juris'positionpaper'unlawfuldetainer

8/12/2019 Juris'Positionpaper'Unlawfuldetainer

1/8

It is established that in ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the

physical possession or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of

ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.

While it is true that both parties raised the issue of ownership over the subject property, yet it is

emphasized that in ejectment cases, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings,the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if

the former is inseparably linked with the latter, but such determination of ownership is not

clothed with finality and neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a bindingand conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of ownership. Therefore, the

judgment in the present case would not amount to res judicata in the other case which is the

pending Annulment of Dacion En Pago.G.R. No. 163495 May 8, 2009

SAMUEL MALABANAN,Petitioners,

vs.

RURAL BANK OF CABUYAO, INC.,Respondent.

Petitioner insists that the allegations in the complaint were not supported by sufficient evidence

to justify the remedy of an action for unlawful detainer.

He challenges the allegations of how respondent came "to possess" the subject property and

anchors his claim on the alleged simulated dacion en pago. To prove fraud in the execution ofsaid deed, petitioner points out that the subject property is formerly covered by TCT No. T-

265916 in his name while the subject of the dacion en pago refers to TCT No. T-255916,

registered in the name of Ledesco Development Corporation.

It can readily be inferred that petitioner is primarily asserting his ownership over the subject property. It

should be reiterated, at the point of being repetitive, that in an unlawful detainer case, the only issue to

be resolved is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property

in dispute. The trial court and the appellate court were one in saying that respondent had

overwhelmingly established its right of possession by virtue of the dacion en pago and the torrens title

Well-established is the rule that if possession is by tolerance as has been alleged in the complaint such

possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate, with the possessor refusing to comply with such

demand. Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, et.al., G.R. No. 111179, 4 July 1994, 233 SCRA 626.

A person who occupies the land of another with the latters toleranceor permission, without any

contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,

failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Ballesteros v. Abion,

G.R. No. 143361, 9 February 2006, 482 SCRA 23, 28.


2/8

The main issue in the case at bar is whether any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

Article 487 is a departure from the rule laid down in the case of Palarca v. Baguisi38 Phil. 177 (1918).

which held that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. As explained by

Tolentino, the law now allows a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, which covers all kinds of

actions for the recovery of possession, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, without the

necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted

for the benefit of all. Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the

Philippines, vol. II, 1992, citingSering v. Plazo, 166 SCRA 84, 85.

In the present case, respondent failed to present evidence to substantiate her allegation that a portion

of the land was sold to her in 1962. In fact, when petitioners sent a letter12

to the respondent,

demanding her to vacate the subject property, the respondent, in reply13

to the said letter, nevermentioned that she purchased the subject land in 1962. If the sale really took place, the respondent

should have immediately and categorically claimed that in her letter response. Clearly therefore,

respondent's submission that there was an oral sale is a mere afterthought.

it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542,

registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven claim that she acquired

a portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of petitioners

must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a

fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an

indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears

therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to

possession thereof.Caa v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines,G.R. No. 157573, February 11,

2008, 544 SCRA 225, 238-239.

InRodriguez v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 175720, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 642, 652-653.citing the case of Co v. Militar,G.R. No. 149912, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 455.the

Court held that:

[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the mosteffective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once

the claim of ownership is established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world

unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt12


3/8

statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the

first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for

cancellation of title.

Respondent first acquired possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance. From 1945 until the filing of

the complaint for ejectment in 1997, the nature of that possession has never changed. Petitioners

allowed the respondent to possess the property with the knowledge that the respondent will vacate the

same upon demand. Hence, until such demand to vacate was communicated by the petitioners to the

respondent, petitioners are not required to do any act to recover the subject land, precisely because

they knew of the nature of the respondent's possession, i.e., possession by mere tolerance. Thus, it

cannot be said that petitioners are guilty of failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time.

Further, after the petitioners gave a demand letter to the respondent giving the latter until November

30, 1996 to vacate the subject premises, which respondent failed to heed, they immediately filed a

complaint before the barangay authorities and, thereafter, lodged an ejectment case before the MCTC

on February 24, 1997. In sum, We find that petitioners are not guilty of laches as would bar their claim

to the property in question.

In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any

person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed

that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of

that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any timeas long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never

barred by laches.

Since respondent's occupation of the subject lot is by mere tolerance or permission of the petitioners,

without any contract between them, respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the

same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against her.

Arambulo v. Gungab,508 Phil. 612, 621-622 (2005).

In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion,18

a similar allegation

possession of theproperty in dispute since time immemorialwas met with rebuke as such possession, for

whatever length of time, cannot prevail over a Torrens title, the validity of which is presumed

and immune to any collateral attack.

In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns the property on the basis of Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 12892, which was "issued in the name of Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x xmarried to Nenita L. Songco." It is a settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jun2012/gr_182716_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jun2012/gr_182716_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jun2012/gr_182716_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jun2012/gr_182716_2012.html#fnt18


4/8

land is entitled to possession thereof. Hence, as the registered owner of the subject property,

respondent is preferred to possess it.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successionalrights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. Art. 960, Civil Code provides in part: "Legal orintestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lostits validity;

(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all property belonging to thetestator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the propertyof which the testator has not disposed;

xxx xxx xxx

But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and

safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to

prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is

usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare.

Handbook on Legal Maxims, p. 67.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any ofthe following cases:

(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the timeof its execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of thebeneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intendthat the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;


5/8

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of makinga will, at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence offear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, onthe part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrumenthe signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with formalities prescribed by law, to control toa certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. Civil Code

Art. 805.

The Attestation clause provides strong legal guarantee for the due execution of a will and insures the

authenticity of the same. Caneda vs. CA (41 SCAD 968, 1993)

Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the

Clerk of Court.

If article 806 is not complied with, the notarial will shall be disallowed. In Re: Testate Estate of Alberto,

L-11948, Apr. 29, 1959

Article 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in

accordance with the Rules of Court.

The plaintiff in forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions may be the owner, a co-owner, or his legal

representative and/or assignee, or the landlord, the vendor, the vendee or the person entitled to the

physical possession of the property. The defendant should be the one who is in possession of the

property, who may either be the lessee, sublessee or an intruder in the premises. (Tumabaga vs.

Vasquez, 99 Phil 1051

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;2. The subject is agricultural land;


6/8

3. There is consent;4. The purpose is agricultural production;5. There is personal cultivation; and6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the

parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or acultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless aperson has established his status as a de juretenant, he is not entitled to security oftenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government underexisting tenancy laws.Tiongson vs. CA, No. L-62626, July 18, 1984,130 SCRA 482. Cited in the case of Caballes vs. DAR,G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988.

Section2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is a party who stands to bebenefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of thesuit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must beprosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

In relation to the above cited provision is Article 487 of the Civil Code which providesthat anyone of the co-owners of an immovable property may bring an action inejectment. A co-owner may thus bring an ejectment action without joining the other co-owners, the suit being deemed instituted for the benefit of all. (Sering vs. Plazo, 166SCRA 84)

In the case at bar, petitioners' cause of action for unlawful detainer is based on their ownership ofthe land covered by TCT No. T-93542 and on their claim that they merely tolerated respondent's

stay thereat. Respondent's possession, as well as those persons claiming right under her, became

unlawful upon her refusal to vacate the premises. Petitioners contend that since they are the

registered owners of the subject land, they are entitled to the possession thereof and their right torecover possession over it is never barred by laches. They maintain that respondent's claim of

ownership is based on an unproven oral sale, which does not exist. Further, respondent cannot

rely on the Tax Declarations as she was paying taxes in the petitioners' name, as the declaredowners of the property. Moreover, she started paying the taxes only in 1984 despite her claim

that the property was sold to her in 1962. Even assuming that the sale took place in 1962,

respondent is guilty of laches as she failed to take any positive action for the delivery andconveyance to her of the portion of the property she is occupying. Finally, respondent cannot

collaterally attack the title of the petitioners to the subject land.


7/8

it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542,

registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven claim that she

acquired a portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens titleof petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is evidence of their

ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title

serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of theperson whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has aTorrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

1Caa v. Evangelical Free Church of

the Philippines,G.R. No. 157573, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 225, 238-239.4

A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute.

The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural

lessee of tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and

the land being agricultural is only one of them. (Anacleto de Jesus vs. Hon. Intermediate

Appellate Court, et. al., G.R. No. 72282, July 24, 1989)

The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangementover lands devoted to agriculture, and as previously mentioned such arrangement maybe

leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. (p. 49 of The Law on Ejectment and Leases, Manalastas, Ne

Revised Edition 2004, Manalastas)

The tenancy is not purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon

the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when thefarmer is installed, and their written arrangements, provided these are complied with and are not

contrary to law, are even more important. (Lea Paz Tuason vs. The Court of Appeals, Sixth

Division and Conrado Miranda, G.R. No. L-44817, November 19, 1982)

In the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is properly within

the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. (Isidro vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503)

Prior physical possession in the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer casebrought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld afterthe expiration or termination of a right to hold possession. . . . . Pangilinan v. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136, 144(1972), reiterated in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372, 383 (1994).

Settled is the rule that in summary actions for ejectment such as Forcible Entry and Unlawful

Detainer, the only issue involved is that of physical possession or possession de facto, thepurpose of which is only to protect the owner from any physical encroachment from without.

Garcia v. Anas, 121 Phil. 1040, 1042 (1965). Such cases are merely quieting processes, not

designed to determine actual title, being summary actions intended to provide an expeditiousmanner for protecting possession or right to possession without involvement of title.University
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_100424_1994.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_100424_1994.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_100424_1994.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_152423_2010.html#fnt14


8/8

Physicians Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 100424, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 86, 89.

It is a settled rule that the mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will

not oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction.Orellano v. Alvestir,No. L-22412, April29, 1977, 76 SCRA 536, 541.

The principal issue to be resolved in the instant petition is: Who between petitioner and

respondents has a better right to possess the subject property?`

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of

ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding

the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have theundoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of

determining the issue of possession.

13

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is

conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of

action involving possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has aTorrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in

support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of

title in the name of petitioner.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_100424_1994.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_100424_1994.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_100424_1994.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/apr1977/gr_22412_1977.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/apr1977/gr_22412_1977.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/apr1977/gr_22412_1977.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/apr1977/gr_22412_1977.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jan2004/gr_149912_2004.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jan2004/gr_149912_2004.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jan2004/gr_149912_2004.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jan2004/gr_149912_2004.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/apr1977/gr_22412_1977.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_100424_1994.html

juris'positionpaper'unlawfuldetainer

Documents