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List of incidents covered up by UNAMID & DPKO requiring

independent & public inquiry

Documented and drafted by the former Spokesperson for UNAMID, Aicha Elbasri

Introduction

On 30 July 2004, the UN Security Council gave the Sudanese government 30 days to disarm the

Janjaweed militias and bring their leaders to justice, or face "further actions." Far from disarming

the Janjaweed and neutralizing them, the government of Omar al-Bashir brazenly integrated a

large number of them into Sudan's auxiliary armed forces. As early as 2005, the UN panel of

experts tasked with monitoring the arms embargo on Darfur flagged this major violation of the

Security Council resolution 1556. It informed the Council that the government had formally

integrated a large number of the Janjaweed into its auxiliary forces, especially the Popular

Defense Force (PDF), the Border Guards (BGs) and the Central Reserve Police (CRP). As part

of its militarization of Darfur tribes, the government recruited these fighting forces among the

Berti, Northern Rizeigat and Ziyadiyah tribes respectively. The subsequent panel of experts’

reports showed that the repackaged and promoted Janjaweed continued the same scorched-earth

war, committed the same atrocities, but rode Land Cruisers instead of horses and camels, and

were equipped with high-powered weapons. This is while the Sudanese government was

claiming that the Janjaweed no longer existed in Darfur.

To avoid confronting Khartoum and exposing what may well amount to crimes against humanity

committed by members of the government auxiliary forces (uniformed Janjawed), DPKO,

UNAMID and several UN agencies purged the UN public reports and statements of any mention

of the Janjaweed. In 2009 they also stopped reporting their human rights violations, and

concealed the truth about the new dynamics of a war that deepened, worsened and extended to

South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states. This includes the government policy of ethnic

targeting of the Zaghawa population, the collective punishment of these populations along with

the Fur and other non-Arab tribes, and fueling intra-Arab war since the Jebel Amer gold-rush

war. UNAMID and DPKO documented these new war dynamics and stopped short of alerting

the Security Council and public opinion about the government’s responsibility for most of the

attacks on civilians and UNAMID peacekeepers.

In fact, DPKO and UNAMID share equal responsibility for concealing the truth about Darfur.

The Peacekeeping Department has been receiving a huge number of daily, weekly and monthly

situation reports, investigation reports and code cables on these crimes, which it didn’t reflect in

its reports of the UN Secretary-General. This is particularly disturbing since this critical report

has become the main source of accounts on developments in Darfur since the mass expulsion of

international humanitarian NGOs in 2009.

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UNAMID’s internal reports shared with DPKO make it clear that the government Border

Guards, Central Reserve Police and Popular Defense Forces were behind most of the assaults on

civilians, along with the “regular” forces, including the Sudanese Air Force, (SAF). However,

when it came to public reporting, UNAMID and DPKO either concealed the crimes committed

by the government auxiliary forces, told half-truths and outright lies about it, or used a plethora

of deceptive labels such as: "Arab militia," "pro-government militia," "government-allied

militia," "Arab tribal militia," "tribal militia," and "armed groups.” Such characterization of the

perpetrators downplays or removes the government’s responsibility for the crimes committed by

the fighters it recruited, armed, and equipped to fight the armed movements and conduct

massive ethnic targeting of non-Arab tribes. In so doing, UNAMID and DPKO have espoused

the Sudanese government's official line that blames all the atrocities on the “out-of-control’

militia, and inter-tribal conflicts over access to natural resources.

Although far from exhaustive, the following incidents show some of the attacks on Darfur

civilians and UNAMID peacekeepers that both UNAMID and DPKO systematically concealed

from the Security Council, the media, the Sudanese people and the public in general.

1. Conflated and conflicting figures:

Following in Rodolphe Adada’s footsteps, the former chief of UNAMID Ibrahim Gambari

frequently used UNAMID statistics to sell the image of a “robust” Mission, and the improvement

of the security situation in Darfur. Soon after I joined UNAMID, I was informed by several

knowledgeable sources within the Mission that the number of daily patrols conducted by the

military and police personnel was conflated by Gambari, probably with the help of the Force

Commander Patrick Nyavumba. Ms. Aichatou Mindaoudou, the Acting chief of UNAMID at

the time, admitted to me that the increase in the number of the patrols was indeed largely

questioned internally. “He [Ibrahim Gambari] kept on underlining this increase of patrols. It is

true the number is disputed but we will address it later as all the concerned components are

recognizing it only now that he has left,” she wrote to me in an email exchange dated 11

September 2012. The same goes for the low mortality figures, which constitutes a clear conflict

of interest. For the UN has set the reduction in the number of "deaths” as one of the indicators

of success in assessing the performance of several peacekeeping missions, including

UNAMID’s.

2. Kutum, North Darfur. August, 2012

Facts documented by UNAMID and shared with DPKO/DFS: A major wave of violence

erupted in Kutum, in North Darfur on 1 August 2012, when the district commissioner of Al

Waha, Abdelrahman Mohammed Eissa, and his driver were killed by “unknown men.” The

commissioner was a leader of the Al-Mahamid branch of the Northern Rezeigat tribe, from

which the government has been recruiting the Janjaweed militias subsequently integrated into the

Border Guards. On the other hand, the government recruited most of the Central Reserve Police

(Janjaweed) among the Zeyadiyah1 tribe. In reaction to the assassination of the Mahamid figure,

1 “GoS’ operational dominance in the sector seems obscured by the complex circumstances surrounding the

developments in Kutum and Mellit. With the BG, CRP and PDF mainly consisting of Rizeigat, Zeyadiyah and Berti

respectively, their alliance seems replaced by divisions and clearly articulated common interest. This is replaced

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Al-Waha Commissioner, the Border Guards and allied tribesmen waged a series of deadly

attacks against the Central Reserve Police (Ziyadiyah tribe), and the government regular forces,

whom they accused of having failed to prevent the assassination of the commissioner and

apprehend perpetrators. They also attacked the Kassab and Fatta Borno camps for internally

displaced persons – predominantly from the Zaghawa and Fur tribes – whom they suspected of

being linked to the Commissioner’s assassination.

Hordes of Border Guards aboard military land cruisers along with non-uniformed Janjaweed on

horses and camels raided both camps, fired at the displaced population, forcing over 25,000

women, men and children to flee both camps. In addition to killing and injuring ethnic villagers,

they raped women and girls, abducted civilians and committed widespread looting and arson.

When UNAMID was called on to protect the civilians from the Border Guards’ attacks a few

kilometers away from its base, the Mission’s response was tardy and inappropriate. In fact, the

displaced population reported that UNAMID did not respond to the situation between 1 and 4

August when the Border Guards and allied tribesmen were committing atrocities against the

thousands of displaced persons in Kassab and the surrounding villages: Kassab village, Salamat

and Hillat Basher. The first response from UNAMID came on 5 August when the Mission

military troops entered the Kassab IDPs camps following the Sudanese military, according to one

UNAMID internal document. In addition, UNAMID Headquarters had ordered Lt. Col.

Mashalaba, the Military commander at UNAMID base in Kutum, to deploy an entire platoon to

the Kassab camp. Mashalaba disobeyed the order and deployed just one section, which was

insufficient to prevent the abduction of an internally displaced woman.2

Public reporting: Khartoum officials and the North Darfur Governor, Osman Kibir, blamed all

this violence on “outlaws,” as part of its typical tactic of distancing the government from the

atrocities committed by members of its fighting forces3. Instead of challenging the government,

both DPKO and UNAMID concealed the identity of the perpetrators. UNAMID’s public

statements and press releases attributed all violence, including the attacks on Kassab and Fatta

Borno civilians, to “armed men,” while its code cables, police sitreps, human rights and civil

affairs reports, alternatively referred to the perpetrators as “Janjaweed,” “Border Guards” or

“Arab militia.” They also omitted the reference to the systematic mass rape, abductions, arson

and other well-documented human rights violations. On 13 - 15 August 2012, UNAMID and the

UN Country Team deployed a verification mission to follow-up on the reports of rape and other

incidents of sexual violence. In addition to taking part in this mission, UNAMID’s Human

Rights Section also conducted a separate field mission from 20 to 25 August which confirmed “8

deaths, injury to 10 persons, 9 sexual violence cases and the abduction of 4 persons.” These

findings were shared with DPKO chief, Hervé Ladsous on 3 October 2012 as part of UNAMID

by differing tribal affiliated interests owing to purported discrimination by GoS. Consequently, the insensitivity

displayed by GoS in response to the specific developments in Mellit targeting the Zeyadiyah has exacerbated the

tribal dimensions of the crisis.” Situational Analysis, Early-Warning and Pro-Active Plan for North Darfur State,

included in outgoing code cable of 14 January 201.

2 See attached code cable of11.04.2012. “Report on Misconduct of Commanding Officer RSABATT 10 Lt. Col T

Mashalaba” 3 “25,000 displaced by unrest in Sudan's Darfur: UN,” By Ian Timberlake (AFP) – Aug 10, 2012

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monthly human rights reports. However, these verified facts and figures wouldn’t be reflected in

the Secretary-General’s report. Ban’s report dated 24 October 2012 (S/2012/771) provided the

same age-old tribal explanation of the incident that blamed most of the violence on “the militia

from the Mahamid tribe.” Not only did the report not identify the Border Guards as the primary

perpetrators of the violence against Kutum civilians, but it even avoided the usual jargon of “pro-

government militia” or “government-militia,” thus abolishing any link to the government forces.

Ban’s report also largely downplayed the atrocities committed by the Border Guards and Central

Reserve Police auxiliary forces against the IDPs in both camps. It only mentioned the killing of

three IDPs on 1 August and the injury of five others on 2 August. The report also listed the

overall quarterly statistics covering the months of July, August and September, in a manner that

makes no distinction between death, injury, systematic rape and other forms of sexual violence4.

Such vague and flawed reporting could not help the public make sense of the consequences of

the deadly attacks on Darfur civilians by the government’s Janjaweed forces. The report turned

UNAMID’s delayed action into a prompt one: “On 2 August, the mission deployed additional

troops to its community policing centre at Fata Borno camp and established a round-the-clock

presence at Kassab camp,” says the report. Withholding of information about the crimes

committed by the Border Guards and aligned militias and the failure to protect civilians under

attack have resulted in both UNAMID and DPKO giving the Janjaweed and the government a

free pass for more human rights violations.

3. Tawila, North Darfur, August 2012

Facts documented by UNAMID and shared with DPKO/DFS: 24 – 27 August 2012,

Sudanese government forces aboard more than 150 military vehicles attacked four villages

mainly inhabited by Zaghawa and Fur ethnic groups on the suspicion that they had supported

Darfur's insurgents. Soldiers assaulted men and children, looted their property, raped women,

and destroyed many farms. On August 26 the local population alerted UNAMID to the attack,

which was forcing some 5,000 civilians to flee their homes. But the peacekeepers didn't rush to

protect them. They waited four days to leave their base to patrol the villages, which were only

about 12 miles away.

Public reporting: On 25 August, UNAMID told the Washington-based Radio Afia Darfur -

which had enquired about the reports of clashes and violence in the area that the situation was

“calm.” UNAMID never made public the findings of its verification mission on this incident.

The Secretary-General report covering the July-September 2012 period (S/2012/771) reported in

length about violent clashes between the government forces and the armed movements in the

Tawila area during the month of August, but made no mention of the Tawila attack and other

4 “48. UNAMID-documented violations of the right to physical integrity accounted for 49 incidents involving 153

victims, compared with 49 incidents involving 315 victims in the previous reporting period. Of these, 16 victims (7

of whom were students) sustained injuries caused by gunfire during the demonstrations in Nyala (see para. 45

above). A further 18 victims sustained injuries during attacks by militia on civilians in Kutum in August and

September (…) 50. UNAMID documented 30 cases of sexual and gender-based violence involving 42 victims, 13

of whom were minors. This represents a slight decrease from 33 cases involving 37 victims, including 23 minors, in

the previous reporting period.” S/2012/771

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assaults by the government forces on the civilians that UNAMID had duly communicated to

DPKO.

4. Kutum, North Darfur, September 2012

Facts documented by UNAMID and shared with DPKO/DFS: On 4 September 2012,

members of the Border Guards and the Central Reserve Police clashed over the assassination

attempt on the deputy Commissioner of the Kutum district in North Darfur. Three members of

the Border Guards died and their corpses remained in the streets of Kutum. The following day,

some 100 armed “Arab militiamen” – identified by eye witnesses cited in Radio Dabanga report

as members of the Border Guards -- gathered at 07:45 a.m. about two meters away from the

UNAMID base. They were chased out of Kutum by the police and local authorities and decided

to loiter right in front of UNAMID base, waiting for an opportunity to go back to retrieve the

three corpses. UNAMID peacekeepers closely monitored their movements and took photos. At

around 11:25 a.m. the militiamen stopped and shot at a group of civilians traveling in a truck to

Kutum, killed one man and injured eight others as UNAMID forces looked on and took photos

of the assault.

Public reporting: The Secretary-General report of 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771) mentioned the

incident, but attributed the attack on defenseless civilians to “the crossfire of a firefight between

armed Arab militia and Government regular forces.” As for UNAMID, it issued a press release

that reads: “On 5 September, armed men allegedly fired at local civilians, resulting in additional

casualties.” The use of “allegedly” in this statement implies that UNAMID didn’t actually

witness the attack, take photos, or provide medical treatment to the wounded.

5. Mellit, North Darfur, September 2012.

Facts documented by UNAMID: On 26 September 2012, a UNAMID convoy was escorting an

arms expert tasked by the UN Security Council to monitor the implementation of the arms

embargo imposed on Sudan. The arms expert headed to Mellit in the North Darfur state to

investigate reports of government bombing. UNAMID’s police reports stated that while

returning to the Mission base, the UNAMID convoy commander received a call from the

Mission military headquarters in the el-Fasher capital alerting him that the Government of Sudan

was threatening to bomb the convoy if it failed to stop immediately. The convoy was obliged to

stop and two government attack helicopters undertook multiple low-level offensive passes, while

an Antonov aircraft orbited overhead.

Public reporting: These facts documented and reported by UNAMID police in its daily, weekly

and monthly reports, contradict all public accounts of the incident by UNAMID, the Secretary-

General report and the panel of experts report, which cover-up the deliberate nature of this

offensive overflight. The report of the Secretary-General of 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771)

stated: “On 26 September, two Sudanese Armed Forces attack helicopters flew at low altitude

over a UNAMID patrol that was returning from an assessment mission near Thabit. The

authorities claimed that the aircraft mistook the patrol for an armed movement convoy.

UNAMID protested to the Government over the incident.” In addition to dropping the reference

to the government threat to bomb the convoy, the report removes every single indication of an

incident that fell within the category “f” of offensive military overflights. It also failed to

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indicate that this was no regular patrol, but one that was escorting a member of the UN panel of

experts. In addition to these omissions, the report didn’t make any mention of another overflight

incident that took place in Nyala, South Darfur. The incident was described in the police

situation report of 21 September in these terms: “On 19 September 2012 at 1349 hrs, two SAF

[Sudanese Armed Forces] Gunship Helicopters flew over the Sector South Super Camp at low

altitude of around 60 feet high.”

In their report dated 12 February 2013, the panel of experts provided a much more elaborate

account of the same incident, which specifies the type of gunship (Mi-24 aircraft) and describes

the low passes as “aerial demonstrations at very low altitude directly over a UNAMID patrol

section,” which were conducted while an Antonov “orbited overhead at a medium altitude.” The

report also described those manoeuvres as “threatening overflights.” However, the panel of

experts too stopped short of exposing the deliberate nature of this threatening overflight. They

made no mention of the government threat to bomb the UNAMID convoy. As for UNAMID,

the Mission’s first public communication about this incident came nearly five months following

its occurrence. Answering a query by Inner City Press reporter, Matthew Russell Lee, the

Mission too covered up the government threat.5 This incident is a clear example of how several

quarters of the United Nations protected a serious violation by the Sudanese Air Force of the

Security Council arms embargo.

6. Hashaba, North Darfur. September 2012.

Facts documented by UNAMID and shared with DPKO: On 25 - 27 September 2012, the

Sudanese government initiated its first battle in the new gold-rush war. The Sudanese Air Force

bombed the Hashaba area before the ground forces, auxiliary and non-uniformed Janjaweed,

were unleashed against defenseless civilians. UNAMID’s Joint Mission Analysis Center’s trend

assessment for the month of September 2012 provides the big picture of what lay behind this

attack and the actors involved:

“The existence of key gold mining sites in Hashaba, Al Sireaf and Kabkabiya has further

aggravated the clashes involving different armed entities including the armed movements,

armed nomadic tribes and GoS. All parties are would-be beneficiaries from this relatively

new source of wealth. While SLA/AW seems to be trying to control the mining site in Owry,

Kabkabiya, northern Rizeigat supported GoS in countering the movement’s expansion

towards Kabkabiya. Border Guards mainly consisting of northern Rizeigat also fought

alongside SAF against the movements including SLA/Unity and SLA/MM in Hashaba, and

also attacked and looted the surrounding villages.”

In Hashaba, just as in all typical government raids in Darfur, the Sudanese Air Force opened the

attack by indiscriminately bombing an entire area inhabited by civilians. Then the Border

Guards and non-uniformed Janjaweed on camels and horses swept into the area, killing civilians,

raping women and burning their property to the ground. By the end of September 2012,

UNAMID knew exactly what had happened. Its Human Rights Section had conducted 13

interviews in El Fasher city with injured victims and witnesses who survived the bombing of

5 http://www.innercitypress.com/ladsous12darfurdrc021413.html

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Souk Zarga in the Hashaba areas. The latter described in detail the Janjaweed atrocities and the

government use of the Russian-made Antonov to bomb them.

Public Reporting: The Sudanese government initially kept quiet about its massacre of civilians

in Hashaba, which was condemned by several countries and members of the Security Council. It

wasn’t until 22 November 2012, when the Sudanese Armed Forces’ spokesman Al-Sawarmi

Khaled Saad broke the government’s silence only to deny any responsibility for the attack. He

accused “some international parties” of trying to turn the incident into “war crimes” and went as

far as accusing SLA/Minni Minnawi rebels of having plotted and conducted the Hashaba attacks.

UNAMID and DPKO had enough evidence to denounce the government’s deliberate massacre of

civilians. Even after the Mission had established the facts about this slaughter during its

successful verification mission of 3 October 2013, UNAMID refused to answer the media

queries and share with the public the thoroughly verified information it collected on the incident.

The Chief of Staff, Karen Tchalian, along with other staff objected to any mission

statement/release about the attack. UNAMID left it to DPKO to report publically on this grave

incident through the Secretary-General reports. However, both Ban Ki-moon reports of October

2012 and January 2013 (S/2012/771 and S/2013/22) developed a narrative that failed to establish

the responsibility of the government for this attack. They blamed the escalation of the conflict on

the “involvement” of the rebels and concealed the deliberate, unjustifiable and indiscriminate

massacre of civilians by the government forces. The reports attributed the ground attacks to

“pro-government militias” and “armed militia,” thus concealing the identity of the perpetrators,

who were the Border Guards and non-uniformed Janjaweed militias as documented by

UNAMID. In addition, the October 2012 report omitted the reference to the bombing, while the

January 2013 report went so far as personifying the aircraft while objectifying the victims in a

troubling account of the incident: “Aircraft of the Sudanese Armed Forces had bombed a nearby

gold mine controlled by the armed movements,” said the report “S/2013/22,” thus failing to

indicate that the Russian-made Antonov was operated by the Sudanese government Air Force

pilots who deliberately bombed not gold mines, but the gold miners, including women, men and

children living and/or working in the area. The excessively manipulated reports also omitted the

systematic rape of women and girls, the abduction of civilians, the widespread looting and acts

of arsons, which all bear the signature of the government Janjaweed forces.

7. Sigili, North Darfur, November 2012

Facts documented by UNAMID and shared with DPKO/DFS: On 2 November 2012, the

government Popular Defense Forces attacked Sigili village in North Darfur, which is inhabited

by Zaghawa families, and shot dead 10 civilians. On 7 November, UNAMID deployed a large

verification team to Sigili and Abu Delek villages, accompanied by two Zaghawa men from the

attacked village. On its way to Abu Delek village, the UNAMID convoy was stopped at a

checkpoint manned by the Popular Defense Forces who started searching the peacekeepers

vehicles – in total violation of the Status of Forces Agreement. They also threatened to kill any

Zaghawa person they might find in the Mission convoy. To save the lives of the two Zagahawa

villagers accompanying the UNAMID team, the convoy commander aborted the mission and

returned to base.

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Public Reporting. UNAMID issued a press release confirming that the Mission to Abu Delek

was aborted but didn’t reveal the reason. The Secretary-General report also mentioned the

incident, omitting the reference to the threat made by the government forces, which constitutes

an additional proof of the ongoing and unreported ethnic targeting of this population. Following

the withdrawal of Minni Minnawi from the Sudanese government in late 2010, the latter

embarked on a war of reprisal targeting the ethnic Zaghawa civilians. To this end, the Popular

Defense Forces had to be recruited among the Berti, Birgit, Tunjur and other non-Arab tribes

who resented the Zaghawa. “It is widely believed here that the actions of the Berti/Birgid/Tunjur

PDF against the Zaghawa are not tribal (resource) based but are in the nature of revenge against

the actions of Minni Minawi during the DPA period up to December 2010,” says a code cable

addressed by UNAMID chief, Ms. Aichatou Mindaoudou to the chief of DPKO on 7 November

2012. Numerous internal reports document in detail the government bombing of the areas

populated by the Zaghawa civilians, and the PDF-led campaign of killing, rape, looting and land

grabbing that forced a large number of the Zaghawa to flee their homes and farms. These facts

were concealed by UNAMID and DPKO-drafted reports of the Secretary-General that framed

ethnic violence against the Zaghawa within the inter-tribal conflict. This backs the government

position that denies any ethnic targeting charges.

8. Golo, Jebel Marra, December 2012

On 24 December 2012, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) captured Golo, a town in west

Jebel Marra, in North Darfur state. The Agence France Press and other media outlets

approached UNAMID to verify this major development. The Chief of Staff, Karen Tchalian

maintained that the Mission couldn’t confirm the reports of the capture of Golo, as it didn’t

possess any verified information. However, Mr. Habib Boumaya, the head of UNAMID’s

office in Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur state, had sent Mr. Tchalian a report on 27

December 2012, providing an update on the fighting in and around Golo. The report showed that

according to local sources, SRF combatants were preventing civilians from leaving Golo, and

feared they would use them as human shields against government retaliation. It also indicated

that the government air force had bombed Golo and nine surrounding villages, killing five

civilians and injuring four others, forcing villagers to flee for their safety. The report also alerted

the Mission to the fact that the government forces were preparing an imminent counterattack to

recapture the town and warned of the danger of an ensuing humanitarian crisis with massive

civilian displacements. It concluded with several recommendations addressed to the Mission

leadership for a quick intervention to protect the civilians under imminent threat. Tchalian

received the report on 27 December 2012 and never shared it with Ms. Mindaoudou. I managed

to obtain a copy of this report from Boumaya, and handed it to Ms. Mindaoudou on 7 January

2013 in the helicopter that was flying us to Central Darfur to meet with the Deputy Governor on

the alarming situation in Golo. This serious incident is a typical example of the modus operandi

of the Chief of Staff who was preventing Ms. Mindaoudou from taking the necessary steps to

protect civilians under attack or at risk of imminent threats.

9. Zam Zam IDP camp, January 2012

Facts documented by UNAMID: According to UNAMID police and security situation reports,

members of the Central Reserve Police assaulted and injured eight male civilians on 7 January

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2013. The attack took place in the market area of Zam Zam camp for displaced populations, in

North Darfur. Policemen stole their personal belongings. A UNAMID patrol was present in the

camp and assisted the victims. The incident was reported by Radio Dabanga and Washington-

based and US-funded Radio Afia Darfur. The latter approached UNAMID, asking the Mission

to respond to the displaced populations’ accusation that the peacekeepers failed to protect them

while they “merely watched them” as they were beaten by the police. These claims were

corroborated by UNAMID’s internal reports that also confirm the daily harassment of the Zam

Zam camp population:

“It has been reported by UNAMID Police that in Center 01 and Center 03 in the Zam

Zam old IDP every day armed men alleged to be Central Reserve Police (CRP) personnel

are frequently harassing IDPs. On 07 January, 2013, a UNAMID team observed a huge

number of the IDPs gathering around the GoS police station protesting for the situation

and causing GoS police personnel to shoot in the air to disperse the IDPs.” (UNAMID’s Security Information Operations Center situation report of 8 January 2013).

Public reporting: UNAMID simply ignored the media query about this incident that was also

omitted in the Secretary-General report of 10 April 2013 (S/2013/225). The assault on the

displaced population, which is mainly made up of Zaghawa, Fur and other non-Arab groups was

reported by UNAMID police on an almost daily basis. However, UNAMID reports often cast

doubt about the credibility of these reports, through the use of “allegedly” or “reportedly.” The

difference here is that this time, UNAMID was present in the camp, witnessed the assault and

refused to confirm it to the media.

10. Jebel Amer, North Darfur. January 2013

Facts documented by UNAMID and mostly shared with DPKO/DFS. The government

bombing and massacre of over 100 civilians in the gold-rich area of Hashaba on September 2012

inaugurated the new phase of the Khartoum-orchestrated war in Darfur: the gold rush war. This

war culminated in the Jebel Amer violence, sparking off one of the bloodiest intra-Arab wars that

Darfur people ever witnessed. Since its eruption on 5 January 2013, the Jebel Amer violence

caused hundreds of deaths and injuries, abductions, rapes, arson attacks, and drove over 300,000

civilians, mainly from Beni Husein tribe, away from their homes. UNAMID documented the

participation of the Border Guards in the cruel attacks by the Northern Rezeigat militiamen on

the Beni Hussein tribesmen, which ended with dispossessing the latter from their ancestral arable

lands, water sources, and gold mines. Providing input to a code cable addressed from Ms.

Mindaoudou to DPKO Chief Hervé Ladsous on 13 January 2013, the Joint Mission Analysis

Center wrote:

“The Northern Rizeigat (Abbala) called supporters for help, and started to attack with

heavy machine guns and rocket propelled grenades (RPG). Huge number of armed

people in more than 200 military vehicles (Border Guards, SAF [Sudanese Armed

Forces) came to Jabel Amir Area and started to attack against Beni Hussein tribes.

During the attack, they shot at people randomly, burnt houses, and looted private

properties of the villagers, due to which a large number people have been displaced to El

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Serief, Kabkabiya and Saraf Omra. Majority of the displaced persons are from Beni

Hussein tribe, even though some displaced persons are from Darok and Fur tribes.”

However, Mr. Ladsous misinformed the members of the UN Security Council during the 18

March 2013 information session, by asserting that UNAMID didn’t possess information about

the government’s support of the “Abbala militia”: “UNAMID has noted the media reports

asserting that some quarters of the government support to the Abbala militia during the

hostilities, but the Mission is not in possession of information that could substantiate such an

allegation.” (NY code cable, 20 March 2013).

Public reporting: While UNAMID’s internal reports documented the involvement of the

government forces, use of government weapons, logistics and equipment, the public reports of

UNAMID and DPKO characterized the Jebel Amer situation as a “heavy intercommunal fighting

between the Aballa and Beni Hussein militias.” For months, their statements disclosed the name

of only one tribe “Beni Husein,” and concealed the other, the Northern Rezeigat, which has been

closely associated with the Janjaweed, including those in the Border Guards. Between January

2013 and February 2014, UNAMID and the Secretary-General reports withheld information

from the public, denying any sort of involvement of government forces in the Jebel Amer

fighting, in stark contrast to credible accounts by the people of Darfur, several armed movements

and the media. It wasn’t until the “Strategic Review” report of the UN Secretary-General dated

25 February 2014 (S/2014/138) that the participation of the government forces would be vaguely

admitted: “The escalation began, in January 2013, when a dispute over control of an artisanal

gold mine in Jebel Amir, North Darfur, triggered heavy fighting between groups from the

Northern Rezeigat and Beni Hussein tribes, supported by paramilitary elements,” says the

review. The lack of UNAMID/DPKO honest reporting on Jebel Amer undoubtedly encouraged

the government to pursue its over-militarization of Darfur tribes, siding with those that support

Khartoum’s fight against the armed movements and ethnic civilians alike, causing further

destruction of Sudan’s social fabric.

11. Zalingei-Nyala road, March 2013

Facts documented by UNAMID and shared with DPKO/DFS: On 24 March 2013, a

UNAMID convoy was escorting 31 women and men IDPs in three civilian buses to attend a

conference in Nyala city. The convoy was stopped by members of the SLA/AW armed

movement at Kass along the Zalingei-Nyala road, who abducted all IDPs and drivers aboard the

three buses. Soon after the media broke the news of the abduction, SLA/AW stepped in to claim

responsibility of the abduction. Speaking to Radio Dabanga on 25 March, Mustapha Tambour,

SLM-AW member, also indicated that during the incident the rebels had introduced themselves

to UNAMID, but didn’t face any resistance from the peacekeepers.

Public reporting: In the first UNAMID press release related to this incident, the peacekeepers

claimed they opposed the abduction of the civilians under their escort. This is in stark contrast

to the following findings of UNAMID’s military investigation:

“a. This investigation established that the UNAMID PKF [Peacekeeping Force] escort

team from NIBATT-36 [ Nigerian Battalion-36] made no visible effort to prevent the

abduction of IDP conference participants from the convoy. Despite the unanimous

11

testimony by the NIBATT-36 PKF escort team members that they deployed defensively

around the convoy and attempted to stop the hijacking of the IDP buses during the

incident, the two drivers of the IDP buses and the six victims who were interviewed

denied having observed any actions or posturing by the escort team to prevent the

abduction. The bus drivers who were interviewed in separate locations and abducted

IDPs claimed that the UNAMID PKF members remained on their vehicles and observed

helplessly as the IDP buses were being forced out on the convoy by the armed men

except for the convoy commander who was seen on the ground. The IDP abductees also

claimed to have observed some PKF members making “thumbs up” signals towards the

abductors which they interpreted to mean concurrence with the abduction.

b. Since there was no resistance demonstrated against the abduction, it is not clear if the

armed men could have persisted with the abduction if the UNAMID PKF escort

aggressively deployed to resist their attempt. It is assessed that the abduction may have

been thwarted if the convoy commander had deployed his team immediately and briefed

the bus drivers not to yield to the demands of the rebels. Although the convoy

commander explained that he felt overpowered by the armed men and therefore decided

not to resist the abduction, a limited attempt would have helped to assess the final resolve

of the abductors and also instill confidence to the protected civilians. A similar incident

had happened along GRAIDA – NYALA road on 26 Feb 2013 when a convoy of

ETHBATT 9 Protection Force escorting a team of de-miners was intercepted by armed

movement who demanded to arrest the de-miners but the UNAMID PKF escort resisted

and asked the protected civilians not to yield, thus thwarting the abduction.

c. The PKF escort team appears to have been oblivious of the potential risks posed

against the IDPs and therefore did not develop quick situation awareness when they came

under attack. If the command had appreciated the security situation correctly, other

options including defensive operations, consideration for night stopping in NERTITI and

early reinforcement could have been adopted.

d. It was also established that although NIBATT-36 escort team was well configured and

properly armed to deal with such eventuality, they did not make sufficient effort that

could help in confirming weather[SIC] the abduction was preventable or not.”

Conclusion of the Preliminary Investigation Report into the Abduction of IDPs under

UNAMID PKF escort along Zalingei-Nyala road on 24 March 2013, pages 11-12.

12. Um Agaga bombing, March 2013

Facts documented by UNAMID and shared with DPKO/DFS: UNAMID situation reports

from various departments leave no reasonable doubt about the indiscriminate and sometimes

deliberate nature of the aerial bombardments carried out by the Sudanese government forces on

areas inhabited by the non-Arab civilians. Reporting on the fatalities pattern for 2012,

UNAMID’s Joint Mission Analysis Center concluded the following:

“Most civilian deaths from belligerence in 2012 were recorded between June and

September (134) due to SAF air strikes targeting the armed movements prior to ground

attacks by GoS auxiliary forces (mainly BGs and PDF), while the CRP was used

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against Fur and Zaghawa supporters of the movements in areas between Jebel Marra,

Thabit, Abu Zerega, Shangil Tobaya and Dar Al Salam.”

Indeed, the months of August and September witnessed a large number of civilian deaths due to

bombing. In its August 2012 report, UNAMID Human Rights Section included these reports of

indiscriminate bombing:

“On 5 August, the SAF reportedly bombed Sharafa village killing four girls (aged 6,8,10

and 12) and injuring four men. On 6 August, similar SAF bombing was said to have

occurred in the villages of Dolma, Himeda, Sharfa, Fur Dos and Ambudja. The bombing in

Dolma village reportedly resulted in three fatalities – three children between the ages of 5

and 7 and injuries sustained by another three children.”

None of these facts and reports made it into the Secretary-General reports. UNAMID and DPKO

often argued that they needed to verify and confirm such “claims” in order to share them with the

media. They often say that they can only share verified information. This claim is nothing more

than a pretext to justify the media blackout they have been imposing on the bombing campaign.

This Um Agaga incident shows that when the Mission is offered the opportunity to investigate

the reports of bombing of civilians, it doesn't conduct a proper investigation and doesn't share the

verified information with the media representatives who enquire about it and have the right to

know what's happening to Darfur civilians.

On 22 March, a UNAMID staffer informed the Mission that the same day, one of the Russian-

made government fighter planes (Antonov) dropped bombs near a water point at the village of

Um Agaga, located about 23 kilometers northwest of UNAMID’s base in Mellit, North Darfur,

killing five people, including a woman and a child. On 24 March 2013, UNAMID police

advisors patrolled the Um Agaga village to follow up on these reports. They spoke to the village

sheikh who confirmed the bombing and the death of the five civilians and the injuring of others.

The team didn’t seize the precious opportunity of being granted access to the bombing site to

check evidence of the bombing such as the bomb crater, debris and other damage. They didn’t

speak to the injured and other witnesses of the bombing. Instead, the UNAMID team contented

itself with the account of one inhabitant of the village. On 30 March 2013, at the request of the

local population, the peacekeepers returned to the Um Agaga and Um Kedrai villages to assess

the pollution levels of the water point, near which the Sudanese forces had dropped bombs one

week earlier. Thus the peacekeepers would miss the second opportunity to properly investigate

the bombing.

Public reporting: In general both UNAMID and DPKO deliberately withheld the reality of the

intensified and indiscriminate bombing of Darfur civilians from the Security Council and the

public. For instance, when Agence France Press’ reporter, Ian Timberlake, asked UNAMID to

confirm the Um Agaga bombing that was already reported in the local press, the mission

stonewalled and never answered his request. This despite the fact that the Mission had deployed

a verification patrol that confirmed the incident. The Um Agaga bombing was communicated to

the chief of the DPKO, Hervé Ladsous in the Joint Operations Center situation report of 24

March 2013. However, Ban Ki-moon’s report covering the January-March period (S/2013/225)

makes no mention of the incident, or of most of the indiscriminate bombings and other attacks.

13

As a matter of fact, three consecutive quarterly reports of the Secretary-General (S/2012/231,

S/2012/548, S/2012/771) covering the nine-month period from January through September 2012

made only four mentions of the SAF bombing, out of which only one - the Hashaba bombing –

vaguely acknowledged civilian deaths: “Sudanese Armed Forces had bombed a nearby gold

mine controlled by the armed movements. It was reported that upwards of 70 civilians had been

killed during the attack. UNAMID observed one bomb crater, three decomposed bodies and

what was alleged to be an area containing 16 graves,” says the report. And yet, UNAMID had

asserted in its internal reports and code cables that the government Air Force had deliberately

bombed civilians before unleashing its Janjaweed forces on gold miners and other villagers who

were mostly Fur and Zaghawa.

In general, UNAMID and DPKO’s use of “air strikes” implies that the government Air Force is

using strategic and target-oriented bombing in a legitimate counter-insurgency war. The reality

is that oftentimes, the government bombed entire areas inhabited by the Fur, Zaghawa and other

non-Arab groups, seriously violating the arms embargo through its illegal use of the Russian-

made Antonov aircraft and other weapons illegally smuggled into Darfur, the deliberate and

indiscriminate bombing of civilians, and offensive military overflights, among many other

flagrant violations. UNAMID had largely documented these facts. However, by failing to

properly investigate and report on these violations, both UNAMID and DPKO have largely

contributed to covering them up.

13. Muhajeria, East Darfur, April 2013

Facts documented by UNAMID and shared with DPKO/DFS: On the night of April 18-19

2013, UNAMID troops were attacked twice within four hours in Muhajeria, in east Darfur, by

the Sudanese government forces. The long firefight resulted in the death of one peacekeeper and

one Sudanese officer. Subsequently, in the following early morning, the Sudanese Lieutenant

Ibrahim Abu-Bakr Abdallah, accompanied by hostile soldiers, bullied his way into the UNAMID

compound and threatened to launch another attack if the mission failed to pay blood money for

killing his officer.

Public reporting: Despite the strong evidence – several internal reports, and Lieutenant

Abdallah’s own admission of guilt – that established that the Sudanese government forces were

behind the deadly attack on international peacekeepers, UNAMID and UN covered it up. The

Mission chief, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, issued a statement on 19 April that mentioned only the

second of the two attacks, turned the government perpetrators into "unidentified assailants," and

suppressed all facts attesting to the government soldiers' responsibility for the attack. The same

version was echoed by DPKO statements.

14. Government forces shooting at peacekeepers near Dobo, Kulbus andAbu

Delek villages

On 7 January 2008, one week after the deployment of UNAMID peacekeepers, the Sudanese

Armed Forces fired at the first UNAMID resupply convoy near Tine in Northern Darfur, injuring

a civilian driver. The UN’s reporting on this attack is certainly exceptional, as it identified the

government forces as the perpetrators of this attack. Subsequently, however, UNAMID and

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DPKO-drafted reports of the Secretary-General would mostly refer to the assailants as

“unidentified” or “unknown” gunmen, even when they held strong evidence asserting the

identity of the perpetrators. In addition to the Muhajeria attack, the blue helmets came under the

government forces’ fire on several occasions that went unreported or obscured by UNAMID and

DPKO. The Mission statements and Secretary-General reports continued to adamantly refer to

the perpetrators as “unidentified” assailants and concealed the facts and circumstances that hint

at the government forces being behind the attacks. The following cases offer a few examples of

the information they withheld from the public:

1). Government forces shot at UNAMID at Dobo village, 11 April 2013

On 11 April 2013, the Mission deployed a large police and military convoy to the Dobo and

Ambudje areas in North Darfur to verify the reports of deadly fighting between the government

forces and the Sudan Revolutionary Front. The convoy was stopped at Dobo by members of the

SLA/Minna Minnawi movement who blocked their passage, requesting a prior notification.

Three days later, UNAMID deployed another large police and military peacekeeper convoy,

which made it to the village and spent most of the day speaking to local inhabitants. While

heading back to the base, the convoy came under heavy fire. The government forces shot several

times at UNAMID peacekeepers, forcing them to spend the night on the road and wait for the

morning hours to be escorted to their base by government forces. While a Sudanese official tried

to deny that the government forces were behind the shooting, the Sudanese Military commander

at the Umdersay camp asserted the opposite:

“On 14 April 2013 at 0700 hrs, the GoS Military Commander at Umdersay Camp

escorted the UNAMID Patrol team to his office where he gave reason for the shooting at

the UNAMID patrol. He stated that the shooting was because of the movement of the

convoy beyond 1800 hours and warned that UNAMID must first inform the GoS Military

Command in Shangil Tobaya about their movements before embarking on such patrols.”

(UNAMID’s police situation report of 14 April 2013)

Public reporting: UNAMID never brought up this incident. Similarly, the Secretary-

General’s report of 25 July 2013 (S/2013/420) referred to three attacks on UNAMID troops by

“unidentified” armed assailants in Muhajeria (19 April), Ed Al Fursan (1 May) Khor Abeche

(28 June). But it made no mention of the government shooting at the peacekeepers at Dobo

village on 11 April 2013.

2). Shooting in Kulbus, west Darfur 24 December 2012

In a similar incident, the government soldiers shot at a UNAMID patrol on 24 December 2012

in Kulbus, in west Darfur. During this incident, the soldiers explained that they acted that way

because they weren’t informed about the Mission movement:

“Shooting: on 24 Dec 12, UNAMID Military reported that, in West Dafur,

Kulbus Locality, Kulbus TS (approx. 100km North of El Geneina), A UNAMID

Patrol came under fire. As the Patrol stopped, the GoS soldiers asked then why

they were going on a patrol without their knowledge. The Patrol team showed

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them their clearance but, GOS personnel said that, they were not aware of the

clearance. After a brief negotiation they allowed the patrol to proceed. No

causality reported.” UNDSS weekly report of 24-30 December 2012.”

(UNAMID police report)

This incident shows how trigger-happy the government forces are even when confronting

UNAMID forces, who according to the Status of Forces Agreement don’t require any

authorization or clearance from the government authorities. This incident wasn’t publicly

reported by UNAMID and didn’t appear in the Secretary-General’s report of 15 January 2013

(S/2013/22).

3). UNAMID under heavy gunfire in Abu Delek area, 25 October 2012

Towards the third week of October 2012, UNAMID received reports of clashes that had

opposed the government forces to the armed movements on 17 October near Abu Delek, in

North Darfur state. However, the casualty figures provided by the government seemed

inconsistent with those the Mission had received from the local sources. In an attempt to verify

these reports and assess the situation in the area, UNAMID sent a team to Abu Delek on 25

October. At about two kilometers away from their destination, the peacekeepers came under

heavy gunfire. This is what UNAMID reported to the head of DPKO, Hervé Ladsous on this

particular incident:

“On 25 October, at approximately 0910 hrs, a team from El Fasher on

verification patrol to Abu Delek (66 Km south-east of El Fasher) in relation to

reported tensions in the area (see UNAMID report of 20 October) came under

heavy gunfire from an identified armed group whilst approaching Abu Delek 2 km

from the destination point. Some shots were fired into the air, some of which

targeted the patrol, but there were no injuries. Prior to the incident, two GoS

military Land Cruisers mounted with 12.7mm bypassed the patrol team in Abu

Delek direction. Assessing the safety and security on the ground, the patrol

decided to return to base.” (Joint Operations Sitrep of 30 Oct. 2012 )

The circumstances of the attack point to the government forces as the perpetrators. The attack

took place in an area under government control. This explains why the government military

were patrolling the area aboard of land cruisers mounted with 12.7 mm machine gun. The

government forces bypassed the UNAMID patrol and returned without interacting with the

team, just before the peacekeepers came under heavy fire. UNAMID peacekeepers strongly

suspected the Government forces of being behind the attack as indicated in its police, security

and Joint Operations Centers’ reports, which were shared with Ladsous:

“On 25 Oct, a UNAMID patrol team aborted its assessment mission to Abu Delek on the

alleged killing of pro-government militias. The team came under heavy gunfire from

unknown armed group, but no one was injured. The gunfire is suspected to have come

from the GoS military, who did not want the team to proceed further for fear of

interaction with the locals.” (UN Department of Safety and Security, Darfur Monthly

Security Review of October 2012)

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The strong suspicion that the government is behind the attack was removed from the public

reporting on this incident. No hint of information about the circumstances surrounding this

incident would be shared with the Security Council members. The Secretary-General’s report

of 15 January 2013 describes the attack in the usual vague terms that keep the government

beyond any suspicion.

“21. Further south, on 17 October, the mission received reports from community sources

in Abu Delek (approximately 50 km south-east of El Fasher, Northern Darfur) of intense

clashes among the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Popular Defense Forces and SLA-Minni

Minawi. On 25 October, UNAMID personnel on patrol to verify the information and

assess the impact of the violence on the civilian community encountered gunfire by

unidentified assailants in the surrounding area. Unable to assess the security situation

ahead, the patrol was aborted.” (Ban Ki-moon report of 15 January 2013, S/2013/22)

15. Non investigated and/or unreported mass and systematic rape in Darfur

Introduction

On 25 January 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-

General concluded in its report that the Government forces and “Janjaweed militias” committed

serious crimes on a widespread and systematic basis that may amount to crimes against

humanity. These include rape and other forms of sexual violence. The Sudanese government

denied all charges, including rape. They claimed that rape simply does not exist in the Sudan.

The government position rendered international reporting of rape problematic, especially

following the ICC indictment of the Sudanese President. By the end of 2009, UN agencies, and

international and national NGOs that remained in Darfur simply stopped reporting on human

rights violations, including rape. Since then, the records of UNAMID have implied a decrease

in sexual and “gender-based violence,” a euphemism used and abused to avoid spelling out rape

crimes. In fact, UNAMID figures reflect not the decrease in rape, but the Mission’s inability to

access the theater of rape and its unwillingness to investigate these crimes.

Based on the Mission records, the Secretary-General’s report of 30 December 2011

(S/2011/814) reported 37 incidents of gender-based violence involving 53 victims over a three-

month period. These already low quarterly figures of the reported cases continued to gradually

decrease over the following 16 month period to such an extent that by April 2013 the Secretary-

General report indicated that UNAMID recorded only 22 incidents involving 38 victims in the

January-March period (S/2013/225). This sharp decrease was taking place while violence,

including sexual violence, was in sharp rise. Such a decrease backs the Sudanese government’s

claim that the evidence for sexual violence in Darfur was fabricated by the international

community. What has actually decreased is merely UNAMID’s willingness and capacity to

report on rape, especially the systematic and mass rape that the government forces/Janjaweed

continued to commit during their ethnically targeted attacks on the non-Arab groups.

Rape survivors have been facing major obstacles to reporting it to the government institutions,

starting with the social stigma, the distrust of government police and the fear of being subjected

17

to criminal prosecution if the rape survivor is unable to meet the evidence threshold for the crime

of rape that is stipulated in the government Evidence Act of 1993. In addition to these obstacles,

UNAMID has been largely unable to access rape survivors following attacks by the government

forces. The government forces have been systematically blocking UNAMID from reaching

civilians during and after their “military operations.” According to the Joint Mission Analysis

Center report on fatality patterns, “In 2012 alone, a total of 149 restrictions (…) were imposed

mainly by GoS (130). Armed movements and locals also restricted UNAMID freedom of

movement on 16 and 3 occasions respectively (…) most of these restrictions took place in

critical areas that required immediate verification and close monitoring due to humanitarian

crisis and potential tension.”

The same trend continued in 2013 and 2014, especially when UNAMID’s assessment missions

were heading to investigate rape. For instance, on 20 February 2013, the Sudanese national

security personnel refused to authorize UNAMID peacekeepers to deploy to Sirba and Abu

Sururj, in West Darfur, to investigate reports of rape and gender-based violence in these areas.

In spite of these disturbing levels of access denial imposed on UNAMID personnel, the UN

panel of experts of 2013 asserted that organized and systematic rape no longer existed in Darfur:

“The Panel notes that, today, sexual and gender-based violence is not used as a

systematic violation of international humanitarian law during attacks on villages and

internally displaced persons camps. Although it is linked to the conflict and its impact in

terms of insecurity, impunity and absence of the rule of law, the Panel’sfindings show

that it is currently neither organized nor systematic.” S/2013/79, p. 40

Such an erroneous conclusion is challenged by UNAMID’s own internal reports. The following

cases demonstrate the reports of systematic sexual aggressions against women and girls during

the attacks by the government forces on the villages that were either not investigated, unreported

or under-reported. These cases relate to the same period during which UNAMID maintained that

its rape records were on the decrease.

1) Tawila, North Darfur, August 2012: On August 24-27 2012, Sudanese government forces

aboard more than 150 military vehicles attacked four villages mainly inhabited by Zaghawa and

Fur ethnic groups on the suspicion that they had supported Darfur's insurgents. The soldiers

raped several women, assaulted men and children, looted, and destroyed many farms. I

requested a report on the findings of the verification mission that included WFP, UNHCR and

possibly OCHA. In total, UNAMID provided me with three consecutive reports that didn’t tell

the same story. The first two reports were drafted by UNAMID, whereas the third one was a

joint UN report. UNAMID reports used the usual vague formula of “unidentified armed men in

military uniform carrying heavy guns,” in an effort to clear the government from any

responsibility for the attack. They also omitted to mention the ethnic targeting and made no

mention of rape cases that were brought to my attention by one national staff member who took

part in the assessment mission. It wasn’t until the third internal report, which was jointly drafted

by UNAMID and UN agencies, that the responsibility of the government forces’ ethnic targeting

attack was established, and rape mentioned. Women from Kushina reported that the government

forces raped seven women from Khartoum Jedeed and two women from Korofola near Kushina.

However, UNAMID failed to follow up on these reports of rape, which the Human Rights Section didn’t mention in its code cable report for the month of August 2012.

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2.) Shanghil Tobaya, North Darfur, 2012: Speaking to the police patrol on behalf of the

internally displaced persons in Nifasha camp, a tribal leader reported that on 12 December 2012

the Government Air Force, using Antonov aircraft, dropped several bombs in their area.

Following the bombing, “pro-government militias” aboard some 150 vehicles raided their

villages, terrorized them, looted their property and raped about 20 women, which led to a wave

of displacement of villagers from Hashaba, Dali, Koto, Massalit, Nemera, Dawa, Sharafa,

Dolma, Hemeda and Dadi villages. The following day, a UNAMID police team in Shanghil

Tobaya conducted another patrol to Umdersay village, which was also the scene of the

government forces’ attacks. The peacekeepers spoke to a 30 year-old woman who was raped

during the attack and had visited the UNAMID clinic for treatment. The rape survivor reported

that 12 other women from the same Umdersay village were raped during the attack and were

“sent to El-Fasher Hospital” for treatment. On 19 December, the Mission police visited El-

Fasher Hospital to follow up on the 12 rape cases reported by the rape survivor in Um Dursay

village in Shangil Tobaya, but “the hospital authorities denied receiving any victims of rape from

Shangil Tobaya area,” says the police report. Indeed, rape cases were difficult to investigate.

However, when offered the opportunity to access the victims of the government attacks,

UNAMID and the UN stop short of investigating the rape cases that the UNAMID police had

reported on.

3) Nifasaha IDP camp, December 2012: The investigation of human rights violations,

including rape, falls under the responsibility of the UNAMID Human Rights Section (HRS). On

30 December 2012, a joint UN assessment mission made up of UNAMID, OCHA, UNHCR,

UNFPA and IOM managed to deploy to Nifasha and extended Nifasha IDP camps that are

located at approximately 2.5 kilometers from the UNAMID team site in Shangil Tobaya. The

camps accommodate approximately 19,000 and 7,000 displaced persons respectively. The UN

had reported the arrival of a total of 991 families who had fled their villages around Abuzerega

in Shangil Tobaya due to the aerial bombardment and “attacks by Janjaweed” on 15-17

December. UNAMID failed to even raise the rape issue during their meeting with the

concerned population. This despite the fact that two out of seven members of the UN assessment

team were UNAMID human rights officers, and that the reports of rape related to these

ethnically targeted attacks were included in UNAMID police situation reports. The consolidated

UNAMID/UN mission report didn’t include a single mention of rape or any other form of sexual

violence, which clearly weren’t part of this assessment mission’s objectives. As for the

Secretary-General report of 15 January 2013 covering the October-December period

(S/2013/22), it stated merely that UNAMID recorded 33 incidents of sexual and gender-based

violence involving 47 victims. Such a characterization of this type of crime doesn’t clarify

whether the cases involved concern rape, attempted rape, systematic, mass or gang rape. The

truth of the human suffering produced by rape crimes disappears under such generic labeling.

4). Tawila, North Darfur. November 2012: During the month of November 2012, UNAMID

police reported several cases of rape, including the deliberate abduction and gang rape of a 17

year-old pregnant girl by three armed men “suspected to be members of the Arab Militia.” The

case was verified and confirmed by a UNAMID doctor who treated the rape survivor, a minor, as

indicated in the police daily and monthly situation reports for the month of November.

However, UNAMID’s Human Rights Section covering the same month made no mention of this

gang rape. The Section report maintained that it had conducted 27 field missions to various

19

localities in Darfur and visited 26 IDP camps, which enabled it to document 38 new cases of

human rights violations involving 75 victims. However, UNAMID Human Rights didn’t list a

single case of rape as part of the human rights violations it documented over the entire month.

This could be an indication that the rape victims who were often treated by UNAMID doctors

across Darfur may not have been reflected in the Mission’s human rights’ reporting.

5)Verified but unreported systematic and mass rape: Fata Borno and kassab IDP camps

When UNAMID and the UN manage to document and confirm systematic rape cases, they tend

to conceal the findings of their verification mission from the UN Security Council members and

general public. This has been the case for the sexual violence that the UN documented and

confirmed following the Border Guards/Janjaweed attacks on IDPs in Kassab and Fatta Borno

camps, during the Kutum violence over the month of August 2012.

“An integrated UNAMID and UNCT mission to Kutum took place from 13 to 15 August

to follow-up on reported sexual violence incidents; HRS participated. HRS also

conducted a separate field mission from 25 to 20 August to follow-up on reported human

rights violations and abuses, including reported sexual violence. from the interviews

conducted during this field mission, HRS was able to confirm 8 deaths, injury to 10

persons, 9 sexual violence cases and the abduction of 4 persons.” (Human Rights Section

report for August 2012).

This report was shared with DPKO, which omitted to include its findings in the Secretary-

General report of October 2012 (S/2012/771).

Conclusion:

Athorough and independent inquiry needs to investigate these serious incidents, publish a public

report of the findings, establish who were responsible for the deliberate manipulation of the

reports and punish them accordingly. Any credible inquiry has to start with listening to the

former Spokesperson, Aicha Elbasri. The charges pressed by the second UN whistle blower on

Darfur in a decade concern UNAMID and DPKO equally. Therefore, any inquiry that doesn’t

investigate the DPKO manipulation of the UN Secretary-General reports will not lead to

establishing the whole truth about the cover-up of the crimes against Darfur civilians.