korea's future: seoul's perspective

Korea's Future: Seoul's PerspectiveAuthor(s): Young Whan KihlSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 11 (Nov., 1977), pp. 1064-1076Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643355 .

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KOREA'S FUTURE: SEOUL'S PERSPECTIVE

Young Whan KihI

THE GOVERNMENT IN Seoul is preoccupied with the question of how to defend South Korea from a possible renewed attack from North Korea. Many officials in Seoul believe that Pyongyang's demand for a U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea is part of an overall strategy of forcing a military showdown with the South. North Korea's military plans might include, according to observers in Seoul: (1) a conventional military attack on Seoul, using either a limited "light- ning war" action or an all-out offensive; (2) initiating guerrilla- type operations by infiltrating a force of its troop to the rear in the guise of a rebellious South Korean unit; and (3) calling for an immediate ceasefire after the initial thrust to increase world sympathy for its cause.' To demonstrate such a possibility, South Korea points out that Seoul, with a population of close to seven million, is militarily vulner- able to an all-out North Korean attack because it is only 30 miles from the border; that North Korea constructed a series of so-called under- ground invasion tunnels across the Demilitarized Zone, two of which have been uncovered so far; and that Pyongyang has obtained increased diplomatic support from nonaligned third world countries in recent years.2

1 This observation is based on a field survey and interviews with some government leaders in South Korea during the summer of 1975. Also, Seoul's perception of North Korea's intention is reflected in the editorials of the government news- paper, The Korea Herald, as well as in occasional publications by the Seoul government. For instance, see A White Paper ofl the South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: South-North Coordinating Committee [Seoul Side], July 1975); Renewed Threat From North Korea (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976); and South North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: International Cultural Society of Korea, 1975, 1976).

2 Since 1971, when the North-South dialogue began, Pyongyang has increased the number of countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations. Pyongyang in June 1976 maintained diplomatic relations with 90 countries, as compared with Seoul's 95. A total of 47 countries recognized both Seoul and Pyongyang in 1976. Also, it is significant to note that the nonaligned nations conference of foreign ministers in Lima, Peru, in August 1975 decided to admit Pyongyang, not Seoul, to

1064



KOREA'S FUTURE: SEOUL'S PERSPECTIVE 1065

Seoul's concern over North Korea's intentions may be somewhat exaggerated and self-serving. What is important, however, is that such a perception of the situation, no matter how distorted and simplistic, is the underlying force behind the policies and actions of the Seoul government vis-a-vis North Korea and the outside world. In this paper Korea's future will be discussed in terms of, first, Seoul's perception of the stalemate on the Korean peninsula today; second, Seoul's position on various international proposals on Korea; and third, Seoul's thinking on the critical factors (variables) affecting future North-South Korea relations.

Many South Koreans believe that the power balance with North Korea is going to be upset as a result of the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. The Seoul government is therefore anxious to develop its own defense capability in order to achieve a military balance with (or a superiority over) North Korea. For this purpose the Seoul government has been implementing a Five-Year Force Improvement Plan since mid-1975.3 Three specific measures have been adopted thus far as part of this plan: (1) increasing the purchase of conventional arms from abroad, mainly from the U.S.; (2) expanding an infrastructure of science and technology which, if necessary, can meet the task of manufacturing conventional weapons; and (3) developing an independent nuclear capability over the long run. Each of these specific points will be elaborated upon subsequently. But the adoption of such measures is an expression of Seoul's attempt to compensate for the "perceived loss" of the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and, possibly, the nuclear umbrella as well.

The recent statement by Seoul that it would no longer object to the U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea if Pyongyang agrees to conclude a nonaggression pact is both a recognition of the inevitability of American disengagement from the Asian mainland and, possibly, a ploy to camouflage its increased effort to strengthen South Korea militarily.4 What is significant from the standpoint of inter-Korean relations is that Seoul has not so far responded favorably to Pyongyang's earlier proposal for mutual troop reduction to 100,000 and that Pyongyang has likewise dismissed Seoul's nonaggression proposal as unacceptable. One would hope that the two proposals might be used to effect a kind of com-

membership and that North Korea, not South Korea, was represented at the Con- ference of Non-Aligned Nations in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in August 1976.

3 A five year program of Modernization of the Republic of Korea Army, which began in 1971, had been completed in part by 1976 or superseded by the new Five Year Force Improvement Plan. The former plan was initiated in response to the Nixon Doctrine proclamation in 1969 and the subsequent withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from Korea in 1969-1970.

4 For the text of Park's annual news conference of January 12, 1977, when he made this announcement, see Korea Herald, January 13, 1977. He also coupled his suggestion with the statement that Seoul was prepared to extend food grain assistance to North Korea, which he said was suffering from a severe food shortage.



1066 YOUNG WHAN KIHL

promise solution that would lessen the level of tension and reduce the danger of a renewed military conflict in the Korean peninsula.5 In the absence of mutual trust and willingness to bargain, however, the possibility of adopting a reasonable solution seems less than likely, and the prospects are for a stalemate of inter-Korean relations.

As part of an over-all effort to improve its defense capability in 1975, South Korea adopted a number of legislative bills, including a defense surtax of 10%.O It is expected that this measure will generate approximately $400 million annually for the subsequent five years of the Force Improvement Plan. This amount will augment Seoul's defense budget, which has already skyrocketed in recent years. It is reported that Seoul spent about $1.6 billion for defense in 1976, more than a four-fold increase from the $382.2 million spent in 1974, and that it has budgeted $1.9 billion for 1977.7 As U.S. military assistance to South Korea has declined, the bulk of the money generated internally is earmarked for the purchase of arms from abroad. It was an- nounced in 1975, for instance, that the U.S. would sell sixty F-5 jet fighters to South Korea for $205 million. The amount spent for the purchase of conventional arms from the U.S. thus increased from $56.4 million in 1974 to $159.8 million in 1975.8 The military expenditures of South Korea in 1975 were estimated by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to be $991 million-5.06% of the total GNP and $25 per capita. In contrast, North Korea's expenditure was estimated by the same source to be $729 million-10.40% of the GNP and $40.40 per capita.9 It is significant to note that South Korea's military expenditure, both gross and per capita, has steadily increased since 1966, while North Korea's military outlay has remained almost constant with only minor fluctuations in the same period.10

5 The Institute for Strategic Studies in London estimated the two Koreas' military preparedness in 1976 as follows: total aimed forces 595,000 (a decrease of 30,000 from that of 1975) for South Korea and 495,000 (an increase of 28,000 over 1975) for North Korea. For details, see The Military Balance, 1976/77 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977).

6 In addition to a surtax bill, the National Assembly passed in July 1975 a public security bill which places under government surveillance and possible in- ternment those convicted once of violating anti-Communist and national security laws and a bill which provides for the organization of a civil defense corps of men between 17 and 50 years of age. Seoul claims that these measures were necessary to cope with the threat from North Korea in the wake of Communist victories in Indochina. New York Times, July 9, 1975.

7Los Angeles Times, December 5, 1976, as quoted in Korea Weck, January 11, 1977.

8 The amount of the U.S. military assistance for the modernization of South Korean armed forces, grants and loans, was $556.2 million (1971), $532.2 million (1972), $363 million (1973), $157.3 million (1974), and $141.6 million (1975). Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976, p. 15.

9 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976), p. 36.

10Ibid. For instance, the military expenditure for 1966 was estimated to have been $531 million for North Korea (as against $294 million for South Korea). Mili-




South Korea plans to augment arms purchases from abroad with the development of its own capability for producing conventional arms. In fact, South Korea has already become self-sufficient in basic weaponry production; in 1976 it started manufacturing its own M-16 rifles and 105 mm and 155 mm artillery pieces. Foreign capital is also in- jected into the armament industry: It is reported that Seoul has con- tracted with Hughes Aircraft Corporation to produce M-500 helicopters and has a plan of coproducing tanks with an unspecified multinational firm." South Korea has a manpower pool and scientific infrastructure which can sustain a program of conventional weaponry development. The Seoul government maintains a ministry of science and technology at the cabinet level and a number of scientific "think tanks," including the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), and President Park recently disclosed that the government plans to establish addi- tional research centers.'2 For these purposes the Ministry of Education in Seoul launched a "brain attraction" campaign to encourage many overseas Korean scientists to return to Korea.

Given such an extensive investment in scientific development, it will not be too difficult to shift from manufacturing conventional weapons to developing a basic nuclear capability. Seoul may reason that it must maintain, as a minimum, a nuclear option such as the one en- joyed by Israel and Japan which can, with short notice, be easily changed to a war footing that could manufacture nuclear warheads and missiles. Seoul appears to have made a decision to "go nuclear" in the long run-i.e., to manufacture its own atomic weapons.13 That South Korea is a signatory power of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty does not deter it from pursuing the policy of preparing for the contingency of nuclear development.

For the purpose of developing a nuclear capability over the long run, Seoul launched a trial balloon to test the possible reaction from abroad to its contemplated plan of developing nuclear weapons. Presi- dent Park said in an interview with the Washington Post on June 26, 1975, that his country "would do anything necessary to insure its sur-

tary expenditures as a percentage of GNP was 12.10% for North Korea (as against 3.92% for South Korea); per capita, it was $42.10 for North Korea (as against $9.98 for South Korea).

11 Korea Week, January 11, 1977. 12 Other related research centers include Korean Scientific and Technological

Information Center (KORSTIC), Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS), and Korea Research Institute of Mineral Research (KORIMR). The proposed new institutes include Korea Chemical Research Institute, Korea Machinery and Metalurgical Research Institute, Korea Shipbuilding and Maritime Research Institute, and the Korea Electronic Research Institute.

13 In an interview with the Asahi Shimbun in Tokyo recently, however, ex- Prime Minister Kim Jong-Pill insisted that South Korea decided not to go nuclear because South Korea does not need it and North Korea may be unnecessarily alarmed by such an act. Asahi Shimbun, February 19, 1977, as reported in Hankilk Ilbo, February 20, 1977.




vival including development of nuclear weapons ... if the U.S. nuclear umbrella is withdrawn."'14 The Minister of Science and Technology was quoted as saying that South Korea "had the technical potential to develop its own nuclear weapons."15 This is not an empty threat because South Korea already possesses two atomic reactors in Seoul.16 A U.S. government study estimated that these two reactors, which began op- eration in 1975, would produce between 240 and 300 kilograms of plutonium each year and that by 1980 South Korea would have accumulated some 820 to 1,000 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient to produce 200 nuclear bombs initially, 60 nuclear bombs annually thereafter, and 88 nuclear bombs annually by the year 2000.17

In order to make its potential of nuclear development a reality, Seoul turned to Canada and France for the purchase of a plutonium reprocessing plant. Seoul's deal with France was cancelled in January 1976, however, when the U.S. State Department threatened to withhold the Export-Import Bank financing for a $292 million Westinghouse Power reactor. Seoul realized that it had no option but to succumb to the U.S. pressure because the deal would have jeopardized even the purchase of U.S. arms, since the U.S. Congress was expected to cancel such purchases as a retaliatory measure if Seoul did not comply. But in spite of these obstructions, it is expected that Seoul will continue to make headway towards a nuclear capability. It is reported that to develop nuclear technology Seoul plans to spend some $110 million in domestic and foreign currencies during the fourth five year plan period (1977-1981). This expenditure, according to one source, will make South Korea 30% self-sufficient in the area of nuclear power plant equipment and nuclear fuel by 1981.18 It may not be an accident that South Korea and Gabon recently concluded an agreement on joint uranium exploration, and that a team of Korean technicians is expected to go to an African country to survey the situation.

In the light of these efforts by South Korea to become self-sufficient militarily, Seoul will not look favorably on any proposals on the Korean peninsula that would impose restrictions upon its freedom of action vis-a-vis North Korea. Except for the four-power conference proposed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975 and 1976, Seoul seems to be basically opposed to international plans for Korea, including a bilateral or multilateral agreement on the ban of conventional

14 The Washington Post, June 26, 1975. 15 Korea Times, June 27, 1975. 16 The first unit, Triga Mark II, 100 kw capacity, was activated on March 19,

1962, and the seecond, Triga Mark III, 2,000 kw capacity, was activated on March 10, 1972. Korea Week, July 17, 1975.

17 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Facts on Nuclear Pro- liferations, 1975 (U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Doc 63-441, 1975), as quoted in Korea Week, January 15, 1976.

18 Hanhuk Ilbo, August 3, 1976.




arms delivery, a multilateral agreement on a nuclear-free zone for Korea, and a North-South confederation or the variations on this proposed by Pyongyang. In a statement on Kissinger's proposal issued in Seoul on July 23, 1976, Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin said that "the unconditional resumption of the South-North dialogue and the conven- ing of the conference of the parties directly concerned are the most realistic and rational approach towards the settlement of outstanding problems on Korea." He also characterized the acceptance of such a proposal by Pyongyang to be "a constructive step" and "a conciliatory approach" that will help put an end to "sterile and unproductive con- frontation" between the two Koreas at the international forum.19 The main reason for Seoul's supporting the Kissinger plan thus seems to be to use it as a way of bringing Pyongyang to renew the North-South dialogue that has been stalemated since August 1973.

Seoul is opposed at this time to any measure restricting the delivery of conventional arms to Korea. Concluding such an agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, would be considered to go against the South's national interests as well as its five-year force improvement plan, which requires continued purchases of sophisticated arms from the United States. Seoul may modify its stand on the matter, however, once its military position vis-a-vis North Korea is felt to be secure and superior. This is a distinct possibility in the near future as long as the current endeavor to build a defense capability continues and the fourth five-year economic plan is successfully implemented. But if the eventuality of military superiority of Seoul over Pyongyang ever becomes a reality, the military balance in the Korean peninsula will no longer be stable. It could also prove counterproductive if Pyongyang decided to escalate the level of its own defense preparedness to counter the military posture of Seoul.

The proposal to establish the Korean peninsula as a nuclear free zone is also likely to be opposed by Seoul because Seoul has invested in the development of its own nuclear capability and indeed may have already crossed the threshold of no return on a nuclear time table. South Korea will feel insecure if the Carter policy of removing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Korea is realized. Seoul naturally hopes -but is not likely-to inherit some of the nuclear weapons equipment and warheads from the U.S. forces in Korea.20 For this reason a nuclear- free zone, unless accompanied by a comprehensive four-power guaran-

19 Underlines added for emphasis. Major Foreign Policy Statements of the Re- public of Korea (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [PS Series No. 36], 1976), p. 23.

20 The U.S. House Appropriations Committee, however, recommended that some of the Hawk and Nike-Hercules missiles plus associated equipment which the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade possesses in Korea be transferred to South Korea. It also suggested that some of the Sergeant and Honest John nuclear capable missiles which the 4th Missile Command possesses might be left to the Koreans. As cited in Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, p. 59.




tee-by the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, and Japan-will be inter- preted by Seoul as premature and unacceptable. Seoul would argue that the acquisition of a nuclear capability by the South is intended not so much for use against the population of North Korea as to deter North Korean threats and aggression.

Seoul may modify its stand and accept the idea of a nuclear-free zone for Korea, however, if there are enough incentives and guarantees associated with the proposal for denuclearization of the peninsula. At least the following three conditions seem to be essential for South Korea: (1) the signing with North Korea of a nonaggression pact or a variation thereof which contains pledges renouncing the use of force against each other and noninterference in each other's domestic affairs; (2) a four-power endorsement of the North-South agreement of mutual nonaggression and a pledge by these powers to respect the nuclear-free zone for Korea; and (3) a U.S. assurance that military involvement in Korea by either China or the U.S.S.R. in the future will be countered by U.S. intervention.21 The present stalemate in the North-South negotiations may not allow the possibility of the first solution, while the second solution seems rather premature since it is contingent upon the first solution. The third solution necessitates separate treaty negotiations with the U.S. which, under its current policies, is not likely to extend its security commitments in Asia. Thus, circumstances may reinforce Seoul's policy of resisting the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, at least for the time being.

Seoul regards the various Pyongyang proposals for a North-South confederation as sheer propaganda and a smokescreen to disguise the North's intention to communize South Korea. Seoul's policy on reunification, as enunciated on August 15, 1974, consists of three principles: (1) the conclusion of a mutual nonaggression pact and a respect for noninterference in each other's internal affairs; (2) the unconditional resumption of the North-South dialogue so as to promote many-sided exchanges and cooperation; and (3) the holding of free general elections in direct proportion to population size.22 In contrast, Pyongyang's "peace proposals" presented at the North-South Coordinating Commit- tee meetings in 1972 consist of five principles: (1) halt to the arms race, mutual force reduction, removal of all foreign troops, a ban on imports of arms from abroad, and an exchange of pledges against the use of arms by concluding a North-South peace treaty; (2) "multifarious co- operations in all fields, including political, military, foreign affairs, economic and cultural"; (3) a "grand national congress" convoked with "representatives of political parties, social organizations and strata"

21 Ralph N. Clough, A. Doak Barnett, Morton H. Halperin, and Jerome H. Kahan, The United States, China and Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 136.

22 Park Chung Hee, Toward Peaceful Unification (Selected Speeches) (Seoul: Kwangmyong Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 103-109.




from the two Koreas as participants; (4) a "North-South federation" having a supreme national council to coordinate a concerted national development, while leaving the two sides in Korea intact for the time being; and (5) unification of North-South Korea in the long run.23

It is significant that both Seoul and Pyongyang describe their re- spective formulas for unification as "peace proposals."24 To counter Pyongyang's accent on an "independent and peaceful reunification of Korea," Seoul took an initiative on June 23, 1973 in proclaiming a "new foreign policy for peace and unification," which states, in part, that Seoul would not object to Pyongyang's participation in international organizations or to joint admission to the United Nations if the majority of the U.N. members so desire.25 Pyongyang dismissed Seoul's line by characterizing it as an attempt to perpetuate the division of the father- land. In view of these expressions of distrust and suspicion, it is not likely that a positive response to each other's proposal on unification can make any headway unless mutual trust and confidence are restored beforehand.

What are the critical factors (variables) which might help South Korea modify its stand on the various international agreements proposed for Korea? Seoul's present position is based on a situation which is perceived by the leadership to be "threatening" to the security of South Korea. But as Seoul is also sensitive to changes in the international environment surrounding the peninsula, it is not likely that its stand will remain unchanged or that it would fail to adapt to altered circumstances.26 Possible factors that might modify Seoul's thinking and behavior are: (1) a change in North Korea's stand on the reunification issue; (2) international pressure on Seoul, whether by the U.S. uni- laterally or by the U.S. in concert with other major powers such as Japan, China, and the U.S.S.R.; and (3) domestic politics within South Korea.

Seoul assumes that Pyongyang will not easily modify its rigid and unyielding position on North-South negotiations without first under- going some kind of internal political change. Seoul views the present leadership in Pyongyang as too inflexible and dogmatic, thus making it difficult to conduct a rational debate with North Korea based on bargaining and negotiation. This estimate of North Korean leadership stems from the South Korean image of Kim Il-song as a fanatic and

23 A White Paper, pp. 81-92. 24 For instance, the titles of publications by both leaders bear the theme of

peace. Park Chung Hee, Toward Peaceful Unification, and Kim Ii Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea (New York: Guardian, 1976).

25 Park, Toward Peaceful Unification. 26 In proclaiming martial law on October 17, 1972, Park cited "the changing

international situation" as one reason for taking this extraordinary measure. Such justifications were also given in the issuance of a series of emergency decrees in December 1971, January 1974, and April 1974.




romantic, a first generation revolutionary who runs the country as an iron-clad dictatorship without allowing the possibility for domestic dissension and criticism. If Kim is replaced, or engulfed by a power struggle to determine his successor, a changed climate in North Korea might be conducive to the resumption of a now stalemated North-South dialogue. In the light of the recent post-Mao succession struggle in China, the Seoul leadership seems to expect a similar process of political turmoil and crisis inside North Korea, although it does not necessarily follow that Kim's successor will soften Pyongyang's stand on the question of reunification and North-South relations.

The preceding scenario on North Korea may or may not be realistic, but the possibility of its occurring cannot be completely ruled out, especially in view of the rumors that Kim's health is failing and that his son, Kim Chong Il, is being groomed as his successor in place of Kim's younger brother, Kim Young-Ju, who has built his own power base in North Korea. If and when the climate for North-South dialogue has improved because of altered circumstances in Pyongyang, Seoul might be willing to sign a North-South agreement to lessen tension on the Korean peninsula (based on a compromise of the two powers' proposals for mutual nonaggression and mutual troop reduction), a multilateral agreement to ban conventional arms delivery and to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, and a call for North-South consultations on a limited political, social, economic, and cultural integration of the two Koreas.

International pressure on Seoul is basically of two types-unilateral and multilateral. The most effective unilateral pressure is exerted by the U.S. and, possibly, Japan. Washington's leverages upon Seoul are the scheduled U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea and the threat to recognize Pyongyang in due course.27 But Seoul expects that the process of troop withdrawal will be gradual, not to be completed in the 1970s, and that the Carter Administration will conduct prior consultations with Seoul and Tokyo on the details of withdrawal.28 Seoul naturally hopes to exercise some leverage of its own on the timing and method of implementing the Carter policy on withdrawal, and will press the U.S. to turn over to South Korea certain weapons and equipment, although it will have difficulty convincing the U.S. to leave the bulk of nuclear weapons and warheads. In the process of bilateral or trilateral talks between Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo, the U.S. can exercise its leverage to induce South Korea to be more tolerant of domestic political dissension and more conciliatory also toward negotiations with Pyongyang.

27President Carter's moves to normalize relations with Cuba and to send an envoy to North Vietnam may be seen by Seoul as ominous signs of his willingness also to improve relations with North Korea in the future.

28 See ex-Prime Minister Kim Jong-Pill's interview with the Asahi Shimbun as cited previously. Also, the pledge of prior consultation with Seoul and Tokyo is repeated in the Carter statement on troop withdrawal from Korea.




Seoul will continue to oppose any move by the U.S. and Japan to recognize Pyongyang unless a reciprocal move of cross-recognition of South Korea by China and the U.S.S.R. is forthcoming. Seoul was pleased to note that Kissenger in his proposal for a four-power conference on Korea stated, in rejecting Pyongyang's proposal for a bilateral peace treaty with the U.S. (to replace the 1953 Korean armistice agreement), that "the U.S. will never accept such proposals . . . designed not to promote peace but to isolate our ally, to precipitate unilateral Amer- ican withdrawal and to dissolve the existing legal arrangements into amorphous general negotiations."129 In spite of these reassurances Seoul is basically fearful that its allies might somehow succumb to pressure and adopt a formula which favors the Pyongyang position. A Shanghai "joint communique" type of agreement on Korea by the U.S. and Japan with Pyongyang would be considered a serious blow by Seoul, and it will strenuously oppose any measure on the future of Korea in which Seoul is not a participant in the process of negotiation. For this reason the U.S. can effectively use its leverage on Seoul in a more constructive way, not so much to punish Seoul as to help both Seoul and Pyongyang to modify their stands on the North-South dialogue and on unification.

Effective international pressure on Seoul to modify its opposition to arms control agreements, including the denuclearization of Korea, lies in speeding up the process of negotiation on such plans and pre- senting them to Seoul as a fait accompli. The initiative must again be taken by the U.S. in negotiating either a series of separate bilateral agreements with the powers or a package of multilateral agreements with China, the U.S.S.R., and Japan regarding Korea. Some years ago Peking advocated a "No First Use" (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy, which can be effective if directed to a specific region like Korea.30 The U.S. can reciprocate by proposing a nuclear-free zone for Korea in which a U.S. pledge of NFU against North Korea would be included. The formula can then be extended to include other major powers, the U.S.S.R. and Japan. If the U.S. and Japan exert pressure, Seoul may accede to an arms control agreement on Korea, in return for a kind of institutional arrangement of trilateral linkage between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, similar to the idea of trilateral partnership between the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan.

The changes in Sino-Soviet relations will be only marginally related to the position of Seoul. Seoul realizes that continued Sino-Soviet conflict will enhance Pyongyang's vulnerability and make the U.S. troop presence in Korea less objectionable to Peking. Seoul would expect a Sino-Soviet accommodation to affect the security position of the U.S.

29 U.S. Department of State, The Secretary of State Speech before the Down- town Rotary Club and the Chamber of Commerce on July 22, 1976, Seattle, Wash- ington, p. 8. This policy was reaffirmed by Secretary of State Vance in a speech to the Asia Society in New York on June 29, 1977. The New York Times, June 30, 1977.

30 Clough, et. al., The United States, pp. 133-137.




and Japan more than that of South Korea; Japan might then prefer the U.S. presence in Asia as a counterweight to a Sino-Soviet threat or initiate the process of strengthening its own defense capability.

Seoul realizes that it is domestic stability and economic prosperity in South Korea which will be decisive ultimately in its competition with North Korea. Without strong and broad support at home, Seoul will not be able to withstand the pressures emanating from North Korea and the external world. This is why the Park government places national unity, together with national security and economic development, as one of its three policy goals.31 To the extent that the forces of an anti-Yushin movement are gaining strength, the Seoul government cannot feel secure. Fortunately for Park, the opposition New Demo- cratic Party is weak and divided internally into competing factions at the moment.32 At the same time, the Seoul government is afraid that U.S. pressure on South Korea to restore the human rights of domestic dissenters will be counterproductive by undermining the credibility of Park at home and abroad and therefore the political stability itself. So far Seoul has resisted U.S. pressure on the human rights issue, but, in the face of mounting criticisms generated by the Korean scandal in the U.S., only time will tell whether Seoul can withstand punitive action by its patron state.

Seoul's strategy for reunification via economic development may very well prove to be effective in the long run, and this has helped the South become increasingly relaxed and confident in its dealing with North Korea in recent years. "Our long-term unification policy," a South Korean official recently commented, "is based on the concept of integration. We see unification more as a process than an event. That is why we have been proposing contacts between the two sides, in trade, academic, sports and artistic exchanges. North Korea has rejected all these proposals. But in the long run they will have to respond to our initiatives, because we are going to be such a preponderant factor in the Korean peninsula. North Korea will have no choice but to respond."33 Underlying such expressions of self-confidence is the psychological uplifting that is the result of pride in achieving economic development in recent years.34 Seoul seems to be in no hurry to bring

31 See Park's new year's press conference of January 12, 1977, Korea Herald, January 13, 1977.

32 A hardliner, Kim Yong Sam, was replaced as leader of the New Democratic Party by Lee Chul Seung, who advocates a bipartisan approach on national security and foreign policy issues.

33As reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review, November 19, 1976, pp. 33-34.

34 Park's special assistant for international affairs, Dr. Kim Kyung Won, added in his interview that "we have to ensure that nothing spoils our economic prosperity. . . . For the first time in the history of our republic, we are finally amounting to something; we are bringing about a great success. And you really have to put your- self in the shoes of a Korean to be able to understand the psychology of exhilara- tion, anticipation and optimism and self-confidence that we are experiencing. . . And we don't want anything to spoil this." Ibid.




about the reunification of divided Korea, in spite of its rhetoric to the contrary, since it believes that time is on its side in the competition with Pyongyang. We can only conclude, therefore, that the prospect of a united Korea through the North-South dialogue on reunification is rather grim in the immediate future and that the present stalemate may well continue throughout the remainder of the 1970s and even into the 1980s.

In recent months a number of significant events have occurred that affect the position of the Seoul government. In late spring it was reported in the U.S. press that many field officers in Korea had openly disagreed with the Carter Administration's plan to withdraw troops from Korea on the grounds that withdrawal would weaken the military position of South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea. Major General John Singlaub, who was chief of staff of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, for instance, predicted another war in Korea unless the Carter plan was modified. The subsequent recall of General Singlaub convinced the Seoul government that Carter's determination on troop withdrawal was rather firm and irreversible. In late May a special mission from the U.S. president, consisting of Undersecretary of State Philip Habib and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General George Brown, visited Seoul to deliver to President Park the Carter Administration's plan on scheduled troop withdrawals from Korea. There followed in Seoul on July 25 and 26 a two-day meeting of the annual security consultative conference on Korea, which was attended by U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The Seoul government took these and other occasions to insist that the U.S. take "compensatory measures" prior to troop withdrawal.

As a result of hard bargaining Seoul succeeded in extracting from the U.S. a commitment to delay a complete troop withdrawal until 1982. A joint statement, issued at the end of the meeting, stated that "the headquarters and two brigades of the U.S. Second Division would remain in Korea until the final phase of the withdrawal." In return, however, Seoul accepted the Carter plan to pull 6,000 American soldiers out of Korea in 1978 as a first step in the total withdrawal plan. The change in the U.S. ground troop withdrawal schedule gave an important psychological boost to the South Korean government. Seoul expects that the bulk of the U.S. ground forces, together with 7,000 Air Force personnel and sonme 4,000 to 6,000 troops involved in communications, logistics, and intelligence, would remain in Korea to deter a possible North Korean attack against the South. Pending congressional approval, Secretary of Defense Brown also pledged a $2 billion program of military sales, credits, and gifts to South Korea to build up the latter's defense. The Seoul government is concerned, however, that the probing of the "Koreagate scandal" in the U.S. may adversely affect the prospects for congressional approval of the revised Carter plan on ground troop withdrawal from Korea.




The Seoul government continues to strengthen the defense build-up by mobilizing domestic support and resources. As if to highlight the government's determination to pursue a policy of self-reliance and independent defense preparedness, the government-censored newspa- pers began to print items describing the awesome fire power of the South Korean Army, the production of domestically manufactured weapons, and the debate on the nuclear option for Korea. A third nuclear reactor activated in August 1977 has the capacity of generating 650,000 KW of electricity by the end of the year. The nuclear "wastes" accumulated from this and two existing reactors, when combined with the technology of reprocessing and purification of nuclear fuel, are expected to yield sufficient nuclear material to make South Korea one of the leading nuclear powers in the 1980s. Nuclear development and the use of nuclear power has thus emerged as one of the important issues for South Korea and for countries surrounding the Korean peninsula.35 The discussion of alternative plans for the Korean peninsula, including the establishment of a nuclear-free zone for Korea, has become ever more urgent in order to prevent the renewal of armed clashes between North and South Korea which next time may involve the use of nuclear weapons.

35 See, for instance, the Hankub Ilbo for June 14, August 14 and August 16, 1977.

YOUNG WHAN KIHL is Professor of Political Science at Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.



korea's future: seoul's perspective

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