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AS BIG AS NEW YORK CITY IS, it is com-posed of many small neighborhoods. Igrew up in the borough of Queens, NY, ina section called Richmond Hill that bor-ders on another section called KewGardens. When you’re 10 years old, as Iwas in 1964, no matter where you are, theknown world is really no larger than a bikeride. The library, the corner store, thehobby shop and schoolyard marked thefour corners of the earth.

On March 13, 1964, some 5,000 feetnorth of my bedroom window, KittyGenovese was raped and murderedin Kew Gardens. A man namedWinston Moseley stabbed her first ataround 3:15 am as she walked fromher parked car to her apartment. Shescreamed and neighbors heard her.Lights went on. One man yelled toleave her alone and the attacker actu-ally retreated as instructed.

Five minutes later, as Genovese laybleeding, Moseley returned andstabbed her again. Several moreneighbors opened their windows towatch and again the attacker left. A10-story apartment building is locat-ed across the street from where the initialattack occurred (see photo at right).During the 10 minutes Moseley wasgone, Genovese dragged herself aroundto the back of her apartment building andentered a hallway, where she collapsed.Moseley returned. He later told police, “Icame back because I knew I’d not fin-ished what I set out to do.” He followedthe blood trail, found his victim, cut offher clothes, raped, robbed and killed her.

Popular versions of the story say that38 neighbors watched the entire episode.Detailed analysis of the crime scene andwitness statements reveal that this is notentirely accurate. One account says anelderly couple shut off their lights, partedthe curtains and pulled chairs up to the

sionals are exceedingly busy, yet oftenfeel, “I could be doing more.”

“Could do” usually turns into “couldhave done” after an accident when hid-den root causes suddenly emerge. “If onlywe had seen. If only we had ventured intothat unfamiliar or uncomfortable territorywhere the components of the accident orincident lay waiting.” This article exam-ines why people may not go the “extramile,” and provides a strategy for noticingand preventing impending incidents.

The Stages of InterventionResearch triggered by the Genovese

murder explored why people often do notspring into action or act effectively whenhelp is needed. Darley and Latane dis-cussed the bystander effect and diffusionof responsibility in 1968. The basic tenet isthat the presence of other people decreasesthe probability that any one individual willhelp—the belief being that someone elsewill surely rise to the occasion. One’s ownresponsibility to act simply slips away into

the crowd of onlookers (Darley andLatane 377). The modern SH&E pro-fessional must set the example andact when needed.

Much of the literature on thebystander effect refers to emergencyresponse. The Genovese murderwas dramatic and disturbing. Thedeliberate, brutal and fatal abuse of ahuman being constitutes the direstpossible emergency. What goesthrough a person’s mind? Whatprompts action? How does the poten-tial Good Samaritan behave at thethreshold of crisis?

Latane and Darley developed adecision tree that describes fivestages leading to intervention:

•Step 1: Noticing. Simply realizingthat something out of the ordinary isactually happening.

•Step 2: Interpreting. Realizing thatthe event is an emergency.

•Step 3: Taking responsibility. Identi-fying yourself as the one who will act.

•Step 4: Deciding how to help. Whatto do.

•Step 5: Providing help. Actually do-ing it [Latane and Darley(b) 31].

Although their research focused oncrisis situations, it is useful to base one’sdaily posture toward safety and organi-zational well-being around these actionstages. Anyone who has worked in safetyand industry can relate to the term“threshold of crisis.” Controlling safety in

The Beauty of

InterventionKitty Genovese story is a call to action for SH&E professionals

By James V. Kulis

OtherVoices

window so they could see better.The fact of the matter is many peopleknew something was wrong that night,yet did nothing.

A Call to Action & ImprovementThe story of Kitty Genovese presents

SH&E professionals with a call to furtheraction and a recommendation for theimprovement of excellence. All profes-

The scene of the first attack on KittyGenovese—Austin Street looking towardLefferts Boulevard.

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an organization is not easy. A body ofworkers performs millions of handmotions and makes millions of decisions.Any one of those actions or decisions canresult in an injury or fatality. Almost anypoint in any day can be described as thethreshold of crisis. Yet, not every daypresents actual accidents, incidents or cri-sis situations. These events should be rareand are becoming even more rare as safe-ty efforts continue to improve. The SH&Eprofessional must be in position at thewindow, with curtains parted, watchingfor signs of trouble.

Step One: NoticingNoticing requires remaining alert to

every possible indicator of trouble. Thismay include visual observations, writtenreports from supervisors, formal conver-sations, gossip, feedback sessions in safe-ty meetings, audits and gut feelings.Think about a typical safety trainingvideo. When an accident is depicted, themain event—such as an electrician stand-

Investigator: “And then he finally felldown the garbage chute?”

Coworker: “Yeah, I knew he was gonna.”Noticing is not difficult, especially

when there is a dedicated network ofobservers in the workforce. People mustfeel free to speak when they suspect aproblem. The “Intervention Game Plan”sidebar (left) outlines a strategy for for-malizing this observation network andtargeting hotspots.

Step Two: InterpretingDarley and Latane also cite pluralistic

ignorance. If no one is acting, then noth-ing must be wrong (Darley and Latane).Here is where the SH&E professionaldoes not sit back and blend in. Experi-ence, training and site-specific job knowl-edge simply do not allow it. If no one isacting, it is because the SH&E profession-al is not acting.

Consider the story of the emperor’snew clothes. When his pretended weaversshow him a cloth so fine that a simpletoncannot see it, he wonders:

”What is this?” thought the emper-or, “I do not see anything at all.That is terrible! Am I stupid? Am Iunfit to be emperor? That wouldindeed be the most dreadful thingthat could happen to me.

“Really,” he said, turning to theweavers, “your cloth has our mostgracious approval” and noddingcontentedly he looked at the emptyloom, for he did not like to say thathe saw nothing. All his attendants,who were with him, looked andlooked, and although they couldnot see anything more than the oth-ers, they said, like the emperor, “Itis very beautiful” (Andersen).The SH&E professional must trust

his/her own judgment and watch forpretended weavers, which may takemany forms—manipulated statistics,“yes” men, polished and painted equip-ment ready to fail—that do not deservecomplete approbation. If the looms areempty, the SH&E professional must notbe convinced by anyone that they are not.Interpreting is easy when members fromdifferent areas of the organization gatherand examine a potential problem frommany sides.

Step Three: Taking ResponsibilityDiffusion of responsibility occurs when

the number of bystanders is high and thenumber of victims is low. This high/lowratio also describes the relationship of non-

ing in a bucket of water while reachingfor a junction box—is usually foretold byominous music. The viewer knowswhat’s coming.

During my safety career, I have oftenheard that music playing in my headweeks or months before an incident. It’s afeeling often expressed during accidentinvestigations: “I knew there was going tobe an accident,” followed by an explana-tion of exactly why that was the case.

Investigator: “How did you know Joewas going to have an accident?”

Coworker: “He used to fall asleepwhere he was standing.”

Investigator: “Standing?”Coworker: “Yeah, it would happen

even if he was walking.”Investigator: “What did you do?”Coworker: “We used to kick him in the

pants. He would wake up and keep mov-ing just as if nothing had happened.”

Investigator: “How long did this con-tinue?”

Coworker: “For about two months.”

Intervention Game Plan:The Five Steps in ActionNoticing

Ask all line and field supervisors to describe—weekly—an area of the opera-tion about which they have safety concerns (hotspots). Their answers might takethe form of, but are not limited to:

•acceptance of shortcuts;•malfunctioning or poorly maintained machinery;•ineffective employee training;•unrealistic deadlines or production schedules;•uneven work flow;•low morale and apathy;•confusion about generic or ambiguous policies.

InterpretingForm a team of two line employees, two supervisors, an SH&E professional

and manager to analyze the hotspots reported by supervisors. The goal is tohave the group work together, while allowing members to speak freely fromtheir specific perspectives. A team composed of members from different levels ofan organization is a powerful alloy. It is a tool for enlightenment of all partiesand can effectively generate and complete action items. It is much stronger thana homogenous group working alone. Management might be unaware of a short-cut that employees accept as a best practice. SH&E personnel might not beaware of specific deadlines or production schedules in all parts of an operation.Working together, the team should analyze hotspots and determine priorities.

Taking ResponsibilityTaking responsibility means making responsibility. Once the team has ana-

lyzed hotspots and set priorities, management should assign action items thatspecific team members will carry out.

Deciding How to HelpThe best compass in deciding how to help is to play to the team’s strengths.

In other words, assign action items on the basis of where a team member func-tions within the organization.

Providing HelpDevelop a concrete timeline of who will perform what action when. Post the

timeline in the team’s meeting room and/or training room so that team mem-bers and their fellow workers remain aware of it.

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injured to injured in an organization. Thelikelihood of getting hurt is relativelysmall. A modern SH&E professional legiti-mately empowers those around him/herto take responsibility. Most current safetyphilosophies and programs stress employ-ee ownership under the guidance of amanager who is personally involved. Inessence, the manager is the program. Inmany cases, it is simply a matter of givingthe go-ahead to a dedicated employee whoalready has the problem half solved.

Step Four: Deciding How to HelpWith respect to the Genovese case,

most people are shocked that it took solong just to call the police. People in theneighborhood said, “Even if they didn’twant to go out in the night themselves,they could have called the cops!” Theattacker had a knife and a clear intent todo harm. No one expected the elderlycouple or other witnesses to dart out intothe street and jump Moseley. They didn’thave the skills and the personal risk wastoo great. Confined space and first-aidtraining stresses the need for a trained res-cuer. There is great wisdom in calling forspecific help. Collectively, the members ofthe organization understand the environ-ment and know how to improve it.

Step Five: Providing HelpThe strategy outlined in the “Inter-

vention” sidebar calls for creating a teamto work through the five steps leading toeffective intervention. The “Line LeakTeam” sidebar (right) explains how a teammade up of a manager, SH&E profession-al, two supervisors and two employeestackles a sample problem. The team movesthrough the five steps as a group, provid-ing each other with analysis and resources.Once the members notice and understandthe problem, they can solve it.

The Beauty of InterventionProviding help in the manner de-

scribed requires discipline because thepayoff is not immediately apparent.When applying the principles of noticing,interpreting, taking responsibility, decid-ing to help and providing help, nothinghappens, and that’s just the point—noth-ing bad happens. The example team wasnearly an accident investigation teamanalyzing a catastrophic line leak. Inter-vention is the easier route.

After an incident or accident, there isoften an overwhelming desire to rewindthe film. It is usually possible to pinpointthe moment when things went awry. It isup to SH&E professionals to be vigilant

in noticing, listening to and never disre-garding the inner voice that warns ofimminent danger.

Kitty Genovese was just one person, yether death has taken on tremendous mean-ing and social significance. From 1992 to2001, an average of 6,200 people died peryear as a result of workplace injuries (BLS).From 1980 through 1995, at least 93,338workers in the U.S. died as a result of trau-ma on the job (NIOSH). Each of thosedeaths should touch people as deeply asGenovese’s did. Death in the workplace issenseless. The only possible meaning it canhave is to indicate where the system failed.Listen for the scary music and vigilantlywork toward improving workplace safety.

ReferencesAndersen, H.C. “The Emperor’s New Suit.”

1837.Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). “Census of

Fatal Occupational Injuries.” Washington, DC: U.S.Dept. of Labor, BLS.

Darley, J.M. and B. Latane. “Bystander

Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsi-bility.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.8(1968): 377-383.

DeMay, J. Jr. “Kitty Genovese: What You ThinkYou Know.” A Picture History of Kew Gardens, NY.<http://www.oldkewgardens.com>.

Gado, M. “A Cry in the Night: The Kitty Geno-vese Murder.” Court TV’s Crime Library: CriminalMinds and Methods. <http://www.crimelibrary.com>.

Latane, B. and J.M. Darley(a). “Group Inhibi-tion of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies.”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 10(1968):215-221.

Latane, B. and J.M. Darley(b). The UnresponsiveBystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? New York: Apple-ton-Century-Crofts, 1970.

NIOSH. “Traumatic Occupational Injury.”Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Preven-tion, NIOSH. <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/injury/trauma.html>.

James V. Kulis, CSP, is a safety specialist withPool Well Services Co. in southern California,where he has worked since 1983. He holds amaster’s in German from San Francisco StateUniversity. Kulis is a member of ASSE’s LosAngeles Chapter.

Line Leak Team:Preventing Disaster By Taking ActionTeam:

Lease manager: Jeff Employee I: FredSupervisor I: Darlene Employee II: JanetSupervisor II: Tom SH&E professional: Gary

NoticingThe team receives the following supervisor hotspot report: “We discovered a

small leak near the ground where a six-inch oil-gathering line exited to surface.”Investigation revealed that the entire weld was worn away. The only thing pre-venting the line from rupturing was the cement insulation inside.

InterpretingThe team discussed the supervisor’s concern. Janet noted that the pipe was

prone to rust at exactly the point where it entered the ground because of move-ment and moisture. She hadn’t seen it before on this lease, but at another facilityit happened all the time.

Jeff added that as far as he knew the gathering lines haven’t been replacedsince he installed them as a roustabout 35 years ago. Darlene said that inspectingthe lines used to be part of her crew’s daily routine but may have been droppedwhen they went from six to four operators.

Taking ResponsibilityTom offered to run a fieldwide check of all gathering lines if that was all right

with Jeff. Jeff agreed. Fred and Janet said that they would like to be part of theproject.

Deciding How to HelpThe team decided that Fred and Janet would conduct a fieldwide sweep of all

gathering stations and inventory the condition of the lines. They would note anydefects and report immediately if a line was in poor condition. Jeff asked toaccompany them to the first gathering station and the crew agreed.

Providing HelpThe team determined that Fred and Janet would check all gathering stations in

four days and provide a report on the condition of the lines. As it turned out, 30percent of the lines needed attention.

Jeff decided to overhaul the lines. He asked Gary to work with engineeringand a permitting agency to investigate installing cathodic protection and soiltreatment to protect all the lines in the field.

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