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8/3/2019 Johnjoe McFadden- The Conscious Electromagnetic Information (Cemi) Field Theory: The Hard Problem Made Easy?

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Johnjoe McFadden

The Conscious Electromagnetic Information (Cemi) Field Theory

The Hard Problem Made Easy?

Abstract: In the April 2002 edition of JCS I outlined the conscious electromag-

netic information field (cemi field) theory, claiming that consciousness is that

component of the brain’s electromagnetic field that is downloaded to motor neu-

rons and is thereby capable of communicating its informational content to the

outside world. In this paper I demonstrate that the theory is robust to criticisms. I

further explore implications of the theory particularly as regards the relationship

between electromagnetic fields, information, the phenomenology of conscious-

ness and the meaning of free will. Using cemi field theory I propose a working

hypothesis that shows, among other things, that awareness and information rep-

resent the same phenomenon viewed from different reference frames.

Key words: consciousness, electromagnetic field, synchronous firing, coherence,

hard problem.

Introduction

Field theories of consciousness are inherently attractive due to their natural solu-

tion to the binding problem. Using theoretical arguments and examining experi-

mental evidence I previously demonstrated (McFadden, 2002) that the brain

generates an electromagnetic (em) field that influences brain function through

em field-sensitive voltage-gated ion channels in neuronal membranes. Informa-tion in neurons is therefore pooled, integrated and reflected back into neurons

through the brain’s em field and its influence on neuron firing patterns. I pointed

out that this self-referral loop has physical and dynamic properties that precisely

map with consciousness and are most parsimoniously accounted for if the brain’s

em field is in fact the physical substrate of consciousness and conscious volition

results from the influence of the brain’s em field on neurons that initiate motor

actions. I therefore proposed the conscious electromagnetic information (cemi)

field theory:

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 8, 2002, pp. 45–60

Correspondence: Johnjoe McFadden, School of Biomedical and Life Sciences, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 5XH, UK. Email: [email protected]



Digital information within neurons is pooled and integrated to form an electromag-netic information field. Consciousness is that component of the brain’s electromag-

netic information field that is downloaded to motor neurons and is thereby capable

of communicating its state to the outside world.

The cemi field theory provides a simple and elegant solution to the binding

problem (without recourse to any new physics or metaphysics), and also pro-

vides new insights into the nature and significance of consciousness. It suggests

that processing information through the wave-mechanical dynamics of the cemi

field provided a significant advantage to our ancestors that was captured by natu-

ral selection to endow our minds with the capability to process information

through fields. We experience this field-level processing (through the cemi field)

as consciousness. Its defining feature is its ability to handle irreducibly complexconcepts such as a face, self, identity, words, meaning, shape, tool, or number, as

holistic units. All conscious thinking involves the manipulation of such irreduc-

ibly complex concepts and must involve a physical system that can process com-

plex information holistically. The only physical system that can perform this

function in the brain is the cemi field. It is through this mechanism that — I

propose — humans acquired the capacity to become conscious agents (Malik,

2000) able to influence the world.

A distinctive feature of the cemi field theory is the proposal that consciousness

corresponds to only that component of the brain’s em field that impacts on motor

activity. This does not imply that the brain’s em field acts directly on motor neu-

rons (which may of course be located outside the brain) but only that em field

information is communicated to the outside world via motor neurons. The site of action of the brain’s em field is most likely to be neurons in the cerebral cortex

involved in initiating motor actions, such as the areas that control speech, or the

areas involved in laying down memories that may later be reported via motor

actions (such as speech). Indeed, there is good deal of evidence (see e.g. Aarons,

1971; Paulesu et al., 1993) that all verbal thought is accompanied by subvocali-

sations (i.e. motor cortex activity accompanied by appropriate but normally

undetectable vocal tract activity). This informational download via the brain’s

em field avoids the pitfalls of most other field theories of consciousness that

either suffer the classic ‘mind–matter problem’ (a non-physical consciousness

whose interaction with the matter of the brain is left unresolved) or leave con-

sciousness as a ghost in the machine (somehow generated by the brain but withno impact on its workings). The theory also sheds light on related thorny issues,

such as the meaning of free will or the possibilities of creating consciousness in

an artificial environment.

The cemi field theory was an extension of the cem field theory outlined in my

book Quantum Evolution (McFadden, 2000). The theory has much in common

with the em field theory of consciousness proposed by Dr Susan Pockett in her

book The Nature of Consciousness: A Hypothesis (Pockett, 2000). Also in the

April edition of JCS was a commentary by Susan Pockett (2002) in which she

explored ‘difficulties’ with any electromagnetic field theory of consciousness.

The neurophysiologist E. Roy John has also recently published a theory of

46 J. McFADDEN



consciousness involving em fields (John, 2002). Since publication, I havereceived many comments and criticisms of the theory. I here demonstrate that the

cemi field theory is robust to these difficulties and criticisms. I further explore

the theory and its implications for our understanding of mind and free will, and I

propose a solution to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness.

What is the electromagnetic field theory of conscious experience?

Susan Pockett’s published commentary outlined several ‘difficulties’ with any

em field theory of consciousness. Yet despite these difficulties, Dr Pockett

remains supportive of the concept that consciousness is identical with the brain’s

em field, as outlined in her book (Pockett, 2000) and points out that she

attempted to publish an account of her own theory as early as 1995.In her commentary, Pockett claims that consciousness (or qualia) is ‘identical

with certain yet-undefined spatio-temporal patterns in the electromagnetic field’

(Pockett, 2002, p. 52). Since the nature of conscious em fields is left ‘undefined’,

an explanatory gap is left in her theory. This contrasts with the cemi field theory

that clearly defines the conscious component of the brain’s em field as that infor-

mation that is downloaded to motor neurons (either directly to drive actions such

as speech or indirectly to lay down memories that may later be reported through

motor actions such as speech). All other information in the brain’s em field is

unavailable to any reportable introspection and therefore cannot be equated with

any kind of (third person) reportable consciousness. In a departure from the

theory outlined in her book, Pockett now casts doubt on whether the putativeconscious em field influences neuron firing patterns.

The neurophysiologist E. Roy John has recently proposed another em theory

of consciousness. In his detailed proposals, brain em fields are involved in

recruiting neurons into reverberant thalamo-cortical oscillations that establish

resonating fields in the brain that correspond to conscious percepts. The theory

has much in common with both the cemi field theory and Pockett’s theory but, as

with Pockett’s current model (and contrasting with the cemi field theory) John’s

theory does not include a mechanism for transferring information from the con-

scious em field to neurons (other than recruiting neurons into a resonating field)

and may therefore be subject to a similar ghost in the machine limitation that

(I believe) afflicts Pockett’s current theory.

I: Three ‘Difficulties’, As Outlined By Susan Pockett

Pockett’s difficulty 1

Pockett here argues that the scientific validity of the em field theory is limited by

the inability to measure the properties of the brain’s em field in order to ‘test the

electromagnetic field theory of consciousness, by seeing if the artificially pro-

duced patterns can be reintegrated into the conscious field of the brain which

originally produced them, to allow a re-experience of the original sensation’

(Pockett, 2002, p. 53). I agree that the theory is currently limited by the lack of a

CEMI FIELD THEORY AND THE HARD PROBLEM 47



direct test but would argue that the test Pockett proposes suffers from the ghost inthe machine problem in relation to her current theory, but nicely illustrates the

differences between our theories. Consider a gedanken experiment in which the

inverse problem had been solved and it was possible to describe fully an electro-

magnetic field that — in a human brain — was associated with the quale of see-

ing a red apple. Consider also that an electrical device — a transmitter — has

been developed that is capable of generating that precise em field inside a —

receiver — human head. Pockett’s presumption seems to be that if the em field

theory were true then, the receiver should experience the quale of a red apple. But

if, as she suggests, qualia are associated with certain em field configurations that

are generated by brains (but do not necessarily download that information) then

the quale corresponding to the experience of a red apple may be experienced bythe generator of the red apple em field — the transmitter — not necessarily the

receiver (the brain). For the receiver to report a sensation corresponding to the

information in the artificially-generated field (the red apple), there would have to

be an informational transfer (download) from the transmitter to the receiver.

Pockett’s current theory lacks a physical mechanism for that transfer. In contrast,

in the cemi field theory, information in the em field is communicated to neurons

via the influence of electromagnetic induction on voltage-gated ion channels. In

the final section of this paper I discuss an experimental approach involving artifi-

cial intelligence that is similar to Pockett’s proposed experiment but would both

test and distinguish between our theories.


Pockett’s second difficulty points out that ‘there actually is no one-to-one corre-

spondence between electromagnetic patterns measurable at the scalp or the sur-

face of the brain and the conscious sensations experienced by the “owner” of the

brain’ (p. 53). However, I would argue that this is only a problem for em field the-

ories that propose an identity between the brain’s total em field and conscious

experience. Indeed, the issue highlights a difficulty with any identity theory

between the brain’s em field and consciousness. Since every action potential

generates a perturbation in the surrounding em field, the information flow

through the brain’s em field must be of a similar order of magnitude as the spike

rate of cortical neurons, about 1012 bits per second. But this is far greater than the

approximately 40 bits per second that are estimated to be involved in consciousthinking (Norretranders, 1998). Clearly only a tiny component of the informa-

tion held in the brain’s em field can correspond to consciousness so any identity

theory must find some means of discarding the excess information. In the cemi

field theory this is explained by the requirement for field information to be down-

loaded to motor neurons. In my paper, I showed that induced transmembrane

voltages are in the range of several microvolts up to about one millivolt. Neurons

will thereby only be sensitive to em field effects when they are within a millivolt

or less of the firing threshold. Since transmembrane voltages vary across approx-

imately 130 mV, very crudely, we would expect less than one hundredth of

48 J. McFADDEN



neurons to be receptive to information held in the surrounding extracellular field.The corollary of this is that most of the information in the brain’s em field will

not be downloaded into neurons. Therefore, in the cemi field theory, only a tiny

portion of the informational content in EEG or MEG signals would be expected

to correlate with consciousness. A one-to-one correspondence between perturba-

tions of the brain’s em field and consciousness is not therefore expected in the

cemi field theory. Although the failure to make a clearly verifiable prediction of

a correlation between the gross structure of the brain’s em field and conscious-

ness may be considered to be a weakness of the cemi field theory, the theory does

make many alternative predictions, as described in my earlier paper, and I

describe a direct test in the final section of this paper.

I should emphasize that the cemi field theory does not propose that conscious-ness is necessarily associated with amplitude, phase or frequency of the brain’s

em field. The defining feature is rather the informational content and its ability to

be communicated (downloaded) to motor neurons. This may, but may not always

correlate with amplitude or phase of em field perturbations. As I discussed in my

paper, regular EEG rhythms may have high amplitudes but contain very little

information; they have nothing to say.

Although a one-to-one correspondence between EEG activity and conscious

sensations is not a prediction of the cemi field theory, some correlation might be

expected. As discussed in my earlier paper, there is abundant evidence of this in

EEG studies of attention and perception. Indeed, electrical ‘microstates’ can

actually be identified by EEG that persist for about 80 ms (John, 2002), which is

a similar duration to the 75–100 ms estimated for ‘perceptual frames’ that definea ‘traveling moment’ of perception (sequential stimuli that occur within this

interval are generally perceived as occurring simultaneously). E. Roy John has

proposed that these electrical microstates are indeed the physical correlates of

perceptual frames (John, 2002).


The third problem raised by Pockett is a question of whether we should ‘expect

consciousness (i.e. conscious electromagnetic fields) to be a direct cause of

behaviour?’ (p. 54). This of course refers to the thorny problem of free will. In

my earlier paper I proposed that free will is our subjective experience of the

influence of the brain’s field on our actions. Pockett highlights two problems.Firstly, Pockett questions whether ‘spatial electromagnetic patterns, which by

their very nature quickly become spread and smeared by volume conduction as

they move through the brain, could maintain enough structure to affect neural

activity patterns in far-flung regions of the central nervous system’ (p. 54). I

would first point out that distortion of a signal is not necessarily a problem in

transmission. So long as the firing of any transmitter neuron(s) induces a repro-

ducible change in the extracellular field surrounding the receiver neuron(s) then

information can be efficiently exchanged between them. The only requirement

for information exchange is that a correlation be maintained (through the em




field) between the firing activity of the transmitter(s) and the probability of firingof the receiver neurons. Nevertheless, it is likely that, as Pockett argues, some

information will be lost from the field as the signal attenuates during its transit.

However, the cemi field theory accounts for this (as I believe Pockett’s theory

also can) by emphasizing the importance of synchronous firing of neurons as a

means of amplifying and relaying information in the brain’s em field.

Secondly, Pockett considers Libet’s classic experiments (Libet, 1993; Libet et

al., 1983) and later work (Trevena and Miller, 2002), that demonstrate electro-

magnetic ‘readiness potentials’ which precede voluntary movement by about a

second. Pockett claims that these findings ‘seem to indicate the lack of a direct

influence of consciousness on the brain’ (p. 54). I would argue instead that these

experiments demonstrate only that em field fluctuations in the brain are a neces-sary but are not a sufficient condition for consciousness, a finding that is entirely

compatible with the cemi field theory.

Consider Libet’s experiments in which ‘readiness potentials’ were detected up

to about 500 ms before the onset of awareness of the intention to perform a vol-

untary act (Libet et al., 1983). Since — in the cemi field theory — conscious voli-

tion is proposed to correspond to our experience of the action of the brain’s em

field on neurons, then the theory predicts that the field should be playing its role

in initiating the action in this period, about 500 ms after the readiness potentials

can be detected. Pockett argues that this is incompatible with a causal role for the

brain’s em field. I would argue instead that the action of the brain’s field is a nec-

essary step in the chain of events that lead to a voluntary action, and it is this input

from the field that makes those actions voluntary (unconsconsious actions lack this input from the field). However, the field’s intensity and dynamics will be a

product of preceding neural activity, involving perhaps the reverberant thalamo-

cortical oscillations that E. Roy John has proposed to be involved in recruiting

neurons into synchronously-firing networks (John, 2002). The events leading to

the voluntary action may initially involve only a small numbers of neurons that

generate a relatively weak field. This can be detected by EEG as readiness poten-

tials, but is unlikely to impact on neuron firing patterns. Although — in the cemi

field theory — this weak field may be associated with awareness (see argument

below considering the hard problem), the awareness cannot be communicable to

neurons and therefore will not be associated with any conscious state. However,

as the neural activity progresses and more and more neurons are recruited into asynchronously firing network that eventually initiates the action, the in-phase

field fluctuations will generate a stronger field that will eventually impact on

nerve firing (if, and only if, the action is voluntary). The impact may be positive,

to reinforce the action, or negative, to veto the action, depending on the influence

of the field on the target neurons. It is at this point — when our brain’s em field is

impacting on neurons — that awareness of the action is downloaded into con-

sciousness (in Libet’s experiment, to report awareness of intention to act). It is

interesting to note that the proposed activity of the field is entirely compatible

with the role that Libet has proposed for consciousness in providing a ‘veto’ for

actions that are initiated by preconscious neural activity (Libet, 1996). This is

50 J. McFADDEN



perhaps not surprising, since Libet himself proposed that consciousness is somekind of field (though not an electromagnetic field) that acts to reinforce or veto

actions that are initiated unconsciously (Libet, 1994).

So although readiness potentials precede conscious awareness, consciousness

(the action of the brain’s em field on neurons) still plays a causal role in initiating

voluntary actions. The situation may be compared with any causal chain. For

instance, it is generally agreed that the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand

played a causal role in initiating the First World War. This is not to say that no

other causal events preceded the assassination (e.g. the collapse of the Ottoman

empire) but only that, if the assassin had missed, the subsequent war may have

been averted. The distinction here is the difference between causality and what

Kanan Malik terms ‘agency’ (Malik, 2000), in the sense of ‘conscious beingswith purpose and agency, . . . we have the ability to transform our selves, our

natures, our world, an ability denied to any other physical being’. In a determin-

istic world, all actions have a cause (that can theoretically be traced right back to

the Big Bang) but I propose that consciousness — as the cemi field — plays the

role of agency in initiating voluntary actions. Whether this agency is viewed as

causal depends on one’s philosophical viewpoint, but unless free will is an action

without a cause, then we must expect it to be always preceded by earlier neural

events. Anything else is incompatible with causality. The only exception here

would be the possibility that voluntary actions may sometimes be initiated by

acausal quantum dynamics, which will be discussed below. Barring quantum

effects, in principle, electromagnetic activity may be detected minutes or even

hours preceding our perception of a self-timed voluntary action but will still belinked in a causal chain of events with that self-timed action.

It is interesting to note that an analogous difficulty arises with any neuronal

identity theory of consciousness. If conscious awareness (of the initiation of a

self-timed voluntary action) is proposed to be identical with certain patterns of

neural activity then those patterns of neuronal activity must have been preceded

by (caused by) earlier neural activity that was not conscious. In the neural iden-

tity theory it is not clear how the unconscious neural activity differs from suc-

ceeding conscious neural activity. In neural identity theory and in Pockett’s em

theory, the problem arises because conscious and unconscious neural processes

are proposed to involve the same physical processes that differ in some unde-

fined dynamic property. In the cemi field theory, that difference is defined.

II: Additional Criticisms and Comments

I now turn to various points, criticisms and comments on the cemi field theory

that have been made via emails and bulletin board messages.

Why don’t external em fields enter our thoughts?

I demonstrated in my earlier paper that static and low frequency electric fields do

not significantly penetrate the head and are thereby incapable of influencing the

cemi field. High frequency electric fields generated by cellular (mobile) phones




would be expected to penetrate the head more effectively (limited by the electro-magnetic skin depth — the distance in which the field is attenuated by a factor of

e –1 — which for the head is about one centimeter) but their high frequencies (in

the MHz or GHz range) make them unlikely to interact with low brain frequency

waves. As discussed in my earlier paper, low frequency magnetic fields, such as

those used in transcranial magnetic stimulation, would be expected to interact

with brain em fields and there is indeed abundant evidence for cognitive effects

of these fields (see for instance, Lyskov et al ., 1993).

If external fields are unable to penetrate brain tissue then endogenous fields

will be similarly attenuated

The fact that EEG signals can be detected on the scalp indicates that endogenousem fields do indeed penetrate brain tissue. The reason for this is that the major

source of EEG signals (and more generally, the brain’s em field) is not the firing

of single neurons but assemblies of neurons firing synchronously (as discussed

in my earlier paper). By firing in synchrony, neurons distribute and amplify field

effects.

Why aren’t artificially-generated em fields conscious?

The only place in the known universe where em fields occur that are capable of

communicating self-generated irreducibly complex concepts like ‘self’ (and

thereby persuading an observer that they are indeed conscious) is in the human

brain. Artificially generated em fields, such as the em fields that communicateradio and TV signals, are only capable of communicating the information

encoded and transmitted within their fields. They have nothing else to say. To

question whether they are either aware or conscious is meaningless.

Quantum mechanics and the cemi field theory

The cemi field theory proposes that consciousness is a wave mechanical system

whose dynamics will have much in common with quantum theories of con-

sciousness. This can be understood by considering an electron first as particle. In

this state, it’s presence or absence can store a single classical bit. However, the

same electron considered as a field can store a range of intermediate numbers

between 0 and 1 as a matrix of field density values. Both field computation andquantum mechanics are expressed in terms of Hilbert space, allowing field com-

putation to perform simultaneous nonlinear computation in linear superposition,

a capability that has been called quantum-like computing (MacLennan, 1999)

within a classical system.

But although not integral, the cemi field theory does not exclude the possi -

bility of direct quantum effects in the brain. I proposed in my book Quantum

Evolution (McFadden, 2000), that the most likely source of quantum effects in

the brain would not be microtubules (which have no established role in informa-

tion processing) but interactions between the brain’s em field and voltage-gated

52 J. McFADDEN



ion channels (with a clearly established role in information processing in the brain) in the neuronal membrane. Near to the neuronal cell body (where the firing

is initiated) the membrane potential is very close to threshold such that the open-

ing or closing of just a few ion channels may be sufficient to trigger or inhibit fir-

ing. Opening of just a single ion channel in vitro has been shown to be capable of

initiating an action potential (Arhem and Johansson, 1996). The precise number

of quanta of em energy that must be absorbed from the surrounding field to open

a single voltage-gated ion channel is currently unknown. The field has to push

7–12 charges of the channel molecule’s sensor towards the open position, but it is

likely that when the membrane potential is already close to the firing threshold,

very little additional energy need be absorbed from the field. Absorption of a sin-

gle photon is sufficient to initiate proton pumping by the bacteriorhodopsin pro-ton pump (Edman et al ., 1999). It is therefore likely that nerve firing may in some

circumstances be triggered (or inhibited) by just a few quanta of energy. If neu-

rons poised on the dynamics of individual membrane proteins are critical to the

initiation of a particular course of motor action or cognitive process, then the

consequent action or cognitive processes will be subject to non- deterministic

quantum dynamics. It is interesting to speculate on whether such un-caused

events play a role in human spontaneity or creativity. According to David Bohm,

Neils Bohr, the founding father of quantum mechanics, considered it likely that

‘thought involves such small amounts of energy that quantum- theoretical limita-

tions play an essential role in determining its character’ (Bohm, 1951).

The cemi field theory and artificial consciousness

The cemi field theory claims that consciousness is a by-product of an evolution-

ary advantage (field-level information processing) captured by the human mind.

However, there is no reason why similar advantages should not be captured by

artificial minds. In my earlier paper I suggested that an artificial consciousness

could be built if real electrical neural networks (rather than the simulated neural

networks in a serial computer) were constructed to ensure that their information

processing was sensitive to their induced em fields (see discussion in McFadden,

2002, p. 44). At the time of writing I did not know of any evidence to support this

claim but I have since been made aware of an intriguing experiment performed

by the School of Cognitive & Computing Sciences (COGS) group at Sussex Uni-

versity that appears to have (accidentally) evolved a field-sensitive electroniccircuit (Davidson, 1997; Thompson, 1996). The group used a silicon chip known

as a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), comprised of an array of cells. Elec-

tronic switches distributed through the array allow the behaviour and connec-

tions of the cells to be reconfigured from software. Starting from a population of

random configurations, the hardware was evolved to perform a task, in this case,

distinguishing between two tones. After about 5,000 generations the network

could efficiently perform its task. When the group examined the evolved net-

work they discovered that it utilized only 32 of the 100 FPGA cells. The remain-

ing cells could be disconnected from the network without affecting performance.




However, when the circuit diagram of the critical network was examined it wasfound that some of the essential cells, although apparently necessary for network

performance (if disconnected, the network failed), were not connected by wires

to the rest of the circuit. According to the researchers, the most likely explanation

seems to be that these cells were contributing to the network through electromag-

netic coupling — field effects — between components in the circuit. It is very

intriguing that evolution of an artificial neural network appeared to capture field

effects spontaneously as a way of optimizing computational performance. This

suggests that natural evolution of neural networks in the brain would similarly

capture field effects, precisely as proposed in the cemi field theory. The finding

may have considerable implications for the design of artificial intelligence.

Conceptual binding is part of the grand illusion, so there is no binding

problem

One of my main arguments in support of the cemi field theory is that it solves the

binding problem without resort to extra physics or metaphysical ghosts in the

machine. Yet it has been argued that the binding problem is a pseudoproblem

since conceptual binding is part of the grand illusion (Blackmore et al ., 1995;

Dennett, 1991; see also special issue of Journal Consciousness Studies, Volume

9, No. 5/6). According to the grand illusion hypothesis, visual scenes (or any

other bound aspect of consciousness) are actually as fragmented as the neuronal

information within our brains but our minds somehow fool us into thinking the

information is all stuck together. If binding is not a problem then the raison d’etrefor the cemi field theory is at least suspect.

I fully accept that our visual experience is not as rich as we naively assume and

the stream of consciousness may actually be closer to a dribble. However, despite

this, binding remains a problem even within the grand illusion hypothesis.

‘Change blindness’, ‘inattentional blindness’ and other cognitive effects indicate

that our conscious mind can attend to only five or six objects within a visual

scene but each attended object is a complex item whose informational content

must be bound within consciousness. This can be illustrated by considering the

familiar ‘impossible triangle’.

The geometric inconsistencies of the object are a property of the percept corre-

sponding to the whole object, not a collection of its parts. During the information

processing performed first by the retina and then by neurons in the visual cortex,

54 J. McFADDEN



information corresponding to various properties of the object (in this case justlines and angles but normally including colour, texture, shading, etc.) is stripped,

separated, handled and processed by thousands of distinct neurons. However, the

illusion only makes sense if this disparate information is somehow bound

together again within our conscious minds to generate a unified percept of the

triangle.

To further emphasize this point, it is illuminating to consider replacing the

neurons of the brain involved in processing this task, with people. We can imag-

ine an artificial retina that captures the same information than enters the human

eye and processes that information through a functionally equivalent neural net-

work as the brain, but with a network of people rather than neurons. Just as in the

brain, the information is dissected and processed by parallel and serial lines of feature detectors and information processors (in this case all people) by some

kind of signaling process (perhaps hand shakes) to generate an output — the -

terminal person-processor issues some kind of verbal report. This person neural

network could perform exactly the same informational processing task as

performed by the neurons in your brain and generate the same verbal report, but

who would see the triangle? Each person in the neural network sees only the signal

from incoming neuron-persons (a sequence of handshakes) that correspond to a

single feature — perhaps the thickness of one of the lines or its orientation. There is

no person-neuron that sees the whole triangle. No one is puzzled by the illusion.

The imaginary person neural network acutely illustrates the binding problem.

The network is constructed from conscious agents. It inputs information, pro-

cesses that information and generates an output, just as the neuronal brain. Just asin the brain, the information corresponding to the triangle is scattered and distrib-

uted through the network. Every component of the network performs its compu-

tation task but there is nothing or no one in the network that even knows there is a

triangle out there. At this point, neural identity theorists generally claim that the

percept is some kind of emergent property of the entire network (‘it is the whole

network that knows’) but I would argue that it is preposterous to claim that a neu-

ron or network of neurons could generate a greater level of awareness than a net-

work of persons. In the person network it is clear that there is nothing or nobody

that sees the whole triangle. The neural brain is similarly ignorant of the reality of

the whole triangle. It is only in the cemi field that the information gets bound into

conscious percepts.

III: The Hard Problem, Information and Frame of Reference

Several commentators have claimed that the cemi field theory does not really

address what Chalmers calls the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers,

1995); that is, to account for how subjective experience arises from objective

neural activity. I will briefly discuss how the cemi field theory provides fresh

insight into the problem.

The most basic property of (reportable) consciousness is that it must have

informational content. Information needs to be encoded within some kind of




physical substrate. A fundamental question regarding consciousness is thereforethe nature of that substrate. It is useful first to consider the physical substrate of

other kinds of information. Although it is often assumed that the information

transmitted in electrical circuits (such as in digital computers) is encoded within

the matter of the electrons that carry current down a wire, a moment’s consider-

ation will show that this cannot be the case. Signals in an electric circuit travel at

nearly the speed of light but electrons flow along a metallic wire much more

slowly, at the drift speed of about 1 mm/s. These facts are reconciled when it is

realized that the signal is carried, not by the electrons themselves, but by an elec-

tromagnetic wave that propagates the length of the wire (guided by the charged

electrons) at approximately light speed. So even in a digital computer, informa-

tion is encoded, not by particles, but by electromagnetic waves. Neuronal signals involve the movement of ions rather than electrons, but simi-

larly, neuronal information cannot be encoded within ions since they move per-

pendicular to the membrane and thereby in the wrong direction with respect to

information flow along the neuron. The information carrier along a neuron is the

em field fluctuation that propagates along the neuron: the action potential. There-

fore, even if we propose that consciousness is a property of neurons, the only

conceivable substrate for its information content is the em field of the neuron.

But, if it is accepted that the informational content of consciousness resides

within the em field of individual neurons then we must also consider that the

informational content of each neuron is causally connected, through the brain’s

em field, to the informational content of all other neurons in the brain. It is a

small step from this realization to the cemi field theory of consciousness.Yet it is still valid to ask: why is the brain’s em field associated with subjective

experience or awareness? Although it may be accepted that the brain’s em field

performs an essential function with regard to informational transfer and process-

ing in the brain, that function is logically consistent with a system that lacks

awareness. Where then does subjective experience (Chalmers, 1995) or aware-

ness come from? This is of course the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness.

Chalmers has proposed the ‘double-aspect theory of information’ (Chalmers,

1995) in which information is proposed to have two aspects, a physical aspect

and a phenomenal aspect. In this sense, subjective experience is a non-reductive

aspect of information, as fundamental to information as gravity is to mass. The

cemi field theory builds on this proposal to argue that awareness — whatChalmers terms experience (see, e.g., Chalmers, 1995, p. 201) and Block terms

phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1995) — is what complex information

encoded in em fields feels like from the inside. The experience of hearing middle

C is therefore what it is like (Nagel, 1974) to be on the inside of electromagnetic

field-encoded information that corresponds to the statement, ‘the acoustic vibra-

tion detected has a frequency in the range of around 256 cycles per second’. In

this sense, information and awareness are considered to be two aspects of the

same phenomenon (we could call it information/awareness) viewed from alter-

native frames of reference. Frame of reference arguments are familiar in physics

where an electromagnetic field may be experienced as an electric field from one

56 J. McFADDEN



frame of reference (e.g. stationary) but a magnetic field from another frame of reference (moving). Many other apparently disparate physical attributes, such as

space and time, are complementary aspects of the same phenomenon viewed

from different frames of reference. I propose that information/ awareness is

experienced as information from the reference frame of an observer external to

that information but is experienced as awareness from the reference frame of the

particles/fields that encode the information.

In this view, all information possesses an awareness aspect. But the nature of

that awareness is a function of the complexity and dynamics of the physical sys-

tem that encodes the information. It is possible to distinguish at least three levels

of awareness, depending on the dynamics of the physical system encoding infor-

mation/awareness. At the first level is information/awareness located with the particles of matter. A single electron, proton, atom or molecule may (from its ref-

erence frame) possess informational awareness but only of the very limited static

information encoded within that particle (essentially, its quantum wave func-

tion). A collection of particles, as in a single neuron of even a neural network,

may encode more complex information, but only from the frame of reference of

an outside observer . From the reference frame of any particle within the network,

it makes no difference whether it is in a brain, or in a bowl of soup; its informa-

tion content (and the awareness associated with that information content)

remains the same. Awareness based in matter, we could call it discrete aware-

ness, including the particles of neurons or the electrons of an electronic circuit, is

always discrete, limited, static and independent of context. It cannot encode

complex concepts such as ‘self’ and it cannot correspond to the kind of dynamicconcept-driven awareness that we experience as consciousness.

The next level of awareness is that associated with fields, which, in contrast to

particles, have unlimited capacity to encode complex information within a single

unified physical system. Complex informational objects, like faces and shapes,

and abstract objects like numbers or words, may be completely encoded (with all

their inherent meaning) within a single unified field. And from the frame of refer-

ence of the field encoding that concept , information will be associated with

awareness of the entire informational content of the object or concept. This level

of awareness, field awareness, may be associated with any system where com-

plex information is encoded in fields. But crucially, without a mechanism to

communicate with the outside world, this field awareness will be a mere ‘ghost inthe machine’. As discussed above, most of the information in the brain’s em field

is not downloaded to neurons. Without access to the motor system, these

non-downloaded em fields will be mute and cannot thereby correspond to any

third person reportable consciousness (although it may be interesting to explore

how far these fields may correspond to ‘the unconscious’). They are ‘ghosts in

the machine’. Since they have no phenotype, these fields will also be invisible to

natural selection so evolution will not have contributed to their structure or

dynamics.

The final level of awareness is consciousness, what Block terms access con-

sciousness (Block, 1995). This has the same physical structure as field awareness




discussed above — it is encoded within fields — but its additional defining char-acteristic is that it can communicate. This level of awareness is associated with

that component of the brain’s em field — the cemi field — that is able to commu-

nicate via its impact (directly or indirectly) on motor neurons and thereby gener-

ate reportable consciousness. In the cemi field theory, consciousness is field-

encoded information/awareness that can talk. And, crucially, the ability to affect

nerve-firing patterns endows consciousness with a phenotype that is visible to

natural selection. In contrast to discrete awareness or field awareness, the struc-

ture and dynamics of consciousness will have been honed by evolution to opti-

mize fitness of conscious animals.

I should emphasize that the three levels of awareness (information/awareness

experienced from an internal reference frame) discussed above are in reality thesame phenomenon — awareness — but with differing dynamics. The distinct

properties of discrete awareness, field awareness and consciousness are merely a

logical consequence of the dynamics of the underlying physical structures that

encode the information/awareness. No new principles are involved. In fact, it

could be argued that additional forms of awareness may be associated with infor-

mation/awareness encoded by further distinct physical systems. For instance,

although the particles of neurons are proposed to possess discrete awareness, if

those particles are able to enter quantum states (as proposed in quantum con-

sciousness theories) to generate a quantum field that can encode complex infor-

mational objects, then those particles may possess something analogous to field

awareness. Or, if electronic devices are constructed to generate light fields that

can represent complex information (as in optoelectronics) then the awarenessassociated with this light-based information/awareness is likely to have its own

distinct dynamics.

The cemi field theory proposes that consciousness is the inner experience of

information/awareness encoded in the brain’s em field. From the reference frame

of the cemi field, conscious actions are its actions — its influence on the world.

In this sense, agency (Malik, 2000) is the experience of influence on the world

from the frame of reference of information/awareness capable of encoding

meaning. Only human brains generate fields with this capacity and are able to

communicating these objects and concepts (although artificially generated fields

may encode complex information and transmit it to TVs or radios, they lack the

dynamics to communicate anything other than the information encoded withintheir signal — they have nothing else to say). That capacity — human conscious-

ness — may be the key evolutionary advantage captured by the human mind.

Discussion

As I emphasized in my earlier paper, the cemi field theory is based on the very

simple premise that em fields impact on neuron firing and may thereby contrib-

ute both positively and negatively to information processing in the brain. If this is

accepted (and, along with the arguments outlined in my earlier paper, the COGS

experiment described above indicates that field effects may at least contribute to

information processing in artificial systems) then natural selection will

58 J. McFADDEN



inevitably act to optimize field-level effects when they provide an advantage andminimize them when they are detrimental. Over millions of years, two parallel

systems will evolve: an em field-sensitive information processing system and an

em field-insensitive system. The cemi field theory proposes that these systems

correspond to our conscious and unconscious mind, respectively. I show here

that the cemi field theory is robust to criticism and is rich with insights and impli-

cations for our understanding of mind, free will and artificial intelligence. The

theory accounts for why consciousness is serial, why synchronous firing of neu-

rons correlate with attention and awareness, and why readiness potentials are

detected prior to conscious actions. Unlike many ‘theories of consciousness’ that

deal primarily with abstractions with no or little reference to the underlying

neurophysiological processes, the cemi field theory is firmly grounded in theneurophysiology of the brain without recourse to any new physics or new biol-

ogy. As well as making many clear predictions, the theory may even be directly

tested in the not too distant future, as I will now briefly discuss.

Consider constructing a supercomputer with conventional electronic architec-

ture but with the complexity of the human brain (perhaps achievable within a few

decades) and capable of communicating. Most AI researchers claim that con-

sciousness would spontaneously emerge in such a system. I would argue instead

that any AI based on digital circuitry will lack consciousness since it will lack the

influence of a field capable of encoding whole concepts. This in itself will be

testable (leaving to one side the thorny issue of how to detect consciousness) and

any emergence of consciousness within a digital AI will clearly disprove the

cemi field theory. However despite its predicted lack of consciousness, the elec-trical circuitry of the supercomputer will generate em fields with informational

complexity and dynamics similar to the fields generated by the human brain.

Such fields would — in the cemi field theory — be associated with awareness of

that information. Yet without an informational downloading mechanism, those

fields will be mute, and possess only field awareness. But it should be possible to

engineer the system to allow the information/awareness in the fields to influence

the computational process. If this were achieved then it should be possible to

evolve (as in the COGS experiment described above) a field-sensitive computer

that is capable of downloading its information/awareness. Such an AI will, I pre-

dict, possess a conscious mind. However, in the proposed experiment, it would

not yet be clear whether consciousness had somehow emerged entirely within thedigital circuitry of the AI or whether it truly resided within the em field. Fortu-

nately, within an artificial system, it should be possible to separate these systems.

Computer X could generate a field whose informational content could be down-

loaded into computer Y. In this case, the cemi field theory predicts that computer

Y, but not computer X, would be conscious.

The cemi field theory places consciousness within a secure scientific frame-

work that is amenable to experimental verification. The theory suggests ways to

engineering consciousness within an artificial system, potentially allowing

future researchers to investigate the origin and dynamics of awareness and

consciousness.




AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Greg Knowles, Chris Nunn, Anthony Freeman and Adrian

Thompson for their helpful criticisms and comments on drafts of this manuscript. I

am also extremely grateful to Dr Pockett for her willingness to engage in a construc-

tive discussion that has been particularly helpful in sharpening the presentation of

my own theory and clarifying our points of agreement and outstanding differences.

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