leadership against insurgency

8/14/2019 Leadership Against Insurgency

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a n d

Lea d ers h ip Aga in s t

Clar enceM. Sonn&Jr.

. .

I n su rgency

JUST 17 yea r s ago, shor t ly a ft er h is

r et ur n t o F ran ce fr om In doch in a,

Genera l J ean de Lat t re de Tassigny

died of ca ncer . By this t ime, his st ra -

t egic pla n for defea tin g t h e Vietmhdi

was in shamhlee. But for a br ief t ime

in 1951, he had turned back the en-emy and kd given France new hope.Credit for ha lt ing the advance of

th e Vietminh at a cr it ical moment in

1951 was due not to any eudden im-

pr ovemen t in t he F ren ch logist ic sit -

72

uat ion or a for tu itous sh ift in the

in ter na tion al polit ieel pict ur e, bu t,

r a ther , a lmost solely to the ekill of

t his in dividu al commander , a dist in -

guished veteran of two World Wars

and the Moroccan campa ign . Through

a combin at ion of en er gy, devot ion t oduty, and cheer milita ry genius, de

Lat t re in the one yea r before his un-

for t una t e dea t h demonst r at ed t ha t in -

dividual grea tnees can et ill preva il

over the forces of history and pro-

MiliblyReview



t ided lessons in st ra tegy againet in-

su rgen cy wh ich mer it r est udy t oda y.

Thle fu tu re Ma reh al of F ran ce wee

born on 2 February 1889. There is

no indica t ion that h le paren t s in t endedhim for a milita ry career , bu t young

J ean de Lst t re wae a vigorous youth

for whom any other choice wou ld have

been inconceivable. As ide from a sca t -

t er in g of m ilit ar y officer s among h ls

anceetore, it was apparent ly a boyhood

love for hor see wh ich led h im to Sa in t -

Cyr a nd t he F ren ch ca va lr y.

St3r t of C3reerAe a young lieutenant , de Let t re

wa s st at ion ed wit hin sigh t of t he Ger -

man border at the t ime World War I

broke out . He and his t roop of horse-

men dis t inguished themselves in those

firet few months h efor e t he conflict

devolved in to t ren ch wa rfa re. By t he

end of 1914, he had become a Cheva lierof the Legion of Honor and had suf-

fer ed a ch est wound wh ich nea r ly cost

h im his life.

Even at this ear ly stage, it was

clear that de Lst t re was a leader of

men . Somewhat st ocky and on ly mod-

er at ely t all, h e wa s not h andeome, bu t

h is er ect st a tu r e, an aqu ilin e nose, and

pen et ra tin g gr ay-blu e eyes cr ea ted a

s t rik ing appearance. He dressed fault i

lessly, a nd his act ions a nd demea nor

wer e oft en t heat rical, a lt hou gh t hey

reflect ed t he character of a man wh o

Cfmwwe M. Somw, Jr., ie thePrkipal Eemwmic O@er with theAmerican Emba#8y, Jidda, Saudi Av*

bia. He 8erved with the 20th Air Fumeduring Werld War II, and joined theDepartment of State as a ForeignSe*-ce Oficer in 1947. H8 woe 08-eigned to the Amet+can Conmdat8 inHanoi in 1950-51, and woa a ot”vilianm8mber of the 1966 clns8 at the USArnqt War College prior to his presentaam”gnment.

GENERAL DE IATIRE

f

not on ly possessed, bu t a lso in spir ed,

confidence and assurance. He bed a

et rict een ee of disciplin e a nd a 8hor t

t emper for t hose gu ilt y of n egligen ce

or t ra nsgr eesion e. Above a ll, h e felta eense of pat r iot ism which be euc-

cesefu lly inst illed in other s. He ra ised

the mora le of those under h im to a

h igh pit ch .

Transfer te Infantry “

Rwdizing that the old cava lry bad

eerved ite ueefu lnees, de Let t re, in

1916, t ra nsfer red t o t he in fan tr y. Inthe t rench warfare of the per iod, he

cher eet er ist ieelly ser ved at t he ou t-

poste of the ba t t lefield and ended

Wor ld Wa r I wit h fu rt her wounds a nd

decora t ions. After come duty in the

peacet ime army, he eerved in Morocco

from 1921 unt il 1926. With the re-

bellion of Mohammed ben Abd-el-

Kr im, de Lst t re ga ined his fir st ex-per ience in the guerr illa war fare

which was to requir e h is exper t a t -

t en tion in In doch in a 25 yea rs la ter .

H e r et ur ned t o F ra nce t o a tt end t he

13colede Gnerre, s ewed sever a l yea r s

as a r egimen ta l commander , a nd wa s

appoin ted in 1933 te the sta ff of theConeeil Superieur de la Gwrre under

Genera l Maxime W. Weygand. In Sep-

tember 1936, he retu rned to a regi-

men t al command a t Met z, not fa r fr om

where he had been eta t ioned at the

outbreak of Wor ld War I.

By 1939, de Lat t re, a t the age of

50, had ach ieved the r ank of br igadier

gen er al. Despit e br ief in ter lu des of

staff work he was clear ly at hh besta e a field commander , st ra tegist , a nd

leader of men. Shor t ly after World

War II sta r ted, he wae given com-

mand of the French 14th Infant ry

Divieion . In t he Germa n in vseion of

1940, he did his utmost to stave off

French defa t . For his services, he

lmualy1*9 13



GENERAL DE LATTRE

was made a gr and officer of t he Legion

of Honor a nd la ter pr omot ed t o major

general.

In J uly 1941, de Let t re joined

Weygand in Nor th Afr ica as com-

mander of t he F ren ch for ces in Tunis.

At th is poin t , he seems not to have

ser iou sly con sider ed leaving F r ench

ter r itory to join the Allies. Instead,

reca lled to France ear ly in 1942, he

sought to mainta in the t roops at h ie

disposal in reediness for a possible

Allied landing in sou thern F r ance and

t he fea red Germa n occu pa tion of t be

Vichy t er r it or y. When the la t ter came,

de Lat t re wa s fou nd gu ilt y of “aban-

don ing h is post ” and was sen t en ced t o

10 years’ impr isonment .

Fame Spreads

De Let t re served only 10 months of

this sentence by escaping on 4 Sep-

t ember 1943. Evacuat ed clandest inely

to England, he soon joined the Frenchforces in Nor th Afr ica . In m id-1944,

he moved on to Ita ly, from where he

led the French cont ingen t in the Al-

lied la ndin g in sou th er n F ra nce. Th e

successes he a ch ieved t her e a nd in t he

subsequen t d rive nor t hwa r d and t h en

a cr oss sou th er n Germany t o t he Au s-

t ria n bor der wer e t o eet ablish de La t-

t r e’s in t er na tiona l r eput a t ion as a mil-it a ry leader .

De Latt re comma nded the French

occupa t ion forces for a year before

r et ur ning t o Fra nce wh er e h e served

as inspector genera l of the army and

ch ief of the genera l et a ff. With the

sign ing of th e Treat y of Bruesels, h e

became commander in chief of the

land forces of Western Europe andsubsequent ly ser ved in t he same ca -

pa cit y in t he form at ive et agce of t he

Nor th At la nt ic Tr ea ty Or gania et ion .

De Lat t re did not heeit a te when he

was ca lled to command the French

forces in Indeeh ina la te in 1950.

Fr en chmen, in 1950, wer e at least aa

con cer ned a bou t t he cou rse of even ts

in Sou th ea st Asia se Amer ica ns wer e

to become 15 yea r s la t er . Alt hough de-

ba t e waa color ed by the des ir e t o ma in -

t ain t he F ren ch Un ion , t her e wa s r ea l

con cer n over h ow t o st em t he a dvance

of communism with less-than -adequate

resources and the absence of a rep-

r esen t a t ive Vietnamese Governmen t .

Militar ily, t ime bega n t o r un out for

the French when the Communis t scom-

plet ed t h eir conquest of Ch in a , offer -

ing the .Vietminh a conven ien t base .

of for eign su ppor t. To meet t hie ch al-

lenge, no other Frenchman seemed bet -

t er qu a lified t han J e an de Lst tr e.

By the fa ll of 1950, the French had

Ioa t t heir pr incipal ou tpos ts a long the

Chhmse fron t ier , and the enemy under

Gen er al Vo Nguyen Gia p wa s pr epa r-

in g for t he fir st t im e t o make a fr on ta l

a t ta ck on the Tonk ]nese capit a l of I fa -

n oi a nd t he por t cit y of Haiph ong. Th e

F r ench for ces s eemed unable t o r ally,

and morale was poor . French civilians ,

wh o h ad lon g sin ce t ra nsfer red t heir

liquid asseta to sa fer ground, were

now evacua t ing their families .

Command Dif fers

De Lat t re’s assumpt ion of command,effect ive 17 December 1950, d iffer ed

fu ndamen ta lly fr om t ha t of h is pr ed-

ecessors in that he wee named not

on ly commander in ch ief of French

forces in the Far Eeat , but a lso h igh

commissioner for I ndoch ina . Cha r ac-

t er ist ica lly, h e t ar ried on ly two days

in Sa igon before proceeding to the

fr on t in Tonkin .Not on ly the t roops, but a leo the

loca l popu la ce wer e t o be impr essed.

De La tt re u sed h is magnet ic per sona l-

ity and well-chosen words to encourage

the officers and men , and the effect

74 Military Rwiaw



6ENESAL DE iAl lSE

was not lost on the civilian popu la t ion .

On Ch ristma s Eve, t h e m idn igh t mass

a t H anoi’s ca th edr al wa s dela yed un -

t il de Lat t re and hia staff made a dra-

mat ic en t ra n ce. The evacua tion of ci-

viliane was ha lted, and Genera l de

La tt re h im self summon ed his wife t o

preside over their household in Ha-

noi. The fact tha t h is on ly eon , Ber -

nard, had alr eady been eerving in

In deeh in a for over a yea r, h e a llowed

t o spea k for itself.

Gener a l de La t tr e was soon visit ing

t he ou tpost s of t he ba t tlefield, inepir -

ing t h e t r oops wit h h le con fidence andcourage. Hie effor te to turn the t ide

of the war , however , consisted of

mor e t han t hea tr ica l a ppea r ances. He

purged many officer s whom he cons id -

er ed der elict in t heir per formance.

Never t heless, t he gr ea t er a ler t ness

which he inst illed th roughout the

army came juet in t ime. On 15 J an-ua ry 1961, the Vietmhh launched a

ma jor at tack against Vln h Yen, on ly

25 miles nor thwest of Hanoi, for the

fir st t ime con cen tr at in g t heir for cee

and r icking bat t le in open coun t ry.

Recogn izing the ser iousness of the

situa t ion , de Lat t re n ot on ly took th e

r ick of wit hdr awing t r oops fr om otherpor tion s of Ton kin , h ut a lso r equ isi-

t ioned commercia l a ircraft to organize

an air lift from Saigon to the nor th .

The bat t le lasted four days dur ing

which the a tt acker s lost a n eet ima ted

5,000 dead and nncoun t ed wounded .

On 19 J anuary, they withdrew to

t he h ille. Gener a l Giap, bimeelf, pub-

licly acknowledged the mist akes of h ie

campaign . Victory for the French,

however , would ecarcely have been pos-

sible had Genera l de Lat t re not ut i-

lized h ls fir st mon th so effect ively in

r est or ing mor a le and per sona lly con -

dnct ed such a vigorous defense.

By this t ime, th e Ch inese su ppor t-

ers of the Vietminh had become en-

gaged in the Korean Cont lict . The

effect of this developm en t on subse-

qu en t even ts in In doch in a is difficu lt

t o a seees, bu t fr om a br oad viewpoin t ,

t he Kor ea n st ru ggle so t axed Ch in ese

r esou r ces t hat t he u lt ima te expansion

A -“ Iielic.mtu? A#aOma t&

The helicopter wse used exteacive ly hythe Freneh in Inderh ina

of the Vietminh in to the south of

Viet nam was delayed.In any even t , de Let tr e r ea lized t ha t

h ie in it ia l vict ory merely r est or ed the

status quo ante u nder which t he hill

coun t ry remained in enemy bands , and

la rge poWlon s of t he Red River Delt a

wer e unsa fe a ft er n igh tfa ll. H e in st i-

tu ted a crash program for the con-

st r uct ion of new for t ifica t ions and r e-

organized hie t roeps to provide lighter

a nd mor e mobile un its. Communiee-

t ions for t he la t ter wer e improved and,

to t he extant of available resou rces,

a ir suppor t wa s in cr ea sed.

De Lat t re ordered the rein force-

ment and holding of Mao-Khe, a key

Jmusry 1969 75



6ENESAL DE lAl lRE

post in h oldin g off a n ew en emy dr ive

t owa rd H aiph ong at t he en d of Ma rch

1951. H e r ea lized, h owever , t ha t t he

deploym en t of available t roopz a nd

milita ry act ion a lon e cou ld n ot win

the Indochinese czmpa ign . In mid-

March , Genera l de Lat t re had re-

tu rned to Par is to demand extensive

r ein for cemen t , empha sizing t hat t h e

loss of Tonkin wou ld mean the 10SS

of In doch in a an d of Sout heast Asia .

Th is was con tr ar y t o t he views of t he

Ch iefs of St a ff who wished t o concen -

t ra te the French effor t s in South

Vietnam.

Forces Withdrawn

While the French Governmen t

a gr eed wit h d e Let tr e on h is st ra tegy,

it faced the dilemma of r eneging on

simultaneous commitmen t for a

gr ea ter F ren ch con tr ibu tion t o Eu ro-

pean defenee or inst itu t ing a polit -

ica lly unpopula r increase in the length

of compulsory milita ry service . Rathert ha n fa ce eit her possibilit y, t he gov-

er nmen t decided t o wit hdr aw for ces

fr om Nor th Afr ica on 20 Ma rch 1951.

The fa t efu l long-r a nge consequences

of this deeieion were not ordy that

F ren ch con tr ol in Afr ica was dim in -

ished by the number of ba t ta lions

withdrawn, but also many Afr ican

t r oops wer e t o have t heir fir st con t actwit h a n a nt icolon ia l r evolt a nd lea rn

met hods wh ich t h ey cou ld la ter a pply

a ga in st t h e F ren ch . Never th eless, de

La t tr e r eceived h is r ein for cemen t s.

Du r in g de Let tr e’s t enu re, Gener al

Giap made a th ird t ry to dr ive the

French from the Red River Delt a . Th is

commenced on 29 May with at tacks

across t he Da y River combin ed wit h

diversiona ry guerr illa at tacks on

F ren ch posit ion s wit hin t he delt a. A

number of the sma ller F rench ou tpost s

wer e wiped out , but the French were

aga in able t o t h r ow in r ein for cemen t s

a nd t o h ar ass t he en emy wit h a ir cr aft

and r iverhorne fir epower . On 18 June ,

the Vietminh ret ir ed after heavy

losses on both sides.

The successfu l ou t come of t his ba t-

t le, however , h eld scant sa tisfa ct ion

for Gen er al de Lat tr e, for , on 30 May,

near the banks of the Day River , his

eon wae killed. Alt hough ear lier h e

had never emphasized the fact tha t

h ie own son was sha r ing the burden

of t he In deeh in ese a ct ion , h is su bse-

qu ent appea ls for greet er effor t and

sacr ifice cou ld not fa il to be more

solemn and ca r ry grea t er weigh t . On ly

br iefly did his personal t ragedy de-

pr ive h ]m of th e for ce to car ry on his

mission in Indoch ina .

ViatnamesaArmy Formed

Meanwh ile, Gen er al de Let tr e h ad

commenced another creditable project

—the format ion of an independen t

Viet namese Ar rnY. Ear ly in t he yea r,Vietnamese troops commenced service

u nder F ren ch officer s, an d t ra in in g

con t inued during the summer months.

Since t he Vietm inh wer e r ea ssessing

their st rength and st ra tegy, and t he

ra iny seeeon made act ion difficu lt ,

there were to be no other major en -

counter s unt il fa ll.

Despite h is in it ia l successes , de La t -

t r e a Iso r ea lized t ha t F r ance cou ld not

win the war in Vietnam without in-

terna t iona l supPor t . In May, he a t-

t en ded a con fer en ce wit h t he Br it ish

in Singa por e. H e wa s in close con ta ct

with the Amer ican Embassy in Saigon

and the Amer ican Consu la t e in Hanoi.

In Sept ember , h e a ccept ed a n invita-

t ion fr om t he US J oin t Ch iefs of St aff

t o visit t he Un it ed St at es.

In Wash in gt on , Gen er al de Lat t re

met President Harry S Truman, Sec-

r et ar y of St at e Dea n G. Ach eson , a nd

76 MMRaryReview



ism, but one to preven t the epread of

communism in Southeast Asia , and

that it was a conflict comparable in

impor tance to tha t in Korea . Hie ap-

pea ls for gr eet er a id, empha sizing t h e

n eeds of t he Viet namese ArmY, wer e

to bea r fru it in du e course, a lthough

de Lat t re, h imself, never benefit edfr om t he in cr eeeed suppor t h e h elped

to obta in .

De Lat t re an d his pa rty r et urn ed t o

Par is on 26 September . A few daye

la ter , he wae told by his doctor tha t

h e had cancer . Never th eless, h e spen t

sever al da ye in Engla nd a t t he in vit a-

January 1969

River a t Yen Bay in order to captu re

Ngh ia Lo, a peet wh ich wa e essen tia l

to the French if they were to hold the

n or t hern mou nta in a rea an d protect

nor thern Laos . Aga in , th rough tbeex-

er cise of mobilit y, including the land-

in g of t hr ee pa ra tr oop ba tt alion s, t he

a ssa ult wa s st opped by 5 Oct ober .Du rin g t he br ief r espit e wh ich fol-

lowed, de Lst t re decided to take the

offensive. The new campa ign was d ic-

t a tedpa~la lly bypolit icel mot ivee. A

conspicuous vict ory wae needed both

t o get t he Indoch inese budget t h rough

t he F ren ch Na tion al Aesembly a nd t o

77



encou r a ge gr ea t ly in cr ea sed suppor t

from the Unit ed States who at the

momen t fa csd a sta lem at e in Kor ea .

With cons iderable foresight , de Lat -

t r e had decided not to at tack the en -

emy’s main cen ter s of st rength , but

to st r ike to the west of Hanoi wh ich

offer ed a bypass for th e Vietm in h to

funnel suppliee tO Communist s incen.

t r a l and South Vietnam. On 11 No-

vember , h e la un ch ed a n a tt ack on Cho

Ben , 30 m iles sou thwest of H an oi. It

fell wit hin t br ee da ys. On 14 Novem -

ber , the a t tack was sh ifted to Hoa

Bin h, du e weat of H an oi on th e Black

River , where the rapid t r anefer of

t roops from Ch o Ben crea t ed an ele-

ment of snrpr ise and resu lt ed in the

ca pt ur e of t be post wit h sm all losses.

Final Journey

At th ie poin t , Genera l de Lat t re

wae a lready in the process of t rans-

fer r ing h is command to Genera l Raou lSaIan, and, on 20 November , h e left

for bis fina l journey to France. The

Hoa Binh campa ign , never t heles s, r e-

main e of in ter est in a ny eva lu at ion of

de Lat t re’e meth ods. Wh ile h k baeic

s t rat egy seemed sound , the successfu l

capture of tbe town was, un for tu -

na tely, hu t the pr elu de to an in tense

bat t le. The Fren ch could supPly th epoet or dy bya win din g r iver r ou te or

by a n ar row r oa d wh ich was less th an

half the length , bu t badly damaged

fr om ea r lier a ct ion and h igh ly vu ln er -

a ble t o a tt ack .

River operations were euccese~ulfor

a t ime, but ended when the enemy,

a ft er fierce figh t ing, ga ined cont rol of

both ban ke. Th eu eeof t he lan d r ou tewas th en a t t empted, but a t an un sup-

por ta ble cost , par tia lly becan se th e

French had fa iled to clear ou t the

underbrush wh ich p rovided cover for

t h e guer r illa e. When General Salan

decid ed t o eva cua te t h e post , even t h e

ret rea t cou ld be accomplished on ly

aga inet h ea vy en emy r esistan ce. At

the end of tbe opera t ion , on 24 Feb-

rua ry 1952, Vietminh lossea hadprob-

ably exceeded tboseof t he F rench , bu t

tbe damage to the French st ra tegic

plan and to th e will t o figh t wh ich de

La t tr e had so ca refu lly cu lt iva t ed was

beyond recall.

It ie difficu lt to believe tha t , if de

La tt r e h ad r et ain ed ch ar ge, h e wou ld

h a ve over look ed t he n eed t o clea r t he

land rou te to Hoa Binh or fa iled to

find some ot her mean s of r escu ing t be

opera t ion . De Lat t re, however , had

nndergone eu rgery ’in December , and

died on 11 J an ua ry 1952. Th e n at ion

honored ita hero posthumously by

naming him a Marshal of France.

Masterful improvisat ion

What de Lat t re h ad pr oved du r in g

bie br ief ten ur e as comma nder in In -doch in a wa s, fir st of a ll, t ha t coun t er -

in g t he in su rgen ts r equ ir ed n oth in g

less than the ablest of figh t ing men

imbu ed with th e will t o win . H e com -

men ced, a nd, in deed, con tin ued, h is

campaign with Iese mater iel than

seemed necess ary t o ach ieve vict ory,

making u p for bis lack th rou gh mas-

t er fu l inp roviea t ion . P robably he waefor tu na t e in en cou nt er in g er ror s on

the par t of his enemy—in this case,

Genera l Giap’a p rema tu re decieion t o

engage in fron ta l comba t—but his

a bilit y t o t ak e a dva nt age of su ch m is-

t ak es mer ely con firmed h is et at u re a e

a m ilit ar y lea der .

De La tt re a lso wa s ou tst an din g not

on ly in his ability to command therespect and bea t effor t s of his men ,

but a lso in his skill in winn ing the

outside suppor t which be saw was

necesea ry if tbe war was to be won .

He convinced the French tha t a

MmatyReview



6ENESALDE IAl lSE

gr ea ter effor t wa s r equ ir ed t o win and

t ha t it wa s wor t h ea cr it lces elsewher e

t o hold the line. He also cont ribu ted

much t o t he French effor t t o win SUP.

por t from the United Sta tes. It is in -

t er est ing t o specula te t o what ext ent

de Lst t re, had he lived, might have

succeeded not on ly in pursuing the

m ilit ar y campa ign mor e effect ively,

hut a lso in persuading la ter French

and US Governmen ts to be more for th -

r igh t in t akin g polit ica l decision s es-

sent ia l to forest all Vietnam’s la terdr ift in to chaos .

While it is cer t a in that de Lat tre

would have missed no step which

might have led to his basic goa l, h is

gen ius lay in war and not in polit ics.

Even his military decisions in Indo-

ch ina reflected an uncer ta in app recia -

t ion of the polit ica l situat ion. The

gr ea t st ring of for tifica t ions h e con -st ructed ar ound t he Red River Delta

cou ld not con tiln t h e<en emy expand-

ing with in th is circle. There wea never

t ime t o lea rn wh et her Gen er al de La t-

t re appr ecia t ed that t he en emy, too,

had ga ined inva luable lessons from the

defea ta h e a dm in ist er ed in 1951, a nd

that subsequent French st ra tegy

wou ld have to rema in tdgh ly flexible.

De Lat t re’s s teps tocrea tean inde-

pen den t Viet namese Army en ded a n

in excu sa ble dela y, bu t t her e is n o in -

dicat ion that be foresaw the danger

of Fr euch bureaucra t ic slowness in

t ransfer r ing other powers to an in-

d igenous government . wha t he offered

wa s an ea r ly demon st r at ion t ha t su tli-

cien t r esou rces, effect ively a pplied,

cou ld over come many of t h e m ilit ar y

advant ages of insur gency, but that ,

without correspondingly effect ive po-

lit ica l act ion, the pr ice of victorym igh t pr ove t oo gr ea t.

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leadership against insurgency

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