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K. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1. LIMBONA V MANGELIN GR No. 80391 28February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona,was elected Speaker of the Regional LegislativeAssembly or Batasang Pampook of CentralMindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987

Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairmanof the Committee on Muslim Affairs of theHouse of Representatives, invited petitioner inhis capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with localgovernment officials. Petitioner accepted theinvitation and informed the Assembly membersthrough the Assembly Secretary that there shallbe no session in November as his presence wasneeded in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, theAssembly held a session in defiance of theLimbona's advice, where he was unseated from

his position. Petitioner prays that the session'sproceedings be declared null and void and be itdeclared that he was still the Speaker of theAssembly. Pending further proceedings of thecase, the SC received a resolution from theAssembly expressly expelling petitioner'smembership therefrom. Respondents argue thatpetitioner had "filed a case before the SupremeCourt against some members of the Assemblyon a question which should have been resolvedwithin the confines of the Assembly," for whichthe respondents now submit that the petitionhad become "moot and academic" because itsresolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governmentsor regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomousgovernments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration whenthe central government delegates

administrative powers to political subdivisionsin order to broaden the base of governmentpower and in the process to make localgovernments "more responsive andaccountable". At the same time, it relieves thecentral government of the burden of managinglocal affairs and enables it to concentrate onnational concerns. The President exercises"general supervision" over them, but only to"ensure that local affairs are administeredaccording to law." He has no control over theiracts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of

power, on the other hand, involves anabdication of political power in the favor of localgovernments units declared to be autonomous.In that case, the autonomous government isfree to chart its own destiny and shape itsfuture with minimum intervention from central

authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoysautonomy of the latter category [CONST.(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to thedecree of the organic act creating it andaccepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomousgovernment of the former class is, as we noted,

under the supervision of the nationalgovernment acting through the President (andthe Department of Local Government). If theSangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, isautonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,debatably beyond the domain of this Court inperhaps the same way that the internal acts,say, of the Congress of the Philippines arebeyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomousin the former category only, it comesunarguably under our jurisdiction. Anexamination of the very Presidential Decreecreating the autonomous governments of

Mindanao persuades us that they were nevermeant to exercise autonomy in the secondsense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618,in the first place, mandates that "[t]he Presidentshall have the power of general supervision andcontrol over Autonomous Regions." Hence, weassume jurisdiction. And if we can make aninquiry in the validity of the expulsion inquestion, with more reason can we review thepetitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle,that of local autonomy. We have to obey theclear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations,one in favor of centralized power in Malacañangand the other beneficial to local autonomy, thescales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that theNovember 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid.It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII

Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not besuspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while thisopinion is in accord with the respondents' own,we still invalidate the twin sessions in question,since at the time the petitioner called the"recess," it was not a settled matter whether ornot he could do so. In the second place, theinvitation tendered by the Committee onMuslim Affairs of the House of Representativesprovided a plausible reason for the intermissionsought. Also, assuming that a valid recess couldnot be called, it does not appear that the

respondents called his attention to this mistake.What appears is that instead, they opened thesessions themselves behind his back in anapparent act of mutiny. Under thecircumstances, we find equity on his side. For



this reason, we uphold the "recess" called onthe ground of good faith.

2. QUEZON CITY VS BAYANTEL G.R. No.162015

Res po nden t Ba ya n T e leco mmun i ca t i o

ns , I nc . (Bayantel) is a legislative franchiseholder under RA 3259toe s t a b l i s h a n d o p e r a t e r a d i o s t a t io n s f o r d o m e s t i c t e l ec o mm u ni c at i ons , radiophone, broadcast ing andte lecasting. A tax provision in its charter exemptedBayantel from payment of realty taxes actually,directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of itsfranchise. On January 1, 2002, the LGCtook ef fect wh ich grants LGUs the power tolevy tax on real properties. On July20, 1992,Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633,amending Bayantel’s original franchise which

contained once again the exemption of Bayantel from payment of realty taxes actually,directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of itsfranchise. In1993, the government of Quezon City

enacted the Quezon City Revenue Code

(QCRC), imposing a real property tax on al l

real properties in Quezon City which inc

luded som eproperties of Bayantel. Bayantel

did not pay the realty taxes prompting

t h e Q C T r e a s u r e r t o i s s u e w a r r a n t s

o f levy against thepropert ies.

Threatened, Bayantel filed with the RTC a

petitionfor prohibition with an urgent app

licatio n for a tempora ryrestraining order

(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Should Bayantel be granted tax

exemption?

RULING: Yes. The power to tax is

pr ima ri ly ves ted in the Congress; however,

in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local

legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a

va l idde legat ion as before , but pursua

nt to d i r ect auth or i tyconferred

by Section 5, Article X of the

Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise

of the power may be subject to such

guidelines and l imitations as the Congre

ss may provide which, however, must be

consistent with the basic policy of local

autonomy. Section 5 does not change the

doctrine that municipal corporations do notpossess inherent powers of taxation. What

it does is to confer municipal corporations

a general power to levy taxes and otherwise

create sources of revenue. They no longer have

to wait for a statutory grant of these powers.

The power of the legislative authority relative to

the fiscal powers of local governments has been

reduced to the authority to impose limitations

on municipal powers. There can really be no

dispute that the power of the Quezon City

Government to tax is limited by Section

232 of the LGC. Under this law, the Legislature

highlighted its power to thereafter exemptcertain realties from the taxing power of local

government units.

A d m i t t e d l y , R e p . A c t N o . 7 6 3 3 w a s

en a c t e d subsequent to the LGC. The

Court v iews this subsequent piece of

legislation as an express and real intention

on the part of Congress to

once again remove from the L GC s

delegated taxing power, all of Bayantel’s

properties that are actually, directly and

exclusively used in the pursuit of i tsfranchise

3. ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR

ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND

DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA

G.R. No. 144256

Subject: Public CorporationDoctrine: Automatic release of IRAFacts:

Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VIImandating the Pres to submit to Congress abudget of expenditures within 30 days beforethe opening of every regular session, submittedthe National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, “ANACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THEOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARYONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO

THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” alsoknown as General Appropriations Act (GAA) forthe Year 2000. It provides under the heading“ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS”that the IRA for local government units shallamount to P111,778,000,000”.In another part of the GAA, under the heading“UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that anamount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apartfrom the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above,shall be used to fund the IRA, which amountshall be released only when the original

revenue targets submitted by the President toCongress can be realized based on a quarterlyassessment to be conducted by certaincommittees which the GAA specifies, namely,the Development Budget Coordinating



Committee, the Committee on Finance of theSenate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Thus, while the GAA appropriatesP111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund,it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billionof IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be

released only upon the occurrence of thecondition stated in the GAA.On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs andPOs, along with 3 barangay officials filed withthis Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, againstrespondents then Executive Secretary RonaldoZamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno,then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit,

challenging the constitutionality of provisionXXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTUNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1,XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND)Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAAprovisions)Petitioners contend that the said provisionsviolates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfullyreducing the IRA allotted by 10B and bywithholding its release by placing the sameunder “Unprogrammed funds”. Although the

effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased,this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolvethe issues raised in the present case, it beingimpressed with public interest. Petitioners arguethat the GAA violated the constitutionalmandate of automatically releasing the IRAswhen it made its release contingent on whetherrevenue collections could meet the revenuetargets originally submitted by the President,rather than making the release automatic.

ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUsfiscal autonomy by not automatically releasingthe whole amount of the allotted IRA.

HELD:

Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the nationaltaxes which shall be automatically released tothem.Petitioners argue that the GAA violated thisconstitutional mandate when it made the

release of IRA contingent on whether revenuecollections could meet the revenue targetsoriginally submitted by the President, ratherthan making the release automatic.Respondents counter argue that the above

constitutional provision is addressed not to thelegislature but to the executive, hence, thesame does not prevent the legislature fromimposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.Respondents thus infer that the subjectconstitutional provision merely prevents theexecutive branch of the government from“unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the

legislature from authorizing the executivebranch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that thePresident or any member of the ExecutiveDepartment cannot unilaterally, i.e., without thebacking of statute, withhold the release of theIRA.”As the Constitution lays upon the executive theduty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so itenjoins the legislature not to pass laws thatmight prevent the executive from performing

this duty. To hold that the executive branchmay disregard constitutional provisions whichdefine its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitutionamendable by statute – a proposition which ispatently absurd. If indeed the framers intendedto allow the enactment of statutes making therelease of IRA conditional instead of automatic,then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitutionwould have been worded differently.Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the

Constitution, only the just share of localgovernments is qualified by the words “asdetermined by law,” and not the releasethereof, the plain implication is that Congress isnot authorized by the Constitution to hinder orimpede the automatic release of the IRA.In another case, the Court held that the onlypossible exception to mandatory automaticrelease of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:…if the national internal revenue collections forthe current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year,

in which case what should be automaticallyreleased shall be a proportionate amount of thecollections for the current fiscal year. Theadjustment may even be made on a quarterlybasis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarterof the current fiscal year. This Court recognizes that the passage of theGAA provisions by Congress was motivated bythe laudable intent to “lower the budget deficitin line with prudent fiscal management.” The

pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must beechoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that eventhe best intentions must be carried out withinthe parameters of the Constitution and the law.Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out



by legal methods.”WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVIIand LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutionalinsofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, inthe amount of P10 Billion, as part of theUNPROGRAMMED FUND.

4. LTO V CITY OF BUTUAN

G. R. No. 131512. January 20,2000

Facts:Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to

LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local Government Code, the SangguniangPanglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an

ordinance "Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for theissuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit,and Imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinanceprovided for, among other things, the paymentof franchise fees for the grant of the franchiseof tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of apermit for the driving thereof.

Petitioner LTO explains that one of thefunctions of the national government that,

indeed, has been transferred to localgovernment units is the franchising authorityover tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and RegulatoryBoard ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, theauthority of LTO to register all motor vehiclesand to issue to qualified persons of licenses todrive such vehicles.

The RTC and CA ruled that the power to giveregistration and license for driving tricycles hasbeen devolved to LGU's.Issue:

Whether or not, the registration of tricycleswas given to LGU's, hence the ordinance is avalid exercise of police power.

Ruling:No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement

the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government Code"- the newly delegated powers to LGU'spertain to the franchising and regulatory powersexercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions

of the LTO relative to the registration of motorvehicles and issuance of licenses for the drivingthereof. Corollarily, the exercised of a policepower must be through a valid delegation. Inthis case the police power of registeringtricycles was not delegated to the LGU’s, but

remained in the LTO.

Clearly unaffected by the Local GovernmentCode are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.4136requiring the registration of all kinds of motorvehicles "used or operated on or upon anypublic highway" in the country.

The Commissioner of Land Transportation

and his deputies are empowered at anytime toexamine and inspect such motor vehicles todetermine whether said vehicles are registered,or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked orequipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated onbecause of possible excessive damage tohighways, bridges and other infrastructures. The LTO is additionally charged with being thecentral repository and custodian of all recordsof all motor vehicles.

Adds the Court, the reliance made byrespondents on the broad taxing power of localgovernment units, specifically under Section

133 of the Local Government Code, istangential.

Police power and taxation, along witheminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share withlocal government units by delegation givenunder a constitutional or a statutory fiat. Allthese inherent powers are for a public purposeand legislative in nature but the similarities justabout end there. The basic aim of police poweris public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case,focuses on the power of government to raiserevenue in order to support its existence andcarry out its legitimate objectives. Althoughcorrelative to each other in many respects, thegrant of one does not necessarily carry with itthe grant of the other. The two powers are, bytradition and jurisprudence, separate anddistinct powers, varying in their respectiveconcepts, character, scopes and limitations.

To construe the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the LGC indistinctively would result in therepeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power

which evidently has not been intended. If itwere otherwise, the law could have just said soin Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the LocalGovernment Code in the same manner that thespecific devolution of LTFRB's power onfranchising of tricycles has been provided.Repeal by implication is not favored.

The power over tricycles granted underSection 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local GovernmentCode to LGUs is the power to regulate theiroperation and to grant franchises for theoperation thereof. The exclusionary clause

contained in the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the Local Government Code must not beheld to have had the effect of withdrawing theexpress power of LTO to cause the registrationof all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions



of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature,exercised pursuant to the police power of theState, whose basic objectives are to achieveroad safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Notinsignificant is the rule that a statute must notbe construed in isolation but must be taken inharmony with the extant body of laws.

LGUs indubitably now have the power toregulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire andto grant franchises for the operation thereof,and not to issue registration.

Ergo, the ordinance being repugnant to astatute is void and ultra vires.

5. BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURTOF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSODand BATANGASCITY MAYOR [G.R. No.138810. September 29, 2004]

FACTS:On July 28, 1986, respondentSangguniang Panlungsod enacted ResolutionNo. 210 granting petitioner a permit toconstruct, install, and operate a CATV systemin Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolutionprovides that petitioner is authorized to chargeits subscribers the maximum rates specifiedtherein, “provided, however, that any increaseof rates shall be subject to the approval of theSangguniang Panlungsod.Sometime in November 1993, petitionerincreased its subscriber rates from P88.00 toP180.00 per month. As a result, respondentMayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening tocancel its permit unless it secures the approvalof respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod,pursuant to Resolution No. 210.Petitioner thenfiled with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, apetition for injunction alleging that respondentsSangguniang Panlungsod has no authority toregulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV

operators because under Executive Order No.205, the National TelecommunicationsCommission (NTC) has the sole authority toregulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.ISSUE :may a local government unit (LGU)regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATVoperators within its territorial jurisdiction?

HELD: No.x x xThe logical conclusion, therefore,is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No.436, the NTC exercises regulatory power overCATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.x x xLike any other enterprise, CATV operation

maybe regulated by LGUs under the generalwelfare clause. This is primarily because theCATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses publicproperties in order to reach subscribers.) Thephysical realities of constructing CATV system

–the use of public streets, rights of ways, thefounding of structures, and the parceling of large regions–allow an LGU a certain degree of regulationover CATV operators.x x xBut, while we recognize the LGUs’ power underthe general welfare clause, we cannot sustain

Resolution No. 210. Weare convinced that respondents strayed fromthe well recognized limits of its power. Theflaws in Resolution No. 210are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing lawsand (2) it violates the State’s deregulationpolicy over the CATV industry.LGUs must recognize that technical mattersconcerning CATV operation are within theexclusive regulatory power of the NTC

6. MAYOR MAGTAJAS & CITY OF CAGAYAN v.PRYCE PROPERTIES & PAGCORFacts:PAGCOR decided to expand its operationsto Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, itleased a portion of a building belonging toPryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovatedand equipped the same, and prepared toinaugurate its casino there during the Christmasseason.. Civic organizations angrily denouncedthe project. The religious elements echoed theobjection and so did the women's groupsand the youth. Demonstrations were ledby the mayor and the city legislators. Themedia trumpeted the protest, describing thecasino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it isviolative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353prohibit ing the use of bui ldings for theoperation of a casino and Ordinance No.3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.

On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D.1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralizeand regulate all games of chance, includingcasinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents.Hence, the petition for review.

Issue:Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 andOrdinance No. 3375-93 are valid

Held:NoRatio:Cagayan de Oro City, like other local politicalsubdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinancesfor the purposes indicated in the Local



Government Code. It is expressly vested withthe police power under what is known as theGeneral Welfare Clause now embodied inSection 16 asfollows:***S ec. 16. — Genera l We lfar e. —Every local government unit shall exercise the powersexpress ly granted, those neces s a r i l y imp l i ed t he re f ro m, a swell as powers necessary,appropriate,

or incidental for its efficient and effectivegovernance, and those which are essentialto the promotion of the general welfare.Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensureand support, among other things, thepreservation and enrichment of culture,promote health and safety, enhance theright of the people to a balancedecology,encour age and supp ort the deve lo pment o f a pp ro p r i a t e a nd s e l f -reliant scientific andtechnologicalcapabilities, improve public morals, enhance

economic prosperity and social justice,promote ful l employment among theirresidents, maintain peace and order, andpreserve the comfort and convenience of theirinhabitants. The re i s a requ i rement t ha t t he o rd ina nces s ho u ld no t co n t ra vene a s t a tute. Munic ipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Localcouncil s exerc ise only dele gatedlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as thenational lawmaking body. The delegate cannotbe superior to the principal or exercise powershigher than those of the latter. It is a heresy tosuggest that the local government units canundo the acts of Congress, from which theyhave derived their power in the first place, andnegate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized byP.D. 1869. This decree has the status of astatute that cannot be amended or nullified bya mereordinance.Therefor e, the peti tion is DENIED and the challenged decision of theCourt of Appeals is AFFIRMED

Drilon vs Lim

GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local

Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had,

on appeal to him of four oil companies and a

taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,

otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code,

null and void for non-compliance with theprescribed procedure in the enactment of tax

ordinances and for containing certain provisions

contrary to law and public policy.

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of

Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila

revoked the Secretary’s resolution and

sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that

the procedural requirements had been

observed. More importantly, it declared Section

187 of the Local Government Code as

unconstitutional because of its vesture in the

Secretary of Justice of the power of control overlocal governments in violation of the policy of

local autonomy mandated in the Constitution

and of the specific provision therein conferring

on the President of the Philippines only the

power of supervision over local governments.

The court cited the familiar distinction between

control and supervision, the first being “the

power of an officer to alter or modify or set

aside what a subordinate officer had done in the

performance of his duties and to substitute the

judgment of the former for the latter,” while thesecond is “the power of a superior officer to see

to it that lower officers perform their functions

is accordance with law.”

ISSUES:

The issues in this case are

(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local

Government Code is unconstitutional; and

(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can

exercise control, rather than supervision, overthe local government

HELD:

The judgment of the lower court is reversed in

so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the

Local Government Code is unconstitutional but

affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the

procedural requirements in the enactment of

the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justiceto review only the constitutionality or legality of

the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it

on either or both of these grounds. When he

alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,

he is not also permitted to substitute his own

judgment for the judgment of the local

government that enacted the measure.

Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila

Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his

own version of what the Code should be.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the

doing of an act. It they are not followed, he

may, in his discretion, order the act undone or

re-done by his subordinate or he may even



decide to do it himself. Supervision does not

cover such authority. The supervisor or

superintendent merely sees to it that the rules

are followed, but he himself does not lay down

such rules, nor does he have the discretion to

modify or replace them. In the opinion of the

Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and

no more nor less than this, and so performed an

act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with

the prescribed procedure in the enactment of

the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully

examined every exhibit and agree with the trial

court that the procedural requirements have

indeed been observed. The only exceptions are

the posting of the ordinance as approved but

this omission does not affect its validity,

considering that its publication in three

successive issues of a newspaper of generalcirculation will satisfy due process.

Miranda vs. Aguirre

FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition

with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing

the constitu-tionality of Republic Act No. 8528,

converting the City of Santiago, Isabela from an

independent component city to merely a

component city.

On May 5, 1994, RA No. 7720 was signed

into a law, which converted the municipality of

Santiago, Isabela, into an independent

component city.

on July 4, 1994, RA No. 7720 was approved

by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.

On February 14, 1998, RA No. 8528 was

enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that

practically downgraded the City of Santiagofrom an independent component city to a

merely component city.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of

RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit

the law for the approval of the people of

Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the

constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the

said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago

from an independent component city into acomponent city. It allegedly did not involve any

“creation, division, merger, abolition, or

substantial alteration of boundaries of local

government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the

people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also

questioned the standing of petitioners to file the

petition and argued that the petition raises a

political question over which the Court lacks

jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:

WHETHER OR NOT RA NO. 8528 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ITS FAILURE TO

SUBMIT IT TO PROPER PLEBISCITE.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS LACKS

STANDING OR PERSONALITY IN FILING THIS

PETITION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS

JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION AT BAR ON

THE GROUND THAT IT INVOLVES A POLITICAL

QUESTION.

DECISION:

Petition was GRANTED. RA No. 8528 is

declared unconstitutional and the writ of

prohibition is hereby issued commanding the

respondents to desist from implementing the

said law.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional

because Sec. 10 of Art. X of the 1987Constitution clearly states that: No province,

city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary

substantially altered, except in accordance with

the criteria established in the local government

code and subject to approval by a majority of

the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political

units directly affected.

That when an amendment of the law

involves creation, merger, division, abolition or

substantial alteration of boundaries of local

government units, a plebiscite in the political

units directly affected is mandatory.

Petitioners are directly affected in the

imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Petitioner

Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado

was the President of the Sangguniang Liga,

together with 3 other petitioners were all

residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is

their right to be heard in the conversion of their

city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by theCOMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.

8528 gives them proper standing to strike down

the law as unconstitutional.



Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states

that: the judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may

be established by law. Judicial power includes

the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are

legally demandable and enforceable, and to

determine whether or not there has been a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch

or instru-mentality of the Government.

That the Supreme Court has the

jurisdiction over said petition because it

involves not a political question but a justiciable

issue, and of which only the court could decide

whether or not a law passed by the Congress is

unconstitutional.

PUBLIC CORP DIGEST FOR Miranda v

Aguirre (1999)

FACTS: 5 May 1994: RA 7720 converted the

municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an

independent component city. 14 Feb 1998: RA

8528 was enacted, amending RA 7720. It

changed the status of Santiago from an

independent component city to a component

city. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of

this RA since it lacked a provision submitting

the law for ratification by the people of Santiago

City in a plebiscite. The respondents raised thedefense of standing and the political question

doctrine. The Sol Gen argued that the RA

merely reclassified Santiago City from an


city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation,

merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of

boundaries of local government units.”

ISSUE: WON a reclassification of a city from an


city requires a plebiscite. YES.

RATIO: The wording of the constitution has a

common denominator: the material change in

the political and economic rights of the LGU

directly affected. The consent of the people is

required to serve as a checking mechanism to

any exercise of legislative power. The changes

are substantial. The city mayor will be placed

under the administrative supervision of the

provincial governor. The resolutions and

ordinances of the city council will have to be

reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will have

to be shared with the province. There would be

a reduction in their IRA.

When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago

City from a municipality to an independent

component city, it required the approval of its

people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose.

There is no reason why the same should not be

done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of

their city. The rules cover all conversions,

whether upward or downward so long as they

result in a material change in the LGU directlyaffected.

NAVARRO v ERMITA

Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a

province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of

Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for

constitutionality for not being in compliance

with the population or the land area

requirements of the Local Government Code

under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to

this case declared the creation of the province

as unconstitutional.

Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a

separate province constitutional?

Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy

considerations in the creation of provinces.

They compared the LGC provisions on the

creation of municipalities and cities and how

they allow an exception to the land area

requirement in cases of non-contiguity asprovided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the

LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the

intent of the legislators to extend such

exception to provinces especially considering

the physical configuration of the Philippine

archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was

absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision

relating to creation of provinces), such was

incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting

the congressional oversight in said provision

and reflecting the true legislative intent.Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very

restrictive construction which could trench on

the equal protection clause, as it actually

defeats the purpose of local autonomy and

decentralization as enshrined in the

Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement

should be read together with territorial

contiguity.

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

(161 SCRA 646)

Facts: Gelacio Tumambing contracted the

services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of

scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of



Manila on board the lighter LCT "Batman."

Pursuant to this agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon

sent his lighter "Batman" to Mariveles where it

docked in 3 feet of water. Then, Gelacio

Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to

Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading

which was actually begun on the same date by

the crew of the lighter under the captain's

supervision. When about half of the scrap ironwas already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of

Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded

P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter

resisted the shakedown and after a heated

argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula

drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing.

The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had

to be taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for

treatment. After sometime, the loading of the

scrap iron was resumed. But on 4 December

1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompaniedby 3 policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza

and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the

lighter was docked. The rest was brought to the

compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor

Rub issued a receipt stating that the

Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of

the scrap iron.

Tumambing instituted with CFI Manila an action

against Ganzon for damages based on culpa

contractual. The trial court rendered a decision

absolving Ganzon from liability. On appeal,

however, the appellate court reversed and set

aside the decision appealed. Hence, the petition

for review on certiorari.

Held: Now the petitioner is changing his theory

to caso fortuito. Such a change of theory on

appeal we cannot, however, allow. In any case,

the intervention of the municipal officials was

not In any case, of a character that would

render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier

of its obligation. The petitioner was not dutybound to obey the illegal order to dump into the

sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence

of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same

order was attended with such force or

intimidation as to completely overpower the will

of the petitioner's employees. The mere

difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is

not considered force majeure. We agree with

the private respondent that the scraps could

have been properly unloaded at the shore or at

the NASSCO compound, so that after thedispute with the local officials concerned was

settled, the scraps could then be delivered in

accordance with the contract of carriage.

Pablico v. Villapando

J. Ynares-Santiago, G.R. No. 147870. July 31,

2002

FACTS: Solomon Maagad and Renato

Fernandez, members of the Sangguniang Bayan

of San Vicente, Palawan filed an administrative

complaint against Alejandro A. Villapando, the

mayor of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of

authority and culpable violation of the

Constitution for entering into a consultancy

agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated

mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections

where Villapando was elected. They allege that

the consultancy agreement amounted to an

appointment to a government position within

the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-

B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.

Villapando, on the other hand, argues that he

did not hire Tiape, but appointed him and

invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the

Department of Justice which states that the

appointment of a defeated candidate as a

consultant does not constitute an appointment

to a government office or position as prohibited

by the Constitution. The Sangguniang

Panalalawigan of Palawan found Villapando

guilty of the administrative charge and

dismissed him from service which was affirmed

by the Office of the President. Meanwhile, Ramir

Pablico, the vice-mayor of San Vicente,Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal

Mayor afterwhich, Villapando filed with the RTC

of Palawan for a temporary restraining order

which was first granted, then denied by the

RTC. So Villapando now goes to Court seeking

to annul the decision of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Palawan and the affirmation of

the Office of the President, and the denial of the

temporary restraining order by the RTC. He

argues that under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160, an

elective local office may be removed from officeon the grounds enumerated under Sec. 60 by

order of the proper court. Without such order of

the court, he cannot be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not local legislative bodies

and/or the Office of the President, on appeal,

may validly impose the penalty of dismissal

from service on erring elective local officials?

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that it is

clear under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160 that the

penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring



elective local official may be decreed only by a

court of law. In Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et

al., it was held that “[t]he Office of the

President is without any power to remove

elected officials, since such power is exclusively

vested in the proper courts as expressly

provided for in the last paragraph of Section

60.” Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and

Regulations Implementing the LocalGovernment Code, however, adds that – “(b) An

elective local official may be removed from

office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph

(a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in

Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by

order of the proper court or the disciplining

authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to

the exclusion of the other.” The disciplining

authority referred to pertains to the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan

and the Office of the President. As held inSalalima, this grant to the “disciplining

authority” of the power to remove elective local

officials is clearly beyond the authority of the

Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules

and Regulations. No rule or regulation may

alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law,

such as the Local Government Code.

Implementing rules should conform, not clash,

with the law that they implement, for a

regulation which operates to create a rule out of

harmony with the statute is a nullity. It isbeyond cavil, therefore, that the power to

remove erring elective local officials from

service is lodged exclusively with the courts.

Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules

and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code, insofar as it vests power on

the “disciplining authority” to remove from

office erring elective local officials, is void for

being repugnant to the last paragraph of

Section 60 of the Local Government Code of

1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly

construed and applied, and the authority in

whom such power of suspension or removal is

vested must exercise it with utmost good faith,

for what is involved is not just an ordinary

public official but one chosen by the people

through the exercise of their constitutional right

of suffrage. Their will must not be put to

naught by the caprice or partisanship of the

disciplining authority. Where the disciplining

authority is given only the power to suspend

and not the power to remove, it should not be

permitted to manipulate the law by usurping

the power to remove.

K.13. ATIENZA V. VILLAROSA

RAMON M. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of OccidentalMindoro, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. VILLAROSA, inhis capacity as Governor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Atienza and respondentVillarosa were the Vice-Governor and Governor,respectively, of the Province of Occidental

Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, the petitioner Vice-Governor received the Memorandum dated June25, 2002 issued by the respondent Governorconcerning the “AUTHORITY TO SIGNPURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES,MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL,REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THESANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.” (JUNE 25,2002)Such purchase orders shall be approved by thegovernor in his capacity as the local chief executive of the province. In reply to thememorandum, the petitioner governor stated

that such purchase orders are included underthose as authorized for signature by the Vice-Chief executive of the Sanggunian on the basisof the DILG Opinion No. 96-1995 as affirmed bythe COA Opinions, and coursing it to theGovernor for his approval is no longernecessary, the fact that [Secs.] 466 and 468, RA7160 already provides for the separation of powers between the executive and legislative.Such authority even includes everythingnecessary for the legislative research programof the Sanggunian.

Unimpressed, the respondent Governor issuedthe Memorandum relating to the “TERMINATIONOF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOBORDER EMPLOYEES AND REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES.” Itterminates all existing contract of employment– casual/job order basis and reappointment of the recommendees – entered into by Vice-Gov.Atienza, it for being unauthirized. (JULY 1,2002). The respondent Governor issued anotherMemorandum regarding the “ENFORCIBILITY(sic) OF PREVIOUS MEMORANDA ISSUED ON

JUNE 20, 26 AND JULY 1, 2002.”

In his letter, the petitioner Vice-Gov. Invokedthe principle of separation of powers as appliedto LGUs. The petitioner Vice-Gov. reiterated hisrequest for the respondent to make a “deepstudy” on the matter before implementing hismemoranda. However, the respondent governorinsisted on obliging the department heads of the provincial government to comply with thememoranda.

Petitioner Vice-Gov. filed a petition with CA for

prohibition assailing the Governor’s Memorandadated June 25 and July 1, 2002, claiming thatsuch memoranda excluded him from the useand enjoyment of his office in violation of RA 7160 or the LGC 1991, and itsimplementing rules and regulations. It prayed



that the respondent governor be enjoined fromimplementing the assailed memoranda.PETITION FOR PROHIBITION – DISMISSED, theCourt citing Sec. 344 of RA 7160.

The CA explained that Section 466(a)(1)[7]of the same Code, relied upon by thepetitioner Vice-Governor, speaks of theauthority of the Vice-Governor to sign

“all warrants drawn on the public treasury forall expenditures appropriated for the operationof the sangguniang panlalawigan.” In declaringthis provision inapplicable, the CA reasonedthat the approval of purchase orders is differentfrom the power of the Vice-Governor to signwarrants drawn against the public treasury.

Anent the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002, theCA ruled that the issue on whether it could beenjoined had already been rendered moot andacademic. The CA pointed out that the subjectof the said memorandum could no longer be

enjoined or restrained as the termination of theemployees had already been effected. It opinedthat where the act sought to be enjoined in theprohibition proceedings had already beenperformed and there is nothing more torestrain, the case is already moot andacademic.

Hence, the instant petition for review oncertiorari was filed, seeking to reverse and setaside the CA’s decision – dismissing his petitionfor prohibition.

ISSUE: Who between the petitioner and therespondent is authorized to approve purchaseorders issued in connection with theprocurement of supplies, materials, equipment,including fuel, repairs and maintenance of theSangguniang Panlalawigan?

RULING: The court held that it is the Vice-Governor who has such authority.

Under Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislativepower for the province is exercised by the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan[13] and the Vice-Governor is its presiding officer. Being vestedwith legislative powers, the SangguniangPanlalawiganenacts ordinances, resolutionsand appropriates funds for the general welfareof the province in accordance with theprovisions of Rep. Act No. 7160. The samestatute vests upon the Vice-Governor the powerto:

(1) Be the presiding officer of thesangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrantsdrawn on the provincial treasury for all

expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

Since it is the Vice-Governor who approvesdisbursement vouchers and approves thepayment for the procurement of the

supplies, materials and equipment neededfor the operation of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, then he also has the authority toapprove the purchase orders to cause thedelivery of the said supplies, materials orequipment.

Indeed, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the

provincial treasury for all expendituresappropriated for the operation of theSangguniang Panlalawigan as well as toapprove disbursement vouchers relating theretois greater and includes the authority toapprove purchase orders for theprocurement of the supplies, materials andequipment necessary for the operation of theSangguniang Panlalawigan.

The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160,therefore, is to vest on theSangguniangPanlalawigan independence in the exercise of

its legislative functions vis-a-vis the dischargeby the Governor of the executive functions. TheMemoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1,2002 of the respondent Governor, whicheffectively excluded the petitioner Vice-Governor, the presiding officer of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, from signing thepurchase orders for the procurement of supplies, materials or equipment needed for theoperation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan aswell as from appointing its casual and job orderemployees, constituted undue interference withthe latter’s functions. The assailed memorandaare clearly not in keeping with the intent of Rep.Act No. 7160 and their implementation shouldthus be permanently enjoined. The petition is GRANTED. The Memorandadated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 issued byrespondent Governor Jose T. Villarosa are NULLAND VOID.

K.14. LATASA V. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS Latasa vs. ComelecFACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected Mayor of Digos, Davao del Sur to 3 three consecutive

terms (1992, 1995, 1998). During his third term,a plebiscite was held to convert Digos into acomponent city (2000). The ratification of theCharter of the City of Digos ended the tenure of Latasa as Mayor. However, he was stillmandated as hold-over mayor of the city untilthe next election.

For the election of 2001, Latasa filed his COC forhis first term as mayor of the city. Heacknowledges that he served as mayor of Digoswhen it was still a municipality. Sunga, also acandidate for mayor, filed a petition to

disqualify Latasa as he already had served asmayor for three consecutive terms in violationof the Local Government Code and theConstitution. Comelec issued a resolution infavor of Sunga and disqualified Latasa. Latasasubmitted a motion for reconsideration which



was not acted upon by the Comelec until theend of the May 14 elections. As a result, Latasawas still able to continue his campaign andeventually won the election. Sunga now alsosought to annul Latasa’s proclamation. Comeleconly rendered its decision denying Latasa’smotion for reconsideration in 2002. Sungaclaims that he should be proclaimed mayor ashe holds the second most number of votes in

2001

ISSUE: WON Latasa is eligible to run ascandidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after heserved for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.

HELD: Latasa cannot serve as Mayor of the newcity of Digos. Latasa having been elected asmayor in 1998, the conversion of Digos from amunicipality to a city in 2000 falls within histerm. As Digos acquired a new corporate

existence, qualifications for its elective positionsalso change. As a result, the Office of theMunicipal Mayor was abolished to make way forthe creation of the Office of the City Mayor.However, under the Charter of the City of Digos,the elective officials of the Municipality of Digosshall have hold-over power until a new electionand the duly elected officials have assumedtheir office. Latasa never ceased to dischargehis duties as Mayor during the conversion of Digos. Also, although Digos was converted intoa city, Digos never redefined its territory, theinhabitants are the same group of voters whoelected petitioner Latasa to be their municipalmayor for three consecutive terms. These arealso the same inhabitants over whom he heldpower and authority as their chief executive fornine years. Sunga’s cannot claim that he beproclaimed as mayor after the disqualificationof Latasa, the SC already ruled that thedisqualification of the winning candidate doesnot entitle the second highest vote earner theposition of mayor. Vacancy be filled bysuccession.

K.15. LACEDA, SR. V. LIMENA

K.16 RIVERA III VS COMMISSION ONELECTIONSFACTS: The case is a resolution of twoconsolidated petitions – one filed by Attys.Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick deGuzman against Marino “Boking Morales, andthe other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, thecandidate who obtained the second highestvote after Morales.

In the May 2004 Synchronized National and

Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking"Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Petitioners filedwith the COMELEC a petition to cancelrespondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on

the ground that he was elected and had servedthree previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacyviolated Section 8, Article X of the Constitutionand Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.

Respondent Morales admitted that he waselected mayor of Mabalacat for the term

commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (firstterm) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (thirdterm), but he served the second term from July1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since hisproclamation as mayor was declared void bythe Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was alsopreventively suspended by the Ombudsman inan anti-graft case from January to July 1999.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales violated thethree-‐term limit rule when he ran for re-‐election as mayor in the 2004 elections.

HELD: For the three-term limit for elective localgovernment officials to apply, two conditions orrequisites must concur, to wit: (1) that theofficial concerned has been elected for threeconsecutive terms in the same localgovernment post, and (2) that he has fullyserved three consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed theposition. He served as mayor until June 30,2001. He was mayor for the entire periodnotwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in theelectoral protest case filed by petitioner Deeousting him (respondent) as mayor. RespondentMorales is now serving his fourth term. He hasbeen mayor of Mabalacat continuously withoutany break since July 1, 1995. In just over amonth, by June 30, 2007, he will have beenmayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuousyears. His assumption of office for the secondterm constituted “service for the full term” andshould be counted as a full term served incontemplation of the three-term limit prescribed

by the constitutional and statutory provisionsbarring local elective officials from beingelected and serving for more than threeconsecutive terms for the same position.

The framers of the Constitution, by includingthis exception, wanted to establish somesafeguards against the excessive accumulationof power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Moralesineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy datedDecember 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Notbeing a candidate, the votes cast for him

SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must beconsidered stray votes.

K.17. DIZON V. COMELEC Case DigestFACTS: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident andtaxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case



with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P.Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat onthe ground that the latter was elected and hadfully served three previous consecutive terms inviolation of Section 43 of the Local GovernmentCode. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipalmayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus,Morales should not have been allowed to havefiled his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007

for the same position and same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that heis still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for thesaid position in the 1998 elections. He averredthat the COMELEC en banc affirmed thedecision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee asthe duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998elections. Thus, he was not elected for the saidposition in the 1998 elections. His term shouldbe reckoned from 2001. He added that hiselection in 2004 is only for his second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicialnotice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera casepromulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was heldthat Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacatin 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding theRTC Decision in an electoral protest case thatthe then proclamation of Morales was void). TheSC ruled in that case that Morales violated thethree-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC.Hence, Morales was considered not a candidatein the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualifyfor the 2004 elections is a gap and allows himto run again for the same position in 2007elections.

Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration beforethe COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En Banc:affirmed. The three-term limit is not applicablehere for: 1) Morales was not the duly -electedmayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June30, 2007 term primordially because he was noteven considered a candidate thereat; and 2)Morales has failed to serve the entire duration

of the term of office because he has alreadyrelinquished the disputed office on May 16,2007 which is more than a month prior to theend of his supposed term.

ISSUES: WON the period served by Morales inthe 2004-2007 term (although he was oustedfrom his office as Mayor on May16, 2007)should be considered his fourth term

HELD: NO. In our decision promulgated on 9May 2007, this Court unseated Morales duringhis fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of

Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. Thiscancellation disqualified Morales from being acandidate in the May 2004 elections. The votescast for Morales were considered stray votes.

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution andSection 43(b) of the Local Government Codestate that the term of office of elective localofficials, except barangay officials, shall bethree years, andno such official shall serve for more than threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuity

of his service for the full term for which he waselected.

There should be a concurrence of twoconditions for the application of thedisqualification: (1) that the official concernedhas been elected for three consecutive terms inthe same local government post and (2) that hehas fully served three consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales waselected as mayor of Mabalacat for fourconsecutive terms:

1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualifiedMorales from his candidacy in the May 2004elections because of the three-term limit.Although the trial court previously ruled thatMorales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 termwas void, there was no interruption of thecontinuity of Morales’ service with respect tothe 1998 - 2001 term because the trial court’sruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, orafter the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’involuntary severance from office with respectto the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severancefrom office for any length of time short of thefull term provided by law amounts to aninterruption of continuity of service. Ourdecision in the Rivera case was promulgated on9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. Thenext day, Morales notified the vice mayor’soffice of our decision. The vice mayor assumedthe office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice

mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter howshort itmay seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not holdoffice for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June2007. (4th term)

K.18. MONTEBON V. COMELEC MontebonVs Comelec FACTS: Petitioners Montebon and Ondoy andrespondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates formunicipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections.

On April 30, 2007, petitioners and othercandidates for municipal councilor filed apetition for disqualification against respondentwith the COMELEC alleging that respondenthad been elected and served three consecutive



terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001,2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he isproscribed from running for the same positionin the 2007 elections as it would be his fourthconsecutive term.

In his answer, respondent argues that he cannotbe disqualified on the ground of the 3 term limitrule because his second term was interrupted

when he assumed the position of vice-mayordue to the retirement of elected vice-mayorPetronilo Mendoza.

Petitioners maintain that respondent'sassumption of office as vice-mayor in January2004 should not be considered an interruptionin the service of his second term since it was avoluntary renunciation of his office as municipalcouncilor. They argued that, according to thelaw (constitution and LGC), voluntaryrenunciation of the office for any length of timeshall not be considered an interruption in the

continuity of service for the full term for whichthe official concerned was elected.

On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Divisiondenied the petition for disqualification rulingthat respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an interruption inthe continuity of his service. His second termhaving been involuntarily interrupted,respondent should thus not be disqualified toseek reelection as municipal councilor.

On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld theruling of the First Division. Petitioners filed theinstant petition for certiorari on the ground thatthe COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent'sassumption of office as vice-mayor in January2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term asmunicipal councilor.

ISSUE: WON the private respondents’assumption of the vice-mayor office, by virtueof succession, can be considered as an effective

disruption in his full service of his second termas councilor.

HELD: YES. In Lonzanida v. Commission onElections, the Court held that the two conditionsfor the application of the disqualificationmust concur: 1) that the officialconcerned has been elected for threeconsecutive terms in the same localgovernment post; and 2) that he has FULLYserved three consecutive terms.

In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the

Court emphasized that the term limit forelective officials must be taken to refer to theright to be elected as well as the right to servein the same elective position. Thus, for thedisqualification to apply, it is not enough thatthe official has been elected three consecutive

times; he must also have served threeconsecutive terms inthe same position.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, theCourt explained the concept of voluntaryrenunciation as follows:

The second sentence of theconstitutional provision under scrutiny

states, ‘Voluntary renunciation of officefor any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in thecontinuity of service for the full term forwhich he was elected.’ The clear intentof the framers of the constitution tobar any attempt to circumvent thethree-term limit by a voluntaryrenunciation of office and at the sametime respect the people’s choice andgrant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.Voluntary renunciation of a term does

not cancel the renounced term in thecomputation of the three term limit;conversely, involuntary severance fromoffice for any length of time short of thefull term provided by law amounts to aninterruption of continuity of service.

While it is undisputed that respondent waselected municipal councilor for threeconsecutive terms, the issue lies on whether heis deemed to have fully served his second termin view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.

Succession in local government offices is byoperation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No.7160, provides that if a permanent vacancyoccurs in the office of the vice mayor, thehighest ranking sanggunian member shallbecome vice mayor.

In this case, a permanent vacancyoccurred in the office of the vice mayordue to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.Respondent, being the highest rankingmunicipal councilor, succeeded him in

accordance with law. Thus, respondent'sassumption of office as vice-mayor in January2004 was an involuntary severance from hisoffice as municipal councilor, resulting in aninterruption in the service of his 2001-2004term. It cannot be deemed to have been byreason of voluntary renunciation because it wasby operation of law.

We quote with approval the ruling of theCOMELEC that –

The legal successor is not given anyoption under the law on whether to

accept the vacated post or not. Section44 of the Local Government Code makesno exception. Only if the highest--‐ranking councilor is permanentlyunable to succeed to the post doesthe law speak of alternate succession.



Under no circumstances can simplerefusal of the official concerned beconsidered as permanent inability withinthe contemplation of law.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated

government office is characteristically not

voluntary since it involves the performance of a

public duty by a government official, the non-

performance of which exposes said official to

possible administrative and criminal charges of

dereliction of duty and neglect in the

performance of public functions. It is therefore

more compulsory and obligatory rather than

voluntary.

BOLOS V COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong

Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3

consecutive terms (1994,1997, 2002).

In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for

Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He

assumed office on July 1, 2004 leaving his post as

Punong Barangay.

After serving his term as a councilor he filed his

candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in

the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang

Kabataan Elections. Cinconiegue, then incumbent

Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the

same office, filed a petition for disqualification on

the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the

maximum limit of three term hence no longereligible to run and hold the position in

accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the

Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the

Local Government Code of 1991.

Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’

relinquishment of the position of Punong

Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part,

as it could be presumed that it was his personal

decision to run as municipal councilor in the May14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added

that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed

the position, there would be a voluntary

renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.

In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he

assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan

member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by

operation of law; hence, it must be considered as

an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his

last term of service.

Pending the resolution of the case before the

COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.

The COMELEC resolved the petition in favor of

Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has already

served the maximum three consecutive term for

an office and thus disqualified to run for the same

office. It further ordered that the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be

succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local

Government Code.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a voluntaryrenunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by

Bolos Jr. when he assumed the post of Municipal

Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for

three consecutive terms.

Held:

YES. The three-term limit for elective official is

contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution

states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective

local officials, except barangay officials,

which shall be determined by law, shall be

three years and no such official shall serve

for more than three consecutive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any

length of time shall not be considered as an

interruption in the continuity of his service

for the full term for which he was elected.”



The Local Government Code provides for the

term of office of Barangay Officials:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local

elective official shall serve for more than

three (3) consecutive terms in the same

position. Voluntary renunciation of the

office for any length of time shall not be

considered as an interruption in the

continuity of service for the full term for

which the elective official concerned was

elected.

(c) The term of barangay officials and

members of the sangguniangkabataan shall be for five (5) years, which

shall begin after the regular election of

barangay officials on the second Monday of

May 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang

kabataan members who were elected in the

May 1996 elections shall serve until the

next regular election of barangay officials.

Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the

three-term limit, embodied in the Constitutionand the Local Government Code, has two parts: x

x x The first part provides that an elective local

official cannot serve for more than three

consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only

consecutive terms count in determining the

three-term limit rule. The second part states that

voluntary renunciation of office for any length of

time does not interrupt the continuity of service.

The clear intent is that involuntary severance

from office for any length of time interrupts

continuity of service and prevents the servicebefore and after the interruption from being

joined together to form a continuous service or

consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local

official cannot seek immediate reelection for a

fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the

next regular election for the same office following

the end of the third consecutive term.

In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court stated that

the second part of the rule on the three-term

limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the

Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the

three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of

office and at the same time respect the people’s

choice and grant their elected official full service

of a term. The Court held that two conditions for

the application of the disqualification must

concur: (1) that the official concerned has been

elected for three consecutive terms in the samegovernment post; and (2) that he has fully served

three consecutive terms.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was

elected as Punong Barangay for three

consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition

for disqualification.

What is to be determined is whether petitioner is

deemed to have voluntarily renounced his

position as Punong Barangay during his third

term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang

Bayan member and assumed said office.

The Court agrees with the COMELEC that

petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of

Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a

consequence of his assumption to office asSangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on

July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.

When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy

for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not

deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts

attending his pursuit of his election as municipal

councilor point out to an intent and readiness to

give up his post as Punong Barangay onceelected to the higher elective office, for it was

very unlikely that respondent had filed his

Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang

Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the

municipal electorate to vote for him as such and

then after being elected and proclaimed, return

to his former position. He knew that his election

as municipal councilor would entail abandonment

of the position he held, and he intended to forego

of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he

assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan

member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by



operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his

third term as Punong Barangay.

The term "operation of law" is defined by the

Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term

describing the fact that rights may be acquired or

lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of

the person affected." Black's Law Dictionary also

defines it as a term that "expresses the manner

in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve

upon a person by the mere application to the

particular transaction of the established rules of

law, without the act or cooperation of the party

himself.

An interruption in the service of a term of office,

by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v.Comelec and Borja vs. Comelec. In this case,

petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by

operation of law. He instead relinquished his

office as Punong Barangay during his third term

when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang

Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed

a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong

Barangay. (Bolos v. Comelec, G.R. No.

184082, March 17, 2009)

Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009

Facts:

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was

elected to the said office for three consecutive

terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In

September 2005, during his third term of office,the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day

preventive suspension against him in relation to

a criminal case. The said suspension order was

subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo

resumed the performance of the functions of his

office.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners

Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and

Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to

deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of

candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he

had been elected and had served for three terms;

his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated

the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article

X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA

7160

Issue:

Whether Asilo’s preventive suspension

constituted an interruption that allowed him to

run for a 4th term?

Held:

The “interruption” of a term exempting an

elective official from the three-term limit rule is

one that involves no less than the involuntary

loss of title to office. The elective official must

have involuntarily left his office for a length of

time, however short, for an effective interruption

to occur.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by

operation of law, being involuntary, is an

effective interruption of service within a

term. On the other hand, temporary inability or

disqualification to exercise the functions of an

elective post, even if involuntary, should not be

considered an effective interruption of a term

because it does not involve the loss of title tooffice or at least an effective break from holding

office; the office holder, while retaining title, is

simply barred from exercising the functions of his

office for a reason provided by law.

Preventive suspension – whether under the Local

Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act – is

an interim remedial measure to address the

situation of an official who have been charged



administratively or criminally, where the

evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of

or potential for eventual guilt or liability. Notably

in all cases of preventive suspension, the

suspended official is barred from performing the

functions of his office and does not receive salary

in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and losetitle to his office; loss of office is a consequence

that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt

or liability. This was what exactly happened to

Asilo.

Hence, the preventive suspension of public

officials (Asilo) does not interrupt their term for

purposes of the three-term limit rule under the

Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA

7160).

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012

EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner, vs.

COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D.

ANTlPOLO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking

to review and nullify the Resolution2 dated 2

February 2011 and the Order3 dated 12 January

2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo D.

Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The

petition asserts that the COMELEC issued the

Resolution and Order with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.

The Facts

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D.

Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of

San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National

and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate

of candidacy on 1 December 2009.4 On 8

December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo)

filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny

due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of

candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida waselected, and had served, as mayor of San

Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms

immediately prior to the term for the May 2010

elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made

a false material representation in his certificate

of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath

that he was eligible for the office he sought

election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987

Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local

Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective

official from being elected and serving for morethan three consecutive terms for the same

position.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a

Resolution7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling

Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Pertinent

portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read:

Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held

the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for

more than nine consecutive years. Instead heraised arguments to forestall or dismiss the

petition on the grounds other than the main issue

itself. We find such arguments as wanting.

Respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of

mayor for more than three consecutive terms,

went against the three-term limit rule; therefore,

he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010

elections. It is time to infuse new blood in the

political arena of San Antonio.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instantpetition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of

Candidacy of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida

for the position of mayor in the municipality of

San Antonio, Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His

name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of

Official Candidates for the position of Mayor of

San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010

elections.

SO ORDERED.8

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the

COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the

May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel

Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of



votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor

and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor

before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond

C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July

2010.9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the

Department of Interior and Local Government

(DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether,as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume

the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s

disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S.

201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to

hold office by reason of his criminal conviction.

As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification,

the Office of the Mayor was deemed permanently

vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of

the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice

to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s

motion for reconsideration. In another letterdated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG

to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of

San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24

August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo

allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the

permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio,

Zambales without prejudice however to the

outcome of the cases pending before the

[COMELEC]."11

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issueda Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from

running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The

COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two

grounds: first , Lonzanida had been elected and

had served as Mayor for more than three

consecutive terms without interruption; and

second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final

judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under

the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was

sentenced for each count of falsification to

imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional as minimum, to eight (8)

years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as

maximum. The judgment of conviction became

final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this

Court in Lonzanida v. People,13 before Lonzanida

filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December

2009. Pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010

Resolution read:

Prescinding from the foregoing premises,

Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of SanAntonio, Zambales for more than three (3)

consecutive terms and for having been convicted

by a final judgment of a crime punishable by

more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is

clearly disqualified to run for the same position in

the May 2010 Elections.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion

for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.14

On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion forLeave to Intervene and to Admit Attached

Petition-in-Intervention.15 She claimed her right to

be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio,

Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a

candidate when the COMELEC Second Division,

through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered

the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy

and the striking out of his name from the list of

official candidates for the position of Mayor of

San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010

elections.

In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea

asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who

received the second highest number of votes,

could not be proclaimed as the winning

candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was

not yet final during election day, the votes cast in

his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s

subsequent disqualification resulted in a

permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and

Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, wasmandated by Section 4416 of the Local

Government Code to succeed as Mayor.

The COMELEC’s Rulings

The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12

January 2011, stating:

Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and

to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed

by Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant tothe power of this Commission to suspend its

Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of

justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:

1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;

2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by

Antipolo;

3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO

LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL ARATEA,proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales,

to file their respective Comments on the Petition-

in- Intervention within a non-extendible period of

five (5) days from receipt thereof;



4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-

Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at

10:00 a.m. COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor,

Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila.

WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for

their information and compliance.

SO ORDERED.17

In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the

COMELEC En Banc no longer considered

Lonzanida’s qualification as an issue: "It is

beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold

and discharge the functions of the Office of the

Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue

to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the

vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s

disqualification."18 The Resolution further stated:

We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor

Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be

proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo

[sic] for being a second placer in the elections.

The teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De

Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC,

et al., while they remain sound jurisprudence find

no application in the case at bar. What sets this

case apart from the cited jurisprudence is that

the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification and

ineligibility to hold public office is establishedboth in fact and in law on election day itself.

Hence, Lonzanida’s name, as already ordered by

the Commission on February 18, 2010 should

have been stricken off from the list of official

candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

Commission hereby:

1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of

respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA;

2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela

D. Antipolo;

3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a

Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to

PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the

duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales;

4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease

and desist from discharging the functions of theOffice of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-

over of the said office to Antipolo upon her

proclamation; and

5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as

well as the Regional Election Director of Region III

to cause the implementation of this Resolution

and disseminate it to the Department of Interior

and Local Government.

SO ORDERED.19

Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February2011.

The Issues

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy

in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,

Zambales is dependent upon the determination

of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was

disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus

Election Code, or made a false material

representation under Section 78 of the sameCode that resulted in his certificate of

candidacy being void ab initio, is

determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is

the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of

San Antonio, Zambales.

The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2

February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011

Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected

Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be

declared Mayor pursuant to the LocalGovernment Code’s rule on succession.

The dissenting opinions make three grave errors:

first , they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a

false representation in the certificate of

candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms

elected and served is a material fact that is a

ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of

candidacy under Section 78; second, they ignore

that a false representation as to eligibility to run

for public office due to the fact that the candidatesuffers from perpetual special disqualification is a

material fact that is a ground for a petition to

cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section

78; and third, they resort to a strained statutory

construction to conclude that the violation of the

three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for

cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under

Section 78, even when it is clear and plain that

violation of the three-term limit rule is an

ineligibility affecting the qualification of a

candidate to elective office.

The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous

ground when they assert that a candidate’s

eligibility to the office he seeks election must be



strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e.,

age, citizenship, or residency, among others,

which the law requires him to state in his COC,

and which he must swear under oath to possess.

The dissenting opinions choose to view a false

certification of a candidate’s eligibility on the

three-term limit rule not as a ground for false

material representation under Section 78 but as a

ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is clearly contrary to well-

established jurisprudence.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second

placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because

Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab

initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate

at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes.

Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate,actually garnered the highest number of votes for

the position of Mayor.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points

to the Local Government Code for the

qualifications of elective local officials.

Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section

40 of the Local Government Code provide in

pertinent part:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local

official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality,

city or province x x x; a resident therein for at

least one (1) year immediately preceding the day

of the election; and able to read and write Filipino

or any other local language or dialect.

x x x x

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-

mayor of independent component cities,

component cities, or municipalities must be at

least twenty-one (21) years of age on election

day.

x x x x

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons

are disqualified from running for any elective

local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for

an offense involving moral turpitude or for

an offense punishable by one (1) year or

more of imprisonment, within two (2) years

after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an

administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for

violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-

political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or

those who have acquired the right to reside

abroad and continue to avail of the same right

after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasissupplied)

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code

provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has

been declared by competent authority insane or

incompetent, or has been sentenced by final

judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion

or for any offense for which he was

sentenced to a penalty of more thaneighteen months or for a crime involving

moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a

candidate and to hold any office, unless he has

been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein

provided shall be deemed removed upon the

declaration by competent authority that said

insanity or incompetence had been removed or

after the expiration of a period of five years from

his service of sentence, unless within the sameperiod he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis

supplied)

The grounds for disqualification for a petition

under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code

are specifically enumerated:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who,

in an action or protest in which he is a party is

declared by final decision by a competent court

guilty of, or found by the Commission of having(a) given money or other material

consideration to influence, induce or

corrupt the voters or public officials

performing electoral functions; (b)



committed acts of terrorism to enhance his

candidacy; (c) spent in his election

campaign an amount in excess of that

allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received

or made any contribution prohibited under

Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated

any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,

paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph

6, shall be disqualified from continuing as acandidate, or if he has been elected, from holding

the office. Any person who is a permanent

resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country

shall not be qualified to run for any elective office

under this Code, unless said person has waived

his status as permanent resident or immigrant of

a foreign country in accordance with the

residence requirement provided for in the

election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

A petition for disqualification under Section 68clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited

acts and possession of a permanent resident

status in a foreign country."20 All the offenses

mentioned in Section 68 refer to election

offenses under the Omnibus Election Code,

not to violations of other penal laws. There

is absolutely nothing in the language of Section

68 that would justify including violation of the

three-term limit rule, or conviction by final

judgment of the crime of falsification under the

Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds oroffenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr.

v. de Venecia,21 this Court ruled:

[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify

candidates is limited to those enumerated in

Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All

other election offenses are beyond the ambit of

COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not

administrative in nature. x x x

Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final

judgment of the crime of falsification under the

Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground

for a petition under Section 68.

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states

that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or

cancelled when there is false material

representation of the contents of thecertificate of candidacy:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel

a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition

seeking to deny due course or to cancel a

certificate of candidacy may be filed by the

person exclusively on the ground that any

material representation contained therein

as required under Section 74 hereof is false.

The petition may be filed at any time not later

than twenty-five days from the time of the filing

of the certificate of candidacy and shall be

decided, after due notice and hearing, not laterthan fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis

supplied)

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details

the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒

The certificate of candidacy shall state that

the person filing it is announcing his candidacy

for the office stated therein and that he is

eligible for said office; if for Member of theBatasang Pambansa, the province, including its

component cities, highly urbanized city or district

or sector which he seeks to represent; the

political party to which he belongs; civil status;

his date of birth; residence; his post office

address for all election purposes; his profession

or occupation; that he will support and defend

the Constitution of the Philippines and will

maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that

he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees

promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant

to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed

by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without

mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and

that the facts stated in the certificate of

candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections

was thus required to provide 12 items of information in the certificate of candidacy:22

name; nickname or stage name; gender; age;

place of birth; political party that nominated the

candidate; civil status; residence/address;

profession or occupation; post office address for

election purposes; locality of which the candidate

is a registered voter; and period of residence in

the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The

candidate also certifies four statements: a

statement that the candidate is a natural born or

naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that thecandidate is not a permanent resident of, or

immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement

that the candidate is eligible for the office

he seeks election; and a statement of the



candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines.23 The certificate of

candidacy should also be under oath, and filed

within the period prescribed by law.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment,

with the penalty of prisión mayor , disqualifies

him perpetually from holding any public

office, or from being elected to any publicoffice. This perpetual disqualification took

effect upon the finality of the judgment of

conviction, before Lonzanida filed his

certificate of candidacy. The pertinent

provisions of the Revised Penal Code are as

follows:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. —

The duration of the penalties of prisiónmayor and temporary disqualification shall

be from six years and one day to twelve

years, except when the penalty of

disqualification is imposed as an accessory

penalty, in which case, it shall be that of

the principal penalty.

x x x x

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or

temporary absolute disqualification. — Thepenalties of perpetual or temporary absolute

disqualification for public office shall produce

the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and

employments which the offender may have

held, even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any

election for any popular elective office or to

be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or

public employments and for the exercise of

any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such

disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2

and 3 of this article shall last during the term of

the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or otherpension for any office formerly held.


temporary special disqualification. — The

penalties of perpetual or temporary special

disqualification for public office, profession

or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment,

profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices

or employments either perpetually or during theterm of the sentence, according to the extent of

such disqualification.


temporary special disqualification for the

exercise of the right of suffrage. — The

perpetual or temporary special

disqualification for the exercise of the right

of suffrage shall deprive the offender

perpetually or during the term of the

sentence, according to the nature of saidpenalty, of the right to vote in any popular

election for any public office or to be elected to

such office. Moreover, the offender shall

not be permitted to hold any public office

during the period of his disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties.

— The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it

that of temporary absolute disqualification

and that of perpetual special disqualification

from the right of suffrage which the offender shallsuffer although pardoned as to the principal

penalty, unless the same shall have been

expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis

supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically

carries with it, by operation of law,24 the

accessory penalties of temporary absolute

disqualification and perpetual special

disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised

Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualificationproduces the effect of "deprivation of the right to

vote in any election for any popular elective

office or to be elected to such office.” The

duration of temporary absolute disqualification is

the same as that of the principal penalty of

prisión mayor . On the other hand, under Article

32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual

special disqualification means that "the

offender shall not be permitted to hold any

public office during the period of his

disqualification,” which is perpetually. Bothtemporary absolute disqualification and

perpetual special disqualification constitute

ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A

person suffering from these ineligibilities is



ineligible to run for elective public office,

and commits a false material

representation if he states in his certificate

of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking

through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import

of the accessory penalty of perpetual special

disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes,

it must be remembered that appellee’s

conviction of a crime penalized with prision

mayor which carried the accessory penalties of

temporary absolute disqualification and

perpetual special disqualification from the right of

suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and

Section 99 of the Revised Election Code

disqualifies a person from voting if he had been

sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year ormore of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute

disqualification disqualifies the convict for public

office and for the right to vote, such

disqualification to last only during the term of the

sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30,

Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes,

would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to theother accessory penalty of perpetual special

disqualification for the exercise of the right of

suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the

convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or

hold public office perpetually , as distinguished

from temporary special disqualification, which

lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32,

Revised Penal Code, provides:


temporary special disqualification for theexercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual

or temporary special disqualification for the

exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the

offender perpetually or during the term of the

sentence, according to the nature of said penalty,

of the right to vote in any popular election for any

public office or to be elected to such office.

Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to

hold any public office during the period of

disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during

the term of the sentence" should be applied

distributively to their respective antecedents;

thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the

perpetual kind of special disqualification, while

the phrase "during the term of the sentence"

refers to the temporary special disqualification.

The duration between the perpetual and the

temporary (both special) are necessarily different

because the provision, instead of merging their

durations into one period, states that such

duration is "according to the nature of said

penalty" — which means according to whetherthe penalty is the perpetual or the temporary

special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory

penalty of perpetual special disqualification

"deprives the convict of the right to vote or

to be elected to or hold public office

perpetually.”

The accessory penalty of perpetual special

disqualification takes effect immediatelyonce the judgment of conviction becomes

final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty

does not depend on the duration of the principal

penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail

sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32

states that "the offender shall not be permitted

to hold any public office during the period of his

[perpetual special] disqualification." Once the

judgment of conviction becomes final, it is

immediately executory. Any public office that the

convict may be holding at the time of hisconviction becomes vacant upon finality of the

judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible

to run for any elective public office

perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he

became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to

run for, any elective public office from the

time the judgment of conviction against

him became final. The judgment of

conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009

and became final on 23 October 2009,

before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground

for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code because this accessory penalty is

an ineligibility, which means that the convict is

not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the

statement that Section 74 requires him to state

under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this

Court held in Fermin v. Commission on

Elections,

27

the false material representation mayrefer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who

suffers from perpetual special disqualification is

ineligible to run for public office. If a person

suffering from perpetual special disqualification



files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath

that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as

expressly required under Section 74, then he

clearly makes a false material representation

that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

As this Court explained in Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due

course to or the cancellation of the CoC is notbased on the lack of qualifications but on a

finding that the candidate made a material

representation that is false, which may relate

to the qualifications required of the public

office he/she is running for. It is noted that

the candidate states in his/her CoC that

he/she is eligible for the office he/she

seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is

to be read in relation to the constitutional

and statutory provisions on qualifications

or eligibility for public office. If thecandidate subsequently states a material

representation in the CoC that is false, the

COMELEC, following the law, is empowered

to deny due course to or cancel such

certificate. Indeed, the Court has already

likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo

warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the

OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or

qualification of a candidate, with the distinction

mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is

filed before proclamation, while a petition for quowarranto is filed after proclamation of the

winning candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied)

Latasa, Rivera and Ong:

The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for

Ineligibility

Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that

he is eligible for the public office he seeks

election. Thus, Section 74 states that "thecertificate of candidacy shall state that the

person filing x x x is eligible for said office.”

The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the

establishment of political dynasties and to

enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice,29 is

found both in the Constitution30 and the law.31

After being elected and serving for three

consecutive terms, an elective local official

cannot seek immediate reelection for the same

office in the next regular election32 because he is

ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run forelective public office is not "eligible for [the]

office." As used in Section 74, the word

"eligible"33 means having the right to run for

elective public office, that is, having all the

qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run

for the public office.

In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner

Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the

Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992,

1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was

converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s

third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections.

Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed before

the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course,

cancel certificate of candidacy and/or

disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground

that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate

of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of

Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make

any false representation. In his certificate of

candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the

phrase "I am eligible" and indicated "*

Havingserved three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and

now running for the first time as city mayor." The

COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa’s

certificate of candidacy for violation of the three-

term limit rule but not for false material

representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC

En Banc’s denial of Latasa’s motion for

reconsideration.

We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of

candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission onElections (Rivera).35 We held that Morales

exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having

been elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat

for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998

to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We

declared him ineligible as a candidate for the

same position for the 2007 to 2010 term.

Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’

violation of the three-term limit rule constituted

false material representation, we nonetheless

granted the petition to cancel Morales’ certificateof candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed

the cancellation of Francis Ong’s certificate of

candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition

to disqualify, deny due course and cancel" Ong’s

certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was

predicated on the violation of the three-term limit

rule.

Loong, Fermin and Munder:

When Possession of a Disqualifying ConditionisNot a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification

It is obvious from a reading of the laws and

jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the



grounds for eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis

qualifications and disqualifications. For example,

a candidate may represent that he is a resident

of a particular Philippine locality37 when he is

actually a permanent resident of another

country.38 In cases of such overlap, the petitioner

should not be constrained in his choice of remedy

when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes

available multiple remedies.39 Section 78 allowsthe filing of a petition to deny due course or to

cancel a certificate of candidacy before the

election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a

petition for quo warranto after the election.

Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should

not confuse a petition for disqualification using

grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition

to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy under Section 78.

The distinction between a petition under Section68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed

in Loong v. Commission on Elections40 with

respect to the applicable prescriptive period.

Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition

under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner

Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional Vice-

Governor of the Autonomous Government of

Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to

his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the

election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25

day period from the last day of filing certificatesof candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalum’s

petition was one based on false representation

under Section 78, and not for disqualification

under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive

period provided in Section 78 should be strictly

applied. We recognized the possible gap in the

law:

It is true that the discovery of false

representation as to material facts required to be

stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse

of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of

the Code, through no fault of the person who

discovers such misrepresentations and who

would want the disqualification of the candidate

committing the misrepresentations. It would

seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a

gap between the time of the discovery of the

misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made

after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code

has lapsed) and the time when the proclamationof the results of the election is made. During this

so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who

would seek the disqualification of the candidate)

is left with nothing to do except to wait for the

proclamation of the results, so that he could avail

of a remedy against the misrepresenting

candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo

warranto against him. Respondent Commission

sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap

which, according to it, is unnecessary and should

be remedied.

At the same time, it can not be denied that it isthe purpose and intent of the legislative branch

of the government to fix a definite time within

which petitions of protests related to eligibility of

candidates for elective offices must be filed, as

seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code.

Respondent Commission may have seen the

need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap",

but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does

not provide, its function not being legislative. The

question of whether the time to file these

petitions or protests is too short or ineffective isone for the Legislature to decide and remedy.41

In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue

of a candidate’s possession of the required one-

year residency requirement was raised in a

petition for disqualification under Section 68

instead of a petition to deny due course or to

cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section

78. Despite the question of the one-year

residency being a proper ground under Section

78, Dilangalen, the petitioner before theCOMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and

5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 780043

and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin,

we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or resolution

cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments

that distinguish the grounds for

disqualification from those of ineligibility,

and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said

grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only

be premised on a ground specified in Section 12

or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition

questioning a candidate’s possession of the

required one-year residency requirement, as

distinguished from permanent residency or

immigrant status in a foreign country, should be

filed under Section 78, and a petition under

Section 68 is the wrong remedy.

In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45

petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of

candidacy for Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip

filed a petition for Munder’s disqualification on 13

April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder

misrepresented that he was a registered voter of



Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible

to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was

not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s

registration. Moreover, Munder’s certificate of

candidacy was not accomplished in full as he

failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his

thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division

dismissed Sarip’s petition and declared that his

grounds are not grounds for disqualificationunder Section 68 but for denial or cancellation of

Munder’s certificate of candidacy under Section

78. Sarip’s petition was filed out of time as he

had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s

certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December

2009, within which to file his petition.

The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified

Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second

Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on

the propriety of Sarip’s remedy but focused onthe question of whether Munder was a registered

voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court

reinstated the COMELEC Second Division’s

resolution. This Court ruled that the ground

raised in the petition, lack of registration as voter

in the locality where he was running as a

candidate, is inappropriate for a petition for

disqualification. We further declared that with our

ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the

claim that lack of substantive qualifications of a

candidate is a ground for a petition fordisqualification under Section 68. The only

substantive qualification the absence of which is

a ground for a petition under Section 68 is the

candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant

status in a foreign country.

The dissenting opinions place the violation of the

three-term limit rule as a disqualification under

Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status,

circumstance or condition which bars him from

running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the

[Local Government Code]." In so holding the

dissenting opinions write in the law what is not

found in the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the

proper grounds for disqualification under said

Section. The grounds for filing a petition for

disqualification under Section 68 are specifically

enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to

the specific enumeration in Section 68 and

contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the

dissenting opinions add to the enumeratedgrounds the violation of the three-term limit rule

and falsification under the Revised Penal Code,

which are obviously not found in the enumeration

in Section 68.

The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s

possession of a disqualifying condition (violation

of the three-term limit rule) with the grounds for

disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is

explicit as to the proper grounds for

disqualification: the commission of specific

prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code

and possession of a permanent residency or

immigrant status in a foreign country. Any otherfalse representation regarding a material fact

should be filed under Section 78, specifically

under the candidate’s certification of his

eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-

term limit as a condition for eligibility, the

dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation,

ignoring the verba legis doctrine and well-

established jurisprudence on this very issue.

In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is

asked to certify under oath his eligibility, andthus qualification, to the office he seeks election.

Even though the certificate of candidacy does not

specifically ask the candidate for the number of

terms elected and served in an elective position,

such fact is material in determining a candidate’s

eligibility, and thus qualification for the office.

Election to and service of the same local elective

position for three consecutive terms renders a

candidate ineligible from running for the same

position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida

misrepresented his eligibility because he knewfull well that he had been elected, and had

served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for

more than three consecutive terms yet he still

certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for

the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s

representation that he was eligible for the office

that he sought election constitutes false material

representation as to his qualification or eligibility

for the office.

Legal Duty of COMELECto Enforce PerpetualSpecial Disqualification

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a

legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy

of anyone suffering from perpetual special

disqualification to run for public office by virtue of

a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment

of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of

the disqualification of the convict from running

for public office. The law itself bars the convictfrom running for public office, and the

disqualification is part of the final judgment of

conviction. The final judgment of the court is

addressed not only to the Executive branch, but



also to other government agencies tasked to

implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly

mentioned in the judgment to implement the

disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of

the final judgment on disqualification to run for

elective public office is addressed to the

COMELEC because under the Constitution theCOMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and

administer all laws and regulations relative to

the conduct of an election."46 The disqualification

of a convict to run for elective public office under

the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final

judgment of a competent court, is part of the

enforcement and administration of "all the

laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio

cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much

less to valid votes.47 We quote from the

COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution with

approval:

As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission

speaking through the Second Division had

already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s

certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his

name in the list of official candidates for themayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales.

Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its

resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously

affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida.

Our findings were likewise sustained by the

Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of

Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground.

On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En

Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification

is two-pronged: first, he violated the

constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; andsecond, as early as December 1, 2009, he is

known to have been convicted by final judgment

for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article

171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on

election day, respondent Lonzanida’s

disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in

law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was

never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of]

San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him

should be considered stray votes. Consequently,

Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the solequalified candidate for the mayoralty post and

obtained the highest number of votes, should

now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of

San Antonio, Zambales.48 (Boldfacing and

underscoring in the original; italicization

supplied)

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was

cancelled because he was ineligible or not

qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1 Whether his

certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or

after the elections is immaterial because the

cancellation on such ground means he was nevera candidate from the very beginning, his

certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.

There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor

in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who

therefore received the highest number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The

Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order

dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane

in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The

COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute aSpecial Municipal Board of Canvassers to

proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected

Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren

Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist

from discharging the functions of the Office of the

Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA,

Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 197015

PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA

RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A. ALCALA,

Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

In focus in these consolidated special civil actions

are the disqualification of a substitute who was



proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election;

and the ascertainment of who should assume the

office following the substitute’s disqualification.

The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to

annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution

issued on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the

dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January

11, 2011 Resolution of the Second Division;

2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of

Roderick A. Alcala;

3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of

respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of

Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor;

4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to

cease and desist from discharging the functions

of the Office of the Mayor;

5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office

of the Mayor of Lucena City, the proclaimed Vice-

Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as

provided under Section 44 of the LocalGovernment Code;

6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the

Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to

the Office of the President of the Philippines, the

Department of Interior and Local Government,

the Department of Finance and the Secretary of

the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City.

Let the Department of Interior and Local

Government and the Regional Election Director of Region IV of COMELEC implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.1

Antecedents

On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009,

Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo

(Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of

candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of

Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May10, 2010 national and local elections.2

Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-

CMD,3 declared in his CoC that he was eligible for

the office he was seeking to be elected to.

Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo

filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated

as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due

Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of

Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already

Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City

Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC).4 He alleged

therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had

been elected and had served three consecutive

terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC

for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010

national and local elections.

The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:

1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, anda resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing, Lucena

City but may be served with summons and other

processes of this Commission at the address of

his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City

4301;

2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of

legal age, married, and a resident of Barangay

Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal

address at the Office of the City Mayor, City Hall,

Lucena City, where he may be served withsummons and other processes of this

Commission;

3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of

Lucena having been elected during the 2007

local elections, is running for city mayor of

Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10

May 2010 local elections and has filed his

certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena;

4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local

elections based on the records of the Commission

on Elections of Lucena City and had fully served

the aforesaid three (3) terms without any

voluntary and involuntary interruption;

5. Except the preventive suspension imposed

upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14 November

2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October

2009 pursuant to Sandiganbayan 4th Division

Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3October 2005, the public service as city mayor of

the respondent is continuous and uninterrupted

under the existing laws and jurisprudence;



6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the

filing of the certificate of candidacy of the

respondent, hence, such act is outrightly

unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;

7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected

for and had fully served three (3) consecutive

terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his

Certificate of Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucenafor this coming 10 May 2010 national and local

elections;

8. Under the Constitution and existing Election

Laws, New Local Government Code of the

Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is

no longer entitled and is already disqualified to

be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term;

9. The filing of the respondent for the position of

city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and ispotentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers

of the City of Lucena; and

10. It is most respectfully prayed by the

petitioner that the respondent be declared

disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public

office as city mayor of Lucena City based on the

existing law and jurisprudence.5

The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to

wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is

respectfully prayed that the Certificate of

Candidacy filed by the respondent be denied due

course to or cancel the same and that he be

declared as a disqualified candidate under the

existing Election Laws and by the provisions of

the New Local Government Code.6 (Emphasis

supplied.)

Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayanhad preventively suspended him from office

during his second and third terms; and that the

three-term limit rule did not then apply to him

pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence7 to the

effect that an involuntary separation from office

amounted to an interruption of continuity of

service for purposes of the application of the

three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the

Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.Commission on Elections,8 holding that

preventive suspension, being a mere temporary

incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding

the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on

December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC

a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking

into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino.

Relevant portions of his Manifestation with

Motion to Resolve are quoted herein, viz:

4. When respondent filed his certificate of

candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena

City, the rule that ‘where the separation fromoffice is caused by reasons beyond the control of

the officer – i.e. involuntary – the service of term

is deemed interrupted’ has not yet been

overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme

Court. As a matter of fact, the prevailing rule

then of the Honorable Commission in [sic]

respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its

decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo

where it stated:

"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the2004 elections, which was supposedly his third

and final term as city councilor, the same cannot

be treated as a complete service or full term in

office since the same was interrupted when he

was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth

Division. And the respondent actually heeded the

suspension order since he did not receive his

salary during the period October 16-31 and

November 1-15 by reason of his actual

suspension from office. And this was further

bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a

Memorandum directing him, among others, to

reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.)

5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the

part of respondent as would constitute a ground

for the denial of due course to and/or the

cancellation of respondent’s certificate of

candidacy at the time he filed the same.

Petitioner’s ground for the denial of due course to

and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificateof candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law,

as there is no ground to warrant such relief under

the Omnibus Election Code and/or its

implementing laws.

6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the

Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the

three (3)-term limitation, respondent

acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to

run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City

having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) termsas Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his

certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections.

7. In view of the foregoing premises and new



jurisprudence on the matter, respondent

respectfully submits the present case for decision

declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the

position of Mayor of Lucena City.9

Notwithstanding his express recognition of his

disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in

the May 10, 2010 national and local elections,

Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.

Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to

Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a

Resolution on April 19, 2010,10 disposing as

follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon

Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to

run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010

National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for

Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010

Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.11 Later

on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010

an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the

Pending Motion for Reconsideration.12 At 4:30

p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her

own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitutionof Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of

Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by

Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated

Ramon.13

On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on

Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal,

declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution

dated April 19, 2010 final and executory.14

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the

votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of

Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate,

resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately

credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s

39,615 votes.15

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board

of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of

Barbara Ruby’s proclamation.16

It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC

En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law

Department,17 gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s

CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917,

thereby including her in the certified list of

candidates.18 Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed

Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of

Lucena City.19

On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for

Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC,20

docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara

Ruby could not substitute Ramon because hisCoC had been cancelled and denied due course;

and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a

candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had

approved her substitution three days after the

elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should

be considered stray.

In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of

Proclamation,21 Barbara Ruby maintained the

validity of her substitution. She countered that

the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course toor cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of

his disqualification, because there was no finding

that he had committed misrepresentation, the

ground for the denial of due course to or

cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her

valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No.

900622 applied, based on which the votes cast for

Ramon were properly counted in her favor.

On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the

duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought tointervene,23 positing that he should assume the

post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s

substitution had been invalid and Castillo had

clearly lost the elections.

On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second

Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s

petition-in-intervention,24 holding:

In the present case, Castillo was notified of

Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was thebasis for the proclamation of Ruby on that date.

He, however, failed to file any action within the

prescribed period either in the Commission or the

Supreme Court assailing the said resolution.

Thus, the said resolution has become final and

executory. It cannot anymore be altered or

reversed.

x x x x

x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed byCastillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was

actually for the disqualification of Ramon for

having served three consecutive terms, which is

a ground for his disqualification under the



Constitution in relation to Section 4(b)3 of

Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein

that Ramon has committed material

representation that would be a ground for the

cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of

Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election

Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the

petition as one for disqualification as gleaned

from the body of the resolution and its dispositiveportion quoted above. This treatment of the First

Division of the petition as one for disqualification

only is affirmed by the fact that its members

signed Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly

stated that the First Division only disqualified

Ramon.

Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid

down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable.

Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such,

the votes for Ramon cannot be considered asstray votes but should be counted in favor of

Ruby since the substituted and the substitute

carry the same surname – Talaga, as provided in

Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.

x x x x

Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus

Election Code or any election laws for that matter

which requires that the substitution and the

Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute shouldbe approved and given due course first by the

Commission or the Law Department before it can

be considered as effective. All that Section 77 of

the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by

Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that

it should be filed with the proper office. The

respondent is correct when she argued that in

fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a

substitute candidate in case the cause for the

substitution happened between the day before

the election and mid-day of election day. Thus,even if the approval of the substitution was made

after the election, the substitution became

effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with

the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance.

There being no irregularity in the substitution by

Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena

City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor

of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of

Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order.

Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul theproclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C.

Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of

Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10,

2010.25

Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions

for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc issued

the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011

reversing the COMELEC Second Division’s

ruling.26

Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not

attain finality for being issued without a hearing

as a mere incident of the COMELEC’s ministerialduty to receive the COCs of substitute

candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based

on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramon’s

disqualification was resolved with finality only on

May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded

that Barbara Ruby could not have properly

substituted Ramon but had simply become an

additional candidate who had filed her COC out of

time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should

succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of

the Local Government Code (LGC).27

Issues

The core issue involves the validity of the

substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the

position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon,

her husband.

Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of

who among the contending parties should

assume the contested elective position.

Ruling

The petitions lack merit.

1.

Existence of a valid CoC is a conditionsine qua

non for a valid substitution

The filing of a CoC within the period provided bylaw is a mandatory requirement for any person to

be considered a candidate in a national or local

election. This is clear from Section 73 of the

Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person

shall be eligible for any elective public office

unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy

within the period fixed herein.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Codespecifies the contents of a COC, viz:

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—

The certificate of candidacy shall state that the



person filing it is announcing his candidacy for

the office stated therein and that he is eligible for

said office; if for Member of the Batasang

Pambansa, the province, including its component

cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector

which he seeks to represent; the political party to

which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;

residence; his post office address for all election

purposes; his profession or occupation; that hewill support and defend the Constitution of the

Philippines and will maintain true faith and

allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,

legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the

duly constituted authorities; that he is not a

permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign

country; that the obligation imposed by his oath

is assumed voluntarily, without mental

reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the

facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are

true to the best of his knowledge. x x x

The evident purposes of the requirement for the

filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing

them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to

know, at least 60 days prior to the regular

election, the candidates from among whom they

are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid

confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of

the votes cast. If the law does not confine to the

duly-registered candidates the choice by the

voters, there may be as many persons voted foras there are voters, and votes may be cast even

for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to

identify the votes in favor of a candidate for

another office in the same election.28 Moreover,

according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the CoC is:

x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to

the whole world of the candidate’s political creed

or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a

person seeking to run for a public office certifying

that he announces his candidacy for the officementioned and that he is eligible for the office,

the name of the political party to which he

belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office

address for all election purposes being as well

stated.

Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his

intention to run for public office and his

affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for

the position he seeks to assume, followed by the

timely filing of such declaration, constitute a validCoC that render the person making the

declaration a valid or official candidate.

There are two remedies available to prevent a

candidate from running in an electoral race. One

is through a petition for disqualification and the

other through a petition to deny due course to or

cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court

differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v.

Commission on Elections,30 thuswise:

x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one

hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of theOmnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local

Government Code. On the other hand, a petition

to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only

be grounded on a statement of a material

representation in the said certificate that is false.

The petitions also have different effects. While a

person who is disqualified under Section 68 is

merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the

person whose certificate is cancelled or denied

due course under Section 78 is not treated as a

candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.31

Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification

under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code

(i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact

of a candidate’s permanent residency in another

country when that fact affects the residency

requirement of a candidate) are separate and

distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of

or denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance

candidates under Section 69 of the Omnibus

Election Code; and material misrepresentationunder Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code),

the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya32

that the following circumstances may result from

the granting of the petitions, to wit:

(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for

election but may have filed a valid CoC;

(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the

same time may not have filed a valid CoC; and

(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may

be denied due course or cancelled.

In the event that a candidate is disqualified to

run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his

CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the

Omnibus Election Code provides the option of

substitution, to wit:

Section 77. Candidates in case of death,

disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the lastday for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an

official candidate of a registered or accredited

political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified

for any cause, only a person belonging to, and



certified by, the same political party may file a

certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate

who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The

substitute candidate nominated by the political

party concerned may file his certificate of

candidacy for the office affected in accordance

with the preceding sections not later than mid-

day of the day of the election. If the death,

withdrawal or disqualification should occurbetween the day before the election and mid-day

of election day, said certificate may be filed with

any board of election inspectors in the political

subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the

case of candidates to be voted for by the entire

electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution

is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a

candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election

Code unequivocally states that only an officialcandidate of a registered or accredited party may

be substituted.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give

rise to a valid candidacy,33 there can be no valid

substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of

the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear,

too, that a candidate who does not file a valid

CoC may not be validly substituted, because a

person without a valid CoC is not considered a

candidate in much the same way as any personwho has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.34

Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his

CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the

Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A

withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a

substitution if the substitute candidate submits

prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by

Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.35

2.

Declaration of Ramon’s disqualificationrendered

his CoC invalid; hence, he was nota valid

candidate to be properly substituted

In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the

Court concurs with the conclusion of the

COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in

SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to

deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section

78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition,

the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on

Elections:36

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due

course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not

based on the lack of qualifications but on a

finding that the candidate made a material

representation that is false, which may relate to

the qualifications required of the public office

he/she is running for. It is noted that the

candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is

eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the

constitutional and statutory provisions on

qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the

candidate subsequently states a material

representation in the CoC that is false, the

COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to

deny due course to or cancel such certificate.

Indeed, the Court has already likened a

proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto

proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since

they both deal with the eligibility or qualificationof a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the

fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before

proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is

filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.

Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations

pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a)

Ramon made a false representation in his CoC;

(b) the false representation referred to a material

matter that would affect the substantive right of

Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run forthe election for which he filed his certificate); and

(c) Ramon made the false representation with the

intention to deceive the electorate as to his

qualification for public office or deliberately

attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact

that would otherwise render him ineligible.37 The

petition expressly challenged Ramon’s eligibility

for public office based on the prohibition stated in

the Constitution and the Local Government Code

against any person serving three consecutive

terms, and specifically prayed that "theCertificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent

Ramon be denied due course to or cancel the

same and that he be declared as a disqualified

candidate."38

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of

the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not

only that a person lacks a qualification but also

that he made a material representation that is

false.39 A petition for the denial of due course to

or cancellation of CoC that is short of therequirements will not be granted. In Mitra v.

Commission on Elections,40 the Court stressed

that there must also be a deliberate attempt to

mislead, thus:



The false representation under Section 78 must

likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead,

misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise

render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose

of the requirement, it must be made with the

intention to deceive the electorate as to the

would-be candidate’s qualifications for public

office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section

78 addresses cannot be the result of a mereinnocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a

situation where the intent to deceive is patently

absent, or where no deception on the electorate

results. The deliberate character of the

misrepresentation necessarily follows from a

consideration of the consequences of any

material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a

material fact cannot run; if he runs and is

elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can

be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

It is underscored, however, that a Section 78

petition should not be interchanged or confused

with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under

the two sections are different, for they are based

on different grounds, and can result in different

eventualities.41 A person who is disqualified under

Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a

candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled

or denied due course under Section 78 is not

considered as a candidate at all because his

status is that of a person who has not filed aCoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has clarified that a

candidate who is disqualified under Section 68

can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77

because he remains a candidate until

disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been

denied due course or cancelled under Section 78

cannot be substituted because he is not

considered a candidate.1âwphi1

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e.,

the three-term limit) is enforced both by theConstitution and statutory law. Article X, Section

8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local

officials, except barangay officials, which shall be

determined by law, shall be three years and no

such official shall serve for more than three

consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the


considered as an interruption in the continuity of

his service for the full term for which he waselected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code

reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for

all elective local officials, to wit:

Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more

than three (3) consecutive terms in the same

position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for

any length of time shall not be considered as an

interruption in the continuity of service for thefull term for which the elective official concerned

was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

The objective of imposing the three-term limit

rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person

accumulating excessive power over a particular

territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged

stay in the same office." The Court underscored

this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on

Elections,44 stating:

x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically

included an exception to the people’s freedom to

choose those who will govern them in order to

avoid the evil of a single person accumulating

excessive power over a particular territorial

jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the

same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for

the position of city mayor after having served for

three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor

would obviously defeat the very intent of the

framers when they wrote this exception. Shouldhe be allowed another three consecutive terms

as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would

then be possibly holding office as chief executive

over the same territorial jurisdiction and

inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive

years. This is the very scenario sought to be

avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

To accord with the constitutional and statutory

proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded

from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term.

Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual

ab initio for containing the incurable defect

consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility

to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC

made his situation even worse than that of a

nuisance candidate because the nuisance

candidate may remain eligible despite

cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of

due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of

the Omnibus Election Code.45

Ramon himself specifically admitted his

ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with

Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the



COMELEC.46 That sufficed to render his CoC

invalid, considering that for all intents and

purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his

disqualification had the effect of announcing that

he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had

no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda

v. Abaya aptly put it:

Even on the most basic and fundamental

principles, it is readily understood that the

concept of a substitute presupposes the

existence of the person to be substituted, for how

can a person take the place of somebody who

does not exist or who never was. The Court has

no other choice but to rule that in all the

instances enumerated in Section 77 of the

Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid

certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is arequisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be

substituted if he had a valid certificate of

candidacy in the first place because, if the

disqualified candidate did not have a valid and

seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is

and was not a candidate at all. If a person was

not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under

Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to

allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new"and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the

period for the filing thereof, it would be a

crystalline case of unequal protection of the law,

an act abhorred by our Constitution.47 (Emphasis

supplied)

3.

Granting without any qualification of petition in

SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s

intention todeclare Ramon disqualified and tocancel his CoC

That the COMELEC made no express finding that

Ramon committed any deliberate

misrepresentation in his CoC was of little

consequence in the determination of whether his

CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.

In Miranda v. Abaya,48 the specific relief that the

petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not

given due course and/or cancelled." TheCOMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and

then pronounced — in apparent contradiction —

that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The

Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the

petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel

Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled

Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC. The Court explained:

The question to settle next is whether or not

aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being

disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998

resolution, his certificate of candidacy hadlikewise been denied due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019

specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the

Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for

the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be

not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises

are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private

respondent specifying a very particular relief, the

Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, theCommission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the

Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is

hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the

position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the

May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No.

98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer

specifically and particularly sought in the petition

was GRANTED, there being no qualification on

the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was

simply ruled over and above the granting of the

specific prayer for denial of due course and

cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x

x.49

x x x x

x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or

petition filed by private respondent in SPA No.

98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel



the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe"

Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no

question that the said petition was GRANTED

without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather

clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec

granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by

disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that

the said petition was granted and that the

certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Mirandawas denied due course and cancelled. x x x.50

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that

the COMELEC actually granted the particular

relief of cancelling or denying due course to the

CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting

that relief to any qualification.

Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although

Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC)

specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or

cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC

categorically stated in the Resolution dated April

19, 2010 that it was granting the petition.

Despite the COMELEC making no finding of

material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon,

its granting of Castillo’s petition without express

qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had

cancelled Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent

ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010

became final and executory because Castillo didnot move for its reconsideration, and because

Ramon later withdrew his motion for

reconsideration filed in relation to it.

4.

Elected Vice Mayor must succeedand assume the

position of Mayordue to a permanent vacancy in

the office

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the

doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer

espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on

Elections51 should not apply to him because

Ramon’s disqualification became final prior to the

elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission

on Elections,53 where the Court said:

x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of

disqualification before the elections. The doctrine

on the rejection of the second placer was appliedin Labo and a host of other cases because the

judgment declaring the candidate’s

disqualification in Labo and the other cases had

not become final before the elections. To repeat,

Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine

on the rejection of the second placer have one

common essential condition — the

disqualification of the candidate had not become

final before the elections. This essential condition

does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became

final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself,

Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present

case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23

days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On

election day, Cayat was no longer legally a

candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy

for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-

existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate

disqualified by final judgment before an electioncannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall

not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of

law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The

Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any

candidate who has been declared by final

judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,

and the votes cast for him shall not be

counted. If for any reason a candidate is notdeclared by final judgment before an election to

be disqualified and he is voted for and receives

the winning number of votes in such election, the

Court or Commission shall continue with the trial

and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,

upon motion of the complainant or any

intervenor, may during the pendency thereof

order the suspension of the proclamation of such

candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is

strong. (Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987

covers two situations. The first is when the

disqualification becomes final before the

elections, which is the situation covered in the

first sentence of Section 6. The second is when

the disqualification becomes final after the

elections, which is the situation covered in the

second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation.

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governingthe first situation is categorical: a candidate

disqualified by final judgment before an election

cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall

not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying



Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before

the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the

8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat

was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004

elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper

because he was the sole and only candidate,

second to none.54

Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castilloasserts that he was entitled to assume the

position of Mayor of Lucena City for having

obtained the highest number of votes among the

remaining qualified candidates.

It would seem, then, that the date of the finality

of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon

disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10,

Rule 19 of the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8804, 55

a decision or resolution of a Division becomes

final and executory after the lapse of five daysfollowing its promulgation unless a motion for

reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section

8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of

the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and

executory five days after its promulgation and

receipt of notice by the parties.

The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon

disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19,

2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the

same date.56

Ramon filed a motion forreconsideration on April 21, 201057 in accordance

with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,58

but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010,59

ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara

Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion

for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated

that there was no more pending matter that

could have effectively suspended the finality of

the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution

dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have

attained finality upon the lapse of five days fromits promulgation and receipt of it by the parties.

This happened probably on April 24, 2010.

Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc

continued to act on the withdrawal by Ramon of

his motion for reconsideration through the May 5,

2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010

Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final

and executory.

Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion

that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming finalprior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in

Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s

filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon

significantly differentiated this case from the

factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr.

Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was

disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his

disqualification became final before the May 10,

2004 elections. Considering that no substitution

of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his

rival, remained the only candidate for the

mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast,

after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being

regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a

bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she

became a contender for the same position vied

for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same

footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate

negated Castillo’s claim of being the candidate

who obtained the highest number of votes, and

of being consequently entitled to assume the

office of Mayor.

Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for

he was only a second placer.1âwphi1 Labo, Jr.

should be applied. There, the Court emphasized

that the candidate obtaining the second highest

number of votes for the contested office could

not assume the office despite the disqualification

of the first placer because the second placer was

"not the choice of the sovereign will."60 Surely,

the Court explained, a minority or defeated

candidate could not be deemed elected to the

office.61

There was to be no question that thesecond placer lost in the election, was repudiated

by the electorate, and could not assume the

vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and

compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a

loser to be their political leader or their

representative.63

The only time that a second placer is allowed to

take the place of a disqualified winning candidate

is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the

candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was

fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s

disqualification as to bring such awareness within

the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast

the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible

candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the

electorate may be said to have waived the

validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously

misapplying their franchise or throwing away

their votes, in which case the eligible candidate

with the second highest number of votes may bedeemed elected.65 But the exception did not

apply in favor of Castillo simply because the

second element was absent. The electorate of

Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact



of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In

fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution

finding her substitution invalid only on May 20,

2011, or a full year after the decisions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc

properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from

assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To

begin with, there was no valid candidate for herto substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also,

Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC

before the elections in accordance with Section

73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was

not an additional candidate for the position of

Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her

CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed

by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a

candidate.66

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy

should be filled pursuant to the law on succession

defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of

the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-

Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the

office of the governor or mayor, the vice-

governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become

the governor or mayor. x x x

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions

in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the

Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the

COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners

to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,

petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails

and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012

Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission

on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-

2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the

COMELEC en banc affirming that division’s

disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn,

affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated

August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55 declaring

Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit

rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position

of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga,

Catanduanes.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely,

the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national andlocal elections, Abundo vied for the position of

municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both

the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was

proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate

and accordingly served the corresponding terms

as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however,

the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially

proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres),

who, in due time, performed the functions of the

office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’

election and proclamation. Abundo waseventually declared the winner of the 2004

mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for

his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006

until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30,

2007, or for a period of a little over one year and

one month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where

Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.

When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy 3

for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoralcontest, Torres lost no time in seeking the

former’s disqualification to run, the

corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case

No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-

consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the

COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5

finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested

Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly

proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga,

Catanduanes.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the

COMELEC could resolve the adverted

disqualification case Torres initiated against

Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R.



Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto7 action

before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes,

docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat

Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres

raised in his petition to disqualify.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election CaseNo. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to

serve as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered

GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo

Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal

mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

SO ORDERED.9

In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v.COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already

served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit,

2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and,

hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth,

consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had

been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004

elections consequent to his protest and occupied

the position of and actually served as Viga mayor

for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from

May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the

RTC, the year and a month service constitutes acomplete and full service of Abundo’s second

term as mayor.

Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC,

his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-

2010.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010,

the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the firstassailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of

which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73,

Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal

is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.11

Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Divisionruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino,

Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion

of a term by a protestant who is declared winner

in an election protest is considered as service for

one full term within the contemplation of the


In time, Abundo sought but was denied

reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its

equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The

fallo of the COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads

as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion

for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

The Resolution of the Commission (Second

Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12

In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division,

the COMELEC en banc held in essence the

following: first, there was no involuntary

interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term servicewhich would be an exception to the three-term

limit rule as he is considered never to have lost

title to the disputed office after he won in his

election protest; and second, what the

Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to

be in office for the same position for more than

three consecutive terms and not to the service of

the term.

Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)and/or preliminary injunction.

Intervening Events

In the meantime, following the issuance by the

COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying

Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the

following events transpired:

1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an

Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolutionfinal and executory. The following day, June 21,

2012, the COMELEC issued an Entry of

Judgment.14

2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for

Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac,

Catanduanes.

3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on

Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day earlier,

issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD(COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire

records to said RTC.

On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff



personally delivered the entire records of the

instant case to, and were duly received by, the

clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.

4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its

receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in

Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for

Execution through an Order18 of even date. And a

Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.

5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received

the Writ of Execution and served the same at the

office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via

substituted service.

6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20

enjoining the enforcement of the assailed

COMELEC Resolutions.

7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of the TRO. On

the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and

First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga,

Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor

and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,

respectively.

8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of

Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent

Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012

praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or statusquo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor

Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.

Cervantes––who had taken their oaths of office

the day before—assumed the posts of mayor and

vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24

9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To

Admit Attached Manifestation)25 and

Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5,

2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by the

Court has become functus officio owing to theexecution of the RTC’s Decision in Election Case

No. 55.

10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his

Comment/Opposition with Leave to the

Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of a Status

Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that

since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First

Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed

the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga,

Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Orderwould serve no purpose.

11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most

Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the

July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In

View of the Unreasonable and Inappropriate

Progression of Events).28

It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that

Abundo was dislodged from his post as

incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be

sure, the speed which characterized Abundo’s

ouster despite the supervening issuance by theCourt of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the

Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-Mayor

Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or

put on notice about the TRO either before they

took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before

assuming the posts of mayor and vice-mayor on

July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following

the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc

irresistibly tends to show that the TRO––issued as

it were to maintain the status quo, thus averting

the premature ouster of Abundo pending thisCourt’s resolution of his appeal––appears to have

been trivialized.

On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment

on Abundo’s petition, followed not long after by

public respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated

Comment.29

The Issues

Abundo raises the following grounds for theallowance of the petition:

6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in

Abundo’s motion for reconsideration as mere

rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised

prior to the promulgation of the Resolution.

6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has

consecutively served for three terms despite the

fact that he only served the remaining one year

and one month of the second term as a result of

an election protest.30

First Issue:

Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not

Mere Reiteration

The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion

for reconsideration on the basis that his

arguments in said motion are mere reiterations of

what he already brought up in his appeal Brief



before the COMELEC Second Division. In this

petition, petitioner claims otherwise.

Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.

A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the

latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his Motion for

Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments

in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his

Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of

jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the quo

warranto case since the alleged violation of the

three-term limit has already been rejected by the

COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128

(DC), while in his MR, Abundo raised the similar

ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s

finding on the issue of his qualification to run for

the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo

assailed RTC’s reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while inhis MR, he argued that the Court’s

pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with

preventive suspension, is not applicable to the

instant case as it involves only a partial service of

the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his

situation cannot be equated with the case of

preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr.,

while in his MR, he argued before that the almost

two years which he did not sit as mayor during

the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the

continuity of his service for the full term.

Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the

issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the

Brief.

Core Issue:

Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served

three consecutive terms

The pivotal determinative issue then is whetherthe service of a term less than the full three

years by an elected official arising from his being

declared as the duly elected official upon an

election protest is considered as full service of

the term for purposes of the application of the

three consecutive term limit for elective local

officials.

On this core issue, We find the petition

meritorious. The consecutiveness of what

otherwise would have been Abundo’s threesuccessive, continuous mayorship was effectively

broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was

initially deprived of title to, and was veritably

disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to

which he, after due proceedings, was eventually

declared to have been the rightful choice of the

electorate.

The three-term limit rule for elective local

officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section

8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which

provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local

officials, except barangay officials, which shall be

determined by law, shall be three years and no

such official shall serve for more than three

consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the


considered as an interruption in the continuity of

his service for the full term for which he was

elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No.(RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC)

of 1991, thusly:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. —

x x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more

than three (3) consecutive terms in the same

position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for

any length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of service for the

full term for which the elective official concerned

was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)

To constitute a disqualification to run for an

elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted

constitutional and statutory provisions, the

following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected

for three consecutive terms in the same localgovernment post; and

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive

terms.31

Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-

term limit rule, as applied to the different factual

milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit

and analyze the various holdings and relevant

pronouncements of the Court on the matter.

As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the

Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,

voluntary renunciation of the office by the

incumbent elective local official for any length of



time shall NOT, in determining service for three

consecutive terms, be considered an interruption

in the continuity of service for the full term for

which the elective official concerned was elected.

In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the

observation that the law "does not textually state

that voluntary renunciation is the only actual

interruption of service that does not affect

‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposesof the three-term limit rule."32

As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on

Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term

limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that

what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive

fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local

official cannot, following his third consecutive

term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth

term,34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term

for the same position after the election where hecould have sought his fourth term but prevented

to do so by reason of the prohibition.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in

the successive terms of the official after his or

her third term. An interruption usually occurs

when the official does not seek a fourth term,

immediately following the third. Of course, the

basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary

renunciation of the office for any length of time

shall NOT be considered an interruption in thecontinuity of service for the full term for which

the elective official concerned was elected." This

qualification was made as a deterrent against an

elective local official intending to skirt the three-

term limit rule by merely resigning before his or

her third term ends. This is a voluntary

interruption as distinguished from involuntary

interruption which may be brought about by

certain events or causes.

While appearing to be seemingly simple, thethree-term limit rule has engendered a host of

disputes resulting from the varying

interpretations applied on local officials who were

elected and served for three terms or more, but

whose terms or service was punctuated by what

they view as involuntary interruptions, thus

entitling them to a, but what their opponents

perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary

interruption is claimed to result from any of these

events or causes: succession or assumption of

office by operation of law, preventive suspension,declaration of the defeated candidate as the

winner in an election contest, declaration of the

proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an

election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate

as the winner in a recall election, removal of the

official by operation of law, and other analogous

causes.

This brings us to an examination of situations and

jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms

were considered or not considered as having

been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."

(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law

In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose

T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v.

Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court

delved on the effects of "assumption to office by

operation of law" on the three-term limit rule.

This contemplates a situation wherein an elective

local official fills by succession a higher local

government post permanently left vacant due to

any of the following contingencies, i.e., when thesupposed incumbent refuses to assume office,

fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,

voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently

incapacitated to discharge the functions of his

office.37

In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected

vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a

term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2,

1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law,

upon the death of the incumbent mayor, CesarBorja. Capco was then elected and served as

mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.

When Capco expressed his intention to run again

for the mayoralty position during the 1998

elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then

also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s

disqualification for violation of the three-term

limit rule.

Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the

disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enoughthat an individual has served three consecutive

terms in an elective local office, he must also

have been elected to the same position for the

same number of times before the disqualification

can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no

violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was

not elected to the office of the mayor in the first

term but simply found himself thrust into it by

operation of law"39 when a permanent vacancy

occurred in that office.

The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the

case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been

elected for three consecutive terms as municipal

councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-



2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004,

or during his second term, Montebon succeeded

and assumed the position of vice-mayor of

Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired.

When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy

again as municipal councilor, a petition for

disqualification was filed against him based on

the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that

Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity

of service as councilor. The Court emphasized

that succession in local government office is by

operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary

severance from office. Since the law no less

allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor

in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his

occupation of the higher office cannot, without

more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of

his position as councilor.

(2) Recall Election

With reference to the effects of recall election on

the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission

on Elections40 (2002) and the aforementioned

case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.

In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was

elected and served as mayor of Lucena City

during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During

the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001

term ended, a recall election was conducted in

May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the

unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When

Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was

challenged on the ground he had already served

as mayor for three consecutive terms for

violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court

held therein that the remainder of Tagarao’s

term after the recall election during which Talaga

served as mayor should not be considered forpurposes of applying the three-term limit rule.

The Court emphasized that the continuity of

Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his defeat

during the 1998 elections.

A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in

Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the

COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward

Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall

election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been

elected and served as mayor of Puerto PrincesaCity for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995,

1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of

the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted

not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the

2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and

eventually won. However, midway into his term,

Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the

recall election held, Hagedorn run for the

former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates

sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the


In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in therecall election, the Court ruled:

x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June

30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the

recall election of September 24, 2002 when he

won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,

Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on

September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto

Princesa was Socrates. During the same period,Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This

period is clearly an interruption in the continuity

of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of

his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal

prohibition.41

The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that

"an elective local official cannot seek immediate

reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited

election refers to the next regular election for the

same office following the end of the thirdconsecutive term and, hence, any subsequent

election, like recall election, is no longer covered

x x x."42

(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City

On the other hand, the conversion of a

municipality into a city does not constitute an

interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity

of service. The Court said so in Latasa v.

Commission on Elections43

(2003).

Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop:

Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as

mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur

for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001.

During his third term, Digos was converted into a

component city, with the corresponding cityhood

law providing the holdover of elective officials.

When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as

mayor for the 2001 elections, the Court declared

Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of DigosCity for violation of the three-term limit rule on

the basis of the following ratiocination:

This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily



relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the

said office has been deemed abolished due to the

conversion. However, the very instant he vacated

his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed

office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where

petitioner therein, for even just a short period of

time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa

never ceased from acting as chief executive of

the local government unit. He never ceased fromdischarging his duties and responsibilities as

chief executive of Digos.

(Emphasis supplied.)

(4) Period of Preventive Suspension

In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court

espoused the doctrine that the period during

which a local elected official is under preventive

suspension cannot be considered as aninterruption of the continuity of his service. The

Court explained why so:

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term

limit rule demands that preventive suspension

should not be considered an interruption that

allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond

three terms. A preventive suspension cannot

simply be a term interruption because the

suspended official continues to stay in office

although he is barred from exercising thefunctions and prerogatives of the office within the

suspension period. The best indicator of the

suspended official’s continuity in office is the

absence of a permanent replacement and the

lack of the authority to appoint one since no

vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)

(5) Election Protest

With regard to the effects of an election protest

vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudencepresents a more differing picture. The Court’s

pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on

Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera

III v. Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon

v. Commission on Elections48 (2009), all protest

cases, are illuminating.

In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and

had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,

Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and

1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative tothe 1995 election was protested and was

eventually declared by the RTC and then by

COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of

elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three

months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida

vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC

order and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s

opponent assumed office for the remainder of the

term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again

filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent,

Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on

the ground that Lonzanida had already served

three consecutive terms in the same post. TheCourt, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2)

conditions which must concur for the three-term

limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has

been elected for three consecutive terms in the

same local government post and 2) that he has

fully served three consecutive terms."49

In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the

foregoing requisites were absent in the case of

Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot

be considered as having been duly elected to thepost in the May 1995 elections since his

assumption of office as mayor "cannot be

deemed to have been by reason of a valid

election but by reason of a void proclamation."

And as a corollary point, the Court stated that

Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998

mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his

post before the expiration of the term, a situation

which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment

of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in

Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50

owing to a variancein the factual situations attendant.

In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and

served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte

for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004.

During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during

his supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified

Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong

lost during the 1998 elections. However, the

COMELEC’s decision became final and executory

on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact

already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as

mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In

2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for

the same position as mayor, which his opponent

opposed for violation of the three-term limit rule.

Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued

that he could not be considered as having served

as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not

duly elected to the post and merely assumedoffice as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing

Ong’s argument, the Court held that his

assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-

2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and



hence, should be counted for purposes of the

three-term limit rule. The Court modified the

conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that

Ong’s service was deemed and counted as

service for a full term because Ong’s

proclamation was voided only after the expiry of

the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC

decision which declared Ong as not having won

the 1998 elections was "without practical andlegal use and value" promulgated as it was after

the contested term has expired. The Court

further reasoned:

Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was

only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty

derby as his proclamation was under protest did

not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His

proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the

1998 mayoralty election coupled by his

assumption of office and his continuous exerciseof the functions thereof from start to finish of the

term, should legally be taken as service for a full

term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a

contrary view is not hard to discern. Such

contrary view would mean that Alegre would –

under the three-term rule - be considered as

having served a term by virtue of a veritably

meaningless electoral protest ruling, when

another actually served such term pursuant to aproclamation made in due course after an

election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida

and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to

wit:

The difference between the case at bench and

Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in

Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election

was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence

thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-

elect was nullified, followed by an order for him

to vacate the office of mayor. For another,

Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998

mayoral term, there being an involuntary

severance from office as a result of legal

processes. In fine, there was an effective

interruption of the continuity of service.52

(Emphasis supplied.)

Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would

later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases

of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee

v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor

of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following

consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and

2001-2004. In relation to the 2004 elections,

Morales again ran as mayor of the same town,

emerged as garnering the majority votes and was

proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing

July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo

warranto was later filed against Morales

predicated on the ground that he is ineligible torun for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor

for three consecutive terms. In his answer,

Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001

term cannot be considered against him, for,

although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat

board of canvassers as elected mayor vis-à-vis

the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of

mayor until June 30, 2001, his proclamation was

later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his

closest rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly

elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Moralesparlayed the idea that he only served as a mere

caretaker.

The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and

held that the case of Morales presents a factual

milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For

ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis

Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like

Morales, had served the three-year term from the

start to the end of the term. Hence, the Court

concluded that Morales exceeded the three-termlimit rule, to wit:

Here, respondent Morales was elected for the

term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed

the position. He served as mayor until June 30,

2001. He was mayor for the entire period

notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the

electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee

ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate,

as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does

not constitute an interruption in serving the fullterm.

x x x x

Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth

term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat

continuously without any break since July 1,

1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he

will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve

(12) continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being

belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the

term, cannot constitute an interruption in

Morales’ service of the full term; neither can



Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a

"caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto

officer" for purposes of applying the three-term

limit rule.

In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on

Elections,56 the Court would again find the same

Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification

proceeding when he ran again as a mayoraltycandidate during the 2007 elections for a term

ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated

from his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in

Rivera, Morales would argue this time around

that the three-term limit rule was no longer

applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This

time, the Court ruled in his favor, holding that for

purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term

limit rule was no longer a disqualifying factor as

against Morales. The Court wrote:

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’

involuntary severance from office with respect to

the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from

office for any length of time short of the full term

provided by law amounts to an interruption of

continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera

case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was

effective immediately. The next day, Morales

notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision.

The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor

from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. Theassumption by the vice mayor of the office of the

mayor, no matter how short it may seem to

Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service.

Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term

of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis

supplied)

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing

jurisprudence on issues affecting

consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary

interruption, viz:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an

elective position and the official merely assumed

the position pursuant to the rules on succession

under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired

portion of the term of the replaced official cannot

be treated as one full term as contemplated

under the subject constitutional and statutory

provision that service cannot be counted in the

application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the

official runs again for the same position he heldprior to his assumption of the higher office, then

his succession to said position is by operation of

law and is considered an involuntary severance

or interruption (Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three

consecutive terms and who did not seek the

elective position for what could be his fourth

term, but later won in a recall election, had an

interruption in the continuity of the official’s

service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,

from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall

election, a private citizen (Adormeo and

Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to

the conversion of a municipality to a city does

not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent

official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-

interrupting event as the elective officer’s

continued stay and entitlement to the office

remain unaffected during the period of

suspension, although he is barred from exercisingthe functions of his office during this period

(Aldovino, Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for

an elective position and assumes office, his term

is interrupted when he loses in an election

protest and is ousted from office, thus

disenabling him from serving what would

otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of

office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida

and Dizon). The break or interruption need not befor a full term of three years or for the major part

of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length

of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is

sufficient to break the continuity of service

(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election

protest and said decision becomes final after said

official had served the full term for said office,

then his loss in the election contest does not

constitute an interruption since he has managedto serve the term from start to finish. His full

service, despite the defeat, should be counted in

the application of term limits because the

nullification of his proclamation came after the

expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

The Case of Abundo

Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC

erred in uniformly ruling that he had already

served three consecutive terms and is, thus,barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule

to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist,

Abundo arguments run thusly:



1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present

case as the former dealt with preventive

suspension which does not interrupt the

continuity of service of a term;

2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an

elected official can be interrupted so as to

remove him from the reach of the constitutional

three-term limitation;

3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of

"term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a mere

portion of the Decision and not on the unified

logic in the disquisition;

4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the

holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III v.

Commission on Elections.59

5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruledthat there was no interruption in the service of

Abundo since what he considered as an

"interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred

before his term started; and

6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres)

whose proclamation was adjudged invalid was

interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo)

who was eventually proclaimed winner was not

so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.

Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC

counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr.

finds application in the instant case. The

COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to

the office as his victory in the protest case

confirmed his entitlement to said office and he

was only unable to temporarily discharge the

functions of the office during the pendency of the

election protest.

We note that this present case of Abundo dealswith the effects of an election protest, for which

the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon

appear to be more attuned than the case of

Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the

imposition of a preventive suspension being the

very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the

same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a

different factual backdrop.

Unlike in the abovementioned election protest

cases wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the

election protest and each declared loser during

the elections, Abundo was the winner during the

election protest and was declared the rightful

holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor

Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both

unseated toward the end of their respective

terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his

opponent and had assumed the remainder of the

term.

Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s

pronouncements in the past as instructive, andconsider several doctrines established from the

1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case

of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving

at this Court’s conclusion.

The intention behind the three-term limit rule

was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of

political power" and prevent elected officials from

breeding "proprietary interest in their position"60

but also to "enhance the people’s freedom of

choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V.Mendoza, "while people should be protected from

the evils that a monopoly of power may bring

about, care should be taken that their freedom of

choice is not unduly curtailed."62

In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s

case meritorious and declares that the two-year

period during which his opponent, Torres, was

serving as mayor should be considered as an

interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s

case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for

the 2004 election for the term starting July 1,

2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected

mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his

election protest against Torres and his

consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor.

Accordingly, the first requisite for the application

of the disqualification rule based on the three-

term limit that the official has been elected is

satisfied.

This thus brings us to the second requisite of

whether or not Abundo had served for "three

consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically

understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes

immediately before the 2010 national and local

elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the

question of whether or not there was an effective

involuntary interruption during the three three-

year periods, resulting in the disruption of the

continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.

The facts of the case clearly point to an

involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June

2007 term.



There can be no quibbling that, during the term

2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the

decision of the election protest in his favor,

Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May

9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007

or for a period of a little over one year and one

month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong

and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said

that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully theentire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise

entitled.

A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of

Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and

definite period of time which the law describes

that an officer may hold an office."64 It also

means the "time during which the officer may

claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes

the interval after which the several incumbents

shall succeed one another."65

It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title

to and can serve the functions of an elective

office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160, 66

the term for local elected officials is three (3)

years starting from noon of June 30 of the first

year of said term.

In the present case, during the period of one year

and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May

8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if

he wanted to, that he could hold office of themayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert

title to the same nor serve the functions of the

said elective office. The reason is simple: during

that period, title to hold such office and the

corresponding right to assume the functions

thereof still belonged to his opponent, as

proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo

actually held the office and exercised the

functions as mayor only upon his declaration,

following the resolution of the protest, as duly

elected candidate in the May 2004 elections orfor only a little over one year and one month.

Consequently, since the legally contemplated full

term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it

cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term

2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that

Abundo actually served less.

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period

during which Abundo’s opponent actually served

as Mayor is and ought to be considered an

involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot,

in the context of the disqualification rule, be

considered as one term for purposes of counting

the three-term threshold.67

The notion of full service of three consecutive

terms is related to the concepts of interruption of

service and voluntary renunciation of service.

The word interruption means temporary

cessation, intermission or suspension.68 To

interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When

the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of

interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to

the continuance of the service by the concernedelected official by effectively cutting short the

service of a term or giving a hiatus in the

occupation of the elective office. On the other

hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea

of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To

renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or

resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by

an elective local official would thus mean to give

up or abandon the title to the office and to cut

short the service of the term the concerned

elected official is entitled to.

In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc,

applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held:

It must be stressed that involuntary interruption

of service which jurisprudence deems an

exception to the three-term limit rule, implies

that the service of the term has begun before it

was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not

lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution

states:

In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to

have lost his title to the office. On the contrary,

he actively sought entitlement to the office when

he lodged the election protest case. And

respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is

a final confirmation that he was validly elected

for the mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in

2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was

only unable to temporarily discharge the

functions of the office to which he was validlyelected during the pendency of the election

protest, but he never lost title to the said office.72

(Emphasis added.)

The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other

hand, pronounced that the actual length of

service by the public official in a given term is

immaterial by reckoning said service for the term

in the application of the three-term limit rule,

thus:

As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this

formulation—no more than three consecutive

terms—is a clear command suggesting the

existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we



cannot subscribe to the argument that since

respondent Abundo served only a portion of the

term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be

considered for purposes of the application of the

three term limit rule. When the framers of the

Constitution drafted and incorporated the three

term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to the

term, not the actual length of the service the

public official may render. Therefore, one’s actualservice of term no matter how long or how short

is immaterial.73

In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on

the theory that the length of the actual service of

the term is immaterial in his case as he was only

temporarily unable to discharge his functions as

mayor.

The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy

reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commendthemselves for concurrence. The Court cannot

simply find its way clear to understand the poll

body’s determination that Abundo was only

temporarily unable to discharge his functions as

mayor during the pendency of the election

protest.

As previously stated, the declaration of being the

winner in an election protest grants the local

elected official the right to serve the unexpired

portion of the term. Verily, while he was declaredwinner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for

the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been

substantially reduced by the actual service

rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there

was actual involuntary interruption in the term of

Abundo and he cannot be considered to have

served the full 2004-2007 term.

This is what happened in the instant case. It

cannot be overemphasized that pending the

favorable resolution of his election protest,Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary

constituent since his opponent, as presumptive

victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the

mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two

years or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term

—until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent

actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo

was a private citizen warming his heels while

awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even

if declared later as having the right to serve the

elective position from July 1, 2004, suchdeclaration would not erase the fact that prior to

the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not

serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no

legal right to said position.

Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to

respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s

resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the

Court succinctly defines what temporary inability

or disqualification to exercise the functions of an

elective office means, thus:

On the other hand, temporary inability or

disqualification to exercise the functions of anelective post, even if involuntary, should not be

considered an effective interruption of a term

because it does not involve the loss of title to

office or at least an effective break from holding

office; the office holder, while retaining title, is

simply barred from exercising the functions of his

office for a reason provided by law.74

We rule that the above pronouncement on

preventive suspension does not apply to the

instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say thatAbundo merely was temporarily unable or

disqualified to exercise the functions of an

elective post. For one, during the intervening

period of almost two years, reckoned from the

start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be

said to have retained title to the mayoralty office

as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed

winner who would have the legal right to assume

and serve such elective office. For another, not

having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot

be said to have lost title to the office since onecannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first

place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and

purposes, even if the belated declaration in the

election protest accords him title to the elective

office from the start of the term, Abundo was not

entitled to the elective office until the election

protest was finally resolved in his favor.1âwphi1

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two

years, consisting of a break and effective

interruption of his service, until he assumed theoffice and served barely over a year of the

remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the

apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with

the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor

Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and

Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners since

they were non-candidates in the regularelections.

They were proclaimed winners during the recall

elections and clearly were not able to fully serve

the terms of the deposed incumbent officials.

Similar to their cases where the Court deemedtheir terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo

also became or was a private citizen during the

period over which his opponent was serving as

mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there



was interruption in Lonzanida’s service because

of his subsequent defeat in the election protest,

then with more reason, Abundo’s term for 2004-

2007 should be declared interrupted since he

was not proclaimed winner after the 2004

elections and was able to assume the office and

serve only for a little more than a year after

winning the protest.

As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as

interruption of service, the "law contemplates a

rest period during which the local elective official

steps down from office and ceases to exercise

power or authority over the inhabitants of the

territorial jurisdiction of a particular local

government unit."75 Applying the said principle in

the present case, there is no question that during

the pendency of the election protest, Abundo

ceased from exercising power or authority over

the good people of Viga, Catanduanes.

Consequently, the period during which Abundo

was not serving as mayor should be considered

as a rest period or break in his service because,

as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the

election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent,

Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue

of the still then valid proclamation.

As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case

differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in

the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he

was the one deprived of his right and opportunity

to serve his constituents. To a certain extent,

Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election

system. While admittedly the Court does not

possess the mandate to remedy such

imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with

enough authority to establish a fortress against

the injustices it may bring.

In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling

would work damage and cause grave injustice to

Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly

declared as the winner and assumed office for

only a short period of the term. If in the cases of

Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of

a losing candidate––or the person who was

adjudged not legally entitled to hold the

contested public office but held it anyway––We

find more reason to rule in favor of a winning

candidate-protestant who, by popular vote,deserves title to the public office but whose

opportunity to hold the same was halted by an

invalid proclamation.

Also, more than the injustice that may be

committed against Abundo is the injustice that

may likewise be committed against the people of

Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their

right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of

the Constitution, We bear in mind that We

"cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to

decide what the people want"76 and hence,

should, as much as possible, "allow the people toexercise their own sense of proportion and rely

on their own strength to curtail the power when it

overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws

strength from the choice the people make which

is the same choice We are likewise bound to

protect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY

GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8,

2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections

Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE)

No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch

43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No.

55, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED

ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga,

Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the

May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered

IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes

are ordered to immediately vacate the positions

of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,

respectively, and shall revert to their original

positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor,

respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.

The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is

hereby LIFTED.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

GARCIA V. COMELECSept. 30, 1994

FACTS:On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a

petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong

to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye

1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong

as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in

accord with the RA No. 7227.

The municipality did not take any action on the



petition within 30 days after its submission; so,

they resorted to their power of initiative under

the Local Government Code of 1991. They

solicited the required number of signatures to

repeal the said resolution.

However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon,

and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang

Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11,1993 to deny the petition for local initiative

and/or referendum.

On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition

for local initiative because its subject is “merely a

resolution and not an ordinance.”

ISSUE:w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,

Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?

Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to

deny the petition be set aside?

HELD:The petition is granted and the decision of

the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set

aside.

RULING:The 1987 Constitution installed back the

power to the people regarding legislation

because of the event in February 1986. The new

Constitution became “less trusting of public

officials.”

Through initiative, the people were given the

power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2

Art. 17 which provides “amendments to this

Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by

the people through initiative upon a petition of at

least 12% of the total number of registered

voters, of which every legislative district must be

represented by at least 3% of the registered

voter therein.”

The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and

administer all laws and regulations relative to the

conduct of an initiative and referendum.

On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No.

6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of

Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating

Funds Therefor.”

YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress

shall provide for a system of initiative andreferendum, and the exceptions therefrom,

whereby the people can directly proposeand

enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or

part thereof passed by the Congress or local

legislative body.

Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3

systems of initiative, namely:1. Initiative on the

Constitution – petition to amend the Constitution

2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to

enact a national legislation3. Initiative on local

legislation – petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangaylaw, resolution or ordinance

Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on

local initiatives, which is “the power of local

initiative shall not be exercised more than once a

year.”

Adormeo vs COMELEC [76 SCRA 90; GR 147927;February 4, 2002]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation: Interruption, Recall –Exception to the 3 term limit)Facts: Petitioner and private respondentincumbent mayor were the only candidates whofiled their COC for mayor of Lucena City in theMay 2001 elections.Private respondent was elected mayor in May1992, where he served the full term. Again, hewas re-elected in May 1995, where he againserved the full term. In the recall election of May 2000, he again won and served only theunexpired term of Tagarao after having lost tothe latter in the 1998 election.

Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/ordisqualification of the respondent in the groundthat the latter was elected and had served ascity mayor for 3 consecutive terms contendingthat serving the unexpired term of office isconsidered as 1 term.

Private respondent maintains that his service ascity mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He losthis bid for a second re-election in 1998 andduring Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a privatecitizen, thus he had not been a mayor for 3

consecutive terms.Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitutionprovides that the term of office of electiveofficials, except barangay officials, which shallbe determined by law, shall be 3 years and nosuch official shall serve for more than 3consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuityof service for the full term for which the electiveofficial concerned was elected.

Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government

Code) provides that “no local elective officialshall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms inthe same position. Voluntary renunciation of theoffice for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuity

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of service for the full term for which the electiveofficial concerned was elected.”

Issue: WON private respondent had alreadyserved 3 consecutive term for mayor of LucenaCity.Held: No. Private respondent was not electedfor 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, hewas a private citizen. The continuity of his termas mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the1998 elections.Neither can respondent’s victory in the recallelection be deemed a voluntary renunciation forclearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of aterm does not cancel the renounced term in thecomputation of the three term limit; conversely,involuntary severance from office for any lengthof time short of the full term provided by lawamounts to an interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC).Hence, being elected in a recall electioninterrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.

Note: Recall – a petition designed to remove anofficial from office by reason of lack of confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year.

Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No.154512, November 12, 2002

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Local Government, Recall Election: Exceptionto the 3 term limit)Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall

Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recallelection on September 7, 2002.On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC formayor in the recall election.

Different petitioners filed their respectivepetitions, which were consolidated seeking thedisqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recallelection and the cancellation of his COC on theground that the latter is disqualified fromrunning for a fourth consecutive term, havingbeen elected and having served as mayor of the

city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992,1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instantrecall election for the same post.

COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in aresolution the petitioner for lack of merit. AndCOMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run inthe recall election.

Issue: WON one who has been elected andserved for 3 consecutive full terms is qualifiedto run for mayor in the recall election.Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for electivelocal officials is found in Section 8, Article X of

the Constitution, which states:“Section 8. The term of office of elective localofficials, except barangay officials, which shallbe determined by law, shall be three years andno such official shall serve for more than three

consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuityof his service for the full term for which he waselected.”

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as theLocal Government Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for morethan three (3) consecutive terms in the sameposition. Voluntary renunciation of the office forany length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of service for thefull term for which the elective official waselected.”

The first part provides that an elective localofficial cannot serve for more than threeconsecutive terms. The clear intent is that

only consecutive terms count in determiningthe three-term limit rule. The second partstates that voluntary renunciation of office forany length of time does not interrupt thecontinuity of service. The clear intent isthat involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before andafter the interruption from being joined togetherto form a continuous service or consecutiveterms.After three consecutive terms, an elective localofficial cannot seek immediate re-election for

a fourth term. The prohibited election refers tothe next regular election for the same officefollowing the end of the third consecutiveterm. Any subsequent election, like a recallelection, is no longer covered by the prohibitionfor two reasons. First, a subsequent electionlike a recall election is no longer an immediatere-election after three consecutiveterms. Second, the intervening periodconstitutes an involuntary interruption in thecontinuity of service.Based from the deliberations of a ConstitutionalCommission, what the Constitution prohibits isan immediate re-election for a fourth termfollowing three consecutive terms. TheConstitution, however, does not prohibit asubsequent re-election for a fourth term as longas the re-election is not immediately after theend of the third consecutive term. A recallelection mid-way in the term following the thirdconsecutive term is a subsequent election butnot an immediate re-election after the thirdterm.Neither does the Constitution prohibit onebarred from seeking immediate re-election to

run in any other subsequent election involvingthe same term of office. What the Constitutionprohibits is a consecutive fourth term.In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in therecall election on September 24, 2002 is not animmediate re-election after his third


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consecutive term which ended on June 30,2001. The immediate re-election that theConstitution barred Hagedorn from seekingreferred to the regular elections in 2001.

MMDA vs. GarinG.R. No. 130230 April 15, 2005Chico – Nazario, J.:

FACTS:Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violationreceipt and his driver’s license was confiscatedfor parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDAChairman Prospero Oreta requesting the returnof his license and expressed his preference forcase to be filed in Court. Without an immediatereply from the reply from the Chairman, Garinfiled a complaint for preliminary injunctionassailing among other that Sec 5(+) of RA 7942violates the constitutional prohibition againstundue delegation of legislative authority,

allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecifiedand unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rules inhis favor directing MMDA to return Garin’sdriver’s license and for MMDA to desist fromconfiscating driver’s license without first givingthe driver to opportunity to be heard in anappropriate proceeding.

ISSUE:Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 whichauthorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend orrevoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic constitutional.

RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. Itwas concluded that MMDA is not a localgovernment unit or a public corporationendowed with legislative power and it has nopower to enact ordinances for the welfare of thecommunity.

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in thelegislative to make, ordain and establish all

manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,statutes and ordinances either with penalties orwithout, not repugnant to the constitution, asthey shall judge to be for the good and welfareof the commonwealth, and for subjects of thesame. There is no provision in RA 7942 that empowersMMDA or its council to “enact ordinances,approve resolutions and appropriate funds forthe general welfare of the inhabitants of MetroManila. All its functions are administrative innature. It is an agency created for the purposeof laying down policies and coordinating with

the various national government agencies, P.O.,NGO’s and private sector for the efficient andexpeditious delivery of services.”

MMDA vs VIRON TRANSPORTATION Case

Digest

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. v. VIRON

TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al.

530 SCRA 341 (2007), EN BANC, (CARPIO

MORALES, J.)

It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which

is authorized to establish and implement a

project such as the mass transport

system.

FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic

congestions problem in Metro Manila the

President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179,

―Providing for the Establishment of Greater

Manila Mass Transportation System. As

determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of

traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been thenumerous buses plying the streets that impede

the flow of vehicles and commuters and the

inefficient connectivity of the different transport

modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

(MMDA) came up with a recommendation,

proposing the elimination of bus terminals

located along major Metro Manila

thoroughfares, and the construction of mass

transport terminal facilties to provide a more

convenient access to mass transport system tothe commuting public.

The project provided for under this E.O. was

called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖

(Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as

the implementing agency. Accordingly, the

Metro Manila Council the governing board of the

MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full

support of the project.

The respondents, which are engaged in the

business of public transportation with a

provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co.,

Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc.,

assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before

the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged

that the E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure

of existing bus terminal, constituted a

deprivation of property without due process;

that it contravened the Public Service Act which

mandates public utilities to provide and

maintain their own terminals as a requisite for

the privilege of operating as common carriers;and that Republic Act 7924, which created

MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the

closure of bus terminals. The trial court

declared the E.O. unconstitutional.



The MMDA argued before the Court that there

was no justiciable controversy in the case for

declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that

E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to

government agencies to coordinate with the

MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons;

that the President has the authority to

implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125;

and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of policepower.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is

constitutional

HELD: By designating the MMDA as

implementing agency of the “Greater Manila

Transport System,” the President clearly

overstepped the limits of the authority

conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires

Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA,was issued by former President Aquino in her

exercise of legislative powers. This executive

order reorganized the Ministry (now

Department) of Transportation and

Communications (DOTC), and defined its

powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to

be the primary policy, planning, programming,

coordinating, implementing, regulating and

administrative entity to promote, develop and

regulate networks of transportation and

communications.

The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the

power to establish and administer

comprehensive and integrated programs for

transportation and communications.

Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is

authorized to issue such orders, rules,

regulations and other issuances as may be

necessary to ensure the effective

implementation of the law. The President may

also exercise the same power and authority toorder the implementation of the mass transport

system project, which admittedly is one for

transportation. Such authority springs from the

President‘s power of control over all executive

departments as well as for the faithful

execution of the laws under the Constitution.

Thus, the President, although authorized to

establish or cause the implementation of the

Project, must exercise the authority through the

instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is

the primary implementing and administrativeentity in the promotion, development and

regulation of networks of transportation. It is

the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is

authorized to establish and implement a project

such as the mass transport system. By

designating the MMDA as implementing agency

of the Project, the President clearly overstepped

the limits of the authority conferred by law,

rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires.

In the absence of a specific grant of authority to

it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for

the closure of existing bus terminals RepublicAct (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform

planning, monitoring and coordinative

functions, and in the process exercises

regulatory and supervisory authority over the

delivery of metro-wide services, including

transport and traffic management. While traffic

decongestion has been recognized as a valid

ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is

not granted police power, let alone legislative

power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local

government units, there is no provision in R.A.7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro

Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve

resolutions and appropriate funds for the

general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro

Manila.

In light of the administrative nature of its

powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of

authority to implement the Greater Manila

Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179;

hence, it could not have been validly

designated by the President to undertake theproject. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly

order the elimination of respondents‘ terminals.

Even assuming arguendo that police power was

delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such

power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid

police power measure: (1) the interest of the

public generally, as distinguished from that of a

particular class, requires its exercise; and (2)

the means employed are reasonably necessary

for the accomplishment of the purpose and notunduly oppressive upon individuals.

In various cases, the Court has recognized that

traffic congestion is a public, not merely a

private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued

due to the felt need to address the worsening

traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the

MMDA so determined, is caused by the

increasing volume of buses plying the major

thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of

existing transport system.

With the avowed objective of decongesting

traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to

eliminate the bus terminals now located along

major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide



more convenient access to the mass transport

system to the commuting public through the

provision of mass transport terminal facilities.

Common carriers with terminals along the major

thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be

compelled to close down their existing bus

terminals and use the MMDA-designated

common parking areas. The Court fails to see

how the prohibition against respondents‘terminals can be considered a reasonable

necessity to ease traffic congestion in the

metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of

respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the

distinct possibility and the equally harrowing

reality of traffic congestion in the common

parking areas, a case of transference from one

site to another.

Moreover, an order for the closure of bus

terminals is not in line with the provisions of thePublic Service Act. The establishment, as well

as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or

passenger terminals, is generally considered a

necessary service by provincial bus operators,

hence, the investments they have poured into

the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal

sites.

Abbas vs. COMELECG.R. No. 89651November 10, 1989Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA6734Facts:A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine(9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,wasscheduled for November 19, 1989, inimplementation of RA 6734, entitled "An ActProviding for an Organic Act for theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao"(Organic Act). These consolidated petitions praythat the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC fromconductingthe plebiscite; and (2) declare RA

6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. Theargumentsagainst R.A. 6734 raised bypetitioners may generally be categorizedinto either of thefollowing: (a) that R.A. 6734,or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and(b) that certainprovisions of R.A. No. 6734conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.Issue:Whether or not certain provisions of the OrganicAct are unconstitutional.Held: The petition has no merit and the law isconstitutional.1. Petitioner contends that thetenor of a provision in the Organic Act makesthe creationof an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only twoprovinces vote in favor of autonomy, an

autonomous region would still be createdcomposed of the two provinceswhere thefavorable votes wereobtained. there is a specific provision in the

Transitory Prov isions (A rticle XIX)of the Organic Act, which incorporates s

ubstantially the samerequirementsembodied in the Constitution and fills in thedetails, thus:

“SEC. 13. The creation of the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao shalltake effectwhen approved by a majority of the votes castby the constituentunits provided in paragraph(2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in aplebiscitewhich shall be held not earlier thanninety (90) days or later than onehundredtwenty (120) days after theapproval of this Act:Provided, That only theprovinces and citiesvoting favorably in such plebiscite shall beincluded in theAutonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao. The provinces and cities whichinthe plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in theAutonomous Region shall remainthe existingadministrative determination, mergethe existing regions. “

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734,the creation of the autonomous region shalltakeeffect only when approved by a majority of thevotes cast by the constituent units inaplebiscite, and only those provinces and citieswhere a majority vote in favor of the OrganicActshall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein suchamajority is not attained shall not be included inthe autonomous region. It may be that evenif an autonomous region is created, not all of thethirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)citiesmentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A.No. 6734 shall be included therein. The singleplebisc i te contemplated by the

Const i tut ionand R.A. No. 6734 wi l l therefore bedet

erminative of (1) whether there shall be anautonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and(2)

which provinces and cities, amongthose enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shallcompromise it.

2. The question has been raised as to what thismajority means. Does it refer to a majorityof the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all theconstituent units, or a majority in each of theconstituent units, or both? The1987 Constitution provides: Thecreation of theautonomous region shall be effectivewhenapproved by majority of the votes cast by the

constituent units in a plebiscite calledfor thepurpose, provided that only provinces, citiesand geographic areas voting favorably in suchplebiscite shall be included in the autonomousregion. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It willreadily beseen that the creation of the autonomous



region is made to depend, not on thetotalmajority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituentunits andthe proviso underscores this.

3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen(13) provinces and nine (9) cities included intheOrganic Act, possess such concurrence inhistorical and cultural heritage and other

relevant characterist ics. By includingareas, which do not strictlyshare the samecharacteristic as the others,

petitioner claims that Congress has expandedthe scope of theautonomous region which theconstitution itself has prescribed to be limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. TheConstitution lays down the standards bywhichCongress shall determine which areasshould constitute the autonomous region.Guided bythese constitutional criteria, theascertainment by Congress of the areas thatshare commonattributes is within the

exclusive realm of the legislature'sdiscretion. Any review of thisascertainmentwould have to go into the wisdom of the law.

4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violatestheconstitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centersona provision in the Organic Act whichmandates that should there be any conflictbetween theMuslim Code and the Tribal Codeon the one had, and the national law on theother hand, the Shari'ah courts createdunder the same Act should applynational law. Petiti onersmaintain that the

islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from theKoran, which makes i t part of divine law. Thusit may not be subjected to any "man-made"national law. Petitioner Abbassupports thisobjection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Codeand national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim'sreligious convictions.In the present case, no actual controvers

y between real litigants exists. There arenoconflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violationof religious freedom. This being so, the Courtin this case may not be called upon toresolvewhat is merely a perceived potentialconflict between the provisions the Muslim Codeandnational law.

5. According to petitioners, said provisiongrants the President the power to mergeregions, a power which is not conferred by theConstitution upon the

President.While the power to merge administrative regions is not expresslyprovided for in theConstitution, it is a powerwhich has traditionally been lodged withthe President to facilitatethe exercise of thepower of general supervision over local

governments. There is no conflictbetween thepower of the President to merge administrativeregions with the constitutional provis ionrequiring a plebiscite in themerger

of local government units because therequirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,municipalities or barangays, not to administrative

regions.

6. Every law has in its favorthe presumption of constitutionality. Basedon the groundsraised by petitioners tochallenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734,the Court finds that petitioners have failed toovercome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

Ordillo v. Comelec

Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the

provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,

Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of

Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held

pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An

Act Providing for an Organic Act for the

Cordillera Autonomous Region.”

The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

results of the plebiscite showed that the

creation of the Region was approved by a

majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao

Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by

148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and

city above-mentioned.

Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14,

1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that

the Organic Act for the Region has been

approved and/or ratified by majority of the

votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.

the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to

declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act

for the Region. The petitioners maintain that

there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous

Region in only one province as the Constitution

and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said

Region be composed of more than one

constituent unit.

Issue: The question raised in this petition is

whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the

only province which voted favorably for the

creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region

can, alone, legally and validly constitute such

Region.

Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly

constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987



Constitution. The keywords — provinces,

cities, municipalities and geographical

areas connote that “region” is to be made

up of more than one constituent unit. The

term “region” used in its ordinary sense

means two or more provinces. This is

supported by the fact that the thirteen

(13) regions into which the Philippines is

divided for administrative purposes are

groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao

is a province by itself. To become part of a

region, it must join other provinces, cities,

municipalities, and geographical areas. It

joins other units because of their common and

distinctive historical and cultural heritage,

economic and social structures and other

relevant characteristics. The Constitutional

requirements are not present in this case.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No.

6766 provide that the Cordillera AutonomousRegion is to be administered by the Cordillera

government consisting of the Regional

Government and local government units. It

further provides that:

“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall

exercise powers and functions necessary for

the proper governance and development of all

provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay

or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .”

From these sections, it can be gleaned that

Congress never intended that a single

province may constitute the autonomous

region. Otherwise, we would be faced with

the absurd situation of having two sets of

officials, a set of provincial officials and

another set of regional officials exercising

their executive and legislative powers

over exactly the same small area

Cordillera Broad Coalitionvs.Commission

on AuditFacts:Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed onSeptember 13, 1986, the Cordillera PeoplesLiberationArmy (CPLA) and the CordilleraBodong Administration agreed that theCordillera people shall notundertake theirdemands through armed and violent strugglebut by peaceful means, such aspoliticalnegotiations.A subsequent jointagreement was then arrived at by the twoparties. Such agreement states that theyareto:Par. 2. Work together in drafting anExecutive Order to create a preparatory body

that couldperform policy-making andadministrative functions and undertakeconsultations and studiesleading to a draftorganic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Haverepresentatives from the Cordillera panel jointhe study group of the R.P. Panel indrafting the

Executive Order.Pursuant to the above jointagreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine governmentand of therepresentatives of the Cordillera people. Thiswas then signed into law by PresidentCorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislativepowers, creating the Cordillera AdministrativeRegion [CAR],which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and

Mountain Province and theCity of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuingthe said order,the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-emptedCongress from itsmandated task of enacting anorganic act and created an autonomous regionin the Cordilleras.

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COADate:

January 29, 1990Petitioner: Cordillera Broad

Coalition Respondent: COA, et alPonente:

CortesFacts:-EO 220, issued by the President in

the exercise of her legislative powers under Art.XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR.

It was created to accelerate economic and

social growth in the region and to prepare for the

establishment of the autonomous region in

the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate

the planning and implementation of programs

and services in the region, particularly, to

coordinate with the local government units as

well as with the executive departments of the

National Government in the supervision of field

offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring,and accepting projects and activities in the

region. It shall also monitor the implementation

of all ongoing national and local government

projects in the region. The CAR shall have a

Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-

formulating body and a Cordillera Executive

Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and

the Assembly and Executive Board shalle xist

until such time as the autonomous regional

government is established and organized. In

these cases, petitioners principally argue thatby issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, inthe

exercise of her legislative powers prior to the

convening of the first Congress under the

1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted

Congress from its mandated task of enacting an

organicact and created an autonomous region

in the Cordilleras.

Issue:WON EO 220 is valid

RULING:Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily

reveal that what it actually envisions is theconsolidation and coordination of the delivery of

services of line departments and agencies

of the National Government in the areas

covered by the administrative region as a step



preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the

Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous

region contemplated in the Constitution. It

merely provides for transitory measures in

anticipation of the enactment of an organic act

and the creation of an autonomous region. In

short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This

does not necessarily conflict with the provisions

of the Constitution on autonomous regions, aswe shall show later. Moreover, the transitory

nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean

that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition

asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the

Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a

basic structure of government in the

autonomous region composed of an elective

executive and legislature and special courts

with personal, family and property law

jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that

E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomousregional government. It created a region,

covering a specified area, for administrative

purposes with the main objective of

coordinating the planning and implementation

of programs and services. To determine policy,

it created a representative assembly, to

convene yearly only for a five-day regular

session, tasked with, among others, identifying

priority projects and development programs. To

serve as an implementing body, it created the

Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies createdby E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing

local governmental structure, nor are they

autonomous government agencies. They merely

constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella"

that brings together the existing local

governments, the agencies of the National

Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or

tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a

concerted effort to spur development in the

Cordilleras.

Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political

subdivision.

Ruling: No We have seen earlier that the CAR is

not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras

contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now

address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No.

220contravenes the Constitution by creating a

new territorial and political subdivision. After

carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No.

220, we find that it did not create a new

territorial and political subdivision or mergeexisting ones into a larger subdivision. Firstly,

the CAR is not a public corporation or a

territorial and political subdivision. It does not

have a separate juridical personality, unlike

provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it

vested with the powers that are normally

granted to public corporations, e.g. the power

to sue and be sued, the power to own and

dispose of property, the power to create its own

sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the

CAR was created primarily to coordinate the

planning and implementation of programs and

services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of

expediting the delivery of services is nothing

new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of

1972, which was made as part of the law of the

land by virtue of PD 1, established 11regions,

later increased to 12, with definite regional

centers and required departments and agencies

of the Executive Branch of the National

Government to set up field offices therein. The

functions of the regional offices to be

established pursuant to the Reorganization Planare: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans,

programs, rules and regulations of the

department or agency in the regional areas; (2)

to provide economical, efficient and effective

service to the people in the area; (3) to

coordinate with regional offices of other

departments, bureaus and agencies in the area;

(4) to coordinate with local government units in

the area; and (5) to perform such other

functions as may be provided by law.CAR is in

the same genre as the administrative regionscreated under the Reorganization Plan, albeit

under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR

requires the participation not only of the line

departments and agencies of the National

Government but also the local governments,

ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental

organizations in bringing about the desired

objectives and the appropriation of funds solely

for that purpose.

Issue: WON the creation of the CARcontravened the constitutional guarantee of the

local autonomy for the provinces (Abra,

Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain

Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose

the CAR.

Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the

constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in

the Constitution refers to the administrative

autonomy of local government units or, cast in

more technical language, the decentralizationof government authority. Local autonomy is not

unique to the1987 Constitution, it being

guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution.

And while there was no express guarantee



under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress

enacted the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264)

and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185),

which ushered the irreversible march towards

further enlargement of local autonomy in the

country. On the other hand, the creation of

autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and

the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987

Constitution, contemplates the grant of politicalautonomy and not just administrative autonomy

to these regions. Thus, the provision in the

Constitution for an autonomous regional

government with a basic structure consisting of

ane xecutive department and a legislative

assembly and special courts with personal,

family and property law jurisdiction in each of

the autonomous regions. As we have said

earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory

coordinating agency that would prepare the

stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras.It fills in the resulting gap in the process of

transforming a group of adjacent territorial and

political subdivisions already enjoying local or

administrative autonomy into an autonomous

region vested with political autonomy.

Disomangcop v. Datumanong (Tinga,

2004)

Facts:

− On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed(Organic Act of ARMM). Four provincesvoted for inclusion in ARMM, namely:Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.

− In accordance with it, EO 426 was issuedby Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the ARMM thepower of the DPWH.

− On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued byDPWH Sec. Vigilar. It created a DPWHMarawi Sub-District Engineering Office

which shall have jurisdiction over allnational infrastructure projects andfacilities under the DPWH within MarawiCity and Lanao del Sur.

− On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which createda new Engineering District in the firstdistrict of Lanao del Sur was passed byPres. Estrada.

− On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 whichamended RA 6734 was passed. Theprovince of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM through said

law.− Petitioners Disomangcop and

Dimalotang in their capacity as OIC andEnginer II respectively of the FirstEngineering District of DPWH-ARMM inLanao del Sur filed a petition questioning

the constitutionality and validity of DO119 and RA 8999 on the ground thatthey contravene the constitution and theorganic acts of the ARMM.

Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both

invalid and constitutionally infirm.

Held and Ratio:

On RA 8999

− RA 8999 never became operative andwas superseded or repealed by a RA9054. By creating an office withpreviously devolved functions, RA 8999,in essence sought to amend RA 6074,which is an organic act which enjoysaffirmation through a plebiscite. Hence,the provisions thereof cannot beamended by an ordinary statute such asRA 8999. The amendatory law needs tobe submitted also to a plebiscite which islacking in the case of RA 8999. RA 6734devolved the functions of the DPWH toARMM which includes Lanao del Sur.

− Moreover, RA 8999 is patentlyinconsistent with RA 9054 which is alater law. RA 9054, which is anchored onthe 1987 Constitution advances theconstitutional grant of autonomy bydetailing the powers of the ARMM whichcovers among others Lanao del Sur.However, RA 8999 ventures toreestablisht he National Government's

jurisdiction over the infrastructureprograms in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 ispatently inconsistent with RA 9054, andit destroys the latter law's objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH inline with the policy of the Constitution togrant LGUs meaningful and authenticregional autonomy.

On DO 119

- DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District

Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over

infrastructure projects within Marawi City and

Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO

426 which implements the transfer of control

and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in

line with RA 6734. The office created under DO

119 having essentially the same powers with

the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur

as created under EO 426, is a duplication. The

DO in effect takes back powers which have

been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA

9054 however has repealed DO 119 because

the former seeks to transfer control and

supervision of DPWH offices to ARMM.



Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by

Autonomous Regions (ARMM) – Population

Requirement

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM.

Cotabato City is part of the province of

Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM

because Cotabato City voted against its

inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.

Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The

1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City

and 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s

Organic Act and vesting it with power to create

provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.

Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional

Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim

Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised

of the municipalities of the 1st district of

Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato

City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections,

COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is

now only made of Cotabato City (because of

MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that

status quo should be retained however just for

the purposes of the elections, the first districtshould be called Shariff Kabunsuan with

Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a

decisive declaration from Congress as to

Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or

part of any).

Sema was a congressional candidate for the

legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with

Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was

contending that Cotabato City should be a

separate legislative district and that votes

therefrom should be excluded in the voting

(probably because her rival Dilangalen was from

there and D was winning – in fact he won). She

contended that under the Constitution, upon

creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that

province automatically gains legislative

representation and since S. Kabunsuan

excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is

being deprived of a representative in the HOR.COMELEC maintained that the legislative district

is still there and that regardless of S.

Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district

is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is

unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can

create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The

creation of local government units is governed

by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,

which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or

barangay may be created, divided, merged,

abolished or its boundary substantially altered

except in accordance with the criteria

established in the local government code and

subject to approval by a majority of the votes

cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local

government units province, city, municipality or

barangay must comply with three conditions.

First, the creation of a local government unit

must follow the criteria fixed in the Local

Government Code. Second, such creation must

not conflict with any provision of the

Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in

the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an

express grant of authority in the Constitution for

Congress to delegate to regional or local

legislative bodies the power to create local

government units. However, under its plenary

legislative powers, Congress can delegate to

local legislative bodies the power to create local

government units, subject to reasonable

standards and provided no conflict arises with

any provision of the Constitution. In fact,

Congress has delegated to provincial boards,

and city and municipal councils, the power to

create barangays within their jurisdiction,

subject to compliance with the criteria

established in the Local Government Code, and

the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article

X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot

validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.



Note that in order to create a city there must be

at least a population of at least 250k, and that a

province, once created, should have at least

one representative in the HOR. Note further

that in order to have a legislative district, there

must at least be 250k (population) in said

district. Cotabato City did not meet the

population requirement so Sema’s contention is

untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot

validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan

without first creating a legislative district. But

this can never be legally possible because the

creation of legislative districts is vested solely in

Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are

barangays not cities and provinces.

Kida v. SenateI. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic

Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that

established the ARMM and scheduled the first

regular elections for the ARMM regional

officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM

Charter and reset the regular elections for the

ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of

September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset

the first regular elections to November 26,

2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the

ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of

August 2005 and on the same date every 3

years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM

regional elections should have been held

on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun

preparations for these elections and had

accepted certificates of candidacies for the

various regional offices to be elected. But

on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,

resetting the next ARMM regular elections to

May 2013 to coincide with the regular national

and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed

directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners

assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the

synchronization of elections [including the

ARMM elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the

three-readings-on-separate-days rule under

Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987

Constitution?3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to

appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the

petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA

No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the

synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not

expressly state that Congress has to

synchronize national and local elections, the

clear intent towards this objective can be

gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article

XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent

to which the Constitutional Commission, by

deliberately making adjustments to the terms of

the incumbent officials, sought to attain

synchronization of elections. The Constitutional

Commission exchanges, read with the

provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the

Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of

the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized

national and local elections, starting the second

Monday of May 1992 and for all the following

elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections,

although called “regional” elections, should be

included among the elections to be

synchronized as it is a “local” election based on

the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that

the 1987 Constitution mandates the

synchronization of elections, including the

ARMM elections.



2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES

NOT violate the three-readings-on-

separate-days requirement in Section

26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed

by either the House or the Senate can become

laws they must pass through three readings onseparate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION

when the President certifies to the necessity of

the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court,

in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained

the effect of the President’s certification of

necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the

requirement not only of printing but also that of

reading the bill on separate days. The phrase"except when the President certifies to the

necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in

Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated

conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]

the bill has passed three readings on separate

days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form

and distributed three days before it is finally

approved.

In the present case, the records show that the

President wrote to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives to certify the necessity of the

immediate enactment of a law synchronizing

the ARMM elections with the national and local

elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the

President’s certification exempted both the

House and the Senate from having to comply

with the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the

power to appoint OICs in the ARMM isconstitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified

the three options open to Congress in order to

resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM

officials in the interim [in order to achieve

synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow

the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM

to remain in office in a hold over capacity until

those elected in the synchronized electionsassume office; (2) hold special elections in the

ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire

when those elected in the [2013] synchronized

elections assume office; or (3) authorize the

President to appoint OICs, [their respective

terms to last also until those elected in the

2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional

since it would extend the terms of office of the

incumbent ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it

violates Section 8, Article X of the

Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local

officials, except barangay officials, which shall

be determined by law, shall be three years and

no such official shall serve for more than three

consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials,

they are covered and bound by the three-year

term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they

cannot extend their term through a

holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is

effectively another term mandated by

Congress, the net result is for Congress to

create a new term and to appoint the occupant

for the new term. This view – like the extension

of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm

because Congress cannot do indirectly what it

cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that

would effectively extend the term of the

incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be

legally done directly can be done indirectly,then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot

also create a new term and effectively appoint

the occupant of the position for the new term.

This is effectively an act of appointment by

Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into

the constitutional appointment power of the

President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is

viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that

Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally

permissible, and there had been statutory basis

for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.



9054) in the past, we have to remember

that the rule of holdover can only apply as an

available option where no express or implied

legislative intent to the contrary exists; it

cannot apply where such contrary intent is

evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it

explicitly clear that it had the intention of

suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed

under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this

provision. The deletion is a policy decision that

is wholly within the discretion of Congress to

make in the exercise of its plenary legislative

powers; this Court cannot pass

upon questions of wisdom, justice or

expediency of legislation, except where an

attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of

discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is

unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has

no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is

essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections

may be held on any other date for the positionsof President, Vice President, Members of

Congress and local officials, except when so

provided by another Act of Congress, or upon

orders of a body or officer to whom Congress

may have delegated either the power or the

authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the

execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMMelections by postponing the scheduled August

2011 elections and setting another date – May

13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized

with the presidential, congressional and other

local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has

made a policy decision in the exercise of its

legislative wisdom that it shall not call special

elections as an adjustment measure in

synchronizing the ARMM elections with the

other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the

Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the

contrary by ordering special elections instead at

the call of the COMELEC. This Court,

particularly, cannot make this call without

thereby supplanting the legislative decision and

effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is

not without the power to declare an act of

Congress null and void for being

unconstitutional or for having been exercised in

grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests

on very narrow ground and is merely to annul acontravening act of Congress; it is not to

supplant the decision of Congress nor to

mandate what Congress itself should have done

in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective

ARMM officials cannot be extended through a

holdover, the term cannot be shortened by

putting an expiration date earlier than the three

(3) years that the Constitution itself

commands. This is what will happen – a term of

less than two years – if a call for special

elections shall prevail. In sum, while

synchronization is achieved, the result is at the

cost of a violation of an express provision of the

Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the

power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim isvalid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’

chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the

appointment by the President of OICs to govern

the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period

pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as

the only measure that Congress can make. This

choice itself, however, should be examined for

any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is

essentially executive in nature, and the

limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of

this power should be strictly construed; these

limitations or qualifications must be clearly

stated in order to be recognized. The appointing

power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of

the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and,

with the consent of the Commission on



Appointments, appoint the heads of the

executive departments, ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls or officers of the

armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval

captain, and other officers whose appointments

are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall

also appoint all other officers of the

Government whose appointments are not

otherwise provided for by law, and those whomhe may be authorized by law to appoint. The

Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of

other officers lower in rank in the President

alone, in the courts, or in the heads of

departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

[emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the

officers that the President can appoint. These

are:

First, the heads of the executive departments;

ambassadors; other public ministers and

consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval

captain; and other officers whose appointments

are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government

whose appointments are not otherwise provided

for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be

authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose

appointments the Congress may by law vest in

the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs

emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the

third group of officials that the President can

appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the

Constitution. Thus, the assailed

law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

express limitation whose non-observance in the

assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs

constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this

alleged constitutional problem is more

apparent than real and becomes very real only

if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a

law that changes the elective and

representative character of ARMM positions. RA

No. 10153, however, does not in any way

amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA

No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of

governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only

does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the

Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice

Governor and Members of the Regional

Legislative Assembly who shall perform the

functions pertaining to the said offices until the

officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections

shall have qualified and assumed office.” This

power is far different from appointing elective

ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending

on the assumption to office of the officials

elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not

amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,

provides only for synchronization of electionsand for the interim measures that must in the

meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No.

10153 should be read – in the manner it was

written and based on its unambiguous facial

terms. Aside from its order for synchronization,

it is purely and simply an interim measure

responding to the adjustments that the

synchronization requires.

local government cases

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