john jay hooker vs gov. bill haslam et. al

7/30/2019 John Jay Hooker vs Gov. Bill Haslam et. al.

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IN THE SPECIAL SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JOHN JAY HOOKER, et al. )

)

Appellant/Petitioner, ))v. ) Case No. M2012-01299-SC-R11-CV

)

) On appeal from Davidson County) Circuit Court Case No. 12C735

GOVERNOR BILL HASLAM, et al. )

)

Appellee/Respondent. )

______________________________________________________________________________

REPLY TO THE BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

SIGNED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ROBERT E. COOPER, JR. ON BEHALF

OF HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE ET AL.

FILED APPARENTLY WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE GOVERNOR OR THE

OTHER DEFENDANTS WHO MUST HAVE KNOWN UNDER THEIR OATH TO

SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION THAT THE WORD CHOSEN IS IN THE

CONSTITUTION AND THAT IT IS A SYNONYM OF THE WORD ELECTED,

WHICH WORD IS USED INTERCHANGABLY WITH THE WORD CHOSEN AND

THAT CONSEQUENTLY ALL ELECTED OFFICIALS UNDER THE PLAIN

LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTIUTION, INCLUDING JUDGES, MUST BE ELECTED

AND CHOSENONLY BY THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE STATE FOR THESUPREME COURT OR THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE DISTRICT FOR THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS AND A REPLY TO THE CLAIM THAT

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE JUDGES MAY BE ELECTED BY THE QUALIFIED

VOTERS OF THE STATE AND A REPLY TO THE CLAIM THAT THIS HONORABLE

COURT NEED NOT RULE ON WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES ARE

COMPETENT TO RULE IN THIS CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT

THE COURT APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT

TWO OF THE THREE JUDGES HAD BEEN RETENTION ELECTED

______________________________________________________________________________

BACKGROUND

The essence of this lawsuit involves the question of whether or not the Legislature can

make provision for the Governor to appoint regular judges both for the Supreme Court and the

intermediate appellate courts either for the full or unexpired terms, and therefore whether the


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retention elections statute, Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-101 et seq., which provides for a vote for the

judges to be either retained or replaced, is constitutional when tested against the plain

language of the Tennessee Constitution contained in Article VI, Sections 3 and 4 and Article VII,

Sections 4 and 5, which provisions require that Judges shall be elected by the qualified voters

of the State or the qualified voters of the Circuit or District, and Article X, Section 1, which

states, Every person who shall be chosen, and Article VII, Section 5, which requires that any

vacancy shall be filled at the next biennial election occurring more than thirty days after the

vacancy occurs.

No challenge regarding the election of intermediate appellate judges has ever before, in

any other case, been litigated, and consequently this case is before this Court as matter of first

impression. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge who held that only the votes of the

qualified voters of the District should be counted, which holding by the Court of Appeals is a

reason for the Application for Permission to Appeal. Therefore, this case is not subject to a res

judicata orstare decisis plea as it relates to intermediate appellate judge elections under Tenn.

Code Ann. 17-4-114 and Article VI, Section 4.

ARGUMENT REGARDING THE WORDS ELECTED AND CHOSEN

In accordance with the above cited provisions, the fact is that the Appellant asserted in

the Brief of the Appellant in Support of the Application for Permission to Appeal the following:

Any impartial analysis of the retention elections statute must

acknowledge that the statute provides for the appointment of all regular appellatecourt judges by the Governor, which circumstance is in direct conflict with the

Tennessee Constitution, because, on the other hand, the Constitution requires that

all appellate judges (as opposed to special judges appointed under Article VI)

must be electedand chosenby the qualified voters of the State or District inwhich they are assigned pursuant to Article VI, Sections 3 and 4, Article VII,

Sections 4 and 5, and Article X, Section 1. [See Appendix] Consequently under

the Tennessee Constitution, there can be retention election where the voters onlychoice is to retain or replace the judge, as under the aforesaid provisions, the


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qualified voters are entitled to choose and elect their judges both for the full

terms and the unexpired terms. How can any judge honestly and impartially say

otherwise in the light of the plain language of the cited constitutional provisions?

To that claim, the Attorney General responded in his Brief on behalf of the Governoret

al. with the following language. Brief of the Defendants-Appellants, page 20:

In construing a constitutional provision, courts may look to three criteria: the text

of the language used, the history of the provisions and similar provisions from

other states. As this Court has stated:

The text of a constitutional provision is the primary guide to the provision's

purpose. Cleveland Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Bradley Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 30 S.W.3d at

282; Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Term. 1974). We must interpretconstitutional provisions in a principled way that attributes plain and ordinary

meaning to their words, Barrett v. Term. Occupational Safety and Health Review

Comm'n, 284 S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tenn.2009); Gaskin v. Collins, 661 S.W.2d 865,867 (Tenn.1983), and that takes into account the history, structure, and underlying

values of the entire document. Cleveland Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Bradley County

Mem'l Hosp., 30 S.W.3d at 282.

All constitutional provisions are entitled to equal respect. Thus, when called upon

to construe a particular provision, the Court must consider the entire instrument,

Barrett v. Tenn. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 284 S.W.3d at787; State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tenn.1997), and must harmonize its

various provisions in order to give effect to them all. State ex rel. Higgins v.

Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 487 (Tenn. 1973); Shelby Cnty. v. Hale, 200 Tenn. 503,

511, 292 S.W.2d 745, 748^9 (1956). No constitutional provision should beconstrued to impair or destroy another provision. Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 792

S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tenn. 1990); Patterson v. Washington County, 136 Tenn. 60,

66, 188 S.W. 613, 614 (1916).

Estate of Bell v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 318 S.W.3d 823, 835 (Tenn.

2010).

Astonishingly, howeveruntruthfully, the Attorney General in footnote 6 on page 20 of

his Brief on behalf of himself, the Governor of Tennessee, all appellate judges of Tennessee, the

Speaker of both Houses of the Legislature, et al. apparently with or without the consent of

each of the aforementioned Defendants, under his own signature, makes the following charge

against this fellow lawyer:


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Mr. Hooker argues that the Tennessee Constitution requires that al l

regular judges mustbe elected and chosen by the qualified voters of the state.

Brief of Appellant at 9. It should be noted that the words choose orchosenare not used anywhere in the Tennessee Constitution but have simply been read

into the Constitution by Mr. Hooker. [Emphasis added.]

It is preposterous that the Attorney General of Tennessee would claim that the

Constitution, without discussing the claim with the other Defendants, does not include the word

chosen, and it is even more preposterousthat the Attorney General, on the contrary, did not

acknowledge that it does, and it is likewise preposterous that the Attorney General apparently

is not prepared to acknowledge that the words elected and chosen are synonyms and are

used interchangeably in Article III, Sections 1 and 4, Article VI, Section 3 and 4, Article VII,

Sections 4 and 5, Article X, Section 1, and Article XI, Sections 3 and 9 and that consequently an

appointmentby the Governor of judges who are supposed to be elected and/or chosen is

unconstitutional.

Furthermore, it is astounding that the Attorney General, under his own signature and

oath as a lawyer sworn to practice law to the best of his skill and ability, would claim that

this lawyer, under that same oath, has read into the Constitution words that are not there

when the fact is that, on the contrary, the Attorney General and his staff on behalf of Governor

Bill Haslam et al.either didnt read the aforesaid sections of the Constitution or, otherwise, the

Attorney General, it appears, must want to read the word chosen out of the Constitution, with

or without the knowledge of the Governor, in order to make the claim that judges can be

appointed by the Governor under the retention election statute in violation of the Constitution,

instead of judges being chosen in a contested popular election by the qualified voters as

the Constitution requires in accordance with Article VI, Sections 3 and 4, Article VII, Section 5,

and Article X, Section 1.


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Consequently, in reliance upon all the cases that the Attorney General set out in the above

excerpt, this Court is bound by that case law regarding the following statements: (a) a

constitutional provision is a primary guide to the provisions purpose; (b) this Court must

interpret the constitutional provisions in a principle way that attributes plain and ordinary

meaning to their words; (c) this Court must give all constitutional provisions . . . equal respect

and the Court must consider the entire document and the Court must harmonize the various

provisions in order to give effect to them all; and (d) the Court must observe the rule that no

constitutional provision should be construed to impair or destroy another provision.

Therefore, it is obvious that the retention election statute is unconstitutional because it

provides that the Governor shall appoint judges when, on the other hand, the Constitution

mandates that all judges be elected and/or chosen by the qualified voters of the State for

the Supreme Court and by the qualified voters of the District forthe intermediate appellate

courts, and that is in accordance with the cases relied on by the Attorney General set out in the

previous paragraphs. There can be no doubt that the words elected and chosen are used

interchangeably under Article III, Sections 1 and 4, Article XI, Sections 3 and 9, and Article X,

Section 1, read in harmony with Article VI, Section 4.

ARGUMENT REGARDING ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4

Article VI, Section 4 of the Constitution provides:

The judges of the Chancery and Circuit courts and of other inferior

courts, shall be elected by the qualified voters of the District or Circuit to whichthey are assigned. Every judge of such courts shall be thirty years of age, and

before his election have been a resident of the State for five years and of the

Circuit or District one year. His term of service shall be eight years.

The Attorney General argues that Article VI, Section 4:


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Confers excluded authority on the General Assembly to define what

constitutes a District and Circuit to which the judges of the inferior court are to be

assigned. In establishing the Court of Appeals and Court of Criminal Appeals,the General Assembly intended these intermediate appellate courts to serve the

entire State, although it authorized these intermediate courts to sit in sections or

panels of three judges. In other words, there is only one Court of Appeals and oneCourt of Criminal Appeals in Tennessee, as specifically recognized by Tenn.Code Ann. 16-4-113, which provides:

In order to expedite the trial and decision of cases the

Court of Appeals, when the court deems it appropriate to do so, isauthorized and empowered to sit in sections of three (3) judges

each, at Knoxville, Nashville, and Jackson, to hear and determine

cases just as though all twelve (12) judges were present and

participating, and the presiding judge of the Court of Appeals shallin such even have the right, from time to time to assign and

reassign the judges and sections.

Furthermore, the fact is that the appellate judges of Tennessee are assigned to three

separate sections; each judge is assigned either to the Middle, Eastern, or Western Section. For

example, Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins, in August 2012, was retention elected to the Court of Criminal

Appeals for the Middle District of Tennessee, where Judge Bivins resides and where he is

assigned as a member of the Middle Section Court of Criminal Appeals. In other words,

Judge Bivins is a judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals for the Middle District of Tennessee

sitting in the Middle Section of Tennessee. All the other Court of Appeals judges, both civil and

criminal, are likewise assigned to a Section, as evidenced by the fact that in the Tennessee

Bluebook the judges of each Section are listed by Section. While they are all pictured together

because they are all judges for the Court of Appeals, they are nonetheless assigned to the

Section or District where they reside. Judge Bivins resides and is eligible to vote in

Williamson County, thus he has been assigned to the Middle Section and would not be able to

vote for himself if he were assigned to any other Section. For the same reason that Judge Bivins

cannot vote in Shelby County, for instance, under Article IV of the Constitution, which requires


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voters to vote in the precincts in which they reside, Judge Bivins could not be a candidate for

the Western Section for the Court of Criminal Appeals as he can only be a candidate for the

Middle Section, where he resides and where he votes and to which he has consequently been

assigned. In other words, judges must be assigned to the Section or District where they

reside and vote. The evidence of that is there is no judge sitting on the bench in any Section

or District of the Court of Appeals who does not reside and is eligible to vote in that Section

or District. Otherwise, no intermediate appellate court judge could vote for himself.

The Legislature by providing for an at-large or a statewide election of appellate

judges, under Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-114, violated Article VI, Section 4, which requires that all

judges be elected by the voters of the District to whichthey are assigned and reside and

are eligible to vote. The word District has a universal meaning. As it is used in the United

States District Courts, the word District connotes a section of the judicial circuit to which

judges are assigned. The State of Tennessee cannot be a judicial District as evidenced by

the fact that there are thirty-one judicial Districts in the State of Tennessee, as there are

ninety-nine House of Representative Districts and thirty-three senatorial Districts. For the

same reason that the Legislature could not pass a law requiring State Representatives and/or

State Senators to run statewide, it cannot pass a law for intermediate appellate judges to run

statewide or for Circuit judges, chancellors, or criminal trial judges to run statewide. The

constitutional scheme and plan is for the Legislature and the judges, except the Supreme Court

judges, to be accountable to their fellow citizens where the office-holder and the voter both

reside.

Furthermore, the Legislature passed a law, Tenn. Code Ann. 16-5-103(a), which

provides that, The judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals shall be elected by the qualified


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voters for a full term of eight (8) years at the same time the regular judicial election is held in the

State of Tennessee for the judges of other courts of record. Furthermore, Tenn. Code Ann. 16-

5-102 provides that the Court shall be composed of twelve (12) judges, of whom no more than

four (4) shall reside in any grand division of the State.

Therefore, it is apparent that the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals must reside

in one of the three Grand Divisions of the State and that only those that reside in that Grand

Division can be elected and/or chosen by the voters of the Eastern, Middle, or Western

Sections or Grand Divisions.

As a consequence, the Tennessee retention election statute as it relates to appellate judges

is unconstitutional in violation of Article VI, Section 4 and as a result, the entire statute is

unconstitutional because the Legislature would not have passed a statute that applied to Supreme

Court judges only if the same statute that applied to the election of the intermediate Court of

Appeals judges had been held to be unconstitutional. Therefore, the opinion written by the Court

of Appeals in this case should be reversed. Moreover, the panel that decided the instant case

consisted of P.J. Herschell Pickens Franks and David G. Haynes and Donald P. Harris.

Notwithstanding, the fact is that two of those three judges, Franks and Haynes, were

disqualified because they themselves were retention elected and the constitutionality of the

retention election statute is the subject matter of this case.

ARGUMENT REGARDING RECUSAL

There is no more important concept under the Rule of Law than that judges must be

constitutionally competent in order to preside because if they are not constitutionally

competent they cannot administer Due Process of Law. The fact is that The People of

Tennessee have suffered for more than forty years because they have been deprived of their


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without jurisdiction as they willfully and intentionally, for their own benefit, violated the

law as a consequence of the fact that is undeniable that Judges Franks and Haynes have an

obvious interest in the subject matter of this lawsuit and said judges are aware of this fact

without being told by this lawyer or any other.

This lawyer, who loves the law and is A Friend of the Constitution, has been guided

in this matter by the opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the case ofHarrison v.

Wisdom, 54 Tenn. 96, 110 (1872). The Court in that case, relied upon the famed legal historian,

Sir William Blackstone, who said that the common law of England, which is equally revered in

this country, mandates that no judge maybe a judge in his own case, and if a judge is a judge

in his own case, that decision is void in itself. TheHarrison case proclaims:

The maxim [no judge may be a judge in his own case] applies in all caseswhere judicial functions are to be exercises and excludes all who are interested,

however remotely, from taking part in their exercise. It is not left to the discretion

of a judge or to his sense of decency to decide whether he shall act or not; all hispowers are subject to this absolute limitation, and when his own rights are in

question he has no authority to determine the cause.

As a consequence, the Court of Appeals, acting without competent judges to decide the

case, had no jurisdiction to rule in this case as the Court in the Higgins case, infra, had no

jurisdiction to rule in that case. TheHarrison opinion further says, and all who practice law

and all Your Honors at every level should know, that once the great office [of judge]

becomes corrupted, when its judgments come to reflect the passions or the interests of the

magistrate rather than the mandates of the law, the courts have ceased to be the conservators of

the common weal, and the law itself is debauched into a prostrate and nerveless mockery.


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With that in mind, this lawyer, under my Attorneys Oath, requests Your Honors to hold,

if Your Honors decide to preside in this case, that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is

void.

CONCLUSION

This litigant lawyer, under my oath to support the Constitution to the best of my skill

and ability- so help me God-proclaims as a Friend of the Constitution that the simple fact

is that any person or organization, whether it be the Governor, the Speaker of both Houses of the

Legislature, any Defendant appellate judges or for that matter the judges who decided the case of

State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 487 (Tenn. 1973) and State ex rel. Hooker v.

Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331 (Tenn. 1996), or others like the Tennessee Bar Association and the

Tennessee Business Roundtable who claim that ThePeople are not entitled to choose their

judges in a contested popular election just as they are entitled to choose their Governor and

Legislators in a contested popular election, has either neglected to read the aforesaid

constitutional provisions, like the Attorney General and his staff and each of the other

Defendants who filed the Reply have apparently neglected to read the aforesaid provisions of

the Constitution, and consequently do not know that The People have the right to choose

their judges like they have the right to choose their Governor and Legislators in a contested

popular election under Article X, Section 1.

It should be noted that the Attorney General issued an opinion, 09-74 at page 2 (May 7,

2009), which concluded that a yes/no retention election for Governor would not be

constitutional,based upon the wording of Article III. However, it is interesting to note that

Article III, Section 2 provides, the Governor shall be chosen by the electors of the members of

the General Assembly, [Emphasis added], whereas Article III, Section 4 provides, the


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Governor shall be elected to hold office for four years and until a successor is elected and

qualified. [Emphasis added]. In other words, the word chosen and elected are used

interchangeably as it relates to the election of the Governor and consequently, since the

Attorney General reasons that the Governor cannot be retention elected based on the wording

of Article III, it is hard to understand how the Attorney General differentiates between

gubernatorial elections and judicial elections and concludes that Governors cannot be retention

elected while claiming judges can be retention elected when under Article X, Section 1 judges

must likewise be chosen. In fact, under Article X, Section 1, all elected officials must be

chosen and therefore, it is obvious that retention elections for any public officers are

unconstitutional and, respectfully, this Honorable Court should so hold and restore, under your

Oaths of Office, the rights of the qualified voters to choose and elect all the judges of

this State.

Otherwise, in the alternative, if the Attorney General did not neglect to read the

aforesaid provisions of the Constitution and did know that The People have the right to

choose their judges like they have the right to choose their Governor and Legislators in a

contested popular election, then any ordinary person, in all fairness, could believe that the

Attorney General and the other aforesaid persons, including all appellate judges who are

Defendants in this case, for selfish reasons orpoliticalbenefit orunlawful purposes, have

determined, for their own benefit, to DISHONOR the Constitution and the Rule of

Law.

Furthermore, the retention election statute deprives the voters of each Grand Division

and/or the Middle, Eastern, and Western Sections of their constitutional rights under Article VI,

Section 4 and Article X, Section 1 to elect and choose their appellate judges. Local


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autonomy is the essence of legislative representation, and, even more importantly, it is the

essence of judicial justice, which is based on the idea that people should be judged by the judges

that residein the Circuit or District where The People reside, so that the judges can

be held accountable in a political sense by The People whose cases they have judged. The

fact is that the cases that come up from the circuit courts and criminal courts from the diverse

Sections, whether it be Middle, East, or West, are assigned to the District from which the

claims were litigated in the lower courts. In other words, Middle Tennessee civil and criminal

cases on appeal are decided by the Middle Tennessee Section unless there is some overriding

reason to do otherwise. Therefore, for the reasons set out herein, Judge Bivins, under the

Constitution, could only be elected and/or chosen by the voters of the Middle Section and

therefore, in accordance with the statute, Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-101 et seq., Judge Bivins has

been unconstitutionally seated and should be forthwith removed by the Legislature under Article

VI, Section 6.

Moreover, the decision by the Court of Appeals is void for the reason that two of the

three judges were constitutionally incompetent to render a decision because Judges Franks

and Haynes have repeatedly been retention elected and therefore have an undeniable interest

in the constitutionality of the retention election statute, Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-101 et seq., and

consequently, said judges cannot be a judge in their own case for the reasons set out above

and best stated by the holding in theHarrison case,supra. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted

that since the opinion of the Court of Appeals is void because it is undeniable that Judges

Franks and Haynes had a self-interest in the holding in violation of Article VI, Section 11,

Tenn. Code Ann. 17-2-101 et seq., and Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 2, then it would appear

that this Honorable Court must rule on the question of whether said judges are disqualified


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under the mandates of Article VI, Section 11, Tenn. Code Ann. 17-2-101 et seq., and Supreme

Court Rule 10, Canon 2 and if so, then it would appear, that this case should be remanded back

to the Court of Appeals so that constitutionally competent judges can be appointed to

preside in this case.

Otherwise, if Your Honors decide to proceed, the members of this Honorable Court

cannot honorably rely upon the decision in Higgins, supra, because the opinion in Higgins

was void because Judges McClanless and Chattin, two of the four judges comprising the

majority, had an interest in the subject matter of that case as they were potential retention

election candidates in 1974 and were therefore disqualified to address the constitutional issue

as the 1971 retention election statute applied to judges of the Supreme Court as well as to judges

of the Court of Appeals.

Nonetheless, Judges McClanless and Chattin did address the issue, and as a consequence,

the judicial tyranny that deprives The People of our constitutional rights continues to

haunt us today. It began with the 1973 holding that retention elections for both Supreme

Court and appellate judges are constitutional. Consequently, for forty years litigants in both the

civil and criminal Courts of Appeal in this State have been deprivedof Due Process of Law

and for that reason, this lawyer has spent many years in the public interest challenging that

circumstance. Regardless of the consequences, intended or unintended, the integrity of

the Constitution cannot by honest men and women be compromised without reauthorizing

judicial tyranny at the expense of the pursuit of happiness and the Oaths of Office of

judges and lawyers alike.

The Tennessee Business Roundtable, in theiramicus curiae brief, forecasts that there will

be chaos if this Honorable Court holds the retention election statute unconstitutional. That


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claim is based on the legendary rule that if a statute is unconstitutional, it is void ab initio,

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886), and under the case ofBoard of Education v.

Shelby County, 339 S.W.2d 569, 584 (1960), which held the existence of unconstitutional

legislation, for any period of time, even after the parties have accepted the same and had rights

determined thereunder by the courts, cannot clothe such invalid laws with the mantle of

validity. SeeEdwards v. Allen, 216 S.W.3d 278, 291 (Tenn. 2007).

Therefore, it would appear from the amicus curiae brief that the Tennessee Business

Roundtable prefers judicial tyranny to addressing the difficult problems that have occurred as

a consequence of that circumstance, which resulted from the Higgins decision. Unhappily, that

decisions was made by judges who dishonored their own Oath of Office for their own

benefit. Furthermore, it would appear that the Tennessee Business Roundtable, claiming to be

A Friend of the Court is urging the members of this Honorable Court to violate your Oaths of

Office and to perpetuate judicial tyrannyin order to avoid the forecasted chaos. However,

regardless of the consequences, the government of this State and The People of this State

cannot pursue happiness ifits judiciary is willing to turn away from the plain truth and the

integrity of the Constitution.

The Constitution is the beacon light of our republican form of government. What

would appear to the Tennessee Business Roundtable as chaos, can be addressed and, no matter

how temporarily painful, will be manageable. However, if this Honorable Court makes a

decision that enthrones the power of the Legislature to violatethe rights of The People to

choose and elect their public officials, which is the essence of democracy and is the

centerpiece of the Constitution, thereby ignoring the plain language of the Constitution and


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rendering it irrelevant, then the Rule of Law, in this lawyers opinion, is in jeopardy and may

not survive in our Great State.


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Respectfully submitted,

____________________________

JOHN JAY HOOKER, BPR #005118

115 Woodmont Blvd.Nashville, Tennessee 37205Phone (615) 269-6558

Cell (615) 479-6531

Fax (615) [email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been sent via First Class

mail, postage prepaid, to:

Janet Kleinfelter

Deputy Attorney General

Public Interest Division

Office of the Attorney GeneralP.O. Box 20207

Nashville, Tennessee 37202

William A Blue, Jr.

Constangy, Brooks, and Smith, LLP

401 Commerce Street, Suite 700

Nashville, Tennessee 37219

Jacqueline B. Dixon

Allan F. RamsaurTennessee Bar Association

Tennessee Bar Center

221 4th

Avenue North, Suite 400Nashville, TN 37219-2198

Patricia Head Moskal

Edmund S. SauerBradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP

1600 Division Street, Suite 700

P.O. Box 340025

Nashville, TN 37203

On this the ____ day of April 2013.

________________________John Jay Hooker


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APPENDIX

Tenn. Const. Art. I, 1

That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are

founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness;for the advancement of those ends they have at all times, an unalienable andindefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as

they may think proper.

Tenn. Const. Art. IV, 1

Every person, being eighteen years of age, being a citizen of the United

States, being a resident of the state for a period of time as prescribed by theGeneral Assembly, and being duly registered in the county of residence for a

period of time prior to the day of any election as prescribed by the General

Assembly, shall be entitled to vote in all federal, state, and local elections held inthe county or district in which such person resides. All such requirements shall be

equal and uniform across the state, and there shall be no other qualification

attached to the right of suffrage.

Tenn. Const. Art. VI, 3

The judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified votersof the state. The Legislature shall have power to prescribe such rules as may be

necessary to carry out the provisions of section two of this article. Every judge of

the Supreme Court shall be thirty-five years of age, and shall before his election

have been a resident of the state for five years. His term of service shall be eightyears.


The Judges of the Circuit and Chancery Courts, and of other inferior

Courts, shall be elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to whichthey are to be assigned. Every Judge of such Courts shall be thirty years of age,

and shall before his election, have been a resident of the State for five years and

of the circuit or district one year. His term of service shall be eight years.


Judges and attorneys for the state may be removed from office by a

concurrent vote of both Houses of the General Assembly, each House votingseparately; but two-thirds of the members to which each House may be entitled

must concur in such vote. The vote shall be determined by ayes and noes, and the

names of the members voting for or against the judge or attorney for the statetogether with the cause or causes of removal, shall be entered on the journals of


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each House respectively. The judge or attorney for the state, against whom the

Legislature may be about to proceed, shall receive notice thereof accompanied

with a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least ten days before the dayon which either House of the General Assembly shall act thereupon.

Tenn. Const. Art. VII, 1

. . . The General Assembly may provide alternate forms of county

government including the right to charter and the manner by which a referendum

may be called. The new form of government shall replace the existing form ifapproved by a majority of the voters in the referendum. . . .


The election of officers, and the filling of all vacancies not otherwise

directed or provided by this Constitution, shall be made in such manner as theLegislature shall direct.


Elections for judicial and other civil officers shall be held on the first

Thursday in August, one thousand eight hundred and seventy, and forever

thereafter on the first Thursday in August next preceding the expiration of theirrespective terms of service. The term of each officer so elected shall be computed

from the first day of September next succeeding his election. The term of office of

the governor and other executive officers shall be computed from the fifteenth of

January next after the election of the governor. No appointment or election to filla vacancy shall be made for a period extending beyond the unexpired term. Every

officer shall hold his office until his successor is elected or appointed, and

qualified. No special election shall be held to fill a vacancy in the office of judgeor district attorney, but a the time herein fixed for the biennial election of civil

officers, and such vacancy shall be filled at the next biennial election recurring

more than thirty days after the vacancy occurs.

Tenn. Const. Art. X, 1

Every person who shall be chosen or appointed to any office of trust orprofit under this Constitution, or any law made in pursuance thereof, shall, before

entering on the duties thereof, take an oath to support the Constitution of this

state, and of the United States, and an oath of office.

Tenn. Const. Art. XI, 3

Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed inthe Senate or House of Representatives, and if the same shall be agreed to by a


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majority of all the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed

amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals with the yeas and

nays thereon, and referred to the General Assembly then next to be chosen; andshall be published six months previous to the time of making such choice; and if

in the General Assembly then next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed

amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the memberselected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to submitsuch proposed amendment or amendments to the people at the next general

election in which a governor is to be chosen. And if the people shall approve and

ratify such amendment or amendments by a majority of all the citizens of the statevoting for governor, voting in their favor, such amendment or amendments shall

become a part of this Constitution. When any amendment or amendments to the

Constitution shall be proposed in pursuance of the foregoing provisions the same

shall at each of said sessions be read three times on three several days in eachhouse.

The Legislature shall have the right by law to submit to the people, at anygeneral election, the question of calling a convention to alter, reform, or abolish

this Constitution, or to alter, reform or abolish any specified part or parts of it; and

when, upon such submission, a majority of all the voters voting upon the proposal

submitted shall approve the proposal to call a convention, the delegates to suchconvention shall be chosen at the next general election and the convention shall

assemble for the consideration of such proposals as shall have received a

favorable vote in said election, in such mode and manner as shall be prescribed.No change in, or amendment to, this Constitution proposed by such convention

shall become effective, unless within the limitations of the call of the convention,

and unless approved and ratified by a majority of the qualified voters voting

separately on such change or amendment at an election to be held in such mannerand on such date as may be fixed by the convention. No such convention shall be

held oftener than once in six years.

Tenn. Const. Art. XI, 9

A charter or amendment may be proposed by ordinance of any home rule

municipality, by a charter commission provided for by act of the General

Assembly and elected by the qualified voters of a home rule municipality voting

thereon or, in the absence of such act of the General Assembly, by a chartercommission of seven (7) members, chosen at large not more often than once in

two (2) years, in a municipal election pursuant to petition for such election signed

by qualified voters of a home rule municipality not less in number than ten (10%)

percent of those voting in the then most recent general municipal election.

Tenn. Code Ann. 16-5-102


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The court of criminal appeals shall be composed of twelve (12) judges, of

whom no more than four (4) shall reside in any grand division of the state. Each

judge shall not be less than thirty (30) years of age and shall have been a citizenand resident of the state for at least five (5) years prior to appointment or election

under this chapter. The judges shall be duly licensed to practice law in this state.

Tenn. Code Ann. 16-5-103(a)

The judges of the court of criminal appeals shall be elected by thequalified voters for a full term of eight (8) years at the same time the regular

judicial election is held in this state for the judges of the other courts of record.

Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-101 et seq.

It is the declared purpose and intent of the general assembly by thepassage of this chapter to:

(1) Assist the governor in finding and appointing the best qualified persons

available for service on the appellate courts of this state, and to assist the

electorate of this state in electing the best qualified persons to the courts;(2) Better insulate the judges of the courts from political influence and pressure;

(3) Improve the administration of justice;

(4) Enhance the prestige of and respect for the courts by minimizing thenecessity of political activities by appellate judges; and

(5) Make the courts less political.

Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-112 (a)(1)

When a vacancy occurs in the office of an appellate court after July 1,

2009, by death, resignation or otherwise, the governor shall fill the vacancy byappointing one (1) of the three (3) persons nominated by the judicial nominating

commission, or the governor may require the commission to submit one (1) other

panel of three (3) additional nominees. Within sixty (60) days following receipt ofthe additional panel of nominees, the governor shall fill the vacancy by appointing

any one (1) of the six (6) nominees certified by the commission.

Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-114(b)(1)

If the declaration of candidacy is timely filed, only the name of the

candidate, without party designation, shall be submitted to the electorate in this

state in the regular August election. Each county election commission of the stateshall cause the following to be placed on the ballot:

.....................


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Shall (Name of Candidate) be retained or replaced in office as a Judge of

the (Name of the Court)?

_____ Retain

OR

_____ Replace.

.....................

Cleveland Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Bradley Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 30 S.W.3d at 282

Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Term. 1974)

Barrett v. Term. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 284 S.W.3d 784, 787(Tenn.2009)

Gaskin v. Collins, 661 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tenn.1983)

Cleveland Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Bradley County Mem'l Hosp., 30 S.W.3d at 282

Barrett v. Tenn. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 284 S.W.3d at 787

State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tenn.1997)

State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 487 (Tenn. 1973)

Shelby Cnty. v. Hale, 200 Tenn. 503, 511, 292 S.W.2d 745, 748^9 (1956)

Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 792 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tenn. 1990)

Patterson v. Washington County, 136 Tenn. 60, 66, 188 S.W. 613, 614 (1916)Estate of Bell v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 318 S.W.3d 823, 835 (Tenn. 2010)

State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331 (Tenn. 1996)

Harrison v. Wisdom, 54 Tenn. 96, 110 (1872)

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)

Board of Education v. Shelby County, 339 S.W.2d 569, 584 (1960)

Edwards v. Allen, 216 S.W.3d 278, 291 (Tenn. 2007)

john jay hooker vs gov. bill haslam et. al

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