local goverment cases

8/21/2019 Local Goverment Cases

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[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL., vs. HON. TEOFSTO T.

G!NGONA, JR., ET AL.,

" E # S O N

Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just

recently passed by Conress and sined by the !resident into law, is

constitutionally infirm.

"ndeed, in this !etition for !rohibition with prayer for #emporary

Restrainin Order and !reliminary !rohibitory "njunction, petitioners assail the

$alidity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Con$ertin the %unicipality

of &antiao, "sabela into an "ndependent Component City to be 'nown as the

City of &antiao, mainly because the Act alleedly did not oriinate e(clusi$ely

in the )ouse of Representati$es as mandated by &ection 2*, Article +" of the

-7 Constitution.

Also, petitioners claim that the %unicipality of &antiao has not met the

minimum a$erae annual income re/uired under &ection *0 of the 1ocal

o$ernment Code of -- in order to be con$erted into a component city.

3ndisputed is the followin chronicle of the metamorphosis of )ouse 4ill

No. 7 into Republic Act No. 77205

On April , --6, )4 No. 7, entitled An Act Con$ertin

the %unicipality of &antiao into an "ndependent Component City to be 'nown

as the City of &antiao, was filed in the )ouse of Representati$es with

Representati$e Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included

Representati$es Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, &antiao Respicio andaustino 8y. #he bill was referred to the )ouse Committee on 1ocal

o$ernment and the )ouse Committee on Appropriations on %ay 5, --6.

On %ay -, --6, 9une , --6, No$ember 2, --6, and 8ecember ,

--6, public hearins on )4 No. 7 were conducted by the )ouse

Committee on 1ocal o$ernment. #he committee submitted to the )ouse a

fa$orable report, with amendments, on 8ecember -, --6.

On 8ecember 6, --6, )4 No. 7 was passed by the )ouse of Representati$es on &econd Readin and was appro$ed on #hird Readin

on 8ecember 7, --6. On 9anuary 2, --*, )4 No. 7 was transmitted

to the &enate.


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%eanwhile, a counterpart of )4 No. 7, &enate 4ill No. 2*6, entitled,

An Act Con$ertin the %unicipality of &antiao into an

"ndependent: Component City to be ;nown as the City of &antiao, was filed

in the &enate. "t was introduced by &enator +icente &otto """, as principal

sponsor, on %ay -, --6. #his was just after the )ouse of Representati$eshad conducted its first public hearin on )4 No. 7.

On ebruary 26, --*, or a little less than a month after )4 No. 7 was

transmitted to the &enate, the &enate Committee on 1ocal o$ernment

conducted public hearins on &4 No. 2*6. On %arch , --*, the said

committee submitted Committee Report No. 67 on )4 No. 7, with the

recommendation that it be appro$ed without amendment, ta'in into

consideration the reality that ).4. No. 7 was on all fours with &4 No. 2*6.

&enator )eherson #. Al$arehen a

plebiscite on the Act was held on9uly 6, --*, a reat majority of the

reistered $oters of &antiao $oted in fa$or of the con$ersion of &antiao into

a city.

#he /uestion as to the $alidity of Republic Act No. 7720 hines on the

followin twin issues5 ?"@ >hether or not the "nternal Re$enue Allotments

?"RAs@ are to be included in the computation of the a$erae annual income of

a municipality for purposes of its con$ersion into an independent component

city, and ?""@ >hether or not, considerin that the &enate passed &4 No. 2*6,

its own $ersion of )4 No. 7, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to ha$e

oriinated in the )ouse of Representati$es.

!etitioners claim that &antiao could not /ualify into a component city

because its a$erae annual income for the last two ?2@ consecuti$e years

based on -- constant prices falls below the re/uired annual income of

#wenty %illion !esos ?!20,000,000.00@ for its con$ersion into a city,petitioners ha$in computed &antiaos a$erae annual income in the

followin manner5

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87


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Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94

in!s"

#$%s for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94

%&era'e %nn!al #ncome P13,109,960.47

4y di$idin the total income of &antiao for calendar years -- and --2,

after deductin the "RAs, the a$erae annual income arri$ed at would only be

!6,0-,0.*7 based on the -- constant prices. #hus, petitioners claim

that &antiaos income is far below the aforesaid #wenty %illion !esos

a$erae annual income re/uirement.

#he certification issued by the 4ureau of 1ocal o$ernment inance of the

8epartment of inance, which indicates &antiaos a$erae annual income to

be !20,-7*,.-7, is alleedly not accurate as the "nternal Re$enue

Allotments were not e(cluded from the computation. !etitioners asse$erate

that the "RAs are not actually income but transfers andB or budetary aid from

the national o$ernment and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease,

dependin on factors li'e population, land and e/ual sharin.

"n this reard, we hold that petitioners asse$erations are untenable

because "nternal Re$enue Allotments form part of the income of 1ocal

o$ernment 3nits.

"t is true that for a municipality to be con$erted into a component city, it

must, amon others, ha$e an a$erae annual income of at least #wenty

%illion !esos for the last two ?2@ consecuti$e years based on -- constant

prices. &uch income must be duly certified by the 8epartment of inance.2

Resolution of the contro$ersy reardin compliance by

the %unicipality of &antiao with the aforecited income re/uirement hines on

a correlati$e and conte(tual e(plication of the meanin of internal re$enue

allotments ?"RAs@ vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local o$ernment unit and

the principles of local autonomy and decentrali


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authority, responsibilities and resources. !ower which used to be hihly

centralin resources and assets.

#he practical side to de$elopment throuh a decentraliith

its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local o$ernment unit

must now operate on a much wider scale. %ore e(tensi$e operations, in turn,

entail more e(penses. 3nderstandably, the $estin of duty, responsibility and

accountability in e$ery local o$ernment unit is accompanied with a pro$ision

for reasonably ade/uate resources to dischare its powers and effecti$ely

carry out its functions.7 A$ailment of such resources is effectuated throuh the

$estin in e$ery local o$ernment unit of ?@ the riht to create and broaden itsown source of re$enue ?2@ the right to be allocated a just share in national

taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and

?6@ the riht to be i$en its e/uitable share in the proceeds of the utili


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urthermore, &ection *0 ?c@ of the 1ocal o$ernment Code pro$ides that

the a$erae annual income shall include the income accruin to the eneral

fund, e(clusi$e of special funds, transfers, and nonErecurrin income. #o

reiterate, "RAs are a reular, recurrin item of income nil is there a basis, too,

to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since "RAs ha$e a technicaldefinition and meanin all its own as used in the 1ocal o$ernment Code that

une/ui$ocally ma'es it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to

when the Code spea's of fundin support from the national o$ernment, its

instrumentalities and o$ernmentEownedEorEcontrolled corporations.2

#hus, 8epartment of inance Order No. 6-6 6 correctly encapsuli


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7, --6 and transmitted to the &enate on 9anuary 2, --* a little less than

a month thereafter, or on ebruary 26, --*, the &enate Committee on 1ocal

o$ernment conducted public hearins on &4 No. 2*6. Clearly, the &enate

held in abeyance any action on &4 No. 2*6 until it recei$ed )4 No. 7,

already appro$ed on the #hird Readin, from the )ouse of Representati$es.#he filin in the &enate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill

from the )ouse, does not contra$ene the constitutional re/uirement that a bill

of local application should oriinate in the )ouse of Representati$es, for as

lon as the &enate does not act thereupon until it recei$es the )ouse bill.

>e ha$e already addressed this issue in the case of

#olentino vs. &ecretary of inance.7 #here, on the matter of the =(panded

+alue Added #a( ?=+A#@ 1aw, which, as a re$enue bill, is nonetheless

constitutionally re/uired to oriinate e(clusi$ely in the )ouse of Representati$es, we e(plained5

To e'in *it+, it is not t+e la*!t t+e re&en!e ill*+ic+ is re-!ired t+e

/onstit!tion to ori'inate ecl!si&el in t+e o!se of $epresentati&es. #t is important

to emp+asie t+is, eca!se a ill ori'inatin' in t+e o!se ma !nder'o s!c+ etensi&e

c+an'es in t+e enate t+at t+e res!lt ma e a re*ritin' of t+e *+ole. as a res!lt

of t+e enate action, a distinct ill ma e prod!ced. To insist t+at a re&en!e stat!te

and not onl t+e ill *+ic+ initiated t+e le'islati&e process c!lminatin' in t+e

enactment of t+e la*m!st s!stantiall e t+e same as t+e o!se ill *o!ld e to

den t+e enates po*er not onl to conc!r *it+ amendments !t also to propose

amendments. #t *o!ld e to &iolate t+e coe-!alit of le'islati&e po*er of t+e t*o

+o!ses of /on'ress and in fact mae t+e o!se s!perior to t+e enate.

((( ((( (((

#t is insisted, +o*e&er, t+at . o. 1630 *as passed not in s!stit!tion of . o. 11197

!t of anot+er enate ill (. o. 1129) earlier filed and t+at *+at t+e enate did *as

merel to tae . o. 11197 into consideration in enactin' . o. 1630. T+ere is

reall no difference et*een t+e enate preser&in' . o. 11197 !p to t+e enactin'

cla!se and t+en *ritin' its o*n &ersion follo*in' t+e enactin' cla!se (*+ic+, it *o!ld

seem petitioners admit is an amendment s!stit!tion), and, on t+e ot+er +and,

separatel presentin' a ill of its o*n on t+e same s!ect matter. #n eit+er case t+e

res!lt are t*o ills on t+e same s!ect.

#ndeed, *+at t+e /onstit!tion simpl means is t+at t+e initiati&e for filin' re&en!e,

tariff, or ta ills, ills a!t+oriin' an increase of t+e p!lic det, pri&ate ills and

ills of local application m!st come from t+e o!se of $epresentati&es on t+e t+eor

t+at, elected as t+e are from t+e districts, t+e memers of t+e o!se can e epected

to e more sensiti&e to t+e local needs and prolems. n t+e ot+er +and, t+e senators,

*+o are elected at lar'e, are epected to approac+ t+e same prolems from t+e

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national perspecti&e. ot+ &ie*s are t+ere made to ear on t+e enactment of s!c+

la*s.

or does t+e /onstit!tion pro+iit t+e filin' in t+e enate of a s!stit!te ill in

anticipation of its receipt of t+e ill from t+e o!se, so lon' as action t+e enate asa od is *it++eld pendin' receipt of t+e o!se ill. 18

"t is a wellEentrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of e$ery law lies

the presumption of constitutionality.- Conse/uently, for RA No. 7720 to be

nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and une/ui$ocal breach of the

Constitution, not merely a doubtful and e/ui$ocal one in other words, the

rounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. 20#hose who

petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully

establish the basis that will justify such a declaration otherwise, their petitionmust fail. #a'in into consideration the justification of our stand on the

immediately precedin round raised by petitioners to challene the

constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holdin that

petitioners ha$e failed to o$ercome the presumption. #he dismissal of this

petition is, therefore, ine$itable.

$HEREFORE, the instant petition is 8"&%"&&=8 for lac' of merit with

costs aainst petitioners.

SO OR"ERE".

G.R. No. 11109% Ju&y '0, 199(

)A*OR +ALO +. )AGTAJAS - THE #T* OF #AGA*AN "E ORO, petitioners,

$s.

+R*#E +RO+ERTES #OR+ORATON, N#. - +HL++NE A)!SE)ENT AN" GA)NG

#OR+ORATON,respondents.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/118303.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/118303.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/118303.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/118303.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/118303.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/118303.htm#_edn20


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#here was instant opposition when !ACOR announced the openin of a casino in Caayan de Oro

City. Ci$ic orani"N #O 4= 3&=8 "#& !R=%"&=& OR !OR#"ON

#)=R=O OR #)= O!=RA#"ON O CA&"NO.

4= "# OR8A"N=8 by the &anunian !anlunsod of the City of Caayan de Oro, in

session assembled that5

&ec. . I #hat pursuant to the policy of the city bannin the operation of casino

within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person,

partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.

&ec. 2. I #hat it shall be a $iolation of e(istin business permit by any persons,

partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or

allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other amblin acti$ities.

&ec. 6. I !=NA1#"=&. I Any $iolation of such e(istin business permit as defined

in the precedin section shall suffer the followin penalties, to wit5

a@ &uspension of the business permit for si(ty ?0@

days for the first offense and a fine of !,000.00Jday

b@ &uspension of the business permit for &i( ?@months for the second offense, and a fine of

!6,000.00Jday

c@ !ermanent re$ocation of the business permit and

imprisonment of One ?@ year, for the third and

subse/uent offenses.

&ec. *. I #his Ordinance shall ta'e effect ten ?0@ days from publication thereof.

Nor was this all. On 9anuary *, --6, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 667E-6 readin as follows5

OR8"NANC= NO. 667E-6

AN OR8"NANC= !RO)"4"#"N #)= O!=RA#"ON O CA&"NO AN8 !RO+"8"N

!=NA1#H OR +"O1A#"ON #)=R=OR.


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>)=R=A&, the City Council established a policy as early as --0 aainst CA&"NO

under its Resolution No. 22-

>)=R=A&, on October *, --2, the City Council passed another Resolution No.

276, reiteratin its policy aainst the establishment of CA&"NO

>)=R=A&, subse/uently, thereafter, it li'ewise passed Ordinance No. 666,

prohibitin the issuance of 4usiness !ermit and to cancel e(istin 4usiness !ermit to

any establishment for the usin and allowin to be used its premises or portion

thereof for the operation of CA&"NO

>)=R=A&, under Art. 6, section *, No. ?*@, sub pararaph +" of the 1ocal

o$ernment Code of -- ?Rep. Act 70@ and under Art. --, No. ?*@, !araraph +"

of the implementin rules of the 1ocal o$ernment Code, the City Council as the

1eislati$e 4ody shall enact measure to suppress any acti$ity inimical to public

morals and eneral welfare of the people andJor reulate or prohibit such acti$ity

pertainin to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moralwelfare of the community

NO> #)=R=OR=,

4= "# OR8A"N=8 by the City Council in session duly assembled that5

&ec. . I #he operation of amblin CA&"NO in the City of Caayan de Oro is

hereby prohibited.

&ec. 2. I Any $iolation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the followin penalties5

a@ Administrati$e fine of !,000.00 shall be imposed aainst the proprietor,

partnership or corporation underta'in the operation, conduct, maintenance of

amblin CA&"NO in the City and closure thereof

b@ "mprisonment of not less than si( ?@ months nor more than one ?@ year or a fine

in the amount of !,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court aainst the manaer,

super$isor, andJor any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and

maintenance of amblin CA&"NO.

&ec. 6. I #his Ordinance shall ta'e effect ten ?0@ days after its publication in a local

newspaper of eneral circulation.

!ryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by !ACOR as

inter$enor and supplemental petitioner. #heir challene succeeded. On %arch 6, --6, the Court of

Appeals declared the ordinances in$alid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their

enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on 9uly 6, --6. '

Caayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for re$iew under Rule * of the

Rules of Court. 3 #hey a$er that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holdin that5

. 3nder e(istin laws, the &anunian !anlunsod of the City of Caayan de Oro

does not ha$e the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation ofa !ACOR amblin casino within the CityFs territorial limits.

2. #he phrase Kamblin and other prohibited ames of chanceK found in &ec. *,

par. ?a@, subEpar. ?@ I ?$@ of R.A. 70 could only mean Killeal amblin.K

6. #he /uestioned Ordinances in effect annul !.8. - and are therefore in$alid on

that point.


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*. #he /uestioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to coc'fihtin

and are therefore in$alid on that point.

. #he /uestioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the eneral

powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws

or policy of the &tate.

. "t had no option but to follow the rulin in the case of asco, et al. v.

!A"#$R, .R. No. -*-, %ay *, --, -7 &CRA 6 in disposin of the issues

presented in this present case.

!ACOR is a corporation created directly by !.8. - to help centrali


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and such other acti$ities inimical to the welfare and

morals of the inhabitants of the city

#his section also authori


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?c@ *he general elfare %rovisions in this #ode shall be liberall' inter%reted to give

more %oers to local government units in acceleratin economic de$elopment and

upradin the /uality of life for the people in the community . . . ?=mphasis

supplied.@

inally, the petitioners also attac' amblin as intrinsically harmful and cite $arious pro$isions of theConstitution and se$eral decisions of this Court e(pressi$e of the eneral and official disapprobation

of the $ice. #hey in$o'e the &tate policies on the family and the proper upbrinin of the youth and,

as miht be e(pected, call attention to the old case of &.+. v. +alaveria, % which sustained a municipal

ordinance prohibitin the playin of %anguingue. #he petitioners decry the immorality of amblin. #hey

also impun the wisdom of !.8. - ?which they describe as Ka martial law instrumentK@ in creatin

!ACOR and authorihile it is enerally

considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothin in the Constitution cateorically

proscribin or penaliell has it been said

that courts do not sit to resol$e the merits of conflictin theories. 8 #hat is the preroati$e of the

political departments. "t is settled that /uestions reardin the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes

are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resol$ed only by the leislati$e and e(ecuti$e departments,

to which the function belons in our scheme of o$ernment. #hat function is e(clusi$e. >hiche$er way

these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will

ultimately jude their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

#he only /uestion we can and shall resol$e in this petition is the $alidity of Ordinance No. 66 and

Ordinance No. 667E-6 as enacted by the &anunian !anlunsod of Caayan de Oro City. And

we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own con$ictions on the propriety

of amblin.

#he tests of a $alid ordinance are well established. A lon line of decisions 9 has held that to be $alid,

an ordinance must conform to the followin substanti$e re/uirements5

@ "t must not contra$ene the constitution or any statute.

2@ "t must not be unfair or oppressi$e.

6@ "t must not be partial or discriminatory.

*@ "t must not prohibit but may reulate trade.

@ "t must be eneral and consistent with public policy.

@ "t must not be unreasonable.

>e bein by obser$in that under &ec. * of the 1ocal o$ernment Code, local o$ernment units

are authori


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to, or i$en the same meanin of, words with which it is associated. Accordinly, we conclude that

since the word KamblinK is associated with Kand other prohibited ames of chance,K the word

should be read as referrin to only illeal amblin which, li'e the other

prohibited ames of chance,

must be pre$ented or suppressed.

>e could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem /uite conclusi$ely. 4ut we willnot. #he $iorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Caayan de Oro City, and

the earnestness of their ad$ocacy, deser$e more than short shrift from this Court.

#he apparent flaw in the ordinances in /uestion is that they contra$ene !.8. - and the public

policy embodied therein insofar as they pre$ent !ACOR from e(ercisin the power conferred on it

to operate a casino in Caayan de Oro City. #he petitioners ha$e an inenious answer to this

misi$in. #hey deny that it is the ordinances that ha$e chaned !.8. - for an ordinance

admittedly cannot pre$ail aainst a statute. #heir theory is that the chane has been made by the

1ocal o$ernment Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawma'in authority. "n their

$iew, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely Kmodified %ro tantoK in the

sense that !ACOR cannot now operate a casino o$er the objection of the local o$ernment unitconcerned. #his modification of !.8. - by the 1ocal o$ernment Code is permissible because

one law can chane or repeal another law.

"t seems to us that the petitioners are playin with words. >hile insistin that the decree has only

been Kmodified %ro tanto,K they are actually aruin that it is already dead, repealed and useless for

all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn !ACOR of all power to centrali


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?e@ #he followin pro$isions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are

inconsistent with the pro$isions of this Code5 &ections 2, , and 2- of !residential

8ecree No. 70* &ections 2 of !residential 8ecree No. 7, as amended &ections

2, 6, , 7, , -, 70, 7, 72, 76, and 7* of !residential 8ecree No. *6, as

amended and &ection of !residential 8ecree No. -72, as amended, and

?f@ All eneral and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, e(ecuti$e orders,

proclamations and administrati$e reulations, or part or parts thereof which are

inconsistent with any of the pro$isions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified

accordinly.

urthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lihtly presumed in the absence of a

clear and unmista'able showin of such intention. "n ichauco #o. v. A%ostol , 10 this Court

e(plained5

#he cases relatin to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the

assumption that if the act of later date clearly re$eals an intention on the part of thelawma'in power to abroate the prior law, this intention must be i$en effect but

there must always be a sufficient re$elation of this intention, and it has become an

unbendin rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will

not be imputed to the 1eislature when it appears that the two statutes, or pro$isions,

with reference to which the /uestion arises bear to each other the relation of eneral

to special.

#here is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of !.8. -. On the contrary, as the pri$ate

respondent points out, !ACOR is mentioned as the source of fundin in two later enactments of

Conress, to wit, R.A. 760-, creatin a 4oard of Claims under the 8epartment of 9ustice for the

benefit of $ictims of unjust punishment or detention or of $iolent crimes, and R.A. 7*, pro$idin formeasures for the solution of the power crisis. !ACOR re$enues are tapped by these two statutes.

#his would show that the !ACOR charter has not been repealed by the 1ocal o$ernment Code

but has in fact been impro$ed as it were to ma'e the entity more responsi$e to the fiscal problems of

the o$ernment.

"t is a canon of leal hermeneutics that instead of pittin one statute aainst another in an ine$itably

destructi$e confrontation, courts must e(ert e$ery effort to reconcile them, rememberin that both

laws deser$e a becomin respect as the handiwor' of a coordinate branch of the o$ernment. On

the assumption of a conflict between !.8. - and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one

and annul the other but to i$e effect to both by harmoni


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e(pressed in the decree allowin the playin of certain ames of chance despite the prohibition of

amblin in eneral.

#he rationale of the re/uirement that the ordinances should not contra$ene a statute is ob$ious.

%unicipal o$ernments are only aents of the national o$ernment. 1ocal councils e(ercise only

deleated leislati$e powers conferred on them by Conress as the national lawma'in body. #hedeleate cannot be superior to the principal or e(ercise powers hiher than those of the latter. "t is a

heresy to suest that the local o$ernment units can undo the acts of Conress, from which they

ha$e deri$ed their power in the first place, and neate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

%unicipal corporations owe their oriin to, and deri$e their powers and rihts wholly

from the leislature. "t breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot

e(ist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abride and control.

3nless there is some constitutional limitation on the riht, the leislature miht, by a

sinle act, and if we can suppose it capable of so reat a folly and so reat a wron,

sweep from e(istence all of the municipal corporations in the &tate, and the

corporation could not pre$ent it. >e 'now of no limitation on the riht so far as to thecorporation themsel$es are concerned. #hey are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at

will of the leislature. 11

#his basic relationship between the national leislature and the local o$ernment units has not been

enfeebled by the new pro$isions in the Constitution strenthenin the policy of local autonomy.

>ithout meanin to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Conress retains control of the

local o$ernment units althouh in sinificantly reduced deree now than under our pre$ious

Constitutions. #he power to create still includes the power to destroy. #he power to rant still

includes the power to withhold or recall. #rue, there are certain notable inno$ations in the

Constitution, li'e the direct conferment on the local o$ernment units of the power to ta(, 1'which

cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. 4y and lare, howe$er, the national leislature is still theprincipal of the local o$ernment units, which cannot defy its will or modify or $iolate it.

#he Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their

constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Caayan de Oro City will be endanered by

the openin of the casino. >e share the $iew that Kthe hope of lare or easy ain, obtained without

special effort, turns the head of the wor'manK 13 and that Khabitual amblin is a cause of laashinton called amblin Kthe child of

a$arice, the brother of ini/uity and the father of mischief.K Ne$ertheless, we must reconi


16/68

/arvasa, #.0., 1eliciano, idin, Regalado, Romero, ellosillo, 2elo, 3uiason, !uno, 4itug,

a%unan and 2endoa, 00., concur.

S/ara/ O2n2on

+A"LLA, J., concurrin5

" concur with the majority holdin that the city ordinances in /uestion cannot modify much less

repeal !ACORFs eneral authority to establish and maintain amblin casinos anywhere in the!hilippines under !residential 8ecree No. -.

"n asco v. !hili%%ine Amusement and "aming #or%oration (!A"#$R), -7 &CRA 2, " stated in a

separate opinion that5

. . . " aree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and

reulation of the entire acti$ity 'nown as amblin properly pertain to Kstate %olic'6 . "t

is, therefore, the political departments of o$ernment, namely, the leislati$e and the

e(ecuti$e that should decide on what o$ernment should do in the entire area of

amblin, and assume full res%onsibilit' to the people for such policy.K ?=mphasis

supplied@

)owe$er, despite the legalit' of the openin and operation of a casino in Caayan de Oro City by

respondent !ACOR, " wish to reiterate my $iew that amblin in any form runs counter to the

o$ernmentFs own efforts to reEestablish and resurrect the ilipino moral character which is enerally

percei$ed to be in a state of continuin erosion.

"t is in the liht of this alarmin perspecti$e that " call upon o$ernment to carefully weih the

ad$antaes and disad$antaes of settin up more amblin facilities in the country.

#hat the !ACOR contributes reatly to the coffers of the o$ernment is not enouh reason for

settin up more amblin casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help impro$e, but will cause afurther deterioration in the ilipino moral character.

"t is worth rememberin in this reard that, @ what is leal is not always moral and 2@ the ends do

not always justify the means.

As in asco, " can easily $isuali


17/68

"AV"E, JR., J., concurrin5

>hile " concur in part with the majority, " wish, howe$er, to e(press my $iews on certain aspects of

this case.

".

"t must at once be noted that pri$ate respondent !ryce !roperties Corporation ?!RHC=@ directly filed

with the Court of Appeals its soEcalled petition for %rohibition, thereby in$o'in the said courtFs

oriinal jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under &ection -?@ of 4.!. 4l. 2-. As " see it,

howe$er, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief5 to declare null and

unconstitutional I for, inter alia, ha$in been enacted without or in e(cess of jurisdiction, for

impairin the obliation of contracts, and for bein inconsistent with public policy I the challened

ordinances enacted by the +angguniang !anglungsod of the City of Caayan de Oro. #he

inter$ention therein of public respondent !hilippine Amusement and amin Corporation ?!ACOR@

further underscores the Kdeclaratory reliefK nature of the action. !ACOR assails the ordinances for

bein contrary to the nonEimpairment and e/ual protection clauses of the Constitution, $iolati$e ofthe 1ocal o$ernment Code, and aainst the &tateFs national policy declared in !.8. No. -.

Accordinly, the Court of Appeals does not ha$e jurisdiction o$er the nature of the action. =$en

assumin arguendo that the case is one for %rohibition, then, under this CourtFs established policy

relati$e to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should ha$e been filed with the Reional #rial Court of

Caayan de Oro City. " find no special or compellin reason why it was not filed with the said court. "

do not wish to entertain the thouht that !RHC= doubted a fa$orable $erdict therefrom, in which

case the filin of the petition with the Court of Appeals may ha$e been impelled by tactical

considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would ha$e been in order

pursuant to our decisions in !eo%le vs. #uaresma ?72 &CRA *, M--:@ and 7efensor-+antiago

vs. 4asue ?27 &CRA 66 M--6:@. "n #uaresma, this Court stated5

A last word. #his courtFs oriinal jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari ?as well as

prohibition,mandamus, uo arranto, habeas cor%us and injunction@ is not e(clusi$e.

"t is shared by this Court with Reional #rial Courts ?formerly Courts of irst

"nstance@, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respecti$e

reions. "t is also shared by this court, and by the Reional #rial Court, with the Court

of Appeals ?formerly, "ntermediate Appellate Court@, althouh prior to the effecti$ity

of atas !ambansa ilang 89: on Auust *, -, the latterFs competence to issue

the e(traordinary writs was restricted by those Kin aid of its appellate jurisdiction.K

#his concurrence of jurisdiction is not, howe$er, to be ta'en as accordin to parties

see'in any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to

which application therefor will be directed. #here is after all a hierarchy of courts.#hat hierarchy is determinati$e of the re$enue of appeals, and should also ser$e as a

eneral determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the e(traordinary writs.

A becomin reard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for

the issuance of e(traordinary writs aainst first le$el ?KinferiorK@ courts should be filed

with the Reional #rial Court, and those aainst the latter, with the Court of Appeals.

A direct in$ocation of the &upreme CourtFs oriinal jurisdiction to issue these writs

should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,

clearly and specifically set out in the petition. #his is established policy. "t is a policy

that is necessary to pre$ent inordinate demands upon the CourtFs time and attention

which are better de$oted to those matters within its e(clusi$e jurisdiction, and to

pre$ent further o$erEcrowdin of the CourtFs doc'et. "ndeed, the remo$al of therestriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this reard, su%ra I resultin

from the deletion of the /ualifyin phrase, Kin aid of its appellate jurisdictionK I was

e$idently intended precisely to relie$e this Court %ro tanto of the burden of dealin

with applications for e(traordinary writs which, but for the e(pansion of the Appellate

CourtFs correspondin jurisdiction, would ha$e had to be filed with it. ?citations

omitted@


18/68

And in 4asue , this Court said5

One final obser$ation. >e discern in the proceedins in this case a propensity on the

part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litiants

who initiate recourses before us, to disreard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial

system by see'in relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same isa$ailable in the lower courts in the e(ercise of their oriinal or concurrent jurisdiction,

or is e$en mandated by law to be souht therein. #his practice must be stopped, not

only because of the imposition upon the pre$ious time of this Court but also because

of the ine$itable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the

case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper

forum under the rules of procedure, or as better e/uipped to resol$e the issues since

this Court is not a trier of facts. >e, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this

Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be

obtained in the appropriate courts or where e(ceptional and compellin

circumstances justify a$ailment of a remedy within and callin for the e(ercise of our

primary jurisdiction.

"".

#he challened ordinances are ?a@ Ordinance No. 666 entitled, K An $rdinance !rohibiting the

Issuance of usiness !ermit and #anceling xisting usiness !ermit *o An' stablishment for the

&sing and Alloing to be &sed Its !remises or !ortion *hereof for the $%eration of #asino ,K and ?b@

Ordinance No. 667E-6 entitled, K An $rdinance !rohibiting the $%eration of #asino and !roviding

!enalt' for 4iolation *herefor

.K #hey were enacted to implement Resolution No. 22- entitled,

KResolution 7eclaring As a 2atter of !olic' to !rohibit andithin their respecti$e territorial

jurisdictions, local o$ernment units shall ensure and support, amon other thins,

the preser$ation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the

riht of the people to a balanced ecoloy, encourae and support the de$elopment of

appropriate and selfEreliant scientific and technoloical capabilities, impro$e public

morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment

amon their residents, maintain peace and order, and preser$e the comfort and

con$enience of their inhabitants.

#he issue that necessarily arises is whether in rantin local o$ernments ?such as the City of

Caayan de Oro@ the abo$e powers and functions, the 1ocal o$ernment Code has, %ro tanto,repealed !.8. No. - insofar as !ACORFs eneral authority to establish and maintain amblin

casinos anywhere in the !hilippines is concerned.

" join the majority in holdin that the ordinances cannot repeal !.8. No. -.

""".


19/68

#he nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challened ordinances as unconstitutional primarily

because it is in contra$ention to !.8. No. - is unwarranted. A contra$ention of a law is not

necessarily a contra$ention of the constitution. "n any case, the ordinances can still stand e$en if

they be conceded as offendin !.8. No. -. #hey can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do.

&o reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applyin to !ACOR.

"+.

rom the pleadins, it is ob$ious that the o$ernment and the people of Caayan de Oro City are,

for ob$ious reasons, stronly aainst the openin of the amblin casino in their city. amblin,

e$en if leali


20/68

"n the present case, it is my considered $iew that the national o$ernment ?throuh !ACOR@

should reEe(amine and reEe$aluate its decision of im%osing the amblin casino on the residents of

Caayan de Oro City for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is $ery much aainst it,

and aain the /uestion must be seriously deliberated5 will the prospects of re$enue to be realihile " concur in part with the majority, " wish, howe$er, to e(press my $iews on certain aspects of

this case.

".

"t must at once be noted that pri$ate respondent !ryce !roperties Corporation ?!RHC=@ directly filed

with the Court of Appeals its soEcalled petition for %rohibition, thereby in$o'in the said courtFs

oriinal jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under &ection -?@ of 4.!. 4l. 2-. As " see it,

howe$er, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief5 to declare null andunconstitutional I for, inter alia, ha$in been enacted without or in e(cess of jurisdiction, for

impairin the obliation of contracts, and for bein inconsistent with public policy I the challened

ordinances enacted by the &anunian !anlunsod of the City of Caayan de Oro. #he

inter$ention therein of public respondent !hilippine Amusement and amin Corporation ?!ACOR@

further underscores the Kdeclaratory reliefK nature of the action. !ACOR assails the ordinances for

bein contrary to the nonEimpairment and e/ual protection clauses of the Constitution, $iolati$e of

the 1ocal o$ernment Code, and aainst the &tateFs national policy declared in !.8. No. -.

Accordinly, the Court of Appeals does not ha$e jurisdiction o$er the nature of the action. =$en

assumin arguendo that the case is one for %rohibition, then, under this CourtFs established policy

relati$e to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should ha$e been filed with the Reional #rial Court of

Caayan de Oro City. " find no special or compellin reason why it was not filed with the said court. "do not wish to entertain the thouht that !RHC= doubted a fa$orable $erdict therefrom, in which

case the filin of the petition with the Court of Appeals may ha$e been impelled by tactical

considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would ha$e been in order

pursuant to our decisions in !eo%le vs. #uaresma ?72 &CRA *, M--:@ and 7efensor-+antiago

vs. 4asue ?27 &CRA 66 M--6:@. "n #uaresma, this Court stated5

A last word. #his courtFs oriinal jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari ?as well as

prohibition,mandamus, uo arranto, habeas cor%us and injunction@ is not e(clusi$e.

"t is shared by this Court with Reional #rial Courts ?formerly Courts of irst

"nstance@, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respecti$e

reions. "t is also shared by this court, and by the Reional #rial Court, with the Courtof Appeals ?formerly, "ntermediate Appellate Court@, althouh prior to the effecti$ity

of atas !ambansa ilang 89: on Auust *, -, the latterFs competence to issue

the e(traordinary writs was restricted by those Kin aid of its appellate jurisdiction.K

#his concurrence of jurisdiction is not, howe$er, to be ta'en as accordin to parties

see'in any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to

which application therefor will be directed. #here is after all a hierarchy of courts.

#hat hierarchy is determinati$e of the re$enue of appeals, and should also ser$e as a

eneral determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the e(traordinary writs.

A becomin reard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for

the issuance of e(traordinary writs aainst first le$el ?KinferiorK@ courts should be filed

with the Reional #rial Court, and those aainst the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct in$ocation of the &upreme CourtFs oriinal jurisdiction to issue these writs

should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,

clearly and specifically set out in the petition. #his is established policy. "t is a policy

that is necessary to pre$ent inordinate demands upon the CourtFs time and attention

which are better de$oted to those matters within its e(clusi$e jurisdiction, and to

pre$ent further o$erEcrowdin of the CourtFs doc'et. "ndeed, the remo$al of the

restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this reard, su%ra I resultin


21/68

from the deletion of the /ualifyin phrase, Kin aid of its appellate jurisdictionK I was

e$idently intended precisely to relie$e this Court %ro tanto of the burden of dealin

with applications for e(traordinary writs which, but for the e(pansion of the Appellate

CourtFs correspondin jurisdiction, would ha$e had to be filed with it. ?citations

omitted@

And in 4asue , this Court said5

One final obser$ation. >e discern in the proceedins in this case a propensity on the

part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litiants

who initiate recourses before us, to disreard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial

system by see'in relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is

a$ailable in the lower courts in the e(ercise of their oriinal or concurrent jurisdiction,

or is e$en mandated by law to be souht therein. #his practice must be stopped, not

only because of the imposition upon the pre$ious time of this Court but also because

of the ine$itable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the

case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the properforum under the rules of procedure, or as better e/uipped to resol$e the issues since

this Court is not a trier of facts. >e, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this

Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be

obtained in the appropriate courts or where e(ceptional and compellin

circumstances justify a$ailment of a remedy within and callin for the e(ercise of our

primary jurisdiction.

"".

#he challened ordinances are ?a@ Ordinance No. 666 entitled, K An $rdinance !rohibiting the

Issuance of usiness !ermit and #anceling xisting usiness !ermit *o An' stablishment for the&sing and Alloing to be &sed Its !remises or !ortion *hereof for the $%eration of #asino ,K and ?b@

Ordinance No. 667E-6 entitled, K An $rdinance !rohibiting the $%eration of #asino and !roviding

!enalt' for 4iolation *herefor

.K #hey were enacted to implement Resolution No. 22- entitled,

KResolution 7eclaring As a 2atter of !olic' to !rohibit andithin their respecti$e territorial

jurisdictions, local o$ernment units shall ensure and support, amon other thins,

the preser$ation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the

riht of the people to a balanced ecoloy, encourae and support the de$elopment of

appropriate and selfEreliant scientific and technoloical capabilities, impro$e publicmorals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment

amon their residents, maintain peace and order, and preser$e the comfort and

con$enience of their inhabitants.

#he issue that necessarily arises is whether in rantin local o$ernments ?such as the City of

Caayan de Oro@ the abo$e powers and functions, the 1ocal o$ernment Code has, %ro tanto,


22/68

repealed !.8. No. - insofar as !ACORFs eneral authority to establish and maintain amblin

casinos anywhere in the !hilippines is concerned.

" join the majority in holdin that the ordinances cannot repeal !.8. No. -.

""".

#he nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challened ordinances as unconstitutional primarily

because it is in contra$ention to !.8. No. - is unwarranted. A contra$ention of a law is not

necessarily a contra$ention of the constitution. "n any case, the ordinances can still stand e$en if

they be conceded as offendin !.8. No. -. #hey can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do.

&o reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applyin to !ACOR.

"+.

rom the pleadins, it is ob$ious that the o$ernment and the people of Caayan de Oro City are,

for ob$ious reasons, stronly aainst the openin of the amblin casino in their city. amblin,e$en if leali


23/68

#he procedural issue is whether petitioners, as ta(payers and practicin lawyers ?petitioner 4ascobein also the Chairman of the Committee on 1aws of the City Council of %anila@, can /uestion andsee' the annulment of !8 - on the alleed rounds mentioned abo$e.

#he !hilippine Amusements and amin Corporation ?!ACOR@ was created by $irtue of !.8.07EA dated 9anuary , -77 and was ranted a franchise under !.8. 07E4 also dated 9anuary ,

-77 Kto establish, operate and maintain amblin casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the !hilippines.K "ts operation was oriinally conducted in the well 'nown floatincasino K!hilippine #ourist.K #he operation was considered a success for it pro$ed to be a potentialsource of re$enue to fund infrastructure and socioEeconomic projects, thus, !.8. 6-- was passedon 9une 2, -7 for !ACOR to fully attain this objecti$e.

&ubse/uently, on 9uly , -6, !ACOR was created under !.8. - to enable the o$ernmentto reulate and centrali


24/68

As >e enter upon the tas' of passin on the $alidity of an act of a coEe/ual and coordinate branch of the o$ernment >e need not be reminded of the timeEhonored principle, deeply inrained in our

jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be $alid. =$ery presumption must be induled in fa$or of its constitutionality. #his is not to say that >e approach Our tas' with diffidence or timidity. >here itis clear that the leislature or the e(ecuti$e for that matter, has o$erEstepped the limits of its authorityunder the constitution, >e should not hesitate to wield the a(e and let it fall hea$ily, as fall it must, on

the offendin statute ?1oith particular reard to the re/uirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us,>e hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and inter$enors because each of themhas sustained or is in daner of sustainin an immediate injury as a result of the acts ormeasures complained of. And e$en if, strictly spea'in they are not co$ered by the definition,it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to wai$e the re/uirement and so remo$e theimpediment to its addressin and resol$in the serious constitutional /uestions raised.

"n the first =merency !owers Cases, ordinary citie ha$esince then applied the e(ception in many other cases. ?Association of &mall 1andowners inthe !hilippines, "nc. $. &ec. of Ararian Reform, 7 &CRA 6*6@.

)a$in disposed of the procedural issue, >e will now discuss the substanti$e issues raised.

amblin in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is enerally prohibited. 4ut the prohibition ofamblin does not mean that the o$ernment cannot reulate it in the e(ercise of its police power.

#he concept of police power is wellEestablished in this jurisdiction. "t has been defined as the Kstateauthority to enact leislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promotethe eneral welfare.K ?=du $. =ricta, 6 &CRA *, *7@ As defined, it consists of ?@ an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, ?2@ in order to foster the common ood. "t is not capable of an e(actdefinition but has been, purposely, $eiled in eneral terms to underscore its allEcomprehensi$eembrace. ?!hilippine Association of &er$ice =(porters, "nc. $. 8rilon, 6 &CRA 6@.


25/68

"ts scope, e$erEe(pandin to meet the e(iencies of the times, e$en to anticipate the future where itcould be done, pro$ides enouh room for an efficient and fle(ible response to conditions andcircumstances thus assumin the reatest benefits. ?=du $. =ricta, su%ra@

"t finds no specific Constitutional rant for the plain reason that it does not owe its oriin to thecharter. Alon with the ta(in power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the $ery fact of statehood

and so$ereinty. "t is a fundamental attribute of o$ernment that has enabled it to perform the most$ital functions of o$ernance. %arshall, to whom the e(pression has been credited, refers to itsuccinctly as the plenary power of the state Kto o$ern its citihat was the reason behind the enactment of !.8. -L

!.8. - was enacted pursuant to the policy of the o$ernment to Kreulate and centrali


26/68

or permitsK was withdrawn by !.8. No. 77 and was $ested e(clusi$ely on the National o$ernment,thus5

&ec. . Any pro$ision of law to the contrary notwithstandin, the authority of chartered citiesand other local o$ernments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate,maintain and establish horse and do race trac's, jaiEalai and other forms of amblin is

hereby re$o'ed.

&ec. 2. )ereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dorace trac's, jaiEalai and other forms of amblin shall be issued by the national o$ernmentupon proper application and $erification of the /ualification of the applicant . . .

#herefore, only the National o$ernment has the power to issue Klicenses or permitsK for theoperation of amblin. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is aconse/uence of the issuance of Klicenses or permitsK is no loner $ested in the City of %anila.

?d@ 1ocal o$ernments ha$e no power to ta( instrumentalities of the National o$ernment. !ACORis a o$ernment owned or controlled corporation with an oriinal charter, !8 -. All of its shares of

stoc's are owned by the National o$ernment. "n addition to its corporate powers ?&ec. 6, #itle "",!8 -@ it also e(ercises reulatory powers thus5

&ec. -. Regulator' !oer . I #he Corporation shall maintain a Reistry of the affiliatedentities, and shall e(ercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities $ested in the&ecurities and =(chane Commission o$er such affiliatin entities mentioned under theprecedin section, includin, but not limited to amendments of Articles of "ncorporation and4yE1aws, chanes in corporate term, structure, capitaliheat6, * 1 =d. 7-@

#his doctrine emanates from the KsupremacyK of the National o$ernment o$er local o$ernments.

9ustice )olmes, spea'in for the &upreme Court, made reference to the entire absence ofpower on the part of the &tates to touch, in that way ?ta(ation@ at least, the instrumentalitiesof the 3nited &tates ?9ohnson $. %aryland, 2* 3& @ and it can be areed that no state or

%olitical subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentalit' in such a a' as to %revent it fromconsummating its federal res%onsibilities, or even to seriousl' burden it in theaccom%lishment of them. ?Antieau, %odern Constitutional 1aw, +ol. 2, p. *0, emphasissupplied@

Otherwise, mere creatures of the &tate can defeat National policies thru e(termination of what localauthorities may percei$e to be undesirable acti$ities or enterprise usin the power to ta( as Ka toolfor reulationK ?3.&. $. &anche


27/68

congress ma' %rovide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. &uch ta(es, feesand chares shall accrue e(clusi$ely to the local o$ernment. ?emphasis supplied@

#he power of local o$ernment to Kimpose ta(es and feesK is always subject to KlimitationsK whichConress may pro$ide by law. &ince !8 - remains an Koperati$eK law until Kamended, repealedor re$o'edK ?&ec. 6, Art. G+""", -7 Constitution@, its Ke(emption clauseK remains as an e(ception to

the e(ercise of the power of local o$ernments to impose ta(es and fees. "t cannot therefore be$iolati$e but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

4esides, the principle of local autonomy under the -7 Constitution simply meansKdecentralie, li'ewise, find no $alid round to sustain this contention. #he petitionersF posture inores thewellEaccepted meanin of the clause Ke/ual protection of the laws.K #he clause does not preclude

classification of indi$iduals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as lon as theclassification is not unreasonable or arbitrary ?"tchon $. )ernande


28/68

#he e/ual protection clause of the *th Amendment does not mean that all occupationscalled by the same name must be treated the same way the state may do what it can topre$ent which is deemed as e$il and stop short of those cases in which harm to the fewconcerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down weremade mathematically e(act. ?8ominican )otel $. Ari


29/68

the O!&, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court maynot constitutionally pass upon. #hose issues should be addressed rather to the politicaldepartments of o$ernment5 the !resident and the Conress.

!arenthetically, >e wish to state that amblin is enerally immoral, and this is precisely so whenthe amblin resorted to is e(cessi$e. #his e(cessi$eness necessarily depends not only on the

financial resources of the ambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outloo'on life. )owe$er, the mere fact that some persons may ha$e lost their material fortunes, mentalcontrol, physical health, or e$en their li$es does not necessarily mean that the same are directlyattributable to amblin. "ambling ma' have been the antecedent, but certainl' not necessaril' thecause. or the same conse/uences could ha$e been preceded by an o$erdose of food, drin',e(ercise, wor', and e$en se(.

>)=R=OR=, the petition is 8"&%"&&=8 for lac' of merit.

&O OR8=R=8.

1ernan, #.0., /arvasa, "utierre, 0r., #ru, 1eliciano, "anca'co, idin, +armiento, "rio-Auino,

2edialdea, Regalado and 7avide, 0r., 00., concur.

S/ara/ O2n2on

+A"LLA, J., concurrin5

" concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother %r. 9ustice !aras. #his meansthat " aree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and reulation of theentire acti$ity 'nown as amblin properly pertain to Kstate %olic' .K "t is, therefore, the political

departments of o$ernment, namely, the leislati$e and the e(ecuti$e that should decide on whato$ernment should do in the entire area of amblin, and assume full responsibility to the people forsuch policy.

#he courts, as the decision states, cannot in/uire into the wisdom, morality or e(pediency of policiesadopted by the political departments of o$ernment in areas which fall within their authority, e(ceptonly when such policies pose a clear and present daner to the life, liberty or property of theindi$idual. #his case does not in$ol$e such a factual situation.

)owe$er, " hasten to ma'e of record that " do not subscribe to amblin in any form. "t demeans thehuman personality, destroys selfEconfidence and e$iscerates oneFs selfErespect, which in the lon runwill corrode whate$er is left of the ilipino moral character. amblin has wrec'ed and will continue

to wrec' families and homes it is an antithesis to indi$idual reliance and reliability as well aspersonal industry which are the touchstones of real economic proress and national de$elopment.

amblin is reprehensible whether maintained by o$ernment or pri$atiould prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authori


30/68

G.R. No. 80391 F/7ruary '8, 1989

S!LTAN AL)!SAR +. L)ONA, petitioner,

$s.

#ONTE )ANGELN, SAL# AL, SALN"ATO AL, +L)+NAS #ON"NG, A#)A" TO)A$S,

GERR* TO)A$S, JES!S ORTZ, ANTONO "ELA F!ENTE, "EGO +ALO)ARES, JR., RA!L

"AGALANGT, an )O SNS!AT, respondents.

Ambrosio !adilla, 2em%in Re'es a $ffices for %etitioner %etitioner.

2a>abang>it . anto for res%ondents.

SAR)ENTO, J.:

#he acts of the &anunian !ampoo' of Reion G"" are assailed in this petition. #he antecedent

facts are as follows5

. On &eptember 2*, -, petitioner &ultan Alimbusar 1imbona was appointed as a

member of the &anunian !ampoo', Reional Autonomous o$ernment, Reion

G"", representin 1anao del &ur.

2. On %arch 2, -7 petitioner was elected &pea'er of the Reional 1eislati$e Assembly or 4atasan !ampoo' of Central %indanao ?Assembly for bre$ity@.

6. &aid Assembly is composed of eihteen ?@ members. #wo of said members,

respondents Acmad #omawis and !a'il 8aalanit, filed on %arch 26, -7 with the

Commission on =lections their respecti$e certificates of candidacy in the %ay ,

-7 conressional elections for the district of 1anao del &ur but they later withdrew


31/68

from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed aain their positions as members

of the Assembly.

*. On October 2, -7 Conressman 8atu uimid %atalam, Chairman of the

Committee on %uslim Affairs of the )ouse of Representati$es, in$ited %r. Ga$ier

Ra


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7. !alomares, 8ieo

. &insuat, 4imbo

-. #omawis, Acmad

0. #omawis, 9erry

After declarin the presence of a /uorum, the &pea'er !roE#empore was authori


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#wel$e ?2@ members $oted in fa$or of the motion to declare the seat of the &pea'er

$acant one abstained and none $oted aainst. 1

Accordinly, the petitioner prays for judment as follows5

>)=R=OR=, petitioner respectfully prays thatE

?a@ #his !etition be i$en due course

?b@ !endin hearin, a restrainin order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued

enjoinin respondents from proceedin with their session to be held on No$ember ,

-7, and on any day thereafter

?c@ After hearin, judment be rendered declarin the proceedins held by

respondents of their session on No$ember 2, -7 as null and $oid

?d@ )oldin the election of petitioner as &pea'er of said 1eislati$e Assembly or4atasan !ampoo', Reion G"" held on %arch 2, -7 $alid and subsistin, and

?e@ %a'in the injunction permanent.

!etitioner li'ewise prays for such other relief as may be just and e/uitable. '

!endin further proceedins, this Court, on 9anuary -, -, recei$ed a resolution filed by the

&anunian !ampoo', K=G!=C#"N A1"%43&AR !. 1"%4ONA RO% %=%4=R&)"! O #)=

&AN3N"AN !A%!OO; A3#ONO%O3& R="ON G"",K 3 on the rounds, amon other thins, that

the petitioner Khad caused to be prepared and sined by him payin Msic: the salaries and emoluments of

Odin Abdula, who was considered resined after filin his Certificate of Candidacy for Conressmen for

the irst 8istrict of %auindanao in the last %ay , elections. . . and nothin in the record of the

Assembly will show that any re/uest for reinstatement by Abdula was e$er made . . .K ( and that Ksuch

action of %r. 1im bona in payin Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the

Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,K that the petitioner Khad recently

caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resultin to the nonEpayment of the

salaries and emoluments of some Assembly Msic:,K 6 and that he had Kfiled a case before the &upreme

Court aainst some members of the Assembly on /uestion which should ha$e been resol$ed within the

confines of the Assembly,K % for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become Kmoot

and academicK. 8

#he first /uestion, e$idently, is whether or not the e(pulsion of the petitioner ?pendin litiation@ has

made the case moot and academic.

>e do not aree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the

e(pulsion resolution so issued. or, if the petitionerFs e(pulsion was done purposely to ma'e this

petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not ma'e it academic.

On the round of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the e(pulsion in

/uestion is of no force and effect. "n the first place, there is no showin that the &anunian had

conducted an in$estiation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,

assumin that there was an in$estiation, or otherwise i$en the opportunity to do so. On the other

hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly ?at least, the respondents@ that

Ksince No$ember, -7 up to this writin, the petitioner has not set foot at the &anunian!ampoo'.K 9 K#o be sure, the pri$ate respondents a$er that KMt:he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory esture,

wanted him to come to Cotabato City,K 10 but that was Kso that their differences could be threshed out and

settled.K11 Certainly, that a$owed wantin or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it

may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearin contemplated by law.


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>hile we ha$e held that due process, as the term is 'nown in administrati$e law, does not absolutely

re/uire notice and that a party need only be i$en the opportunity to be heard, 1' it does not appear

herein that the petitioner had, to bein with, been made aware that he had in fact stood chared of raft

and corruption before his colleues. "t cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to

rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the chares now le$elled amount to mere accusations that

cannot warrant e(pulsion.

"n the second place, ?the resolution@ appears stronly to be a bare act of $endetta by the other

Assemblymen aainst the petitioner arisin from what the former percei$e to be abduracy on the

part of the latter. "ndeed, it ?the resolution@ spea's of Ka case Mha$in been filed: Mby the petitioner:

before the &upreme Court . . . on /uestion which should ha$e been resol$ed within the confines of

the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their interity

and character as representati$e of the peopleK 13 an act that cannot possibly justify e(pulsion. Access to

judicial remedies is uaranteed by the Constitution, 1( and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious

prosecution, no one may be punished for see'in redress in the courts.

>e therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed

warrant his remo$al, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper

proceedins therefor in line with the most elementary re/uirements of due process. And while it is

within the discretion of the members of the &anunian to punish their errin colleaues, their acts

are nonetheless subject to the moderatin band of this Court in the e$ent that such discretion is

e(ercised with ra$e abuse.

"t is, to be sure, said that precisely because the &anunian !ampoo'?s@ are Kautonomous,K the

courts may not rihtfully inter$ene in their affairs, much less stri'e down their acts. >e come,

therefore, to the second issue5 Are the soEcalled autonomous o$ernments of %indanao, as they are

now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courtsL "n other words, what is the e(tent

of selfEo$ernment i$en to the two autonomous o$ernments of Reion "G and G""L

#he autonomous o$ernments of %indanao were orani


35/68

?-@ "mmiration and deportation

?0@ Citi


36/68

autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the

same way that the internal acts, say, of the Conress of the !hilippines are beyond our jurisdiction. 4ut if

it is autonomous in the former cateory only, it comes unaruably under our jurisdiction. An e(amination

of the $ery !residential 8ecree creatin the autonomous o$ernments of %indanao persuades us that

they were ne$er meant to e(ercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central

o$ernment commits an act of selfEimmolation. !residential 8ecree No. , in the first place, mandates

that KMt:he !resident shall ha$e the power of eneral super$ision and control o$er Autonomous

Reions.K 33 "n the second place, the &anunian !ampoo', their leislati$e arm, is made to dischare

chiefly administrati$e ser$ices, thus5

&=C. 7. !owers of the &anunian !ampoo'. #he &anunian !ampoo' shall

e(ercise local leislati$e powers o$er reional affairs within the framewor' of national

de$elopment plans, policies and oals, in the followin areas5

?@ Orani


37/68

adjourned e(cept by direction of the &anunian !ampoo',K 3 but it pro$ides li'ewise that Kthe

&pea'er may, on Msic: his discretion, declare a recess of Kshort inter$als.K 36 Of course, there is

disareement between the protaonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effecti$e

No$ember throuh , -7 is the Krecess of short inter$alsK referred to the petitioner says that it is

while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that KrecessK as

used by their Rules only refers to Ka recess when aruments et heated up so that protaonists in a

debate can tal' thins out informally and ob$iate dissenssion Msic: and disunity. 3% #he Court arees with

the respondents on this reard, since clearly, the Rules spea' of Kshort inter$als.K &econdly, the Court

li'ewise arees that the &pea'er could not ha$e $alidly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to

con$ene on No$ember , the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 )ence, there can be no

recess to spea' of that could possibly interrupt any session. 4ut while this opinion is in accord with the

respondentsF own, we still in$alidate the twin sessions in /uestion, since at the time the petitioner called

the Krecess,K it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. "n the second place, the in$itation

tendered by the Committee on %uslim Affairs of the )ouse of Representati$es pro$ided a plausible

reason for the intermission souht. #hirdly, assumin that a $alid recess could not be called, it does not

appear that the respondents called his attention to this mista'e. >hat appears is that instead, they

opened the sessions themsel$es behind his bac' in an apparent act of mutiny. 3nder the circumstances,

we find e/uity on his side. or this reason, we uphold the KrecessK called on the round of ood faith.

"t does not appear to us, moreo$er, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid KrecessK in order

to forestall the Assembly from brinin about his ouster. #his is not apparent from the pleadins

before us. >e are con$inced that the in$itation was what precipitated it.

"n holdin that the KrecessK in /uestion is $alid, we are not to be ta'en as establishin a precedent,

since, as we said, a recess can not be $alidly declared without a session ha$in been first opened.

"n upholdin the petitioner herein, we are not i$in him a carte blanche to order recesses in the

future in $iolation of the Rules, or otherwise to pre$ent the lawful meetins thereof.

Neither are we, by this disposition, discourain the &anunian from reorani)=R=OR=, premises considered, the petition is RAN#=8. #he &anunian !ampoo', Reion

G"", is =N9O"N=8 to ?@ R="NA#= the petitioner as %ember, &anunian !ampoo', Reion G""

and ?2@ R="NA#= him as &pea'er thereof. No costs.

&O OR8=R=8.


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G.R. No. 93'' Auu , 1991

RO"OLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,

$s.

THE HONORALE #O!RT OF A++EALS an L!S T. SANTOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 93%(6 Auu ,1991

)AR* ANN RVERA ARTE"A, petitioner,

$s.HON. L!S SANTOS, 2n :2 ;aa;2y a S/;r/ary o< :/ "/ar=/n o< Lo;a& Go>/rn=/n,

N#ANOR ). +ATR#O, 2n :2 ;aa;2y a #:2/2;/ o< :/ "/ar=/n o< Lo;a&

Go>/rn=/n an SALVA"OR #AAL!NA JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 9'( Auu ,1991

RO"OLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,

$s.

THE HONORALE #O!RT OF A++EALS an L!S T. SANTOS, 2n :2 ;aa;2y a :/

S/;r/ary o< :/ "/ar=/n o< Lo;a& Go>/rn=/n, respondents.

/icolas !. +onalan for %etitioner in :B959.

Romeo A. "erochi for %etitioner in :BCDE.

ugenio $riginal for %etitioner in :59D5.

SAR)ENTO, J.: p

#he petitioners ta'e common issue on the power of the !resident ?actin throuh the &ecretary of1ocal o$ernment@, to suspend andJor remo$e local officials.

#he petitioners are the %ayor of "loilo City ?.R. Nos. -622 and -2*@ and a member of the

&anunian !anlunsod thereof ?.R. No. -67*@, respecti$ely.

#he petitions of %ayor ane /uote5

((( ((( (((


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"n her $erified complaint ?Anne( A@, %rs. Cabaluna, a cler' assined to the City

)ealth, Office of "loilo City chared that due to political reasons, ha$in supported

the ri$al candidate, %rs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City %ayor, usin as an

e(cuse the e(iency of the ser$ice and the interest of the public, pulled her out from

rihtful office where her /ualifications are best suited and assined her to a wor' that

should be the function of a nonEcareer ser$ice employee. #o ma'e matters worse, autility wor'er in the office of the !ublic &er$ices, whose duties are alien to the

complainantFs duties and functions, has been detailed to ta'e her place. #he

petitionerFs act are pure harassments aimed at lurin her away from her permanent

position or force her to resin.

"n the case of 8ra. elicidad Ortio


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#he ne(t hearins were reEset to 9uly 2, 2, 27,- in the same $enueE"loilo City.

Aain, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedins and mo$ed for a

postponement under the e(cuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the

hearin officers denied the motion to postpone, in $iew of the fact that the parties

were notified by telerams of the scheduled hearins ?Anne( %@.

"n the said hearins, petitionerFs counsel crossEe(amined the complainants and their

witnesses.

indin probable rounds and reasons, the respondent issued a pre$enti$e

suspension order on Auust , - to last until October ,- for a period of

si(ty ?0@ days.

#hen the ne(t in$estiation was set on &eptember 2, - and the petitioner aain

as'ed for a postponement to &eptember 2,-. On &eptember 2, -, the

complainants and petitioner were present, toether with their respecti$e counsel. #he

petitioner souht for a postponement which was denied. "n these hearins whichwere held in %ala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. CE02- and 02--.

#he in$estiation was continued reardin the %alabor case and the complainants

testified includin their witnesses.

On October 0, -, petitionerFs counsel, Atty. Oriinal mo$ed for a postponement

of the October 2*, - hearin to No$ember 7 to , - which was ranted.

)owe$er, the motion for chane of $enue as denied due to lac' of funds. At the

hearin on No$ember 7, -, the parties and counsel were present. !etitioner

reiterated his motion to chane $enue and mo$ed for postponement anew. #he

counsel discussed a proposal to ta'e the deposition of witnesses in "loilo City so thehearin was indefinitely postponed. )owe$er, the parties failed to come to terms and

after the parties were notified of the hearin, the in$estiation was set to 8ecember

6 to , -.

#he petitioner souht for another postponement on the round that his witnesses

were sic' or cannot attend the in$estiation due to lac' of transportation. #he motion

was denied and the petitioner was i$en up to 8ecember *, - to present his

e$idence.

On 8ecember *,-, petitionerFs counsel insisted on his motion for postponement

and the hearin officers a$e petitioner up to 8ecember , - to present hise$idence. On 8ecember , -, the petitioner failed to present e$idence and the

cases were considered submitted for resolution.

"n the meantime, a prima facie e$idence was found to e(ist in the arbitrary detention

case filed by !ancho =rbite so the respondent ordered the petitionerFs second

pre$enti$e suspension dated October , - for another si(ty ?0@ days. #he

petitioner was able to obtain a restrainin order and a writ of preliminary injunction in

the Reional #rial Court, 4ranch 66 of "loilo City. #he second pre$enti$e suspension

was not enforced.

Amidst the two successi$e suspensions, %ayor an


41/68

CAE.R. &! No. 2076 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 ?%alabor it is to be noted, is

one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seein %ayor an


42/68

part of the hearin officer, and based on %ayor anhether or not the &ecretary of 1ocal o$ernment, as the

!residentFs alter eo, can suspend andJor remo$e local officials.

"t is the petitionersF arument that the -7 Constitution '0 no loner allows the !resident, as the -6

and -76 Constitutions did, to e(ercise the power of suspension andJor remo$al o$er local officials.

Accordin to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strenthen selfErule by local o$ernment

units and second, by deletin the phrase '1 as may be pro$ided by law to strip the !resident of the power

of control o$er local o$ernments. "t is a $iew, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the

Constitutional Commission. #he pro$ision in /uestion reads as follows5

&ec. *. #he !resident of the !hilippines shall e(ercise eneral super$ision o$er local

o$ernments. !ro$inces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and

cities and municipalities with respect to component baranays shall ensure that the

acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and

functions. ''

"t modifies a counterpart pro$ision appearin in the -6 Constitution, which we /uote5

&ec. 0. #he !resident shall ha$e control of all the e(ecuti$e departments, bureaus,

or offices, e(ercise eneral super$ision o$er all 1ocal o$ernments as may be

pro$ided by law, and ta'e care that the laws be faithfully e(ecuted. '3

#he petitioners submit that the deletion ?of Kas may be pro$ided by lawK@ is sinificant, as their

arument oes, since5 ?@ the power of the !resident is Kpro$ided by lawK and ?2@ hence, no law may

pro$ide for it any loner.

"t is to be noted that in metin out the suspensions under /uestion, the &ecretary of 1ocal

o$ernment acted in consonance with the specific leal pro$isions of 4atas 4l. 667, the 1ocal

o$ernment Code, we /uote5

&ec. 2. /otice of Fearing. G >ithin se$en days after the complaint is filed, the

%inister of local o$ernment, or the sanunian concerned, as the case may be,

shall re/uire the respondent to submit his $erified answer within se$en days from

receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearin and in$estiation of the case

within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No in$estiation shall

be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no pre$enti$e

suspension shall be imposed with the said period. "f pre$enti$e suspension has been

imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the pre$enti$e suspension shall be lifted. '(

&ec. 6. !reventive +us%ension. I ?@ !re$enti$e suspension may be imposed by

the %inister of 1ocal o$ernment if the respondent is a pro$incial or city official, by

the pro$incial o$ernor if the respondent is an electi$e municipal official, or by the

city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an electi$e baranay official.

?2@ !re$enti$e suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,

when there is reasonable round to belie$e that the respondent has committed the

act or acts complained of, when the e$idence of culpability is stron, when the ra$ity

of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could

influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and interity of the records and

other e$idence. "n all cases, pre$enti$e suspension shall not e(tend beyond si(ty

days after the start of said suspension.


43/68

?6@ At the e(piration of si(ty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated

in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedins aainst him until its

termination. )owe$er F if the delay in the proceedins of the case is due to his fault,

nelect or re/uest, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computin the time of

suspension. '

#he issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three /uestions5 ?@ 8id the -7 Constitution, in

deletin the phrase Kas may be pro$ided by lawK intend to di$est the !resident of the power to

in$estiate, suspend, discipline, andJor remo$e local officialsL ?2@ )as the Constitution repealed

&ections 2 and 6 of the 1ocal o$ernment CodeL ?6@ >hat is the sinificance of the chane in the

constitutional lanuaeL

"t is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstandin the chane in the constitutional

lanuae, the charter did not intend to di$est the leislature of its riht or the !resident of her

preroati$e as conferred by e(istin leislation to pro$ide administrati$e sanctions aainst local

officials. "t is our opinion that the omission ?of Kas may be pro$ided by lawK@ sinifies nothin more

than to underscore local o$ernmentsF autonomy from conress and to brea' ConressF KcontrolKo$er local o$ernment affairs. #he Constitution did not, howe$er, intend, for the sa'e of local

autonomy, to depri$e the leislature of all authority o$er municipal corporations, in particular,

concernin discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate ma'in miniEstates out of local o$ernment units, as in the

federal o$ernments of the 3nited &tates of America ?or 4ra


44/68

((( ((( (((

"t is true that in the case of %ondano $s. &il$osa, Off. a


45/68

mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer ?not bein the municipal treasurer@

pendin action by the board, if in his opinion the chare by one affectin the official

interity of the officer in /uestion.K &ection of the Re$ised Administration Code

adds nothin to the power of super$ision to be e(ercised by the 8epartment )ead

o$er the administration of ... municipalities ... . "f it be construed that it does and such

additional power is the same authority as that $ested in the 8epartment )ead bysection 7-?c@ of the Re$ised Administrati$e Code, then such additional power must

be deemed to ha$e been abroated by &ection 0?l@, Article +"" of the

Constitution. (%

((( ((( (((

"n !elae , we stated that the !resident can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials

e(cept on appeal from the pro$incial board pursuant to the Administrati$e Code. (8

#hus, in those case that this Court denied the !resident the power ?to suspendJremo$e@ it was not

because we did not thin' that the !resident can not e(ercise it on account of his limited power, butbecause the law loded the power elsewhere. 4ut in those cases ii which the law a$e him the

power, the Court, as in "anon v. a'anan, found little difficulty in sustainin him. (9

#he Court does not belie$e that the petitioners can rihtfully point to the debates of the

Constitutional Commission to defeat the !residentFs powers. #he Court belie$es that the

deliberations are by themsel$es inconclusi$e, because althouh Commissioner 9ose Nolledo would

e(clude the power of remo$al from the !resident, 0Commissioner 4las Ople would not. 1

#he Court is conse/uently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the 1ocal

o$ernment Code, 4atas 4l. 67. As we said, Ksuper$isionK and Kremo$alK are not incompatible

terms and one may stand with the other notwithstandin the stroner e(pression of local autonomyunder the new Charter. >e ha$e indeed held that in spite of the appro$al of the Charter, 4atas 4l.

667 is still in force and effect. '

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means Ka more responsi$e and accountable local

o$ernment structure instituted throuh a system of decentrali


46/68

8ecentrali


47/68

As we obser$ed earlier, imposin 00 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility %ayor

ane reiterate that we are not precludin the !resident, throuh the &ecretary of "nterior frome(ercisin a leal power, yet we are of the opinion that the &ecretary of "nterior is e(ercisin that

power oppressi$ely, and needless to say, with a ra$e abuse of discretion.

#he Court is aware that only the third suspension is under /uestions, and that any tal' of future

suspensions is in fact premature. #he fact remains, howe$er, that %ayor ane are therefore allowin %ayor Rodolfo an


48/68

a@ that delays in the in$estiation of those chares Kdue to his fault,

nelect or re/uest, ?the time of the delay@ shall not be counted in

computin the time of suspension. M+u%ra, sec. 6?6@:

b@ that if durin, or after the e(piration of, his pre$enti$e suspension,

the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for whichproper chares are filed aainst him by the arie$ed party or

parties, his pre$ious suspension shall not be a bar to his bein

pre$enti$ely suspended aain, if warranted under subpar. ?2@, &ection

6 of the 1ocal o$ernment Code.

>)=R=OR=, premises considered, the petitions are 8"&%"&&=8. #he #emporary Restrainin

Order issued is 1"#=8. #he suspensions of the petitioners are A"R%=8, pro$ided that the

petitioner, %ayor Rodolfo an


49/68

[G.R. No. 1396'. )ar;: '%, '000]

)ETRO+OLTAN )ANLA "EVELO+)ENT A!THORT*, petitioner , vs.

EL?AR VLLAGE ASSO#ATON, N#., respondent .

" E # S O N

+!NO, J .@

Not infre/uently, the o$ernment is tempted

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