land titles cases final 10.14.15

Republic of the Philippines 111111111

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-56694 July 2, 1990

HEIRS OF THE LATE PEDRO PINOTE, represented by his children, RUFINA PINOTE-AYING, ANTONINA PINOTE-SILAWAN, RAMONA PINOTE VDA. DE GUOD, and JULIAN PINOTE, petitioners,

vs.

HON. JUDGE CEFERINO E. DULAY, as Presiding Judge of Branch XVI (Lapu-Lapu City) of the Court of First Instance of Cebu & FRANCISCO P. OTTO, representing his mother, PETRA PINOTE, respondents.

Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This special civil action of certiorari and mandamus was filed by the heirs of Pedro Pinote to compel respondent Judge Ceferino E. Dulay of the Court of First Instance of Cebu at Lapu-Lapu City give due course to their appeal from his order dated June 7, 1979, granting the private respondent's petition for reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre.

On September 30, 1978, Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother Petra Pinote, filed in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu, Branch XVI, at Lapu-Lapu City, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original certificate of title to Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, which, as shown by a certified copy of the Municipal Index of Decrees (Annex A of the petition), was supposedly adjudicated to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, under Decree No. 230607 dated May 7, 1934 in Cadastral Case No. 20, LRC Rec. No. 1004. The petition alleged that the original, as well as owner's duplicate certificate of title, were burned in the Opon municipal building during World War II, and the same could not be located despite diligent search; that there were no annotations or liens and encumbrances on the title affecting the same; that no deed or instrument affecting the property had been presented for registration; and that, based on the plans and technical description marked as Annexes B and C, the area, location, and boundaries of Lot 2381 are as follows:

On the SE., by Lot 2383-Vicente Tunacao; and by Lot 2382-Margarito Tunacao; and also by Lot 2377-Maximo Patalinjug and Lot 2377-Joaquin Patalingjug; on the SW, and NW., by Lot 2380-General Milling Corporation; on the NE., by Lot 2386-Antonio Patalinghug; on the SE. E. and NE., by Lot 2385-General Milling Corporation; and on the SE., by Lot 2384-Escolastico Tunacao, all of Barrio Pusok, Lapu-Lapu City. (p. 9, Rollo.) *

By an order dated November 6, 1978, the court set the case for hearing on February 22, 1979 at 8:30 A.M. A copy of the notice of hearing was ordered to be published in the Official Gazette, furnished to all the adjoining owners, and posted by the Sheriff at the main entrances of the Provincial Capitol Building, the City Hall, and the Public Market of Lapu-Lapu City, at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing. The court also ordered copies of the notice and order to be sent to the Registers of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City and Cebu, the Director of Lands, and the Commissioner of Land Registration, directing them to show cause, if any, why the petition may not be granted.

It does not appear, however, that notices were sent to each of the registered co-owners — Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, or their heirs, so that they could have been heard on the petition.

As there was no opposition to the petition when it was called for hearing, the lower court commissioned its Clerk of Court to receive the evidence.

Based on the Commissioner's Report, as well as the oral and documentary evidence submitted by Francisco Otto in support of his petition, including a supposed abstract of the decision of the cadastral court (Expediente Cat. No. 20, Record Cat. 1004) dated January 15, 1930, which reads:

Lote No. 2381. — A favor de cada uno de los cinco hermanos Pinote, llamados Saturnino, casado con Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra y Petronilo, solteros y de 20 y 17 años respectivamente, los dos ultimos.

ASI SE ORDENA. (Emphasis supplied; p. 62, Rollo)

the Court issued an order on June 7, 1979, directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to reconstitute the original certificate of title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, upon payment of the corresponding fees, in the names of SATURNINO PINOTE, married to Maria Igot, JUANA, IRINEO, PETRA (not Pedro) and PETRONILO, all surnamed Pinote (p.11, Rollo). The court relied on the supposed abstract of the decision of the cadastral court (Exh. E), the technical descriptions, plan and report of the Land Registration Commission (Exhs. F and G) which are not found in the records before us.

Pursuant to the court's order, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2355 of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City was issued in the names of the alleged brothers and sisters, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra (not Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.

On October 1, 1979, Atty. Porfirio Ellescas, as alleged counsel for the heirs of Pedro, Juana and Saturnino Pinote, supposedly all deceased, filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, and sought the re-opening of the proceedings and the rectification of the June 7, 1979 order, for, while Otto's main petition for reconstitution based on the Municipal Index of Decrees, alleged that Lot 2381 was decreed in the names of Irineo, Juana, Saturnino, Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the court's order of June 7, 1979 ordered the reconstitution of the title in the names of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra (instead of Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote. The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that they "learned of the error" only on September 27, 1979 through their counsel, who made the inquiry and obtained a copy of the court order.

A copy of the motion for reconsideration was received by Attorney Ramon Codilla, Otto's counsel, on Oct. 5, 1979 (p. 17, Rollo).i•t•c-aüsl The hearing of the motion was set on Nov. 14, 1979 at 8:30 A.M. with notice to Otto and Atty. Cedilla (p. 18, Rollo). Because of a conflict in his trial calendar, Atty. Ellescas informed the court that he would not be able to attend the hearing (p. 19, Rollo). Only Atty. Codilla appeared at the hearing on Nov. 14, 1979. He was ordered by the court to submit a photocopy of OCT No. RO-2355 which he complied with.

On December 2, 1979, the court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that:

. . . Annex "A" of the petition for reconstitution of title wherein Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre was allegedly decreed in the names of Irineo, Juana, Saturnino, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote. During the hearing of this petition, no opposition was registered thereto and the evidence adduced by the petitioner shows clearly that an original certificate of title covering subject lot was issued in favor of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, co-owners and brothers and sisters; that the original, as well as the owners' duplicate, was burned in the Opon municipal building during the last war; that there were no annotations on this title affecting the same; that the so-called index of decree showing that Pedro Pinote is one of the co-owners is erroneous and it should instead read as "Petra" since they are the brothers and sisters; and that this fact is also reflected in the extract of the decision of the cadastral court dated January 15, 1930 which reads:

Lot No. 2381. — A favor de cada uno de los cinco hermanos Pinote llamados Saturnino, casado con Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra y Petronilo, solteros y de 20 y 17 años respectivamente, los dos ultimos.

Under Republic Act No. 26, a petition for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed original certificate of title for registered land may be filed with the Court of First Instance "by the registered owner, his assigns or any person having an interest in the property" from any of the sources enumerated therein, and in accordance with the procedure outlined in the same law. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (1) owner's duplicate certificate; (2) mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate certificate or co-owner's copy; (3) a certified copy of the certificate of title previously issued by the Register of Deeds or by a legal custodian thereof, (4) an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (5) a document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and (6) any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. The index of decree which mentioned "Pedro Pinote" is neither controlling nor conclusive as it is not an "authenticated copy of the decree of registration pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued." Accordingly, the Court is justified in granting this petition on the bases of the decision of the cadastral court which is accompanied by the duly approved plan and technical description of the property (Emphasis supplied; pp. 21-23, Rollo.)

On January 2, 1980, the heirs of the late Pedro Pinote; namely, Rufina-Pinote-Aying, Antonina Pinote-Silawan, Ramona Pinote Vda. de Guod and Julian Pinote, filed their notice of appeal (p. 24, Rollo). On January 4, 1980, they filed an urgent ex parte motion for extension of time to file record on appeal (p. 25, Rollo). The record on appeal was filed on January 9, 1980, and a copy was sent to the private respondent by registered mail on the same date (p. 26, Rollo).

On May 10, 1980, the court denied due course to the appeal on the ground of tardiness as the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, which the court declared to be pro forma, did not suspend the finality of the court's June 7, 1979 order.

The issue is: Has the appeal been perfected on time? We hold the contrary. Admittedly, they received a copy of the Order dated June 7, 1979 on September 27, 1979; hence, they had until October 27, 1979 within which to perfect their appeal. Instead, they opted to file a motion for reconsideration on October 1, 1979 which is merely pro forma. The ground alleged in the motion for reconsideration is the same ground for a new trial under Section 1 (c), Rule 37 of the new Rules of Court. This being so, the Court finds and so holds that their motion for reconsideration failed to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions: hence, it shall be treated as a motion pro forma intended merely to delay the proceedings and it shall not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of an appeal. And since the period to appeal had long expired, the parties herein have lost their right to appeal from the Order of June 7, 1979. (Emphasis ours; pp. 29-30, Rollo.)

Hence, this petition for mandamus and/or certiorari filed by the heirs of Pedro Pinote praying that respondent court be ordered to give due course to their appeal or to amend the order of June 7, 1979, by striking out Petra and putting in Pedro instead as one of the co-owners of Lot 2381.

The only issues in this case are:

(1) whether the petitioners' appeal is timely; and

(2) whether the reconstitution proceedings should be reopened and the order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979 should be rectified or amended.

After a careful examination of the sparse records before us, we find merit in the petition for certiorari and mandamus. First, because the petitioners' appeal was not tardy. Their motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 7, 1979 was not pro forma (Annex D, p. 14, Rollo). It invited the court's attention to a substantial variance between the petition for reconstitution and the court's order of reconstitution, for while the unopposed petition alleged that the registered co-owners of Lot 2381 were Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, as evidenced by the entry in the Municipal Index of' Decrees, the Order of Reconstitution dated June 7, 1979, on the other hand, identified the co-owners as "Saturnino Pinote, married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra and Petronilo all surnamed Pinote . . ." The movants prayed that an order be issued for the reopening of the reconstitution proceeding and that the

court's order of June 7, 1979 be rectified "to change the name of Petra to that of Pedro Pinote"' (p. 14, Rollo).

The error adverted to in the motion for reconsideration is substantial for it affects the participation and interest of Pedro Pinote (or his heirs) in Lot No. 2381, an interest that appeared in the petition for reconstitution and in the notice of hearing issued by the court, but which disappeared from the court's order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979, having been replaced by "Petra Pinote" instead. The trial court issued a three page-single-spaced order, disposing of the motion for reconsideration. That so much argument was lavished on the denial of the motion proves that it was not pro forma or merely dilatory.

The motion for reconsideration was timely. The petitioners had not been separately notified of the reconstitution proceedings except by constructive notice through the published notice of hearing. They discovered the assailed order dated June 7, 1979 on September 27, 1979, through Atty. Ellescas. They had up to October 27, 1979 to either file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. They filed a motion for reconsideration on October 1, 1979 after only four (4) days of the 30-day appeal period had elapsed, so, they had 26 days left to appeal. On December 11, 1979, they received the court's order denying their motion for reconsideration (p. 23, Rollo). They filed a notice of appeal, cash appeal bond and a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal on January 4, 1980 or 24 days later, with two (2) or more days of the appeal period to spare. Their record on appeal was actually filed on January 8, 1980, within the 10-day extension which they sought from the court (p. 29, Rollo).i•t•c-aüsl Clearly, their appeal was seasonably filed.

But apart from the question of whether their appeal was timely or not, the more important issue is the validity of the order of reconstitution. As the petition for reconstitution of title was a proceeding in rem, compliance with the requirements of R.A. 26 is a condition sine qua non for the conferment of jurisdiction on the court taking cognizance of the petition. Considering that both the petition and the court's notice of hearing, referred to the reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 in the names of the registered co-owners, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the cadastral court had jurisdiction only to grant or deny the prayer of the petition as published in the notice of hearing. The court could not receive evidence proving that Petra Pinote, instead of Pedro, is a registered co-owner of Lot 2381. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. Hence, in Bunagan, et al. vs. CFI of Cebu, et al., 97 SCRA 72, where the certificate of title was decreed in the names of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong," the reconstitution of the title in the names of "spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" was held to be "a material change that cannot be authorized."

The jurisdiction of the cadastral court is hedged in by the four walls of the petition and the published notice of hearing which define the subject matter of the petition. If the court oversteps those borders, it acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction in the case.

On the basis of the allegations of the petition and the published notice of hearing, the heirs of Pedro Pinote had no reason to oppose the petition for reconstitution for the rights and interest in Lot 2381 of their ancestor, Pedro Pinote, were not adversely affected by the petition. It was only when Pedro's name (and in effect, his interest in Lot 2381) disappeared from the court's order of reconstitution that his heirs had cause to rise in arms as it were, and ask for the reopening of the case.

There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with extreme caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles to land under R.A. 26. Experience has shown that this proceeding has many times been misused as a means of divesting a property owner of the title to his property. Through fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up one day to discover that his certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a reconstituted title in someone else's name. Courts, therefore, should not only require strict compliance with the requirements of R.A. 26 but, in addition, should ascertain the identity of every person who files a petition for reconstitution of title to land. If the petition is filed by someone other than the registered owner, the court should spare no effort to assure itself of the authenticity and due execution of the petitioner's authority to institute the proceeding.

It should avoid being unwittingly used as a tool of swindlers and impostors in robbing someone of his title.

It does not appear that the above precautions had been taken in this case. We note that:

(1) The registered owners (or their heirs) had not been individually notified of the filing of Otto's petition for reconstitution.

(2) His authority, if any, and that of Atty. Ramon Codilla, to represent all the registered co-owners of Lot 2381 in the reconstitution proceeding, does not appear to have been investigated by the court.

(3) It does not appear that the court verified Atty. Porfirio Ellescas' authority to appear as counsel for the movants-intervenors, Pedro, Juana and Saturnino Pinote (who are also supposed to be represented by Atty. Codilla), and their heirs.

(4) Neither did it ascertain the identities of the heirs of Pedro, Saturnino and Juana who filed the motion to reopen the reconstitution proceedings.

(5) We are intrigued why the heirs of Juana and Saturnino Pinote, through Atty. Ellescas, asked for reconsideration of the court's order dated June 7, 1979 since their interests in Lot 2381 were not adversely affected by the court's order dated June 7, 1979.

(6) It does not appear that the court carefully ascertained the genuineness of the abstract of the decision of the cadastral court (which the petitioners alleged to be uncertified).

(7) Ascertaining which is correct or wrong: the abstract of the decree, or, the Municipal Index of Decrees — calls for the reopening of the reconstitution proceeding and the careful examination of all available evidence as to who are the true registered co-owners of Lot 2381, for the Court may have unknowingly changed the ownership of Lot 2381 by vesting title in a stranger or impostor.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The orders dated June 27, 1979, December 2, 1979 and May 10, 1980 in Cad. Case No. 20, LRC Rec. No. 1004, Lot No. 2381, Opon Cadastre, are hereby annulled and set aside for having been issued without jurisdiction. The respondent court is ordered to reopen the proceeding for reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381, with due notice to each of the registered co-owners, the adjoining property owners, and others who are required by law to be notified. They should be separately furnished by respondent Francisco P. Otto, at their respective residential addresses, with copies of the petition and its annexes. The petitioners herein should be allowed to intervene in the proceeding in order that their or their predecessors' interest, if any, may be heard.

This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* There is no statement of the area of Lot 2381.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17913 June 22, 1965

MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JOSE M. MOYA, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and CONSUELO L. VDA. DE PRIETO, respondents.

J. C. Patalinjug and M. B. Bermudez for petitioner.

De la Cruz and De la Cruz for respondents.

REGALA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On May 21, 1958, the Manila Railroad Company filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition to reconstitute Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 38 and 42 covering three parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Baao and Bula, Camarines Sur. The petitioner submitted plans and technical descriptions of the properties as the basis for the requested reconstitution.

The petition was given due course and after notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette and posted on the bulletin board of the municipalities where the properties are located, an order was entered on January 26, 1959 granting the reconstitution of the titles.

Pursuant to said order, the Register of Deeds of the province thus issued TCT No. RT-43 in place of the allegedly lost TCT No. 38 covering the lot described under Plan SWO-25758 and TCT RT-44, in place of TCT No. 42 covering Lots 1 and 2 of Plan

II-3331, Amd. 2.

On or about June 28, 1960, herein respondent Consuelo L. Vda. de Prieto filed a motion to set aside the order granting reconstitution stating that she was never served with notice of the petition filed by the Manila Railroad Company, otherwise, she would have appeared to oppose the same with respect to Lot 2, II-3331, Amd. 2, containing an area of 259,610 square meters; that as far as she can remember Lot 2, which belongs to her and her late husband Mauro Prieto, was never sold to the Manila Railroad Company; that it was only Lot 1, II-3331, Amd. 2 in the same location containing an area of 84,739 square meters that she and her late husband had sold to the said company; that she has always been in possession of Lot 2 and leased some portions thereof to tenants; and that the lot in question is sought to be expropriated by the Government in Civil Case No. 4163 in the same court, entitled Republic of the Philippines was Consuelo L. Vda. de Prieto, upon petition filed by the tenants thereat, for which the Land Tenure Administration would pay the said widow the corresponding price thereof upon her presenting her title thereto.

The Manila Railroad Company answered the motion of herein respondent to set aside the decision, averring, on the other hand, that the said Mrs. Prieto cannot claim that she was not duly served with notice of the hearing of the petition to reconstitute as said notice was duly published in the Official Gazette. The said company also moved to dismiss the petition to set aside on the ground that the order sought to be set aside had already become final, unappealable and executory.

The opposing parties both submitted memoranda to support their respective positions, and after a study by the lower court, it issued a order, dated October 4, 1960, setting aside the order of January 26, 1959, only as to Lot 2, II-3331, Amd. 2, and set the case for hearing on November 18, 1960.

Motion for reconsideration of the order of October 4, 1960 having been denied by the lower court, the Manila Railroad Company has filed this petition seeking to annul the said order.

Provisions of the law governing reconstitution of original and transfer certificates of title (Republic Act No. 26) which are pertinent to this case are sections 3, 12 and 13 thereof, quoted respectively, to wit:

SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;.

(c) A certified copy of the certificates of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

SEC. 12. Petition for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having any interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain among other things, the following: (a) ...; (e) the name and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; ... . All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same; provided, that in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.

SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition filed under the preceding section to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and

boundaries of the property, and the date on which all per sons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court. (Emphasis ours)

Inasmuch as the petition filed by the Manila Railroad Company would have the transfer certificates of title reconstituted from the plans and technical descriptions of the lots involved, which sources may fall properly under section 3 (e) or 3 (f) of the law, respondent Vda. de Prieto, as possessor thereof, or as one who is known to have an interest in the property, should have been sent a copy of the notice at the expense of the petitioner, pursuant to section 13 (underscored portions) of the cited law. As aptly observe by the lower court in its order setting aside the order of reconstitution, the Manila Railroad Company has admitted that Vda. de Prieto has been in possession of the questioned Lot 2 and that she has leased portions thereof to various tenants.

In granting the petition to set aside, the lower court cited as authority the case of Reyes v. Pecson, et al., 47 Off. Gaz. 6133, wherein it was held that where the record of a case was reconstituted on petition of the plaintiff but no notice upon the adverse party was given and the other requirements of Act No. 3110 were not complied with, the order of reconstitution is void and may be set aside even though more than three years have elapsed since its promulgation for the reason that the order being ineffective, the judgment rendered in the case cannot become final and executory. In the other case cited by the same court, Paluay v. Decudao, et al., 51 Off. Gaz. 5149, it was likewise ruled that even if the petition for the reconstitution of the record of an application is published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by Act No. 3110, if no notice of the date of hearing is served on an adverse claimant, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution should be set aside in order that a new hearing may be had with notice to all the parties, notwithstanding the fact that more than one year had elapsed since the order directing the reconstitution of the record of the case.

In Santiago Syjuco, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank, 86 Phil. 320, this Court held that if an order of reconstitution is issued without any previous publication, as required by law, particularly section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, such order of reconstitution is null and void and of no effect, and naturally, anything done under said order is void.

The first two cases, cited by the lower court, are certainly not cases on reconstitution that involve certificates of title to land, but they deal with records of a case and application for registration. Nevertheless, we do not see any reason why the ruling in those cases may not be made to apply here, considering that the same principle is involved, namely, the strict compliance of notice requirements under statutes governing reconstitution. The more rigid should even be the application of those provisions on a case such as this which deals with title to property.

It is clear from section 13 of Republic Act No. 26 that notice by publication is not sufficient under the circumstances. Notice must be actually sent or delivered to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution. The order of reconstitution, therefore, having been issued without compliance with the said requirement, has never become final as it was null and void. The Manila Railroad Company cannot then complain that the motion to set aside was filed beyond the reglementary period.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court setting aside its order of reconstitution is hereby affirmed. Writ denied but without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., is on leave.



SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-29182-83 July 25, 1983

ESSO STANDARD EASTERN INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ALFONSO LIM, defendant-appellant.

G.R. Nos. L-29182-83 July 25, 1983

ALFONSO LIM, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

STANDARD VACUUM OIL COMPANY, defendant-appellee, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of La Union in Civil Cases No. 1868 and No. 2162 declaring Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, as the registered owner of the disputed property and ordering Alfonso Lim to vacate the land and pay rentals, attorney's fees, and costs.

The subject matter of litigation in the above-mentioned cases is a parcel of urban land, with an approximate area of 20,000 square meters, valued at Two Million Pesos more or less at the time the cases were filed, and located at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union.

The said parcel of land was originally owned by one Miguel Flores who sold it to Leon Rivera on December 6, 1926. By a document executed by Leon Rivera himself in 1926, he and Angel Salanga were jointly invested in common ownership over the property.

The parcel of land was brought under the Torrens System in Land Registration Case No. 259 (Exhibit "J") sometime in 1933. In said case, the Court issued Decree No. 503752 covering lots 1, 2, and 3 of Plan Ps- 15087 which were then owned by Salanga and Rivera. According to Angel Salanga, Standard Vacuum Oil Company secured title over lot 4, the land in question. (Exhibits "O" and "O-1") This was evidenced by Decree No. 593753, as explained by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his report dated November 17, 1955, (Exhibit "2"; Appellee's Brief, p. 12, Rollo, p. 214) to wit:

Acting upon the verified petition dated August 26, 1955, filed in the above- entitled case for the reconstitution of the alleged lost or destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 4, PS-15087, now described on plan Psu-148885, this Commission has the honor to report that:

In the salvaged index cards kept in this Office, it appears that certain Angel Salanga and Leon Rivera of Poro, San Fernando, La Union, Med an application for the registration of four (4) parcels of land described on plan Ps-15087-Amd. for which Decree Nos. 503752 and 503753 were issued on March 6, 1933 in Court Case No. 125, GLRO Record No. 503752 filed in this commission reveals that the same covers Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3, Ps- 15087-Amd. in the name of the aforesaid applicants. It is believed, therefore, that Lot No. 4, Ps-15087-Amd. is the parcel covered by Decree No. 503753.

Considering, however, the loss or destruction caused by the last war of all other records filed in this Office relative to said case, including all copies of Decree No. 503753, we have no way of determining in whose favor Lot 4 in question was originally decreed. But for purposes of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26, the plan Psu-148885 submitted by the petitioner has been verified correct by this Commission to represent Lot No. 4 being claimed by said petitioner.

Earlier, on January 28, 1930, in a deed of sale duly executed, notarized, and registered, Leon Rivera and Angel Salanga for and in consideration of the amount of Four Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos sold the land in question to the Standard Oil Company of New York which was the predecessor corporation of Standard Vacuum Oil Company which in turn was the predecessor corporation of Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.

On August 26, 1955, the appellee's predecessor-in-interest, Standard Vacuum Oil Co., filed a petition for the reconstitution of title covering Lot 4, which petition for reconstitution was docketed as Administrative Case No. 316-R, Special Proceeding Record No. 145. The Standard Vacuum Oil Co., alleged that the Original Certificate of Title No. 503753 covering Lot 4 was lost and destroyed during the last world war.

The appellee, in the course of the reconstitution proceedings, submitted an alleged plan of the property, designated as Plan Psu-148885, together with the technical description, showing an area of 20,057 square meters although the plan mentioned in the notice of hearing dated August 29, 1955 was plan Ps-

15087-Amd., and the area appearing in said plan was exactly 20,000 square meters as compared with the area appearing in the alleged plan Psu-148885 which was 20,057 square meters.

The petition for reconstitution was granted by the Court of First Instance of La Union. The Standard Vacuum Oil Co., was issued a reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321(N.A.).

On July 2, 1963, appellee Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., now named Petrophil, formerly known under the corporate name Standard Vacuum Oil Co. (successor-in-interest of Standard Oil Co. of New York) filed a complaint against appellant Alfonso Lim for accion publiciana which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1868, CFI, La Union. In the complaint, the appellee anchored its cause of action upon the alleged fact that in or prior to 1955, without its knowledge and consent, the appellant began occupying a portion measuring three-fourths (3/4), more or less, of that parcel of land in question situated in the Barrio of Poro, Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union, belonging to and registered in the name of the appellee pursuant to Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 (N.A.) which had been reconstituted under the petition filed by the appellee on August 26, 1955, using as basis thereof plan Psu-148885 and its corresponding technical description. The appellee also asserted that the appellant had unlawfully withheld possession of the property to its damage and prejudice.

During the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1868, the following were admitted and made of record:

1. Original Certificate of Title No. 2321 is not forged;

2. Said title covers a parcel of land with an area of 20,057 square meters; and was issued on November 19, 1955 in the name of Standard Vacuum Oil Co., but subsequently was changed to Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., said title appears to be a reconstituted title pursuant to Court order dated 1955;

3. Scrap iron of assorted nature could be found there today and that the area is being used by the defendant and under his control.

The defendant Alfonso Lim interposed the following allegations which were denied by the plaintiff Esso:

1. The title secured by plaintiff over the parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 (N.A.) of La Union is null and void because:

a. it was registered through mistake, if not fraud;

b. defendant was never notified of the survey and registration thereof in the manner provided by law;

c. plaintiff does not appear to fulfill the qualifications required for corporations with stockholders who are citizens of the United States to hold and own real estate of the Philippines;

2. Plaintiff is guilty of laches.

While Civil Case No. 1868 was pending, appellant Alfonso Lim filed Civil Case No. 2162 for the annulment of the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 issued in favor of the appellee and for

declaration as the lawful and rightful owner of the property in question by prescriptive acquisition. It was the position of the appellant that:

xxx xxx xxx

... he is the absolute owner and possessor to the present of that property, more or less described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 4), plan Ps-15087-Amd. Bounded on the SE. by Lot 2; on the SW. by Poro Provincial Road; on the W. by property of Pantaleon Pimentel; and on the NW. by property of Manila Railroad Company. Point '1' is S. 58 deg. 45 min. W., 1820.88 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1, San Fernando, La Union, Area 20,000 Square Meters.' (pp. 2-3, Record on Appeal)

... appellant has been in actual possession and occupation of the above- described parcel of land for more than seventeen (17) years and has religiously and faithfully paid the real estate taxes due on said land under Tax Declaration No. 43431 of the Provincial Assessor of the Province of La Union . ... The issuance of the Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 was erroneous, fraudulent and irregular, and therefore null and void, as the basis for its issuance was plan Psu-148885 and the corresponding technical description, and not the original plan, Lot 4, plan Psu-15087-Amd. and technical description which should be the basis of the reconstitution, ...

... from the publication in the Official Gazette dated January 7,1932 (Vol. XXX, No. 3, page 32), the original lot described and embraced in ordinary Land Registration Record No. 40942, is Lot No. 4, plan Ps- 15087-Amd. and not plan Psu-148885 which was approved by the Bureau of Lands only on October 19, 1955.

xxx xxx xxx

... from the records available in Ordinary Land Registration Record No. 40942, the applicant for registration of Lot No. 4, Plan Ps-15087-Amd. are Angel Salanga and Leon Rivera, and not the herein Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. . . .

... appellee has intentionally and deliberately through fraud, misrepresentation and under a cloud of secrecy, caused the reconstitution of Lot No. 4, plan Ps-15087-Amd. by using plan Psu-148885 and its corresponding technical description which was only approved long after the war, that is, October 19, 1955, and in spite of the clear showing that both lots are not Identical with each other, as there was a difference of FIFTY SEVEN (57) SQUARE METERS in the area of plan Psu-148885. In other words, reconstitution of the said title under plan Psu-148885 was highly impossible ... .

... appellee or its predecessors-in-interest never acquired title over the parcel of land now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 (La Union) because it never applied for the original registration in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496, as amended, and was never issued a title (Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 2162, pp. 45, 55 and 56).

... appellee or its predecessors-in-interest have no interest whatsoever in the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 (La Union) because sometime in the year 1936 it exchanged the same for another parcel of land then owned by the North American Trading and Export Company (Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 2162, pp. 45 and 56).

On May 31, 1967, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion and a complaint in intervention which was duly admitted by the lower court. The Government contended that it is the owner of the disputed parcel of land because in the Report of the Commissioner of Land Registration Commission, there was a variance in the basis of the petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 (N.A.) which embraced Lot 4 of plan Ps-15087-Amd. The report stated:

That according to the records available in this Commission and upon reverification of the status of Lot 4, plan Ps-15087-Amd., it shows that the said lot was among the four (4) parcels under plan Ps-15087-Amd. applied for registration in the Ordinary Registration Case No. 259, LRC (GIRO) Record No. C-40942, for which Angel Salanga and Leon Rivera were applicants. However, in view of the loss of pertinent records during the war, this Commission cannot determine whether or not decree of registration was issued for Lot 4, plan Ps-15087-Amd.

That upon re-examination of the petition for reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title for said Lot 4, Ps-15087-Amd. we have found out and discovered that the plan Psu-148885 and corresponding technical description used as basis of the said petition for reconstitution was not one and the same Identical plan for Lot 4, Ps-15087-Amd., supposed to be the basis of the said petition for reconstitution, there being a difference of fifty- seven (57) square meters in area with that of the new Psu-148885.

Without objection on the part of the appellee and the appellant, the two complaints for intervention were admitted by the lower court.

After the cases were submitted for decisions, appellant Alfonso Lim filed a motion to receive additional evidence on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The alleged newly discovered evidence consists of the testimony of Atty. Matias E. Vergara who claimed to have prepared the two documents of exchange between Standard Vacuum Oil Co., and the North American Trading and Import Co. in the year 1936.

These two cases were jointly tried and after hearing, the lower court rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and with a declaration that the Esso Standard Eastern Inc., plaintiff in 1868 and defendant in 2162 is the registered owner of the land in question covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 (N.A.), Alfonso Lim defendant in 1868 and plaintiff in 2162 is now sentenced:

l) to vacate and leave the possession and control of the land in question which is lot 4 of plan 148885 covered by said Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 (N.A.);

2) Alfonso Lim shall pay Esso Standard Eastern Inc., the amount of P100.00 a month by way of rental from July 1963 until complete possession shall have been delivered to the above registered owner;

3) Alfonso Lim shall pay Esso Standard Eastern Inc., the amount of P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and litigation expenses;

4) Alfonso Lim shall pay the costs in both cases.

The complaint of Alfonso Lim in 2162 is dismissed in its entirety.

The complaint in intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines is also dismissed in its entirety.

Moreover, in the same decision, the lower court passed upon the motion of appellant Alfonso Lim to receive additional evidence and ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

What is the new discovered evidence that Alfonso Lim and the Republic of the Philippines want to present in this case because according to them it will affect the decision that shall be rendered? During the numerous hearings had in this case with the testimonies of witnesses many of them on inadmissible hearsay version, Alfonso Lim maintained that the land in question had long ago ceased to be owned by Esso; it was transferred by Esso to the North American Trading; and that conveyance to the North American Trading, whether by sale or barter was done long before the war. On the foregoing statements the records are practically clogged with many hearsay statements from witnesses who brought this outside version of barter and conveyance. If only to allow a review done with fun knowledge of the facts of the case such hearing evidence was allowed to be inserted. This Court, however, believes at this moment that hearsay evidence on the Idea of barter is totally inadmissible in this case. Besides the North American Trading in authentic correspondence sent to the Philippines clearly said that the corporation had no property in the Philippines. The alleged newly discovered evidence that Lim and the Republic of the Philippines would like to present in the re-opening of the case would consist mainly of the testimony of Atty. Matias Vergara to the effect that he prepared two documents. On one document the North American Trading ceded a property to the Standard Vacuum Oil Company.

This document is available for examination even now. In another document supposed to be a part of the transaction, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company ceded the land in question to the North American Trading. But this document according to Matias Vergara is not available, the original and the duplicate. There is no way of tracing its terms or existence in any registry or any government office.

The least that the Court can say is that it should be the North American which is an existing corporation in the United States who should come forward and claim the land in question if truly the land had been validly acquired in pre-war days by said corporation. It is queer that the one pressuring the non-ownership of the land in question by the Esso Standard is not the North American Trading, the supposed owner, but Alfonso Lim who is a total stranger and the way to bring it out is by hearsay testimony of a lawyer on his memory of events in 1936.

The Court rules now that the motion to receive additional evidence on the ground of newly discovered evidence filed on November 28, 1967, joined by the Republic of the Philippines must be, as it is now denied in its entirety.

xxx xxx xxx

Appellant Alfonso Lim raised the following assignments of errors in his brief:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. — The lower court gravely erred in holding that the reconstitution of title over Lot 4, Psu-148885, the property in question, was validly done in spite of the clear showing that there was absolute no proven title to reconstitute.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. — The lower Court erred in declaring that Lot 4 of Plan Ps-15087-Amended is the same Lot 4 in Plan Psu-148885.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. — The lower court gravely erred in declaring that the appellee Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., is the registered owner of the land in question allegedly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 (N.A.) in spite of the clear showing that the issuance of said title was erroneous and irregular as the basis for its issuance was Plan Psu-148885 and not the Original Plan Psu-148885 and not the Original Plan Ps- 15087 Amd. as manifested from the publication in the Official Gazette dated January 7, 1932, and that it was obtained through fraud without the requirements of the law being complied with.

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. — The lower Court erred in overlooking and failing to apply the principle of laches against appellee Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.

FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. — The lower Court gravely erred and/or abused its discretion in denying the motion to receive additional and newly discovered evidence filed by appellant Alfonso Lim and joined by intervenor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, and in so doing deprived appellants of the opportunity of proving that the property in question was sold and assigned by Standard Vacuum Oil Company (appellee's predecessor) to the North American Trading and Import Co. in exchange for the two properties owned by the latter through the testimony of Atty. Matias E. Vergara who directly participated in the preparation of the documents and worked for the exchange of properties.

SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. — The lower Court erred in not declaring appellant Alfonso Lim, the rightful owner of the property in question, having acquired the same by acquisitive prescription.

SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. — The lower Court erred in holding that appellant Alfonso Lim was liable to pay appellee the amount of P100.00 a month by way of rentals.

EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.— The lower Court erred in rendering judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of P 10,000.00 in favor of appellee.

NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.— The lower Court erred in holding that appellant Alfonso Lim is not a possessor in good faith and therefore not entitled to the amount of P150,000.00 as indemnity for the improvements introduced on the land in question.

The Republic of the Philippines as intervenor-appellant raised the following assignments of errors:

First Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT LIM'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF ATTY. MATIAS VERGARA AND IN HOLDING THAT NO EXCHANGE WAS EFFECTED INVOLVING THE LAND IN QUESTION.

Second Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLEE WAS ABLE TO SECURE A TITLE TO THE LAND.

Third Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION WAS ABANDONED AND THEREFORE BELONGS TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

The first, second, third, and fourth assignments of errors of appellant Lim coincide with the Republic's second assignment of error. We find them without merit.

To support his first assignment of error, the appellant argues that in a reconstitution proceeding, a valid record, document, title or other matter sought to be reconstituted must clearly be shown to exist for otherwise, no judicial or quasi-judicial body has the authority to render a decision or order for such reconstitution.

According to the appellant, the requirements of Section 15, Republic Act No. 26, that the destroyed or lost certificate of title which may be reconstituted is one that was in force at the time of loss or destruction was not complied with.

The assigned error has no merit. It is clear from the records that in the reconstitution proceeding, Esso was able to show its valid title over the property in question. It was able to prove that it lost its owner's duplicate certificate of title when its building was burned in Manila while the original thereof was lost or destroyed in the custody of the Register of Deeds of La Union when its offices were also burned. Both destructions were during World War II. Furthermore, the order in the reconstitution proceedings, being in rem in nature, has long become final and unassailable. The findings of the court therein can no longer be opened for review especially with the kind of speculative challenge posed by the appellant.

The salvaged index cards of the Commissioner of Land Registration show that Angel Salanga and Leon Rivera applied for the registration of four parcels of land and that Decrees 503752 and 503753 were issued for these parcels on March 6, 1933. The certified copy of Decree No. 503752 covers lots Numbered 1, 2, and 3 in the names of Salanga and Rivera. It logically follows that Decree No. 503753

covers Lot No. 4, the contested area. The records of the Land Registration Commission corroborate the other evidence for the appellee in this case.

The appellant points to a 57 square meter discrepancy in his second assignment of error. Plan Ps-15087-Amd. contains an area of 20,000 square meters, whereas Plan Psu-148885, relied upon as the basis for reconstitution contains a greater area of 20,057 square meters, which from the viewpoint of the appellant conclusively shows divergence in area and lack of Identity between the lots respectively covered by the two plans.

During the trial of these cases, Atty. Villalon (counsel for Lim) and Atty. Laurea (counsel for Esso) stipulated that the subject matter of the reconstitution parcel 4 is the same parcel 4 of the Land Registration Case No. 259 GLRO Record No. 40942 with the only difference that the reconstituted title had covered a bigger area because they made a separate survey. The foregoing admission should be binding on Lim. A court decision long final and executory cannot be undone on the basis of such a minute and inconsequential detail as the 57 square meter discrepancy in a 2 hectare parcel of land.

As early as 1924, this Court ruled in Smith Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Director of Lands (50 Phil. 879) that discrepancies between old and new surveys in the Philippines are often found and are due to the fact that the areas and distances in the old surveys were usually estimated instead of computed and that care not to over-estimate seems generally to have been taken; and that taking into consideration that twenty-five years passed between two surveys and that the population in the locality where the surveys were made was of an unsettled character, the fact that the names of the boundary men differed widely in the two surveys does not necessarily indicate that the surveys did not embrace the same land.

In Government of the Philippine Islands v. Isidoro Abaja et al. (52 Phil. 261) this Court stated that the fact that the Royal Decree of August 20, 1880, required that the sketch show the exact area and boundaries of the lands acquired by purchase or composition with the State was no guarantee against any fraud or error that might be committed in drawing the proper plans, because, considering the deficiency in the procedure adopted during the Spanish Government and the inexperience of the surveyors, many cases have been found in which great errors in calculation with respect to the area were committed, thus making the area of the lands vary greatly.

The appellant alleges fraud in his third assignment of error. He contends that in spite of the knowledge of the appellee that he was in actual possession and occupation of the property since 1949 and continuously without interruption, adversely and publicly up to the filing of the cases, no notice was given to him. This is alleged as manifest bad faith and in violation of the express mandate of Section 13, Republic Act No. 26 because lack of notice is fatal and renders the reconstitution proceedings as well as the resulting title void and of no effect. He cites Santiago Syjuco, Inc. v. PNB (86 Phil. 320) and Pecson v. Reyes (86 Phil. 187-188) where this Court held that "lack of notice is fatal and renders the reconstitution proceedings as well as the resulting title void and of no legal effect. "

Appellant Lim cannot assail the reconstitution of Esso's title on this ground. In his petition docketed as Civil Case No. 2162, he averred that he was the absolute owner of the disputed land. During the trial, however, he did not introduce any evidence as to how he acquired ownership. On the contrary, he

admitted that he merely occupied the land when he was told that there was no occupant. In short, he was a mere squatter or usurper whose only basis for the possession is alleged occupation but with no showing of ownership.

We also note that the court acquired jurisdiction by publication in the Official Gazette (Exhibit "GG"). Under our ruling in Municipality (Now City) of Legazpi v. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. (26 SCRA 218) lack of notice even to those with interest in the property, is not a jurisdictional defect because of such publication.

The appellant wants the title of the appellee set aside but he was absolutely no showing of a better title in himself. There would have been no difference if he had been notified. He could not have objected to the reconstitution by asserting his own rights over the property. Having no valid rights over the disputed lot, he suffered no damage as a result of the reconstitution of title.

The fourth assignment of error alleges that the lower court erred in overlooking and failing to apply the principle of laches against appellee Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. According to the appellant, from the time the lot was sold by Angel Salanga and Leon Rivera to Standard Vacuum Oil Co. up to the date appellee Esso Standard Eastern Inc., as successor-in-interest of Standard Vacuum Oil Co., filed the case for recovery of possession, more than 33 years had elapsed before the appellee thought of asserting its rights over the property in question. Therefore, the action should be barred by laches following the cases of Miguel v. Catalino (26 SCRA 234); Buenaventura v. David (37 Phil. 435); Edralin v. Edralin (1 SCRA 222) according to the appellant.

While the complaint in Civil Case No. 1868 was filed only in 1963, the records show that several demands to vacate the property were already made long before that date. Furthermore, the appellant is hardly the person to assert laches. As pointed out by the appellee mere possession without claim of title either legal or equitable does not place the occupant in a position to assert the defense of stale claim. For laches to exist, there should be a showing of delay in asserting the complainant's right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having had an opportunity to institute a suit. Delay is not counted from the date the lot was sold to the buyer but from the time Lim entered the premises, if known to the owner or from the time Esso came to know of Lim's occupancy for that is the only time it could possibly have demanded that he get out of the premises or it could have instituted a suit.

While the appellant claims to have occupied the land for 17 years, knowledge of such occupancy by the appellee was much later.

In the next assignment of error, both the appellant and the intervenor-appellant raised the issue whether or not the lower court committed error and/or abused its discretion in disallowing appellant Alfonso Lim from introducing additional evidences which are material and relevant to the matter in dispute.

The appellant alleges that Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. has no valid and legal claim over the lot in question as appellee's predecessor-in-interest, Standard Vacuum Oil Co. had transferred and assigned all

its rights, title and interests over the said property to the North American Trading and Import Co. sometime in 1936 in exchange for two properties owned by the latter. He states that Atty. Matias E. Vergara has personal knowledge of the transaction which led to the exchange of properties between Standard Vacuum Oil Co. and the North American Trading and Import Company because he was instrumental in the execution of the transaction, he being the one who prepared the two documents of exchange between the two companies in the year 1936 as an assistant attorney in the law firm of Ross, Laurence and Selph, then retained counsel of Standard Vacuum Oil Company.

The lower court's ruling on this issue has been mentioned earlier. We see no error in the court's ruling. We agree with the court that the testimony of Atty, Matias Vergara could have been discovered and produced during the several years that the case had been pending (from 1963-1967) if only Lim had exercised reasonable diligence.

Furthermore, the court could not have relied on the declaration of Atty. Vergara as to the contents of the alleged deed of sale, because the requirement that due execution and loss or destruction must first be proved was not followed. (Government v. Martinez, et al., 44 Phil. 817; Michael & Co. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87, 89; Hernaez v. McGrath, 48 O.G. 2686; Saldivar, et al. v. Mun. of Talisay, 18 Phil. 362; De Borja v. De Borja, 99 Phil. 19)

There are other reasons why we find the alleged error of the lower court in not declaring appellant Alfonso Lim as the rightful owner of the property in question, without merit.

The appellee has summarized why Lim's possession of the land does not have the qualities claimed by him:

1. The property has been previously brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, a fact that rendered the ownership thereof imprescriptible;

2. Lim failed to show a just title to the property;

3. Lim occupied part of the premises only after the title of Esso was reconstituted in 1955;

4. Lim's possession was not in good faith because he was not able to show reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof and could transmit his ownership;

5. Lim's possession could not have been in the concept of an owner since he knew all along that he acquired no real or imaginary title to the property;

6. Lim's possession was not continuous since the filing of this case on July 1, 1963 had the effect of interrupting the same;

7. Lim expressly recognized the title to Esso in his conversation with Atty. Florentino (Tsn., August 9, 1957, p. 55);

8. Lim all along was clearly aware that Esso owned the property in question (Tsn., July 1, 1963, pp. 36-57);

9. Lim declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1960, and after extrajudicial demands had been made for him to vacate (Exhibit 1). The mere failure to declare land for taxation purposes indicates that the claimant did not believe himself to be the owner. (Cruzado v. Bustos, 34 Phil. 17);

10. Lim kept silent when a portion of the lot was expropriated. When the road to Poro Point was widened and improved, a portion was taken by the government (Exhibits "KK", " KK-1 " to " KK-4 "); and

11. Lim claims that he has in his favor a legal presumption that he possesses under a just title and he cannot be obliged to show it. He apparently relies on Article 541 of the New Civil Code. He has conveniently closed his eyes to Art. 1131 of the New Civil Code which requires that "for purposes of prescription, just title must be proved; it is never presumed.

We find the P100.00 a month rental for the appellant's use of 20,057 square meters of urban land at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union valued at P2,000,000.00 in 1967, to be more than fair and reasonable insofar as he is concerned. We see no reason to disturb the lower court's judgment in this respect. The same thing is true of the award of P10,000.00 attorney's fees considering the protracted nature of the litigation. Appellant Alfonso Lim is not a possessor in good faith and is not entitled to the P150,000.00 he claims for alleged improvements on the lot. His use of the valuable property more than compensates for whatever he may have put on the land.

The intervenor-appellant's argument that the land was abandoned and therefore belongs to the public domain has no merit. The land was titled in 1933. The burning of the Standard Vacuum building in Manila during World War II and the destruction of the title did not constitute abandonment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is AFFIRMED with costs against appellant Alfonso Lim.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin and Relova JJ., concur.

Plana, J., took no part.

Vasquez, J., is on leave.



SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-69303 July 23, 1987

HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN, namely, Teofilo, Isabel, Maximina, Anicia, and Francisco, all surnamed Marasigan, petitioners,

vs.

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MARIA MARRON, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Who has a better right to the property in question, the party who bought it with a notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of her title or the party in whose favor the notice of lis pendens was made? The appellate court answered this question in favor of the party who had the notice annotated and who won the litigation over the property. We affirm.

The disputed property in this case is a residential lot (Lot No. 2-A) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila in the name of one Fe Springael-Bazar, married to Felicisimo Bazar.

The pertinent facts as disclosed by the record are as follows:

On April 24, 1975, Civil Case No. 97479 entitled "Maria Marron v. Felicisimo Bazar and Fe S. Bazaar" was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII. The action sought to compel defendants Bazar to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale of their lot covered by T.C.T. No. 100612 in favor of Maria Marron.

On January 27, 1976, while Civil Case No. 97479 was still pending, the private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of T.C.T. No. 100612.

On February 24, 1976, judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 97479. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:

a) Ordering the defendants Fe Springael Bazar and Felicisimo Bazar as vendors (1) to execute in favor of the plaintiff Maria Marron as vendee a Deed of Absolute Sale in a public instrument over the residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila to and in the name of Fe S. Bazar, married to Felicisimo Bazaar; and (2) to deliver to plaintiff sufficient copies of such deed of sale, together with the Owner's copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612, in order that the plaintiff can register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila and secure a transfer certificate of title for the land in her name.

b) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500.00 Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees; and

c) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. (Rollo, p. 15).

The above judgment became final and executory so Maria Marron filed a motion for execution which was granted. A writ of execution was issued by the court on July 12, 1976. The spouses Bazar, however, refused to surrender their title to the property in question and to execute the required deed of sale in Marron's favor. On November 29, 1978, the lower court finally ordered the Clerk of Court to execute the deed of sale in behalf of the erring spouses. When the said deed was presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a court order in order that the new title issued in the name of herein petitioner Maria Marasigan could be cancelled.

It appears that on December 18, 1974, a deed of absolute sale of Lot 2-A covered by T.C.T. No. 100612 was executed by Fe S. Bazar in favor of Maria Marasigan for and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). However, it was only on July 5, 1977 that said deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Consequently, T.C.T. No. 100612 was cancelled and a new title was issued in Maria Marasigan's name. When the Register of Deeds of Manila issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126056 naming Maria Marasigan as the new owner of Lot 2-A, the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by Marron on the Bazar's title was carried over on the said new title.

Meanwhile, on May 26, 1977, the Bazaars filed a petition for relief from the judgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. While their petition was still pending, they moved to set aside the said judgment on June 22, 1979 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons.

On the other hand, on February 24, 1979, Marron instituted L.R.C. Case No. 7680 captioned "Maria Marron v. Maria Marasigan" which prayed for a court order requiring the Register of Deeds of Manila to register the deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court in behalf of the Bazaars pursuant to the order dated November 29, 1978 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, Branch XIII. L.R.C. Case No. 7680 was tried by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV acting as a land registration court. Said case was dismissed for the following reason:

... This court acting as a Land Registration Court, with limited and special jurisdiction cannot act on this petition under summary proceedings but (sic) should be ventilated before a court of general jurisdiction Branch XIII, which issued the aforesaid Order dated November 29, 1978, the said petition is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice on the part of the petitioner to institute the appropriate civil action before the proper court. ... (Annex "A," p. 4, Rollo, p. 138)

On September 6, 1979, Marron filed another case docketed as Civil Case No. 126378 to have Marasigan's TCT 126056 cancelled conformably to the procedure outlined in the decision of the above land registration court. On July 30, 1980, the parties submitted said case for decision.

On February 18, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV to which Civil Case No. 126378 was assigned dismissed Marron's complaint for being premature since the decision rendered by the CFI, Branch XIII in Civil Case No. 97479 had not yet become final and executory considering that it was still the subject of a petition for relief from judgment.

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on August 7, 1984, ruled that Marron is entitled to the property under litigation by virtue of the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Maria

Marasigan's title. The appellate court further ruled that the decision in Civil Case No. 97479 had become final and executory because the petition for relief from judgment of the spouses Bazar was filed out of time. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and another one entered —

(a) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel T.C.T. No. 126056 in the name of Maria Marasigan and issue another in the name of Maria Marron by virtue of the Deed of Sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch XIII;

(b) Ordering the said Register of Deeds, during the pendency of this case, to refrain from registering any deed of sale pertaining to T.C.T. No. 126056 in the name of Maria Marasigan other than that of the herein plaintiff; and

(c) Ordering the defendant Maria Marasigan to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00. (IAC, Decision. Rollo, pp. 17-18).

Maria Marasigan who died in the course of the proceedings is now represented by her heirs in the instant petition which assigns the following errors:

I

THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT THE RIGHT OF ACTION OF RESPONDENT MARIA MARRON (AS PLAINTIFF) IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAD PRESCRIBED AND SHE INCURRED IN LACHES.

II

THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT RESPONDENT ABANDONED OR WAIVED HER PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EFFECTS TO/OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479, WHEN SHE FILED CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378, DURING ITS EFFECTIVITY.

III

THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

IV

THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378 OVER THE PERSONS OF PETITIONERS.

V

THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF DEFENDANTS SPOUSES FELICISIMO BAZAAR AND FE S. BAZAAR.

VI

THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY THE DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT, WAS NOT LEGAL AND VALID AND WITHOUT PROOF AND EFFECT. (Brief for the appellant, pp. 1 and 2)

We find no merit in the present petition.

There is a clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired the property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a deed of absolute sale on December 18, 1974 or a little over four months before the filing of Civil Case No. 97479, the transaction became effective as against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world. Section 51 of Act 496, as amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) provides:

Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. — Every conveyance ... affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

Moreover, there is no question that when the late Maria Marasigan was issued her transfer certificate of title to the subject property (T.C.T. No. 126056), the Registrar of Deeds of Manila then carried over to the new title the notice of lis pendens which the private respondent had caused to be annotated at the back of the Bazar's title. In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens on all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if he cancels any notice of lis pendens in violation of his duty, he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third persons (The Director of Lands, et al. v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177).

A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his own risk (Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v. Morales, 101 Phil. 171). It was also a clear notice to Maria Marasigan that there was a court case affecting her rights to the property she had purchased.1avvphi1

As earlier stated it was only on July 5, 1977 that the sale between Maria Marasigan and the Bazaars became effective as against third persons. The registration of the deed of sale over the subject property was definitely subsequent to the annotation made on January 27, 1976. Consequently, Marasigan was bound by the outcome of the litigation against her vendors or transferors. (See Rivera v. Tirona, et al., 109 Phil. 505).

We reiterate the established rule that:

... the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of the particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the

Court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. ... (Laroza v. Guia, 134 SCRA 34 1)

The late Marasigan's transferors did not interpose any appeal from the adverse judgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. The 30-day period under the old rule (Rule 41, section 3 of the Revised Rules of court now amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, section 39) within which the Bazaars may have taken an appeal started to run from May 12, 1976 when they were served with a copy of the said decision. On June 11, 1976, the February 24, 1976 decision in Civil Case No. 97479 became final and executory. At this point after the finality of the said decision, the Bazaars no longer had the right to alienate the property subject of the litigation. Any transaction effective during the period of litigation is subject to the risks implicit in the notice of lis pendens and to the eventual outcome of the litigation.

Moreover, we agree with the finding of the appellate court that the petition for relief from judgment by the Bazaars dated May 26, 1977 was filed beyond the two periods provided in Section 3 Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. There may have been some errors in the computations but the petition itself was out of time.

Rule 38, Section 3 of said Rules provides, in part, that:

Sec. 3. Time for filing petition. ... — A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was taken. ...

The 60-day period must be reckoned from May 12, 1976 when the Bazaars were served with a copy of the assailed decision. Therefore, the 60-day period expired on July 11, 1976. It was only after 379 days or more than 12 months after they learned of the judgment that the Bazaars filed their petition for relief from said judgment. (See Domingo v. Dela Cruz, 23 SCRA 1121) The appellate court computed the 6-month period from the date of the judgment was rendered. Rule 38 states that the counting should commence from the entry of the judgment or order. (See Dirige v. Biranya, 17 SCRA 840). A judgment is entered only after its finality and Civil Case No. 97479 became final on June 11, 1976. Since the records do not bear the exact date the questioned judgment was entered, the 6-month period can be counted for purposes of our decision from July 12, 1976 when the writ of execution of the final judgment was issued. The phrase "or other proceeding" in Section 3 of Rule 38 includes a writ of execution (Aquino v. Blanco, 79 Phil. 647). The 6-month period from July 12, 1976 lapsed on January 8, 1977. A period of ten (10) months had already lapsed when the Bazaars filed their petition for relief from judgment on May 26, 1977. Obviously, the petitioners cannot now question the effects of the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 97479. In the words of Laroza v. Guia (supra) they cannot render the final judgment abortive and impossible of execution. The deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court on behalf of the Bazar spouses pursuant to the court's judgment was valid and binding.

The petitioners cannot also raise before us the issues of prescription or laches and lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the Bazar spouses in Civil Case No. 97479. This cannot be done in this petition which stems from Civil Case No. 126378 in the trial court and AC-G.R. No. 00183 in the appellate court. The Bazaars were the proper parties who ought to have raised them as defenses either in a motion to dismiss or in their answer. Since they did not do so, the same were deemed waived. (See Rule 9, section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court; MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Estrella, 113 SCRA 378; Torreda v. Boncaros, 69 SCRA 247; Visayan Electric Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 SCRA 43; Republic v. Mambulao Lumber Company, 6 SCRA 858).

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. ???????

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur

Bidin, J., took no part.



SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94114 June 19, 1991

FELICISIMA PINO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, DEMETRIA GAFFUD, ROMUALDO GAFFUD, ADOLFO GAFFUD & RAYMUNDO GAFFUD, respondents.

Ramon A. Barcelona for petitioner.

Eligio A. Labog for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21457 which affirmed in toto, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Echague, Isabela, Branch 24 in Civil Case No. 24-0190, the dispositive portion of which latter decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Rafaela Donato Vda. de Gaffud in favor of the defendant on June 10, 1970 over Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-68395 being a portion of Lot 6 of the Echague Cadastre LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1063, containing an area of 11,095 square meters, more or less, null and void insofar as the shares of Cicero Gaffud and Raymundo Gaffud are concerned, which is one-half-thereof, or approximately 5,547.5 square meters, more or less;

2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 49380 in the name of the defendant;

3. Ordering the defendant to reconvey one-half of the property subject of this proceeding to the plaintiffs within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision, failing which the same shall be done at the cost of the defendant by the Clerk of Court and such act, when so done, shall have like effect as if done by her;

4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

is now being assailed in the instant petition for certiorari upon the ground —

THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION PETITION —

I

WHEN IT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS NOT AN INNOCENT PURCHASER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY;

II

WHEN IT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PRESCRIPTION WOULD NOT LIE TO BAR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ACTION; and

III

WHEN IT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS VALID THE TRANSFER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FROM THE ORIGINAL REGISTERED OWNERS TO RAFAELA DONATO;

The pertinent background facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the respondent Court of Appeals in its now assailed decision are the following:

The property subject of the controversy is a parcel of land situated in Echague, Isabela, identified as Lot 6-B of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-68395, being a portion of Lot 6 containing an area of 11,095 square meters, more or less.

Lot 6 has an area of 12,799 square meters, more or less. It was acquired in 1924 by the spouses Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Donato. Juan Gaffud died in 1936. On January 11, 1938, Lot 6 was originally registered in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela, under Original Certificate of Title No. 4340 pursuant to Decree No. 650247 issued under L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 1063 in the names of Rafaela Donato, Raymundo Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud (Raymundo and Cicero are the sons of the spouses) as co-owners thereof in fee simple subject to such of the incumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said act and to Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court. The said lot was sold to Rafaela Donato through a Deed of Transfer which cancelled O.C.T. No. 4340 and in lieu thereof T.C.T. No. T-30407 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato.

On February 25, 1967, Rafaela Donato sold a portion of said Lot 6, consisting of 1,704 sq. m., more or less in favor of Fortunato Pascua. The aforesaid sale caused the subdivision of the said Lot 6 into Lot 6-A containing an area of 1,704 sq. m., more or less, and Lot 6-B containing an area of 11,095 sq. m., more or less, under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-68395.

Upon registration of said sale in favor of Fortunato Pascua, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-30407 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32683 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato on March 2, 1967 covering the land designated as Lot 6-B of the subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-68395, being a portion of Lot 6 of the Echague Cadastre, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1063, containing an area of 11,095 sq.m., more or less, which is the subject land. (RTC Decision dated November 15, 1988, p. 310 Record).

On June 10, 1970 Rafaela Donato sold to petitioner Felicisima Pino said Lot 6-B in consideration of P10,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale she executed in favor of petitioner Felicisima Pino which was notarized by her lawyer, Atty. Concepcion Tagudin (Exh. 1).

Rafaela Donato undertook to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds of Isabela and on July 13, 1970 the sale was inscribed therein under Entry No. 9286 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49380 was issued in the name of Felicisima Pino.

On September 30, 1980, Cicero Gaffud died survived by his wife Demetria Gaffud and sons Romualdo Gaffud and Adolfo Gaffud who are the private respondents herein.

On March 9, 1982, private respondents filed a complaint for nullity of sale and reconveyance against petitioner — Felicisima Pino. Incidentally, the sale of the other portion (Lot A) of the same lot to Fortunato Pascua is not assailed by private respondents.

During the pendency of the case before the trial court, Rafaela Donato (who was not a party to the case) died on November her 26, 1982.

On November 5, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision (the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted in this decision) which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appellant in its now assailed decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The defense of an innocent purchaser for value would be of no help to appellant in the absence of the document on extrajudicial partition indicating that the conjugal property has been adjudicated to Rafaela Donato Vda. de Gaffud and which would be the source of her authority in transferring the subject property to defendant. The sensible thing to do by any prudent person is to examine not only the certificate of title of said property but also all the factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaw in vendor's capacity to transfer the land.

Nor would prescription of action lie. An ordinary action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in four (4) years (Lanera v. Lopos, 106 Phil. 70). Appellant was a party to the alleged fraudulent transfer of the subject property, consequently, appellees have four (4) years to file an action to annul the deed of sale from the discovery of the fraudulent act. In the case at bar, appellees learned about the fraud on July 6, 1981 when they received a letter from the appellant (Exhibit D). The filing, therefore, of the complaint on March 9, 1982 (p. 1. Rec.) was within the prescriptive period. (pp. 62-63, Rollo)

In elevating the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals to Us for review petitioner prays that the appealed decision be reversed and another one entered declaring as valid (1) the sale of the subject property executed on June 10, 1970 in favor of petitioner Felicisima Pino by Rafaela Donato Vda. de Gaffud and (2) the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49380 issued in the name of petitioner by the Register of Deeds of Isabela on July 13, 1970 upon the grounds —

(a) that private respondents has (sic) no cause of action against petitioner because she is an innocent purchaser for value of the subject property;

(b) that the action of private respondents was already barred by prescription when it was filed; and

(c) that the transfer of the subject property from the original registered owners to Rafaela Donato was valid. (pp. 61-62, Rollo)

The rule applicable to this controversy is well-settled. Where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. The rationale for the rule is stated thus:

The main purpose of the Torrens' System is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. (Pascua v. Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78) Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire tights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights. (Director of Land v. Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606)

In the case at bar, the evidence on record discloses that when petitioner purchased the subject property on June 10, 1970, the title thereto (TCT No. T-32683) was in the name of her vendor Rafaela Donato alone. The said TCT No. T-32683 was shown to petitioner which shows on its face the following:

is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of —

RAFAELA DONATO, Filipino, of legal age, widow and with residence and postal address at Centro, Echague, Isabela, Philippines as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act as may be subsisting, and to Section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court. (Ex. A, p. 169, Record)

The lien imposed by Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court appears as cancelled on April 8, 1969 under the following entry:

Entry No. 2090 –– Petition for cancellation of Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the

D-340; P-75-1 Rules of Court executed by Rafaela D.Vda. de

B-4; S-1969 Gaffud. Hence, by virtue of which the lien appea-

R.M. Angubong,ring on the face of this title is now cancelled.

Notary Public

Date of Instrument — March 11, 1969

Date of Inscription — April 2, 1969

Time: 12:30 p.m.

(Sgd.) ANASTACIO J. PASCUA

ANASTACIO J. PASCUA

Deputy Register of Deeds V

(Emphasis supplied) (p. 15, Rollo)

Petitioner was advised by her lawyers that she could proceed to buy the property because the same was registered in the name of the vendor. Thus, on pp. 13 & 14 of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing of December 12, 1986, petitioner testified as follows:

Atty. Mallabo:

Q Before you brought this property madam witness, were you shown a copy of the title of Rafaela Donato vda. de Gaffud on the property?

A Yes, sir, she showed me the title. And I saw that the title was in her name.

Q When the offer was made to you and the title was shown to you, do you remember if you have done anything?

A Yes, sir, before I bought the property, I showed the documents she bought to me to our lawyer, Custodia Villalva and Concepcion Tagudin.

Q Why did you show them the title Madam witness?

A To be sure that the title does not have any encumbrance and because I do not know anything about legal matters.

Q What did they advise you?

A Yes, Okey, I can proceed in buying the property, the title was registered in her name, it was her personal property. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)

In the case of Maguiling v. Umadhay, (33 SCRA 99, 103) this Court held:

However, while the Umadhay spouses cannot rely on the title, the same not being in the name of their grantor, respondent Crisanta S. Gumban stands on a different footing altogether. At the time she purchased the land the title thereto was already in the name of her vendors (T.C.T, 15522). She had the right to rely on what appeared on the face of said title. There is nothing in the record to indicate that she knew of any unregistered claims to or equities in the land pertaining to other persons, such as that of herein petitioner, or of any other circumstances which should put her on guard and cause her to inquire behind the certificate. According to the Court of Appeals she took all the necessary precautions to ascertain the true ownership of the property, having engaged the services of a lawyer for the specific purpose and, it was only after said counsel had assured her that everything was in order did she make the final arrangements to purchase the property. The appellate court's conclusion that respondent Crisanta S. Gumban was a purchaser in good faith and for value is correct, and the title she has thereof acquired is good and indefeasible.

Petitioner paid the sum of P10,000,00 in consideration of the sale which is fair and reasonable considering that in 1967 Fortunato Pascua paid the sum of P390.00 for the portion of the land consisting of 1,704 square meters. (Exhs. 1 and 5)

The court a quo, however, ruled and this was sustained by respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner was not an innocent purchaser.

The defense of an innocent purchaser for value could be of no help to appellant in the absence of the document on extra-judicial partition indicating that the conjugal property has been adjudicated to Rafaela Donato Vda. de Gaffud and which would be the source of her authority in transferring the subject property to defendant. The sensible thing to do by any prudent person is to examine not only the certificate of title of said property but also all the factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in vendor's capacity to transfer the land. (p. 10, Rollo)

We do not find any evidence in the record that would sustain such a finding. The extra-judicial partition adverted to in said ruling was executed by the heirs of Juan Gaffud prior to, and as the basis for, the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title No. 4340 in the names of the heirs of Juan Gaffud, as testified to by witness Demetria Gaffud in this wise:

Q Were you able to read the title that was kept by your brother in law?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was the registered owner?

A Rafaela Donato, Raymundo Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud, co-owner.

Q In other words, the title you read appears that the owners were Raymundo, Cicero and Rafaela?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know what a title is ?

A Yes, it is thick.

Q You said that the property was bought by Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Gaffud, how come that there is no name Juan Gaffud in the title?

A Because he was already dead when I got married.

Q Do you have a knowledge how the title come to have the name of Raymundo, Rafaela and Cicero?

A Yes, sir. (p. 66, Rollo)

The extra-judicial settlement, upon which was based the lien imposed by Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court, was executed after the death of Juan Gaffud in 1936 but before the issuance of the original title on January 11, 1938 so that the title would be issued in the names of the heirs of Juan Gaffud, namely: Rafaela Donato, Raymundo Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud.

This conclusion is supported (a) by the fact that the subject property was registered only on January 11, 1938, which is around two (2) years after the death of Juan Gaffud in 1936, and therefore the title could not have been issued in the name of Juan Gaffud; (b) by the fact that the lien imposed by Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court was inscribed on the face of the title itself and was not entered on the Memorandum of Encumbrances as were done with the mortgages and their releases which were inscribed under their Entry Numbers on the page for Memorandum of Encumbrances and (c) by the fact that the Original Certificate of Title was issued in the names of the heirs of Juan Gaffud.

The extra-judicial settlement, therefore, has no bearing on whether or not there was fraud in the transfer of the subject property to Rafaela Donato.

On the other hand, it was a Deed of Transfer which transferred the subject property from the original owners to Rafaela Donato as stated in Exhibit 3 which is the petition to cancel the conditions imposed by Section 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court, to wit:

That since the time of the execution of the Deed of transfer from the original owners to herein petitioner in 1967, and also since the time of the registration of the said transfer at Register of Deeds of Isabela — last March 2, 1967, — more than two (2) years have already elapsed;

That from the time of the Deed of Transfer and within the period of two years thereafter, NO CLAIM WHATSOEVER has been filed against the herein petitioner with respect to the property thus sold to her . (p. 67, Rollo)

Even granting that the extra-judicial settlement was the document which transferred the subject property from the original owners to Rafaela Donato the non-production thereof (private respondents should have presented it, not petitioner) does not prove that there was fraud committed in its execution and neither does it prove that petitioner was a party thereto. There was no allegation, and much less any evidence, that the transfer of the subject property from the original owners to Rafaela Donato was fraudulent.

What private respondents allege as fraudulent was the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Juan Gaffud. But it has been shown that this settlement was not the basis of the transfer of the subject property to Rafaela Donato, petitioner's vendor.

That petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value is within the scope of established jurisprudence.

The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible. (Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531, 581)

x x x x x x x x x

Guided by previous decisions of this Court, good faith consists in the possessor's belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title (Ariola v. Gomez dela Serna, 14 Phil. 627). Good faith, while it is always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom title was received by himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it (Santiago v. Cruz, 19 Phil. 148). There is good faith where there is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage from another (Fule v. Legare, 7 SCRA 351). Otherwise stated, good faith is the opposite of fraud and it refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. In the case at bar, private respondents (petitioner in this case), in good faith relied on the certificate of title in the name of Fe S. Duran (Rafaela Donato in this case) and . . . "even on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rules that the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale may

become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger. (Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489, 494).

x x x x x x x x x

Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of the certificate of title issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate for that would impair public confidence in the certificate of title; otherwise everyone dealing with property registered under the torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Indeed, this is contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Stated differently, an innocent purchaser for value relying on a torrens title issued is protected . . . (Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489, 494-495). (pp. 68-70, Rollo)

In the case of Centeno v. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 545, 555) the same rule was observed by this Court when it ruled —

. . . Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest or any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. (William Anderson v. Garcia, 64 Phil. 506; Fule v. Legare, 7 SCRA 351). (p. 71, Rollo)

Petitioner being an innocent purchaser for value, private respondents will have no cause of action against her. "The issue alone that petitioner is a purchase in good faith and for value sufficiently constitutes a bar to the complaint of private respondents . . ."(Medina v. Chanco, 117 SCRA 201, 205).

If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud or were instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is now well-settled that such action prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property. (Armerol v. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396, 407; Caro v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 407; Walstron v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431, 442).

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32683 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato on March 2, 1967. The present action for reconveyance was filed only on March 9, 1982. Clearly then, the action has already prescribed because it was filed fifteen (15) years after the issuance of TCT No. T-32683. Even if the period were to be reckoned from the registration of the deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner on July 13, 1970, which is also the date of the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49380 in the

name of petitioner, the action of private respondents had already prescribed because a period of eleven (11) years, seven (7) months and twenty-six (26) days has elapsed from July 13, 1910 to March 9, 1982.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered dismissing Civil Case No. Br. V-756, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Echague, Isabela.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.



SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40177 February 12, 1976

LUCIO C. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL BANK OF ORMOC CITY, INC., respondents.

Froilan V. Quijano for petitioner.

Bruno Villamor for private respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court reverses respondent appellate court's dismissal of the case on a procedural question and instead applies the settled doctrine that when the right to appeal is not an adequate remedy, certiorari will issue to promptly relieve an aggrieved party from the injurious effects of an order issued with grave abuse of discretion. On the merits, the Court holds that a mere money claim such as a personal loan granted by a bank on promissory notes executed by the borrower and his co-maker is riot registrable as an adverse claim to be annotated on their registered real properties.

Respondent Rural Bank of Ormoc City, Inc. had executed certain affidavits of adverse claim to certain registered sugar lands in Tacloban and Ormoc Cities alleged by petitioner to belong to him either as co-

owner and/or as redemptioner. The said lands were the subject of mortgage loans obtained from respondent bank which had been fully paid and discharged either by payment or redemption after extra-judicial foreclosure.

Claiming that it still had certain unsecured money claims against the registered owners (i.e. loans extended by it to seven other borrowers covered by promissory notes wherein petitioner had signed as co-maker as well as other unsecured loans wherein the other registered owners [Magno Amora and Ponciano Mangco, represented by petitioner as attorney-in-fact] had likewise signed as co-makers of the promissory notes), respondent bank sought to have its adverse claim annotated on the certificates of title as "a claim or right of (the) bank to the properties of the persons ... having a contractual obligation with the bank" 1 and refused to surrender the certificates of title to petitioner without such annotation first having been made so that it "will not be at the losing end and to protect the rights of the bank." 2

Upon the refusal of the Tacloban Register of Deeds to register the bank's adverse claim, respondent bank filed with the court of first instance of Leyte as a land registration court three petitions 3 for an order to direct the Tacloban and Ormoc Registers of Deeds to annotate its adverse claim on the said titles, while petitioner in turn opposed the petitions and filed his counter-petition for an order directing respondent bank to return the said titles without such annotations.

In its Order of July 10, 1974, the court of first instance resolved the petitions and counter-petition by ordering the Registers of Deeds to annotate respondent' bank's adverse claims and "thereafter ... to release the aforesaid titles to the corresponding registered owners." The Order was immediately implemented even before it became final and executory and the bank's affidavits of adverse claim were annotated by the Registers of Deeds on the back of the certificates of title.

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court of Appeals for the setting aside of the Order and the cancellation of the annotations of adverse claims, pleading the inadequacy of resorting to an ordinary appeal with its concomitant delay.

Giving due course to the petition, respondent court thus stated the legal issues submitted to it: "(T)he answer of respondent bank did not raise any question of fact. The only issues raised in this petition for certiorari are (1) 'whether a mere money claim may be properly registered as an adverse claim on a Torrens Certificate of Title within the purview of the Land Registration Act,' and (2) 'whether a Judge of the Court of First Instance who orders the annotation of such money claim as an adverse claim on the certificate of title commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."'

By-passing the first and principal issue, respondent court in its decision of January 9, 1975 dismissed the petition on the ground that appeal from the lower court's order for the annotation of the bank's money claims, and not certiorari, was "the only remedy" and that "even if, as contended by herein petitioner, respondent Judge erred in ordering the annotation of the adverse claim on the certificates of title, that error, alone and in itself, is not a ground for certiorari, for not every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is abuse of discretion (Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, G.R. No. L-18957, April 23, 1963)."

Hence, the present petition, after the failure of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with respondent court.

Upon receipt of respondent bank's comment on the petition as required, — the Court resolved, by way of expediting the disposition of the simple issues of the case, to treat the petition as a special civil action and declared the case submitted for decision without briefs.

Respondent court clearly erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that appeal from the questioned Order was

petitioner's "only remedy". It is settled doctrine that the prerogative writ of certiorari may be applied for by proper petition notwithstanding the existence of the regular remedy of an appeal in due course when, among other reasons, the broader interests of justice so require or an ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy. 4

Here, petitioner had correctly pleaded that an appeal would be ineffectual to redress the lower court's error since lien-free titles to the sugar lands in question were required by the banks as collaterals before they would grant him badly needed crop loans to finance their operation and the delay in securing a reversal by ordinary appeal would work injustice to him while certiorari could promptly relieve him from the injurious and prejudicial effects of the questioned order.

Now, to resolve the issues of the case on the merits.

A mere money claim may not be registered as an adverse claim on a torrens certificate of title and a judge who orders the annotation on the certificate of title of such money claim as an adverse claim acts without any authority in law and commits a grave discretion amounting in law and commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction that calls for the issuance of the corrective writ of certiorari.

Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) manifestly provides that a person or entity who wishes to register an adverse claim in registered land must-claim a "part or interest in (the) registered land adverse to the registered owner. 5

Thus, purely money claims such as those of respondent bank by virtue of unsecured personal loans granted by it on promissory notes executed in its favor signed by the borrowers and co-signed by petitioner as co-maker are not registrable as adverse claims against the petitioner's registered lands. 6 The claim asserted must affect the title or be adverse to the title of the registered owner in order to be duly annotated as an adverse claim to the land against the registered owner. As pointed out by the Court, the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. 7

If respondent bank wanted the additional security of petitioner's real properties besides his personal signature assuming liability for the payment of the personal loans, then it should not have extended the

loans without requiring furthermore the execution of a covering real 'estate mortgage. If the loans were due and it feared that there would be a fraudulent removal-or disposition of the debtors' properties, then its proper course was to file the proper collection suit and seek a court order for attachment under bond — but certainly not to execute and submit for registration a mere baseless adverse claim, simply because it happened to be in possession of petitioner's certificates of title as a mortgagee whose mortgage lien had been fully discharged.

The writ of certiorari sought in vain by petitioner from respondent court should therefore be issued.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's decision of January 9, 1975 is set aside and in lieu thereof judgment is hereby rendered declaring null and void the lower court's Order of July 10, 1974 for annotation of respondent bank's affidavits of adverse claims on the certificates of title in question. Private respondent is ordered to deliver forthwith to the Tacloban and Ormoc Cities Registers of Deeds the owner's copies of said certificates of title and pay the required fees for the cancellation of said annotations and for the return of said certificates thereafter to petitioner and the corresponding registered owners. With costs in all instances against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ, concur.


PhilippineLaw.info » Jurisprudence » 1982 » July »

PhilippineLaw.info » Jurisprudence » SCRA » Vol. 116 »

G.R. No. , 116 SCRA 261 7777777777777777

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

July 31, 1982

G.R. No. , ,

vs.

, .

, J.:

On the authority of relevant and controlling pronouncements in the related case of "Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, respondents; Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor; Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors," * the Court declares as null and void the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 granting the reconstitution of the certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial supposedly covering Lots 2 and 4 of Survey Plan II-4374. As in the authoritative case above mentioned, the said decision suffers from jurisdictional infirmity, fatal to the petition for reconstitution since said petition and the notice thereof lacked essential data mandatorily required by the law, 1 and, just as importantly, the decision was invalidly issued without actual and personal notice having been served upon possessors, actual occupants and adjoining owners of the property involved who are indispensable parties in interest and without whom a valid judgment cannot be rendered.

The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the order of reconstitution alleges that the petitioners are registered owners as evidenced by certain Transfer Certificates of Title 2 all issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal covering parcels of land located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that TCT Nos. 175223 to 175235 were the subject of petition for Consolidation-Subdivision Plan PCS 5878, LRC Record No. 6137 after approval by the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission on petition of Alabang Development Corporation with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII; that after hearing the Court issued an order dated April 19, 1969, by virtue of which the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued among others sixty-seven (67) Transfer Certificates of Titles; 3 that said parcels of land surrounded by a high perimeter wall on their boundaries were sold to innocent purchasers in good faith for valuable consideration as part of Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, owned by petitioner Alabang Development Corporation, many of whom were already issued in turn the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title in their favor; and that these innocent purchasers for value have been in open, actual, adverse, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted possession of their respective lands since 1969.

Petitioners further alleged that in the reconstitution case below, filed only in 1977, herein respondents as petitioners therein sought to reconstitute a lost certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy (allegedly lost or destroyed over 30 years earlier in the last World War II) and issued allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, deceased Manuela Aquial, covering two lots, 2 and 4, indicated in Plan II-4374, situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Para?aque, Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal; that on the basis of the technical descriptions contained in petitioners' titles and as appear in the alleged title sought to be reconstituted, the latter overlap the parcels of land owned by petitioners and duly registered in their names; that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, actual, continuous, adverse, notorious possession since time immemorial of these parcels of land and that they have been paying religiously the real estate taxes thereon up to the present time; that petitioners being actual possessors and registered owners were not served with notice of the hearing of the petition for reconstitution in violation of Republic Act 26 such that the court a quo acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the reconstitution and that there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

As prayed for, the Court issued on June 27, 1980 a temporary restraining order upon the filing of the petition and restrained the respondents from enforcing the challenged decision, and specifically the Register of Deeds of Rizal from issuing a reconstituted title based on Decree No. 15170 in the name of the respondents-members of the Aquial-Pascual family.

Respondents on the other hand alleged that the petitioners filed in the court below a belated intervention and motion for new trial which were denied by respondent judge, and since neither appealed therefrom nor did they question such denials by way of certiorari, the petition is barred by laches; that the petition is not accompanied by copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto as required by Rule 65, section I and 2, Rules of Court; that certiorari being a remedy against jurisdictional infirmity, the absence of any allegation of ultimate facts tending to show such infirmity is fatal to the petition; that there is no allegation that private respondents knew of such alleged facts and the addresses of petitioners' vendees and/or that they have better rights than the alleged boundary owners who were notified, that petitioner Alabang Development Corporation is an intangible juridical person incapable of physical possession of the property and petitioner Bagatsing who is publicly known to be residing in Manila is not in physical possession or occupation of any property adjacent to the property in question; that the question of boundary owners not having been notified is a factual question not determinable a priori but in a proper action for ownership of any overlapping; that if there is any "sensible question" (sic) raised in the petition, the same is ownership over the alleged overlappings which cannot be sweepingly adjudicated in a certiorari proceeding or a reconstitution case "especially if a good issue is on the validity of petitioners' titles;" "that non-joinder of some alleged owners would render ineffective any judgment petitioners may get in these proceedings;" that the existence of respondents' title is indubitably established with the existence of the corresponding decree in the Land Registration Commission which was examined and found authentic and genuine by NBI and PC handwriting experts, approved plans reproduced from the microfilm (the plans duly approved by the Director of Lands on July 25, 1911), survey plan, and relocation and verification plans in the Bureau of Lands - all government document; and that private respondents have been in continuous possession of the land and have been up to date in the payment of land taxes thereof.

After both parties had submitted their respective memoranda, Greenfield Development Corporation moved to intervene in the proceedings stating, in brief, that upon comparison of the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land with an aggregate area of 43 hectares designated as Lots 2 and 4 of Plan 11-4374, as set forth in the alleged copy of Decree No. 15170, Land Registration Case 9368, relied upon by respondents in their petition for reconstitution, with those technical descriptions set forth in the certificates of title in the name of said intervenor, 4 it appears that the lots supposedly covered by the title sought to be reconstituted overlap and include a substantial portion of intervenor's land covered by its titles. As in the Bernal case, supra, 5 the Court is called upon to allow such intervention of an indispensable party "in view of the higher and greater interest of the public and in order to administer justice consistent with a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the respective claims of the parties and their numerous successors-in-interest," in view of the overlapping titles that respondent judge would authorize in his questioned decision in derogation of the underlying indefeasibility and stability of the Torrens System of registration. As the Court therein stressed, "the

sprawling area of the property in question where various subdivisions, residential houses and homes and infrastructures have mushroomed and the great number of people living or having proprietary rights and interests in such a vast property would certainly bring about the swamping of the courts and the clogging of their dockets with cases involving not only the original parties and the movants but also their successors-in-interest. This litigation will have no end, which this Court will not allow nor tolerate." 6

Unlike in the Bernal case, however, the Director of Lands need not be directed to conduct anew a relocation-verification survey of the properties involved in this case, as the petition before us is simply a special civil action attacking the jurisdiction of the lower court, and not a petition for review where the court would need to delve deep into the issues on the merits. But even if the Court found some need to do so, the land involved insofar as herein petitioners and intervenor are concerned refers to one and same area involved in the Bernal case, and the report of the Bureau of Lands in that sister case would suffice to enlighten us on the question of surrounding improvements, boundaries and overlappings.

The basic issue in the case at bar is the jurisdiction of the lower court to act upon the petition for reconstitution.

Section 12 and 13 of Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed," read-

Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same; Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the O.G. and to be posted on the main

entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition.?t?@lF? The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that some essential data required in section 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have been omitted: the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements, and the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property. Neither do these data appear in the Notice of Hearing. 7 such that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. On these glaringly conspicuous omissions, the Court repeats its pronouncement in the Bernal case, to wit.

And since the above data do not appear in the Amended Petition, the same data do not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the petition published in the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which enumerates mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13 which similarly require the contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that 'all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they have why said petition should not be granted' is not sufficient for the law must be interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court granting the motion to amend the original petition provided all the requisites for publication and posting of notices be complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to comply with all the requirements for publication and posting of notices, which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

The rule on notification to the possessor or one having interest in the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted is laid down explicitly in Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-17913, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:

'Where a petition for reconstitution would have the certificates of title reconstituted from the plans and technical descriptions of the lots involved, which sources may fall properly under section 3(e) or 3(f ) of Republic Act No. 26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to have an interest in the property should be sent a copy of the notice of the petition at the expense of the petitioner, pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.

'If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if otherwise the said order should have been final and executory.

'Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by publication is not sufficient but such notice must be actually sent or delivered to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution.'

The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al. supra, is rightly so because one who seeks the reconstitution of his title to the property is dutybound to know who are the occupants, possessors thereof, or persons having an interest in the property involved, specially where the property is so vast and situated in a suitable residential and commercial location, where buildings and improvements have been or are being constructed openly and publicly. As stated earlier, indispensable parties have appeared, claiming ownership, possession, and valuable interests in the property, which are not only numerous but also patently conspicuous that private respondent cannot feign ignorance, much less unawareness, nor blindness as to their existence of her or within her claimed property. (Emphasis supplied)

After passing upon the jurisdiction issue, the Court cannot just let go unmentioned its observation that the lots 8 involved in this reconstitution case are part of the survey plan (Plan II-4373) allegedly covering also Lots 1 and 3 which are involved in the Bernal case. In other words, these lots are covered by the same survey plan and they are contiguous. As a matter of fact, "Annex 5-A" 9 of respondents' memorandum which they claim to be a survey plan for their mother Manuela Aquial is actually entitled "Plan of Property of Olimpia D. Sta. Maria." Olimpia Sta. Maria is supposed to be the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, the petitioner in the Bernal reconstitution case involving Lots 1 and 3. Also, in each of the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 embodied in the petition for reconstitution filed by Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal 10, Manuela Aquial consistently appears to be an adjoining owner. This remarkable coincidence warrants a reproduction here of the Court's findings as to the non-veracity and falsity of the survey plan II-4374 submitted in support of reconstitution in the Bernal case.

It is to be remembered that per resolution of this Court dated September 25, 1979 in the Bernal case, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands was directed to conduct a relocation survey of the property involved therein. Pursuant to such directive, a "Final Report" on the matter was submitted by Amante R. Dumag, Officer-in-Charge, National Capital Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands, based upon a memorandum addressed to him by the Staff Supervisor for Technical Plan and Standards of said Bureau. Excerpts from both the report and the memorandum as reproduced in the decision in the Bernal case are hereunder quoted.

I. From the Final Report:

3. That while making a research on the survey data of the lands involved in this case the surveyors of the Bureau of Lands found out that the properties claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal consisting of lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, does not have an original copy of a plan in the Records Division of the Bureau of Lands. Attached with this Report is a certified photocopy of a letter dated January 30, 1978 marked as Annex 'A' to form an integral part of this Report sent by the Staff Supervisor for Technical Plan and Standards, Bureau of Lands, Manila, addressed to the Officer- in-Charge, Region IV, Bureau of Lands, Metro Manila, informing the latter of the non-existence of the original copy of plan II-4374. However, he further informed that there exists a microfilm copy of plan II-4374 with Accession No. 385637, but he expressed his doubts as to its source and authenticity, and gave his reasons for his apprehension in his aforementioned letter dated January 30, 1978 to the Officer-in-Charge of Region IV, Metro Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

6. That it was ascertained during the verification survey that the lands known as Lots I and 3, plan II-4374 claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal does not actually exist on the ground;

7. That the properties claimed by private respondent Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal consisting of Lots 1 and 3, plan II-4374, were platted on the plan Vs-04-000153 using the xerox copies of uncertified technical descriptions furnished by the Office of the Solicitor General;

8. That as directed by this Honorable Court, the location of industries, factories, warehouses, plants and other commercial infrastructures, residential buildings, public or private roads and other landmarks found inside the areas concerned are properly indicated on the white print copies of plan Vs-04-000153 (Annex 'D').

II. From the Memorandum:

1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the last world war and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged. Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical Reference Section records were recently turned over to the Records Division. A perusal of the folder of the case in the Records Division also shows that on July 17, 1972 Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the Records Division certified that his division (Survey Records Section in particular) has no copy of II-4374 (page 183 of the folio).

2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May 15, 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record was submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged source of data Accession No. 195551. This record turns out to be Plan 11-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the land is the property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.

3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction Section upon request of the interested party, issued technical descriptions for Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374. (This document was submitted to the Court as part of the petition for reconstitution of title [pp. 1 and 2 of folio]) As to how the data were reconstituted by the then Chief of Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original copy of the plan is not known. This not our standard operating procedure since we always issue technical descriptions based on available approved survey records.

4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto Eloriaga, then Chief, Reproduction Section, certified a copy of the microfilm enlargement of a frame with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the survey number II-4374. As to how a record that was not salvaged after the war not microfilmed is a mystery. Furthermore, as to how this frame is pinpointed without the locator card indeed confounds us. We are not now privy to the testimonies made in Court regarding this Microfilm.

5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears II-4374. For this reason, we caused the preparation of an enlargement of said microfilm for further examination and evaluation.

6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the following significant discrepancies and deviations from similar survey plans on record ...

7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm enlargement of the frame that purports to be that of survey plan II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not authentic and does not and has never represented any parcel of land properly surveyed and approved by this Bureau. (Emphasis supplied)

As the Court accepted and approved in the Bernal case the above final report on the relocation-verification survey of the regional officer of the Bureau of Lands and admitted it as evidence of the falsity of the survey plan in question, there is no reason for this Court not to use it likewise as basis for reaching. The conclusion that Lots 2 and 4 supposedly covered by the same Survey Plan II-4374 are purely imaginary and "do not actually exist on the ground."

There are a number of other observations in the Bernal case that would warrant rejection of the totality of the evidence presented by respondents in support of their petition for reconstitution 11 but a discussion thereon would be superfluous since the weight of all such other evidence is anchored upon the veracity or falsity of Survey Plan II-4374 as determined by the office of the Bureau of Lands commissioned by the Court for that purpose, and also considering, as stated earlier, that this is a special civil action wherein a ruling on jurisdiction is sufficient to adjudicate the matter in controversy.

The herein respondents attribute laches to the petitioners for not appealing from the order of the lower court denying their motion to intervene and motion for new trial hence allowing the said order/decision to become final. There is no laches nor finality of any decision to speak of since the decision under question is herein pronounced null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Prescinding therefrom, as admitted by themselves in their comment, the judgment of reconstitution is "ineffective" against the owners of lands covered thereby who were not joined as parties in the proceeding. As the Court ruled in the Bernal case on the matter of intervention 12 "a valid judgment cannot even be

rendered where there is want of indispensable parties" such as petitioners who hold subsisting Torrens Titles to the properties in question and "this aspect of the case commands the joinder of indispensable parties to allow them to uphold their interests based upon the Torrens titles they hold overrides any question of late intervention." Petitioners have precisely availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy of the present special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to annul and set aside for want of jurisdiction the decision and all proceedings of respondent judge.

If there is any laches at all to speak about, it is the respondents who should be held culpable thereof. For they appear to have slept on their supposed rights to the property claimed by them. It is of record that the petition for reconstitution was prepared and filed in September 1977, more than thirty years after the alleged loss or destruction of the alleged certificate of title in the last World War II. During this long span of time, herein respondents never protested the development and building of residential subdivisions as well as factories, roads and infrastructures in the area which unexplained inaction taken together with the falsity of their basic survey plan, supra, impress upon their petition a most dubious character to say the least.

To repeat what the writer hereof said in his concurring opinion in the Bernal Case, "The first lesson to be drawn here is that courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining such petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates of title, particularly where the petitions are filed, as in this case, after an inexplicable delay of 25 years after the alleged loss. Furthermore, the courts must likewise make sure that indispensable parties, i.e. the actual owners and possessors of the lands involved, are duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition (not by mere general publication), particularly where the lands involved constitute prime developed commercial land including a part of the South Superhighway. The stability and indefeasibility of the Torrens System would have been greatly imperiled had the appellate court's judgment granting reconstitution prevailed, resulting in two holders of Torrens certificates over the same lands. We can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and controversies that have been spawned by the reckless and hasty grant of such reconstitution of alleged lost or destroyed titles as well as of the numerous purchasers who have been victimized only to find that the 'lands' purchased by them were covered by forged or fake titles or their areas simply 'expanded' through 'table surveys' with the cooperation of unscrupulous officials." (Emphasis supplied)

The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section 38 of the land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, 13 "in cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners.?t?@lF? The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. A fortiori, such proceedings for

"reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly accountable therefor.

WHEREFORE, the subject judgment of the lower court ordering the register of deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and technical descriptions submitted, the alleged certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial is hereby annulled and set aside, and the petition for reconstitution is ordered dismissed.

The temporary restraining order of June 27, 1980 issued against respondents is hereby made and declared permanent. With costs jointly and severally against private respondents.

The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish the Honorable Minister of Justice a copy of the decision at bar (as well as a copy, for ready reference, of the decision of January 27, 1981 in the related Bernal case, G.R. No. L-45168, previously ordered furnished to him) for the institution of appropriate criminal proceedings against private respondents and all others who have assisted or conspired with them as may be warranted by the evidence of record.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., is on leave.

&

Footnotes

* G.R. No. 45168, decided on January 27, 1981; reported in 102 SCRA 370.

1 Sections 12 and 13, Republic Act 26, entitled "An Act providing a special procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed."

2 Nos. 175223, 175224, 175225, 175226, 175231, 175232, 175233, 175234, 175235 and 165473.

3 Nos. 247999 to 248017; 247681 to 247685; 247692 to 247708; 247927, 247929, 247931, 247933, 247935 to 247937, 247981 to 247998-A.

4 Annexes 1 to 6 of the Motion to Intervene.

5 G.R. No. L-45168, Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Bernal, Resolution of September 25, 1979 allowing intervention; reported in 93 SCRA 238.

6 93 SCRA at P. 247; emphasis supplied.

7 Issues Nos. 46, 47, 48, Vol. 73 of the Official Gazette. Penultimate paragraph reads:

"Let copies of this Notice be published in the Official Gazette and in the Newspaper of general circulation in the Greater Manila Area, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners, and likewise posted in the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City."

8 Lots 2 and 4.

9 P. 180, Record.

10 Copied in pages 2 and 3, Supreme Court decision in L-45168.

11 Evidence relied upon are: "(1) Said Decree No. 15170 issued on March 4, 1914 (Annex 'A') and the certification thereof by the Chief, Docket Division, Land Registry Commission (Annex 'A-1'); (2) Survey Plan II-4374 from microfilm Reel 560 under Accession No. 385637 on file with the Bureau of Lnads (Annex 'B'), and certification thereof (Annex 'B-1'), and the corresponding affidavit of the Chief, Reproduction Section, Bureau of Lands, attesting to such fact (Annex 'B-2'); (3) Certified Technical Description of Lots 2 and 4 under said Plan 11-4374, by the Chief, Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands (Annexes 'C' and 'C-l'); (4) Certification by the Acting Chief, Records Division, Bureau of Lands, that there is no record of any Sales Patent, Sales Certificates or any land grant affecting or embracing the subject lands to an person (Annex 'D'); (5) Tax Declaration (Annexes 'E', 'E-1', 'E-2' and 'E-3'); (6) Tax Receipts (Annexes 'F') and 'F-l'); (7) Affidavit of adjoining owner Pedro L. Flores executed before Notary Public Atty. F. S. Guanco for Quezon City (Annex 'G'); (8) White print copy of Relocation Plan dated July 7-12, 1974, with the certification of Geodetic Engineer Restituto L. Beltran who conducted said relocation survey of Lots Nos. 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 in the presence of the adjoining owners (Annex 'H'). All of which are xerox copies and made integral parts of this petition but the originals thereof shall be presented at the hearing."

12 93 SCRA at pp. 247, 248.

13 G.R. Nos. L-32694 and L-33119, July 16, 1982.

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NOTES OR SUMMARY.

In Heirs of Pedro Pinote vs. Dulay

the High Court warned the courts to proceed with extreme caution in proceeding with the petition for reconstitution. In the said case, the other registered owners or their heirs were not individually notified of the filing of the petition. It held:

Under R.A. No. 26, reconstitution is validly made only in case the original copy of the certificate of title with the Register of Deeds is lost or destroyed. And if no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Moya, et al., 14 SCRA 358). The case at bar is not for reconstitution, but merely for replacement of lost duplicate certificate.

A judicial reconstitution proceedings is an in rem proceeding. When an order in such a proceeding has been final, the findings of the Court therein can no longer be opened for review. However, if it can be shown that the order of reconstitution was issued by the Court without previous publication in the Official Gazette as required by Sec. 13 of RA No. 26 and P.D. No. 1529, which is mandatory and jurisdictional, such order is null and void and naturally anything done under said order is likewise null and void. Publication in a newspaper of general circulation in lieu of the Official Gazette cannot be considered in itself as sufficient compliance (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Sison, et al. G.S. No. L-40309, Aug. 31, 1983, 124 SCRA 394; Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Lim, G.R. Nos. L-29182-83, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 464).

Pinote

In one case, the petition for reconstitution of the title was filed in the names of the registered co-owners, Saturnino Pinote married

to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed

Pinote. It was held that the court could not receive evidence proving

that Petra Pinote, instead of Pedro, is a registered co-owner of the

lot in question. As the petition for reconstitution of title was a

proceeding in rem, compliance with the requirements of RA 26 is a

condition sine qua non for the conferment of jurisdiction on the

court taking cognizance of the petition. Considering that both the

petition and the court’s notice of hearing, referred to the

reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 in the names of the registered

co-owners, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo,

Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the cadastral court had

jurisdiction only to grant or deny the prayer of the petition as

published in the notice of hearing. The jurisdiction of the cadastral

court is hedged in by the four walls of the petition and the published

notice of hearing which define the subject matter of the petition. If

the court oversteps those borders, it acts without or in excess of its

jurisdiction in the case. Hence, in Bunagan, et al. vs. CFI of Cebu, et

al., 97 SCRA 72, where the certificate of title was decreed in the

names of “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,’’ the reconstitution of

the title in the names of “spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia

Icong’’ was held to be “a material change that cannot be authorized.’’

Thus, the Supreme Court warned the courts to proceed with extreme

caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles so as to avoid being

used as a tool of swindlers and impostors in robbing someone of his

title, as follows:

“There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with

extreme caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles to land under

RA 26. Experience has shown that this proceeding has many times

been misused as a means of divesting a property owner of the title to

his property. Through fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes

up one day to discover that his certificate has been cancelled and

replaced by a reconstituted title in someone else’s name. Courts,

therefore, should not only require strict compliance with the

requirements of RA 26 but, in addition, should ascertain the identity

of every person who files a petition for reconstitution of title of the

authenticity and due execution of the petitioner’s authority to institute

the proceedings’’ (Heirs of Pedro Pinote vs. Dulay, 1990, 187 SCRA 12,

20).

The procedure may be resorted to regardless of whether or not

the duplicate copy of the title has been saved.

Salient features of this method include petition to and a

subsequent hearing in the Regional Trial Court of the province or

Notice of Lis Pendens Lis Pendens is that legal process in a suit regarding land which amounts to a legal notice to all the world that there is a dispute as to the title of the same. Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit (People vs. Regional Trial Court of Manila, 1989, 178 SCRA 299, 306 citing Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 25A, 1961, p. 7) or a pending litigation while a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the results of the litigation over the said property

The notice of lis pendens — i.e., that real property is involved in an action — is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein (Magdalena Homeowners Assn., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 1990, 184 SCRA 425, 330 citing Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. IAC, 1987, 152 SCRA 253 and Tanchoco vs. Aquino, 1987, 154 SCRA 1

The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal — like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunction — is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof. Thus, in one case which had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs’ appeal, it was held that the Court of Appeals had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or

the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. In this case, the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the case had dragged on and had been unnecessarily prolonged by repeated amendments of the complaints by the plaintiffs, and that the circumstances on record justified the conclusion that the annotation of the notice of lis pendens was intended to molest and harass the defendants. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the Court of Appeals was correct in ordering the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens which may be cancelled upon order of the court “after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded’’ (Magdalena Homeowners Assn., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 1990, 184 SCRA 325, 330-331 citing Sec. 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Sec. 77, P.D. 1529; Tan vs. Lantin, 1986, 142 SCRA 423).

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof (Sanchez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 332 [1976]; Pag

In Director of Lands vs. CA and Demetria Sta. Maria de Bernal, Greenfiled Development Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon Bagatsing, 102 SCRA 370, the Supreme Court ruled that “in all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction in mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.” Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction. (Po vs. Republic, 40 SCRA 37). And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA 220).

In the case of Register of Deeds of Malabon vs. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 170, 1990, 181 SCRA 788, the issue was whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette forty-seven (47) days after the hearing, instead of “at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing’’ was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the petition for reconstitution. The Supreme Court held that it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in

the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. In Director of Lands vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria de Bernal, Greenfield Development Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon Bagatsing, 102 SCRA 370, the Supreme Court ruled that “in all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.’’ Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction (citing Po vs. Republic, 40 SCRA 37). And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case an

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