land titles and deeds midterms reviewer

8/10/2019 Land Titles and Deeds Midterms Reviewer

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NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WITH LAND TITLE AND DEEDMIDTERMS REVIEWER

Z A Z Z A S I M B U L A N | | S A N B E D A C O L L E G E O F L A W

REGALIAN DOCTRINEdeclares that all lands and all other naturalresources are owned by the State.

All lands of whatever classification and other naturalresources not otherwise appearing to be clearly withinprivate ownership belong to the State.

The State is the source of any asserted right to ownership ofland and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or releasedas alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private personby the State remain part of the alienable public domain. Toovercome this presumption, it is indispensable that there bea showing of a title from the State or any other modes ofacquisition recognized by law.

Reflected in the Constitution: principle of state ownership oflands and other natural resources in:o Section 2, Article 12 on National Economy and Patrimony,

1987 All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potentialenergy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,and other natural resources are owned by the State. With theexception of agricultural lands, all other natural resourcesshall not be alienated. The exploration, development, andutilization of natural resources shall be under the full controland supervision of the State. The State may directly undertakesuch activities, or it may enter into co-production, jointventure, or production-sharing agreements with Filipinocitizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centumof whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreementsmay be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and undersuch terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases ofwater rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrialuses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial usemay be the measure and limit of the grant.

Sec 1, Art. 13 on Conservation and Utilization of Natural

Resources, 1935 Constitution Sec 8, Art. 14 on National Patrimony and the Patrimony

of the Nation, 1973 Constitution

Jura Regalia Private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or

implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, theAmerican Colonial Government and/or Republic of thePhilippines.

Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippinesbecause title to land must emanate from some source for itcannot be issue forth from nowhere.

In its broad sense,jura regaliarefers to royal rights, or those

rights which the King has by virtue of is prerogatives. In Spanish Law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has

over anything in which a subject has a right of property. Feudal System- this theory was that title to all lands was

originally held by the King and while the use of lands wasgranted out to others who were permitted to hold themunder certain conditions, the King theoretically retained thetitle. The King was regarded as the original proprietor of alllands and true and only source of title, and from him all landswere held.

Jura regalia was nothing more than a natural fruit ofconquest.

States power of dominium-capacity of the State to own oracquire property.

Regalian Doctrine or Jura regalia is a Western legal concept that wfirst introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of discovery an

conquest and all lands became the exclusive patrimony anddominion of the Spanish Crown.

The Spanish government took charge of distributing thelands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards,both military and civilian.

Private land could only be acquired from the governmenteither by purchase or grant from the crown.

-Laws of Indies followed by Ley Hipotecaria or Mortgage La

of 1893

Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic

registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claimsIt also sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the RoyaDecree of 1880.

-The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law

It was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well asthe Law of Indies, as already amended by previous ordersand decrees.

Last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines Required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural

lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the State.

-Treaty of Paris- December 10, 1898

Spain ceded to US government all rights, interests and claimover the national territory of the Philippine Islands.

CRUZ VS. SEC. OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

GR No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit forprohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing theconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rulon the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States

ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and othenatural resources therein, by recognizing the rights of the ICCs and the Ito their ancestral lands and domains on the basis of native title which win violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article 12 ofthe Constitution as well as violation of the rights of private land owners

ISSUE: Is RA 8371 unconstitutional because it violates the Regalian

Doctrine?

HELD: 7 justices voted to dismiss while 7 voted to grant the petition andthe necessary majority was not obtained so the case was redeliberatedupon. However, after such, voting remained the same and pursuant to se7, Rule 56 of Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed and the validity the law deemed upheld.

Justice Kapunan: Regalian doctrine does not negate the native title tolands held in private ownership since time immemorial.

As an exception to jura regalia: ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial andindependent of any grant from the Spanish Crown/native title.


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Justice Puno:IPRA grants recognizes the existence of the ICCs and IPs asa distinct sector of the Philippines and it grants these people theownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands,an indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces itsorigin to native title.

SEC. OF DENR VS YAP

GR 167707, Oct 8, 2008FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No.1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulasin the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under theadministration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).

Respondents, Mayor Yap Jr. and others filed a petition for declaratoryrelief with RTC Kalibo, Aklan claiming that Proc No. 1801 and PTACircular No. 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicialconfirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes evenif they had been in OCEN possession and occupation of the land in Boracaysince June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial under CA 141, Se48(b), and they pay taxes regularly.

OSG opposed saying that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of thepublic domain formed part of the mass of lands classified as publicforest, which was not available for disposition. Since Boracay Island had

not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession theyhad cannot ripen into ownership.

ISSUE:W/N private claimants have a right to secure titles over their

occupied portions in Boracay

HELD: CA decision was reversed. Except for for lands already covered byexisting titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain priorto Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered publicforest under PD No. 705. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests.PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

Classification of lands of public domain under the Constitution are:agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, national parks. onlyagricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 ofMay 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly andadministratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracaywas an unclassified land of the public domain.

In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has timeand again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,declaring land as alienable and disposable.In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrativeaction, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. Therecords are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions ofBoracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a governmentproclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of landclassification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION

Made by Sir Robert Torrens, a layman in South Australia in1857

Title by registration takes the place of title by deed of the

system under the general law. Object of the Torrens system is to do away with delay,uncertainty and expense of the old conveyancing system

By Torrens systems generally are meant those systems ofregistration of transactions with interest in land whosedeclared object is, under governmental authority, to establishand certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasibletitle to realty and simplify its transfer.

Torrens System requires that the government issue anofficial certificate of title attesting to the fact that the personnamed is the owner of the property described therein,subject to such liens and encumbrances as noted or as lawwarrants.

Certificate title is INDEFEASIBLE and IMPRESCRIPTIBLE anall claims to the land is quited by the issuance of thecertificate.

Does not furnish a shield for fraud, nor permit one to enrichhimself at the expense of others. INDEFEASIBILITY does noattach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.

Act No. 496 or Land Registration Act of 1903. o Grants of public land were brought under the

operation of Torrens system under this acto Placed all public and private lands in the

Philippines under Torrens System

o

Was said to be almost a verbatim copy of theMassachusetts Land Registration Act of 1898, whiin turn, followed the principles and procedure ofthe Torrens System of registration who patternedafter the MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS in SOUTHAUSTRALIA

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but ismerely a procedure to establish evidence of title over realtyIt is a mode of confirming the fact of its existence with noticto the world at large.

TITLE: constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, orwhich is the foundation of ownership property.

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE: mere evidence of ownership; notthe title to the land itself.

PURPOSES OFTORRENS SYSTEM (QR-PIPS-FF)

To quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question othe legality of the title, EXCEPT claims which were noted atthe time of the registration, in the certificate, or which mayarise subsequent thereto.

To relieve the land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjuagainst it EXCEPT statutory liens under sec. 44 of PD 1529.

To establish priority in right To create indefeasible and imprescriptible title binding to t

whole whole To provide means of publication or notice to third persons To provide stability to land titles To facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the pub

the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate oftitle and to dispense with the need of inquiring furtherEXCEPT when the party concerned has actual knowledge offacts and circumstances that should imply a reasonablecautious man to make such further inquiry.

To prevent fraudulent claims

ADVANTAGES OF TORRENS SYSTEM (SRESAR)

Substituted security for insecurity; Reduced the cost of conveyances from pounds to shillings

and the time occupied from months to days; Exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiag Simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the

three Rs can transact his own conveyancing; Affords protection against fraud;

Restored to their just value many estates, held under goodtitles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur ortechnical defect and has barred the reocurrence ofsimilar faults.


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PAST & PRESENT LEGISLATION ON LAND REGISTRATION TIMELTABLE

1902Nov. 6

but tookeffect on

Jan. 1,1903

Act No. 496Land Registration

Act

-established the Torrens system ofRegistration in the country.

-created Court of Land Registration forapplications for registration with powerto hear and determine all questionsarising from applications. (before in CFI)

-the purpose of the law is to bring landtitles in the Philippines under onecomprehensive and harmonious system.

-provided for an Assurance Fund to payfor the loss or damage sustained by aperson who without negligence on hispart, is wrongfully deprived of any landor interest therein on account ofbringing the same under Torrenssystem.

1903Oct. 7

Act No. 926First Public Land Act

-US government through the PhilippineCommission, passed in pursuance of theprovisions of Philippine Bill of 1902.

-governed the disposition of lands of thepublic domain

-prescribed rules and regulations for thehomesteading, selling and leasingportions of the public domain of the PIand prescribed the terms and conditionsto enable persons to perfect their titlesto public land.

-provided for the issuance of patents tocertain native settlers upon public landsfor the establishment of townsites andsale of lots therein for the completion ofimperfect titles and for the cancellationor confirmation of the Spanishconcessions.

-PLA OPERATED ON THE ASSUMPTIONTHAT TITLE TO PUBLIC LANDS IN THEPHIL. ISLANDS REMAINED IN THEGOVERNMENT AND THAT THEGOVERNMENTS TITLE TO PUBLIC

LAND SPRUNG FROM THE TREATY OF

PARIS AND OTHER TREATIESBETWEEN SPAIN AND US.

1913Feb 11

Act No. 2259The Cadastral Act

-When in the opinion of the President,the public interest requires that title toany lands be settled and adjudicated, heshall order the Dir. Of Lands to make asurvey thereof, with notice to all personsclaiming interest therein. Dir. Of Lands,represented by Sol.Gen. shall instituteregistration proceedings by filing apetition in the proper court againstholders, claimants, possessors oroccupants of such lands, stating thatpublic interest requires that titles tosuch lands be settled and adjudicated.

-cadastral proccedings are in remtoo-provisions of this Acts have beensubstantially incorporated in theProperty Registration Decree (PD 1529)particularly in Sec 35 to 38

-Sec 53 of the Public Land Act, deemedintegrated in the Property Registrationdecree.

1919Nov. 29

Act No. 2874Second Public Land

Act

-This was passed under the Jones Law

-It was more comprehensive in scopebut limited the exploitation ofagricultural lands to Filipinos andAmericans and citizens of other

countries which gave Filipinos sameprivileges.

-applied to lands of public domainexcept timber and mineral

-Fil and US Citizens may apply to CFI fthe confirmation of their claims

1936Nov. 7

but tookeffect onDec. 1,1936

CA 141The third and

present Public LandAct

-existing general lawgoverning

classification anddisposition of lands

of public domain

-After the passage of 1935 Constitutiothis amended Act 2874 which areessentially the same.

-Main difference between the two:transitory provisions on the rights of

American Citizens and corporationsduring the Commonwealth period at pwith Filipino citizens and corporation

-applies to lands of the public domainwhich have been declared open todisposition or concession and finallydelimited and classified.

-contains provisions on the differentmodes of govt grants and reservationsfor public and semi-public purpose.

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any suchlands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfecteor completed, may apply to the Regional Trial Court of the provincewhere the land is located for confirmation of their claims and theissuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registratio

Act , to wit:(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to theUnited States have applied for the purchase, composition or otherform of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royadecrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted theproceedings in connection therewith, but have with or withoutdefault upon their part, or for any other cause, not received titletherefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupieand cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of theirapplications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownershipsince June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeurThese shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselvesthrough their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuoexclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of thepublic domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

1978June 11

PD 1529Property

Registration Decree

-issued to update the Land RegistratioAct

-to codify the various laws relative toregistration of property and to facilitaeffective implementation of said laws

-supersedes all other laws relative to tregistration of property

-RTC and in proper cases, the lowercourts exercise jurisdiction overapplications for registration and allsubsequent proceedings relative theresubject to judicial review.

-Section 48(b) of CA 141 and Section 1of PD 1529 are virtually the same, withthe latter law operationalizing theregistration of lands of the publicdomain and codifying the various lawsrelative to registration of property.

-incorporated the substantive andprocedural requirement of its precurs


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Land Registration Act of 1902 butincluded judicial confirmation ofimperfect and incomplete titles in Sec 14(1), cadastral registration proceedins inSec 35 to 38, voluntary proceedings inSec 51 to 68, involuntary proceedings inSec 69 to 77, certificates of land transferand emancipation patents issuedpursuant to PD No. 27 in Sections 104 to106 and reconstitution of lost ordestroyed original Torrens titles in Sec110.

-in rem judicial proceedings-jurisdiction is acquired by giving publicnotice through publication, mailing andnotice.

-created the Land RegistrationCommission, now Land RegistrationAuthority as the central repository ofrecords relative to the originalregistration, including subdivision andconsolidation plans of titled lands.

Section 14. Who may apply.

The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instancean application for registration of title to land, whether personally orthrough their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands byprescription under the provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands orabandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under theexisting laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other mannerprovided for by law.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

OVER LAND REGISTRATION CASES

Section 2 of 1529: RTCs shall have exclusive jurisdiction overall applications for original registration of titles to lands,including improvements and interest therein and over allpetitions filed after original registration of title, with powerto hear and determine all questions arising upon suchapplications or petitions.

Section 108 of PD 1529: jurisdiction over petitions foramendments of certificates of title.

Before 1529, summary reliefs can only filed before RTCacting as a land registration court, if there is unanimityamong the parties, or there is no adverse claim or seriousobjection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, thecase becomes contentious and controversial and should be

threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where theincident property belonged.

EXCEPTIONS:

First level courts: Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal TrialCourts in Cities, Mun. Trial Courts, and Mun. Circuit TrialCourts have delegated jurisdiction to hear and determinecadastral or land registration cases in the ff. instances (Section34 of BP Blg. 129: Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by RA7691 on March 25, 1994):

o Where the lot sought to be registered is not thesubject of controversy or opposition; or

o Where the land is contested but the value does noexceed P100,000, such value to be ascertained bythe affidavit of the claimant or by the agreement othe respective claimants, if there be more than onor from the corresponding tax declaration of thereal property.

Note: Decisions of first level courts are appealable to CA; jurisdiction limited to what is expressly mentioned in the delegation hence, mattesubsequent to orig. registration determined by second level courts,including petitions for reconstitution of lost titles, may not be unloade

to first level courts.

SC Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A (Nov. 15, 1995)oCadastral or land registration cases filed before the

effectivity of this Circular but where the hearing has nyet commenced shall be transferred by the Exec. Judgeof RTC to the Exec. Judge of MTC for the required rafflamong the branches od the court under hisadministrative supervision.

oCadastral or land registration cases pending in RTCwhere trial had already been commenced as of circulashall remain with courts. However, by agreement of thparties, these cases may be transferred to theappropriate MTCs.

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES INVOLVING TITLE TO PROPERTY

Pursuant to Section 19 (2) of BP Blg. 129, RTC shall exercisexclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions whichinvolve title to, or possession of, real property, or anyinterest therein:

o where the assessed value of the property exceedsP20,000 outside Metro Manila;

o for civil actions in Metropolitan Manila, where theassessed value exceeds P50,000;

EXCEPT actions for forcible entry into, unlawful detainer oflands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which isconferred upon the MTCs.

What determines jurisdiction are the allegations in the complaint and th

reliefs prayed for.

o Where the objective is to OBTAIN TITLE to property, it should be

filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed valuof the propertyo

An action for reconveyance, the complaint should allege the assessvalue of the property to determine which court has jurisdictions.

o If the complaint simply alleges market value of property, it is the

inferior court and not the RTC which ahs jurisdiction over the case

DISTINCTION BETWEEN COURTS GENERAL & LIMITED

JURISDICTION ELIMINATED

Sec. 2 has eliminated the distinction between generaljurisdiction vested in RTC and the limited jurisdictionconferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as land registration or cadastral court

To avoid multiplicity of suits, simplied registrationproceedings by conferring upon RTC the authority to act noonly on applications for original registration but also over apetitions filed after orig. registration of title, with power tohear and determine all questions arising upon suchapplications or petitions.

Now authorized to hear and decide not only non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantiaissues which were before beyond its competence.

JUNIO VS. DE LOS SANTOS

GR No. L-35744, Sept 28, 1984Although the grounds relied upon by petitioner for cancellation of the adversclaim were unmeritorious, it behooved the lower Court to have conducted aspeedy hearing upon the question of validity of the adverse claim pursuant tothe second paragraph of Section 110 of the Land Registration.


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In fact, the lower Court, instead of confining itself to the propriety of theregistration of the adverse claim should already have decided the controversybetween the parties on the merits thereof. Doctrinal jurisprudence holds thatthe Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a LandRegistration Court, can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civilactions, since the Courts of First Instance are at the same time, Courts ofgeneral jurisdiction and could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidityof respondent's adverse claim, with a view to determining whether petitioner isentitled or not to the relief that he seeks.

ARCEO VS. CA

GR No. 81401, May 18, 1990

The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power todetermine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely toconfirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have beenawarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) orotherwise, by acquisitive prescription.

We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, theurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is noonger as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land

registration law. The SC said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinctionbetween the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and theimited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as

a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits,the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the

required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for 'originalregistration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of title,with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applicationsor petitions.

LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION= LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

June 17, 1954- RA 1151 created LRC to provide moreefficient execution of the existing laws relative to theregistration of lands.

LRC exercises supervision and control over all Register ofDeeds, as well as clerical and archival system of the CFIsthroughout the Philippines with the reference to theregistration of lands.

Headed by a Commissioner and an Assistant Commissioner,both appointed by the President with the consent

Commission of Audit Commissioner of Land Registration took over all the powers

and functions of the Chief of the General Land RegistrationOffice, which position was abolished, as well as the powersand functions of the Judge of the Fourth Branch of the CFIManila, in all matters submitted to it for resolution under

All functions, records, personnel, equipment, and otherproperties of the General Land Registration Office weretransferred to LRC.

LRC renamed to LRA pursuant to Section 28, Chapter 9, Title3 of EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)

Headed by an Administrator, assisted by 2 DeputyAdministrators, all of whom are appointed by President uponrecommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

All other officials of the LRA, except Register of Deeds, areappointed by the Secretary of Justice upon therecommendation of the Administrator.

LRA or Pangasiwaan sa Patalaan ng Lupainis the centralrepository of records relative to the original registration oflands titled under the Torrens System, including subdivisionand consolidation plans of titled lands.

Responsible for the issuance of decrees of registration andcertificated of title (original and duplicate) where the land isbrought for the first time under the Torrens System

FUNCTIONS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (S-A-C)

Extend SPEEDY and effective assistance to the DepartmentAgrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in theimplementation of the land reform program of thegovernment;

ExtendASSISTANCE to courts in ordinary and cadastral lanregistration proceedings;

Be the CENTRAL REPOSITORY of records relative to originregistration of lands titled under the Torrens System,including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled land

FUNCTIONS OF THE LRA ADMINISTRATOR (DR. VISE) Issue decreesof registration pursuant to final judgments o

the courts in land registration proceedings and cause theissuance by the ROD of the corresponding certificates of titl

Resolvecases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from thROD;

Verifyand approve subdivision, consolidation, andconsolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titledunder Act No. 496 except those covered by PD 957.

Implementall orders, decisions, and decrees promulgatedrelative to the registration of lands and issue, subject to theapproval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules andregulations therefor;

Exercisesupervisionand control over all ROD and otherpersonnel of the Commission

Exercise executivesupervisionover all clerks of court andpersonnel of the CFI throughout the Philippines with respeto the discharge of their duties and functions in relation tothe registration of lands;--------------------------------------------------------------------------

o LRA Administrators functions are plainly executive and

subject to the Presidents power of supervision and control

o He can be investigated and removed only by the Presidentand not by SC.

o Duty of the LRA officials to issue decree of registration ispurely ministerial, in the sense that they act under the ordeof the court and the decree must be in conformity with thedecision of the court and with the data found in the record.

o EXCEPT when they are doubt upon any point in relation to

the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty trefer the matter to the court acting as officials of the court.o The issuance by LRA officials of a decree of registration is n

purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that suchwould result to the double titling of the same land. RODcannot be compelled by mandamus where there is existingtitle and there are reasons to question those requesting.

o The issuance of the decree of registration is part of judicialfunction of the courts and is not compellable by mandamusbecause it involves the exercise of discretion.

REGISTRATION: the entry of instruments or deeds in a book or publregistry; to record formally and distinctly. Any entry made in thebooks of the Registry, including both registration in its ordinary andstrict sense, and cancellation, annotation and even marginal notes. Itthe entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanentlythe right of ownership and other real rights.

EFFECT:Notice to the whole world

Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under

the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to:

1) the first registrant in good faith;2) the first possessor in good faith;3) the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.But this does not apply if the property is not registered under Torren


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CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT

KRIVENKO DOCTRINE: aliens are disqualified from acquiring

public and private lands.

Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to landsof the public domain, except only by way of hereditary succession.

KRIVENKO VS. REGISTER OF DEEDSGR No. L-630, November 15, 1957

FACTS: Alenxander A. Kriventor is an alien (foreigner) who bought a residentialot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941. The registration of

which was interrupted by the war.

In May 1945, he registered the lot but was denied by the register of deeds ofManila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in thisurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of

First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court renderedudgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko

appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residentialand?

HELD: This case has settled the issue as to who are qualified and disqualified toown public as well as private lands in the Philippines. It was held throughJustice Moran that aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,thus:

Under Section 1 of Art.13 of the 1935 Constitution which is now in Sec 2, Art. 12of 1987 Constitution, natural resources, with the exception of publicagricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and with respect to public

agricultural lands, their alienation is limited only to Filipino citizens. But thisconstitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands ofFilipino may easily be defeated by Filipinos who may alienate their agriculturalands in favor of aliens. To prevent such, Sec 5 is included in Art. 13:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations

qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through whichagricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile toprohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may

be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in thehands of Filipino citizens.

Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy ofnationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be readtogether for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It mustbe noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire orhold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity toacquire or hold lands of the public domain.= Filipinos, corporations at least60% of capital of which is owned by Filipinos.

HALILI VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 113539, Mar 12, 1998

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving realproperties in the Philippines to his heirs: widow, defendant appellee HelenMeyers Guzman, and his son, David Rey Guzman, both of whom are alsoAmerican citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaimassigning and transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles andnterests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from

Simeon. On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land todefendant-appellee Emiliano Cataniag, and lands were issued in the lattersname.

Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before theRegional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality andvalidity of the two conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David ReyGuzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claimingownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621 of

the Civil Code.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on Mar 10 1992. It ruled that HelenGuzmans waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to th

constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpoof the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of theirproperties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippineand not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land wasurban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemptionunder Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Is the Sale to Cataniag Valid?

HELD: Yes. The court did not find any reversible error in the appellate courtsholding that the sale of the subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag rendemoot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by HeleGuzman to her son David Rey. Helens deed of quitclaimcollided with theConstitution, Article XII, Section 7. However, the landmark case of Krivenko vsRegister of Deedssettled the issue as to who are qualified (and disqualified) toown public as well as private lands in the Philippines. Section 2, Art XII of theconstitution intended to insure the policy of nationalization. Both sectionsmust, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the samsubject matter.

Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien whsubsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in theoriginal transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee isrendered valid.

Since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, aFilipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. Theobjective of the constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands has been served.

A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN WHO HAS LOST HIS

CITIZENSHIP MAY BE A TRANSFEREE OF A PRIVATE LAND

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no privatelands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individualcorporations, or associations qualified to acquire or holdlands of the public domain.

Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of th

Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has loshis Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of privatelands, subject to limitations provided by law.

Pursuant to Sec. 10 of RA 7042 (An Act to Promote ForeignInvestment), as amended by RA 8179 dated March 28, 1996,

provides that any natural-born citizen who has the legal capacityto enter into a contract may be a transferee of a PRIVATE land upto a maximum area: 5000 sqm in the case of urban land, or 3hectares in rural land.

In case of married couple, one of them may avail of the same, thetotal area acquired shall not exceed the maximum fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land, he shallstill be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural lan

which when added to those already owned shall not exceed themax area. A transferee who has already acquired urban land shall be

disqualified from acquiring rural land area and vice versa. Under RA 9225, Aug 29, 2003: natural born citizens of the Phils

who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of theirnaturalization as citizens of foreign country are deemed to have racquired Philippine Citizenship upon taking oath of allegiance tothe Republic.

o He shall then enjoy full civil and political rights and besubject to all liabilities and responsibilities under existinlaws of the Philippines. Area limitation does not applysince 9225 grants him right to enjoy full civil and politicright upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.


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The time to determine whether a person acquiring theland is qualified is the time the right to own it is acquired

not the time to register its ownership. o

Capacity to own land is determined as of the time ofthe acquisition and not registration.

REPUBLIC VS CA AND LAPIAEven if the spouses were already Canadian Citizens atthe time they applied for registration, the lots werealready private lands and no longer formed part of thepublic domain. They were already private in characterat the time of the purchase since respondents

predecessors-in-interest had been in OCEN possession

and occupation prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937,which is the prescribed period for the acquisition oftitle under the Public Land Act, Sec 48b thus acquiringan imperfect title thereto.

Moreover, the law provides that a natural-born citizenof the Phils. who has lost his Phil. citizenship may be atransferee of a private land under the termsprescribed by law. Therefore, for the purpose oftransfer of the residential land, it is not significantwhether they are no longer Filipino citizens at thetime they purchased or registered the land. What isimportant is that they were formally natural-borncitizens and as transferees of a private land, they couldapply for registration in accordance with Section 8,Art. 12 of the Constitution. (IMPERFECT TITLE OVERPROPERTY BEFORE THEY LOST PHIL. CITIZENSHIP)

ALIENS MAY LEASE PRIVATE LANDS

Aliens are disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain, butthey may lease private lands.

A lease for a reasonable period is valid Giving the alien the right to buy real property on the condition

that he is granted Phil. Citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the

use of lands for residential purposes since their residence in thecountry is temporary, they may be granted temporary rightssuch as a lease contract which is not forbidden by theConstitution.

Should they remain here forever and share our fortune andmisfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

If alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy apiece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell ordispose his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomesclear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownershipwhereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the rightto enjoy the land and the sum of which make up ownership.

GREGORIO LLANTINO and BELINDA LLANTINO

vs. CO LIONG CHONG alias JUAN MOLINAFACTS: Plaintiffs aver that they are the owners of a commercial-residential landsituated in the municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, which sometime in 1954they leased to the defendant who was then a Chinese national and went by thename of Co Liong Chong for a period of thirteen (13) years for the sum ofP6,150.00 for the whole period. The defendant was placed in possession of theproperty but knowing that the period of the least would end with the year

1967, petitioners requested private respondent for a conference but the latterdid not honor the request and instead he informed the petitioners that he hadalready constructed a commercial building on the land worth P50,000.00; thatthe lease contract was for a period of sixty (60) years, counted from 1954; andthat he is already a Filipino citizen. The claim of Chong came as a surprise to theLlantinos because they did not remember having agreed to a sixty-year leaseagreement as that would virtually make Chong the owner of the realty which, asa Chinese national, he had no right to own and neither could he have acquiredsuch ownership after naturalization subsequent to 1954. On December 16,1967, in order to avoid a court litigation the Llantinos once more invited Chongto a conference about the matter but again Chong ignored the invitation.

Hence, on January 10, 1968, the Llantinos filed their complaint to quiet titlewith damages before the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, the Court finds

the contract of lease valid and in accordance with law and the complaint isdismissed with costs against the plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of lease entered into by and between thepetitioners and private respondent on October 5, 1954 for a period of sixty (6years is valid.

HELD: The lower court correctly ruled that the defendant-appellee Chong hadat the time of the execution of the contract, the right to hold by lease theproperty involved in the case although at the time of the execution of thecontract, he was still a Chinese national.

In the present case, it has been established that there is only one contract andthere is no option to buy the leased property in favor of Chong. There is nothiin the record, either in the lease contract or in the complaint itself, to indicateany scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition. Chong had merelyasked them for a lease of the premises to which they agreed. Admittedly undethe terms of the contract there is nothing to prevent the Llantinos fromdisposing of their title to the land to any qualified party.

Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. Sis an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that hegranted Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by theConstitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residencethe Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as alease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire tremain here forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizensh

is not impossible to acquire. The only instance where a contract of lease may considered invalid is, if there are circumstances attendant to its execution,which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.

If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of landby virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of hisproperty, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangementa virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages nonly of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and juabutendi) rights, the sum of which make up ownership. It is just as if todaythe possession is transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day the disposition,and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up areconsolidated in an alien.

Coming back to the case at bar, even assuming, arguendo, that the subject

contract is prohibited, the same can no longer be questioned presently upon tacquisition by the private respondent of Filipino citizenship. It was held thatsale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the hands of a naturalizeFilipino citizen is valid.

FOREIGNERS ALLOWED TO PURCHASE CONDO UNITS

RA 4726, Sec 5: foreign nationals can own Philippine realestate through purchase of condo units or townhouses.

Foreigners are allowed to acquire condo units and shares incondo corporations up to no more than 40% of the total andoutstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlledcorporation. 60% of the members of the condo corporationshould be Filipinos.

A unit owner is simply a member of the condominiumcorporation and the land remained owned by condominium

corporation, then the constitutional proscription againstaliens owning real property does not apply.

DONATION IN FAVOR OF A RELIGIOUS CORPORATION

CONTROLLED BY NON-FILIPINOS NOT REGISTRABLE

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL VS UNG SIU SI TEMPLE

GR No. L-6776, 21 May 1955The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed ofdonation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen,conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, in favor of the unregisteredreligious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of Chinenationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder adeaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its


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trustees.

The refusal of the Registrar was elevated tothe Court of First Instance of Manila. On March14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds.

UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and

administrator are all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of

the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines

imiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or

associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens

adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the

case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should

not be admitted for registration.

Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land inquestion, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 o f the oldPhilippine Commission and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates thefreedom of religion clause of our Constitution.

HELD:

We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the absoluteterms of section 5, Title 13, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the oldPhilippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in sofar as incompatible therewith. In providing that,

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall betransferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associationsqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines,

The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations.

The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice toescape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreignnationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure thatcorporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit naturalresources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands thatn the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino

citizens.As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom ofreligion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means convinced (norhas it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment ofreligious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to thedictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple.

Land acquired by an American citizen in 1945 can beregistered under the ordinance appended to the 1935 Consti.

The ordinance appended thereto on November 10, 1939provided that until the final withdrawal of the US sovereigntyover the Phils, citizens and corporations of the US couldenjoy the same civil rights as Phil citizens. (as directed byTydings-McDuffie Law)

Upon the proclamation of Phil Independence on July 4, 1946,all property rights of citizens or corporations of US shall beacknowledged, respected and safeguarded to the same extentas property rights of citizens of Phils.

A CORPORATION SOLE MAY ACQUIRE AND REGISTER PRIVATEAGRICULTURAL LAND

ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO INC.

VS LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSIONOn October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City ofDavao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same citycovered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman CatholicApostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., a corporation sole organized and existingn accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian

citizen, as actual incumbent.

As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability if thedocument, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner enconsulta for resolution in accordance with section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151.

Proper hearing on the matter was conducted by the Commissioner and after thepetitioner corporation had filed its memorandum, a resolution was rendered onSeptember 21, 1954, holding that in view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 ofArticle XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified toacquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic ApostolicAdministrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipinocitizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporationsole was a Canadian citizen.

Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole, irrespective of thecitizenship of its incumbent, is not prohibited or disqualified to acquire andhold real properties. The Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit intheir provisions that a corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the othe properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof.

HELD: A corporation sole, which consists of one person only, is vested with thright to purchase and hold real estate and to register the same in trust for thefaithful members of the religious society or church for which the corporationwas organized.

It is not treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it

so treated, the constitutional proscription against private corporations will napply because a corporation sole has no nationality and the framers of theConsti did not have in mind the religious corporation sole when they providethat 60 per centum of the capital should be owned by Filipinos.

A corporation sole is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire butmere the administrator thereof. Upon his death, properties are passed not tohis personal heirs but to his successor in office.

LANDS SOLD TO AN ALIEN WHICH IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF AFILIPINO MAY NO LONGER BE ANNULLED

DE CASTRO VS TAN

GR NO. L-31956, 30 APRIL 1984In 1938, petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein

respondents his widow, To O. Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan,Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing.

Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin,became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on Novembe18, 1962, his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale,whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.

On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai forannulment of the sale for alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibitinthe sale of land to aliens.

Issue:Will the action filed by the petitioner prosper?

Held:No. Independently of the doctrine ofpari delicto, the petitioner cannot have thsale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was aalien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property ofrespondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who isconstitutionally qualified to own land. There would be no more public policy be served in allowing petitioner to recover the land as it is already in the hanof a qualified person.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. IAC and GONZALVESThe case involved three (3) parcels of land. Lots 1 and 2 were sold by theowners, the Maosca Spouses, to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on Dec. 30, 1934. Lot549 was also sold by the Marquez Spouses to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un onDecember 27, 1934.

Subsequently, Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, and his adopted son, Chua Kim @ U

Teng, took possession of the property.

The three (3) parcels of land above mentioned, together with several others,later became subject of a compromise agreement in a litigation in the Court oFirst Instance of Quezon Province.

Chua Kim then filed a petition for issuance of decree of confirmation andregistration in Land Registration Case No. 405 of the Court of First Instance oQuezon Province.

Court of First Instance of Quezon promulgated on January 14, 1982 that hereipetitioner Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be has duly established his registerable titover the properties in question in this land registration case and adjudicated


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the said properties to Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, challenged thecorrectness of the Order and appealed it to the Court of Appeals. That Court,however, affirmed the Order "in all respects," in a decision promulgated by CFI.

Republic has come to this Court on appeal by certiorariarguing: that theconveyances to Chua Kim were made while he was still an alien, i.e., prior to histaking oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen on January 7, 1977, at a timewhen he was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines hence,his asserted titles are null and void.

It is a fact that the lands in dispute were properly and formally adjudicated by acompetent Court to the Spouses Gaspar and to the Spouses Marquez in feesimple, and that the latter had afterwards conveyed said lands to GregorioReyes Uy Un, Chua Kim's adopting parent, by deeds executed in due form onDecember 27, 1934 and December 30, 1934, respectively. the conveyanceswere made before the 1935 Constitution went into effect, at a time when therewas no prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands byaliens. Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands thuspurchased by him

It is a fact, furthermore, that since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kim@ Uy Teng Be had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept ofowner, as the putative heir of his adoptive father, said Gregorio Reyes. Also, theacquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should foreclose any furtherdebate regarding the title to the property in controversy, the litigated property

s now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by adisqualified vendee. As a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified toown the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served.

RECOVERY OF LAND SOLD TO ALIEN

RELLOSA VS. GAW CHEE HUN

GR No. L-1411, Sept. 29, 1953On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land,together with the house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila,Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained in possession of theproperty under a contract of lease entered into on the same date between thesame parties. Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition thatthe vendee, being a Chinese citizen, would obtain the approval of the JapaneseMilitary Administration in accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2,1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and

that, even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be voidunder article XIII, section 5, of our Constitution.

The vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manilaseeking the annulment of the sale as well as the lease covering the land and thehouse above mentioned, and praying that, once the sale and the lease aredeclared null and void, the vendee be ordered to return to vendor the duplicateof the title covering the property, and be restrained from in any waydispossessing the latter of said property.

The court declared both the sale and the lease valid and binding and dismissedthe complaint.

HELD: The sale in question having been entered into in violation of theConstitution, the next question to be determined is, can petitioner have the saledeclared null and void and recover the property considering the effect of the

aw governing rescission of contracts? Our answer must of necessity be in the:"We can, therefore, say that even if the plaintiffs can still invoke theConstitution, or the doctrine in the Krivenko Case, to set aside the sale inquestion, they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recoverthe lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guiltyknowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. Theycannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. Asthis court well said: 'A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court ofaw and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The law will not aid either

party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.' Asexpressed in the maxim in pari delicto.

Two ways or remedies:1) an action for reversion2) escheat to the state

They differ in procedure but are essentially the same in effects, imputes to thsovereign or to the government the ownership of all lands and makes them thoriginal source of private titles. Reversion of property to state which takesplace when title fails.

PHIL. BANKING CORPORATION VS LUI SHE

The Court declared that the pari delicto rule may not be applied in said casesince:

1)

the original parties who were guilty of the violation of thefundamental character have died and have since been substituted btheir administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their gu

2)

As an EXCEPTION to the rule on pari delicto, when the agreement inot illegal per se but is merely prohibited and the prohibition by lais designed to protect the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is therebenhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.

But when the buyer has acquired Phil citizenship OR where the land hascome to the hands of a qualified transferee in good faith.

If land is transferred invalidly to an alien who subsequently becomes a Fcitizen or transfers is to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction isconsidered cured and the title is rendered valid. The objective of theconstitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has beenachieved.

PUBLIC LANDS PRIVATE LANDSFILIPINO CITIZENS YES

Sec. 2, Art. 12YES

FILIPINO CORPORATIONS AND

ASSOCIATIONS

Yes =1935 Consti aslong as not exceeding1,024 hectares

No=1973 ConstiExcept by LEASE

No=1987 Consti, Sec3, Art. 12 Except byLEASE period: not toexceed 25 yrs,renewable for notmore than 25yrsArea: not to exceed1000 hectares

YES-at the time of thecorporation acquired theland, its predecessor ininterest had been inpossession and occupatioin manner and for perioddescribed by law as toentitle him to registratioin his name, thenproscription againscorporation acquire publand does not apply sincethe land was no longerpublic but PRIVATE land

-At least 60% of capital iowned by Filipinos

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS NO NOALIENS NO NO except by HEREDITA

SUCCESSION, Sec 7 Art 1

-allowed to buy condo unand shares; as long as nomore than 40% of totalstocks of condo corpobecause he is a member ocondo corpo only, but lanbelong to the condo corpstill

LEASE YES, and mayacquire the land upon gr

of Phil. CitizenshipNATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OFTHE PHILIPPINES WHO LOST

CITIZENSHIP

YESUpon taking oath ofallegiance to Republicpursuant to RA 9225which grants him fullcivil and politicalrights

YES, by transferee of landSec 8.5000 sqm urban3 hectares in rural

RELIGIOUS

CORPORATIONS

CONTROLLED

BY NON-FILIPINOS

NO NO

CORPORATION SOLE NO YES


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CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAND Governed by CA 141

1935: Agricultural, Forest, Timber1973: Agricultural, Industrial or Commercial, residential,resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands and others asmay provided by law.1987: Agricultural, Forest, Timber, National Parks

ONLY AGRICULTURAL LANDS MAY BE ALIENATED.

CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC LANDS IS AN EXECUTIVE

PREROGATIVE of the executive department of the governmentand not of courts.

In the absence of such classification, the land remainsunclassified land until it is released therefrom and renderedopen to disposition. REGALIAN DOCTRINE

SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION (governed by CA 141 since Nov 7,1936: the classification and disposition of lands of public domain)

President is authorized, from time to time, to classify thelands of public domain into: (Sec 6)

o ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE Agricultural Residential, Commercial, Industrial or for

similar productive purposes

Educational, Charitable or other similarpurposes

Reservations for town sites and for publicor quasi-public uses (Sec 9)

o TIMBER OR FOREST,o MINERAL LANDS

Under Sec. 6 of CA 141, the President through a PP or EOcan classify or reclassify land to be included or excludedfrom the public domain

The Sec of DENR is the only other public officialempowered by law to approve a land classification anddeclare such land as A & D.

REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH CLASSIFICATION:

Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office(PENRO) or Community Environment and NaturalResources Officer (CENRO) certification that land is A&D.

Applicant must prove that DENR Sec has approved the landclassification and released the land of Public Domain asA&D or PP classifying the land as A&D.

Land falls within the land classification map as verifiedthrough survey by PENRO or CENRO

ONLY A & D LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE THE SUBJECTS OFDISPOSITION

Public Land Act, Sec. 2, Sec. 6, Sec. 9, Sec. 10 BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT COULD ALIENATE OR DISPOSE

OF LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN:o The president must first officially classify the lands

as A&Do Declare them open to disposition or concession

(there must be no law reserving these lands forpublic or quasi-public uses)

o Positive act of the government such as an officialproclamation, declassifying inalienable public landinto disposable land for agricultural or otherpurposes

o A and D= those land which have been delimited andclassified

CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002FACTS:

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and sellifunctions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foresholands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporatiof the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also soughthave 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of tconstitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienabland of the public domain.The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lancomprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in tname of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectaressubmerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of tpublic domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a privacorporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transis void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitutiwhich prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable laof the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areasManila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XIIthe 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources oth

than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Notes: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areis rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands awaters of the public domain.After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed andmarshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased annot sold to private parties.56These lands remainedsui generis, as the onlyalienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could notsell to private parties.

Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to privateparties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the publicdomain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed andmarshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands

classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands fornon-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.

In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable landof the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA tosell these lands.

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease itsreclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimedalienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional baon private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless theyare classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The merereclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable naturalresources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain

There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying thesereclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition orconcession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienabledisposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuanceof a specialpatent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamationclassifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the publicdomain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent alsoconstitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed forpublic service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable landsthe public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.


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There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged

areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to

disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent orcertificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas formpart of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable andoutside the commerce of man.

The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areasdoes not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the publicdomain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by theNational Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make theands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonialands of PEA.

Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable ordisposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are notneeded for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands ofthe public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declarationcan convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the publicdomain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83of CANo. 141 and other applicable laws

There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,

whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sellto private parties itspatrimonial propertiesin accordance with the PEAcharter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on privatecorporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does notapply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domainto

private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer anystatutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does notapply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposableands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of

the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authoritybenefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiringany kind of alienable land of the public domain, including governmentreclaimed lands.

Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not availablefor sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed landsretain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce naturalresources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population.To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions havebarred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of thepublic domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources

of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of landsof the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.

BUREAU OF FORESTRY VS CA AND GALLO

GR No. L-37995, 31 Aug. 1987

On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo w/ anapproximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application forregistration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herselfoccupied said parcels of land having bought them from the testate estate of theate Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from

Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The Director of Lands opposed saidapplication on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-nterest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be

registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open,continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior

to the filing of the application. The Director of Forestry on the other handanchored his opposition principally on the ground that certain specific portionsof the lands subject matter of the application, with an area of approximately194,080 square meters .

On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subjectparcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substitutedn place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for

Registration of Title substantially reproducing the allegations in the applicationof Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved onAugust 30, 1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry asoppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision andcontrol of said portion having been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry tothe Philippine Fisheries Commission.

On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration

of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo afterexcluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hof Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of meters width.

Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposableportion of the public domain. The rest, consisting of 19.4080 hectares is nowthe center of controversy of the present appeal.

Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classificatioof the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 181956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of thepublic domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearl

therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director ofForestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is nmore valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was noquestion of whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that saidforest land had been declared and certified as such by the Director of theBureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years beforethe originalapplicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961

As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was liftedfrom Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands intoalienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of theExecutive Department of the government and not of the courts. With theserules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court whichdetermines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through theOffice of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion fthe respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed

area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director oForestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.

Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title byprescription inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied anadmission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain whichcannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is arule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen intoprivate ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).

DIR. OF LANDS VS. CA & BISNARIn their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filedon July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be theowners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 3hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality ofPresident Roxas, Province of Capiz. The applicants alleged that they inherited

those parcels of land and they had been paying the taxes thereon.On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau oForest Development, opposed the application.

On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which wasapproved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation: Should thLand Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby applfor the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they antheir predecessors-ininterest have been in possession of the land as owners fmore than fifty (50) years.

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots inthe names of the applicants, herein private respondents.

Held: As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which waslifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into

alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now aprerogative of theExecutive Department of the government and not the courts.

Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an pfficialproclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposableagricultural lands of public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titdo not apply. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen intprivate ownership. The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of tformer Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs


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PUBLIC LANDS AND GOVERNMENTAL LAND DISTINGUISHED

MONTANO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Facts:Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration for thenscription of a piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan,

used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805 square meters, andbounded as set out in the petition; its value according to the last assessmentbeing $505.05, United States currency. This petition was opposed by theSolicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the entity known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land inquestion belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it

was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of thesaid fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906,dismissed the said oppositions without costs and decreed, after a general entryby default, the adjudication and registration of the property described in thepetition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From this decision only counselfor the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. and precisely IsabeloMontano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years' occupation pursuantto paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission

Issue:Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano

Held:Public lands is equivalent to public domain and does not by any mean includeall lands of government ownership, but only so much of said lands as arethrown open to private appropriation and settlement.

Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymoustems. The first includes not only the second, but also other lands of the

Government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to privateright. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the"public lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof.

Government property was of two kinds first, that of public use or service,said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private character oruse. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retaintheir public character are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore,there is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affectedby statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples inpoint are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal orother governmental uses.

It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands

does not extend to tide lands. It provided that the scrip might be located on theunoccupied and unappropriated public lands. As said in Newhall vs. Sanger (92U.S. 761, 763.) A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to theState and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no applicationn the present case inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of theitigation was not yet titled.

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES

Property of Public Dominion

Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, andothers of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and areintended for some public service or for the development of the nationalwealth.

Parts of the public domain and intended for pub use and pub service,

and are outside the commerce of men and therefore not subject to

private appropriation.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated inthe preceding article, is patrimonial property.

Art. 422.Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public usor for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.(341a)

Public domain lands become patrimonial property:o A declaration that such is A & Do Express government manifestation that the property is

already patrimonial or no longer retained for public servi

or the development of national wealth Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive

period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to

run.

Patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private person

through prescription (Art 1113)

Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided intoproperty for public use and patrimonial property. (343)

Art. 424.Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service pafor by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall begoverned by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.(344a)

Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property ofthe State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belongto private persons, either individually or collectively.

LAUREL VS GARCIAThe executive department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Japanwhich was acquired by the Phil. Government for use as embassy. Although thChancery transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the court rulethat under Art. 422 of NCC, property of public dominion retains such characteuntil formally declared otherwise.

The fact that the Roponggi site has not been used for a long time for actualEmbassy does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any suchconversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. Aproperty continues to be part of the public domain, not available for privateappropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of tgovernment to withdraw it from such.

REPUBLIC VS. ALAGADOn 11 October 1951, Melitona, Carmen (with spouse Espiridion Kolimlim), Justo, Carlos,Librada (with spouse Emerson Abano), Demetrio, and Antonio Alagad filed an

application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, PilaLaguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares (survey plan Psu-116971), which wasamended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area o5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares (survey plan Psu-22697amendment 2). The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed groundthat app

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