land titles and deeds cases 1

8/10/2019 Land Titles and Deeds Cases 1

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 107930 October 7, 1994

HEIRS OF GEORGE BOFILL, IGNACIO BOFILL, VICTORIA B. ANASTACIO,REGINA FRANCISCA B. CHUACHINGCO, EVELYN B. SERRA, MANUELITAB. VIZCONDE, LAGRIMAS B. DULLANO, LOURDES B. DASAL, MANUELBOFILL, JR., HEIRS OF PLARIDEL BOFILL, EDUARDO BOFILL, MARIALUISA BOFILL, petitioners,

vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. ENRIQUE BEGALAN andFLORDELIZA BEGALAN, SPS. JOSE CATALAN and BERNARDITACATALAN, and HEIRS OF MANUEL BARREDO, namely, NORMA B.ALEJAGA, LEONY BARREDO, MAGILYN BARREDO, MARIA BARREDO,RAMY BARREDO, RELLY BARREDO, ENRIQUETA B. SARTORIO,represented by VILMA BARREDO BALATAYO, respondents.

P.E. Cases, Jr. & Associates Law Offices for petitioners.

J.D. Villanueva Law Office for private respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J .:

This case arose from an action for declaration of ownership over LotNo. 2954-A of the Panay Cadastre, situated in Bo. Linatiran, Panay, Capiz,covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19894, filed by petitioners againstthe Sps. Enrique and Flordeliza Begalan and Sps. Jose and Bernardita Catalan,two (2) of private respondents herein. Joining their cause, the heirs of Manuel

Barredo, claiming also to be the owners of the lot in litigation, filed a complaint inintervention against the petitioners herein, heirs of Manuel Bofill.

On 12 August 1988, the trial court rendered a decision declaring petitioners theowners of the lot in question and entitled to the possession thereof, orderingrespondents as defendants therein to vacate the premises, and to pay petitioners


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P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. The counterclaim as well as the complaint inintervention was dismissed. 1

The rationale for the foregoing disposition of the trial court is that

. . . the claim of the plaintiff-intervenors and defendants over thisland mainly anchored on the supposed Deed of Exchange of March8, 1994, executed between Manuel Bofill and Cornelio Barriatos,was a mere exchange of collateral(s) from Lot 526 to Lot 2954-A fora loan of P450.00 obtained by Manuel Bofill. The said loan havingbeen paid one year thereafter, said deed of exchange as collateralfor said loan was rendered without legal force and effect, hence noentry in the title covering the lot was made regarding said loan, norwas the title in the name of Manuel Bofill transferred to anybody elseup to the present time.

The case filed by Juana Brillo against Sotera Bofill . . . on November17, 1975 for the registration of the Deed of Exchange of 1944 andfor the surrender of the original title was done thirty-one (31) yearsafter its execution, considering laches and prescription, is alsowithout force and effect . . . . Moreover, the order in said case hasbecome moot and academic upon the death of Sotera Bofill and thesurrender of RO-1456 by her heirs and the cancellation of the sameupon the execution of anExtra-Judicial Partition by the heirs of Manuel Bofill and Sotera Bofilland the issuance of the present Certificate of Title No. 19894 in thename of the plaintiffs.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 31 August 1992reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court. It directed the Register ofDeeds of Capiz ". . . to divide TCT No. 19894 into two titles: one in the name ofthe plaintiffs without including the portion covered by Lot No. 2954-A; the othertitle covering Lot No. 2954-A in the name of the heirs of Manuel Barredo (hereinintervenor-appellants), after payment of the required taxes and fees."

In this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, we reverse theappellate court and reinstate the judgment of the court a quo .

First . The Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the findings of the trial court whichwe find to be supported by the evidence on record. Specifically, it discarded thetestimonial evidence proving that the Casugot 2 involves an exchange of collaterals securingthe P450-loan of Bofill to a certain Cornelio Barriatos without citing any contrary proof nor explaining whysuch factual finding should be thrown out or ignored. In the same fashion, it casually brushed aside the


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factual finding of the trial court that the loan of Bofill was paid one year after the execution ofthe Casugot thereby rendering it without further effect. 3

We note that this Casugot written in Hiligaynon is ambiguous as the exchangecan refer to ownership, possession, collateral, etc. It does not necessarily apply

to ownership alone as understood by the Court of Appeals. Apparently, the errorof the appellate court lies in the interpretation of the Casugot when it stated in itsdecision that the document "speaks eloquently of Manuel Bofill's intention totransfer" Lot 2954-A to Barriatos and concluded that it was an exchange ofownership of two (2) lots. This error is not surprising as the appellate court notonly adopted the English translation of the Casugot offered by privaterespondents, which was obviously tailored to suit their purpose, but alsobecause it omitted a material phrase stipulating that Barriatos was returning Lot526 to Bofill . Without that phrase on the return of Lot 526 it would appear, as itdoes, that Bofill donated Lot 2954-A to Barriatos which, in effect, would renderthe deed of exchange an absurdity. Had the Court of Appeals been moreaccurate and precise in quoting data from the records, perhaps it would havearrived at the right conclusion.

Second . Admittedly, the Casugot clearly reflects the agreement of Bofill andBarriatos with regard to the ownership of Lot 2954, now comprisingLot 2954-A, which is the lot in controversy, and Lot 2954-B. Therein is their clearand categorical covenant: "MANUEL F. BOFILL is the real and absolute owner oftwo (2) parcels of land, Lot 2954 and Lot 526." This declaration is decisive in thedisposition of this case as it contains an express stipulation by the signatoriesthereto on the ownership of Bofill of the lot in question binding upon them andtheir successors in interest.

Private respondents attempt to crush this overwhelming evidence by givingcertain portions of the Casugot a connotation contrary to the agreement andintention of the parties. Private respondents allege that the 1939 plan subdividingLot 2954 into Lot 2954-A in the name of Barriatos and Lot 2954-B in the name ofBofill reveals the extent of ownership of the parties overLot 2954. But the plan reflecting this subdivision is not conclusive as toownership as it may refer only to the delineation of their possession. The bestproof of the ownership of Manuel Bofill is the certificate of title in his name.

Moreover, the parties to the agreement apparently did not consider the placing ofLot 2954-A in the name of Barriatos as a transfer of ownership because whenthey executed the Casugot in 1944 they still acknowledged Bofill as the real andabsolute owner of the entire Lot 2954.

Private respondents call our attention to the statement in the Casugot to theeffect that Barriatos was already in possession of Lot 2954-A before the


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subdivision of the lot. This argument is based on an erroneous premise sincenowhere in the Casugot is the word "possession" or its equivalentin Hiligaynon mentioned. It is only in the English translation proposed byintervenors, which the Court of Appeals injudiciously adopted, where that wordappears. In any case, the exchange of lots as used in the Casugot can refer toexchange of ownership, of possession, of collaterals, or of any other attribute ofownership. Definitely, exchange of lands does not necessarily refer to exchangeof ownership. Besides, possession is not a definitive proof of ownership, nor isnon-possession inconsistent therewith. Hence, the claim that Barriatos was thepossessor of Lot 2954-A is not incompatible with Bofill's claim of ownership.

Private respondents next point us to the crux of the Casugot whereby Barriatosreturns his interest in Lot 526 to Bofill in exchange for Lot 2954-A. However, it isnot clear from the provision what interest was being traded by the parties.Consequently, we are constrained to lean on the premise they themselves

established in the first part of the Casugot , i.e., that Bofill is the real and absoluteowner of Lot 526 and Lot 2954. Barriatos not being the owner of either lot, therecould not have been a transfer of ownership between them.

As regards the clause creating a right of way on Lot 2954-A in favor of Lot 2954-B undisputably belonging to Bofill, private respondents arguethat Bofill would not have required such easement if he were the owner ofLot 2954-A, the latter being considered a servient estate. This argument isfallacious; it is non sequitur . Bofill did not lose ownership of his lot by imposing onit a right of way in favor of another lot belonging to him. Besides, we cannot

ignore the practice in the provinces that in giving a realty for a collateral,possession usually goes with it. At the time the Casugot was entered intobetween the parties, this was a common practice. This further explains the realtransaction between them and why Bofill had to demand a right of way over hisown land, so that when possession thereof should be transferred to a thirdperson he could still pass through it, otherwise, he may have no ingress to oregress from his estate.

Private respondents focus on the stipulation that if a certificate of title over Lot2954-A would be issued to Barriatos the above-mentioned right of way would beannotated thereon. While the signatories expressed the possibility of transferringLot 2954-A to Barriatos in the future, it is quite clear that the provision cited doesnot forthwith effect such transfer. The records do not reveal that the transfer waseventually carried out by the parties or their successors in interest.

Third . As regards the case filed by Juana Brillo against Sotera Bofill for thesurrender of the duplicate certificate of title, the appellate court statedthat


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. . . the CFI is also convinced of the strength of Juana Brillo's claimof ownership (which herein appellant-intervenors subsequentlyacquired) based originally on the aforequoted Deed of Exchange.The above decision does not appear to have been appealed. Thus itis already the law of the case between therein parties and theirsuccessors in interest. The CFI's Decision being against plaintiff'smother is binding against the plaintiffs ( see Sec. 49, Rule 39 of theRules of Court).

We cannot agree with this conclusion. for, it was error for the Court of Appeals toassume that the issue of ownership over Lot 2954-A was already determined inSpecial Case No. 1828 as to bar the present action for declaration of ownership.In that case, the CFI simply directed the mother of petitioners, Sotera Vda. deBofill, to surrender the duplicate certificate of title overLot 2954 so that the Casugot and the subsequent instruments of sale covering

Lot 2954-A could be annotated thereon. Definitely, that court did not declareJuana Brillo owner of the lot in question. The sole issue resolved by the CFI waswhether Juana Brillo was entitled to have the Casugot as well as the documentsof sale conveying the rights of Barriatos to her thereunder recorded in theCertificate of title No. RO-1456 in the name of Manuel Bofill. The ownership ofLot 2954-A and Lot 526 was never raised, hence, was not determined therein inSpecial Case No. 1828.

Although Juana Brillo prayed for the cancellation of RO-1456 and the issuance ofa separate certificate of title in her name which would effectively divest Bofill of

his title over Lot 2954-A, this was not granted by the CFI. The CFI merelydirected the annotation of the deeds on RO-1456 apparently because there wasnot enough evidence to negate the title of Bofill over Lot 2954-A. Besides, thiswas not the appropriate proceeding to adjudicate the ownership of the property.The evidence adduced by Brillo was only sufficient to compel Sotera Vda. deBofill to surrender certificate of title No. RO-1456. It was not adequate to settlethe issue of ownership.

The factual finding of the CFI in Special Case No. 1828 that Lot 526 was ownedby Barriatos was, to say the least, erroneous considering that the Casugot ,apparently the same document from which the CFI drew its conclusion, expresslystipulates that Bofill was the owner of Lot 2954-A and therefore implying thatBofill was the owner of Lot 526, respondents are assailing albeit unwittingly thevery decision in Special Case No. 1828 which they now set up as res judicata inthis case. Thus, in adopting a theory contrary to that maintained in a formerdecision, a party is now precluded from raising that case as a bar to asubsequent one. Incidentally, the error was adopted by the Court of Appeals.


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We emphasize that the decision in Special Case No. 1828 could not bindpetitioners herein as they were not parties thereto. The order directing theirmother to surrender RO-1456 that was supposed to be in her possession wasonly personal to her and could not bind anybody else, particularly petitionersherein who were not parties thereto nor notified thereof.

Fourth . In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals also reasoned out that

. . . there is no evidence that plaintiffs religiously paid the taxes duethereon from 1947 up to the filing of their complaint. What appearsto have been paid by the plaintiffs were only for the period from 1972to 1987. However, the same were paid by the plaintiffs belatedly in1986 and 1987, evidently in anticipation of this controversy. Besides,the receipts of this period do not show whether the taxes paid werealso for Lot No. 2954-A considering that they (plaintiffs) own Lot

2954-B. Moreover, payments of realty taxes, more so if not regularlymade, are not conclusive evidence of ownership ( see Ferrer-Lopezv. CA, 150 SCRA 393).

This again is error. The issue as to who of the parties paid the property in goodfaith is not really paramount in the determination of ownership considering thatgenerally municipal treasurers simply accept payments regardless of conflictingclaims of ownership. After all, statements in the tax receipts showing suchpayment are far inferior to the recitals in the certificate of title. Withthe Casugot and the certificate of title against them, private respondent miserablyfailed to carry their burden to a successful conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the appealed is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision ofthe Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 16, in favor of petitioners in CivilCase No. V-5374 is REITERATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.


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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION,FRANCISCA S. BOMBASI, HERCULINO M. DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADAand REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY, respondents-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Gonzalo D. David for respondents.

AQUlNO, J .:

These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstitutedTorrens titles whose originals are existing and whose reconstitution was,therefore, uncalled for.

1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-fiveand twenty-four hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches, Caloocan, nowQuezon City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines ,as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the Registryof Deeds of Rizal both dated April 30, 1938.

The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal.They were not destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the precedingcancelled titles for those two lots, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.15832 and 15834 in the name of the Philippine Trust Company, are intact in the

registry of deeds.

2. The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widowresiding at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal at Caloocan City a petition dated November, 1967 for thereconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot No. 915. She allegedthat she was the owner of the lot and that the title covering it, the number ofwhich she could not specify, was "N.A." or not available (Civil Case No. C-677).


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P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's petition was notexplained. (17-21, Consolidated Record on Appeal.)

8. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January 31, 1969. As inLaborada's petition, the notice of hearing for Bombast's petition was published inthe Official Gazette. It was posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan Cityand copies thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining owners (22,Consolidated Record on Appeal). But no copies of the petition and notice ofhearing were served upon the registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, theofficials who would be interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost titleand who could certify whether the original of the title was really missing.

9. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was not opposedby the government lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon, JudgeSalvador in his order of April 3, 1969 granted the petition.

The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available"title was issued to Regino Gollez who sold the land to petitioner Bombast. Theowner's duplicate of Gollez's title was supposedly destroyed during the war.Taxes were paid for that land by Gollez and Bombast. The technical descriptionof the land the plan were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registrationwho submitted a report recommending the reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25,Consolidated Record on Appeal).

10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing titleof Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the register ofdeeds issued to Bombast Transfer Certificate of Title No. N.A. 4(R) dated August27, 1969 (pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal).

11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the issuance of the reconstitutedtitle, Francisca Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a resident of1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco, Manila, which was the same address used byFructuosa Laborada (Bombast used first the address 2021 San Marcelino Street)sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. TransferCertificate of Title No. 34146R was issued to Deo.

On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporationallegedly for P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued tothe corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34, Consolidated Record on Appeal).

12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation andannulment of the reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent thereto(Civil Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge Salvador, who had ordered the


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reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation wereassigned, issued on June 5, 1970 restraining orders enjoining the register ofdeeds, city engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from accepting orrecording any transaction regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918.

13. The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer, filed separateanswers containing mere denials. The Commissioner of Land Registrationfiled pro forma answers wherein he interposed no objection to the issuance of thepreliminary injunction sought by the State. After a joint trial of the two cases,respondents corporation and Laborada filed amended answers wherein theypleaded the defense that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.

14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself)rendered a decision in the two cases holding that the State's evidence wasinsufficient to establish its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918

and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation were purchasersin good faith and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable andannullable.

Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had orderedallegedly in conformity with law, could not be attacked collaterally and, therefore,"the reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same validity, force andeffect as the originals before the reconstitution" (pp. 160-161, ConsolidatedRecord on Appeal). The State appealed.

15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's judgment, held that theorders of reconstitution dated July 6, 1968 and April 3, 1969 could no longer beset aside on May 26, 1970, when the petitions for annulment and cancellation ofthe reconstituted titles were filed, and that if there were irregularities in thereconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties, the State, as the party thatmade possible the reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of Appealscited section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered owner may losehis land "by the registration of any other person as owner of such land".

The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity of thereconstituted titles which, although issued with judicial sanction, are no betterthan spurious and forged titles.

In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil CasesNos. C-677 and C-763, were simply devices employed by petitioners Laboradaand Bombast for landgrabbing or for the usurpation and illegal appropriation offifty hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable value.


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The crucial and decisive fact, to which no importance was attached by the lowercourt and the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals (Reyes, L.B., Domondon andEricta, JJ.), is that two valid and existing Torrens titles in the name of theCommonwealth of the Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names ofLaborada and Bombast on the false or perjurious assumption that the two titleswere destroyed during the war.

That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on thecourts of justice. It was a stultification of the judicial process. One and the same

judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and then (2) decided the two subsequentcases for the cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted titles.

The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipsofacto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in thesaid proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot

be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and werefiled in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced andcannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.

Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution ofTorrens certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles whichare existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title thatare on file and available in the registry of deeds. The reconstitution proceedingsin Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because they are contrary toRepublic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the titlesreconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not requirereconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatorylaws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).

To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allowRepublic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (SeeRepublic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978,83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinationsfor depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability andsecurity of Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration. Thetheory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in goodfaith and for value is indefensible because the title of the lot which it purchasedunmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted. That circumstance shouldhave alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry ofdeeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that Lot 918 isowned by the State.


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WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court arereversed and set aside. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are declared void and are set aside. The reconstituted titles,Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N.A. 3-(R) and N.A. 4-(R) and TransferCertificates of Title Nos. 34146-R, 34147-R and 30257 to 30263 and the surveyplans and subdivision plan connected therewith are likewise declared void. Theregister of deeds is directed to cancel the said titles.

The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of the Commonwealth of thePhilippines, is hereby declared the registered owner of Lots 915 and 918 of theTala Estate, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 ofthe registry of deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private respondents-appellees.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur. Antonio, J., took no part.


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and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The pointmarked on the plan with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angleformed by the northeastern side of Calle Escolta and the corner of thePasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S. 49 40' W.,27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for thetopographical operations, the result whereof is as follows: 1awphil.net

| Points or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries || stations. | degrees. | in meters. | | | A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. || B to C | S. 46 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio || C to D | S. 42 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. |

| D to E | S. 40 50' E | 13.20 | || E to F | N. 49 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. || F to G | N. 52 00' E | 10.94 | || G to H | N. 37 10' W | 24.90 | || H to I | N. 35 45' W | 6.56 | || I to J | N. 50 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. || J to K | N. 35 00' W | 7.60 | || K to A | N. 42 05' W | 25.50 | |

The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the pointsspecified are marked on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, andits boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the PasigRiver; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, theestate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez.

The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and whichaccompanied the petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."

{bmc 029035a.bmp}

By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A),it will be noted that the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44, 30' W.,and that the distance between A and B was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line

A-B runs S. 46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. Attention is called to this


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difference between the technical description and the plan at this time, but itsimportance to the questions presented will be discussed below.

Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits,showing the chain of title of the petitioner.

We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoiningowners of the land in question. The petition gives the names of said persons, asfollows:

The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of theparcels of land conterminous with this estate are, according to myinformation:

The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys

Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, PedroP. Roxas, 154 Malacaang, San Miguel.

Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing thechain of title of the petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner of titles ofthe Court of Land Registration, who made a very careful examination of the titleof the petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th day of March, 1906,presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the titleof the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, the recommendsthe registration of said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of thepetitioner.

Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions ofsection 31 of Act No. 496, issued the following notice:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.Case No. 1895.]

To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the MunicipalBoard of the city of Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90;Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No. 92; RosendoComas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28;Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs.Greilsammer Bros., No. 36; and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No.


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34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio Vy Chuico, No. 226,and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang SengQueng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle JabonerosNo. 113; all these of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde& Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, Calle SantoTomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of Intramuros; Carmen Ayalade Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, thesetwo No. 330, the three on Calle Malacaang, district of San Miguel;Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, CalleLacoste No. 122, and Gervasio Rosario Ventura, Calle DulumbayanNo. 111, these three of the district of Santa Cruz; and EnriqueSomes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the city ofManila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:

Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del

Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact AntonioBonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I.,to register and confirm her title in the following described land: Fourparcels of land with the improvements of strong materials thereon, situatedin the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded anddescribed as follows:

Parcel A . Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked"A" on plan, being S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan atthe S. intersection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30'

W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of the Escolta, to pt. "B"; S. 46 15' E.,16.15 m. to pt. "C"; S. 42 E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40 50' E., 13.20 m. topt. "E"; N. 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52 E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N.36 20' W., 14.20 m. to pt. "H"; N. 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52 35'E., 2.27 m. to pt. "J"; N. 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt. "K"; N. 53 30' E., 0.30m. to pt. "L"; N. 40 05' W., 14 m. to pt. "M"; N. 44 W., 15.35 m. to pt. "E"to "G" follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River.

Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by thePasig River; SW. by property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. bythe Escolta.

Date of survey, December 26, 1905.

You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be heldat the City Hall, Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25thday of April, A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, toshow cause, if any you have, why the prayer of said application shall not


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be granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and placeaforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will betaken as confessed, and you will be forever barred from contesting saidapplication or any decree entered thereon.

Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of Marchin the year nineteen hundred and six.

Attest: A. K. JONES,Clerk of said Court.

In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of LandRegistration, on the 28th day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each ofthe persons mentioned therein, by registered mail. The record shows that each ofsaid persons received a copy of said notice, including the representative of the

heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record furthershows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, thatsaid notice was posted upon the land in question. The record further shows thatsaid notice had been published in two daily newspapers of the city of Manila. TheManila Times and La Democracia .

On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of LandRegistration, made the following certificate relating to the notice and to thepublication of the notices required by section 31 of Act No. 496.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

Case No. 1895.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.

I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the PhilippineIslands, certify that, in compliance with the order issued by said court, anotice referring to the application for registry No. 1895, presented by

Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas yChuidian, was published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, TheManila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of thesame month and year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice wasserved upon the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the MunicipalBoard of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke & Chandler; F. M.Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao


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Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; GreilsammerHermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang SengQueng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala deRoxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez; AlfonsoTiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a copy of saidnotice in Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, byregistered mail. And for the purposes of the necessary procedure, I issuethe present in Manila on the 17th day of April, 1906.

A. K. JONES,Clerk of the Court.

On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorneyfor the city of Manila (p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the courtcalling its attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in the plan of

said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error. The said attorney alsocalled the attention of the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in theoriginal petition. Our attention has not been called to any order made by thelower court, relating to said request of the attorney of the city of Manila.

In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on thesaid petition was brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock a.m., at the place mentioned in said notice. At the hearing the petitioner wasrepresented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio Enriquez."

On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner andMy. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, appeared for the city ofManila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to the fact that thereexisted certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the planpresented by the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the courtordered that said errors be corrected. So far as the record shows no correctionwhatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A.

On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, thehonorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order or judgmentin default against all persons:


No. 1895.


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Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian forregistration of the real estate described herein,

vs.

The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Boardof the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M.Sousa; Ramon Geneto; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; ChengTao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez;Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico;Lim Tinco; And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde &Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and DoloresOchoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura;and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern, defendants.

The present case having been duly tried, andWhereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a noticein due from referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers ofgeneral circulation, one printed in the English language and another in theSpanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of this city, and LaDemocracia of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publicationof said notice was effected;

Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within sevendays after the publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanishlanguage to each one of the persons named in the application or whoappeared to be concerned therein;

Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each ofthe parcels of land included in the application a certified copy of the noticein Spanish, and also in a conspicuous place in the principal municipalbuilding of the city of Manila, before the fourteen days preceding that setfor the termination of the period fixed;

Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to

impugn the application, within the period fixed by the law;

This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants andother persons who may be concerned in opposing the application, which isgranted.


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Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of LandRegistration, in Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906.

Attest: A. K. JONES,Clerk of the Court.

Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeingthat said parcel of land, A, be registered as the absolute property of Maria delConsuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said decree was as follows:

Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del ConsueloFelisa Roxas y Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster,is the absolute owner of the real property, which is adjudicated to her,located in the city of Manila, the description whereof is hereinafter set forth:

A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district ofBinondo; bounded on the NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas;on the SE. by the Pasig River; on the SW. by the property of the heirs of

Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta.

Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 4940' W. from the extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. ofCalle Escolta and Passage de Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30'W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to point C; thenceS., 42 E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.;thence N., 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52 E., 10.94 m. topoint G; thence N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38 40' W.,17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to point J; thence N., 3850' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N., 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to point L; thenceN., 40 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44 W., 15.35 m. to point ofbeginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square meters.

All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic;date of survey, December 26, 1905.

Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in

accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name ofthe aforesaid Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subjecthowever to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39 of said Act thatmay be in force and effect.


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Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of LandRegistration, in Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred andsix, at eight o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian.

Attest:[SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones,Clerk of the Court.

A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila,September 25, 1906.

On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known asNo. 742, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the propertybecame registered under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.

After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21stday of July, 1906, nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of LandRegistration until on or about the 19th day of December, 1911, nearly five yearsand a half after said land had been registered, when we find that the assistantattorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition:


Case No. 1895.

Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.

MOTION.

The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into thecourt and respectfully represents;

I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals isaffected by an error of closure greater than 1/1500;

II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as ithas to expropriate a portion of said land for use as a public street;

Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of saidproperty described in the plan filed in this case.

Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.


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It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B, C, and D),which were included in the petition of the petitioner.

On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge ofthe Court of Land Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to thechief surveyor of the court. On the 27th day of December, 1911, the saidsurveyor reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure in said plans."

On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registrationordered the chief surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of

Act No. 1875, and directed that notice be given to the adjoining owners.

On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del ConsueloFelisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the certificate

issued to her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings uponthe lands included in her petition. Said petition was as follows:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:

Case No. 1895.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.

Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registrationand represents:

1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name andrepresentation of the applicant, sought the legalization of property title tofour estates, among them the following:

(a ) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.

(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located atNos. 28 to 36 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.

(c ) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No.149 Calle Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.

2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcelof land, with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230


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Calle Rosario, district of Binondo, which buildings were totally destroyed bythe fire that occurred on the 2d of November of the year just past, and itcannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application.

3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estatedesignated by the letter ( a ) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 centsUnited States currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United Statescurrency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter ( b) wasassessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and thebuildings at 15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of theestate designated by the letter ( c ) was assessed at 5,658 dollars UnitesStates currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars United States currency.

4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans andtechnical descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are

annexed to the above-entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of landwhich form part of the estates under consideration there are erectedbuildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one behind theother, in the estate designated by the letter ( a ); a house of stone andmasonry in that designated by the letter ( b); and another house of stoneand masonry in that designated by the letter ( c ).

5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entriesreferring to the said estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels ofland and the buildings stated.

6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, thetenants, and owners conterminous with the estates referred to therein, thebuildings erected on them are likewise mentioned.

7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of theestates were ordered in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in theapplication; but in the certificate of the decree or resolution underconsideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the parcelof land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective buildingon each was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of title,Nos. 472, 764, and 743, which accompany this application.

8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legalrepresentative of the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund,the rights of issuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessedvaluation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency, the receipts andvouchers wherefore do not accompany this application because the


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applicant destroyed them in the belief that there was no need to exhibitthem, but averring that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited inthe accounting division of the Court of Land Registration and the office ofthe register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a person delegatedtherefor by the applicant.

9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentionedshe observed the omission in the corresponding certificate of title of thebuilding existing thereon, the same as in the certificates of titlecorresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed thatsaid omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which neverthelessgreatly affects the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable courtwith the request that you order the correction of said omission, especiallyas there at present exist on the said parcels of land, without modification oralteration, the same buildings that existed when legalization of title thereto

was applied for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to theabove-entitled case, reference whereto has been made in the thirdparagraph.

10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the saidestates consist not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the buildingerected on each, the applicant attaches hereto the assessment orproperty-tax receipts for each of the said estates, wherein are stated thetwo points mentioned.

11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicantprays the honorable court to decree, after the necessary legal

proceedings, correction of the omission referred to by ordering the freeissuance of a new certificate of title to each of the said estates, whereinrecord be made of the building erected on each , consisting of thoseenumerated in the third paragraph of this application.

Manila, February 28, 1912.

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.

On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent acommunication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of LandRegistration, accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March,1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her rights, title,and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon , to the said MasonicTemple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila


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requested the judge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in thecase and issue a new certificate to it.

On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B.W. Hay, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with theorder of the court of the 23d of December, 1911. Said new plan was made for thepurpose of correcting the errors in closure in the original plan presented by thepetitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as follows (seepage 48):

After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:

(a ) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the originalplan;

(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in hercertificate of title the buildings located upon the lands registered in accordancewith her original petition; and

(c ) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issuedto it in accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands from Maria delConsuelo

{bmc 029048.bmp}

Felisa Roxas y Chuidian after notice had been given to all the interestedparties, were set down for hearing . For one reason or another, the hearings onsaid motion were transferred from one date to another from the 22d of April,1912, until the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings, in addition tothe appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was takenupon the question of the correctness of the original plan presented by thepetitioner, in January, 1906. During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio

Enriquez appeared and apparently made some objection to the granting of saidmotions. They presented no written statement in which their specific objectionsappear. The nearest approach to a definite and specific statement of theirobjections appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said severalhearings, in which it appears that their objections to the correction of the originalplan and certificate and the issuance of a new certificate to the Masonic Temple


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Association of Manila was based upon the ground that they claimedeasements or servitudes in the land in the question.

After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of theCourt of Land Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrandand the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting inbanc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a unanimous decision, granted themotions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, andof the Masonic Temple Association of Manila.

On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented amotion for new trial, basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of the lowercourt were manifestly contrary to the proof. After a due consideration of saidmotion for a new trial and after hearing the respective parties, the Court of LandRegistration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A. Ostrand,

and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to thiscourt. In this court the respondents presented the following assignments of error:

1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Courtof Land Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiffand appellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in thissuit.

2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.

3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of eachof said assignments of error, we are of the opinion that they may be discussedtogether.

In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there isbut little argument against the decision of the court rendered on the 24th of

August, 1912. Practically the whole argument of the appellants is based upon theground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued July 21, 1906) is absolutely

void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency of theoriginal action to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now admit that anotice of the pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan,Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez. Appellants now allege that it affirmatively appearsthat neither this firm nor any of its members represented the defendants andappellants in that action. The record shows, as we have pointed out above, thatthe original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were


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the representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice wasduly sent to them. We have searched the record now in vain to find the slightestdenial of the fact that they were the representatives of said heirs, even thoughone of said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the presentproceedings. So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion found inthe various hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions,that said attorneys were not the representation of the heirs of Don AntonioEnriquez at the time of the original proceedings. Neither does the record showany attempt on their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given inthe original action. The appellants assert in their argument that "personal noticewas absolutely necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decreein favor of the plaintiff and appellee, in the first instance" (the originalproceeding). The appellants, by that argument, attempt to show, not that the

judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original certificate(No. 742) was void, because they had not been served with personal notice. This

brings us to the question whether or not personal notice to all of the personsinterested in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrenssystem, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said registration. It will beremembered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of theoriginal petition had been given and that a publication of the same had beenmade in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.

After the expiration of the period during which notice must be given, the originalcause was set down for hearing. The record also shows that the clerk of the LandCourt made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and publishedin accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said " certificate of

the clerk that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing ormailing, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of such service ."

On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared tooppose the granting of the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No. 496provides: "If no person appears and answer within the time allowed, the courtmay at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing,order a general default to be recorded and the application ( petition ) be taken forconfessed . By the description in the notice. "To all whom it may concern," all theworld are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default andorder . The court shall not be bound by the report of the examiner of titles, butmay require other and further proof."

The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of theappellants. It seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal notice asan absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.


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The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No.496. Said section 38 provides that: " Every decree of registration shall bind theland and quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in thefollowing section . It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, includingthe Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned byname in the application, notice or citations, or included in the general description'To all whom it may concern .'"

There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is notabsolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system. Section32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems it possible ,require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners and to all persons whoappear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the application." Itwill be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required togive any notice to any person . The law requires the clerk of the court to give the

notices. (Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may alsocause other or further notice of the application to be given in such a manner andto such persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is seen that the applicant is byexpress provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to give motiveto any person of the pendency of his application to have his land registeredunder the Torrens system. That being true, upon what theory may the applicantbe subjected to harassment or delay or additional expense, because someperson claims that he did not receive actual personal notice? Section 101 and102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have suffereddamages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law.

(Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have theregistration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the provisions ofsection 38, and even then he is without a remedy against the applicant unless hecan show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration and thegranting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate orinterest therein," by fraud , and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for thevalue has acquired and interest." In the present case five years and a half hadtranspired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an innocent purchaser hadbeen terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in theslightes degree.

While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted inmany States and its provisions have been attacked at almost every point. Therequirements relating to notices has been a fruitful source of litigation. Theconstitutionality of the law has been attacked many times, because of theprovision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the questionhas been presented to this court. The same question was presented to this courtin the case of Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the


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registered title was attacked upon the ground that fraud existed, simply becausepersonal notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was predicated uponthe failure of actual personal notice. In passing upon that question, this court,speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus):

In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, theappellee herein was made a party- defendant by publication, but was not

personally served with notice: Held , That the decree of the Court of LandRegistration is conclusive against his as well as all the world.

The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are inrem and not in personam . A proceeding in rem , dealing with a tangible res ,may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service uponthe claimants within the state or notice by name to those outside of it.Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res . Such a

proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do tomake a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who wereknown and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceedingis to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)

In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant(Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The recordshows that she named all the persons who might have an interest in theregistration of her land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged even withnegligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do.

In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primarypurpose is the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and torelieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrenssystem of land registration is a system for the registration of title to land only, andnot a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that landsmay be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the title,which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens andburdens of whatsoever character, except those which shall be noted in the orderof registration and in the certificate issued.

If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gainsnothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transferof his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known as well asunknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into court and tomake there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly concerningeither the character or the extent of such claims.


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The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity ofregistration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for thereason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." Thegreat difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknownclaimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment,in fact, to the transfer of titles.

Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is notnecessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res.(Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71;

American Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was first establishedin admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of thecase. The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found inthe most distant ports of the earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies,such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its business necessitated the

making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacityto make contracts and to get credit. It might also, perchance, cause damage toother craft, in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfyall possible obligations, to continue its voyage and its business on the high seas,merchants and courts came to regard the "ship" as a person, with whom or withwhich they were dealing, and not its real owner. Consequently there came intoexistence this action in rem . For the purpose of carrying into effect the broaderpurposes of the Torrens land law, it has been universally considered that theaction should be considered as one in rem . Mr. Justice Holmes, then of theSupreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, and now a member of the

Supreme Court of the United State, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass.,71), in discussing this question, said:

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessaryrequirements of justice, a proceeding in rem , dealing with a tangible res ,may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service uponclaimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and notencounter any provision of either constitution (of the State ofMassachusetts or the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the powerof the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would beimpossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to make a distinctionbetween the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and thosewho were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.(Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)

There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their propertyand of their rights, without personal notice of the proceedings in which that mayoccur. For instance, in attachment cases, notice or service upon the defendant


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may be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727.) So also indivorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates ofdeceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publicationmay be had. Also unknown claimants or owners may be brought into courtwithout personal notice in an action for the condemnation of private property forpublic use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal service is notnecessary and service by publication is sufficient.

The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to landmight be quited "by notice by publication to all persons." (Hamilton vs. Brown,101 U.S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564;Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land Company vs. Zeiss,219 U.S., 47; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal.,580.)

Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right toprovide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state hadcontrol over real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of realestate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, are subject to itsrules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or public,and the models of establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of determiningthese question, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure.(Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U.S., 481;Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U.S., 238;Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; American

Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate maybe acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative competency toestablish the method of procedure. (American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47;Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan,150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)

The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for theadjudication of title in a proceeding in rem , or in the nature of a proceeding inrem , which shall be binding upon all persons known and unknown.(State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86Cal., 580; 21 Am.t. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St.Rep., 56; People's National Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon,176 Ill., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep.,662; Ruppin vs. McLaughlin, 122 Iowa, 343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362;21 Am. St. Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A., 571; 57 L.R.A.,


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297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24; Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y.Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)

If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title toreal estate against an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable method forsecuring substituted services against residents. The power of the state to providemethods of quieting title should not be limited to known persons. In order to makesuch a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it bemade to operate on all interest and persons known or unknown.

Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussingthis question, said: "If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution, a

judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for thevery meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as knownclaims indeed certainly against the unknown may be said to be its chief end

and unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant."

Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case ofthe American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that theprovisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause (of theConstitution) because a case may be conceived where rights in and to propertywould be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by theproceedings is in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject.The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just andreasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject withwhich the statute deals."

The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire CityBank (18 N.Y., 199, 215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe insuitable cases for substituted service, said: "Various prudential regulations aremade with respect to these remedies by it may possibly happen, notwithstandingall these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of theacts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his estate without any actualknowledge of the process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as wemust, in order to sustain this legislation, that the Constitution does not positivelyrequire personal notice in order to constitute a legal proceedings due process oflaw, it then belongs to the legislature to determine in the particular instancewhether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what manner ofconstructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceededagainst of the Legal steps which are taken against him. (American LandCompany vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan,150 Cal., 289.)"


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The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case ofthe American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts and thedecisions of the different courts which are cited in that case, it is difficult tounderstand how it is authority in support of the contention of the appellants here.The facts in that case are as follows:

Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court ofthe country San Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and 19th daysof April, 1906, a material part of the public records contained in the office of thecounty recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was destroyed by fire;that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the complaint,he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parcels ofland in controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land,and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from allencumbrances, liens, defect, claims or demands of any kind or nature

whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prayed that the be adjudged tobe the owner of and entitled to the possession of said parcels of land, and eachof them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrance,liens, defects, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under thesefacts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that he be adjudged to be the owner of andentitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and thatno one else had any estate, rights, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or anypart thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.

Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and

notice of the pendency of the action was published in certain newspaper, as wasrequired by law. Notice was also posted upon the property, as required by thestatute. No one having appeared and opposed the granting of the petition of thecomplaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in thecomplaint, a default was ordered against all persons , and on the 19th days ofDecember, 1906, a decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he wasthe owner in fee simple, absolute, and entitled to the possession of the landdescribed in the complaint and that no other person had any right title, interest, orestate in and to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present orfuture, vested or contingent.

Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor ofZeiss, until the 26th day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after theentry of the decree of the superior court, in the city and county of San Francisco.On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in the United StatesCircuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimedtitle to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple , absolute, which hadtheretofore been decreed to Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by


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the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco was void and of noforce and effect and was made and maintained without due process of law,and that said superior court , in said action and proceedings never had any

jurisdiction over the persons holding the title during such proceedings, and thatsaid court did not have or obtain jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest orestate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right whatever in saidparcels of land, other than his rights of possession and occupation." The billfurther alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents ofCalifornia, not seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons andeasily reached for that purpose; that, notwithstanding that fact, no service wasmade upon them nor did they in any way receive notice of the pendency of theaction (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real propertyherein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of the decreeuntil more than a year after its entry . To the complaint the defendant, Zeiss,demurred.

Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Districtcertified the question involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. TheSupreme Court of the United States, after a careful analysis of the facts and ofthe law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S., 47), decided each ofthe question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the contention ofthe plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below.

The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of landfor the purpose of registrating his title to the same under an act of the legislature

of the State of California, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment andquieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction of public records."Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to providea method whereby owners in possession of real estate, where records had beendestroyed to such an extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, mightsecure a degree in the court which would furnish public, authenticated evidenceof title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that practically all of thepublic records of title in several counties in the State of California had recentlytheretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said lawprovided that whenever the public records in the office of the county recordedhad been, or shall hereafter be lost or destroyed, in whole or in any material part,by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims an estate of inheritance orhave title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or other persons holdingunder him, in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said county,may bring and maintain an action in rem , against all the world , in the superiorcourt for the county in which said real property is situate, to establish his title,and to determine all adverse claims thereto .


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The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of averified complaint, in which he shall name the defendants as "all personsclaiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or anypart thereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular description ofthe property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summonsor notice was required to be issued, containing the names of the court and thecountry in which the action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particulardescription of the property involved, which notice was directed to "all personsclaiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or anypart thereof," as defendants.

The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in anewspaper of general circulation in the county where the action was brought, atleast once a week for a period of two months.

The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any personclaiming an interest in the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff.

The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of thesummons and its service upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it isherein directed to be specially served, the court shall have full and complete

jurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person and every oneclaiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, orany part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession andcontrol of said property, for the purpose of the action , and shall have full andcomplete jurisdiction to render judgment therein, which is provided for in the law.

In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon bythe appellants, the validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the titlegranted to Zeiss was impugned for the reason that the law was unconstitutionaland void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual notice of theapplication to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Courtof the United States (219 U.S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that thelaw was constitutional and that a compliance with the requirements of the noticeprovided for in said law was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the resand to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the decision in thecase of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to support the contention of theappellants.

Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adoptthe procedure provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the title of lands;and


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proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be thatthe dividing line between said properties was not changed but simplyapproved and so indicated upon the record title. For instance, the linebetween said properties beginning on the south side of the Escolta isexactly at the same point indicated in the original description and approvedby the court; in other words, the premises in question of the said Maria delConsuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundarylines thereof have not been changed; the real descriptions of the propertieshave been left undisturbed; the adjoining land owned by the petitioners isundiminished, except possibly as to alleged easements claimed to havebeen created by the projection of some of the roots of the petitioners'building over the aforesaid registered property of the said Roxas. Thatmatter is settled clearly by the provisions of the last paragraph of section39 of Act No. 496."

We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-Bof her property ran S., 44 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the planaccompanying said petition (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante ) made said line to runS., 46 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters An examination of the certificateissued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante ) also states that the line A-B runs S.,46 30' W., for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no application whythe original plan (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) did not conform to the descriptionof the land given in the petition. That error, in our judgment, seems to haveconstituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said conditionswe are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely justified in ordering the plan

corrected for the purposes above indicated.There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have notdiscussed, and that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian tohave her original certificate of registration corrected, for the purpose of showingthat she was the owner of the buildings located upon the parcel of land inquestion. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12, 1906,she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land in question, togetherwith the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was madeto the registration of the land as described in her petition. The record shows noreason why the buildings should have been omitted in the certificate ofregistration. The omission must have been an errors. on the part of the clerk. Wefind that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of sucherrors. Section 112 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply bypetition to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering acertificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." Wethink the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such originalcertificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we


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believe that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel ofland, unless the record contains something to the contrary, necessarily includesthe buildings and edifices located thereon, even though they are not mentioned.Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in view of the petitionof the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original certificate be amended so asto include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildingslocated thereon as well.

With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, therecord contains no sufficient reasons for not granting the same.

Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.


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Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, plaintiff-appellee,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO andEMELITA MAGCAMIT, defendants-appellants.

PARAS, J .:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * (now Courtof Appeals) dated January 31, 1984, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District,Branch III, and of the resolution dated August 28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration filed thereof.

The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and the Intermediate AppellateCourt are as follows:

On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of aparcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses MelencioMagcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private respondents) asevidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with right to repurchase wasrecorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6,1971 under ActNo. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas andLizardo in favor of the private respondents for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of whichwas paid upon the execu

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