maoist insurgency

45
MAOIST INSURGENCY: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE Presented By Amiya K.Samanta

Upload: arijit-sarkar

Post on 03-Sep-2014

1.462 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

 

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Maoist insurgency

MAOIST INSURGENCY:CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

Presented By

Amiya K.Samanta

Page 2: Maoist insurgency

Milestones in Naxalite MovementMilestones in Naxalite MovementMarch,1967March,1967: A multiparty combination led : A multiparty combination led

by CPI-M was voted to power in West by CPI-M was voted to power in West Bengal. Soon thereafter,Bengal. Soon thereafter,

a small CPI-M extremist group in Siliguri a small CPI-M extremist group in Siliguri sub-division led an aggressive peasant sub-division led an aggressive peasant

movement.movement.May 24:May 24: Attack on Police &death of Attack on Police &death of

Insp.WangdiInsp.WangdiMay 25May 25: Police firing; 7 female and 2 male : Police firing; 7 female and 2 male

killedkilled

Page 3: Maoist insurgency

June 28June 28: Radio Peking Broadcast “front paw of : Radio Peking Broadcast “front paw of the Indian revolutionary struggle”.the Indian revolutionary struggle”.

July 5July 5: Peking Daily: “Spring thunder breaks over : Peking Daily: “Spring thunder breaks over India.”India.”

Tension within CPM, specially students and youth Tension within CPM, specially students and youth August 1967August 1967: Madurai meeting: Madurai meetingApril 1968April 1968: Burdwan Plenum: Burdwan Plenum

Dec. 1968Dec. 1968: Cochin Congress: Expulsion and : Cochin Congress: Expulsion and consolidation. 75% in Andhra, 25% in WB left the consolidation. 75% in Andhra, 25% in WB left the

party.party.March, 1968March, 1968: Formation of the AICCCR: Formation of the AICCCR

April 22& May 1, 1969:April 22& May 1, 1969:Formation and launching Formation and launching of CPI-MLof CPI-ML

Page 4: Maoist insurgency

Not all Maoist groups joined CPI-ML. Not all Maoist groups joined CPI-ML. Dakshin Dakshin DeshDesh group, known as group, known as Maoist Communist Maoist Communist

CenterCenter did not join. Andhra group minus did not join. Andhra group minus Srikakulam group did not join.Srikakulam group did not join.Charu Mazumdar’s StrategyCharu Mazumdar’s Strategy::

1. 1. Armed peasant struggle– politicisation and Armed peasant struggle– politicisation and struggle should go hand in hand, 2. Peasant struggle should go hand in hand, 2. Peasant

guerrilla squads,guerrilla squads,3. Annihilation of class enemies, 4. Formation of 3. Annihilation of class enemies, 4. Formation of small liberated areas, 5.Joining of small armed small liberated areas, 5.Joining of small armed

squads to make the PLA, 6. Joining of the squads to make the PLA, 6. Joining of the liberated areas to make liberated zones, 7.Use of liberated areas to make liberated zones, 7.Use of

conventional weapons in guerrilla actions.conventional weapons in guerrilla actions.

Page 5: Maoist insurgency

Structure of the CPI-MLStructure of the CPI-MLCentral CommitteeCentral CommitteeState CommitteesState Committees

District Committees / local committeesDistrict Committees / local committeesGuerrilla SquadsGuerrilla Squads

Peoples’ Liberation ArmyPeoples’ Liberation ArmyUnderground outfitsUnderground outfitsShelter/ Safe house,Shelter/ Safe house,

Dump/ storageDump/ storagePost BoxPost BoxCourierCourier

Contact pointsContact pointsTech. namesTech. names

Page 6: Maoist insurgency

MCC StrategyMCC Strategy1. Politicization first, 2. Class struggle through 1. Politicization first, 2. Class struggle through

local issues, 3.To punish class enemies through local issues, 3.To punish class enemies through guerrilla squads, 4. Organize the workers too, 5. guerrilla squads, 4. Organize the workers too, 5. Procure arms when the ground is prepared, 6. Procure arms when the ground is prepared, 6.

Underground organization.Underground organization.MCC first started their organizing activities MCC first started their organizing activities

among the tribal in the Jungle Mahal areas of among the tribal in the Jungle Mahal areas of Burdwan in West Bengal. Late on they spread to Burdwan in West Bengal. Late on they spread to

nearby Hazaribagh and Gaya districts.nearby Hazaribagh and Gaya districts.

Page 7: Maoist insurgency

Mazumdar’s adventurism: 1) To destroy Mazumdar’s adventurism: 1) To destroy educational institutions as centers of educational institutions as centers of

colonial education, 2) To kill policemen,3) to colonial education, 2) To kill policemen,3) to denigrate national leaders, 4) To break jails, denigrate national leaders, 4) To break jails, 5) To attack difficult targets, 6) To resort to 5) To attack difficult targets, 6) To resort to indiscriminate killings, 7) Holding out false indiscriminate killings, 7) Holding out false hopes, 8) To resort to difficult actions, 9) hopes, 8) To resort to difficult actions, 9)

Floating counterproductive slogans, leading Floating counterproductive slogans, leading to split in the party.to split in the party.

Mazumdar died in 1972 (26 August). But his Mazumdar died in 1972 (26 August). But his ideological influence on the splinter groups ideological influence on the splinter groups

by and large remainedby and large remained..

Page 8: Maoist insurgency

One of the many splinter groups was COC-CPI-ML,with One of the many splinter groups was COC-CPI-ML,with K.G.Satyamurthy, Jagjit Singh, Suniti Ghosh, Kondapalli K.G.Satyamurthy, Jagjit Singh, Suniti Ghosh, Kondapalli Sitaramaya as members. In 1980 Kondapalli broke away Sitaramaya as members. In 1980 Kondapalli broke away from the party and launched a new party CPI-ML(PWG). from the party and launched a new party CPI-ML(PWG).

Its underground organization was widespread Its underground organization was widespread encompassing at least 10 states ; but it was most encompassing at least 10 states ; but it was most

effective in Andhra Pradesh.effective in Andhra Pradesh.Organization: Central Committee, State Committee, Organization: Central Committee, State Committee,

District Committee and regional committees and even District Committee and regional committees and even forest committees.Actions by Area commander, Dalams forest committees.Actions by Area commander, Dalams

(guerrilla squads)(guerrilla squads)Front organizations like RSU, RCS,Jana Natya Mandali, Front organizations like RSU, RCS,Jana Natya Mandali,

Revolutionary Writes Association, Civil Liberties Revolutionary Writes Association, Civil Liberties Committee etc. were on the surface carrying on Committee etc. were on the surface carrying on

propaganda and other jobspropaganda and other jobs

Page 9: Maoist insurgency

Inner party struggle led to the expulsion of Inner party struggle led to the expulsion of Sitaramiya in June 1992, and one Laxamana Rao Sitaramiya in June 1992, and one Laxamana Rao

took charge of the party as General Secretary. took charge of the party as General Secretary. Although the PWG broadly followed the Charu Although the PWG broadly followed the Charu Mazumdar’s line they made some significant Mazumdar’s line they made some significant

changes in the strategy.changes in the strategy.1) Increasing use of sophisticated weapons and 1) Increasing use of sophisticated weapons and

explosive, 2) Arms supply from external and explosive, 2) Arms supply from external and internal sources, 3) Kidnapping as a means of internal sources, 3) Kidnapping as a means of extorting money and showing strength, 4) To extorting money and showing strength, 4) To

bring as many Maoist groups as possible under bring as many Maoist groups as possible under one umbrella, 5) To have front organizations on one umbrella, 5) To have front organizations on the surface for propaganda wand other public the surface for propaganda wand other public

relation works.relation works.

Page 10: Maoist insurgency

6) Mobilize public support through 6) Mobilize public support through seminars, meetings demonstrations seminars, meetings demonstrations etc. 7)To keep police actions under etc. 7)To keep police actions under

lease encouraged civil liberties lease encouraged civil liberties organizations, like APDR, RSF etc. 8) organizations, like APDR, RSF etc. 8)

Increasing use of explosives in terrorist Increasing use of explosives in terrorist actions, 9) Militarisation of the actions, 9) Militarisation of the

movement by relying more and more movement by relying more and more on arms and explosives, 10)More on arms and explosives, 10)More

ideological tolerance than ever before.ideological tolerance than ever before.

Page 11: Maoist insurgency

Before the merger of PWG and the MCC, both Before the merger of PWG and the MCC, both came very close in the arena of struggle.Both came very close in the arena of struggle.Both

had separate outfits. had separate outfits. PWG’s areaPWG’s area : Andhra, UP, Chattisgarh, Orissa, : Andhra, UP, Chattisgarh, Orissa,

MP Karnataka, MaharashtraMP Karnataka, MaharashtraMCC’s AreaMCC’s Area: Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar : Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar

Pradesh.Pradesh.CadresCadres: PWG has 3,500 armed cadres: PWG has 3,500 armed cadres3000 fire arms ( AK Group, LMG, SLR)3000 fire arms ( AK Group, LMG, SLR)

MCCMCC: 3000 to 4000 armed cadres: 3000 to 4000 armed cadres2,500 fire arms.2,500 fire arms.

MCCMCC: Peoples Guerrilla army (PGA): Peoples Guerrilla army (PGA)PWGPWG: People’s Liberation Guerrilla : People’s Liberation Guerrilla

Army(PGLA) Army(PGLA)

Page 12: Maoist insurgency

Joint operation and negotiation for a period of 4/5 Joint operation and negotiation for a period of 4/5 years led to merger of PWG and MCC on 21 years led to merger of PWG and MCC on 21

Sept. 2004. The new party is named CPI(Maoist). Sept. 2004. The new party is named CPI(Maoist).

1. Merger of “People’s Guerrilla Army” (MCC) and 1. Merger of “People’s Guerrilla Army” (MCC) and “People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army”(PWG) into “People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army”(PWG) into

Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)2.Muppala Lakshaman Rao @ Ganapathi to be 2.Muppala Lakshaman Rao @ Ganapathi to be

Secretary General of the new party.Secretary General of the new party.3. Creation of “Compact Revolutionary Zone” 3. Creation of “Compact Revolutionary Zone”

should be the aim of the struggle.should be the aim of the struggle.4. Linkages with the fraternal paties in the 4. Linkages with the fraternal paties in the

neighbouring countries,ie, CPN-Maoist neighbouring countries,ie, CPN-Maoist (Nepal)and CPB(Maoist) of Bhutan (Nepal)and CPB(Maoist) of Bhutan

Page 13: Maoist insurgency

1.1. Polit BureauPolit Bureau; Top policy making ; Top policy making body with 13 members body with 13 members

2.2.Central CommitteeCentral Committee with 38 with 38 members members

3. 3. Provincial CommitteesProvincial Committees; ; number varies: Bihar-24, AP: 32,number varies: Bihar-24, AP: 32,

Orissa-15, W.Bengal-13Orissa-15, W.Bengal-13

Page 14: Maoist insurgency

4.a) In some cases Committees follow the 4.a) In some cases Committees follow the administrative division like district, subdivision administrative division like district, subdivision

etc. In othersetc. In otherstopographical advantages aretopographical advantages are

considered. So there are Special Zonal , Special considered. So there are Special Zonal , Special Area, Zonal, Area Committees.Area, Zonal, Area Committees.

Leadership:Leadership:1. MuppalaLakshman Rao @Ganapati 1. MuppalaLakshman Rao @Ganapati

2.Prasanta [email protected] Bose@Nirvoy

Page 15: Maoist insurgency

3.M.Koteswar [email protected] Rao@Kisenji4. N. Kesava Rao@Ganganna4. N. Kesava Rao@Ganganna

5. M.Venugopal @Sonu5. M.Venugopal @Sonu6.Kotakam Sudarsan @Anand6.Kotakam Sudarsan @Anand

7Pramod Misra7Pramod Misra8. Mallaraj Reddy8. Mallaraj Reddy

9.Sabyasachi Panda 9.Sabyasachi Panda10 Cherikuri rajkumar @Azad10 Cherikuri rajkumar @Azad

Azad was killed in a clash with Police at Azad was killed in a clash with Police at Adilabad. Kobad Gandhi is now in jail. Adilabad. Kobad Gandhi is now in jail.

Ideological leader, in favour of peace talkIdeological leader, in favour of peace talk

Page 16: Maoist insurgency

Military UnitMilitary Unit5. Central Military Commission- at per with the 5. Central Military Commission- at per with the

Central committee. It plans strategies and Central committee. It plans strategies and actions.actions.

6. Military units have three components: a) Main 6. Military units have three components: a) Main Force: Trained personnel. B) Auxiliary Force, Force: Trained personnel. B) Auxiliary Force,

c) People’s Militia.c) People’s Militia.7. Main Force is divided into Company, Platoon 7. Main Force is divided into Company, Platoon

and it has Central/State Special Action team.and it has Central/State Special Action team.8.Aux. Force Consists of a) Local Guerrilla 8.Aux. Force Consists of a) Local Guerrilla squad,b) Special Guerrilla Squad c) District squad,b) Special Guerrilla Squad c) District

/Division special squad./Division special squad.

Page 17: Maoist insurgency

Arms supplyArms supply from following source: from following source:a) Purchase from a) Purchase from

International marketInternational marketb) From S.F.—about 2000, c) ULFA of the b) From S.F.—about 2000, c) ULFA of the

NE region, d) LTTE of Sri Lanka.NE region, d) LTTE of Sri Lanka., e) Nepal Maoist party , f) manufacturing , e) Nepal Maoist party , f) manufacturing

own weapons: Engaged expert techniciansown weapons: Engaged expert techniciansTotal holding: 18000 to 20000Total holding: 18000 to 20000

Type: AK group, SLR, Insas, .303 etcType: AK group, SLR, Insas, .303 etc

Page 18: Maoist insurgency

ExplosiveExplosive: Tactical change from January : Tactical change from January 2008: use of more explosives than 2008: use of more explosives than

firearms. firearms. Learnt this from Af-Pak Talibans. Results: Learnt this from Af-Pak Talibans. Results:

i) More casualties, ii) halts the pace of i) More casualties, ii) halts the pace of offensive, iii) less risky offensive, iii) less risky

Manufacture various types of mines to Manufacture various types of mines to suit environs. Employment of technicians. suit environs. Employment of technicians.

Source: Purchase, Clandestine of forcible Source: Purchase, Clandestine of forcible removal from mine godowns, looting etc removal from mine godowns, looting etc

Often unreportedOften unreported

Page 19: Maoist insurgency

PLGA:Composed of trained recruits, PLGA:Composed of trained recruits, some paid. some ideologically committed. some paid. some ideologically committed.

Recent trend is to recruit young. Recent trend is to recruit young. Mostly local youth-know terrain. Mostly local youth-know terrain.

Strength: 13000 to 14000Strength: 13000 to 14000i) Ideology, training make them i) Ideology, training make them

formidable. formidable. ll) Perfect tactical planning in some ll) Perfect tactical planning in some

operations- Jahanabad, Koraput, operations- Jahanabad, Koraput, Dantewadaa etcDantewadaa etc

Page 20: Maoist insurgency

FundsFunds a)Extortion from rich contractors, a)Extortion from rich contractors,

businessmen in the mine and forest businessmen in the mine and forest areas, b) Leaves collection contract areas, b) Leaves collection contract from forest Deptt. c) Siphoning of from forest Deptt. c) Siphoning of

rural development funds of the rural development funds of the Government,d) Kidnapping for Government,d) Kidnapping for

ransom, e) Looting of rich land lords ransom, e) Looting of rich land lords houses etc. Total annual houses etc. Total annual

collection:over Rs 1000 crorescollection:over Rs 1000 crores

Page 21: Maoist insurgency

Expenditure:Expenditure:a) Arms, explosive, equipment purchase,a) Arms, explosive, equipment purchase,

b) salary payment, c) maintenance of b) salary payment, c) maintenance of martyrs’ families, d) rural development martyrs’ families, d) rural development

work in selected areas, e) medical work in selected areas, e) medical treatment, f) meeting and party treatment, f) meeting and party

expenditure, g) information network h) aid expenditure, g) information network h) aid to surface organization for campaign, i) to surface organization for campaign, i)

publicatio of propaganda literaturepublicatio of propaganda literature

Page 22: Maoist insurgency

Managing surface politics to their Managing surface politics to their advantageadvantage: They are guns for hire. Power : They are guns for hire. Power of guns to keep opposition under control of guns to keep opposition under control

and win election.and win election.Help in times of need. No political Help in times of need. No political

consensus even for ‘consensus even for ‘green hunt’. green hunt’. No consensus that it is even a big security

threat..In Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal In Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal

surface political parties have used them surface political parties have used them against the political opponents.against the political opponents.

Page 23: Maoist insurgency

Media ManipulationMedia Manipulation: : Get Get favourable things published. favourable things published.

Kishenji’s high profile Kishenji’s high profile appearance in the appearance in the

media,Propaganda through media,Propaganda through surrogate organizations. surrogate organizations.

Interviews in remote Interviews in remote jungles help build up image jungles help build up image of heroes dedicated to the cause of heroes dedicated to the cause

of poor. of poor.

Page 24: Maoist insurgency

Intervention of civil societyIntervention of civil society support: Like of Mahasweta and support: Like of Mahasweta and Arundhuti, campaign for calling Arundhuti, campaign for calling

off ‘green hunt’-war against tribal, off ‘green hunt’-war against tribal, for dialogue, for development for dialogue, for development first, no human right violation. first, no human right violation. State fighting for corporate to State fighting for corporate to

secure minerals.20 m. displaced secure minerals.20 m. displaced –56% tribal –56% tribal

Page 25: Maoist insurgency

Propaganda by surface friendly units:Propaganda by surface friendly units:i) Human right groups: PUCL, i) Human right groups: PUCL,

APDR,Tribal-Dalit organisationsAPDR,Tribal-Dalit organisationsii)Publications creating a favourable mind ii)Publications creating a favourable mind

set: Ex. Binayak Senset: Ex. Binayak Seniii) Student associationsiii) Student associationsiv) Seminars, meetingsiv) Seminars, meetings

Page 26: Maoist insurgency

Nature of the insurgency:Nature of the insurgency:1. Terrain protected: No spread in the 1. Terrain protected: No spread in the

plains during last 4 decades.plains during last 4 decades.2. Militarism: so more Guaverist and Rege 2. Militarism: so more Guaverist and Rege

Debre fashion elitist.Debre fashion elitist.3.Attacking—Battle oriented and not mass 3.Attacking—Battle oriented and not mass

organisation minded.organisation minded.4. No class struggle but struggle with 4. No class struggle but struggle with

state power.state power.5. Paid soldiers—mercenaries, paid 5. Paid soldiers—mercenaries, paid

technicians and experts. technicians and experts.

Page 27: Maoist insurgency

6. More attack on Govt.properties and on 6. More attack on Govt.properties and on insignifocant personsinsignifocant persons

7. Therefore less ideological and 7. Therefore less ideological and consequently tends to have criminal consequently tends to have criminal

propensity. More extortions, kidnapping propensity. More extortions, kidnapping etc for money.etc for money.

8. No real mass base, but sustained by 8. No real mass base, but sustained by fear of the gun.fear of the gun.

Page 28: Maoist insurgency

Insurgency area: According to HM 23 Insurgency area: According to HM 23 states, 135 districts, over 2000 PSs, states, 135 districts, over 2000 PSs,

encompassing an area of more than a encompassing an area of more than a lakh sq.km.lakh sq.km.

Nature of insurgency varies from state to Nature of insurgency varies from state to state. In W. Bengal it is no insurgency, state. In W. Bengal it is no insurgency,

primarily inter party clash.primarily inter party clash.

Page 29: Maoist insurgency

Violence ProfileViolence Profile

Year Civilian S F Maoists Total

2005 281 150 285 638

2006 266 128 348 742

2007 250 238 208 696

2008 270 224 227 721

2009 392 312 294 998

2010-Apl 124 137 87 348

Page 30: Maoist insurgency
Page 31: Maoist insurgency
Page 32: Maoist insurgency

Response:Response:PM: No quarter should be given to those who PM: No quarter should be given to those who have taken upon themselves to challenge the have taken upon themselves to challenge the

authority of the Indian stateand the fabric of our authority of the Indian stateand the fabric of our democratic polity.” (21 April,2010)democratic polity.” (21 April,2010)

1. Co-ordinated Police Action,1. Co-ordinated Police Action,2. Cease fire and dialogue2. Cease fire and dialogue

3. Development of the area3. Development of the areaDevelopment’s pre-condition is peace. So state Development’s pre-condition is peace. So state

opted for police actionopted for police action

Page 33: Maoist insurgency

GOI’s dilema:GOI’s dilema:i)Police operation vs. Development, i)Police operation vs. Development,

priority or simultaneous.priority or simultaneous.ii) Army-Air force deployment or only SFii) Army-Air force deployment or only SFiii) An overseeing authority or no changeiii) An overseeing authority or no change

Decided in favor of: simultaneous, SF and Decided in favor of: simultaneous, SF and no changeno change

Civil society played a big role in making Civil society played a big role in making choicechoice

Page 34: Maoist insurgency

Operation Plan:Operation Plan:i) To establish state authority on a territory i) To establish state authority on a territory

and sustain it,and sustain it,ii) To push them to certain pre determined ii) To push them to certain pre determined

areas,areas,iii) To make the high ways safe,iii) To make the high ways safe,

iv) To contact people to win them overiv) To contact people to win them overv) Intelligence from grass root levelv) Intelligence from grass root level

vi) Coordination of intelligence from all vi) Coordination of intelligence from all sources. sources.

Vii) Use of sanitized local police more,Vii) Use of sanitized local police more,

Page 35: Maoist insurgency

vii) Modern, updated equipmentsvii) Modern, updated equipmentsIED safety—MRAP,NIRF, PING and IED safety—MRAP,NIRF, PING and

unmanned ground vehicleunmanned ground vehiclevii) Use of helicopters: UAVsvii) Use of helicopters: UAVs

viii) Interrogation for information in an viii) Interrogation for information in an “expanding torrents”.“expanding torrents”.

Page 36: Maoist insurgency

Rehabilitation measures:Rehabilitation measures:i) Sincere, prompti) Sincere, prompt

ii) Authority to pardon and reward to local ii) Authority to pardon and reward to local officersofficers

iii)To revive salwa judum in a less iii)To revive salwa judum in a less aggressive form within the legal aggressive form within the legal

framework of the right of private defense, framework of the right of private defense, avoiding SC’s “unrealistic activism.”avoiding SC’s “unrealistic activism.”

Page 37: Maoist insurgency

Dialogue is an uncertain game. The Dialogue is an uncertain game. The interlude is used to rejuvenate the interlude is used to rejuvenate the

strength of Party, enhance mass contact.strength of Party, enhance mass contact.State also fails to keep promise/ This time State also fails to keep promise/ This time

the dialogue has been used to gain the dialogue has been used to gain propaganda advantage and also to delay propaganda advantage and also to delay

and confuse police operation.and confuse police operation.

Page 38: Maoist insurgency

Development : Two facets: a) Fund Development : Two facets: a) Fund intensive and b) Improvement through intensive and b) Improvement through

systemic changesystemic changea) is more popular for flow of funds.a) is more popular for flow of funds.

b) is land distribution, empowerment, b) is land distribution, empowerment, participation in public matters etc.participation in public matters etc.

Ready at hand is the report of Expert Ready at hand is the report of Expert Group on Development Challenges in Group on Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas( April,2008)Extremist Affected Areas( April,2008)

Page 39: Maoist insurgency

Not much attention.Not much attention.Then Forest Empowerment Act of 2006. PM Then Forest Empowerment Act of 2006. PM has urged for implementation. Not yet fully has urged for implementation. Not yet fully

implemented.implemented.Report of Bihar Land Reform Commission. Report of Bihar Land Reform Commission.

Shelved as soon as placed before the Shelved as soon as placed before the Assembly (Dec. 2009)Assembly (Dec. 2009)

Private jury of six eminent persons in Private jury of six eminent persons in April,2010:April,2010:

Recommended 1. Stop acquisition of agri & Recommended 1. Stop acquisition of agri & forest land, 2. Disclose MOU details, forest land, 2. Disclose MOU details,

Page 40: Maoist insurgency

3. Rehabilitate displaced tribal,3. Rehabilitate displaced tribal,4.Stop environmental degradation,4.Stop environmental degradation,

5. Stop Green Hunt.5. Stop Green Hunt.Govt. model is to sustain privatisation and Govt. model is to sustain privatisation and

globalisation.globalisation.Under contemplation is an enactment on Under contemplation is an enactment on

giving share of mineral extraction and giving share of mineral extraction and some regulatory power of such some regulatory power of such

exploitation. exploitation.

Page 41: Maoist insurgency

Jharkhand with richest mineral depositsJharkhand with richest mineral depositshas 2500 hidden mines.has 2500 hidden mines.

Looting of resources without any Looting of resources without any accountability.Bailadila and Nijhnigarh in accountability.Bailadila and Nijhnigarh in

Chattisgarh. In Niyam Giri hills in Chattisgarh. In Niyam Giri hills in Kalahandi in Orissa.Kalahandi in Orissa.

1. Environment destruction, 2. Eviction of 1. Environment destruction, 2. Eviction of Tribals, 3. Forest out of bounds,Tribals, 3. Forest out of bounds,

4. Hardship for high price4. Hardship for high priceSome licenses cancelledSome licenses cancelled..

Page 42: Maoist insurgency
Page 43: Maoist insurgency
Page 44: Maoist insurgency

Developmental paradigms are complex.Developmental paradigms are complex.Systemic changes are uphill tasks. The Systemic changes are uphill tasks. The

insurgency is no mass upsurge so far, but insurgency is no mass upsurge so far, but it may turn out to be one if neglected for it may turn out to be one if neglected for

long.long.

Page 45: Maoist insurgency

Thank YouThank You