locgov digest compilation (class)

LocGov Digests | August 10, 2015

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

01 - PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V. ROMULO [2004] ......................................................... 1

02 - NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY AND ALEX DAVID VS. PAREDES [2004] ....... 3

03 - MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN V DIRECTOR OF LANDS ....................................... 5

04 - TEJANO ....................................................................................................................... 6

05 - HEBRON VS REYES ..................................................................................................... 6

06 - RODOLFO T. GANZON VS. CA [1991] ........................................................................ 7

07 - VILAS, TRIGAS, AGUADO V. CITY OF MANILA [1921] ............................................... 8

08 - BARA LIDASAN V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [1967] .......................................... 9

09 - REPUBLIC V CITY OF DAVAO (2002) ........................................................................ 11

10 - GREENHILLS EAST ASSOCIATION, INC. V. GANZON................................................ 12

11 - ALECHA V. PASION [2010] ....................................................................................... 14

12 - PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL VS. COMMISSIONERS, COA [2010] ............ 15

13 - CAVESTANY .............................................................................................................. 16

14 - KULAYAN V. TAN (3 JULY 2012) 675 S 482 ............................................................. 16

15 - PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [2012] .......................................................... 17

16 - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. YU [2012] ............................................................. 18

17. SAN JUAN V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [1991] ................................................... 20

18 – PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE [2000] ................................................................................ 22

19 - TAN V. COMELEC [1986].......................................................................................... 24

20 - TAN V. PEREA [2005] ............................................................................................... 24

21 - BATANGAS CATV V. CA, BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD [2204] 25

22 - DAVAO NEW TOWN V. SPS. SALIGA (2013) ............................................................ 27

23 PROVINCE OF RIZAL V EXEC SEC [2005] .................................................................... 29

24 - VELOSO, V. COA [2011] ........................................................................................... 31

25 - ACCORD V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ZAMORA ........................................................ 35

26 - ALDABA VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 188078, JANUARY 25, 2010 .............................. 36

27 - FULLECIDO - NAVARRO 2010 ..................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

28 - NAVARRO V. ERMITA (2011) ................................................................................... 39

29 DORIA ......................................................................................................................... 43

30 DOMINGO ................................................................................................................... 43

31 LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC [2010] ..................................................................... 43

32 - LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC .............................................................................. 45

33 - LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC [APRIL 2011] ........................................................ 46

34 - AQUINO III V. COMELEC [2010] .............................................................................. 48

35 MMDA V BELAIR ........................................................................................................ 50

36 – MMDA V. GARIN [2005] ......................................................................................... 52

37 - MMDA V VIRON TRANSPORTATION [2007] .......................................................... 53

38 - DISOMANGCOP VS. DATUMANONG [2004] .......................................................... 56

39 – SERNA V. COMELEC [2008] .................................................................................... 59

40 – ADORNA (KIDA) ....................................................................................................... 62

41 – ABDON (ORDILLO ) ................................................................................................. 62

42 - CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA [1990] .................................................... 62

43 - BAGABUYO V. COMELEC ......................................................................................... 64

44 - SAMSON V AGUIRRE ............................................................................................... 65

45 TEJANO ...................................................................................................................... 66

46 - MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO VS MENDEZ ....................................................... 66

01 - PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V. ROMULO [2004]

Digest by: Kathleen Villamin (sourced from Monique Lee’s digest)

Topic: Overview, Local Governments as part of the Executive Branch

FACTS

In 1998, then Pres. Estrada issued EO 48 entitled “Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” in order to “facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code (LGC).” Later, the program was renamed as the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF).

For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG. From 1999 onwards, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the IRRs governing equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to LGUs.

In the GAA 1999, of the P96 billion allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes, P5 billion shall be earmarked for the LGSEF for the funding requirements of the LGUs provided that these funds will be released subject to the implementing rules and regulations that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee. The Oversight Committee also passed several resolutions which contained guidelines that the LGUs must follow in order for them to be eligible for funding under the LGSEF (i.e. the LGUs had to identify projects and submit project proposals that fell under the proposed criteria in the said resolutions in order to get


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a share in the LGSEF). Similarly, in the GAA 2000 and GAA 2001, P5 billion was earmarked for the LGSEF.

As petitioner, Batangas Governor Mandanas assailed the provisos in the 1999, 2000 and 2001 GAAs and the corresponding resolutions, insofar as they each earmarked the amount of P5 billion of the IRA for the LGSEF, as unconstitutional and void. It was also argued that imposed conditions for the release of such funds were likewise unconstitutional and void.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:

1. Violation of “Automatic Release of Funds.” The provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions violate the Constitution and the LGC. Art. X Sec. 6 of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. Secs. 18 and 286 of the LGC of 1991 provides that the “just share” of the LGUs shall be “automatically and directly” released to them “without need of further action.” The use of the word "shall" must be given compulsory meaning.

2. Anathema to Local Autonomy. To vest the Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy. (Example: In 1991, the release of the LGSEF was long delayed because the Oversight Committee was not able to convene that year and no guidelines were issued therefor.) Furthermore, the possible disapproval by the Oversight Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs would result in the diminution of the latter’s share in the IRA.

3. Illegal Amendment to the LGC on Percentage Sharing among LGUs. The Oversight Committee resolutions also made an improper amendment to Sec. 285 of the LGC on the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs. Said resolutions allocate the IRA as follows: Provinces - 40%, Cities - 20%, Municipalities - 40%; whereas in Sec. 285 of the LGC, it provides that: Provinces - 23%, Cities - 23%, Municipalities - 34%, and Barangays - 20%. Petitioner further point out that there was an instance when Exec. Sec. Romulo endorsed to DBM Sec. Boncodin the release of funds from the LGSEF to certain LGUs “In accordance to with the handwritten instructions of President Arroyo.” Thus, the LGUs are at a loss as to how a portion of the LGSEF is actually allocated.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:

1. LGU Shares Not Solely Determined by the LGC. The provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001 and the assailed resolutions by the Oversight Committee are not unconstitutional because Sec. 6 Art. X of the Constitution does not specify that the “just share” of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the LGC. The Congress can also determine what should be the “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes.

2. LGC Percentage Sharing Not Intended to Be A Fixed Determination. Sec. 285 of the LGC, which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs, was not intended to be a fixed determination of the LGUs’ “just share”. LGUs have no vested rights in a permanent percentage as Congress may adjust the “just share” of the LGUs. Sec. 285 was merely intended to be the default share to do away with the need to determine annually by law the LGUs’ just share.

3. Petitioner has no legal standing because he has no suffered injury. In fact, the petitioner’s “just share” has even increased.

4. Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact to the SC.

5. Petition is already moot since the IRAs for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001 have already been released and the government is now operating under the 2003 budget

[Issue/ Held: WON the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions violate the Constitution and the LGC / YES]

SC RULING

[Procedural Ruling: (1) Petitioner has locus standi to sue since its interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes; (2) Petition involves a significant legal issue and the nature of the present controversy warrants the relaxation of procedural rules; (3) The SC will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.]

[Substantive Ruling: The SC cites the following as basis for its decision: Sec. 25, Article II, 1987 Constitution The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments; Sec. 2, Article X, 1987 Constitution The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Control - one lays down the rules in the doing of an act; if not followed, one may order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or may decide to do it himself Supervision - one merely sees to it that the rules are followed; if not followed, one may order the work done or re-done but only to conform with the prescribed rules. *Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the president's power over the LGUs to one of GENERAL SUPERVISION (and excludes the power of control).

#1THE ASSAILED PROVISOS IN THE GAAS OF 1999, 2000 AND 2001 AND THE OCD RESOLUTIONS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT ON LOCAL AUTONOMY:

Section 6, Article X, 1987 Constitution Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. [This provision mandates that (1) the LGUs


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shall have a "just share" in the national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be determined by law; and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released to the LGUs.]

The entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee makes the release not automatic. The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy 'means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.' Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.

Decentralization means devolution of national administration – but not power – to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable' and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the Court declared therein that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the

constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.

#2THE ASSAILED PROVISOS IN THE GAAS OF 1999, 2000 AND 2001 AND THE OCD RESOLUTIONS CANNOT AMEND SECTION 285 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

Section 284 of the LGC provides that, beginning the third year of its effectivity, the LGUs' share in the national internal revenue taxes shall be 40%. This percentage is fixed and may not be reduced except "in the event the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon compliance with stringent requirements set forth. This also means that the only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs' IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year.

Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs:

(a) Provinces – Twenty-three (23%); (b) Cities – Twenty-three percent (23%);

(c) Municipalities – Thirty-four (34%); and (d) Barangays – Twenty percent (20%).

However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion pesos LGSEF as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a different sharing scheme.

The Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an "inappropriate provision." The category of "inappropriate provisions" includes unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.

02 - NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY AND ALEX DAVID VS. PAREDES [2004]

G.R. No. 130775 | J. Tinga | Digest by: Aaron Valdez


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FACTS

Manuel Rayos, a Punong Barangay in Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO against Alex David, then President of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter after David allegedly committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue, and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay (Liga) elections in 1997. One of these irregularities was that the deadline of the filing of Certificates of Candidacy was set on the third day prior to the election day and Rayos failed to meet the deadline because he failed to obtain a certified true copy of a COMELEC Certificate of Canvas. The Executive Judge issued a TRO in favour of Rayos, but David was allegedly not properly served and elections for the Liga continued, hence David won as President.

Rayos filed a 2nd petition for quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition against David, the newly-elected officers of the Liga, and DILG Sec. Robert Barbers, alleging the former won as President in a later elections held in June 14, 1997. Before both cases were consolidated, Barbers filed an Urgent Motion, invoking the President’s power of general supervision over all local government units and praying the DILG be appointed as Interim Caretaker to manage and administer affairs of the Liga. Such prayer for injunctive relief was anchored on the ff grounds, among others:

a. The DILG Sec exercises the power of general supervision over all gov’t units;

b. The Liga is a gov’t organization

c. Undue interference of some local elective officials during the Municipal and City Chapter elections of the Liga

d. Improper issuance of confirmations of the elected Liga Chapter officers by David

e. Incapacity of the Liga Board to address their problems properly

Petitioner’s (David’s) reply: Undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga

DILG USec Manuel Sanchez issued a Memorandum Circular directing all provincial governors, vice governors, city mayors, vice mayors, and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and panlungsod not to recognize and/or honor any Liga Presidents of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex ofiicio members and to disregard any pronouncements made by David.

On Aug. 4, 1997, respondent Judge Paredes issued the assailed order granting the DILG’s Urgent Motion for its appointment as the Interim Caretaker of the Liga. Upon its appointment as caretaker, the DILG did the following:

a. Provided supplemental guidelines for the 1997 elections

b. Appointed Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan

c. Conducted synchronized elections of Provincial and Metropolitan Liga Chapters

On October 10, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners Respondents

The power of general supervision of the president over LGUs does not apply to the Liga because the Liga is not an LGU. Sec. 507 of the LGC provides the Liga shall be governed by its own Consti and by-laws

The DILG Sec supervises acts of local officials. Members of the Liga are local officials, hence they are subject to the supervision of the DILG Sec.

Assuming the Liga is an LGU over which the President thru the DILG Sec has power of supervision, there is no legal or constitutional basis for appointing the DILG as interim caretaker; such powers go beyond supervision but are of control eg altering, modifying, nullifying or setting aside the actions of the Liga Board of Directors

They rely on Taule v. Santos which provided that the DILG Sec has no authority to pass upon the regularity or validity of the election of the officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay

No legal or constitutional basis for the DILG from refraining from taking over as Interim Caretaker

SOLGEN: He agreed with the DILG did not merely exercise the power of supervision but exercised powers of control as well.

ISSUE(S):

WON THE LIGA IS A GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUBJECT TO THE DILG SECRETARY’S POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS THE ALTER EGO OF THE PRESIDENT - YES

There is a difference between a barangay and the Liga ng mga Barangay

Barangay Liga

the primary planning and implementing unit of government

the organization of all barangays, the primary purpose of which is the


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policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled

determination of the representation of the Liga in thesanggunians, and the ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government administration and securing solutions thereto, through proper and legal means

The barangay is positioned to influence and direct the development of the entire country. The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make this new development approach materialize and produce results. The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels, automatically become ex-officio members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respectively.

In Bito-onon v. Fernandez, the Court held that in Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the DOJ ruled the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.

The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development.

WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGE’S DESIGNATION OF THE DILG SECRETARY AS THE INTERIM CARETAKER OF THE LIGA HAS INVESTED THE DILG WITH CONTROL OVER THE LIGA – YES

In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court defined supervision as overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their

duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

In Taule v. Santos, the Court held the Constitution permits the President to wield no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or its officers perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.

In Drilon v. Lim, the Court held that the supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are followed.

When respondent judge appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga. Even if said caretakership was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of control in derogation of the Constitution.

In Bito-Onon, the Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar as it authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board of Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral protest, involved the exercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines already promulgated by the Liga.

HELD: The Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the RTC dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

03 - MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN V DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:

Petitioner attempts to have a certain parcel of land where the municipal courthouse stands, be registered as property of the municipality.

Respondent argues that the land belongs to the insular government.


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◦ Asks for the application of the doctrine in City of Manila v Insular Government where the land was adjudicated in favor of the Insular Government.

ISSUE:

WON the property belongs to the municipality or the insular government? The municipality of Catbalogan owns the land

RATIO:

The Recompilation of Laws under Law 7 – Title 7 – Book 4, as well as Law 8 and Law 14, allows for the formation of pueblos. Upon the formation of pueblos, the casa reales (court-house) will be established. The municipality of Catbalogan as the provincial seat of Samar, must have established its pueblo and its casa reales in accordance with the laws in the Recompilation.

The court-house building was used and enjoyed quietly and peaceably and without any opposition until the present time.

Adjudication of the lot to the municipality of Catbalogan as duly confirmed by the Spanish Government may be inferred from the fact of continuous possession.

If, in accordance with the laws during the Spanish period, the casa reales must be established in the pueblo, it is only logical that the casa reales is established WITHIN the pueblo, i.e., within the property of Catbalogan. In fact, the casa reales were right at the town square, next to the church.

At present, the municipality's ownership of the land in question is bolstered by: o the Civil Code. Art. 343 states that the provinces and towns may have

two types of property – those for public use and those for patrimonial use.

o Act No. 82 (The Municipal Code) under Section 2 provides that municipalities may sue, enter contracts, and hold property.

The fact that there is no document or title is not unusual because it was not common practice before to document and record everything.

Re the City of Manila v Insular Government argument, the difference is that in that case, the property in question belonged to not to the municipality but was held “in common.” (i.e., not as important to the pueblo as a casa reales)

04 - TEJANO

05 - HEBRON VS REYES

FACTS:

This is a quo warranto proceeding case filed by a suspended mayor against the acting mayor of Carmona, Cavite.

In 1951, petitioner Bernardo Hebron was elected Mayor while respondent Eulalio Reyes was elected Vice Mayor, of Carmona, Cavite. The term was for four years beginning from January 1952.

In 1954, Hebron received a letter from the Office of the President suspending him from office which was to last until the final termination of the administrative proceedings against him. In the letter he was advised that Reyes was to assume office during the period of the suspension as acting mayor.

After holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal submitted his report thereon on July 1954. Since then the matter has been pending in the Office of the President for decision. Inasmuch as the same did not appear to be forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to expire, he instituted the present action.

ISSUE:

Whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Held: No.

PETITIONER:

Petitioner: Respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto.

RESPONDENT AND SOLICITOR GENERAL:

Respondent was holding the office of the mayor in compliance with a valid and lawful order of the President.

The President has the power to suspend Hebron through section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 79(C) was inserted in the Administrative Code by Act No. 3535, passed by the Philippine Legislature, during the American regime, in line with section 22 of the Jones Law, pursuant to which "all Executive functions of the Government must be directly under the Governor General or within one of the Executive Departments under the supervision and control of the Governor General."

Through section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President also has the power “To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare


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vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United States), the Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippines Islands) Philippines.”

SUPREME COURT:

The procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of the municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory. Supervisory and investigative authority are lodged with the provincial governor and the provincial board.

If there is any conflict between said sections 64 (b) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of the Revised Administrative Code, on the other hand, and sections 2188 to 2191 of the same code, on the other, the latter — being specific provisions, setting forth the procedure for the disciplinary action that may be taken, particularly, against municipal officials — must prevail over the former, as general provisions, dealing with the powers of the President and the department heads over the officers of the Government.

President McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government; that said supervision and control should be "confined within the narrowest limits"; that in the distribution of powers among the governments to be organized in the Philippines, "the presumption is always to be in favor of the smaller subdivision". If such were the basic principles underlying the organization of our local governments, at a time when the same were under the control of the Governor-General (the representative of the United States, which has delegated to us some governmental powers, to be exercised in the name of the United States), with more reason must those principles be observed under the Constitution of the Philippines, pursuant to which "sovereignty resides in the (Filipino) people and all government authority emanates from them" and the power of the President over local governments is limited to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law."

06 - RODOLFO T. GANZON VS. CA [1991]

FACTS:

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City.

10 complaints were filed against him on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.

The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon

was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon obtained a preliminary injunction vs the Secretary.

Ganzon then appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary.

SC issued a TRO v the Secretary and the CA.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS (GANZON):

The 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power

Denial of due process of the law

Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards Ganzon, which arose from his alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.

Ganzon also requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), to no avail.

Ganzon requested postponement on "valid and justifiable" grounds which was unduly denied:

o He was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement

o A "vital"witness was also hospitalized, another lacked transportation

ISSUE:

WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials. (Yes.)

HELD:

TRO Lifted.

Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In


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administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

o The SC is ill at ease with suspensions; injustice inflicted to the accused if acquitted since right to office will have been nullified and to the people who are deprived of the services of the man they elected.

o The sole objective of a suspension:to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other evidence.

o A preventive suspension may be justified. BUT, its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question

o Suspension is temporary and Local Government Code provides:it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. A longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, nothing less than tyranny.

o Ganzon's guilt has not been proven; the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably-this cannot be allowed.

COURT LAID DOWN THE FOLLOWING RULES:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:

a. that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.

b. that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 LGC

07 - VILAS, TRIGAS, AGUADO V. CITY OF MANILA [1921]

FACTS:

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioners Trigas, Vilas and Aguado are creditors of the City. After the incorporation, petitioners brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to them by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris.

In the case of Aguado, he sought to establish his claim as a charge against certain property and funds held by the city as trustee, known as the Carriedo fund (a trust fund bequeathed to the city by a certain Don Carriedo for the establishment of waterworks). Aguado took a contract with the Ayuntamiento of Manila to supply coal for the use of the Carriedo works, and made a deposit to guarantee the contract. When the city was occupied by the American Army it was indebted to him for coal so supplied, as well as for the deposit so made. That the coal was bought for and used in the operation of the Carriedo works is not denied. But there is no evidence that the credit was given to the Carriedo fund so held in trust under the will of Carriedo.

PETITIONERS:

The City, under its present charter, is the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city.


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RESPONDENT (CITY OF MANILA):

The present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.

The corporate identity and corporate liability extinguished as a necessary legal result of the new charter. The Ayuntamiento of Manila was a corporate entity created by the Spanish government. When the sovereignty of Spain in the Islands was terminated by the treaty of cession, the municipality ipso facto disappeared for all purposes. The death of the principal ends the agency.

All the property (and property rights) of Manila passed to US for a consideration (USD 20 million)which was paid. The US was justified in creating a new municipality free from any obligation to the creditors of that city.

HELD:

Background: Before the conquest of the Philippine by Spain, Manila existed. In 1571, the Spaniards occupied what was then and is now known as Manila, and established it as a municipal corporation. From time to time there occurred amendments, and, on January 19, 1894, there was a reorganization of the city government under a royal decree of that date. Under that charter there was power to incur debts for municipal purposes and power to sue and be sued. The obligations here in suit were incurred under the charter referred to, and are obviously obligations strictly within the provision of the municipal power. To pay judgments upon such debts it was the duty of the ayuntamiento of Manila, which was the corporate name of the old city, to make provision in its budget. While the contracts from which the claims in suit resulted were in progress, war between the United States and Spain ensued. On August 13, 1898, the city was occupied by the US forces, and its affairs conducted by military authority. On July 31, 1901, the present incorporating act was passed, and the city since that time has been an autonomous municipality. The charter in force is act 183 of the Philippine Commission, and now may be found as chapters 68 to 75 of the compiled acts of the Philippine Commission. The charter contains no reference to the obligations or contracts of the old city.

Ratio:

The argument of City of Manila loses sight of the dual character of municipal corporations. They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private or business character. In the one character a municipal corporation is a governmental subdivision, and for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state. In the other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred.

That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. But it is equally settled in the same public law that that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.

The continuity of the corporate city was not inconsistent with the military occupation or the constitution or institutions of the occupying power.

It is true that the United States acquired all the public rights of the City of Manila under the Treaty of Paris. However, the relinquishment was limited to properties belonging to the public domain and as such belonging to the Crown of Spain. It did not affect property which, in conformity with law belonged to the City of Manila as a municipal corporation. Since the new corporation is endowed with all the property and property rights of the old, the new corporation also succeeds to the contracts and obligations of the old corporation, and is subject to all of its liabilities.

In the Aguado case, the contract not having been made with special reference to the liability of the Carriedo fund held in trust by the city, but apparently upon the general credit of the city, the claim of Aguado did not constitute a charge upon the Carriedo fund. Aguado is, nevertheless, entitled to a judgment. The debt having been incurred by the city, it must be regarded as a city liability.

08 - BARA LIDASAN V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [1967]

Prepared by Tobie Reynes

FACTS

1. [June 18, 1966] The Chief Executive signed into law House Bill No. 1247, which became Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur.

a. The Act mentioned 21 barrios “in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur” that were to be separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur.

b. It also established Togaig (one of the 21 barrios) as the seat of the government of the municipality.

2. However, it turned out that two of the barrios (i.e. Togaig and Madalum) are actually within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato; while ten were part of the municipality of Parang, Province of Cotabato. These eleven provinces were not part of Lanao del Sur.


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3. [Aug. 15, 1967] The COMELEC issued a resolution implementing the Act for purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters, and other election purposes.

4. [Sept. 7, 1967] The Office of the President, recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation.

5. [Sept. 20, 1967] COMELEC stood by its own interpretation and declared that the Act should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional.

6. Petitioner Lisadan filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition in his capacity as a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and as a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays for the Act to be declared unconstitutional and for the COMELEC resolutions to be nullified.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

1. The Constitution provides that “[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” [CONST. (1935) art. VI, § 21 (1)]

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

1. The change in boundaries of the two provinces (Cotabato and Lanao del Sur) is merely the incidental legal result of the definition of the boundary of the municipality of Dianaton.

a. Thus, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away need not be expressed in the title of the law.

2. The case of Felwa v. Salas is controlling. There, the title “An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga, Apayao” was assailed as the provisions thereof in reference to the elective officials of the provinces created were not set forth in the title. The Court ruled that a law creating provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run its affairs—something which is manifestly germane to the subject of legislation.

3. Assuming that the Act is unconstitutional for the arguments presented, it may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios. The limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in Lanao del Sur.

4. Petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the Act.

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO

W/N THE PETITIONER IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST — YES, HE IS.

1. He is a qualified voter who expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected.

W/N REP. ACT NO. 4790 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR HAVING A DEFECTIVE TITLE — YES, IT IS.

1. Rationale behind the constitutional mandate relied on by petitioner: a. The provision contains two limitations upon legislative power: (1)

Congress is to refrain from conglomeration of heterogeneous subjects under one statue; and (2) the title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

b. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment language of such precision as to mirror all the contents and the minute details therein. It is simply to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

c. The test of sufficiency of a title is WON it is misleading. Its substance rather than its form should be considered.

2. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” creates the impression that solely the province of Lanao de Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. However, it is a fact that the communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new town in Lanao del Sur.

a. “In the Province of Lanao del Sur” is thus misleading and deceptive. 3. COMELEC’s posture that the change in boundaries is merely an incidental legal

result only emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill.

a. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another necessarily involves reduction of area, population, and income of the first and the corresponding increase of the other; this is as important as the creation of a municipality.

4. Felwa v. Salas is inapplicable as the Act in question is totally different, as the statute involved here contemplates the lumping together of barrios from two separate provinces under one statute—neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of a new municipality.

W/N REP. ACT NO. 4790 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A WHOLE — YES, IT IS.

1. The provisions of Rep. Act No. 4790 are inseparable. It is thus null and void in its entirety.

2. When the bill was presented in Congress, the totality of 21 barrios (not just 9) was in the mind of the proponent.

a. The Explanatory Note to House Bill 1247 read: “The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.”


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b. It can further be seen that Togaig—one of the barrios located in Cotabato—was established in the Act as the “seat of the government of the municipality.”

c. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population, and sufficient income, the Court cannot now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only 9 barrios with a seat of government left to be conjectured.

Rep. Act No. 4790 is declared NULL and VOID. The COMELEC is PROHIBITED from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

09 - REPUBLIC V CITY OF DAVAO (2002)

Doctrine: The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Therefore, LGUs are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.

FACTS:

The City of Davao filed an application with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome.

The EMB Region XI denied the application, finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area. The City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate, pursuant to Sec2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact Statement System) in relation to Sec4 of PD 1151 (Philippine Environment Policy), before it can proceed with the construction of its project.

• Davao filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC, alleging that

1. Its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system.

2. It was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents.

• RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.

1. There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires LGUs to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects

which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. An LGU, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

2. The site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondent’s application for CNC after it has satisfied all the requirements for its issuance.

• Petitioner filed MR, which was denied. Petitioner then filed the petition for review.

• Upon change of administration, respondent filed a manifestation expressing its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its proposed project.

• While the petition has been rendered moot, the court decided to address the issue raised, for the guidance of the implementors of the EIS law.


• Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his capacity as Secretary of DENR, CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region XI and ENGR. BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of the DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU, Region XI

• Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the RTC, which granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor of the City of Davao

• The proposed project was within an environmentally critical area. The City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate, pursuant to Sec2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact Statement System) in relation to Sec4 of PD 1151 (Philippine Environment Policy), before it can proceed with the construction of its project


• Respondent: THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, City Mayor

• Arguments in the RTC: Its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system.

• It was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents.

• (RTC in favor of Respondent) There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the


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EIA system), which requires LGUs to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. An LGU, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

ISSUES:

WON LGUs are required to comply with the EIS law (YES)

WON the site was within an environmentally critical area (NO)

RATIO:

Nature of LGUs

• Section 15 of the Local Government Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.

- It performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary.

- Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally.

- Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit.

- When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs.

• Section 16 of the Local Government Code provides for the duty of the LGUs to promote the people’s right to a balanced ecology. An LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.

• Section 4 of PD 1586 states that “no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.”

- The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.

Environmentally Critical Area

• The arguments, however, presuppose that a project is environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical area. Respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact because it is not an environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally critical area.

• The trial court found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project.

• The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental protection and regulates certain government activities affecting the environment, was established by Presidential Decree No. 1586.

• Proclamation No. 2146 was later issued, proclaiming the areas and types of projects which are regarded as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System established under PD 1586.

• The Artica Sports Dome in Langub is not among the projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of them. Therefore, the project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. It is therefore the ministerial duty of the DENR to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage.

10 - GREENHILLS EAST ASSOCIATION, INC. V. GANZON

FACTS:

Petitioner Greenhills East Association, Inc. (GEA) is the homeowners association of Greenhills East Subdivision, a residential subdivision in Barangay Wack-Wack, Greenhills East, Mandaluyong City.

E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) sought to develop a 4,109-square meter lot (the land site) at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue in in Barangay with its owner, the San Buena Realty and Development Corp. EGI wanted to build on the property a total of 85 storeys: 77 for mix-used and 8 for basement. It will be called the SKYCITY Condominum (the project).

Petitioner GEAs subdivision has been classified under Section 4, Article IV of the Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance 81-01 (MMZO 81-01) as an R-1 low density residential zone. The subdivision consists of about 380 lots, a church (the Sanctuario de San Jose), a school (the La Salle Greenhills), and a private road network. On the other hand, the site on which the project will rise is classified under the same ordinance as C-2 or a Major Commercial Zone.

The EGI began the excavation and other works on the land without first getting a clearance from the Barangay. The HLURB eventually issued to EGI a Certificate of Locational Viability. The City of Mandaluyong likewise issued to it an Excavation and


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Ground Preparation Permit. HLURB further issued to EGI a Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance for its project.

GEA wrote oppositions to with HLURB and to the DPWH. On June 4, 1998 the DPWH advised the Building Official of Mandaluyong to require EGI to secure a Development Permit and a valid Locational Clearance for its project from the HLURB. In a separate development, EGI applied with the Barangay for clearance covering its project. On July 15, 1998, however, the Barangay denied the application.


1. GEA invokes Section 10, Article V of MMZO 81-01. This section provides height restrictions on a C-2 property that adjoins an R-1 property without an intervening street or permanent open space that is over six meters wide and that the properties have adjacent front yards, or even when there are none, the intervening street or permanent open space does not exceed three meters in width.

2. The lots that Ordinance 128 converted into C-2 zones were only the lots between Ortigas Avenue and Notre Dame Street that run parallel to EDSA but at some depth from it. They are on the Wack-Wack side of Ortigas Avenue. Ordinance 128 describes the newly converted C-2 zones relevant to this case as "a lot deep along Ortigas Avenue from EDSA to Notre Dame Street." Because of the mention of Notre Dame Street, which is found on only one side of Ortigas Avenue, GEA concludes that the new C-2 zones did not extend to the other side of Ortigas Avenue where Greenhills East Subdivision and respondent EGI's land site are located.

3. If the purpose of the ordinance was to limit the land classification conversion only to the side of Ortigas Avenue where the Wack-Wack Subdivision lay, it would have simply stated, using the technical language applied to the other converted areas, "a lot deep along the Wack-Wack side of Ortigas Avenue from EDSA to Notre Dame Street," instead of saying, "a lot deep along Ortigas Avenue." It could only mean, therefore, that the ordinance intended to convert all the lots, on both sides and margins of Ortigas Avenue up to the point where Notre Dame Street was.

4. The proposed 77-storey building would have mixed uses, part residential, part office, and part commercial, which would not be accord with the patterns of land uses suitable to C-2 zones. The buildings in C-2 zones, it suggests, should rise no higher than 40 or 50 storeys from the ground. GEA invokes Article IV, Section 4, paragraph 5 of MMZO 81-01, which states that establishments in a C-2 zone should be sufficient to provide the needs of the district level. GEA infers from this that a C-2 establishment must be such that it will provide the needs of the district level only and that, beyond those needs, the establishment should be in High Intensity or C-3 Zone.

5. Lack of approval of the project by the homeowners' association or the Barangay precludes it from proceeding. GEA invokes Section 14, Article V of MMZO 81-01 which provides that, where a proposed land use will necessarily affect the character

of the residential zone, the proponent needs to get such approval. It is a prerequisite for the issuance of a locational clearance and a building permit.

*There were no arguments of the respondents stated in this case. Court only rendered its decision.*

ISSUE

WON the SKYCITY Condominium project violate zoning areas. (NO)

RATIO

1. MMZO 81-01 applies to a situation where an R-1 property adjoins a C-2 property. This has ceased to be the case between the land site and the subdivision after the Mandaluyong City government enacted Ordinance 128 in 1993. That was before the present case came up. Ordinance 128 converted certain R-1 zones to C-2 zones and these included those on the western side of respondent EGI's land site, namely Lot 11, Block 4, and Lot 11, Block 20. Consequently, the subject land site ceased to be adjacent to an R-1 zone and no longer suffered from height restrictions.

2. The purpose of the ordinance was to limit the land classification conversion only to the side of Ortigas Avenue where the Wack-Wack Subdivision lay, it would have simply stated, using the technical language applied to the other converted areas, "a lot deep along the Wack-Wack side of Ortigas Avenue from EDSA to Notre Dame Street," instead of saying, "a lot deep along Ortigas Avenue." It could only mean, therefore, that the ordinance intended to convert all the lots, on both sides and margins of Ortigas Avenue up to the point where Notre Dame Street was.

3. Although the land site indeed adjoins Lot 11, Block 4, it does so not in the manner that would properly call for the application of the zoning ordinance. Based on the HLURB's observation, Lot 11 of Block 4 and the land site do not have common boundaries that join them. Rather, they touch each other only at a certain point due to the irregular shape of the properties, following the direction of the meandering creek that lies between them. For this reason, it cannot be said that Section 10, Article V of MMZO 81-01, which sets height restrictions, applies to the project.

4. MMZO 81-01 contains no provision that allows the construction of not more than 40 or 50-storey buildings in a C-1 or C-2 zone and restricts higher buildings to a C-3 zone. There are just no height restrictions under the law for buildings located in C-2 zones, save probably for height clearances prescribed by the Air Transportation Office. Houses of petitioner GEA's members are separated by fence and guarded gates from the adjacent areas outside their subdivision. Their exclusiveness amply protects their yen for greater space than the rest of the people of the metropolis outside their enclave can hope for. Respondent EGI's project offers no threat to the subdivision's privacy. It is on the other side of the fence, wholly unconnected to the workings within the subdivision. The new building would be in the stream of human traffic that passes EDSA and Ortigas Avenue. Consequently, it would largely attract people whose primary activities connect to those wide avenues. It would seem


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unreasonable for petitioner GEA to dictate on property owners outside their gates how they should use their lands if such use is not in contravention of law.

5. Although Section 152 (c) of the Local Government Code requires a barangay clearance for any activity within its jurisdiction, such clearance cannot be denied when the activity is in a permissible zone. The denial would otherwise be illegal. Here, as discussed above, the applicable ordinance of Mandaluyong City does not preclude the construction of the project on the land site in question over the unreasonable objection of a nearby association of subdivision dwellers. Indeed, the city or municipality to which the barangay unit belongs may still issue the required license or building permit despite the withholding of the barangay clearance as had happened in this case.

11 - ALECHA V. PASION [2010]

FACTS:

Petitioners Paulino M. Alecha and Precioso M. Tapitan filed before the Ombudsman (Mindanao) a criminal complaint against respondent municipal officials of the Municipality of Midsalip, Zamboanga del Sur for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, Section 81 of RA 7160, Section 10 of RA 6758 and RA 9137.

Petitioners averred that respondent municipal officials conspired in unlawfully adopting and actually collecting the salaries, representation and travel allowances (RATA) and personnel economic relief assistance (PERA) of public officials for special cities and/or first class provinces or cities, notwithstanding the fact that the Municipality of Midsalip had no financial capacity to cover such expenditures, thus seriously affecting the delivery of basic services within its jurisdiction.

The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against respondent municipal officials.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

Ombudsman was in grave abuse of discretion (GAD) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed their letter-complaint against respondent municipal officials. Petitioners cite the admission made by respondent municipal officials that they had been receiving salaries for special cities even though the Municipality of Midsalip was a fifth-class municipality.

They also aver that the Municipality of Midsalip was financially incapable of implementing a higher salary schedule.

ISSUE: WON THERE WAS GAD BY THE OMBUDSMAN? NO.

SC DECISION:

A FIFTH-CLASS MUNICIPALITY LIKE MIDSALIP IS NOT ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED FROM ADOPTING A SALARY SCHEDULE EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF A SPECIAL CITY OR A FIRST- CLASS PROVINCE.

Local Budget Circular No. 64 dated January 1, 1997, in conjunction with paragraph 11 of Local Budget No. 56, allows local government units (LGUs) lower than special cities and first-class provinces and cities to adopt a salary scheme for special cities and first-class provinces. The adoption of a higher salary schedule needs only to comply with the following requirements:

a. the LGU is financially capable; b. the salary schedule to be adopted shall be uniformly applied to all

positions in the in the LGU concerned; c. the salary schedule for the special and highly urbanized cities and first

class provinces and cities shall not be higher than that being adopted by the national government;

d. in implementing a new and higher salary schedule, the salary grade allocation of positions and the salary steps of personnel shall be retained;

e. the adoption of the higher salary schedule shall be subject to the budgetary and general limitations on personal services expenditures mandated under Sections 324 and 325 of RA 7160;

f. in the case of component cities and municipalities, the salary schedule to be adopted shall not be higher than that of the province or city in the case of some municipalities, where they belong; and

g. the adoption of a higher salary schedule shall not in any manner alter the existing classification of the LGU concerned.

The Municipality of Midsalip has complied with above requirements.

MIDSALIP WAS FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF ADOPTING THE CONTESTED SALARY SCHEDULE AS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:

5 years into the implementation of the higher salary schedule, the Municipality of Midsalip had savings of P 14,913,554.68 in its bank account.

Certified statement of savings of unobligated balances for the years 2002 and 2003 issued by the Midsalip municipal treasurer and accountant, revealed repeated surplus accounts in the amounts of P7,709,311.64 and P 5,070,913.23 for the said years, respectively.

The certification of the Midsalip municipal accountant dated January 14, 2003 also stated that there was no realignment or disbursement of the 20% municipal development project for personal services expenditures from 1998 to 2002.


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The Local Budget Ordinance of the Municipality of Midsalip was duly approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur and the Department of Budget and Management. The Commission on Audit did not disallow or suspend the foregoing disbursement and/or expenditures.

II. Constitutional And Legal Framework> B. RA 7160 [LGC]> 3. Declaration of Policy [Sec 2, LGC1]> Local Autonomy and National Accountability

12 - PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL VS. COMMISSIONERS, COA [2010]

FACTS

21 Dec 1994 - the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A4 allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province.

Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care Agreement involving a total payment of P3,760,000

23 January 1997 – the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension No. 97-001-1015 suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President (OP) as provided under Administrative Order No.

1 Section 2. Declaration of Policy. (LGC) (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. (b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.1aw

1036 (AO 103), and that the premium payment violated Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law).

President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount of P100,000.

The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead issued Notice of Disallowance

Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA.

COA affirmed the Provincial Auditor’s Notice of Disallowance o COA: under AO 103, no government entity, including a local

government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the President granting additional benefits to its personnel.

o Further, Section 468(a)(1)(viii)11 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 has to be harmonized with Section 1212 of RA 6758.

o The insurance benefits from Philam Care, a private insurance company, was a duplication of the benefits provided to employees under the Medicare program which is mandated by law.

MR: denied

ISSUES/HOLDING/RATIO

WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000 for premium paid by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees? YES. COA erred. Court rules in favor of the Petitioners.

PETITIONER:

1. The payment of the insurance premium was paid from an allocation of its retained earnings pursuant to a valid appropriation ordinance.

2. Such enactment was a clear exercise of its express powers under the principle of local fiscal autonomy which includes the power of Local Government Units (LGUs) to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.

3. While it is true that LGUs are only agents of the national government and local autonomy simply means decentralization, it is equally true that an LGU has fiscal control over its own revenues derived solely from its own tax base.

RESPONDENTS:

1. Although LGUs are afforded local fiscal autonomy, LGUs are still bound by RA 6758 and their actions are subject to the scrutiny of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and applicable auditing rules and regulations enforced by the COA

2. The grant of additional compensation, like the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case, must have prior Presidential approval to


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conform with the state policy on salary standardization for government workers.

3. (Implied) Based on Section 2 of AO 103,2 the President enjoined all heads of government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the President’s prior approval.

COURT:

1. From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to "government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards." Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The requirement then of prior approval from the President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus, offices and government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch.

2. (SYLLABUS TOPIC) In other words, AO 103 must be observed by government offices under the President’s control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which states:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

On the other hand, the President merely exercises general supervision over LGU’s under Section 4, Article X of the Constitution:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

3. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to

2 SECTION 2. All heads of government offices/agencies, including government owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards are hereby enjoined and prohibited from authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and all forms of allowances/benefits without prior approval and authorization via Administrative Order by the Office of the President.

modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid.

4. Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA 6758, the COA did not clearly establish that the medical care benefits given by the government at the time under Presidential Decree No. 151917 were sufficient to cover the needs of government employees especially those employed by LGUs.

5. Petitioner correctly relied on the Civil Service Commission’s (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 33 (CSC MC No. 33), wherein all government offices including LGUs were directed to provide a health program for government employees, which included hospitalization services and annual mental, medical-physical examinations.

6. The CSC, through CSC MC No. 33, as well as the President, through AO 402 (which expanded protection), recognized the deficiency of the state of health care and medical services implemented at the time. Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25, Article II20 and Section 2, Article X,21 and the Local Government Code of 1991,22 we declare that the grant and release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials and employees were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

13 - CAVESTANY

14 - KULAYAN V. TAN (3 JULY 2012) 675 S 482

FACTS:

1. 3 members from the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in Patikul, Sulu y the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG).

2. Respondent Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians redeployed to areas of Patikul.

3. Threatening that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG demanded evacuation of military camps in Jolo.

4. Tan issued Proclamation 1-09 declaring a state of emergency in Sulu province and calling upon the PNP with the assistance of AFP and CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints and conduct general search and seizures.

ISSUE/HELD:

WON Proclamation 1-09 is valid. NO.


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RATIO:

a. Petitioners: Proclamation 1-09 violates the Constitution, Article 7, Sec 1 and 18, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers. Respondent: Proclamation 1-09 is consistent with the LGC, Sec 16 and 465, which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities and disasters, and to call upon the national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder. SC: When the Constitution, Article 7, Sec 1 speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President who is authorized to exercise emergency powers (Article 6, Section 23) and calling-out powers (Article 7, Section 7). The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the SC’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. The calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone.

The framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations. But the police is subject to the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.

b. Respondent: Nowhere does it limit the authority to declare a state of emergency to the President alone. David v. Arroyo limits the authority to declare a national emergency, and does not include emergency situation in LGUs.

SC: It is the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to security, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers.

c. Respondent: LGC, Section 465 in relation to Section 16 allows the governor to

carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies for assistance.

Petitioners: General search and seizure in the pursuit of kidnappers violates the Bill of Rights, Sec 2. SC: Respondent cannot rely on Sec 465, par 1 (vii)3 as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters. Kidnapping cannot be considered as a calamity or disaster. Par 2 (vi)4 is equally inapplicable. First, the AFP does not fall under the category of a national law enforcement agency. Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the country. Second, there was no allegation that the local police forces were inadequate. If they were, the recourse was to ask assistance from the DILG Secretary. The LGC does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted to the President. The intent behind the powers granted to LGUs is fiscal, economic, and administrative. The LGC is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers.

15 - PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [2012]

G.R. No. 19577017 July 2012 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

petitioners Aquilino Pimentel Jr., Sergio Tadeo, Nelson Alcantara

respondents Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, DSWD Secretary Corazon Soliman

summary Petitioners assert that the budget allocation under the DSWD for its CCTP violates the Constitution and LGC because it amounts to a recentralization of basic government functions. SC ruled that unless an LGU is designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government even if it involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy and issued AO 16 s. 2008 setting the IRR for its Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program. This Conditional

3 The provincial governor shall: (vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;

4 (vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces of the component city or municipality where the disorder or violation is happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators;


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Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow them to meet certain human development goals.

Under the AO, the DSWD, as lead implementing agency, institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among DepEd, DOH, DILG, NAPC (National Anti-Poverty Commission) and the LGUs

Congress funded the program as follows: 2008: PHP298.5M, 2009: PHP5B, 2010: PHP10B, 2011, PHP21B.

Former Senator Pimentel, et al. challenged the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of LGUs.

Petitioners admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP is with the legislation, however, the object to the fact that it is being implemented through a national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare, agriculture and health care services have been devolved pursuant to Sec. 17, LGC in relation to Sec. 25, Art. II and Sec. 3, Art. X, 1987 Const.

They assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered results in the “recentralization” of basic government functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and decentralization.

ISSUE

Whether the PHP21B budget allocation under the DSWD in the 2011 General Appropriations Act (GAA) violates the Constitution and LGC. NEGATIVE.

RATIO

In order to secure the autonomy of LGUs, Sec. 17, LGC vests in them the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities. Par. (c), however, provides an exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, programs and services.5 Unless an LGU is designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the GAA even if it involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU

Ganzon v. CA: While it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure,

5 Sec. 17 par. (c), LGC. …other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual GAA… are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the LGU concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency…

the concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into “mini-states.”

Pimentel v. Aguirre: To enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Petitioners have failed to prove the invalidity of the provisions under the 2011 GAA. The PHP21B budget allocation for an intervention program formulated by the national government can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of LGs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. DISMISSED I tell you.

16 - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. YU [2012]

G.R. 189041; July 31, 2012; Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Digest by Reinerr Nuestro

FACTS:

In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to RA 7160 (the Local Gov’t. Code of 1991) which affected the Dept. of Health along with other government agencies.

Prior to the devolution, Dr. Castillo held the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of the DOH Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City and was the head of both the Basilan Provincial Health Hospital and Public Health Services.

Respondent Dr. Agnes Yu, on the other hand, held the position of Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I). She was assigned at the Integrated Provincial Office in Isabela, Basilan.

Upon the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position that was to be devolved to the LGU of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga where she would serve the remaining four years of her public service.

In 1994, two years after the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position.

On Feb. 23, 1998, RA 8543 (An Act Converting the Basilan Provincial Hospital in the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, into a Tertiary Hospital Under the Full Administrative and Technical Supervision of the Department of Health, Increasing the Capacity to One Hundred Beds and Appropriating Funds Therefor) was passed whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to the LGU of Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH.The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital was later renamed the Basilan General Hospital, and the position of PHO II was then reclassified to Chief of Hospital II.


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Dr. Yu was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II. One Dr. Domingo Remus Dayrit was appointed by DOH Secretary Manuel Dayrit to the position of Chief of Hospital II.

RESPONDENT:

Dr. Yu (Respondent in this Case) filed a letter of protest dated Sept. 30, 2003 before the Civil Service Commission claiming that she has a vested right to the position of Chief of Hospital II. In her letter, she said that:

The Position of Chief of Hospital II to which Dr. Dayrit has been appointed is a mere conversion from the item of Provincial Health Officer II she previously occupied.

When the former Basilan Provincial Hospital was renationalized, the position of PHO II which she then occupied was refused renationalization by the DOH alleging that it was an LGU-created position created by the LGU of Basilan. Hence, instead of being automatically reappointed PHO II later to be renamed Chief of Hospital II pursuant to the Renationalization Law, she was instead given an appointment still as a PHO II but under a coterminous status at the Center for Health and Development, DOH which she refused to accept.

PETITIONER:

The Civil Service Commission (Petitioner in this Case) initially granted Dr. Yu’s protest and revoked the appointment of Dr. Dayrit as Chief of Hospital II. It further directed DOH Secretary Manuel Dayrit to appoint Dr. Yu to said position. But the CSC reversed itself upon MR declaring that the position of PHO II was never devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan but was retained by the DOH; that the PHO II position held by Dr. Yu was a newly-created position, therefore, she did not have a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position created by RA 8543.

Dr. Yu moved to reconsider which was denied by the CSC. She then brought the case to the CA on petition for review raising the sole issue of whether the item of PHO II she previously occupied was a devolved position or a locally created one.

CA

The CA ruled in favor of Dr. Yu saying that she has a vested right in the Chief of Hospital II position up to her retirement. It ratiocinated:

The CSC’s ruling that there are two PHO II positions is not implausible but contrary to the evidence at hand.

A perusal of the pleadings and attachments reveal that the PHO II position was devolved to the Basilan Provincial Government.

A letter from one Ms. Vivian Young, OIC of the DOH, Local Government Assistance & Monitoring Service, informed Governer Salapuddin that the POH II

position was devolved to the local government. The said letter provided that only the devolved health personnel who were not accepted by their Local Chief Executive have been retained by DOH, the item positions per se remained in the respective LGUs.

ISSUE/RATIO #1:

WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PHO II POSITION PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED BY DR. YU IS A DEVOLVED POSITION. NO

Pursuant to the declared policy under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) to provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization, national agencies or offices, including the DOH, were mandated to devolve to the local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities.

Devolution is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

Sec. 17 (i) of the same Code provides that devolution shall include the transfer to LGUs of the records, equipment and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities. The personnel of said national agencies shall be absorbed by the LGUs to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee.

Hence, it was MANDATORY for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Castillo. The absence of discretion is highlighted by the use of the word “shall” both is Sec. 17(i) of the Code and in Sec. 2(a)(2) of EO No. 503, which connotes a mandatory order.

The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the national government agency (NGA) personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable such that it would lead to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government.

In the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed [Sec. 2(a)(12)] by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992.

Evidence shows that the item position of PHO II was in fact devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan. Governor Salapuddin himself certified that said position was included in the 1992 Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (OSCAS) received from the DBM with budget appropriation. He further declared during the formal turn over program in 1993 that the item position of PHO II was among the positions turned over to the Provincial Government of Basilan. It cannot be disputed that Dr. Castillo’s position was devolved.


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But Governor Salapuddin refused to reappoint Dr. Castillo to her devolved position in the LGU for no other reason than that he wanted to accept only the item position of PHO II. It was not shown that the absorption of Dr. Castillo was not administratively viable making Governor Salapuddin’s refusal whimsical.

Nonetheless, the refusal did not prevent the devolution of Dr. Castillo which took effect by operation of law. To solve this dilemma, Governor Salapuddin requested that Dr. Castillo be detailed instead at the DOH which was confirmed by Secretary Juan Flavier in an order which provided that the Provincial Government of Basilan would continue to pay her salary and other benefits.

Therefore, the drawing of Dr. Castillo’s salary from the LGU of Basilan was a necessary consequence of her devolution and subsequent detail to the DOH.

A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If an employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission.

The law afforded Dr. Castillo the right to appeal her case to the CSC but she had not seen fit to question the justification for her detail. The Court surmised that since Dr. Castillo was looking at only 3 more years until retirement, she found it pointless to pursue the matter.

Neither did Dr. Castillo complain when she was categorized as a devolution non-viable employee, along with 216 others nationwide, by the mere fact that she was not accepted by the LGU of Basilan and not because of actual non-viability.

Ms. Vivian Young, OIC of the DOH Local Government Assistance and Monitoring Service assured Governor Salapuddin that while Dr. Castillo was retained by the DOH, her item position remained with the LGU of Basilan. Moreover, Dr. Milagros Fernandez, Director IV of the DOH Regional Field Office No. IX in Zamboanga City, clarified that Dr. Castillo never carried with her the item position and the funds appropriated for salary and other benefits accruing to the position of PHO II.

Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position of PHO II.

ISSUE/RATIO #2:

MAY DR. CASTILLO BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE ABANDONED HER POSITION FOR CONSISTENTLY FAILING TO ASSERT HER RIGHTS THERETO? NO

Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment.

There are two essential elements of abandonment: (1) an intention to abandon, and (2) an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect.

Governor Salapuddin’s refusal to accept Dr. Castillo negates any and all voluntariness on the part of the latter to let go of her position. The risk of incurring the ire of a powerful politician effectively tied Dr. Castillo’s hands and it was quite understandable that “she could not don her gloves and fight even if she wanted to.”

Under these circumstances with Dr. Castillo’s reabsorption by the DOH which appears to bear the former’s approval, her devolved position with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant.

Thus, Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II in 1994 and consequently, acquired a vested right to its reclassified designation – chief of Hospital II. As such, Dr. Yu should have been automatically reappointed by Secretary Dayrit in accordance with the Guidelines for the Renationalization of Personnel, Assets and Appropirations of Basilan Provincial Hospital.

Considering that Dr. Yu had already retired, the SC upheld the ruling of the CA that since reappointment was no longer feasible, she should at least recover her salaries for the services she had rendered.

However, Dr. Yu admitted that she received her salary as PHO II converted to Chief of Hospital II for the period August to November 2001. Therefore, she should receive her salary and benefits as Chief of Hospital from Dec 2001 up to her retirement in aug. 2004.

17. SAN JUAN V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [1991]

FACTS:

Petitioner Governor San Juan prays for the nullification of CSC resolutions upholding the appointment of respondent, Almajose as Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) of Rizal in this petition for certiorari.

Previously, the position of PBO for Rizal was left vacant by its former holder.

Petitioner informed DBM Region IV’s director, Abella that a certain Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO (Santo was the Municipal BO of Taytay, Rizal before discharging functions of acting PBO). Futhermore, petitioner requested Abella to endorse the appointment of Santos.

However, Abella recommended the appointment of Almajose on the basis of a comparative study of all MBOs of Rizal. According to Abella, respondent was the most qualified since she was the only CPA among the contenders

DBM USec Cabuquit signed the appointment papers of Almajose

In a letter addressed to Sec Carague, petitioner reiterated the request to appoint Santos, unaware of the appointment made by Cabuquit


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DBM regional director Galvez wrote the petitioner that Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 and w/n through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees

Petitioner, having been informed of Almajose’s appointment protested on the ground that Cabuquit is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO and that under EO 112, it is the governor, not the regional director, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position

DBM issued a memo ruling that petitioner’s protest is not meritorious considering that DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling up the position since none of the petitioner’s nominees met the requirements.

Petitioner’s MR was denied by DBM Sec.

Subsequently, petitioner wrote the CSC reiterating his protest. CSC issued resolutions upholding Almajose’s appointment, hence this petition.

ISSUE/HOLDING/RATIO:

W/N private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO pursuant to the appointment made by DBM’s USec upon recommendation of DBM Region IV’s director. NO. Petition granted, appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified.

PETITIONER:

Sole right and privilege to recommend nominees belong to petitioner and the appointee should come only from his nominees. [see Sec 1 of EO 1126] The phrase "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 257 and Art. X, Sec. 28

6 Sec 1 (EO 112). All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.

7 Sec. 25 (Art II, 1987 Consti). The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments 8 Sections 2 and 3 (Art X, 1987 Consti):

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more

responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

thereof. His power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of DBM.

RESPONDENT:

As required by E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for appointment to the position. Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise would in effect give E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking into consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role in the LGU…hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said officer from the LGU, he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meets the requirements for the position

SC:

The issue involves the application of local autonomy; where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. [see Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2] Thus, when the CSC interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 319 is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

9 Sec. 6.0 (Local Budget Circular No. 31). The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.


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18 – PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE [2000]

18 - Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Alexander Aguirre in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Emilia Boncodin in her capacity as DBM Secretary | J. Panganiban | En Banc

Case: Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking:

1. To annul Sec. 2 of AO 372; and

2. To enjoin respondents from implementing Sec. 4 of AO 372

FACTS:

12/27/1997 – Pres. Ramos issued AO 372 as a government fiscal management measure in response to the economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation for the purpose of maintaining economic stability and sustain the country’s growth momentum.

The assailed provisions of AO 372 states:

1. Sec. 1. All government departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services…

2. Sec. 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC) of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA to LGUs shall be withheld.

Petitioner Pimentel contends that:

1. The President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs in violation of the Constitution which vests in the President only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy

2. Sec. 4 or the directive to withhold 10% of the LGUs’ IRA is in contravention of Sec. 286 of the LGC and Sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to the LGUs their share in the national internal revenue

SolGen, in behalf of respondents, claims on the other hand that:

1. The President is merely exercising the power of supervision over LGUs as AO 372 was issued to alleviate the economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation.

2. AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy because it merely directs LGs to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25%

3. The withholding of 10% of the IRA of LGUs does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the DBCC of the emerging fiscal situation.

ISSUE:

W/N (a) Sec. 1 insofar as it “directs” LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% and (b) Sec. 4, which withholds 10% of the LGUs’ IRA, are valid exercises of the President’s power of general supervision over LGs.

HELD:

(a) Sec. 1 is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Sec. 1 is a valid exercise of the President’s power of general supervision over LGUs.

(b) Sec. 4 effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments, thus, invalid.

RATIO:

(a) While the wordings of Sec.1 have a rather commanding tone, and while the Court agrees with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the LGC (Requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: 1. Unmanaged public sector deficit of the national gov’t, 2. Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representative, and president of the various leagues of local governments, and 3. Corresponding recommendation from the DOF, DILG, and DBM Secretaries) have not been satisfied, the Court accepted the SolGen’s assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures that will reduce total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.

The provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice.


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Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

(b) Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with local autonomy, particularly local fiscal autonomy. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 % of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the DBCC of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.

OTHER NOTES: (JUST IN CASE MA’AM ASKS)

The Court deemed it important to define certain crucial concepts:

1) the scope of the President’s power of general supervision and

2) the extent of the local governments’ autonomy

1. THE SCOPE OF THE PRESIDENT’S POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION

Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control

In the recent case of Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or

redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.

2) THE EXTENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ AUTONOMY

Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.

Local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." (Ganzon v. CA) Decentralization means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide.

In Limbona v. Mangelin, the Court explained that autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."


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Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. To enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As the Court stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.

19 - TAN V. COMELEC [1986]

July 11, 1986 | Alampay | En Banc

FACTS

Petitioners who are residents of Negros Occidental filed a case for prohibition to stop the COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite pursuant to B.P. 885, an act creating a new province to be known as Negros del Norte. The plebiscite sought to be restrained was held as scheduled. Petitioners filed a supplemental petition to plead for writ of prohibition against COMELEC to desist from issuing the official proclamation of the results.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS

B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local Government Code and Consti. Art. XI, Sec. 3.

C.A11.S3. No province…may be created…except in accordance with…the local government code, and subject to…a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

LGC.S197. A province may be created if it has…a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers…

The requisite area in the LGC has not been satisfied.

Limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns which would comprise the new province is violative of the Constitution.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS

B.P. 885 should be accorded the presumption of legality. The law is not void on its face and the petition does not show a clear infringement of the Constitution.

The case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte.

The remaining cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental not included in the area of Negros del Norte do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected."

B.P. 885 plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte

comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.

SC DECISION

The case cannot be moot and academic because the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites.

Pivotal issue revolves around the interpretation of C.A11.S3. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. There is no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. The draft of the legislation contemplates a plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite, including people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements in the Constitution.

The created province does not even satisfy the area requirement.

B.P. 885 is unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of the officials are also null and void.

20 - TAN V. PEREA [2005]

Petitioner: Leonardo Tan, Roberto Uy, Lamberto Te

Respondent: Soccorro Perea

Keywords: Cockfighting, Damages and Injunction, Implied Repeal

Tinga, J. (2005)

FACTS:

1. 1974 - PD 499 (Cockfighting Law) was enacted. Sec. 5 (b) provides that only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities of municipalities with a population of over 100K, two cockpits may be established, maintained and operated.

2. 1991 – Local Government Code (LGC) was enacted. Among many others, the LGC thru Section 447(a)(3)(v) empowered the sangguniang bayan (SB) to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks.

3. 1993 - The (SB) of Daanbantayan enacted Municipal Ordinance (MO) No. 6, sec. 5 thereof provides that the number of cockpits to be allowed in Daantanyan shall be based in PD 449 provided however that the ordinance may be amended for purposes of establishing additional cockpits if the municipal population so warrants.

4. 1993 - Shortly after MO 6, MO 7 was enacted amending Section 5 of MO 6 allowing 3 cockpits in Daanbantayan.


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5. 1995 - Petitioner Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission (MGC) for the issuance of a permit/licese to establish and operate a cockpit in the Municipality of Daanbantayan.

7. At the time of Tan's application, Respondent Perea is a holder of a franchise and license to operate a cockpit in the municipality, valid until 2002.

8. The MGC recommended to Mayor Te that a permit be issued to Tan.

9. 1996 - Mayor Te issued a permit to Tan valid from Jan - Dec 1996. [Resolution 78-96 eventually conferred to Tan a franchise for a period of 10 years (1996-2006)]

10. Perea filed a complaint for damanges with prayer for injunction against Tan and Te.

11. Perea prayed for damages for the injury caused to her own business and for the nullification of the permit and a permanent injunction be issued against Mayor Te preventing Tan from conducting cockfights in the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan.

ARGUMENT OF TAN:

LGC empowered the SB of each municipality to grant franchises and enact ordinances authorizing the establishment, licsneing, opration and maintenance of cockpits. Thru such authority, MO 6 and 7 was promulgated. Section 447(a)(3)(v) - Powers, Duties, Function and Compensation

x x x

(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks; Provided, that existing rights should not be prejudiced;

ARGUMENT OF PEREA:

MO 6 and 7 violated Section 5 of the Cockfighting Law. (See Fact 1 for text of Sec. 5)

RTC - Dismissed the complaint. It ruled that since the case was only for damages, it cannot grant more relief than that prayed for. It ruled that there was no evidence to show plaintiff had actually suffered damages. In the MR by Perea, the RTC stated that MO 6 and 7 were valid. It noted that while there seemed to be a conflict between the ordinances and PD 499, any doubt in the interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant of more power to the LGU following thee principle of devolution under the LGC.

CA - Reversed the decision as to the injunction but upheld that Perea was not entitled to damages. It ruled that Section 447 (a)(3)(v) of the LGC vested in SB the power to authorize and license the establishments of cockpits but did not do away

with the Cockfighting Law. What the provision did was to transfer to the SB the powers that were previously conferred on the MGC.

ISSUES:

1. WON the validity of a municipal ordinance may be determined in an action for damages which does not contain a prayer to declare the ordinance valid. YES.

2. WON the LGC has rendered inoperative the Cockfighting Law. NO

SC:

1. The action is not only an action for damages, but also one for injunction. An action for injunction will require judicial determination WON there exists a right in esse which is to be protected. The specific allegations in the complaint puts into question the legal basis for allowing tan to operate another cockpit in Daanbantayaan. The answer also posed as defense the valid effect of MO 7. Therefore, the validity of MO 7 became a justiciable matter.

2. Since the Cockfightiing Law was not among the laws expressly repealed in the LGC, the test of implied repeal must be applied. Applying the test, Section 5 of the Cockfighting Law and Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC can stand together. While the SB retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established. Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit operation, it is not inconsistent with previous enactments that impose restrictions on how such power may be exercised. In short, there is no dichotomy between affirming the power and subjecting it to limitations at the same time. The SB is the sole issuing authority but it can only issue as much as permit as the Cockfighting Law allows.

Obiter: If Section 447(a)(3)(v) is construed as vesting an unlimited discretion to the sanggunian to control all aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective jurisdiction, this could lead to the prospect of daily cockfights in municipalities, a certain distraction in the daily routine of life in a municipality. If the arguments of the petitioners were adopted, the national government would be effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory enactments pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it were to repeal Section 447(a)(3)(v).

21 - BATANGAS CATV V. CA, BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD [2204]

Sandoval- Gutierrez, J. September 29, 2004 G.R. 138810


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SUMMARY:

Resolution No. 210 granted petitioner to operate a CATV system and charge its subscribers with any increase in rates subject to the approval of the respondent. Petitioner increased its subscriber rates without the approval of the respondent. The court held that said Resolution is invalid and that an LGU cannot regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators due to NTC’s exercise of regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies as provided for by the national legislature. A municipality cannot regulate the same conduct that the state legislature has been regulating with a statute that fully covers the subject matter. Under the general welfare clause, an LGU may only prescribe regulations to the use of public properties or the construction of a CATV system.

FACTS

The Sangguniang Panlungsod (respondent) enacted Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV (petitioner) a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City and authorizing them to charge its subscribers the specified maximum rates with any increase subject to their approval. When the petitioner increased its rates from Php 88 to Php 180 per month, the mayor threatened to cancel their permit unless they secure the approval of the respondent.

Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for injunction alleging that the respondent had no authority to regulate the subscriber rates because the National Telecommunication Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate CATV operators in the Philippines pursuant to E.O. 205.

The Trial Court enjoined the respondents from cancelling the petitioner’s permit to operate and from interfering with their right to fix their service rates, which needs no prior approval from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. It held that the enactment of Resolution 210 violates the States’ deregulation policy as set forth by the NTC commissioner with the NTC as the sole government agency that can regulated CATV operations and that the LGU cannot exercise regulatory power without legislation.

The CA reversed the trial court holding that although the NTC is the one granting the certification, the respondent is not precluded from regulating the operation of the CATV in the locality pursuant to the powers vested by the LGC of 1983. Under the General Welfare Clause (Sec. 177 of the LGC of 1983), the LGUs can perform just about any power that will benefit their constituencies wherein the regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided and the fixing of service rates is lawful. Therefore, in violation of the requirements expressed in Resolution No. 210, the City shall have the right to withdraw the franchise.

Petitioner’s MR was denied.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner: The LGC of 1991 does not authorize respondents to regulate the CATV operations. As per E.O. 205, only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV operations, including the fixing of subscriber rates.

Respondent:

1. Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant of Section 177 (c ) and (d) of the LGS of 1983, which authorizes the LGUs to regulate businesses.

2. Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a contract, being a grant of a franchise to operate a CATV system. To hold that E.O. 205 amended its terms would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts

MAIN ISSUE: W/N A LGU CAN REGULATE THE SUBSCRIBER RATES CHARGED BY CATV OPERATOR WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

HELD: NO, the national government, through the NTC, has assumed regulatory power over the CATV industry. Several presidential issuances10 reinforced the NTC’s exercise of regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies, including fixing of subscriber rates. A municipality cannot regulate the same conduct that the state legislature has been regulating with a statute that fully covers the subject matter. Under the general welfare clause, an LGU may only

10 P.D. No. 1512 (President Marcos) - Established a monopoly of the CATV industry by granting Sining Makulay, Inc., an exclusive

franchise to operate CATV system, prescribed their subscriber rates and terminated all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments or by any instrumentality or agency of the national government.

LOI No. 894 (President Marcos) - Vested upon the Chairman of the Board of Communications direct supervision over the

operations of Sining Makulay, Inc. E.O. No. 546 (President Marcos)

- Integrated the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau to form the National Telecommunications Commission.

E.O. No. 205 (President Aquino) - Opened the CATV industry to all citizens of the Philippines - Mandated the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the

necessary implementing rules and regulations. E.O. No. 436 (President Ramos)

- Prescribed policy guidelines to govern CATV operation in the Philippines and restated the NTCs regulatory powers over CATV operations


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prescribe regulations to the use of public properties or the construction of a CATV system.

RATIO:

The Sanguniang Panlungsod has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of the LGC of 1983, which is a delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to the LGUs to prescribe regulations for the protection of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their territorial jurisdictions.

The CATV operations may be regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause due to its use of public properties to reach its subscribers but in this case, the respondents strayed from its limits through its violation of the mandate of existing laws and the State deregulation policy over the CATV industry.

Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as an agent of the national legislature. However, Resolution No. 210 contravenes E.O. 205 and E.O. 436 in so far as it permits the respondents to usurp the power exclusively vested in the NTC, particularly the fixing of subscriber rates. In De la Cruz v. Paraz

“Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause […] must not be inconsistent with the laws or policy of the state.”

Under its general powers, a municipality cannot regulate the same conduct that the state legislature has been regulating with a statute that fully covers the subject matter.

E.O. 205, as a general law, mandates the regulation of CATV operations by the NTC; an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of said law. Municipal ordinances are subordinate to the laws of the state; therefore, an ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and state-wide application is held to be invalid. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. The basic relationship between the national legislature and the LGUs has not been weakened by the new provision in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Congress still retains control of the LGUs, although in a reduced degree. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs, which cannot defy or modify or violate it.

E.O. 436 provided for the deregulation of cable television industry and the LGUs are bound to follow. LGUs cannot defeat national policy through enactments of contrary measures. Therefore, petitioner may increase its subscriber rate without respondent’s approval, as per MC 06-2-81 and the implementing guidelines of R.A. 7925. It bears stressing that municipal corporations are bodies created as local units of self-government AND as government agencies of the states. The legislature, by

establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty or absolve itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district.

ISSUE: W/N R.A. 7610 REPEALED E.O. 205 - NO

Argument of the Respondent: The regulatory power of the LGUs is granted by the LGC of 1991 (R.A. 7610), a handiwork of the national law making body. Thus, R.A. 7610 repealed E.O. 205.

COURT:

There is no basis to conclude that R.A. 7610 repealed E.O. 205. The repealing clause of R.A. 7610 contains specific laws and parts it has repealed but did not mention E.O. 205.

There is also no implied repeal by R.A. 7610, E.O. 436, MC 8-9-95, and the IRR of R.A. 7925 (Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines) shows that the NTC’s regulatory power over the CATV operations is continuously recognized.

On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. 205 and R.A. 7610, the proper action is to harmonize them if possible. Thus, NTC has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting CATV operations, including the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing precludes LGUs from exercising its general power to prescribe regulations for the general welfare of their constituents.

ISSUE: W/N E.O. 205 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS - NO

Respondent’s Argument: E.O. 205 violates the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts because Resolution No. 2010 was a grant of franchise to the petitioner.

COURT:

There is no law authorizing LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV systems. Assuming there was one, it has been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. 1512, terminating all franchises for the operation of CATV system previously grants be the local governments. Only the NTC may issue Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority for the operation and maintenance of CATV system.

22 - DAVAO NEW TOWN V. SPS. SALIGA (2013)

J. Brion

Petitioner: Davao New Town Development Corporation

Respondents: Sps. Saliga and Sps. Ehara


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FACTS:

On 5 February 1998, respondents filed before Office of the PARAD in Davao City a complaint for injunction, cancellation of titles and damages against the petitioner.

PETITIONER

1. The petitioner alleged in defense that it purchased the property in good faith from the previous owners (Paz Flores and Elizabeth Nepomuceno) in 1995.

2. At that time, the alleged tenancy relationship between the respondent and Eugenio had already expired following the expiration of their lease contract in 1986.

3. Prior to the sale, the Davao City Office of the Zoning Administrator confirmed that the property was not classified as agricultural. The affidavit of non-tenancy executed by the vendors affirmed the absence of any recognized agricultural lessees on the property.

4. The property had already been classified to be within an “urban/urbanizing zone” in th 1979-2000 Comprehensive Land Use Plan for Davao City that was duly adopted by the City Council of Davao City and approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board/HLURB)

RESPONDENTS

1. The respondents claimed that they and their parents, from whom they took over the cultivation of the landholding, had been tenants of the property as early as 1965.

2. On 12 August 1981, the respondents and Atty. Mendiola, originally registered owner of the 2 parcels of land situated in Catalunan Pequeno, Davao City, executed a five-year lease contract.

3. While they made stipulations regarding their respective rights and obligations over the landholding, the respondents claimed that the instrument was actually a device Eugenio used to evade the land reform law.

4. Pursuant to the provisions of PD 27, they, as tenants, were deemed owners of the property beginning October 21, 1972 (the PD’s effectivity date); thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to the petitioner was not valid.

5. The petitioner could not have been a buyer in good faith as it did not verify the status of the property – whether tenanted or not tenanted – prior to its purchase.

6. The respondents submitted, among others, pertinent tax declarations showing the property was agricultural as of 1985.

ISSUE/HELD:

WON the property had been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 so as to remove it from the coverage of RA 6657 – YES

The City Council of Davao City has the authority to adopt zoning resolutions and ordinances. Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 (the then LGC), municipal and/or city officials are specifically empowered to "adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission."

This power of the local government units to reclassify or convert lands to non-agricultural uses is not subject to the approval of the DAR.

While DNTDC attached the May 2, 1996 HLURB certification only in its MR, the DARAB should have considered it, especially in the light of the various documents that DNTDC presented to support its position that the property had already been reclassified as non-agricultural land prior to June 15, 1988.

Considering that the property is no longer agricultural as of June 15, 1988, it is removed from the operation of R.A. No. 6657. Only those parcels of land specifically classified as agricultural are covered by the CARL; any parcel of land otherwise classified is beyond its ambit.

NO VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE PROPERTY ACCRUED TO THE RESPONDENTS UNDER P.D. NO. 27

Under P.D. No. 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn agricultural lands are "deemed owners" of the land that they till as of October 21, 1972. Under these terms, vested rights cannot simply be taken away by the expedience of adopting zoning plans and ordinances reclassifying an agricultural land to an "urban/urbanizing" area.

However, this policy should not be interpreted as automatically vesting in them absolute ownership over their respective tillage. The tenant-farmers must still first comply with the requisite preconditions, i.e., payment of just compensation and perfection of title before acquisition of full ownership.

The record does not show that the respondents had been issued certificates of land transfer (CLTs) – best evidence of the government’s recognition of their inchoate right as "deemed owners" of the property.


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Similarly, the record does not show that the government had placed the property under its OLT program or that the government, through the MARO, recognized the respondents as the actual tenants of the property on the relevant date, thereby sufficiently vesting in them such inchoate right.

NO TENANCY RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN DNTDC AND THE RESPONDENTS

In a tenancy relationship, the subject must be agricultural land. Here, it has already been reclassified as non-agricultural. Accordingly, the respondents are not de jure tenants and are, therefore, not entitled to the benefits granted to agricultural lessees under the provisions of P.D. No. 27, in relation to R.A. No. 6657.

Under Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389, declaration by the department head, upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission, to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes, terminates the right of the agricultural lessee to continue in its possession and enjoyment. The approval of the conversion, however, is not limited to the authority of the DAR or the courts. The reclassification and conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, on June 15, 1988, was a coordinated effort of several government agencies, such as local government units and the HSRC.

In effect, therefore, whether the leasehold relationship between the respondents and Eugenio had been established by virtue of the provisions of R.A. No. 3844 or of the five-year lease contract executed in 1981, this leasehold relationship had been terminated with the reclassification of the property as non-agricultural land in 1982. The expiration the five-year lease contract in 1986 could not have done more than simply finally terminate any leasehold relationship that may have prevailed under the terms of that contract.

Consequently, when the DNTDC purchased the property in 1995, there was no longer any tenancy relationship that could have subrogated the DNTDC to the rights and obligations of the previous owner

23 PROVINCE OF RIZAL V EXEC SEC [2005]

Dec 13, 2005; Chico-Nazario, J

FACTS:

case sprouted from a MOA signed by Secretaries of DPWH and DENR with the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) Governor; provides that DENR is allowing the utilization of its land in Pintong, Bocaue, Rizal as a sanitary landfill by MMC

turned out, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo already wrote to Gov. Cruz of MMC, the DPWH, the Executive Secretary, and the DENR,

informing them of an SB resolution banning creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. No action was taken.

Upon investigations by forest officers, it was later found that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. A report submitted by CENRO forest officers revealed that there was no permit issued to MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes.

February 1990, DENR granted MMA (formerly MMC) an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the garbage dumpsite, ECC was in compliance of PD 1586

o July 31 1990, less than 6 months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the respondent DPWH Sec, stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from improper development of the site

March 9, 1990, LLDA sent a letter to MMA, expressing its objection to the proposed location of the dumpsite within the watershed; LLDA’s environmental management program regards dumpsites as incompatible within the watershed

November 1993, DENR Secretary sent a letter to MMA recommending that the all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong Bocaue be dismantled; stated that after a series of investigations by field officials of the DENR, the agency realized that the MOA entered into on 17 November 1988 is a very costly error

Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies, the Office of the President, through Exec Sec Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation 635,“Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the MMDA.”

o 22 July 1996, petitioners filed before CA a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

o CA denied for lack of cause of action

28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite

o MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after 6 months o 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada issued a Memorandum

ordering the closure of the dumpsite on 31 Dec 2000 o 20 July 1999, the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and

Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial Gov’t of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo, wherein the latter agreed to further extend the use of the dumpsite until its permanent closure on 31 Dec 2000

11 January 2001, Pres Estrada directed DILG Sec Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chair Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite “in view of the emergency situation


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of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic.”

o Claiming the above events constituted a “clear and present danger of violence erupting in the affected areas,” the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on 19 January 2001

24 January 2001, SC issued the TRO prayed for, “effective immediately and until further orders.”

26 January 2001, RA 9003 “The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,” was signed into law by Pres Estrada


mere presence of a garbage dumpsite inside a watershed reservation is definitely not compatible with the very purpose and objectives for which the reservation was established

dumping site is without the concurrence of the Provincial Governor, Rizal Province and without any permit from DENR who has functional jurisdiction over the Watershed Reservation

about 1,192 families residing and cultivating areas covered by 4 Barangays surrounding the dumping site will adversely be affected by the dumping operations of MMC including their sources of domestic water supply

[based on petitioner’s assignment of errors by CA]

Presidential Proclamation 635 was based on a forgery of the DENR Secretary’s signature (of the recommendation)

spurious ECC

violation of RA 7586 when Proclamation 635 was issued considering it may only be done by an act of congress

brushed aside the unanimous findings of concerned government agencies and non-partisan officials; while MMDA Chair is an interested party

San Mateo dumpsite is not located in the buffer zone of the reservation

CA’s unjustified fear of mini-Smokey Mountains


(from the ruling and some from MMDA’s letter to Senator Jovito Salonga (represented the residents of Pintong Bocaue)

Marikina Watershed Reservation, and thus the San Mateo Site, is located in the public domain. Neither the Province of Rizal nor the municipality of San Mateo has the power to control or regulate its use since properties of this nature belong to the national, and not to the local governments.

unless we are prepared with a better alternative, the project simply has to be pursued in the best interest of the greater majority of the population, particularly their health and welfare

sanitary landfill projects are now on their fifth year of implementation. The amount of effort and money already invested in the project by the government cannot easily be disregarded, in favor of the few settlers/squatters who chose to ignore the earlier notice given to them

place within the jurisdiction of Metro Manila, with an area big enough to accommodate at least 3 to 5 years of waste disposal requirements

site was within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under the administration of the DENR, located at the lower periphery of the buffer zone; was evaluated to be least likely to affect the underground water supply; and could, in fact, be excluded from the reservation

relocating the site at this point and time would not be easy, if not impracticable, because aside from the investments that had been made in locating the present site, further investments have been incurred

ISSUES:

1. WoN MMDA agreed to the permanent closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of Dec 2000 (NO)

2. WoN DENR has the sole power to control or regulate the use of the San Mateo site (NO)

3. WoN Proclamation 635 is unconstitutional (YES) 4. WoN permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by RA 9003

(YES)

HELD: reversed CA; ruled in favor of petitioners

RATIO:

1. THE LAW AND THE FACTS INDICATE THAT A MERE MOA DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE DUMPSITES PERMANENT CLOSURE.

Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp: "The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare."

2. REORGANIZATION ACT OF DENR DEFINES AND LIMITS ITS POWERS OVER THE COUNTRY’S NATURAL RESOURCES

DENR mandated by EO 192 to be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain.


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Oposa v. Factoran: the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Administrative Code of 1987 and EO 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although the DENR, an agency of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority.

Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources: one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. The Regalian doctrine was reiterated in the 1973 Constitution and reaffirmed in the 1987 Constitution in Section 2 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony.

3. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PROCLAMATION NO. 635 WAS PASSED ALSO VIOLATES RA 7160, THE LGC.

Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the LGC, which was approved 4 years earlier, on 10 October 1991. The LGC gives to LGUs all the necessary powers to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants.

Section 2(c) of LGC declares that it is the policy of the state to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained.

- at the height of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province

- such action is allowed by Section 16, every local government unit may exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare, which involve, among other things, promot(ing) health and safety, enhance(ing) the right of the people

to a balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Under the LGC, therefore, 2 requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

4. RA 9003, THE ECOLOGICAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2000, WAS APPROVED ON 26 JANUARY 2001.

Law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework, which should include, among other things, the method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. The site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where the landfills operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.

24 - VELOSO, V. COA [2011]

G.R. No. 193677, 6 September 2011; Peralta.

Luciano Veloso, Abraham Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion, and Marlon M. Lacson v. Commission On Audit

FACTS

1. On Dec 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. Section 2 thereof provides that the EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds.

2. Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of the following former councilors:

Councilor/Recipients Check Date (P9,923,257)


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Abraham C. Cabochan 353010 06/07/05 P1,658,989.09

Julio E. Logarta, Jr. 353156 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08

Luciano M. Veloso 353778 06/30/05 P1,658,989.08

Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion 353155 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08

Marlon M. Lacson 353157 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08

Heirs of Hilarion C. Silva 353093 06/09/05 P1,628,311.59

3. On August 8, 2005, Atty. Espina, Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila, issued Audit Observation Memo No. 2005-100(05)07(05) with the following observations:

The initial payment of monetary reward as part of EPSA is without legal basis.

The amount granted is excessive and tantamount to double compensation in contravention to Article 170 (c) of the IRR of RA 7160 which provides that no elective or appointive local official shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.

The appropriations to implement EPSA ordinance was classified as Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses instead of Personal Services contrary to Section 7, Volume III of the Manual on the New Government Accounting System (NGAS) for local government units and COA Circular No. 2004-008 dated September 20, 2004 which provide the updated description of accounts under the NGAS.

4. After evaluation, the COA Director, issued ND No. 06-010-100-05 (May 24, 2006) disallowing the payment.

5. On Nov. 9, 2006, former councilors Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion, Luciano M. Veloso, Abraham C. Cabochan, Marlon M. Lacson, Julio E. Logarta, Jr., and Monina U. Silva, City Accountant Gloria C. Quilantang, City Budget Officer Alicia Moscaya and then Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer Danilo B. Lacuna filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance. The Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA decided in favor of them

Citing Article 170 of the IRR of RA No. 7160, the monetary reward can be one of gratuity and, therefore, cannot be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. Giving importance to

the principle of local autonomy, the LAO-local upheld the power of LGUs to grant allowances. More importantly, it emphasized that the DBM did not disapprove the appropriation for the EPSA of the City which indicate that the same is valid.

6. Upon review, the COA sustained ND No. 06-010-100-05 disallowing the payment. MR denied.

7. Aggrieved, petitioners went to the SC on R65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA (1) when it ruled that the monetary award given was not a GRATUITY and (2) when it effectively nullified a duly-enacted ordinance which is essentially a judicial function. In other words, in the guise of disallowing the disbursement in question, the respondent Commission arrogated unto itself an authority it did not possess, and a prerogative it did not have.

ISSUES:

• Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds. YES

• Whether the COA committed GAD in affirming the disallowance.

THE COA HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DISALLOW THE DISBURSEMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNDS

PETITIONERS’CONTENTION:

• The power and authority of the COA to audit government funds and accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power to disallow a particular disbursement. Citing Guevara v. Gimenez, petitioners claim that the COA has no discretion or authority to disapprove payments on the ground that the same was unwise or that the amount is unreasonable. The COA's remedy is to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer such expenditures that, in its opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant. While admitting that the cited case was decided by the Court under the 1935 Constitution, petitioners submit that the same principle applies in the present case.

RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION:

1. It is vested by the Constitution the power to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds and to disallow irregular disbursements.

SC DISAGREES WITH THE PETITIONER.


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• In NEA v. COA, Guevara has already been overturned by the Court in Caltex Phil., Inc. v. COA. The Court explained that under the 1935 Constitution, the Auditor General could not correct irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of public funds, but could only bring the matter to the attention of the proper administrative officer. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.

• The SC quoted Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution11 and Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 198712.

• Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property.

11 Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.

12 Under the first paragraph of the above provision, the COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous state colleges and universities, other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, and such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from or through the government. The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies cannot be taken away from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that "no law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the [COA]."

• This includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, and to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.

• The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

• The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the COA to disapprove payments which it finds excessive and disadvantageous to the Government; to determine the meaning of "public bidding" and when there is failure in the bidding; to disallow expenditures which it finds unnecessary according to its rules even if disallowance will mean discontinuance of foreign aid; to disallow a contract even after it has been executed and goods have been delivered.

• Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

THE COA PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS JURISDICTION IN DISALLOWING THE DISBURSEMENT.

PETITIONERS’CONTENTION:

1. The retirement and gratuity pay remuneration is a valid exercise of the powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod set forth in RA 7160.

2. Section 458 of RA 7160 defines the power, duties, functions and compensation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod:

SEC. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

x x x x

(viii) Determine the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from city funds and provide for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and activities of the city government.

3. In the exercise of the above power, the City Council authorized the


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conferment of the EPSA to the former three-term councilors and the award is a "gratuity" which is a free gift, a present, or benefit of pecuniary value bestowed without claim or demand, or without consideration.

RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION:

1. The COA opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by the term "compensation."

2. Though it recognizes the local autonomy of LGUs, it emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant of such monetary reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence of a specific law passed by Congress which ordains the conferment of such monetary reward or gratuity to the former councilors.

SC DISAGREES WITH THE PETITIONER.

1. It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. \

2. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.

3. The power cited by the petitioners is not without limitations.

Section 81 of RA 7160,. Compensation of Local Officials and Employees. The compensation of local officials and personnel shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That the increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect only after the terms of office of those approving such increase shall have expired: Provided, further, That the increase in compensation of the appointive officials and employees shall take effect as provided in the ordinance authorizing such increase; Provided however, That said increases shall not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal services provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided finally, That such compensation may be based upon the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Moreover, the IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the Constitutional

provision that "no elective or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government." Section 325 of the law limit the total appropriations for personal services of a local government unit to not more than 45% of its total annual income from regular sources realized in the next preceding fiscal year.

4. While it may be true that the above appropriation did not exceed the budgetary limitation set by RA 7160, the SC found that the COA is correct in sustaining ND No. 06-010-100-05.

5. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8040 provides for the payment of "retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms" as part of the EPSA. The recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to the total compensation received by each awardee for nine years that includes basic salary, additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance, representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial assistance, clothing allowance, 13th month pay and cash gift. This is not disputed by petitioners. There is nothing wrong with the local government granting additional benefits to the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the granting of incentive benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees. Considering, however, that the payment of these benefits constitute disbursement of public funds, it must not contravene the law on disbursement of public funds.

6. In Yap v. COA, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers and employees. Without this limitation, government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.

7. Undoubtedly, the computation of the reward is excessive and tantamount to double and additional compensation. This cannot be justified by the mere fact that the awardees have been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Neither can it be justified that the reward is given as a


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gratuity at the end of the last term of the qualified elective official.

8. The fact remains that the remuneration is equivalent to everything that the awardees received during the entire period that he served as such official. Indirectly, their salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they receive half of them at the end of their last term.

9. The purpose of the prohibition against additional or double compensation is best expressed in Peralta v. Auditor General:

This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration. The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the idea. There is then to be an awareness on the part of the officer or employee of the government that he is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position.

10. Verily, the COA's assailed decisions were made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented.

11. However, in line with existing jurisprudence, we need not require the refund of the disallowed amount because all the parties acted in good faith.

25 - ACCORD V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ZAMORA

J. Carpio Morales

FACTS:

President Estrada submitted the National Expenditures Program for fiscal year 2000 to Congress. In the said program, the President proposed an Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the amount of P121,778,000,000, following the formula provided for in Section 284 of the Local Government Code of 1992:

SECTION 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. Local government units shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:

(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);

(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and

(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).

The General Appropriations Act (GAA) SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) passed by Congress and subsequently approved by President Estrada, however provides that:

1. IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000 only. 2. An UNPROGRAMMED FUND in the amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10B) shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.

NGOs filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of above-quoted provision. Governors of the provinces of Batangas and Nueva Ecija intervened.

ISSUES:

WON the GAA provisions on Unprogrammed Fund is unconstitutional as they violate the autonomy of local governments by reducing by P10B the IRA due to the


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local governments and withholding the release of such amount; WON said GAA provision violates ART. X, SEC. 6 of the Constitution (and SECS. 284, 286.13)


Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS:

The above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.

Basis: During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioners Davide and Nolledo shared a common assumption that the entity which would execute the automatic release of internal revenue was the executive department.

The subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA

SUPREME COURT

HELD: The GAA provision on the P10B Unprogrammed Fund is void and unconstitutional.

13 Section 286. Automatic Release of Shares. – (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.

(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local government units under existing laws.

RATIO: A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. As a rule, the term shall is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.

Under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not the release thereof. The plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.

Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution binds the legislative just as much as the executive branch was presumed in the ruling of this Court in the case of The Province of Batangas v. Romulo which is analogous in many respects to the one at bar.

This provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs.

NOTE: There is an exception to the automatic release of IRA rule. SECTION 284: . . .Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the "liga", to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year:

26 - ALDABA VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 188078, JANUARY 25, 2010

FACTS:

1. This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.


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2. House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

3. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.

ISSUE: WON R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional.

HELD: Republic Act No. 9591 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB.

2. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by the Court.

3. Based on the Certification’s own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces.

4. A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.

5. Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the

1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

27 - NAVARRO V ERMITA (2010)

Issue: Constitutionality of RA 9355 “An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands”?

Petitioner: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA

Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands

FACTS:

- Petitioners are taxpayers and residents of Surgao del Norte (served once as Vice-Governor and Provincial Board)

o They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the area.

- The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under RA 2786. The rovince is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island

- Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has

o an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and

o a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or

o a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau.

o The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province. (Dinagat Island 106,951)

RESPONDENT ARGUMENT:

- Petitioners do not have the legal standing to question the constitutionality of the creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they have not been directly


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injured by its creation and are without substantial interest over the matter in controversy.

- The petition is moot and academic because the existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has already commenced

- The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for the years 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.25.

- the Lands Management Bureau certified that though the land area of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed of one or more islands; thus, it is exempt from the required land area of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code.

- The number of inhabitants in the Province of Dinagat Islands as of 2003, or almost three years before the enactment of R.A. No. 9355 in 2006, was 371,576, which is more than the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants

PETITIONER ARGUMENT:

- the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is not qualified to become a province because

o it failed to comply with the land area or the population requirement. It has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the statutory requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers.

o Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement is a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants.

- the House of Representatives and the Senate erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.

RATIO:

- Standing o The Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious

constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party

- Moot and Academic o The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is

capable of repetition, yet evading review.

Constitutionality

- The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:

o SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected

- The Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for the creation of a province, thus:

o (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

o (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

o (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.[15]

- As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.

- Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code.

- Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands is null and void.


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- In this case, the pertinent provision in the IRR did not fill in any detail in accordance with a known standard provided for by the law. Instead, the IRR added an exemption to the standard or criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code in the creation of a province as regards the land area requirement, which exemption is not found in the Code.

28 - NAVARRO V. ERMITA (2011)

FACTS:

On Oct. 2, 2006, the President approved into law RA 9355, creating the province of Dinagat Islands.

On Dec. 3, 2006 the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC.

o 69, 943 affirmed while 63,502 voted in the negative.

The President appointed the interim set of provincial officials, and they took their oaths on January 26, 2007.

Rodolfo Navarro, Victor Bernal and Rene Medina filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9335.

o But the petition was dismissed on technical grounds.

Again, they filed a petition for the same reason, on the grounds that:

o The creation of Dinagat as a new province would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would deprive the people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk of territory, natural and financial resources.

o That when the law was passed, Dinagat only had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers and a population of 106, 951

Violating Sec. 461 of the LGC which mandates that at least 2,000 sq.km. of land and a population of 250,000 are needed to create a province.

And in thus violating the criteria set by the LGC, it also violated Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

The SC granted this petition and declared RA 9335 unconstitutional.

o Also declared null and void the provision on Art. 9(2) of the LGC IRR which said that “the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed o 1 or more islands” inasmuch as the same exemption is not provided for in the law.

o The law only states an exception to the contiguity requirement for pronvinces composed of islands.

The Republic, the Sol Gen and Dinagat filed their MRs but were all denied.

o They filed a second one which was “noted without action.”

Movants-Intervenors filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

o They are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte, whose positions will be affected if the SC Resolution is not reversed.

Their election to their offices would be annulled.

o As per COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, which says that:

If the decision of the SC is reversed, then status quo will remain since the system in place is that Dinagat and Surigao del Norte are two separate provinces.

If the decision of the SC is not reversed and becomes final and executory before the elections, the province of Dinagat will revert to its previous status as part of Surigao del Norte.

Voters of Dinagat will not be able to vote for candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of Reps, and candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte, since they are not in the respective ballots.

Thus, the COMELEC will postpone the elections.

If the decision of the SC is not reversed and becomes final and executory after the elections, the province of Dinagat will revert to its previous status as part of Surigao del Norte.

The result of the elections would have to be nullified, and a special election would be conducted.

The SC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene.

o The movants intervenors filed an MR. Denied.

The Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that this decision had become final and executory already.

The Movant-intervenors filed an Urgent Motion for Recall Entry of Judgment which is resolved in this Resolution.

ISSUES + RULING:

ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE URGENT MOTION FOR RECALL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

There appears nothing in the case which would support the contention that this motion was a ploy by the respondents’ lawyers to reopen the case despite the entry of judgment.

It was COMELEC resolution 8790 which gave the movant intervenors interest in reopening the case.


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If the motion was not entertained, the movant-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their elections.

It cannot be denied that movant-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the even that their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment is denied.

They should not be left without any remedy simply because their interest in the case became manifest only after the case had already been decided.

Anyway, in this case, the compelling concern is not only the movant-intervenors’ right to be heard, but also the arrival at the correct interpretation of the LGC and the manner of creation of LGUs.

ON THE CREATION OF THE LGUS

The criteria prescribed by the LGC (income, population, land area) are designed with central policy considerations on creating an LGU in mind:

o Economic viability

o Efficient administration

o Capability to deliver basic services to constitutions

Economic viability being the primordial criterion, as given evidence by congressional debates.

o Hon. Laguda: “The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and population are functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an income level which would be the trigger point for economic development, population will naturally increase because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from being converted into a province because of the population problems in the beginning, it will never be able to reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will never have the economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development.”

Case also cited the provisions and IRR on the creation of the LGUs.

The LGC says that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively.

o This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

There appears no reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municiaplities, but not to provinces.

o In fact there is greater likelihood that island or ground of islands would form part of the land area of a newly created province.

Thus, it seems that the exception given to cities and municipalities was inadvertently omitted in Sec. 461, or for provinces.

o The inclusion of such exemption in the IRR was to correct such oversight.

Thus, the Court upholds the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

o Finds merit when considering the underpinning principle of local autonomy.

In Sec. 2 of the LGC (Declaration of Policy)

“It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units.”

o Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results.

Strict interpretation of the previous SC decision would be counterproductive.

Anyway, if the provision is applied, This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands -- and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency

This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the


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islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.

o Court also quotes portions of the a Bicameral Conference Committee meeting which clearly show the manifest intention of the Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them a direct share in the national budget.

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law,[31] or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR.

o The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated.

o This amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court,[ but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.

Despite lack of exemption in the LGCt Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR.

o The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR.

o Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.

DISPOSITION: The Court granted the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment. The first SC Resolution is set aside, and provision in Art. 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 is declared VALID. RA 9335 is also declared VALID. Original petition is dismissed.

CARPIO, J., DISSENTING:

The ruling is a blatant violation of the Constitution and the Local Government Code, and opens the floodgates to the proliferation of pygmy provinces and legislative districts.

1. The Dinagat Islands province simply does not meet the criteria for the creation of a province.

Section 461 requires a province to meet the minimum income requirement and either the minimum land area or minimum population requirement. In short, two of the three minimum requirements must be satisfied, with the minimum income requirement one of the two.

The Dinagat Islands province does not meet either the minimum land area requirement or the minimum population requirement. Its population was only at 120,813 in 2006 and the land area of the island comprised only 802.12 sq.km.

The Local Government Code contains no exception to the income and population or land area requirements in creating provinces.

What the Code relaxed was the contiguity rule for provinces consisting of "two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

No exception was ever created by law. Hence, the exception created in the implementing rule of the Local Government Code, exempting provinces "composed of one (1) or more islands" from the minimum land area requirement, is void for being ultra vires.

The majority argues that since the exception of island provinces from the minimum land area requirement was inserted in the implementing rules by the congressional Oversight Committee, the Court should extend great weight to this "legislative construction" of the Code. BUT:

i. A congressional oversight committee has no power to approve or disapprove the implementing rules of laws because the


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implementation of laws is purely an executive function (Macalintal v Comelec)

ii. Congress has no power to construe the law. Only the courts are vested with the power to construe the law. Congress may provide in the law itself a definition of terms but it cannot define or construe the law through its Oversight Committee after it has enacted the law because such power belongs to the courts.

Ratio behind the withholding of exemption for minimum land area requirement for provinces composed of islands:

o The province, as the largest political and corporate subdivision of local governance in this country, serves as the geographic base from which municipalities, cities and even another province will be carved, fostering local development.

o The ruling wipes away the territorial and population tiering among provinces, cities and municipalities the Local Government Code has carefully structured, reducing provinces to the level of a rich municipality,unable to host otherwise qualified new smaller local government units for sheer lack of space.

Even assuming that the minimum land area requirement does not apply to island provinces, an assumption that is devoid of any legal basis, Dinagat Islands still fail to meet the minimum population requirement.

The majority's ruling clearly violates Section 461 of the Code, no question about it.

2. When Congress creates a province it necessarily creates at the same time a legislative district. The province must comply with the minimum population of 250,000 because the Constitution mandates that 250,000 shall be the minimum population for the creation of legislative districts. The 1987 Constitution mandates that "each province[,] shall have at least one representative

To treat land area as an alternative to the minimum population requirement (based on the conjunctive "either" in Section 461) destroys the supremacy of the Constitution, making the statutory text prevail over the clear constitutional language mandating a minimum population through the requirement of proportional representation in the apportionment of all legislative districts.

In creation of a province neither Congress nor the Executive can replace the minimum population requirement with a land area requirement because the creation of a province necessarily creates at the same time a

legislative district, which under the Constitution must have a minimum population of 250,000.

As an effect of the ruling, The House of Representatives will now count among its members a representative of a district consisting, as of the 2007 census, of only 120,813 constituents, well below the minimum population of 250,000 his peers from the other regular districts represent.

This malapportionment tolerates, on the one hand, vote undervaluation in overpopulated districts, and, on the other hand, vote overvaluation in underpopulated ones, in clear breach of the "one person, one vote" rule rooted in the Equal Protection Clause.

Thus, one vote in Dinagat Islands has the weight of more than two votes in Metro Manila for the purpose of representation in the House of Representatives.

This is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

3. Fosters entrenchment of political dynasties and fuels feudalistic practices by assuring political dynasties easy access to public funds.

For each new province created - entailing at the same time the creation of a legislative district - a pipeline to a huge pool of resources is opened, with the Congressman enjoying wide discretion on how and where he will dispense such legislative largesse.

Under the majority's ruling, not only land area but also population is immaterial in creating island provinces. This is an open invitation to ruling political clans strategically situated in this country's thousands of islands to sponsor the creation of more underpopulated provinces within their political bailiwicks.

4. Far from being dispensable components in the creation of local government units, population and land area - not income - are the pivotal factors in funding local government units.

Under the Local Government Code, these components determine 75% of the share from the national taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA) each local government unit receives, the lifeblood of their operations, based on the following formula:

o Population - Fifty percent (50%)

o Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%)

o Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)


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Thus, population, with a weight of 50% ranks first in determining the financial entitlement of local government units, followed by land area (25%)

5. By treating Dinagat Islands' land area of 802.12 square kilometers as compliant with the 2,000 square kilometers minimum under Section 461, the majority effectively included in their land area computation the enclosed marine area or waters of Dinagat Islands.

In short, other island provinces, like Romblon, Marinduque, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan, can now claim their enclosed marine areas as part of their "land area" in computing their share of the IRA.

On the part of landlocked provinces hosting large bodies of water, like Rizal, Laguna, Batangas, Cavite and Lanao del Sur, the situation is reversed. Finding themselves holding, but not surrounded by, water, the submerged territory, no matter how large, is excluded from the computation of their land area, thus proportionately lowering their share in the revenue allotment compared to their island counterparts.

6. The Constitution and the Local Government Code are normative guides for courts to reasonably interpret and give expression to the will of the Filipino people as encoded in their provisions.

Members of this Court go beyond the bounds of their sworn duties when they second guess the intent of the Constitution's framers and the people's elected representatives, pretending to act as if they themselves have been accorded electoral mandate to amend statutes as they see fit.

29 DORIA

30 DOMINGO

31 LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC (2010)

FACTS:

The subject matter of this case pertains to the conversion of municipalities into cities, and the concomitant requirements therefore.

11th Congress: 33 bills were converted into law by Congress, each converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress didn't act on 24 bills meant to convert 24 other municipalities into cities.

12th Congress: RA 9009 was enacted, which raises the annual income requirement for the conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million, thus amending Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009 was meant to restrain the rush of municipalities to convert into cities just to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment. Joint Resolution No. 29, however, sought to exempt the previously mentioned 24 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement of RA 9009.

13th Congress: Joint Resolution No. 29, now readopted as JR No. 1, was forwarded to the Senate for approval. The Senate failed to act on it though, prompting 16 of the 24 municipalities to file individual cityhood bills, each bill containing an exemption from the P100 million income requirement of RA 9009, and directing the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in the concerned municipalities approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. These cityhood bills were passed into cityhood laws.

In 2008, the Supreme Court struck down the cityhood laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. However, the court reversed itself in 2009. The case is now before the SC again for reexamination.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONERS:

The Cityhood laws are unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE RESPONDENTS:

Operative Fact Doctrine

Def. This doctrine recognizes the unconstitutionality of a law but leaves undisturbed its effects prior to its declaration of nullity, in the name of equity and fair play.

This theory is invoked to argue for the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. The idea is that if the law is already implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, it can no longer be revoked and must be continuously applied even after said declaration


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ISSUES

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING OF THE COURT:

1. YES, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

"No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."

The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

The exemption from the P100 million income requirement provided in the Cityhood Laws clearly violates and deviates from the Local Government Code, specifically Section 450 thereof, which, as amended by RA 9009, requires municipalities to earn at least P100 million annually in order to be eligible for conversion into a city. RA 9009 does NOT provide any exemption from this income requirement. The Cityhood Laws were enacted AFTER RA 9009 (enacted in 2001); thus, the exemption in the former deviates from the requirements of the latter. It must be noted that RA 9009 is not different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the said code.

Operative Fact Doctrine

The court strikes down the interpretation of the Operative Fact Doctrine aimed at constitutionalizing the Cityhood Laws. To interpret the doctrine in this way would result in a mad rush to immediately implement laws before the Court can declare them unconstitutional, since doing so would leave their implementation undisturbed despite a subsequent declaration of their unconstitutionality. This interpretation invites a quick and serial violation of the constitution.

The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity and must thus be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It

can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act; only the law's EFFECTS prior to the declaration of nullity remain. The doctrine modifies the effects of the unconstitutional law, but not the unconstitutional law itself.

As applied to the Cityhood Laws, only its effects prior to RA 9009 are left undisturbed such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities, or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts. The Cityhood Laws, however, are unconstitutional and void from the time of enactment of RA 9009 onwards.

2. YES, the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.

The classification criterion-- mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.

In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can

Note:

In relation to the creation of municipal corporation being a legislative matter

Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that [n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.


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32 - LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC (2011)

FACTS:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 Dec 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.

On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court, by a majority vote, declared the 16 Cityhood laws to be in violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the P100 million income requirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, the Cityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities were unconstitutional.

On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the respondent municipalities’ first MR. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities’ second MR. The 18 November 2008 decision became final and executory.

However, on 21 Deceber 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the 18 November 2008 decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws

ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONERS:

The Cityhood laws are unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.

Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE RESPONDENTS:

First, when Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the local government code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the Local GovernmentCode (LGC) of 1991.

Second, deliberations on RA 9009, particularly the floor exchange between Senators Aquilino Pimentel and Franklin Drilon, indicated the following complementary legislative intentions: (a) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the proposed P100million minimum income requirement; and (b) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the pending cityhood bills were concerned.

Third, petitioners could not plausibly invoke the equal protection clause because no deprivation of property resulted by the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. It was presumptuous on the part of petitioner LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA was yet to be allocated.

Fourth, the existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the Cityhood Laws in the plebiscites held in the affected municipalities is now an operative fact.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.


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RULING OF THE COURT:

The Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear – the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units follows the same uniform, non -discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code.

From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. The uniform exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.

Respondent municipalities’ theory that the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, which resulted in 16 municipalities functioning as new cities with new sets of officials and employees, operated to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws, was a misapplication of the operative fact doctrine and would set a gravely dangerous precedent. This view would open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court could declare them unconstitutional.

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains

unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. Accordingly, the 16 Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the

Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective, as a matter of equity and fair play, to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. In short, the classification criterion −mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress −is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress, as a criterion, limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.

33 - LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC [APRIL 2011]

April 12, 2011; Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

1. At the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was enacted which amended Sec 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for the conversion of a municipality into a city from P20M to P100M. The law did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

2. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives (HOR) adopted a joint resolution exempting 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were pending when RA 9009 was enacted (These cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress). The joint resolution, however, was not approved by the Senate.

3. At the 13th Congress, HOR re-adopted the said joint resolution but the Senate again failed to approve it.


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4. Upon the advice of Sen. Pimentel, 16 municipalities instead filed individual cityhood bills which had a provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the new P100M income requirement under RA 9009.

5. All the cityhood bills were enacted and later lapsed into law without the President’s signature.

6. These Cityhood Laws also directed COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the affected constituents approved of the conversion.

7. League of Cities, et al filed petitions with the SC for prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and TRO assailing the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws and enjoining the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscites. The petitioners’ main contention is that the 16 municipalities should not be exempt from the new income requirement under RA 9009.

8. On February 15, 2011, the SC issued a resolution declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws constitutional.

9. Petitioners filed this Ad Cautelam MR challenging the February 15, 2011 Resolution.


1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sec. 614 and 1015 of Art. X of the 1987 Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.

2. The new income P100 million requirement from locally generated sources is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with since there are several municipalities that have already complied (i.e. Sta. Rosa, Navotas, San Juan, Dasmariãs, and Biñan, etc.).

3. There exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of petitioner’s member cities, considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their creation.


(not explicitly stated in the case; probably the same as the SC’s decision)

14 Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

15 Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,

or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:

(SC basically reiterated its ratio in its Feb. 2011 resolution)

1. W/N the 16 cityhood laws are constitutional—YES.

Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

SC cited the manifestation of Senator Pimentel showing the legislative intent to exempt the LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws from the P100 million requirement.

The acts of both Chambers of Congress (of unanimously approving the conversion bills together with the deliberations on the scope of RA 9009) show that the exemption clauses in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. As such, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.

Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the 100M requirement is arbitrary and difficult to be complied with.

When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data supported the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise.

With the imposition of the 100M requirement, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality—that “metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever.” (Senator Pimentel)

By increasing the income requirement abruptly, cities outside of Metro Manila would be less likely to become cities. This is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth.

Petitioner’s 3rd argument is too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the P20 million requirement was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis-à-vis the population of a city.


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The increased income requirement of P100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a component city. This is evidenced by the fact that even the 59 members of the League of Cities have failed to be compliant with the new P100 million income requirement five years after R.A. 9009 became law but still remained viable.

The LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots.

While the Constitution mandates that the creation of LGUs must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.

Cityhood Laws did not violate the League members’ right to a just share in the national taxes.

The share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

DISSENTING OPINION (CARPIO)

“This Court has made history with its repeated flip-flopping in this case.”

1. Majority opinion erred in declaring that the Cityhood Laws amended the LGC. a. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can this be

inferred. The laws contains a uniformly worded Separability Clause: i. That if any of its provisions is “inconsistent with the LGC,” the

other consistent provisions “shall continue to be in full force and effect. Hence, any provision in each Cityhood Law inconsistent with the LGC is void and ineffective.

b. Since the Cityhood Laws do not form integral parts of the LGC, said laws cannot stipulate an exception from the requirements of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution:

i. “No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

c. The constitution is clear that the creation of LGUs must follow the criteria established by the LGC itself and not in any other law.

2. The increased income requirement of P100 million is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply.

a. The legislature is not required by the Constitution to show the courts evidence to support the increased income requirement such as data like inflation rates. This court should not venture into areas of analyses beyond its competence. The increase is a policy determination involving the wisdom of the law which exclusively lies within the province of the Legislature.

b. Cities of San Juan and Navotas. Sta. Rosa, Dasmariñas and Biñan were created in full compliance with the P100 million income requirement. 21 other municipalities have also satisfied the requirement.

3. The reduction in the Internal Revenue Allotment will adversely affect the cities’ economic situation.

4. The P20 million criterion is not substantial compliance, but outright violation of the constitution.

Topic: Creation of municipal corporation is a legislative matter (Sec. 14, LGC)

34 - AQUINO III V. COMELEC [2010]

by LA Celebrado

Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs.

Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 189793 | April 7, 2010 | En Banc | Perez, J.

FACTS:

Aquino et al. seek the unconstitutionality of RA 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the 1st and 2nd Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." and pray that COMELEC be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of RA 9716.


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PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS

Reapportionment introduced by RA 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of 250k for the creation of a legislative district16

Reconfiguration of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur will end up with a population of less than 250k

Existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250k

Intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250k

250k population requirement found in Constitution is based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats, when they fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Rep to 200, they took into account the projected national population of 55M for the year ‘86

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS

On procedural matters: o first, error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of RA 9716 via

the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65; o second, absence of locus standi

On substantive matters: o There’s an apparent distinction between cities and provinces

drawn by the Constitution and that it has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces

o 250k minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city and no fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces

o RA 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law

16 Section 5(3), Article VI, 1987 Constitution: Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

ISSUES:

1. WON there’s a fatal procedural lapse? (NO) 2. WON the Constitution fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must

compose a legislative district? (NO)

HELD:

1. NO. Absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed.

2. NO. The contested provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250k in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) requires a 250k minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. Apropos for discussion is the provision of the LGC on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the LGC 17 shows that the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. In Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, the Court held that the Constitution does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the

17 Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.


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constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. We don’t say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.

DISSENTING OPINIONS:

Carpio, J.: Under the ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces without regard to any minimum population. Such legislative districts can have a population of 150,000, 100,000, 50,000 or even 100, thus throwing out of the window the constitutional standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts. To disregard the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in provincial legislative districts while maintaining it in city legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the constitutional standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This means that legislative districts in provinces can have a minimum population of anywhere from 100 (or even less) to 250,000, while legislative districts in cities will always have a minimum population of 250,000. This will spell the end of our democratic and republican system of government as we know it and as envisioned in the 1987 Constitution. If left unchecked, laws like RA 9716 will fill the House of Representatives with two breeds of legislators, one, representing districts two, four, ten times more populous than other favored districts, elected by voters holding "mickey mouse votes" and another, representing small, favored districts, elected by voters holding "premium votes" two, four, ten times more valuable than the votes in disfavored districts.

Carpio-Morales, J.: Undoubtedly, Camarines Sur’s malapportionment largely partakes of gerrymandering. By pronouncing that "other factors," aside from population, should be considered in the composition of additional districts, thereby adding other requisites despite the Constitution’s clear limitation to population and contiguity, the ponencia effectively opens the floodgates to opportunistic lawmakers to reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even religious ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.

35 MMDA V BELAIR

FACTS:

1995: BAVA received a notice from MMDA requesting for the opening of Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

BAVA filed a case for injunction against MMDA.

o RTC issued a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune St but after due hearing, the RTC denied the issuance of injunction.

o On appeal, the CA conducted an ocular inspection and afterwards, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining MMDA’s proposed action. On the merits of the case, it held that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune St and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls, as this authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

ISSUE:

WON MMDA has authority to order the opening of subdivision road – NO

SHORT RATIO: MMDA was constituted for the administration of metro-wide basic services affecting Metropolitan Manila. Among these services is transport and traffic management. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 (MMDA’s Charter) that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. When RA 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units." MMDA is not a LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Sec. 11, Art. X of the Constitution.

MMDA only cites as basis for the opening a NOTICE it sent to BAVA. The notice itself does not cite any ordinance or law either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or MMDA as legal basis. MMDA simply relied on the authority in its charter to “rationalize roads and thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons” – by no stretch of imagination can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance making power, much less police power. MMDA therefore has no power to enact ordinances. Likewise, it cannot order BAVA


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to open a private road by mere notice, when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati did not pass any ordinance ordering such opening.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT

It has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public.

It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate CA.

From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT (WALANG SINABI SA CASE)

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel -Air Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. (Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates.)

SUPREME COURT

MMDA does not have police power. It does not have legislative power either.

MMDA is not a LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Sec. 11, Art. X of the Constitution.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar.

Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC.

In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of Dec 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as

the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power.

In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent CA did not err in so ruling.

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

Some bit of history:

Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan. Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."

The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.


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When RA 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units." It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

36 – MMDA V. GARIN [2005]

36 - [G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.

FACTS:

Dante O. Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and his drivers license was confiscated for illegal parking along Binondo.


In the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.

The provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties.

MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 (authorizing confiscation of licenses upon issuance of a TVR) was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.

MMDA’S ARGUMENTS:

The powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed.

The doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of government in administrative agencies.

Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 has an existing IRR: MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is

Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.

A license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare.

The revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

RTC:

MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 void. It was passed without a quorum.

The summary confiscation violates due process.

MMDA is ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

SUPERVENING EVENT:

MMDA implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04 S. 2004. Under the circular, traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations.

ISSUE:

WON Section 5(f) of RA 7924 creating the MMDA, which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, is valid.

RULING:

Case is moot. The petitioner, however, is not precluded from implementing any scheme that would entail confiscating drivers licenses.

RATIO:

1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.

2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.

The MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state


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which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.

The MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.18

MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.

3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.

MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.

37 - MMDA V VIRON TRANSPORTATION [2007]

G.R. No. 170657; 15 Aug 2007; CARPIO MORALES, J.| Digest by Miguel

FACTS:

1. Recognizing the worsening traffic situation in Metro Manila and nearby provinces, on February 10, 2003, then-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the questioned EO 179, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System." Among the salient points of the EO are the following:

18 Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.

a. In one of the Whereas clauses: The MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system by providing common mass transport terminal facilities, integrating buses and railway systems.

b. Secs. 2 and 3: The project was for four interim common terminals, focusing initially on North and South Metro Manila. The MMDA would be designated as the Implementing Agency for the project.

c. For this project, the MMDA would have several functions and responsibilities:

1. preparation of the project Master Plan

2. coordinating with agencies and landowners for the use of land/properties for the project

3. supervising and managing construction of structures and facilities.

4. executing necessary contracts for the implementation of the project in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations

5. managing funds as may be necessary for the projects in accordance with prevailing accounting and audit practice in government

6. enlisting the assistance of any national govenrment agency, office, or department, including LGUs and GOCCs, as may be necessary

7. assigning and hiring personnel for the above purposes

8. performing such other related functions as necessary to accomplish the objectives and purposes of EO 179.

2. The MMDA's governing board and policymaking body, the Metro Manila Council (MMC), issued Resolution No. 03-07 s.2003 expressing full support of the Project. In particular, the MMC stressed the need to remove the bus terminals along major Metro Manila thoroughfares.

3. The MMDA then began implementing the EO. Around February 24 of the same year, two bus companies filed petitions before the RTC of Manila:

a. Viron Transport filed a petition for declaratory relief, alleging that the MMDA was poised to issue a Memo Circular or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the


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whole of Metro Manila. Its terminals in Sampaloc, Manila and in Quezon City would be among them. They allege that such is outside the authority of the MMDA to regulate traffic under its charter, RA 7924. In addition, they seek a ruling on the legality of the said acts alongside the Public Service Act and related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as requisite for operating as common carriers.

b. Mencorp Transport filed a similar petition, making similar allegations as Viron. They also seek that the EO be declared unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals.

4. The TC in its original decision ruled in favor of MMDA, holding that the EO was a valid exercise of police power as it satisfied the subject matter and means tests. However, they reversed on MR, holding that the EO was an unreasonable exercise of police power, that MMDA's authority under Sec. 5e of its charter does not include the power to close the terminals, and that the EO is inconsistent with the Public Service Act. MMDA's MR being denied, they file the present petition with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS PER ISSUE:

1. W/N the case presents a justiciable controversy, allowing for a petition for declaratory relief. A. PETITIONER MMDA's ARGUMENTS

a. There is no justiciable controversy as nothing in the body of the EO mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals. No evidence was cited apprising the transport groups of an immediate plan to close down their terminals. b. Even then, the EO is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and to make available for use government property along EDSA and SLEX. As such, the EO only created a relationship between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, and not third persons.

B. RESPONDENTS' COUNTER-ARGUMENTS a. There is a justiciable controversy. They resorted to the Court because the EO, in one of its whereas clauses (see Facts), set out the MMDA's plan to eliminate the bus terminals. Viron even alleged that there is already a diagram laying down the design of one the terminals, and that such is already being constructed. (the MMDA even affirmed that they have begun implementing the EO)

2. W/N the MMDA has the authority to order the elimination of the bus terminals given the law and the Constitution.

A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS

a. The MMDA has no authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals under the EO. Such violates the Constitution and the Public Service Act; they do not even have the necessary authority in their charter.

B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS a. The real issue is the President's authority to undertake/cause the implementation of the project. EO 125 (Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications), her residual power, and the Revised Administrative Code constitute sufficient authority. b. Moreover, the EO is a valid exercise of police power.

3. Assuming arguendo that police power was validly delegated to the MMDA, W/N the EO was a valid police power measure. A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS:

a. No issue as to public purpose. Traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. b. The exercise of the power was oppressive and transgressed their rights over their respective terminals (of a confiscatory character).

B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS:

a. There was a valid exercise of police power.

4. Regardless of the implementing agency, W/N the EO is in line with the

provisions of the Public Service Act. A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT:

a. The closure of the terminals is not in line with the PSA, which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers.

B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT: a. The closure is in line with the PSA. The issue is more on the President’s authority.

COURT’S DISCUSSION:


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1. YES, as the EO is already being implemented, and there is already the possibility of closure of terminals (an event that would make the EO applicable to the transportation companies)-- such would be ripe for declaratory relief.

- General: The requirements of a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court are: (1) There must be a justiciable controversy, (2) Such controversy must be between persons with adverse interests, (3) The party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, and (4) The issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.

As to the argument that closure was not contemplated:

- A justiciable controversy is present when an actual legal controversy exists between the parties, and is before the Court, and the declaration sought would help in ending the controversy: in other words, where there is a claim of a right which is actually contested. Moreover, in a petition for declaratory relief, the action must be brought before the breach or violation as per Rule 63, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court.

- The resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the EO. Several provisions under the EO show an intent to immediately execute the plans laid therein:

- The EO was made effective immediately.

- Sec. 2 laid down the immediate establishment of common terminals for north- and south-bound commuters.

- Sec. 8 directed the DBM to allocate funds for the terminals.

- Such resolve is bolstered by the MMC's Resolution 03-07, where it also stressed the intent to remove bus terminals, and to establish common terminals. The MMDA even affirmed that they have begun implementing the project.

- This is no longer conjectural or anticipatory—it is an actual, justiciable controversy. For them to wait for actual issuance of an order of closure would be to bring the case outside the ambit of declaratory relief.

As to the argument that the EO is unrelated to third persons:

- The provisions of the EO are clear that the MMDA seeks to eliminate the existing bus terminals, including those owned by the respondents. Said respondents would have to operate from the common terminals.

- Surely, there would be an adverse effect on them for they stand to be deprived of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.

2. NO, as (1) the agency with the power to establish and administer integrated programs for transportation is the DOTC, and (2) even if the MMDA could be delegated the power, the MMDA's Charter is limited merely to administer and apply the law.

I. On the part of the President

- Secs. 4, 5, 6, and 22 of EO 125 gave the DOTC the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications, with the DOTC as the primary entity for the promotion, development, and regulation of transportation and communications.

- Such power extends to the President through her control of the executive department, bureaus and offices under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, and Sec. 1, Bk III and Sec. 38, Chapter 37, Bk IV of the Revised Administrative Code. The latter even defines supervision and control to include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate.

[Note that such a delegation is a delegation of police power. This is a matter of importance in related issues.]

II. On the part of the MMDA

- However, EO 125 states that the DOTC is the primary implementing and administrative entity for transportation. With this alone, EO 125 is ultra vires by making the MMDA the implementing agency.

- Moreover, RA 7924 does not give authority to the MMDA to eliminate bus terminals.

- The scope of the MMDA's functions was already settled in MMDA v Bel-Air, where the Court stressed that they are limited to the delivery of seven basic services-- one of which is transport and traffic management, including the mass transport system, and that only certain acts were allowed under their charter: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of systems and administration.

- That scope did not give them anything resembling police or legislative power, unlike the legislative bodies of LGUs. They cannot order the elimination of terminals, the act being one of police power.

3. NO, as the means used in lessening traffic congestion were unduly oppressive.


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- There are two tests for a valid police power measure.

(1) Public purpose test - the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise

(2) Means test - the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

- There was no issue as to public purpose, only as to the means employed. The effect of the EO would necessarily be the closure of the existing bus terminals—is this oppressive?.

- This is similar to Lucena Grand Central Terminal v JAC Liner, where a city ordinance requiring all PUVs in Lucena to unload and load at a single common terminal was struck down due to overbreadth, the Court then finding that it was beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city. Worse, the compulsory use of the central terminal was held oppressive as it subjected its users to additional fees and charges. Surely there could have been alternatives-- if terminals lack adequate space that drivers have to load and unload on the streets, then they could impose regulations for terminal specifications. Worse, the scope is so broad that even entities that may be able to provide better facilities are barred.

- The same is the case here. There are so many less intrusive measures that could have been availed of, such as banning colorum vehicles or strictly enforcing traffic rules. Here, there is certainly an invalid exercise of police power.

- A caveat: the EO cannot said to be confiscatory of properties as their certificates of public convenience confer no property rights-- they are mere licenses or privileges that must yield to legislation.

4. NO, as the law recognizes the terminal facilities as a necessary service, with the elimination of such running contrary to it.

- Paragraph (a), Sec. 13, Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now part of the LTFRB charter) vested the PSC (now LTFRB) with jurisdiction, supervision and control over public services (at least for land transport), as well as their franchises, equipment, and other properties. It may also impose conditions as to construction and service as the public interest and convenience may require.

- Among these is the power to compel public utilities to furnish safe, adequate and proper service, including facilities (Sec. 16 of the Public Service Act).

This recognizes the terminals as a necessary service where elimination would run counter to the law.

PETITION DENIED. EO 179 DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ULTRA VIRES.

38 - DISOMANGCOP VS. DATUMANONG [2004]

G.R. No. 149848; November 25, 2004; Tinga. | Digest by Ian

FACTS:

This case involves the constitutionality and validity of RA 899919 signed by Pres. Estrada and DPWH’s D.O. 11920 issued by then Sec. Gregorio R. Vigilar.

Petitioners in this case are Arsadi M. Disomangcop and Ramir M. Dimalotang, in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur.

The 1987 Constitution21 mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 673422 was signed into law on Aug. 1, 1989 by Pres. Aquino eventually creating the ARMM. This was followed by E0 426 (Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government).

After 9 years, on May 20, 1999, Sec. Vigilar issued DO 119 creating “DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur”. This was followed by RA 899923 on January 17, 2001 which provided that the sum necessary for the maintenance and operation of the district office shall be included in the annual GAA. Then Congress passed R.A. 905424 which lapsed into law ]on 31 March 2001. It was ratified in a plebiscite held on 14 August 2001. The province of Basilan and the

19 An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor.

20 Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office 21 Art. X, Secs. 1 and 15. 22 An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 23 An Act Establishing An Engineering District In The First District Of The Province Of Lanao Del Sur

And Appropriating Funds Therefor 24 An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose RA 6734.


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City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.

On July 23, 2001, petitioners wrote DPWH Sec. Simeon Datumanong seeking the revocation of the DO and the non-implementation of the RA. No action was taken on the petition so they filed this petition before the SC.

PETITIONERS

Reliefs sought: 1. to annul and set aside D.O. 119; 2. to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing the DO

and RA and releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH;

3. to compel the DBM Sec. to release all funds for public works projects intended for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and

4. to compel respondent DPWH Sec. to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area.

Arguments: 1. DO was issued with grave abuse of discretion and it violates the

constitutional autonomy of the ARMM because it has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH- ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.

2. On RA 8999 a. A piece of legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly

studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is questionable. [SC will mention at the later part of the case that the HB was passed in record time on 2nd reading (not more than 10 mins.), without the usual sponsorship speech and debates].

b. Prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House Committee on Public Works and Highways (Committee) failed to invite a single official from the affected agency.

c. The law was skillfully timed for signature by former Pres. Estrada during the pendency of the impeachment proceedings.

RESPONDENTS (THROUGH THE OSG) ARGUMENTS:

1. Maintain the validity of the DO because it was issued in accordance with EO 124 (Reorganizing The Ministry Of Public Works and Highways, Redefining Its Powers And Functions, And For Other Purposes).

2. In defense of the constitutionality of R.A. 8999, they submit that the powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power of Congress.

3. Petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note that petitioners have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

Petitioners: They have standing, as they will suffer actual injury as a result of the enactments complained of.

ISSUES:

WON (I) R.A. 8999 and (II) D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: The Court agrees in part with the petitioners. It held the RA and DO unconstitutional.

It does not agree, however, that there is grave abuse of discretion based on the allegation that the RA was allegedly signed into law under suspicious circumstances because according to the SC, it cannot inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or expediency of the acts of legislative branch. It further disagrees as regards the alleged lack of consultation or public hearing because absence of consultation does not render a law infirm. This Court holds that the Congress did not transgress the Constitution nor any statute or House Rule in failing to invite a resource person from the DPWH-ARMM during the Committee meeting.

DISCUSSION:

I. On RA 8999 and the Autonomy Organic Acts- RA 8999 violates regional autonomy

It never became operative because it was superseded by RA 9054.

It is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999 unconstitutional for the adjudication of this case. The challenged law never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment., RA 9054.

The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite. This was explicitly mentioned


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in the excerpts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted by the SC.

Regional Autonomy under RA 6734 and RA 9054

Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government unit vis--vis the central government. Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central government.

However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is achieved through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain member communities who choose their own authorities from within the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs.

In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive means for national integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase their trust in the government and pave the way for the unhampered implementation of the development programs in the region.

And by regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean meaningful and authentic regional autonomy.

Substantial and meaningful autonomy is the kind of local self-government which allows the people of the region or area the power to determine what is best for their growth and development without undue interference or dictation from the central government.

To this end, Section 16, Article X limits the power of the President over autonomous region. In essence, the

provision also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions.

RA 8999 violates regional autonomy

E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG).

Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to the ARG.

E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH within the ARMM, including their functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG. According to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional Government enables it to appropriate, manage and disburse all public work funds allocated for the region by the central government.

The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and unfettered. Christians in this country.

With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control again.

The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.

Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national government to the autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement of R.A. 8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers which have previously been handed over.

II. On DO 119:

The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously


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devolved under the said EO. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWHs order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source of power the Executive.

The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124signed and approved by President Aquino in her residual legislative powersis of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogant generali.

In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124.

Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

39 – SERNA V. COMELEC [2008]

Bai Sandra S. A. Sema v. Commission on Elections and Didagen P. Dilangalen

G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008 | Carpio, J.

SUMMARY:

Upon the creation by the ARMM Regional Assembly of the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan via local law (Act 201), Cotabato City, as one of the local units transferred to the new province from its former province of Maguindanao, asked COMELEC to clarify its legislative district status in light of the upcoming May 2007 elections. COMELEC issued Resolution 7902, which stated that Cotabato City, while belonging to the new province of SK, would retain its status as part of the first legislative district of Maguindanao, absent any national law proclaiming otherwise.

Petitioner Sema, a candidate for representative of SK, assailed this Resolution arguing that the Province of SK should have its own legislative district, and that the votes cast in Cotabato City, as belonging to the first legislative district of Maguindanao, should be excluded from elections for an SK representative to Congress.

The Court ruled that Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Act 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is valid.

FACTS:

In the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, 2 legislative districts were apportioned for the Province of Maguindanao. Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities formed the first legislative district of Maguindanao which, in turn, formed part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as created by Organic Act RA 6734, amended by RA 9054. Cotabato City, however, is part of Region XII and not ARMM because constituents voted against its inclusion in ARMM in the Nov 1989 plebiscite.

Aug 28, 2006, ARMM’s Legislature (ARMM Regional Assembly/ARMM Assembly) exercised its power to create provinces (granted by Sec 19, Art. VI of RA 9054) by enacting the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201 (Act 201)25 which created the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan (SK); 8 municipalities from the first district of Maguindanao were separated from the latter to make up the province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

As a result of SK’s creation, all that was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, while part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, now belonged to SK.

25 Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province. Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.


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In anticipation of the May 2007 elections, Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City requested COMELEC via resolution to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the enactment of Act 201. COMELEC issued several resolutions in response:

1. Resolution 07-407: maintained status quo with Cotabato City as part of SK in the first legislative district of Maguindanao, pursuant to the COMELEC’s Law Department’s memo recommending that Cotabato City’s status quo be maintained pending enactment by appropriate law by Congress. (in other words — without law by Congress, Cotabato City was to remain part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, despite belonging to the province of SK).

2. Resolution 7845 (subsequently issued): Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City, because of the enactment of Act 201.

3. [Contested] Resolution 7902, amending 07-0407: renaming the legislative district as SK Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES:

A. ON THE REAPPORTIONMENT OF MAGUINDANAO

PETITIONER SEMA

(a candidate in the May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan w/ Cotabato City) prayed for the nullification of COMELEC’s Resolution 7902 and the exclusion of the votes cast in Cotabato City as far as the province of SK is concerned, arguing that:

1. SK, as a province, is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec 5(3) Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

2. [ main ] COMELEC acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing said Resolution maintaining the status quo of Maguindanao’s first legislative district when its earlier resolution had already designated Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanao’s reapportioned first legislative district

3. COMELEC had usurped Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts

RESPONDENT COMELEC:

1. SEMA wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify the COMELEC resolution because COMELEC issued such resolution pursuant to the exercise of its administrative, and not-quasi-judicial, power

2. SEMA’s prayer became moot when Respondent Didagen Dilangalen was proclaimed representative of the legislative district of SK Province with Cotabato City.

RESPONDENT DILANGALEN:

1. SEMA is estopped from questioning COMELEC’s resolution because the certificate of candidacy indicated she was seeking election as a representative of the Province of SK including Cotabato City.

2. COMELEC Resolution is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for SK nor reapportion legislative districts in Maguindanao, but merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.

3. COMELEC did not reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make Cotabato City its lone component because the power to reapportion lies exclusively with Congress and Cotabato City does not meet minimum population requirements under the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within the city.

B. ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A PROVINCE CREATED BY THE ARMM ASSEMBLY IS ENTITLED TO ONE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HOR) WITHOUT NEED OF NATIONAL LAW CREATING A LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT.

PETITIONER SEMA (W/ CONCURRENCE BY COMELEC, ABANDONING ITS EARLIER STANCE): YES

1. Citing Felwa v. Salas, SEMA argues that when a province is created by statute (Act 201 by the ARMM Assembly in this case), a corresponding representative district comes into existence by operation of the Constitution, without reapportionment.

2. RA 7160 on the creation of provinces affirms the apportionment of legislative districts incident to such creation.

3. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate apportionment of a legislative district.

RESPONDENT DILANGALEN: NO

1. Sec. 3, Art. IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Assembly the power to enact measures relation to national elections, including the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the HoR

2. Recognizing a legislative district for every province created by the ARMM Assembly would lead to disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the HoR

3. Cotabato City’s population of less than 250k does not entitle it to a representative in the HoR


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C. ON WON SEC. 19, ART. VI, RA 9054 DELEGATING TO THE ARMM REGIONAL ASSEMBLY THE POWER TO CREATE PROVINCES IS CONSTITUTIONAL, AND IF SO, WHETHER A PROVINCE SO CREATED IS ENTITLED TO ONE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE HOR WITHOUT NEED OF A NATIONAL LAW.

PETITIONER SEMA: YES

1. RA 9054 is a constitutional delegation by Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the former’s power to create provinces.

2. Art. X of the Constitution grants to autonomous regions through the organic acts legislative powers over other matters authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in that region

RESPONDENT DILANGALEN (W/ CONCURRENCE BY COMELEC): UNCONSTITUTIONAL

1. the power to create provinces is not granted to autonomous regions 2. to grant ARMM the power the prescribe lower standards in the creation of

provinces than those provided by RA 7610 contravenes Art. X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause

COURT’S RULING:

Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Act 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is valid.

RATIO:

ISSUE [main] : WON Sec. 19 Art VI of RA 9054 delegating to ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional. Unconstitutional, wrt the creation of provinces and cities.

While Congress, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, has delegated to provincial boards and municipal councils the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, the Local Government Code states that only an Act of Congress can create provinces cities or municipalities. o Under Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, three conditions must be

complied with for the creation of any of the four local government units: a) criteria in the local government code must be followed, creation of said unit must not be in conflict with Constitutional provisions, and c) a plebiscite must be held in the political units affected

While there is no conflict with the Constitution wrt to the delegation of power to create municipalities and barangays, the creation of provinces and cities is a different matter because under the Constitution, pending certain requirements, the creation of the latter two units may result in additional representatives to the House of Representatives. o Cities with a population of at least 250k or more shall have at least 1 HoR o Any province subsequently created, or city with a population of 250k or

more, shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one member in the HoR

o Thus, a province, or a city with a population of 250k or more, cannot be created without a legislative district, or else the Constitution will be violated. Even the creations of provinces, or cities with less than 250k, also requires the power to create legislative districts because a city’s population may increase in the future.

Legislative districts are created or reapportioned only by an Act of Congress. o The power to increase allowable membership in the HoR and reapportion

legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress. (Art. VI, Sec. 5, Constitution): Sec 5(1), Art VI: Congress may increase through law allowable

membership in the HoR; Sec 5(4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts, which necessarily includes the power to create such districts.

o These powers are exercised exclusively through Congress because the latter is a national legislature, thus any change in its allowable membership or incumbent membership must be embodied in national law; an inferior legislative body (i.e. a regional body) may not change the membership of the superior legislative body (i.e. national body)

ARMM’s Regional Assembly cannot create legislative districts whose representatives are elected through national elections, because such would extend ARMM’s legislative powers beyond its territorial jurisdiction, in violation of the Constitution. o Nothing in Sec. 20, Art. X of the Constitution (which enumerates the

powers of autonomous regions) authorizes autonomous regions expressly or impliedly to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

o Sec. 3, Art. IV of RA 9054 provides that the ARMM Assembly may exercise legislative powers except on certain matters, including national elections, thus it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.


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o The office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, maintained by national funds.

o ARMM’s Regional Assembly cannot create a national office because such would allow the former’s legislative powers to operate outside of ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction, in violation of Art. X of the Constitution which expressly limits coverage of regional assemblys to within its territorial juridiction.

ISSUE [main] : WON a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly via Act 201 is entitled to one representative in the HoR without a need of national law creating a legislative district for such province. NO. A province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that each province have at least one representative. The creation of the SK Province without a legislative district is unconstitutional.

Petitioner SEMA’s use of the Felwa ruling (the creation of legislative districts by operation of the Constitution upon the creation of a province) does not apply in this case. In Felwa, the creation of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao occurred via RA 4595 which was a national law. The new province of SK was enacted by a regional law. While the Felwa doctrine holds true insofar as the creation of a legislative district occurs by operation of the Constitution when a province is created, the power to create such legislative districts nevertheless remains exclusively with Congress because the power to create provinces belongs exclusively to Congress.

If the creation of the SK Province included an apportioned legislative district, Cotabato City would be left as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao, in violation of the Constitution, because pursuant to the 2000 census, Cotabato City’s population stands at 163, 849.

The grant by Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces and cities without regard to the criteria provided by RA 7160 (minimum annual income of P20M and minimum contiguous territory of 2k sq. km., or minimum population of 250k) would give rise to the ff. absurd possibilities: o An inferior legislative body like ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100

or more provinces and increase its membership in a superior legislative body like the HoR beyond the maximum limit provided by the Constitution (250)

o Proportional representation in the HoR of one representative per 250k residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not

comply with the requirement that every province created must have at least 250k population

o Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the HoR thru the ARMM Regional Assembly’s continuous creation of provinces or cities within ARMM

Organic Acts of Autonomous Regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Sec. 20, Art. X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited, “within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws.”

ISSUE: [minor] WON the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus were proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution 7902, and whether the proclamation of Dilangalen as representative of the SK Province with Cotabato City mooted Sema’s petition. Yes, the writs are proper. The petition is not moot.

The writ of prohibition is appropriate to test the constitutionality of election laws, rules and regulations.

Dilangalen’s proclamation as representative to the province of SK does not moot the petition because this case does not involve Dilangalen’s election, but inquires into the validity of the COMELEC Resolution and the constitutionality of Act 201 and Sec. 19, Art VI of RA 9054. The issue is whether votes cast in Cotabato City for the representative of SK Province will be included in canvassing of ballots, and ruling on these petitions will affect all other succeeding elections, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create future additional provinces.

40 – ADORNA (KIDA)

41 – ABDON (ORDILLO )

42 - CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA [1990]

Digest by Kathleen Villamin | 29 January 1990 | Cortes, J.:

Topic: Part III Creation of autonomous regional bodies

GENERAL FACTS


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In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued EO 220, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), covering Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR, Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized.

In this case, the constitutionality of EO 220 is now being assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

1. By issuing EO 220, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

2. EO 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision.

3. The creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS (IMPLIED)

1. By issuing EO 220, the President did not preempt Congress.

2. EO 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision.

3. The creation of CAR did not contravene local autonomy for the provinces involved.

SC RULING

1. E.O. No. 220 actually envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.

Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created.

Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is “the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras." E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

2. E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.

- Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.

- Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering


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further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14].

3. The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy. Petitioner failed to show how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.

43 - BAGABUYO V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 176970 | J. Brhion | Digest by: Aaron Valdez

FACTS:

Rogelio Bagabuyo filed a petition for CPM with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of PI to prevent the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 7387 on the ground that RA 9371 (the law that Resolution No. 7387 implements) is unconstitutional. Then-CdO Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed HB No. 5859 (which then became RA 9371) titled “An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of Cagayan de Oro”, which apportioned Cagayan de Oro into two legislative districts. The COMELEC issued a Resolution to implement RA 9371.

ARGUMENTS

Petitioner Respondent

The COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit

In his Reply:

The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein

A voter's sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC

A voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district

Government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City

R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

The criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place

R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.


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ISSUE(S):

WON No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or whether it involves the division and conversion of a local government unit

It merely provides for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro. There is a difference between legislative reapportionment and mere reapportionment.

Legislative Reapportionment Reapportionment

It is the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts (Black’s Law)

The realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Covered by Art. VI Sec. 5 which does not require a plebiscite

Covered by Art. X Sec. 10 which requires a plebiscite

Authority to act vested in Legislature Authority to act vested in Legislature

The aim is political representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard

Emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory.

In terms of the people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every province (irrespective of

Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are specified as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide services.

population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative districts and provinces and cities relate and interface with each other.

Further, there are differences between legislative districts and local government units.

Legislatives Districts LGUs

A representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs.

These are political and corporate units. They are the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature.

R.A. No. 9371 is a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. The wording of its provisions provides that no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

HELD: Petition DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT

44 - SAMSON V AGUIRRE

FACTS

petitioner was a councilor who opposed RA 8535 which created the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. Petitioner argues:


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◦ RA 8535 failed to conform to the requirements on income, population, and land area established under Sections 7, 11, and 450 of the LGC.

RA 8535 did not specify a seat of government

◦ There was no certification that the said law, when it was being proposed, would not adversely affect Quezon City.

◦ The said law in effect amends the Constitution.

◦

ISSUE:

WON RA 8535 is unconstitutional or is invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of the LGC?

Held: RA 8535 is valid and constitutional.

RATIO:

(The court essentially sided with the OSG's defense of the law)

First of all, all statutes are presumed to be valid (Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union)

On the requirements of the LGC in terms of land, income and population, Novaliches more than exceeds these requirements. The income requirement is 20M annually for the last two years, and Novaliches had an income of 26M. The population requirement was 150k, and Novaliches had a population of 347,310. the land requirement was 100 square kilometers, but the case did not specify Novaliches' land area.

on the requirement of certification of compliance with the requirements on income, population, and land, the court held that while it was true that no certificate was submitted to the Senate, a certificate was submitted to the House of Representatives. Considering that the bill emerged from the HOR, the court held that the certification submitted to the HOR was enough. The fact that the certification was oral (made by representatives of the DILG, DOF, DBM) was enough, since these officials are presumed to be knowledgeable about matters such as the area's income, population, etc.

On the failure of RA 8535 to specify a seat of government, the court held that the same could be specified after the creation of the city. Section 12 of the LGC speaks of government centers, which could also include the seat of government.

On the fact that there was no certification that the creation of said city would not adversely affect Quezon City, the court held that Mayor Mathay's failure to protest or make issue with the bill is an indication that

there would be no adverse effect to QC. The fact that the Quezon City Council was not given a copy of the petition (to create the new city) was insignificant too, because the councilors were all aware of the bill.

On the “amendment of the constitution,” the court held that RA 8535 only apportions the seats of the HOR to different legislative districts. Nowhere in the constitution is it provided that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities.

45 TEJANO

46 - MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO VS MENDEZ

FACTS:

In 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia issued EO 353 creating the municipality of San Andres, Quezon. The new municipality was created by segregating it other barrios from the municipality of San Narciso

In 1965, President Diosdado Macapagal issued EO 174 which recognized San Andres as having gained the status of a 5th class municipality. The EO added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."

In 1989, the municipality of San Narciso filed a quo warranto petition which sought the declaration of nullity of EO 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.

IN RTC, PETITIONER:

Relying on Pelaez vs Auditor General, EO 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

IN RTC, RESPONDENTS:

asked for the dismissal of the petition. It was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of EO 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning


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the creation of the new municipality; 5 that because the Municipality of San Andred had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General.

In the meantime, RA 7160 was passed which provided in Sec 442 (d) thus,

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or EOs and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

RTC: dismissed the petition. Whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and EOs, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991.

Issue: W/N San Andres is a de jure municipality. YES.

IN SC, PETITIONER:

The existence of a municipality created by a null and void presidential order may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and is inoperative such as though it has never been passed.

SUPREME COURT:

1) Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. It took petitioners almost 30 years from the time EO 353 was issued before they decided to challenge its legality. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.

2) Granting the EO 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, San Andres at least attained the status a de facto municipal corporation. When the Pelaez ruling came out, San Andres had only been in existence for six years and the ruling could have been used to declare EOE 353 as unconstitutional. This was not done. Instead San Andres was continually recognized by the State through its acts – it was reclassified as a 5th class municipality, a municipal circuit court has jurisdiction over it, it’s

considered one of the twelve municipalities comprising the 3rd district of Quezon.

3) At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

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