidate for Governor of Iloilo where the sub-province of Guimaras is located.

LGC of 1991 took effect requiring the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is one such sub-provinces, upon approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite.

The plebiscite favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but petitioner questioned the COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting for Gov, Vice Gov and members of the Sanggunian of Iloilo.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.HELD: NO

The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under the LGC of 1991, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will appoint provincial officials.

However, the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province so there was need to undo what COMELEC has done in plebiscite.

There ballots in Guimaras should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now considered the case moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion of Guimaras.

Alvarez v. GuingonaFacts:

HB 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as theCity of Santiago," was filed in the HoR, subsequently passed by the HoR, and transmitted to the Senate.

A counterpart of HB 8817, SB1243 was filed in the Senate, and was passed as well.

The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by the Chief Executive as RA7720.

When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION Petitioners contend that the IRAs must be deducted from the

municipality’s income because they are not income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the NG and thatthey fluctuate depending on different factors.

Issue: WON Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) must be includedin determining the average annual income for purposes of conversion.HELD: YES

For a municipality to be converted into an independent component city, its average annual income for the last two consecutive years (at that time, based on 1991constant prices) must be at least 20M.

The court in its discussion of what an LGU is said that: a.it is a political subdivision of the State which isconstituted by law and possessed of substantialcontrol over its own affairs. b.It is an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereignnation, but not intended, however, to be an imperiumin imperioc. It is autonomous in the sense that it is given morepowers, authority, responsibilities and resources.

Since the LGU is given broadened powers and increasedresponsibilities, it now operates on a much wider scale

More extensive operations, in turn, entail moreexpenses. The vesting of duty, responsibility andaccountability in every LGU

is accompanied with aprovision for reasonably adequate resources todischarge its powers and effectively carry out itsfunctions.

Availment of such resources is effectuated through thevesting in every LG unit of

(1) the right to create andbroaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to beallocated a just share in national taxes, such share beingin the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3)the right to be given its equitable share in the proceedsof the utilization and development of the nationalwealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.

The court held that the IRAs were properly included because they are items of income and form part of thegross accretion of the funds of the LGU.

The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasurywithout need of any further action on the part of the LGunit.

They thus constitute income which the LG can invariably rely upon as the source of much neededfunds.

LGC, Sec 450 (c): "the average annual income shallinclude the income accruing to the general fund,exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurringincome."

DOF Order 35-93: ANNUAL INCOME: revenues andreceipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalitiesfrom regular sources of the Local General Fund includingthe internal revenue allotment and other sharesprovided for in Secs 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, butexclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as othernational aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds,sales of fixed assets, and similar others.

Herrera v. COMELECFacts:

In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have the province subdivided into two provincial districts. A

cting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties.

A consensus was reached in favor of the division. The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the

province. Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class

province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras-1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:

1. the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area. 2. the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province. 3. the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable. 4. there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?Held: NO COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent.

Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances.

On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.

There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor.

As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and represented.

Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members.

Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with one legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.

Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters.

The districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the National Statistics Office.

League of Cities v. ComelecFacts:

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress , the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.

However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.

Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.

The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills.

The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007.

The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood

Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.

Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; Held: YES

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

NAVARRO V ERMITA (2010)Facts:When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NationalStatistics Office (NSO), which population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000square kilometers. R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains anapproximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers.Hence, Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islandswas held unconstitutional and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where theproposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," was declared NULL and VOID. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

Respondents instead asserted that the province, which is composed of more than one island, isexempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 whichstates that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands."

Issue: Whether Dinagat Islands is exempted from the land area requirementHeld: No.

The requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000 squarekilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area. The exemption under Sec461(b)pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity.

There are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the landarea must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of itspopulace.

The requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least2,000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area.

The exemption above pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity.

It clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more islands,or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province is composedof two or more islands, or when the territory of a province is separated by a chartered city or cities,such province need not comply with the land area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the Local Government Code.

The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands’ population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?

February 10, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of

802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. “There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law,” held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.

April 12, 2011 Ruling

Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.

The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is declared VALID.

According to the SC, “with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.”

“But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”

xxx “There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently

omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”

xxx“Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.”

xxx “What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.”