land title cases- gimarino

Toledo banaga vs CA

Register of Deeds refused to comply with the writ of execution alleging that the Certificates of Title issued to petitioner Tan must first be surrendered

4) ordering the respondent court to issue writ of execution for the enforcement of this decision and of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29868 (sic), as well as a writ of possession for the delivery to petitioner Damalerio of the Physical possession of the parcels of land subject matter of this case.

\To once again re-open that issue through a different avenue would defeat the existence of our courts as final arbiters of legal controversies. Having attained finality, the decision is beyond review or modification even by this Court.

Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties, are bound by such final decision, otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. All the elements of res judicata are present in this case, which are:

(a) the former judgment must be final;

(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;

(c) it must be a judgment on the merits;

(d) and there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

The judgment in the redemption suit had long become final and executory; Banaga’s right of redemption which she did not timely exercise and as a consequence, lost her claim of ownership of the lot. once a judgment had become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be.

The surrender of the duplicate is implied from the executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides, as part of the execution process, it is a ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain person, especially when the decision had attained finality, as in this case.

To repeat, at the time of the sale, the person from whom petitioner Tan bought the property is neither the registered owner nor was the former authorized by the latter to sell the same. She knew she was not dealing with the registered owner or a representative of the latter. One who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of his vendor is enough proof of his bad faith and cannot claim that he acquired title in good faith as against the owner or of an interest therein. When she nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot, petitioner Tan gambled on the result of litigation petitioner Tan is indeed a buyer in bad faith on which the Court agrees:

“Notwithstanding her constructive and actual knowledge that Damalerio was claiming the land, that the land was in his name, and it was involved in pending litigation, Jovita Tan bought it from Banaga on January 7, 1993. Herein private respondent Tan was buying a land not registered in her seller’s (Banaga’s) name, but in that of petitioner Damalerio who had been claiming it as his own. She admitted this fact when she had the land subdivided on February 2, 1993 not in her name but in the name of Candelario Damalerio (Annex “Q”, Reply). Evidently, she was a purchaser in bad faith because she had full knowledge of the flaws and defects of title of her seller, Banaga. X x x.

“The notice of lis pendens registered on March 3, 1993 involving the land in question and private respondent Tan’s actual knowledge of the then pending Civil Case No. 2556, where the question as to whether the redemption of the land which she financed was raised, rendered her a purchaser in bad faith and made the decision therein binding upon her.”

for she merely stepped into the shoes of the latter.

The title secured by a purchaser in bad faith is a nullity and gave the latter no right whatsoever, as against the owner (x x x).

3. Private respondent Tan’s titles and those of her predecessor, Banaga, arose from the void orders of August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993. Since a void order could not give rise to valid rights, said titles were also necessarily null and void (x x x).

declared petitioner Damalerio absolute owner of the property

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DBP vs Bautista

As creditor, the Development Bank of the Philippines now appellant, filed a complaint against one of its debtors, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, now appellee, for the recovery of a sum of money representing the unpaid mortgage indebtedness, which previously had been wiped out with the creditor bank acquiring the title of the mortgaged property in an extrajudicial sale . Thereafter, the title was nullified in a judicial proceeding, the land in question being adjudged as belonging to another claimant, without, however, such debtor, as above noted, having been cited to appear in such court action.

After appellant bank had acquired her title by such extrajudicial foreclosure sale and thus, through its own act, seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled, considering that she was not made a party on the occasion of such nullification.

Bautista, as vendor, should have been summoned and given the opportunity to defend herself. In view of her being denied her day in court, it would to be respected, that she is not "obliged to made good the proper warranty."

In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines were likewise made defendants by appellant bank because of its belief that if no right existed as against appellee Bautista, recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief finds no support in the applicable, law, which allows recovery only upon a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act.8 This certainly is not the case here, plaintiff-appellant being solely responsible for the light in which it now finds itself. Accordingly, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines are likewise exempt from any liability.

Note: DBP is negligent bec. It failed to bring bautista as co-defendant to the suit.

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Torres VS CA

chanrobles virtual law library

The parcel of land is owned by Mariano Torres, the herein petitioner,

Sometime in 1966, Francisco Fernandez, Torres' brother-in-law, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, , misrepresenting to be the attorney-in-fact of Torres and falsely alleging that the a duplicate copy was lost, succeeded in obtaining a court order for the issuance of another copy of the certificate.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Once in possession thereof, Fernandez forged a simulated deed of sale of the realties in his favor. Whereupon TCT No. 53628 in the name of Torres was canceled and TCT No. 86018 was issued in Fernandez' name.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On various dates from December, 1966 to November, 1967 Fernandez mortgaged the realties to Rosario Mota, wife of Ernesto Cue

Torres, who up to this time still had possession of his owner's duplicate certificate of title and who was still collecting rentals from the occupants of the subject building, upon Teaming of the fraud committed by Fernandez, caused, on March 18, 1968, the annotation on the latter's TCT a notice of adverse claim.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 30, 1968, Torres filed Civil Case .On April 2, 1968, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT.

In the meantime, Fernandez failed to pay his various loans which prompted the Cues to institute an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But meanwhile, prior to the Court of Appeals' decision declaring his title void, Fernandez failed to comply with his obligation under the amicable settlement and whereupon the Cues applied for

and were granted a writ of execution. The subject realties were then levied upon and sold at public auction where Rosario Mota was the highest bidder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 31, 1971, the redemption period for the subject immovables having lapsed without Fernandez nor Torres redeeming the properties, Rosario Mota was issued the Sheriffs Deed of Sale. Thereafter, TCT No. 86018 was canceled and TCT No. 105953 was issued in her name.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

law library

On December 17, 1971 Torres filed a complaint, against Fernandez and his spouse and the Cues to restrain the latter from collecting rentals and for the declaration as void TCT No. 105953. The Cues in turn filed a cross-claim against Fernandez spouses and a third party complaint against the National Treasurer as the custodian of the Assurance Fund.


There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres performed any act or omission which could have jeopardized his peaceful dominion over his realties. The decision under review, however, in considering Mota an innocent mortgagee. protected under Section 55 of the Land Registration Law, held that Torres was bound by the mortgage. Inevitably, it pronounced that the foreclosure sale, where Mota was the highest bidder, also bound Torres and concluded that the certificate of title issued in the name of Mota prevails over that of Torres'. As correctly pointed out by Torres, however, His properties were sold on execution, and not on foreclosure sale, and hence, the purchaser thereof was bound by his notice of adverse claim and lis pendens annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT. Moreover, even if we grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in realty.

"a mere affirmation of the recognized principle that a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same land is in existence. We held that as between two persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transfer of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the foregoing, to hold, for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota was an innocent mortgagee would be futile because, as above shown, no certificate of title covering the subject realties in derogation of Torres' certificate of title may validly be issued.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Then it becomes evident that the remaining possible remedies of the Cues are to go against Fernandez or the Assurance Fund chanrobles vi

The trial court also dismissed the Cues' third party complaint against the Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund after finding them negligent in protecting their interest. The trial court recognized the principle that a person dealing with registered lands need not go beyond the certificate of title but nevertheless pointed out that there are circumstances in

this case which should have put the Cues on guard and prompted them to investigate the property being mortgaged to them, thus: (Cues-bad faith and negligent)

The property in question is a very valuable property, in fact accepted by defendants Mota and Medina Cue as collateral for more than half a million pesos in loans granted by them to Fernandez. Its value lies principally in its income potential, in the form of substantial monthly rentals. Certainly, the registered title does not yield any information as to the amount of rentals due from the building, much less on who is collecting them, or who is recognized by the tenants as their landlord. Any prospective buyer or mortgagee of such a property, if prudent and in good faith, is normally expected to inquire into all these and related facts and circumstances.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

. Had (the Cues) known of this fact would they have accepted the mortgage alone over TCT No. 86018? The answer is obvious. And yet, to all indications, they never bothered to look into this fact about the M. Torres Building.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Cues failed to contest the ruling of the trial court negating the liability of the Assurance Fund. For these reasons, We hold that the Cues' remedy merely is to go against Francisco Fernandez or rather his estate since record shows that he died sometime in 1983.chanriiiiiii ;;mnfxfx

Lilildf55666

Ligon vs CA

granting the motion of respondent of Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate of the certificates of title in her possession – (AFFIRMED by the SC).---

respondent iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint 1 for specific performance with damages against (IDP) Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land both of which IDP is the registered owner.

On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK alleged that the document could not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite repeated requests.

On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in open court for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK. 2


Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: in holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled to registration of its ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior right to the possession of the owner's copies of the certificates of title. law library


Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument (mortgage) shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states:

(Applicable both to voluntary and involuntary instrument)

Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. - Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new, certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions."

This principle is based on expediency and in accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.

Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title.

It is inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem - a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded

It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be avoided.

Canero vs UP

On September 6, 1994, petitioner filed an action16 to quiet the title of the said lot with the RTC of Quezon City against UP and the City Assessor of Quezon City. Petitioner relied on his reconstituted title. He averred that even before the title was issued in his and his wife’s name, his father had been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lot. He alleged that his "designated caretakers" occupy the lot at present. Petitioner contended that UP has no legal title or claim over the lot since it failed to raise objections during the reconstitution proceedings. Thus, petitioner prayed to: 1) deny any claim which respondent UP may have over his lot; 2) cancel any land title which respondent UP has for the property; and 3) cancel the annotation in Tax Declaration

For its part, respondent UP filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that it had been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said lot from the year 1914.19 Tracing its origin, it alleged that the government owned several parcels of land amounting to some 4,930,981.3 square meters in Diliman, Quezon City, under TCT No. 36048, which was derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 730, issued in 1914UP owns or maintains several buildings in the area, among them, the PHILCOA Wet Market, the Asian Institute of Tourism, the Philippine Social Sciences Building, the National Hydraulic Center, the UP Sewage Treatment Plant, the Petron Gas Station, the U.P. Arboretum, the Campus Landscaping Office, the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission Building, and the INNOTECH Building. Respondent UP averred that petitioner was never in possession of the lot, and his cause of action, whether for quieting of title or annulment of title, has already prescribed. Petitioner opposed UP’s Motion to Dismiss. Finally, UP assailed the validity of the reconstitution proceedings on the ground that a jurisdictional requirement prescribed under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26, was not complied with as the trial court failed to notify it and the other owners of properties adjoining the lot about the same.

. It is an absolute absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds.32 If we were to sustain petitioner’s stance, the establishment of the Torrens system of land titling would be for naught, as cases dealing with claims of ownership of registered land would be teeming like worms coming out of the woodwork.

We further note that even if the subject lot had not already been registered in the name of respondent UP, still the reconstitution proceedings are void for lack of notice to adjoining property owners.

The adjoining property owners were never mentioned and, hence, not notified we had already ruled that if no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void

In sum, RTC, Branch 82 never acquired jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings because it failed to notify the respondent, an adjoining property owner. Its judgment must perforce be declared void

the person claiming under the certificate earlier registered is the rightful owner of the lot in dispute.41 UP’s title is earlier and should be upheld.

The appellate court found that the reconstitution proceedings were void as the lot was already registered earlier in the name of respondent. Further, it found that notice to adjoining property owners was not given by the trial court. For this reason, it never acquired jurisdiction over the quieting of title case and all the proceedings granting the petition for reconstitution are null and void.42

Republic vs sanchez

The Facts

On 28 May 1996, respondents filed a petition ("LRC Case No. Q-96-8296") in the trial court to reconstitute the original of Transfer Certificate of Title .Respondents claimed that TCT No. 252708 was issued in the name of respondent Marina Sanchez ("Marina") by the Register of Deeds, Quezon City. Respondents alleged that the original of TCT No. 252708 was among the documents destroyed by the fire which razed the Office of the Register of Deeds, Quezon City in June 1988. Respondents sought reconstitution under Section 3(a)4 of Republic Act No. 265

("RA 26") based on Marina's duplicate title. The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on 15 August 1996. The notice of hearing dated 30 May 1996 was published in the 8 and 15 July 1996 issues of the Official Gazette and posted at the main entrance of the City Hall and the Hall of Justice, Quezon City on 1 July 1996. Petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Management Section, Surveys Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, and the Register of Deeds, Quezon City were furnished copies of the notice of hearing.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court granted reconstitution and ordered TCT No. 252708 reconstituted. The 28 October 1996 Order became final on 6 January 1997. The Register of Deeds, Quezon City issued to respondents reconstituted

Issue:

Whether it is under Sec 3(a) or Sec 3 (f)

This Court is of the view that the failure to notify the registered owners of the Reconstitution proceeding proved to be a mistake.

Section 13, Republic Act No. 26 x x x provides that "x x x x The Court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. Said notice shall state among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate[] of title[,] if known, the name of the registered owner, the name[s] of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner[s] of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein, must appear and file their claim o[r] objection to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court."

Petitioners' failure to comply with this provision is a fatal defect for the same is mandatory and jurisdictional

The Actual Notice Requirement under Section 13 in Relationto Section 12 of RA 26 Applies Here

Respondents are correct in saying that the service of notice of the petition for reconstitution filed under RA 26 to the occupants of the property, owners of the adjoining properties, and all persons who may have any interest in the property is not required if the petition is based on the owner's duplicate certificate of title or on that of the co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's.

In other words, the requirements under Sections 12 and 13 do not apply to all petitions for judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on any of the sources specified in Section 12, that is, "sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act."

Sections 2 and 3 of RA 26 provide as follows:

"SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

"SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;


(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document[] which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title."

Put differently, Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 require that 30 days before the date of hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the petitioner, and (2) such notice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of the municipal hall where the property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the

registered owner, (3) the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest in the property, must appear and file such claims as they may have.

For petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement: that the notice be mailed to occupants, owners of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an interest in the property. To repeat, mailing the notice is not required for a petition based on Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and 4(a), as in the present case.

[T]here is no question that in [petitions for] reconstitution involving Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26], notices to adjoining owners and to the actual occupants of the land are mandatory and jurisdictional. But in petitions for reconstitution falling under Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 where, as in the present case, the source is the owner's duplicate copy, notices to adjoining owners and to actual occupants of the land are not required. When the law is clear, the mandate of the courts is simply to apply it, not to interpret or to speculate on it.

In contrast, the trial court in the present case was misled into treating LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 as having been filed under Section 3(a) based on Marina's purported duplicate title. Thus, the trial court followed Section 1021 in connection with Section 922 of RA 26

We hold that the instant petition for judicial reconstitution falls squarely under Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 26, because the Director of Lands claims that the respondent's duplicate of the Certificate of Title No. T-12/79 or TCT No. 42449 are [sic] both fake and fictitious.

Consequently, we applied Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and held that for non-compliance with these provisions, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.

Consequently, it is Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26 which applies ,Hence, in addition to its posting and publication, the notice of hearing should also have been served through mail on the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property.29 The records show that neither adjoining owners nor the other interested parties were notified of respondents' petition

The Actual Notice Requirement in Section 13 inRelation to Section 12, RA 26 is Jurisdictional

Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed," approved on September 25, 1946. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can act on the petition and grant to the petitioner the remedy sought for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The petition for reconstitution must allege the jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must also be published and posted in particular places and the same sent to specified persons.

For non-compliance with the actual notice requirement in Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over LRC Case No. Q-96-8296. The proceedings in that case were thus a nullity and the 28 October 1996 Order was void.

Heirs of Venturanza vs Republic

In the report submitted by the LRC deputy clerk, the latter made a finding that the Venturanzas

TCT No. 2574, a direct transfer from TCT No. RT-40 (140) which was, in turn, derived from TCT No.

140, covers only a parcel of land with an area of 451 square meters and not 23,944,635 square meters or

2,394 hectares which practically comprise the entire Municipality of Buhi.

The trial court came out with its decision ordering the annulment and cancellation of the

Venturanzas TCT No. 2574 and the reversion of the land covered thereby to the mass of the public

domain.

As a necessary consequence, no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the

reconstitution of Moras TCT No. RT-40 (140) over the land which has never been originally

registered.

The records of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, however, do not show how

the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name of Florencio Mora was

registered.

wPetitioners also claim that they are protected by law considering that they were buyers in good faith.

cralawAgain, this assertion is without basis considering that Moras reconstituted TCT No. RT-40

(140), from where petitionersTCT No. 2574 was derived, is void. The only way by which Mora

could have acquired ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that ownership

to the petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own name.

It is, thus, safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not have been registered in

the name of petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for the simple reason that under the

Constitution, timberlands, which are part of the public domain, cannot be alienated . A certificate of

title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said

title may be found. Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the

public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable

lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

LOURDES A. PASCUA vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Reconstitution of Title – Original Certificate of Title

Pascua petitioned for the reconstitution of the original title of a parcel of land (Lot 3209) located in Pagsanjan, Laguna. She said that the lot was sold to her parents in 1930 by a certain Limuaco who earlier acquired the land via a cadastral proceeding. However, in the Deed of Absolute Sale between Limuaco and Pascua’s parents, it was indicated that the land was unregistered. Also, because of the war, the original copy as well as the duplicates were destroyed.

Pascua presented as evidence the said Deed of Sale as well as a tracing cloth plan and technical description and a tax declaration. She claimed that the land issued to Limuaco was pursuant to a cadastral decree. And that she has been paying taxes however the land reflecting on the tax declaration is Lot No. 19-pt. Pascua averred that Lot No. 19-pt is one and the same as Lot 3209; that Lot 19-pt was the Assessor’s designation to the same land when the cadastral survey was made but when the decree was issued, it was turned to Lot 3209.

The lower court denied her petition due to lack of evidence. She was not able to prove that Lot 19-pt is the same as Lot 3209.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant Pascua’s petition.

HELD: No. The evidence presented by Pascua to grant reconstitution are not those included in Section 2 of RA 26 which provides:

SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;


(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original has been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Further, she presented two tax declarations: one pertaining to her parents’ and the other to hers. Her parents’ tax declaration failed to reflect any Lot No. while hers reflected Lot No. 19-pt. It cannot be legally concluded that the land is one and the same. She was not able to adduce any additional document to prove her claim.

Even if Lot No 3209 and Lot 19-pt are one and the same, no title can still be reconstituted to Pascua because there is no convincing evidence that a certificate of title was ever issued for either land. Note that even the Deed of Sale between Limuaco and Pascua’s parents indicated that the land is unregistered.

Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

Barstowe Philippines Corporation (BPC) vs. Republic

http://howardscasedigests.webs.com/

wAn investigation conducted by the LRA TCTs No. 200629 and 200630, found

the said certificates of titles spurious

.The BPC failed to present evidence to refute the same.

..

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonable cautious man to make such further inquiry.

Now the question is whether BPC qualifies as an innocent purchaser for value which acquired valid titles to the subject lots, despite the fact that the titles of its predecessor-in-interest were found to be forged and spurious.

cralawThis Court finds in the negative.

cralawFurthermore, BPC cannot really claim that it was a purchaser in good faith which

relied upon the face of Servandos titles.It should be recalled that the Quezon City Register

of Deeds caught fire on 11 June 1988.Presumably, the original copies of TCTs No. 200629

and 200630 were burnt in the said fire.Servandos heirs sought the administrative

reconstitution of of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 only in December 1990. BPC bought the

subject lots after TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were destroyed when the Quezon City

Register of Deeds burned down, but before the said certificates were reconstituted, then on

the face of what titles did BPC rely on before deciding to proceed with the purchase of the

subject lots?

Under section 7 of Republic Act No. 26, "Reconstituted titles shall have the same validity

and legal effect as the originals thereof" unless the reconstitution was made extrajudicially.

In this case, TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were reconstituted administratively, hence,

extrajudicially.In contrast to the judicial reconstitution of a lost certificate of title which is in

rem, the administrative reconstitution is essentially ex-parte and without notice.The

reconstituted certificates of title do not share the same indefeasible character of the original

certificates of title for the following reason

The fact that the TCTs were reconstituted should have alerted BPC and its officers to

conduct an inquiry or investigation as might be necessary to acquaint themselves with the

defects in the titles of Servando.

For the above-stated reasons, this Court cannot declare BPC an innocent purchaser for

value, and it acquired no better titles to the subject lots than its predecessors-in-interest,

Servando and Antonio.

At this point, it would seem that the Republic does hold better titles to the subject

lots.Nonetheless, another level of transactions involving the subject lots was brought by

intervenors to the attention of this Court.

intervenors, Nicolas-Agbulos and Abesamis, together with other legitimate homeowners in

Parthenon Hills, acquired from BPC titles to their respective subdivided lots in good faith and for

value. Even the Republic could not refute that the individuals who acquired lots in Parthenon

Hills from BPC were purchasers in good faith and for value.

The forged TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were later administratively reconstituted, and although an

investigation would show that their reconstitution was also attended with irregularities, It is a settled

doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond

the same, but only has to rely on the certificates of title.He is charged with notice only of such

burdens and claims as are annotated on the certificates.

Herein intervenors, Nicolas-Agbulos and Abesamis, before purchasing subdivision lots in

Parthenon Hills, looked into the TCTs of BPC and found nothing on the face thereof to raise doubts

or suspicions as to their validity and authenticity.Besides, BPC was the holder of licenses and

permits to subdivide, develop, and sell the subject lots as Parthenon Hills, issued by the appropriate

government agencies, primarily HLURB.

This is definitely a situation which constitutes an exception to the general rule that estoppel cannot lie

against the government. The Republic v. Court of Appeals, provides an illuminating discourse on when

such an exception applies, thus

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions, viz:

"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. (the doctrine of equitable estoppels) may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals."

It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value.

Estoppel, being an equitable principle, may only be invoked by one who comes to court

with clean hands.

YUJUICO vs REPUBLIC

Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this

case, the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government

did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time.

is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel

by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers

for value

They are only charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances on

the property that are noted on the certificate.

Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in

1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action for reversion was filed,

then said action is now barred by laches.

“innocent purchaser for value ---it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances for value.

land title cases- gimarino

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